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2000/05/30  
CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7

26 February 1953

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
Received from [redacted] Staff  
Administrative Office, Office Chief of Staff, a five-  
page outline of a talk given by Mr. Allen Dulles at  
the Pentagon on 23 January 1953.

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*Handwritten:* E.O. DDI

Document No. <u>8</u>
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS <u>S</u> C
Next Review Date: _____
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: <u>25 FEB 1980</u> By: <u>018015</u>

*Becker*I. LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR

History shows when two great alliances arm against each other war is usual outcome.

This historical precedent reinforced in present situation by:

1. Basic incompatibility of Western and Soviet systems.

2. Soviet pronouncements as to inevitability of war,

their suspicions of Western intentions and fear of encirclement.

II. FACTORS MITIGATING LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR

1. Soviet belief in Western collapse without war.

2. Historical Soviet caution to openly provoke war (contrast with Hitler).

3. Both sided possession of atomic weapons and possibility each side might receive knock-out blow.

III. FACTORS MITIGATING LIKELIHOOD EARLY WAR.

1. Soviet success in cold war.

*- Maybe shaken recently - K...*

2. U. S. atomic superiority - Soviet does not yet have "enough."

3. Apparent lack sufficient long range bombers.

4. Due to location our bases and atomic superiority, our "knock-out" might exceed theirs.

IV. WAYS IN WHICH WAR MIGHT COME

1. Deliberate Soviet initiation (unlikely at present time).
2. Soviet miscalculations in cold war actions.
3. Soviet reaction to Western action rearmament (Germany and Japan).
4. Accident in critical area--Berlin, Iran, Indochina.

V. DEVELOPMENTS THAT AFFECT LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

1. Soviet unlikely deliberately provoke war unless they feel able deal knock-out blow again U. S. and its bases, i.e., deal knock-out blow without receiving one.

2. Hence, will not deliberately move unless they have superior long range striking power which not the case today.

3. This situation might change if Soviet felt balance was definitely turning against them and that this could be righted by offensive action in Europe and Asia even at risk of U. S. attack.

VI. CONCLUSION - APPRAISAL OF IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Intelligence community does not anticipate early aggressive Soviet attack involving general war, but world in such grave condition that

VII. WAR WARNING MECHANISMS

Systematic and a current review of Soviet intentions and study of key war indicators.

1. Domestic purges (as before 1938).
2. Soviet propaganda (already at new heights against us).
3. Shift in industrial production to military production.

This largely a fact today.

4. Shift in character aircraft production from interceptor to long range bomber types.
5. Production of guided missiles. (In general should get some medium range warning use of these indorses nothing definite as to timing).
6. Atomic and thermonuclear production.

VIII. WARNING OF GENERAL WAR, ESPECIALLY SURPRISE ATTACK ON U. S.

1. Unlikely able to pinpoint surprise attack of Pearl Harbor type but might get some long range clue as to potential to make such an attack (assuming such an attack would be made with the use of forward observable bases).

2. We should get prior warning of ground attack in Europe or Far East, if attack on scale requiring mobilization or forward concentration of troops and supplies. (But this unlikely method of procedure).

VIII MACHINERY FOR SHORT TERM WARNING

1. WATCH Committee
2. IAC
3. 24 hour watch by coordinated intelligence services

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