


GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



CIA/RR-MR-51

January 1957



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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^{*}The individual classification of each article in this Review is given at the end of the article.

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Task Force 90, some 861,700 refugees successfully escaped from Communist North Vietnam. These refugees, comprising 676,000 Catholics, 184,000 Buddhists, and 1,400 Protestants, have passed the "point of no return" as far as the Communist Viet Minh regime of North Vietnam is concerned. Almost certain imprisonment or death would await them at the hands of the Viet Minh. Diem can expect these people as a whole to remain staunchly loyal to him; and he, in turn, will make them the main component of his resettlement plans.

The refugees have been settled either in temporary refugee centers or in more permanent villages. Usually the entire population of a former North Vietnamese village remains together. The locations of 153 refugee centers or villages are shown on a set of 8 annotated maps at the scale of 1:400,000,* recently received from Saigon. These maps are keyed to a text that gives the number of refugees and houses in each village. Since most of these people had their first contact with Americans on board ships of Task Force 90, where the harassed refugees received sympathetic treatment from American sailors, a residue of gratitude toward Americans undoubtedly remains. Consequently the maps have a special strategic value because they give the location of villages that may be expected to be friendly to the United States in case of future emergencies.

It was from these refugee villages that Diem, in January 1956, called for 100,000 volunteers for one of his most important projects --

^{*}CIA Map Library Call No. 51141.

"PHASE II" IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Since 1954, when Ngo Dinh Diem was called upon to form a government for South Vietnam, he has concentrated his efforts on building a strong central government and obtaining security for his people. In Diem's thinking, these goals constituted "Phase I." The recent execution of Ba Cut, notorious leader of the dissident Hoa Hao sect, may be cited as a symbol of Diem's success in nearing the completion of Phase I.

Diem has now turned his attention to "Phase II," the revitalization of the economy of South Vietnam, which has been traditionally agricultural. Much of the emphasis from now on will, therefore, be placed upon land distribution, the resettlement of abandoned ricelands, and the opening of new ricelands. Essentially, this will involve the relocation of many families. The strategic value of the program is twofold: (1) the security of the more sparsely settled, inaccessible areas will be strengthened by settlement of people loyal to Diem's government, and (2) Communist propaganda based on maldistribution of land will become less effective as a landed peasantry is established.

Adding to Diem's burden has been the influx of refugees from

North Vietnam. What started in July 1954 as a trickle of refugees

rapidly grew into a flood and became known as "Operation Exodus."

Chiefly through the assistance of the French Air Force and U.S. Navy

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drawback is that the waterway is navigable only for ships up to 200 tons.

The Elbe-Baltic Canal project is in itself an indication that responsible East German quarters do not expect German reunification within the foreseeable future. On the other hand, there is a possibility that the canal will never be completed. In the event of German unification the construction of the canal at an estimated cost of 150 to 350 million marks (East) would be an expensive and unnecessary duplication of existing facilities. Another major obstacle is the fact that calculations indicate that more water is required to supply the canal at full capacity than is actually available. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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dredging of a 3-meter-deep channel through Schweriner See and the enlargement of the Stör and Elde waterways.

The possibility of connecting the Magdeburg area of Sachsen (Saxony) and the Czechoslovak industrial region with the Baltic Sea through the old Elde Canal from Dömitz to Grabow as also been considered. This connection, however, has several disadvantages:

(1) the Elde Canal in this area is navigable only by ships up to 270 tens, (2) boats must pass through seven inadequate looks, and (3) the left bank of the Elbe between Schnackenturg and Dömitz is in the Federal Republic of Germany. The last is particularly unfavorable to East Germany, since it would permit observation of East German shipping by the West, as well as offering a means of defection. For these reasons, preference has been given to the construction of a new canal between the Elbe and Grabow rather than to improving the lower Elde canal system.

The exact location of the third section is still to be decided.

Two proposals are being considered: (1) a 45-kilometer (27.9-mile)

stretch between Wittenberge and Grabow and (2) a cut-off from the

Elbe a short distance from the zonal border near Kumlosen. The latter

is more likely to be adopted because it is only 25 to 30 kilometers

(15.5-18.6 miles) long, which is appreciably shorter than the

Wittenberge-Grabow route. It would also have a connection with the

canal system of the Berlin area by way of the upper Elde Canal, the

lake country of Mecklenburg, and the upper Havel River. The principal

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



Figure 2. A port scene at Alter Hafen, Wismar.

Figure 3. A 295-foot passenger ship and a 400-ton floating dock at the Mathias Thesen shipyard at Wismar.



also considered the most difficult of the entire project because a difference in elevation of 38.8 meters (127.3 feet) must be overcome. To solve this problem, East German engineers have planned four specially designed locks, which will, also make possible the construction of a hydroelectric plant to help supply the rapidly increasing power demands of the two port cities of Wismar and Rostock.

A sharp increase in westbound traffic through these Baltic ports during the past year has resulted largely from the modernization of the port of Wismar (see Figure 3 and accompanying town plan). The basin of the port, which was 5.5 meters (18 feet) deep before World War II, has been dredged to a depth of 8.5 meters (28 feet) and is now capable of receiving deep-draft vessels. Oil-storage tanks have also been constructed, and 10,000-ton tankers can be unloaded at Wismar. The East Germans plan to improve the port of Wismar still further during the construction of the canal. Eventually Wismar is to have the same transshipment capacity as Lübeck, or 2.5 million tons. A major deficiency of the port, which would in large part be corrected by the building of a new canal, is its dependence upon the single-track Wismar-Ludwigslust-Wittenberge-Magdeburg railroad, over which all materials must be transported to and from the Middle German industrial centers.

The second section of the canal, which runs from Schweriner See to Grabow, is scheduled for completion at the same time as the first section and will have five locks. Construction work involves the

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(C), and industrial (D) the center is the Mathias Thesen shipyards (X) , coal Wismar showing the lumber the port the old harbor of view 1. Aerial We11 Figure l

PROPOSED EAST GERMAN ELBE-BALTIC CANAL


The East German Government is currently taking steps that will upset the established order of the German inland waterways system.

As part of the Second Five-Year Plan, authorities are constructing a canal 116 kilometers (72.1 miles) long to connect the Elbe River with the Baltic port of Wismar (Figure 1).


The new canal, which has been under consideration for years, will bypass the existing Elbe-Trave Canal from Lauenburg to the port of Lübeck and will make East Germany (the Soviet Zone) independent of the West German ports. Thus Hamburg and Lübeck will be effectively cut off from their East German and Czech hinterlands. Completion of the waterway would also put East Germany in the favorable position of being able to interfere with shipping crossing the interzonal boundary from the west without running the risk of retaliation.

According to reports, the canal is to run from the Elbe near Kumlosen to Grabow, then follow the Elde canal system to the mouth of the Stör Canal, continue through the Stör Canal into Schweriner See, and from there extend east of Bad Kleinen along the so-called Wallenstein Graben to Wismar (see Figure 2 and accompanying sketch map). The canal, which is to be 30 meters (98.4 feet) wide and 3 meters (9.8 feet) deep, will be capable of handling 1,000-ton craft.

The first section of the canal, between Wismar and Schweriner See, is the most northerly. This 15-kilometer (9.3-mile) section is



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the settlement and redevelopment of an estimated 190,000 acres of abandoned riceland in the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen area. The success of this project is of prime importance to Diem, but its failure might have peculiar bearing on U.S. prestige in Southeast Asia. If the project succeeds, Diem's government will take credit for it; if it fails the magnitude of the failure would undoubtedly affect the stability of his government. The United States, which has backed the project financially and technically, would probably be the scapegoat in case of failure, and repercussions against the entire U.S. policy in Southeast Asia could probably be expected. That the Communists are fully aware of the value of the project is indicated by the barrage of propaganda directed against it from Hanoi, and by the fact that some 20 armed persons, presumably Viet Minh agents, were apprehended in the area in early July 1956.

The Rach Gia-Long Xuyen area (see accompanying Map 25619) is part of the broad, flat flood plain of the Mekong delta. Its horizon is broken only in the northwest, where the Seven Mountains near the Cambodian border are visible. The years of war between the French and Viet Minh had depleted the area of most of its population, and both landlords and tenants had moved to areas of greater security. Consequently, in early January 1956 the area presented a vista of huge tracts of idle land, generally grass covered, where agriculture was still very hazardous because of the presence of rebels such as Ba Cut's dissidents and possibly Viet Minh elements. In one district,

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Ten Hiep, less than 5 percent of a total of 11,000 hectares was being cultivated.

By February 1956, hundreds of refugee settlers had arrived in the area. High priority was given to the improvement of the canal network, since the canals are the chief means of communication and their banks provide the only housing sites that are not subject to flooding in the rainy season. Concurrently, houses were erected and the land was plowed in readiness for sowing before the monsoon began. By early July the number of settlers had grown to 37,500, some 125 miles of canals had been completed, 7,108 houses and 157 temporary long-house structures had been erected, and almost 30,000 acres of land were ready for planting. Individual family plots of about 7-1/2 acres had been allotted to many of the families.

Although the original goal of settling 100,000 refugees and preparing almost 200,000 acres of land before the advent of the monsoon was not reached, progress has been great enough to provide a definite impetus for continuing the resettlement of this vast area. With a settled population the area will no longer be open to Viet Minh elements, and as the land-distribution plan progresses the combination of new settlers and the formerly landless indigenous peasantry of the area will no longer comprise a "real proletariat," to use Diem's words, and will become less and less susceptible to the "promises" of Communist propaganda.

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The degree of success achieved in the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen project to date has engendered a definite pride of accomplishment among responsible Vietnamese officials and has reinforced their reported determination to make a complete success of the project. Such an atmosphere augurs well for the completion of Phase II -- the attainment of a viable economy throughout South Vietnam. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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REORGANIZATION OF YUGOSIAV LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

The most complete reorganization of Yugoslav local administrative units since World War II took place on 22 June 1955. Existing secondand third-order units* -- srezovi (districts) and opstina (communes) -were enlarged and thereby reduced in number. Whereas there were formerly 329 districts, there are now 107; and the number of communes has been reduced from 3,904 to 1,479. The outlines of the new districts are shown on the accompanying map (25465). From information now available** it is possible to assess the extent of the changes at the district level. Apparently a complete realignment of administrative boundaries was made, rather than a simple merging of former districts. Only 11 of the new districts were formed solely by amalgamation of former districts; the others have newly delineated boundaries. The enlarged communes each contain several villages. Details regarding the areas contained within the new communes are lacking; thus, it is not known whether the reorganization of communes involved the regrouping of old units or a completely new alignment of boundaries.

^{*}The Yugoslav state is federal in form, the constituent members of the federation being 6 republics. Within the Republic of Serbia there are 2 autonomous areas. The 6 republics and the 2 autonomous areas constitute the first-order administrative units of the country, and their boundaries have remained substantially unaltered since shortly after World War II. In the table on p. , the current districts of Yugoslavia are listed under the appropriate first-order units.

**Statisticki Godišnjak, 1956.

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This latest territorial reorganization appears to represent an attempt to form units that are both politically and economically functional in accordance with Communist -- and particularly with Yugoslav Communist -- theories of area administration. In Yugoslavia, the significance of the changes has been obscured by a great deal of theoretical discussion; in the following analysis an attempt has been made to present some of the salient factors underlying the reorganization.

Communist territorial-administrative units of many types may be considered as economic regions, since they function in the economic activities of the state. By contrast, in the system found in capitalist societies, economic enterprises operate to a large extent independently of the civil divisions of the country. In discussing economic regionalization in Communist countries, it is desirable to distinguish between "nodal" regions and "uniform" regions. A nodal region is an area dependent upon and serving one important city or town. This central place is the transportation hub and the heart of economic activity of the region. Economic activities within the region may vary widely and may complement each other. The region thus may be self sufficient to a considerable degree. A uniform region is one characterized throughout its various parts by a distribution of some common element; for example, a region having a uniformly high production of wheat, or a region in which coal mining is the dominant activity.

Under the administrative system developed in the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's, the second-order territorial units or oblasts are theoretically nodal regions with locally important urban centers as their seats of administration. The placing of the local administrative apparatus in centers of population and industry during the early days of the Soviet regime not only facilitated economic planning and execution but also helped to consolidate power in the hands of the urban workers to the detriment of the rural population, whose loyalty to the regime was considered more questionable. Following World War II the Soviet system of nodal regions was copied in several of the European Satellite countries.

After a long period of experimentation and the creation and abolition of various types of second-order administrative units, the Yugoslavs have created a system which is comprised of districts that are essentially nodal regions similar in structure to the original Soviet concept of the oblast. The nodal character of the districts is pointed up on the accompanying map, which shows the district boundaries superimposed on the terrain and the transportation network. Within each district, transportation routes focus on a large city or town, and the boundaries in many cases follow topographic or drainage features. In the more isolated mountain areas, where population is sparse and economic development low, the districts are larger than in the more densely populated areas. For the most part, each of the new districts is somewhat varied in its economic activities, consisting as

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it does of an industrial or commercial focal point and a rural hinterland. The districts are therefore more nearly balanced in terms of transportation, population, and revenue than their predecessors, and so are perhaps better suited for the regional development of economic activities.

On the other hand, although the districts are nodal in form, many of them are similar in content to regions of uniformity. From the statistics given in the table accompanying this article, four types of regions that approach uniformity can be delimited: (1) industrial areas with a high proportion of both nonagricultural population and nonagricultural revenue, such as Kranj (Slovenia), Zenica (Bosnia), and Belgrade; (2) districts with a low proportion of both nonagricultural population and revenue, which are well developed agriculturally, such as those in the Vojvodina; (3) districts with a low proportion of both nonagricultural population and revenue, in which farming is at subsistence level and industrial development is slight or nonexistent, such as Prokuplje (Serbia); and (4) districts with a low proportion of nonagricultural population and a high proportion of nonagricultural revenue, which are backward agriculturally but have some development of industry or mining, such as Kosovska Mitrovica (Kosovo-Metohija).

The reorganization of local government into fewer, more closely integrated units has made possible the consolidation of Communist Party control into a smaller number of "loyal" hands while extending control of the larger, "more advanced" towns over the countryside.

Although the majority of the people throughout Yugoslavia are engaged in agriculture, the nonagricultural sector of the economy now dominates local government. Each district is governed by a People's Committee, a bicameral body consisting of a District Council and a Council of Producers. The latter body consists of representatives of the different elements of production or services -- industry, construction, transportation, commerce, forestry, and agriculture -- and membership is determined by the proportional contribution of the different elements to overall district production. Since the nonagricultural elements produce the bulk of the revenue in nearly three-fourths of the districts, these elements have been accorded exaggerated representation on the Councils of Producers. The nonagricultural elements are also much more heavily nationalized than the agricultural sector; in official terminology the nonagricultural elements are termed the "socialist sector" of the economy. The previous administrative breakdown, with units in which a large town did not necessarily dominate and in which the administration of the grad (town) and the srez (district) were in many cases separated, permitted no such "legal" control of the peasantry by representatives of the urban workers.

The revised political-economic orientation is shown statistically in the table at the end of this article.* Comparing the proportion

^{*}Although the official statistics list the state-farm population as part of the socialist or nonagricultural sector, this population has been added to the agricultural sector. All agricultural income is grouped together in the official revenue statistics.

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of the "active" population engaged in agricultural and nonagricultural activities in each district, it is seen that 98 out of a total of 107 new districts have over half of their population engaged in agriculture. The picture, however, is quite different if the respective shares contributed by agricultural and nonagricultural populations to the national revenue are compared. In this case, 75 out of 107 districts derive over half of their total income from nonagricultural activities. Under the new administrative organization, it is this revenue-producing, nonagricultural population group that will dominate the Councils of Producers.

Yugoslav officials make much of the fact that the territorial reorganization is part of the program of decentralization now taking place in the country. According to official doctrine, the People's Committees of the districts enjoy a high degree of autonomy in planning and administrative matters, operating within a framework of general legislation and overall economic plans of the central and republic governments, but otherwise receiving few mandates from higher authority. By reducing centralized control to a minimum it is hoped that a swollen bureaucracy in Belgrade can be dispensed with, and workers can thus be released to "productive" employment. Yugoslav Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj has stated that as a result of the campaign for decentralization the number of central government workers, exclusive of those in the Secretariat for National Defense, has been reduced from 47,310 in 1948 to 10,328 currently. According to

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Kardelj, decentralization will encourage individual and local initiative in economic enterprises, and the local, or "commune"* governments will become the media through which the need for centralized planning and regulation is reconciled with the desire for individual accomplishment. The program of territorial decentralization parallels that of decentralization in the management of individual industries, the two programs being undertaken concurrently.

It is difficult to understand how a government based on the dictatorship of a closely knit central group such as Tito and his circle of advisers, and a government dedicated to the socialization of the means of production, could go very far along the road toward genuine local self-government. In the economic sphere it will still be necessary to have centralized planning and control, and in the political sphere it will be necessary for the regime to maintain loyalty to itself on the part of the local bodies. Even Kardelj admits that there are problems. Doubtless the Yugoslav Communist Party will continue to be the cement that holds the system together.

Decentralization at the federal and republic levels is accompanied by centralization at the district level. Thus the system does not provide truly representative government, since the socialist sector

^{*}Yugoslav use of the term "commune" is somewhat confusing. At times it is used to mean the third-order administrative unit, but just as often it is used to mean local governments in general, including the districts. Kardelj used "commune" in the latter sense.

of the economy, which is mainly nonagricultural, is favored at the expense of the agricultural sector. The peasants, even though they constitute the largest segment of the population, remain for the most part unrepresented. It is questionable whether any significance is attached to the decrease in the number of central government workers under the new system, for this decrease is more than counterbalanced by the swarm of individuals serving on People's Committees, Workers' Councils of various enterprises, or otherwise engaged in some local governmental activity. On the other hand, this also is an advantage from the standpoint of the central government, for it gives a large number of persons a sense of participation in government and a stake in the success of the regime. It may be that, given sufficient time, the Tito regime will be able to work out a middle way in local government that will differ from the extreme centralization of the Soviet type on the one hand and the type of local self-government practiced in many western countries on the other. (Unclassified)

Districts of Yugoslavia According to the Reorganization of 22 June 1955

Districts	Nonagricultural Population*	Nonagricultural Revenue*
	(percent)	(percent)
<u> Srbija (Republic</u>)	60.6	al =
Beograd	68.6	94.5
Čačak -	17.1	59.7
Kragujevac	16.7	54.2
Kraljevo	19.7	73.5
Kruševac	10.7	48.2
Lazarevac	20.4	54.8
Leskovac	10.5	55.9
Loznica	18.9	63.9
Mladenovac	14.8	52.6
Negotin	4.6	29.5
Nis	19.4	74.0
Novi Pazar	8.3	35.2
Obrenovac	9.7	45.4
Pirot	7.4	39•3
Pozarevac	8.7	36.8
Prijepolje	17.1	68.8
Prokuplje	4.9	22.5
Smederevo	14.2	51.8
Svetozarevo	17.3	62.7
Sabac	9.6	44.8
Titovo Užice	13.9	52.3
Valjevo	12.8	58.9
Vranje	14.7	57•3
Zajecar	20.5	73.6
Vojvodina (Autonomous Province)		
Bačka Palanka	13.6	48.3
Bačka Topola	11.0	28.4
Kikinda	17.4	38.0
Novi Sad	35•7	77.2
Pancěvo	16.5	50.1
Senta	19.8	36.4
Sombor	21.8	38.3
Sremska Mitrovica	17.0	47.3
Stara Pazova	11.8	29.3

^{*}From Statistički Bilten, No. 51, 1955.

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Districts	Nonagricultural Population	Nonagricultural Revenue
	(percent)	(percent)
Subotica Vrbas	34.4 21.5	66.4 70.7
Vršac	16.2	32.7
Zrenjanin	20.4	57.6
Kosovo-Metohija (Autonomous Obl		1.0. 7
Gnjilane	7.1	40.7
K. Mitrovica	31.0	76.5
Peć	14.4	29.3
Priština	21.1	58.4
Prizren	8.7	23.1
Hrvatska (Republic)		
B,jelovar	11.8	30.4
Cakovec	14.3	54·7
Daruvar	15.9	47.2
Dubrovnik	30.4	65.8
Gospić	15.5	53.8
Karlovac	19.0	72.8
Koprivnica	10.3	30.0
Krapina	16.9	59.9
Križevci	6.2	26.9
Kutina	17.9	44.2
Makarska	15.3	54.1
Našice	15.9	47.9
Nova Gradiška	22.6	52.2
Ogulin	31.6	73.8
Osijek	32.5	71.5
Pula	41.1	73.1
Rijeka	67.2	95.6
Sisak	21.3	73.9
Slav. Požega	14.4	46.9
Slav. Brod	26.5	79.8
Şplit	39.4	86.5
Sibenik	24.0	65.8
Varaždin	18.9	66.3
Vinkovci	26.8	70.9
Virovitica	12.9	41.4
Zadar	23.5	52.5
Zagreb	58.0	93.3

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Districts	Nonagricultural Population	Nonagricultural Revenue
	(percent)	(percent)
Slovenija (Republic)	l. 7	97 O
Celje	41.1	87.9 78.4
Gorica	33.9	•
Kočevje	27.1 35.8	71.7 70.6
Kopar	62.5	94.3
Kranj	63.1	92 . 4
Ljubljana	54·3	90.0
Maribor	10.5	47 . 9
Murska Sobota	22.3	58 . 8
Novo Mesto	16.9	55 . 1
Ptuj	44.2	87.4
Trbovlje	44•6	01.4
Bosna i Hercegovina (Republic)		
Banja Luka	16.1	55.6
Bihać	15.3	59•3
Brčko	9 . 6	44.3
Derventa	11.5	63.7
Doboj	16.9	64.2
Goražde	24.5	76.0
Jajce	22.6	64.6
Livno	6.4	34.6
Mostar	27.4	72.6
Prijedor	16.0	65.5
Sarajevo	59.1	90.8
Trebinje	15.3	39.5
Tuzla	39.3	86.2
Zenica	64.6	93.6
Zvornik	8.7	39.2
Makedonija (Republic)		
Bitolj	18.6	63.5
Kumanovo	11.4	64.6
Ohrid	14.6	52.3
Skoplje	51.5	86.0
Štip	13.9	53.3
Tetovo	23.8	58.3
Titov Veles	21.0	56.1
Crna Gora (Republic)		
Cetin,je	39•3	71.6
Ivangrad	13.7	59.5
Nikšić	41.9	75.3
Pljevlja	24.0	64.5
Titograd	37.1	67.3

CHANGES IN POLISH ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

The changes in Polish administrative divisions, which began after World War II, have continued in increasing numbers to the present. All reflect a recognition by the Communist regime of the need for the creation of an administrative organization that could be used effectively as an instrument for developing its economic and political programs.

Changes in the last 5 years have involved units at all levels of administration and include (1) minor realignments of the województwa (province -- first-order division), (2) the creation of 48 new powiats (county -- second-order administrative division), and numerous changes in the boundaries of other powiats, (3) the elevation of 13 cities to the level of powiat miejski (independent urban powiat), and (4) the creation of the gromada (third-order division) to replace the former commune and village units. Plans called for the creation of a total of 10,000 to 12,000 gromadas. Each was to include an area of 15 to 50 square kilometers and have a population of 1,000 to 3,000 people. The current boundaries of the województwa, powiats, and powiats miejskie are shown on the accompanying map (Map 25584).* Available information on reform at the gromada level is too incomplete to permit mapping at this level.

^{*}This map supersedes Map 11780, which accompanies an article on the Polish administrative divisions in the Map Intelligence Review, No. 36S-6, June 1953.

For the most part, changes affecting the first- and second-order units and the independent urban powiats conform to the pattern that had been established by 1951. By that time, it was evident that the Polish Government, following the Soviet example, intended to make the administrative structure an effective tool for tightening controls. People's councils at the województwo, powiat, and powiat miejski levels were assigned the task of preparing and implementing economic plans for their respective units within the framework of higher level plans.

The adoption of this control of the preparation and execution of economic plans by administrative divisions was followed by a series of boundary changes aimed at creating units more suitable for fulfilling this function. Emphasis was placed on reducing areas of the powiats so that they would be more nearly nodal economic units consisting of an urban area and its hinterland. As a consequence of the realignment of powiat boundaries, some transfers of territory were made between województwa where it was decided that an area within one province had closer economic ties with the adjacent province.

The raising of the status of cities to urban <u>powiats</u> and the creation of the new third-order administrative division appear to be further manifestations of the government's policy of tightening controls over the population.

These widespread revisions in the administrative framework of Poland, although motivated by the government's need to facilitate

supervision of the population, have in some areas been preceded by detailed investigations to determine a realistic basis for further development or exploitation of the areas. In the case of Bia/ystok and Stalinogród Województwa, administrative changes were made after the completion of detailed analyses of the geography and economy of the regions. The current Polish 5-year plan for geographic research calls for intensive studies of this type in other provinces. (Unclassified)

TRENDS IN USSR TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

.Since the publication 2 years ago of the latest available territorial-administrative handbook for the USSR as a whole (SSSR:

Administrativno-Territorial'noye Deleniye Soyuznykh Respublik, 1954), more than 160 administrative changes involving units at rayon level or above have occurred. This figure does not include the many changes in administrative status of towns, such as the promotion of workers' settlements to cities of rayon subordination, or the changes below rayon level involving sel'sovets. The frequent changes in the Soviet territorial-administrative system are of continuing interest to many fields of intelligence and some of the more important recent changes and trends are summarized as follows: (1) abolition of several oblasts and one important change in the status of an oblast; (2) several minor changes in the boundaries between union republics; (3) abolition of a considerable number of rural rayons; and (4) a trend toward abolition of urban rayons within small cities.

Several changes at oblast level were made in Central Asia. In the Tadzhik SSR, Garmskaya Oblast' and Kulyabskaya Oblast' were abolished in August 1955, and their territories were placed under republic subordination, following the pattern established earlier when Stalinabadskaya Oblast' was abolished. The abolition of these two oblasts has resulted in an unusual administrative structure within the Tadzhik SSR, which now is composed of Leninabadskaya Oblast',

Gorno-Badakhshanskaya A.O., and a number of rayons directly subordinate to the republic.

Other oblasts were abolished in the Central Asian Turkmen and Kirgiz SSR's. Krasnovodskaya Oblast' of the Turkmen SSR, which was created in 1952, was abolished in December 1955 and its territory was again incorporated into Ashkhabadskaya Oblast'. This is the second time that the oblast has been established and then abolished. Talasskaya Oblast' of the Kirgiz SSR was abolished in February 1956, and its rayons were incorporated into Frunzenskaya Oblast'.

In the Far East, the territorial evolution of Khabarovskiy Kray seems to have reached a logical conclusion, at least for the present. Kamchatskaya Oblast' was removed from the kray in January 1956, and became a regular administrative oblast directly subordinate to the RSFSR. The creation of Magadanskaya Oblast' in December 1953 had isolated Kamchatskaya Oblast' from the rest of Khabarovskiy Kray. In January 1956, at the same time that the remote Kamchatka area became an independent oblast, the one remaining intra-kray oblast, Nizhne-Amurskaya, was abolished and its rayons were placed under direct kray subordination. As a result of these changes the formerly complex Khabarovskiy Kray now consists of contiguous administrative divisions including a number of rayons and the Yevreyskaya A.O., which is a nationality unit.

Another, minor, change at oblast level was the shifting of the center of Kamenskaya Oblast' from Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy to Shakhty in September 1955.

The several small transfers of territory between union republics are of particular interest because they involve minor changes in republic boundaries, which in the past have generally been fairly stable. The transfer of Alakurtinskiy Sel'sovet from Kesteng'skiy Rayon of the Karelo-Finnish SSR to Kandalakshskiy Rayon of Murmanskaya Oblast' in February 1955 resulted in a small gain in area for the RSFSR. Another small gain for the RSFSR came in March 1955, when Klukhorskiy Rayon of the Georgian SSR was transferred to Stavropol'skiy Kray. A small part of the rayon -- one sel'sovet -- was subsequently given to the Kabardinskaya ASSR. The resulting changes in republic boundaries are shown on recent political-administrative maps.

Two transfers of territory from the Kazakh SSR to other republics were made in early 1956. Both appear to involve only small areas, but no maps showing the changes have been received as yet. In January 1956, Bostandykskiy Rayon of Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast' and a part of the Golodnaya Steppe were transferred from the Kazakh SSR to the Uzbek SSR. Another small area in the southern part of Dzhanybekskiy Rayon of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast' was transferred from Kazakh SSR to Astrakhanskaya Oblast' of the RSFSR in April 1956.

Between July 1954 and May 1956, about 100 rural rayons in the USSR were abolished.* During this same period, only 13 new rayons were created. Of these, 4 were rayons which had previously existed, had been abolished, and were now reorganized. Seven of the newly

^{*}Based on information received through June 1956.

created rayons are in the area of New Lands agricultural activity in northern Kazakhstan. The large number of rayons abolished, compared with the small number created, seems to indicate a trend toward consolidation of existing units rather than further subdivision.

Of the 100 rayons abolished, 56 were in various parts of the RSFSR; the others were scattered among some of the smaller republics. Fourteen were abolished in the Moldavian SSR in February 1956, thus reducing the total number of rayons in that republic by about a fourth. It is of interest to note that no changes at rayon level or above have been made in the Ukrainian SSR during the past 2 years, although this republic ranks next to the RSFSR in the number of its administrative subdivisions.

A trend toward the abolition of rayons within small cities began in 1955. Several articles advocating this move have appeared in the press, arguing that there was too much duplication of effort at city and rayon levels and that all or some of the urban rayons in small cities should be abolished. All the rayons of Petrozavodsk were abolished in June 1955, those of Kaunas and Samarkand in September 1955, and those of Kurgan in May 1956. Other cities have reduced the total number of rayons by abolishing a few and adding their territories to other rayons. In Arkhangel'sk the number of rayons has been reduced from 6 to 4, in Krasnodar from 4 to 2, in Astrakhan' and Kalinin from 5 to 3, in Rostov from 8 to 6, and in Gor'kiy from 11 to 6. Some of these cities are certainly not in the

"small city" category, so the trend toward efficiency seems to have spread. Indications are that several other cities also have either abolished or are preparing to abolish urban rayons.

In some cases the abolition of the rural rayons, previously mentioned, seems to be a part of the same drive for efficiency and elimination of unnecessary duplication. Several rural rayons, chiefly in the Urals area, were abolished and their former territory subordinated to the city soviets of small cities. The cities involved are generally in the 25,000 to 50,000 population category, such as Pervoural'sk, Solikamsk, and Kungur. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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BOUNDARY CHANGES IN PAKISTAN

The merger of the various political divisions of West Pakistan into the single Province of West Pakistan, which had been under serious consideration since early in the year, was effected in October 1955. Provisional information relevant to the changes in internal political units and a provisional map showing these changes were published in the Geographic Intelligence Review MR-48, December 1955. Definitive information on the changes has now been received from Pakistan and has permitted publication of a map of the internal administrative divisions, which supersedes Map 25076, the provisional edition published in December 1955. The new map, 25620, accompanies this article.

On the current map the following changes are noteworthy. The former districts of Nasīrābād and Bolān Pass have been abolished and their areas merged with Sibi District. The former state of Phura has been absorbed by Hazara District. The northern part of Thar Pārkar District now constitutes the District of Sanghar. Bahāwalpur Division now consists of three districts: Rahīmyār Khān, Bahāwalpur, and Bahawalnagar.

Information pertaining to the former province of East Bengal indicates that it became known officially as the Province of East Pakistan in January 1956. (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

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STALIN ON AND OFF THE MAP

The recent break of Soviet leadership with the Stalin tradition has raised questions regarding the probable fate of the numerous "Stalin" place names in the USSR and other Communist countries.

Widely used in geographic names even before World War II, "Stalin" has since 1945 been applied to many additional towns, civil divisions, industrial enterprises, and physical features throughout the Communist world. There are at least 60 instances in which the name has been assigned in varied forms to features prominent enough to be listed even in gazetteers of limited scope. If the count were broadened to include the names of minor features, the total would probably swell to several hundred. The Soviet Union, of course, has the greatest number of "Stalins," but the name is also much used in the Satellite countries.

Khrushchev, in his speech to the 20th Party Congress, outlined no specific plans for the erasure of "Stalin," but he did refer in a general way to place names and lampooned the practice of naming towns or factories after living party leaders. "How," he said, "is the authority and the importance of this or that leader judged? On the basis of how many towns, industrial enterprises and factories, kholkhozes and sovkhozes carry his name?" It was indicated that corrective action will be taken, but that the matter will be approached "calmly and slowly" by the Central Committee so as to prevent "errors

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and excesses." In justifying a go-slow approach, Khrushchev said,
"I can remember how the Ukraine learned about Kossior's arrest. The
Kiev radio used to start its programs thus: 'This is Radio -- (in
the name of) Kossior.' When one day the programs began without
naming Kossior, everyone was certain that ... he had probably been
arrested. Thus, if today we begin to remove ... signs everywhere
and change names, people will think that ... comrades in whose honor
the ... cities are named also met some bad fate."

Khrushchev's call for caution in replacing names has evidently been heeded because to date, with one possible exception, no elimination of "Stalin" as a prominent toponym has been reported. The exception is the Bulgarian port city of Stalin, which was clearly referred to in a 28 April 1956 Bulgarian broadcast by its former name -- Varna. To date, no confirmation of this as an official name change has been received. It is noteworthy, however, that a new Bulgarian Government policy calling for changes in the names of towns and other features named after living people was announced in a broadcast of 6 July 1956. Evidence of name changes in European Satellites other than Bulgaria and in the USSR is limited to the reported deletion of "Stalin" from identification of a few industrial enterprises and institutes.

The pace at which the erasure of "Stalin" is proceeding may appear slow to western eyes, but it becomes understandable if it is recalled that the Communist rank and file in the USSR, at least thus

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far, have been exposed to only the barest outline of the "downgrading."

In the light of Khrushchev's remarks, it seems that an interval of preparation for a more complete breaking of the idol is scheduled, and that during this period the removal of "Stalin" place names will be planned. Replacements of the more prominent occurrences of "Stalin," as in the name of a major city, are likely to receive priority, since they invite situations in which even the most loyal party adherents will be able to detect the ridiculous. For example, an agitator from Stalino might be sent to Stalinsk to tell the residents of the latter city why Stalin and Stalinism are now in bad grace.

Among the first problems to be dealt with in getting Stalin off the map will be that of selecting replacement names. This may be solved in some cases by restoring old names that were brushed aside in favor of "Stalin." This, however, will not always be suitable from a Communist point of view, because some of the old names have connotations that are anathema to Marxism. A clue to some possible replacement names is the increased emphasis being given in the USSR to the glorification of Old Bolsheviks and Russian revolutionaries of the 1870's. It may be felt in Kremlin circles that the use of their names to replace "Stalin" will help to repair Communism's posture of unity and continuity.

Regardless of what guiding policies are arrived at, finding replacement names for some occurrences of "Stalin" will be especially difficult. The name "Stalingrad," for example, may tear party

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functionaries between a desire to eliminate one of the most prominent occurrences of "Stalin" as a geographic name and reluctance to obliterate the memory of a vital victory of Soviet arms. Similarly, difficulties may be presented by the names of features that have figured importantly in the economic development of Communist countries.

The mere selection of replacement names will by no means end the Stalin woes of Communist planners. Putting the new names into effect will require, for example, revision of maps, atlases, gazetteers, textbooks, civil-division lists, postal guides, and timetables, as well as countless signs on roads, streets, and railroad stations. This phase of a name-changing effort may take considerable time and cause some administrative confusion.

In Stalin's time, the renaming of towns and other features in his honor was often accompanied by a loud fanfare in which local Communist leaders participated avidly. These same leaders, or at least those who are still alive, may prefer to have "Operation Erase" conducted as quietly as possible. If this happens, the appearance of replacement names on new maps from Communist countries may often be the first indication to reach the West that certain names have been officially changed.

No matter how or at what pace the job of getting "Stalin" off the map proceeds, it is likely that those responsible will agree with the understatement of the Polish leader who said, "The charges against Stalin create among us a certain chaos and fill us with disquiet."

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY ATLAS OF DISEASES

Work on the maps of the American Geographical Society's (AGS)

Atlas of Diseases stopped in 1955 with publication of the 17th plate
of the 25 envisaged by the original plan. With map production discontinued for the present, the AGS Department of Medical Geography
will devote its resources to the preparation of a 2-volume text.

This work, which is tentatively planned as a general study of medical
geography, will incorporate much of the unmappable data that came to
hand during research for the atlas. Some of the information will be
on subjects covered by published atlas maps, but the textual treatment is intended to be more than a mere discussion or explanation of
the maps. The shift in emphasis from maps to text is in accordance
with the wishes and budget of the Office of Naval Research, which has
supported AGS work in medical geography since 1952.

There is a possibility that map production may be resumed in 1 to 3 years if funds become available. But even if no additional maps are prepared, the 17 plates already published are likely to be much referred to, both for the basic data they present and for their pioneering solutions to some of the problems involved in mapping complex disease information.

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
The published maps are listed below.*

Plate No.	<u> Title</u>	Date	CIA Map Library Call No.
1	Distribution of Poliomyelitis, 1900-1950	1950	71578
2	Distribution of Cholera, 1816-1950	1951	75551
3	Distribution of Malaria Vectors	1951	74770
14	Distribution of Helminthiases	1952	81611
5	Distribution of Dengue and Yellow Fever	1952	78857
6	Distribution of Plague, 1900-1952	1952	81612
7	Distribution of Leprosy, 1952	1953	81789
8	Study in Human Starvation 1. Sources of Selected Foods	1953	83321
9	Study in Human Starvation 2. Diets and Deficiency Diseases	1953	84011
10	Distribution of Rickettsial Diseases 1. Louse-borne and Flea-borne Typhus	1953	85098
11	Distribution of Rickettsial Diseases 2. Tick-borne and Mite-borne Forms	1954	87111
12	Distribution of Rickettsial Diseases 3. Tick and Mite Vectors	1954	92063
13	Explored Areas of Anthropod-borne Viral Infections (Yellow Fever and Dengue Excepted)	1954	92064
14	World Distribution of Leishmaniases	1954	93109
15	World Distribution of Spirochetal Diseases 1. Yaws, Pinta, Bejel	1955	9 58 20

^{*}An article noting publication of the first five maps and other developments in medical mapping appeared in Map Intelligence Review No. 34, August 1952.

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Plate No.	<u>Title</u> <u>Date</u>	CIA Map Library Call No.
16	World Distribution of Spirochetal Diseases 1955 2. Relapsing Fevers (Louse-borne and Tick-borne)	96460
17	World Distribution of Spirochetal Diseases 1955 3. Leptospiroses	94260



A small section of Plate 5 (Dengue and Yellow Fever) of the Atlas of Diseases. Original in four colors, scale 1:40,000,000.

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The main maps on each of the 25" x 38" plates range in scale from 1:25,000,000 to 1:75,000,000. Most of the plates include insets at larger scales depicting critical areas; some include brief textual summaries; and nearly all give comprehensive source listings. The source information provides references for readers requiring additional detail and is also useful in weighing the reliability of the data. Space limitations required that certain relationships be presented on more than one plate (e.g., Maps 10-12, covering different aspects of the rickettsial diseases). Each plate, however, is a self-contained unit.

The maps are based on answers to questionnaires sent by the American Geographical Society to health agencies throughout the world, as well as on available medical literature. The latter includes the reports of the public health agencies of many countries and civil divisions within them, the studies of international health organizations, medical periodicals, and standard reference works. The information available on the diseases covered thus far has varied considerably in completeness and reliability from country to country and subject to subject. Gaps and questionable data are noted on the maps.

The plates of the atlas were planned primarily as research tools for calling attention to possible causes and correlations that, if fully investigated, might lead to the improvement of disease-control measures -- for example, relationships between agriculture and disease

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distribution and the role of communications in the spread of certain diseases. The maps have also proved useful as teaching aids in medical schools and as planning tools for public health officials, medical practitioners, and others.

There are several ways in which the maps could be of value to the intelligence community. Foremost among these would probably be in operational planning, that is, as convenient reference aids for determining what health problems are likely to be encountered in particular areas. The maps could also serve as guides to the detailed medical literature of different countries and, on the negative side, as indicators of the fact that little or nothing is known about the prevalence of certain diseases in certain countries. In regional studies, the maps might throw light on the causes of sociological and economic phenomena that might otherwise be inexplicable, for example, sharp differences in the productivity of peoples living in nearby areas.

Although some of the maps of the Atlas of Diseases are highly complicated, all can be interpreted with reasonable patience and care. On the whole, the treatment of the difficult subject matter is highly professional and a credit to the competence of the staff of the American Geographical Society. There is every reason to believe that the same high standards will be reflected in the forthcoming text on medical geography. (UNCIASSIFIED)

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A NEW HUNGARIAN ROAD ATLAS

A valuable and reliable source for current information on the highway network of Hungary has recently been made available to the U.S. intelligence community through the acquisition of Magyarországi Autóutak Térképe (Hungarian Road Atlas).* The atlas, which is the first such postwar publication, was issued in 50,000 copies by the Kartográfai Vállalat, Budapest, in 1955, probably under the auspices of the State Land Survey and Cartographic Office (Állami Földmérési és Térképészeti Hivatal). The small volume is about 5 by 7 inches, a suitable size for field and office use.


The volume is divided into two sections -- a 27-plate atlas and a gazetteer. The first section is preceded by an index map on which the individual maps are identified and the first-order administrative divisions are delineated and keyed to an alphabetical list. The multicolor maps that follow are at the scale of 1:400,000, and each map covers about 65 by 75 kilometers, with a few kilometers of overlap on all sides as an orientation aid. Three categories of roads are identified -- main highways, secondary roads, and field roads. The eight main highways and some of the secondary roads are identified by route numbers. Kilometer readings are indicated by ticks at 10-kilometer intervals along main and secondary roads, and actual distances between villages, between villages and road intersections, and


*CIA Map Library Call No. aF 305-28 .M3 1955.

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between road intersections and branch routes are given. In comparing the road data with that on earlier postwar road maps, the primary differences noted were in the route numbers of secondary roads. Other information on the maps includes (1) the railroad network, with no distinction made between single- and double-track lines or between standard-, broad-, and narrow-gauge lines; (2) hydrography, with ferry or bridge crossing points indicated; (3) county boundaries; and (4) county and district centers. On each map, the adjoining plates are noted.

The gazetteer section is especially useful. All place names given are keyed to the map on which they appear. Towns that have hotels, spas, or first-aid stations are identified. A table giving distances between major towns, a 19-item legend for the maps, and an explanatory table of road symbols complete the atlas. (UNCIASSIFIED)







YUGOSLAVIA: ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS-1956 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300020002-9 FEDERATIVNA LJUDSKA REPUBLIKA JUGOSLAVIJA Priredila prof. dr.V.BOHINEC in prof. FR.PLANINA lzdelal IVAN SELAN MERILO 1:1.500.000 Založila DRŽAVNA ZALOŽBA SLOVENIJE v Ljubljani Tiskala TISKARNA-LJUDSKE PRAVICE-v Ljubljani LEGEND