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Security Information

Official Diary  
(Acting DD/I)

Friday, 28 November 1952

25X1A6a 1. At morning meeting reported that the secure center for special intelligence in the [redacted] had been set up and was ready to go. Details are set forth in memorandum from AD/CI, dated 21 November, which is in the files. 25X1X6

25X1X6

[redacted]

25X1A9a specifically mentioned possibility of [redacted] now under clearance. Mean-25X1A9a while, alerted [redacted] and had AD/IC confer with him. [redacted] re-25X1A9a

25X1A9a reported to me later in the morning and suggested that because of the sensitive nature of such an operation it would not be wise to use someone until fully 25X1A2g cleared. They suggested that the [redacted] could wait awhile while 25X1A2g

25X1A6a of O/SI conducted the initial work [redacted] I in- 25X1A6a dicated that there was no immediate rush in terms of days and that the project could well be set for after Christmas. Meanwhile, DD/P shops are being alerted and State is querying [redacted] regarding contacts with [redacted] etc. 25X1A6a 25X1X7

3. At morning meeting, DCI in response to questions from DD/CI gave a brief description of the proceedings at the NSC on the 26th. Apparently, DCI did most of the talking, the others present not having read, with the exception of [redacted] the Joint Chiefs' memo or otherwise done their homework. DCI characterized the 25X1A9a

25X1A9a Joint Chiefs' memo as "silly" and got some degree of agreement as to this from [redacted] The action taken approved the recommendations of the Senior Staff but did not include any action on the Director's larger project. The President apparently concluded the discussion with the suggestion that DCI will see if he can work things out with the JCS. DCI went on to comment that he thought a good approach henceforth would be through [redacted] who seemed to have some understanding of the 25X1A9a problem. In response to my question, he indicated that we should move right ahead with the staff work necessary to implement Paragraph B, i. e., the terms of reference for summary evaluation and machinery for "such an estimate" which I once more pointed out could be very broadly interpreted. 25X1A2g

4. Presented O/NE Board final version of [redacted] with the thought that DCI might wish to discuss it with Eisenhower. He only said he would read it and consider the matter. He also did not give me any indication as to whether he wishes this to be co-ordinated with the IAC.

5. Explained that it was none of my business but that I felt extremely concerned about the matter; I presented DCI with a page and a half memorandum of my ideas for a prompt and decisive solution to crisis in Iran. (Memo appended.) 25X1A9a

6. Talked briefly with [redacted] about the necessity of cutting O/SI and O/RR in the Agency discussion of the Board of Estimates Program for 1953, and I told him I had found several instances where I thought the deadlines had been set too early and urged the necessity of making haste slowly so as to get good substance on the critical estimates.

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7. Attended USCIB Meeting. Sheldon attended as CIA delegate and in General Smith's absence, General Canine presided. At the end of the old USCIB Meeting, the FBI individuals politely, but dramatically, left the room. Off the record, Sheldon briefed the other members present on the developments with respect to Mr. Hoover's protest, the committee's counter-offer, and present impasse.

25X1A9a

8. [redacted] and I went over the NSC action with respect to the summary evaluation. Expressed the desirability of proceeding immediately to outline best possible terms of reference, including intabular form the detailed percentage of destruction estimates under various assumptions as to weapons available and delivered on target. When such terms of reference have been refined, it will then be appropriate to consider who can best answer the questions posed, and out of that consideration, to develop machinery aspects of the NSC decision.

9. Conferred with Mr. Sheldon on the following points:

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Mentioned [redacted] apprehensions about Argentine actions and Sheldon agreed to have OCI review and comment on them. Apprised him of the possibility that we might want to go even further and produce a special estimate for the incoming Secretary of State.

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Discussed the advantages of [redacted] as against its weaknesses and the mechanical difficulties of making sure it was good enough to circulate more broadly than it is now. Also outlined to him my idea of a weekly "financial statement" type of summary of how U. S. interests had fared in the world on a debit and credit basis.

25X1A9a

Discussed [redacted] memorandum on new types of coaxial cable and possibility of the bloc's obtaining this and thereby enabling itself to curtail drastically its radio communications. This will be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities including [redacted]

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Continued on discussion of OCI's participation in estimating process. Sheldon still somewhat skeptical but agreed to send a representative to the initial meeting next Tuesday on SE-34 - Albanian coup prospects.

25X6A

10. Attended OCI briefing on French [redacted] and Saar political situations.

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25X1A9a 11. Upon advice of [redacted] and after consultation with [redacted] suggested 25X1A9a  
25X1A9a that he wire [redacted] reaction to the [redacted] 25X1X6  
possibility. Left to [redacted] question as to whether CIA man should consult  
with Congen or not.

[redacted] 25X1A9a