

~~TOP SECRET~~

Security Information

Official Diary  
(Acting DD/I)

Wednesday, 26 November 1952

25X6A

25X1X7

1. Discussed at the morning meeting, dismal appreciation of the situation in Iran received from [redacted]. This led to general discussion 25X6A during which DCI asked for my curbstone opinion [redacted]. I gave as my opinion that any effort to unseat Mossadeq and to replace him with someone [redacted] would be more than likely to deliver the works to the Tudeh.

2. Briefed DCI on yesterday's Senior Staff Meeting regarding his proposals in letter of transmittal of the Summary Evaluation. He accepted the minor changes worked out in Paragraphs A and B and announced his determination to press individually for Council action on his C as revised by myself, [redacted]. He asked me to prepare a brief, pungent, oral statement to back this up. I did so, checked the draft with [redacted] and presented it to him together with brief set of notes. He accepted these and after reading the JCS memorandum, he appeared more determined than ever to press the point. Talk appended. 25X1A9a

3. Colonel Baird called and was very put out with DD/A's high-handed action in continuing the limitation of GS-11 and below in the terms of reference to the Selection Panel. Baird feels very strongly that when the Career Service Board voted 7 to 1 (General Morris dissenting), DD/A had no authority to ignore that vote. I told Colonel Baird I would associate myself with his protest. 25X1A9a

4. Showed DCI the O/RR-O/SI contribution to Air Force's [redacted] consisting of a detailed target map of primary areas to be exploited if the overflight-photographic capabilities envisaged in [redacted] are brought to fruition. 25X1A2g

5. At [redacted] 25X1A9a request, agreed to send L. Becker message regarding his activities [redacted] 25X1A6a about which State Department desk is somewhat concerned though fortunately ~~Mel Hendrickson~~ Loy Henderson put some stiffening in their backbone. 25X1A9a

6. Lunched with Loy Henderson and Kent, [redacted] Wisner, and [redacted] 25X1A9a Henderson is very frank and very useful going over much of the detail of problems that are still puzzling to the Board. He underscored the infiltration of the Tudeh in the Army, particularly in the junior officer and NCO level and said it was hard to distinguish between this and Kasharni's infiltration which was merely designed to stir up resentment among the juniors so that they would be amenable to national front actions against senior officers. He stated that the Ministry of Education was badly infiltrated back during the Qavam Ministry and no real attempt had ever been made to root out the Commies put in by the Tudeh Minister of Education in those days. He felt that Point 4, although acknowledged privately to do some good, was invariably a whipping boy in all public statements; that Kasharni was particularly vitriolic against it because of the female Moslems working under American Christians which to his low mind meant only one thing. Henderson was emphatic that unless America undertook some really substantial major public work that the Iranians would never feel that we had lived up to our Teheran declaration undertakings to "do something" for them in return for their "laying the carpet" in 1942-44. Suggested taking over the Kur River project which will produce hydro-electric power and create 750,000 acres of fertile land in what is now desert.

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25X1A6c 7. Conferred with [redacted] together with [redacted] on problems of liaison and co-ordination, brought particularly to light by incoming cable [redacted] [redacted] took detailed notes and undertook to prepare a memorandum for DD/P on this. It seems quite clear that the complaint was not of any local problem during the [redacted] but was a much broader general one of focussing the liaison between the operation of offices of CIA, both in Washington and the field, with the EDO offices---clearly a problem for DD/P. I agreed to act as an honest broker in bringing the two together.

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8. Conferred with [redacted] very briefly. He is troubled by O/NE's reluctance to be the point of contact with respect to [redacted] Vulnerabilities. I did not have time to explore the subject in detail with him but will do so the next time he is in town. He also had some concern with the O/RR overall program--although states it is directed to details rather than to broad concepts. He undertook to submit his thoughts in writing.

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25X1A6a 9. Conferred with [redacted] on the subject of high-level recruiting contacts. Discussed personnel in the [redacted] and briefly mentioned [redacted] as an ideal fellow for the Southwest. I stressed the point that this must be carefully co-ordinated with the DD/A people because while it was all right to spread stratospheric structure over the present personnel procurement, it would not be very sensible to have us create one and the DD/P offices another one to do the same thing. It was agreed that we would continue as planned by Mr. Becker but that once any of the arrangements in the various regions were operational, DD/P should be invited to submit its particularly difficult high-level recruiting problems to the same people.

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10. Attended PRC Meeting during which undertook for Frank Wisner to have a memorandum by [redacted] outlining his apprehension regarding Argentina's apparent tactics of nominally wooing US with a few liberal actions at home on the one hand while maintaining aggression on the the neighboring South American countries and acting as a conduit for Russian agitational funds on the other, reviewed by OCI and ONE, with the end in view of having an intelligence paper for the Department of State as armor against any naivete when Peron approached us for loans, etc.

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11. Sheldon reported a 3-1/2 hour discussion with [redacted] in which the most specific advance was the willingness shown by [redacted] to explore the possibility of having CIA take over his [redacted] I undertook to explore on a very sensitive basis what the reactions of Service and State would be to such an arrangement.

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[redacted] 25X1A9a