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State Dept. review
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Secret

30 July 1971
No. 0381/71

Copy No 48

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FAR EAST

Indochina

Vietnam: Filling Out the Election Ticket

President Thieu's selection of Senator and former prime minister Tran Van Huong as his running mate will provide a regional and religious balance to his ticket. Huong was a rather ineffective prime minister who did not enjoy an easy relationship with the National Assembly, but as a civilian and a southern Buddhist he will balance Thieu's Catholic and central Vietnam background. In addition, Huong is widely admired for his personal integrity, has a large following in Saigon, and may offset Thieu's unpopularity there.

Prime Minister Khiem—Thieu's alternate vice-presidential choice—[redacted] being passed over. However, Thieu probably considers Khiem's administrative abilities more useful in the prime minister's job. If Huong should drop out, Khiem still would be available to fill out the ticket. Huong is 67 and his health is not good.

Big Minh's selection of Dr. Ho Van Minh for his vice-presidential candidate follows a period of behind-the-scenes backing and filling by the general and his potential running mates. [redacted]

Ky's Election Chances

Time and events are continuing to run against Vice President Ky's chances of qualifying for the fall election. Reports on the status of Ky's endorsements conflict, but at last count he apparently had no more than 20 certified endorsements of the 100 he needs, although his staff is claiming over 100 signed or promised supporters. Lack of money for campaigning and bribes and the lackadaisical efforts of his campaign staff have also contributed to Ky's

poor showing, but it is obvious that much of his potential support has been scared off by local officials, who are actively backing President Thieu.

Province chiefs throughout the country have been openly soliciting endorsements for the President and have frequently employed subtle pressures to induce councilors to sign for Thieu, sign blank endorsements, or simply refrain from endorsing Ky.

[redacted] Even in the absence of direct pressure, most councilmen are aware of the dangers of arousing the displeasure of a powerful province chief or mayor.

Thieu's organization seems determined to exclude Ky from the election, not only to assure the former's victory, but to give him a majority mandate this time—he won in 1967 with only 34.9 percent of the vote. Thieu and his advisers seem unconcerned about the possible unfavorable impact on Thieu's image abroad and they have discounted Big Minh's threats to pull out of the race if Ky is blocked. In view of Thieu's determination to be a majority winner, he seems unlikely to relent in his efforts to block Ky's candidacy.

Military Action Picks Up

Small-scale Communist attacks increased during the past week as the enemy continued its effort to nibble away at the government's pacification program. Most of the targets were militia outposts and small population centers. One raid on a Mekong Delta hamlet accounted for some 30 civilian casualties. Enemy sappers also penetrated a well-defended air base near Saigon and destroyed four helicopters.

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Although the expected upsurge in larger scale enemy action this month has been delayed by heavy rains and flooding, signs persist that the enemy still hopes to stage another round of attacks soon. The evidence suggests that the action will be mostly concentrated in the northern provinces.

Worry in Hanoi

Hanoi continues to register unprecedented concern that Peking-Washington diplomacy has upstaged its own seven point initiative. Bitter indirect criticism of the Chinese is still appearing in the press, and Le Duc Tho, the top negotiator in Paris, has been called home for consultations. The Vietnamese may also be seeking some Soviet assistance in refocusing world attention on the seven points.

Moscow has already provided propaganda support by echoing North Vietnamese strictures against any Washington-Peking attempt to settle the Vietnam war "behind Hanoi's back," and the Soviets will probably do more. Afforded an opportunity to score points against the Chinese, Moscow will probably do its best to accommodate itself to any plan the Vietnamese come up with to recapture the negotiations initiative.

Laos: The Government Moves in the South

Four irregular battalions, numbering 1,300 men, were airlifted to an area north of the town of Saravane on 28 July in a major new government offensive in south Laos. The troops subsequently occupied the town without opposition. This provincial capital has been in enemy hands since last year, and its capture should give a psychological boost to the government in Vientiane. The irregulars, however, do not intend to

hold the town for long, but will try to move against Communist installations and supply caches to the west.

The move into Saravane is the beginning of a wider effort in the Bolovens Plateau. On 29 July government units began an operation to recapture Paksong in the central portion of the plateau. As a diversionary measure, government units had been moved into areas on the eastern edge of the plateau. These units ran into stiff Communist resistance.

The Communists have between six and eight North Vietnamese battalions in the Bolovens with armor and artillery support. They hold most of the key high-ground positions on the plateau and have had some time to pre-position ammunition caches.


In north Laos, irregular units have once again moved into the foothills north of the Plaine des Jarres, reoccupying positions that had been lost to a Communist counterattack on 21 July. An irregular force also seized Phou San, a high point about five miles northeast of the government position at Phou Keng. The force moving south from Bouam Long, however, continues to encounter difficulties. Several clashes have slowed the irregulars' advance.

North Vietnamese resistance in the Plaine has increased. On 26 July enemy gunners directed over 100 rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds at the government base on Phou Theung. Other enemy units initiated clashes on the northern and eastern edge of the Plaine.

The Government on Peace Talks

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma attempted to keep up at least the appearance of a dialogue

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Laos

- Government-held location
- Communist-held location


on Lao peace talks by replying to the extremely hard-line Pathet Lao statement of 11 July. His latest message to Communist leader Souphanouvong called for immediate and serious negotiations to end the war. Souvanna again ignored the Communist proposal for a country-wide cease-fire and instead proposed a bombing halt limited to the area of the eventual talks site, presumably the Plaine des Jarres and Vientiane alternately.

Souvanna's message did make one suggestion, moving a step closer to specifics about the modalities of talks. He proposed that security for the talk sites be provided by a mixed force of Lao Army and Pathet Lao forces under the supervision of the International Control Commission.

The Communists are unlikely to respond positively to Souvanna's latest message. Most of it, including the proposal for a partial cease-fire, has already been rejected. The Communists took the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Geneva Accords to repeat their position on negotiations. They asserted that they will continue to seek a negotiated solution to the war even while they "smash" US acts of escalation.

Cambodia: Concern for the Future

The government has moved to calm fears that an improvement in Sino-US relations may create difficulties for Cambodia. In a radiobroadcast to the nation on 26 July, Lon Nol reaffirmed Phnom Penh's "satisfaction" with President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking. The prime minister also stated that the National Assembly shared his view that the Geneva Accords of 1954 call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from



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Cambodia, and that Sino-US rapprochement should lead to a new international respect for the accords.


important elements of the armed forces—especially the elite Khmer Krom (KK) units—that the government will continue to resist Communist aggression. The prime minister's remarks came at a time when the morale of KK troops was showing some signs of flagging. The KK soldiers have regularly borne a disproportionate share of the Cambodian Army's combat responsibilities and have taken heavy losses.

Thus far the decline in morale apparently is slight, and does not appear to have affected the discipline or fighting qualities of KK units.

A Small Head Rolls

The Lon Nol government suffered the first political casualty of its new administration when the National Assembly voted to censure Minister of Commerce Khung Thay Ly, apparently as much to protest the government's failure to curb inflation as to fault Ly for his inept performance in office. The speed with which the government accepted Ly's resignation served to confirm reports that it was prepared to see him go without a fight, in the hope that his removal would increase assembly support for the regime's proposed economic stabilization program.

It seems likely that Lon Nol's speech was aimed at least in part at reassuring politically



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Communist China: *Ferretting Out the Extremists*

The behind-the-scenes investigation of a notorious Peking-based Red Guard organization that has been exacerbating tensions within China's ruling politburo over the past year may be entering a more public phase. Western diplomats in Peking have recently been informed of the censure of a former Foreign Ministry official associated with activities of the "May 16 Corps," which had attacked Premier Chou En-lai and other moderately oriented officials during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, [redacted] a mass rally to repudiate the May 16 Corps will be held in Canton early next month. Similar political rallies are likely in other areas and could result in some fresh purges of local cadres, many of whom may be only tenuously connected, if at all, with the original May 16 organization. In any case, it appears that a major decision has been taken in recent weeks to repudiate openly the more extreme manifestations of the Cultural Revolution and that the political fortunes of ultra-leftist leaders both at the national and local levels are continuing their downward spiral.

Efforts to ferret out and arrest alleged followers of the May 16 Corps were initiated in Peking and nearby Tientsin in late 1969. Although the full ramifications of the investigation are still not clear, it apparently served as the catalyst in an intense power struggle between moderate and ultraleftist forces on the politburo and touched off the dramatic alterations within the top leadership over the past year. The May 16 case has never been openly discussed in the Chinese press and local officials were apparently kept in the dark about the affair until late 1970 when they were evidently ordered to begin holding anti - May 16 criticism sessions at various administrative levels. [redacted]

[redacted] they were probably designed to prepare local cadres for future revelations stemming from the intricate maneuvering in Peking.

In recent months, the campaign in the provinces appears to have broadened to include investigations into the backgrounds of suspected May 16

elements, the majority of which probably include local cadres. The campaign in Canton has been run by the military and has reportedly been confined to factories, [redacted]


[redacted] the staffs in government offices, schools, hospitals, and communes have been prime targets. Because the original May 16 Corps appeared to have relatively few adherents outside of Peking, it is likely that the party leadership has authorized the campaign as a device for further undercutting the positions of extremist elements that may still be challenging the dominance of conservatively oriented military officers and veteran party cadres in many localities in the emergent post - Cultural Revolution party apparatus.

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The degree to which Peking is willing to expose publicly the extent of disunity at the highest levels of national leadership, however, remains a moot point. In May, a pro-Communist Australian journalist claimed that he had been told in Peking that the names of the "plotters" behind the original May 16 group would be revealed as soon as the investigation was completed, [redacted]

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[redacted] At this stage, therefore, it appears that Peking will primarily use the public rallies against the May 16 Corps both for domestic and international consumption and as a forum for repudiating political extremism, past and present. Even if the forthcoming rallies shed little additional light on the complex internal leadership picture, the very fact that the May 16 affair is being moved into the public realm seems another indication of the growing strength of the moderate elements in the central leadership and of the strong shift to the right in China's internal politics. [redacted]

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EUROPE

Soviets Uneasy About Sino-US Moves

In a carefully worded article in *Pravda* on 25 July that ended a nine-day official silence, the Soviets expressed some of their worst fears regarding the Sino-American rapprochement but offered to wait for future events to "reveal the true intentions" of Peking and Washington. The Soviet message was clearly twofold: on the one hand, it was a serious warning that Sino-US contacts cannot be used to pressure the USSR; on the other hand, it was a reaffirmation of Moscow's willingness to continue efforts to improve relations with both China and the US. For at least the time being, then, the Soviets are not of a mind to permit recent events to get in the way of border talks with Peking or the strategic arms talks with Washington.

Although the article employed the Soviet practice of using statements from the foreign press to vent Moscow's ire, it did not attempt to conceal the view that the rapprochement is designed in no small measure to bring pressure on the USSR, and could even lead to a "political combination" against the Soviets. The article accused both Peking and Washington of cloaking their intentions behind a "dense propaganda screen," and it warned that their actions will be watched closely in Moscow. Any attempt to use the contacts to "pressure" the USSR, *Pravda* warns, could only be the result of a "loss of touch with reality."

The article, however, states that the 24th Party Congress defined Soviet policy toward Peking and Washington, and that the current course

of events "confirms the correctness" of this policy. In this way, the Soviets have endorsed bilateral negotiations with both states and the article itself concludes with an endorsement of active cooperation with Peking and the US.

Meanwhile, the private remarks of Soviet officials appear to parallel the *Pravda* message of warning and wariness regarding Sino-American developments. Several Soviet diplomats have expressed the opinion that China and the US have reached some understanding on Vietnam. The Soviets are already seeking a sympathetic audience in Hanoi and other Communist states for their view that Peking's actions have threatened North Vietnamese opportunities for success against the US. The Soviets are probably fearful of being cut out of future efforts to arrange a political settlement in Southeast Asia.

Moscow, aware that Washington's moves have considerably enhanced Communist China's chances for early entry into the UN, has reiterated its endorsement of Peking's admission. Several days after the Presidential announcement on 15 July, the Soviets publicly released a note to UN Secretary General Thant calling for Peking's entry and Taipei's ouster from the UN. Although the Soviets are probably counting on Taipei to be an obstacle to Peking's entry—as well as to any genuine improvement in Chinese relations with the US—Moscow must prepare for the day when it is competing with Peking for influence among Third World states at the General Assembly.

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RSFSR Premiership Changes Hands

The replacement of Gennady Voronov by party secretary Mikhail Solomentsev as premier of the Russian Federation this past week sets the stage for future changes in the Politburo and Secretariat from which Brezhnev and his allies probably have the most to gain.

Election of 57-year-old Solomentsev by the new RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 28 July places the Soviet Union's dominant republic under the premiership of an independent with no obvious ties to top Soviet leaders. In the early 1960s, in fact, Solomentsev rose to the position of second secretary of Kazakhstan during an eclipse in the career of Kazakh leader and Brezhnev protege D. A. Kunayev, now a member of the Politburo. An industrial specialist with some experience in agriculture, Solomentsev was appointed party secretary and chief of the Central Committee's heavy industry department in 1966. His rare speeches do not reveal a parochial outlook, however, as they have touched on the themes of consumer production, decentralization of some economic responsibilities, and ideology.

Voronov, 60, is also a loner, but one who has recently been obviously out of favor with Brezhnev and his allies. Voronov's appointment as

chairman of the People's Control Committee on 22 July was a serious demotion.

Despite some apparent support last fall from another independent, senior secretary Suslov, Voronov suffered a series of reversals this past year. In February his chief deputy for six years was replaced by an official with career ties to Brezhnev. Brezhnev's ranking of the Politburo at the party congress this spring showed a steep decline for Voronov in the five years since the 1966 congress. Voronov's rivalry with Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, Kirilenko, goes back to the early 1960s. Voronov's persistent advocacy of more agricultural reform at a lower cost contradicted the wishes of First Deputy Premier Polyansky and the agricultural program announced by Brezhnev last summer.

Changes in the Politburo seemed to be foreshadowed by its expansion at the party congress in April. Solomentsev's replacement of Voronov as RSFSR premier has relevance for the composition of both the Politburo and the Secretariat. By precedent, Voronov's new position does not entitle him to continued membership on the Politburo. Solomentsev, on the other hand, is now in line to gain Politburo status, although he will have to relinquish his Secretariat post, leaving a vacancy in that body.

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


Gennady Voronov



Mikhail Solomentsev

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UK-Malta: *Negotiations on the Knife's Edge*

The British high commissioner in Valleta has described the UK-Malta negotiations on a new defense arrangement as being "on the knife's edge." He is not optimistic about the outcome of the talks, which have been in progress for more than a month, because Prime Minister Mintoff has displayed little flexibility in his tactics. Mintoff has told the British that if they do not soon meet his financial demands, British forces will have to be withdrawn and he will turn elsewhere for aid.

Valleta has advanced two proposals for a new agreement. The first embraces a "wholly exclusive defense arrangement" that would permit the British to retain a veto power over third country military use of Maltese facilities in exchange for an annual payment of \$72 million. The other proposal is for a "less exclusive arrangement" costing \$48 million annually, under which Malta would have the power to grant the use of its harbors and airfields to any nations except those in the Warsaw Pact. The use of the island by British forces would be strictly defined under either of these two proposals. The Royal Navy would be limited to Grand Harbor, and the Royal Air Force would have to give up its base at Hall Far and retain facilities only at Luqa, Malta's principal airfield.

Mintoff has told the British that, although NATO must leave the island, the Allies could contribute toward the UK payment to Malta. Valleta, however, would not count bilateral development aid from NATO members as part of the "rent" it is seeking from the British.


The UK has asked the Allies for their position on the principle of a NATO contribution to Malta and how much each would be willing to

offer. Although NATO Secretary General Brosio is dubious about the chances for a special financial contribution, he has agreed to hold a meeting to discuss the request. London will seek a firm response by 5 August so that it can resume negotiations with Valleta. The British representative to NATO has implied that London would like to offer Mintoff an annual payment of \$24 million, of which the UK would pick up somewhat less than half. The level of annual UK aid up to now has averaged out to about \$12 million.



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Mintoff's negotiating tactics are aimed at producing an agreement before the Maltese parliament convenes in late August. An accord with London that is seen as a significant improvement will help mute opposition criticism of the Maltese Labor government and consolidate Mintoff's hold over the moderate wing of his own party, thus allowing him to exercise his one seat parliamentary majority with confidence.



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Romania: *Ceausescu Feints and Jabs*

The 25th annual session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) opened in Bucharest on 27 July against a backdrop of recent assertive speeches by Romanian leader Ceausescu. Insofar as these speeches stressed national sovereignty and the right of each party to determine its own policies, Ceausescu basically restated old principles, but he also used them to surface some new ideas, particularly with respect to economic integration. His apparent intent was both to reassure the Romanian people and to signal his allies that Bucharest proposed to stand firm during the CEMA session which called, *inter alia*, for "developing socialist economic integration."

Ceausescu used his strongest language with respect to CEMA and Moscow in a speech at Constanta on 23 July. In it, he asserted that CEMA is "an important body," but added that "interdependence in production must in no way infringe on national sovereignty" nor influence the right of each nation "to decide independently its development program according to its own wishes." He later drove home his point by "denouncing old enslaving economic and military agreements and treaties" and by adding that the "times of oppression and diktat have gone forever."

The Constanta speech also contained other carefully tailored phrases implicitly striking out at mounting Soviet pressure and criticism of the Romanian regime. Thus Ceausescu stressed that "an absolute end must be put to the imperialist policy of force, diktat, and interference in the affairs of other states or of any kind of pressure against other states." More specifically, he asserted that "small and medium-sized states should oppose the imperialist policy of force and diktat and should assert and defend their right to a free life!"

Ceausescu is walking a very thin wire for an Eastern European Communist leader. Earlier this month he posed some maverick ideas with respect to economic integration—a subject about which Bucharest has long been chary. Noting that "integration is being discussed, both the socialist type and that of the Common Market," he stated that "we must distinctly analyze and discuss the theses and practices connected with capitalist integration as well as the problem of socialist cooperative relations and the forms of integration within the framework of CEMA."

Neither the more positive tone of his remarks on "the practices of the Common Market" nor his linkage of CEMA and Common Market principles will reduce Moscow's irritation with Bucharest. At the same time, however, the Romanian leadership considers itself sufficiently prudent politically to sense the "danger quota," as a high-level Romanian official recently put it, that Moscow will tolerate. In practical terms, therefore, Bucharest can be expected to resist any sharp increase in integration within CEMA, but it can accept minor progress that is coupled with precise language protecting Romania's national sovereignty.

How extensively Bucharest cooperates at this CEMA session will help to determine whether Moscow tests anew Romania's loyalty to all Soviet-sponsored and bloc-wide institutions, including the Warsaw Pact. In this regard, more Soviet pressure may be forthcoming to gain either Romanian participation in next month's combined Pact exercise in Bulgaria or transit rights for participating Soviet troops via Romanian surface routes.

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BERLIN PASS TALKS: West Berlin Senat negotiator Mueller and East German state secretary Kohrt again failed to make any progress on 26 July in their meeting aimed at trying to hammer out a holiday pass agreement for West Berliners. The East Germans, who have little interest in an agreement for humanitarian purposes alone, continued to insist on discussing the question of the

Bonn government's presence in West Berlin, a topic reserved for the Four Power negotiations on the divided city. The lack of enthusiasm on both sides at this meeting, the first since May, was reflected in the fact that the next session is not scheduled until 30 August, "unless progress is noted in the Four Power talks." [redacted]

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ARMS CONTROL: The Soviets have responded in a forthcoming manner to US suggestions for revisions in their draft convention curbing biological weapons (BW). Only a few minor points remain at issue between the two countries, and agreement should be reached soon on a single text to be presented to the other participants in the 25-nation Geneva disarmament conference. The

nonaligned delegates still would prefer a convention that would also include limits on chemical weapons (CW), but they are not inclined to prevent acceptance of a text confined to BW. Thus it seems likely that the conferees will present a BW convention to the UN General Assembly this fall. [redacted]

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UN: At week's end the UN faced the strong possibility of unprecedented strike action by its staff personnel—clerical, security, and maintenance workers—beginning in October. Secretary General Thant has offered a retroactive eight-percent pay hike, but the staff union is demanding a 15-percent boost. Thant believes the UN member states could accept an eight-percent increase, but

the Big Four major donors—the US, UK, France, and the USSR—have told him they have serious problems with his 1972 budget, which failed to project even the eight-percent rise. Any strike action would pose serious security problems at the headquarters complex and hinder the upcoming General Assembly session. [redacted]

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USSR-SUDAN: Soviet-Sudanese relations are almost certain to deteriorate sharply in the next few weeks. As of 1200 EDT, Thursday, Moscow had not yet commented authoritatively on the execution of Sudanese Communist Party leader Mahjoub. Based on its reaction to the execution earlier this week of the leading Sudanese Communist trade union official, however, Moscow is likely to protest vigorously.

recent coup attempt and reiterated his desire for good relations with the USSR. At the same time, however, Numayri also announced that at least some of the estimated 470 Soviet economic and military advisers would be leaving the Sudan "because their mission was completed." None of the military or economic projects undertaken by the Soviets in the Sudan would appear to be far enough along to warrant the departure of the experts, but in the present circumstances both sides may see some advantage in cutting back on the Soviet presence. It is unlikely, however, that either side will want to terminate the aid program completely. [redacted]

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Press reports from Khartoum indicate that Sudanese President Numayri, in a speech on 29 July, absolved the Soviets of any role in the

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Tito Gains Ground in Fight Against Croat Nationalists

Events over the past two weeks indicate that Tito has made impressive gains toward re-establishing control over Croatian nationalists. The Croat party—including leaders sympathetic to the nationalists—has dropped its resistance to Tito's demands for action and for the first time is trying to isolate and neutralize radical separatists.

Since the party meeting in late April, Tito has pushed for such measures but, constrained by consideration for his upcoming political reforms, was unable to bring his full administrative power to bear. Now that his reforms have been passed into law and his dramatization of the Soviet threat has tightened Yugoslav unity, Tito's warnings are having more effect in Zagreb.

Moderate Croat party leaders fell into line in early July, but until last week the nationalistic members still refused to accept the inherent dangers of their course. A turn in Tito's favor, however, came on 25 July when Mika Tripalo, the Croatian party leadership's most active booster of Croat independence, made an abrupt tactical about-face. Tripalo, aware of the party's expulsion of two prominent protégés two days earlier, delivered a speech emphasizing that nationalism had become a threat to the federation, that concentration of power in the federation had benefited all Yugoslavs, and that separatism was inimical to both Yugoslav and Croatian interests. He

further recommended "self-denial, discipline and practical action" as guidelines for the future.

Tripalo's back-pedaling will confuse the nationalists, and more fissures in their unity are to be expected. There are indications that the Croat party chief, Mrs. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, the Croat party's most vocal supporter of Tito's line, is now ready to capitalize on this opportunity. The Croat student federation, which has been virtually unchecked in its separatist course since party loyalists were driven out of its leadership early this year, will be a primary target of her efforts. A rival group, the Croat youth federation, has already begun to dissociate itself from recent excesses by the student federation. Other targets will probably be militant Croatian cultural societies, like Matica Hrvatska, and nationalist journals that have incited quarrels with other minorities.

Tightening discipline will not be an easy task for the Croat party, however. The manner in which it handles the more adamant nationalists will be subject to criticism both from Belgrade for being too soft and from its own ranks for serving as an anti-Croatian tool. Mrs. Dabcevic-Kucar will have to strike a balance that will redeem her party in Tito's eyes and preserve, as much as possible, party unity and influence over the republic. [REDACTED]

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UN - PEACE-KEEPING: A working paper the Soviet delegation at the UN has given the US on guidelines for UN peace-keeping missions reveals no movement by the USSR on key substantive points, but the Soviets want to revive bilateral talks on the subject. They continue to insist that the Security Council have full control over a

peace-keeping mission, with little latitude for the Secretary General. Other UN members are becoming restive over the lack of progress in completing the guidelines and may soon offer their own proposals. [REDACTED]

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
Rome and Vienna Wind Down Their Dispute Over South Tyrol

Steady progress toward settling the long-disputed status of the South Tyrol area, called the Alto Adige in Italian, has resulted in considerable improvement in Austro-Italian relations.

Discontent has simmered—and sometimes boiled—in the South Tyrol, where most of the people speak German, since Austria was forced to cede the area to Italy after World War I. In 1946, Italy promised to give autonomy to the South Tyrol, which it had designated Bolzano Province. In fact, Rome merged the province with predominantly Italian Trento Province to form an Italian-dominated “autonomous region” called Trentino - Alto Adige.

The affected German-speaking population numbers only some 200,000 but their demands have always evoked sympathy in Austria, particularly in the North Tyrol, and have been an unavoidable political issue for all postwar Austrian governments. Rome's interest in finding a solution to the dispute has been heightened by repeated terrorist activities of anti-Italian groups having imprecise ties to Salzburg, Munich, or Vienna. In December 1969, Rome and Vienna agreed on a program of steps to peace in the South Tyrol. It provided that progressively over a period of four years, Bolzano Province would be given more legislative and administrative autonomy and the German and Italian languages will have equal status in the public media and the educational system.

This month, Austrian Foreign Minister Kirchschaeger and Italian Foreign Minister Moro signed a treaty providing for jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice at The Hague in case of further dispute over the government or the borders of the province.



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The progress made by the two governments in laying the South Tyrol issue to rest has been marked by the relaxation of tensions in the area—particularly evident in the cessation of terrorist attacks—and in the emergence of better feeling between Rome and Vienna. Italy has moved away from its long-standing role as the most outspoken opponent of Austria's bid for association with the Common Market and now supports Vienna's request for early negotiations for a free trade area between Austria and an enlarged European Community.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Sudan: *Numayri's Problems Still Around*

Although he has been restored to power following the collapse of the three-day Communist take-over in Khartoum, Revolutionary Command Council Chairman Numayri will not find his position much better than it was before the coup.

In southern Sudan, the 16-year-old rebellion led by the Anya-Nya continues. Although the dissidents do not present a serious challenge to the government, their unrelenting guerrilla warfare has forced Numayri to station a sizable portion of the army in the major cities of the area. Military leaders are not pleased about having their forces tied down in garrison duty, however, and are frustrated by their inability to take effective action against an opponent that appears and disappears quickly into the jungle. They are likely to bring pressure on Numayri until he finds some accommodation with the rebels.

Economic problems also remain to be coped with. Two years of incredible mismanagement and erratic changes of policy have brought development to a standstill. Increased revenues have been offset by growing expenditures, and the country's cotton crop, a prime source of income, is heavily mortgaged to Moscow to pay for arms. Although the removal of Communists from the government may provide a more favorable climate for aid from Libya and the West, it is likely to be some time before any economic turnabout is possible.

Moreover, with an Indonesian-style vendetta against the Communists moving into high gear, Numayri will now be more beholden than ever to the army, the only source of authority and power left in the country. The military establishment—and especially its senior officers—has long been conservative in political ideology and is likely to urge Numayri to remove whatever leftists remain in the government. The chairman will also be under great pressure to emulate more closely the "progressive revolutionary" regimes in Libya and Egypt.

Paradoxically, however, when Numayri moves in this direction—and he has already announced his intention to take Sudan into the Federation of Arab Republics next January—it will cost him grass-roots support, for the Sudanese have been divided on the issue of association with Egypt ever since independence. Numayri will have to work hard indeed to sell to the people the advantages of a closer political relationship with Cairo, the cornerstone of the federation.

Numayri may have been given a second chance, but his tenure depends to a large degree on how well he handles his problems, and especially on his ability to keep the military placated. If he stumbles, as he had been doing in the months before the coup, Numayri could find himself removed from power again, this time by a conservative junta. [REDACTED]

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ETHIOPIA: Emperor Haile Selassie intends to visit Communist China this fall, probably in late October. The trip follows the establishment of diplomatic relations in December 1970. Addis Ababa apparently hopes Peking will offer economic assistance, and a high-level committee is already at work on a list of aid projects to be discussed with the Chinese. An Ethiopian trade

and aid delegation is going in September to work out details of an economic agreement that then can be signed by the Emperor the following month. [REDACTED]

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Pakistan: *Guerrilla Activity on the Rise*

Sabotage, assassinations, and ambushes in East Pakistan are increasing. Bengali insurgents have been able to disrupt the transportation system in the eastern part of the province and communications elsewhere are far from normal. A Pakistani general admits that, on an average, two bridges a day are being blown up.

Sabotage of the electric power system also continues, and the cutoff of natural gas in Dacca may have resulted from guerrilla operations.

The guerrillas are not yet strong enough to challenge the army directly, and it appears unlikely that they will be able to do so in the near future. But with many government troops diverted to the border—where clashes with the Indians continue—the army may be spread too thin to deal effectively with the sabotage campaign.

Guerrilla activity and government inactivity have both contributed to the lack of progress in

solving the food distribution problem. The US consulate general believes that it may prove impossible to distribute the 1.4 million tons of grain that will be needed before the end of the year, and predicts that starvation in parts of the province is likely to begin by November.

In India, pressure to recognize "Bangla Desh" is mounting, although the flow of refugees has slackened, at least temporarily. Prime Minister Gandhi's political opponents are allegedly unanimous in support of recognition, and the major opposition parties are planning a series of public demonstrations on the issue. Mrs. Gandhi has strengthened her public statements in support of the "freedom fighters," but still maintains that India will base its decision to recognize "Bangla Desh" exclusively on direct national interest and on whether such a move would support the cause of the Bengalis. In discussions with members of parliament on 25 July, however, she gave the Bengali nationalists some encouragement by asserting that no preconditions or criteria—such as control of specific amounts of territory in East Bengal—have been established for recognition.

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UN - SOUTH ASIA: The UN secretariat this week completed its decisions on staffing the refugee areas in West and East Bengal, and the full complement of personnel should be on the scene shortly. With food and other relief supplies now flowing into the subcontinent on a more adequate basis, the international community is again focusing on political problems there rather than on the humanitarian concerns. India has reacted sharply—in both diplomatic channels and the

mass media—to Secretary General Thant's proposal that UN observers be stationed on each side of the Indo-Pakistani border. New Delhi maintains that such a proposition would be tantamount to suggesting that the civil war in East Pakistan was an international conflict. The presence of such observers could also hinder Indian cross-border operations in support of the Bengali freedom fighters.

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
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Liberia: A Time of Testing

The death last week of President William Tubman ushers in a time of testing both for the system of government he developed during 27 years of rule and for William Tolbert, his successor. Former vice president Tolbert must now make that system—which depended heavily on Tubman's personality and intimate knowledge of the personal affairs of members of the ruling elite—responsive to his own direction.

Tubman's death has created among most Liberians a sense of loss and shock, as well as fears that with him will go the prosperity and political stability associated with his long rule. Reforms initiated by Tubman helped lay the basis for modernization of the mineral-rich economy, and for more equitable sharing of the country's wealth and political power by disparate social and tribal groups. In his first public speech after becoming president, Tolbert pledged to continue these highly popular policies.


Many observers doubt that Tolbert possesses the skills necessary to duplicate Tubman's adroit manipulation of Liberia's various interest groups. One danger is that he will alienate powerful segments of the ruling group by ignoring their advice or adopting too heavy-handed an approach in lining up supporters.



Tolbert has enemies within the power structure, but they do not appear to be organized into a single faction. They have thus far moved cautiously because at this time the President still looks like a winner. This could change if Tolbert

badly mishandles the reins of power over the next several months, however.

Unable to prevent Tolbert's accession to the presidency, his rivals have fastened on the legal question of how long he may govern without facing elections, which many believe he could not win. The four-year term to which Tolbert and Tubman were elected in May 1971 does not officially begin until next January. Some opponents maintain that the new President's mandate does not extend through the new term and that presidential elections must be held next year.




Tolbert is clearly prepared to fight back, probably through behind-the-scenes deals with key members of the ruling oligarchy. The main plum in his bargaining is the now vacant office of vice president, for which an "immediate" special election is required. One rumor circulating in Monrovia is that Tolbert has agreed to back William Tubman Jr., the late president's 36-year-old son, for the post, and to stand for election

himself at the same time. Tolbert allegedly reasons that a Tolbert - Tubman Jr. ticket would be unbeatable, and that he would profit from enhanced legitimacy and the longer eight-year tenure allowed first-term presidents. Whatever the final solution, the maneuvering by Liberia's power brokers has only just begun.



William Tolbert



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Egypt: Sadat Searches for Peace Despite Frustrations

President Sadat broke no new ground during his speech commemorating the anniversary of the revolution of 23 July 1952, but he did vent his sense of frustration over the state of Middle Eastern affairs.

He began his address with a lengthy review of the domestic situation, dwelling on the need to create a strong, modern state, and calling for "open dialogue and democracy" within Egypt's newly restructured political organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Sadat expressed his sadness at the present disarray in the Arab world, especially on the moribund "Eastern Front." Particularly bitter criticism was directed at King Husayn of Jordan and his recent actions against the fedayeen. Sadat accused Husayn of "prevaricating," charging that he must

bear the responsibility for the "crimes which have taken place in Jordan."

The Egyptian President's unhappiness was also evident in his remarks concerning the prolonged impasse with Israel. He restated his earlier vow that 1971 would be a decisive year, then went somewhat further by pledging that he would "not allow it to pass without this battle being decided." Sadat modified this statement a few days later, however, when he told the ASU National Congress, "I am not saying that our road to victory must be completed this year." Sadat closed no doors to a political solution during his remarks; he reiterated his support for UN peace efforts and stated that he would "never stop looking for any road leading to peace if there is a chance for peace." [redacted]

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Yemen (Aden): Plus ça Change...

The squabbling between "moderate" and leftist factions in Aden will probably be quelled by the return last week of the influential secretary general of the National Front (NF), the country's sole party. In the absence of Abd al-Fattah Ismail, [redacted]

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[redacted] competition between the lesser political leaders had brought the government to a virtual standstill.

Salim Rubai Ali, the head of state, took advantage of Ismail's absence to extend his personal influence and win support for his Maoist policies. Ali inspired various "spontaneous happenings," including the seizure of land by landless laborers, of fishing boats by crews, and of unoccupied homes by the homeless. Revolutionary groups also started appearing in schools, factories, and government offices. In a short time, it appeared, Ali was attempting to create a Yemeni version of the Chinese cultural revolution.

Ali's bid for power was opposed by Muhammad Ali Haytham, the prime minister, who heads a group of so-called moderates. This group, whose

extremism has a dash of pragmatism, remained mostly on the defensive, however, reacting to Ali's excesses rather than taking the initiative. The Haytham group's one attempt to take the play away from Ali fizzled when it was found that he had already gained the backing of the most influential members of the NF.

Haytham's position was weakened further when he lost the support he had depended on from the army and the Interior Ministry's security forces. The army sided with Ali as the strongest seeming political leader on the scene—ironically, a practice that Haytham himself had established under earlier circumstances. The prime minister's presumed support from the security forces proved to have been only a temporary tactical maneuver by the tribal group that controlled the ministry; the tribesmen were, in fact, trying to bring down both Ali and Haytham.

Ismail apparently also hoped that his two rivals would destroy each other during his absence, and so he delayed his return [redacted] until their infighting finally threatened to undermine the

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stability of both the government and the NF. Ismail was particularly concerned by the outbreak of clashes between landless peasants and property owners. Although this never developed into large-scale fighting, it created serious bitterness between local factions; even personnel of the armed forces became personally involved and refused to take action to preserve order.

Now that he is back, Ismail will probably support Haytham, so that together they can put a temporary end to Ali's radical policies. Once the mini-Mao is restrained, however, Ismail's alliance with Haytham is likely to dissolve, giving the extremists an opportunity to stir up trouble again. 25X1

Black Power Comes to South Africa

A developing black power movement, primarily among university students, is causing concern in the government. The authorities are uncertain how to deal with the movement, however, because it espouses "separateness," which is in keeping with the official policy toward the country's blacks.

The core of the movement lies in the all-black South African Student Organization (SASO), which was formed in 1969 when black students broke from the multiracial National Union of South African Students. The main purpose of the organization, according to a SASO spokesman, is to instill in black people an awareness of their own power, to restore their self-respect, and to teach them that they have to look out for themselves. SASO leaders have closely followed the activities of black Americans in recent years and readily admit to borrowing liberally from their views and terminology.

SASO claims 3,000 active members, a rapid growth from the original 30 who attended organizational meetings in late 1968. At a conference in July 1970, the leadership decided that priority should be given to building "black consciousness" and a feeling of solidarity among African, Asian, and Colored students. They initiated a campaign to end the activities of all multiracial organizations on nonwhite campuses and get the students to affiliate with SASO. Within a year, they have had substantial success: of the ten schools targeted, seven have formally affiliated with SASO and one has opted for a type of associate membership.

Although not as successful off the campus, the movement is not solely a student phenomenon. In Soweto, a large African township near Johannes-

burg, a "Black is Beautiful" campaign has been organized by David Thebehali, a militant young member of the local Urban Bantu Council. He wants Africans to support black-owned shops, to establish separate black churches, and to give children tribal rather than English names. Thebehali also urges blacks to move to their proposed rural homelands, which he wants them to develop themselves using money and expertise gained in the cities; if assistance is necessary, he believes it should be sought from black Americans rather than from the white South African Government.

Blacks have been hesitant to show much enthusiasm for the movement, despite its still nonpolitical nature, because of the government's pervasive presence. The blacks suspect—probably correctly—that SASO is heavily infiltrated with informers, and that security officials are watching its activities carefully. The government is caught in something of a bind, however, because a developing "black consciousness" is a natural by-product of the official policy to establish and eventually grant independence to the African homelands.

A complicating factor—and one the government is also watching with concern—is the rise in popularity of the charismatic chief of Zululand, Gatsha Buthelezi. Some black student militants already look to Buthelezi for leadership on a national level, and the government may worry that he will be able to take advantage of these movements to create a united black front. The quandary that Pretoria must therefore reconcile is how to continue with its plans for black "independence," which it wants, without fostering a further growth of black power, which it fears. 25X1

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Argentina-Chile: *The Salta Talks*

The meeting of Argentine President Lanusse and Chilean President Allende in the Argentine city of Salta on 23-24 July was generally harmonious and friendly and has been well received in both nations. The talks were held to mark the signing of an agreement on arbitration procedures aimed at resolving the long-standing boundary dispute in the Beagle Channel and provided an opportunity for General Lanusse and the Marxist Allende to size each other up.

The mutual suspicions that have traditionally characterized relations between the two countries were intensified by the election of a Marxist government in Chile last year. Leftist Chilean politicians were concerned that Argentina, perhaps in concert with the military government of Brazil, might seek to intervene in Chilean politics or actively attempt to isolate the Allende regime. The Lanusse government, on the other hand, has been concerned with the possibility both of a Communist take-over in neighboring Chile and of leftist subversion being directed into Argentina from across the long and undefended border. The presidents reassured one another in Salta last week, although hints of the tensions

were not entirely absent from the ceremonies and private talks. Allende reportedly told Lanusse that he would not do away with democratic processes and that if the people rejected his socialist program he would not impose it by force. For his part, Lanusse joined Allende in an official joint declaration that, among other things, paid homage to the principles of nonintervention and "political pluralism" in international affairs.

Domestically, both presidents appear to have benefited from the Salta meeting. President Lanusse's image was probably enhanced with the Argentine political left, and this should aid, however slightly, his current effort to smooth over some of the deep divisions in Argentine politics. The meeting also gave a timely boost to the prestige of the Allende administration, which is beginning to be embarrassed by shortages, economic disorganization, and recent political reverses. The talks with Lanusse are being treated in the Chilean press as the harbinger of a "new era" in Argentine-Chilean relations, and this major step toward neutralization of an ideological adversary is generally regarded as a diplomatic triumph for Allende. [REDACTED]

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VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA: Friction has eased considerably following Colombian participation in the recent celebration of 150 years of Venezuelan independence. The presidents of both nations worked at lowering the tensions raised in late May, when a Venezuelan plane violated Colombian airspace and attacked two US helicopters on a surveying mission. Despite the belligerent mood, fed in Bogota and Caracas by the sensationalist press, the Pastrana and Caldera governments agreed to proceed with scheduled meetings in Rome, where delegates will seek to settle the jurisdictional dispute over the potentially oil-

rich Gulf of Venezuela. The emphasis on the two countries' common heritage has continued this week, with Venezuelan labor groups meeting with their counterparts in Colombia, "to establish a harmonious climate." A Venezuelan labor confederation in turn has invited Colombians to meet in Caracas this weekend to discuss means to resolve outstanding differences peacefully. With many bilateral issues still unsettled, however, and with continuing military readiness along both sides of the frontier, the danger of another hostile incident is always present. [REDACTED]


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SECRET*Cuba: Castro Accentuates the Positive*

Fidel Castro struck a cautiously optimistic note regarding both foreign and domestic matters in his speech on 26 July. He clearly sees the trend of events in Latin America as developing in Cuba's favor, and he tailored his comments to take advantage of this movement. In discussing problems of the national economy, he was careful to counterbalance the negative with the positive aspects of production, and he neglected completely to refer to the failure to achieve this year's sugar harvest goal. His generally positive approach suggests that he is aware of the demoralizing impact his long recitations of economic problems have had on the public in the past and that he is taking pains to avoid any loss of confidence such as that which followed his speech at this time last year.

With Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda and a delegation of students and workers from Bolivia looking on, Castro lauded the "revolutionary" governments of Chile and Peru and expressed optimism that in Uruguay, too, a "popular government" could be in power following elections



FIDEL CASTRO

late this year. He attempted to take advantage of recent statements by some Bolivian officials regarding diplomatic relations with Cuba, saying that the request of Bolivian workers and students for relations "will not find a negative response" on the part of the Cuban Government. He indicated, however, that he expected that those involved in the execution of Che Guevara in October 1967, some of whom still occupy important positions in Bolivia, would be dealt with in due time. In the meantime, he said, every positive attitude of the Bolivian Government would have Cuba's support.

In domestic affairs, Castro avoided a repetition of the bleak economic picture he painted last year. Although he acknowledged that production difficulties were continuing in some sectors, he attempted to give a more positive view by presenting comparative statistics showing a general increase in industrial output during the first half of 1971 over the same period last year. Such a comparison is not very meaningful, however, because production in the first half of 1970 was low because of the unusually large diversion of labor into the sugar harvest. In quoting statistics, Castro failed to mention the size of the 1971 sugar harvest, which was more than a million tons below the original goal of seven million tons and two and one-half million tons below production of 1970. Although his emphasis was on positive economic developments, he gave no indication that he expected Cuba's problems to diminish significantly in the near future.

Regarding Cuba's relations with the US, Castro said he "will not seek a conciliation of any kind with the Yankee imperialists." He did not flatly reject all moves toward an improvement in relations, but he stated emphatically that concessions on his part would be totally unacceptable.

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A Counterbalance to Moderate Trend in Peru

Recent developments in Peru demonstrate an effort by the Velasco government to take a more pragmatic approach in dealing with the growing economic problems and at the same time to retain a revolutionary image. Moderates and conservatives seem to be taking an increasingly dominant role in the government's day-to-day operation through their control of most of the ministries, but at the same time the government has set up a new "social mobilization" organization that has a definite radical leftist orientation.

Evidence of a trend toward moderation has slowly been building over the past several months. The first indication was cabinet changes in April and May, the most significant of which was the appointment of the moderate Admiral Jimenez to the important post of minister of industry. Increasing criticism from the army both of President Velasco's leftist drift and of his handling of Peru's economic problems was probably largely responsible for the apparent change of direction. The recent signing of an oil exploration and exploitation contract with the Occidental Oil Company, the tougher stand toward the Communist labor confederation, and President Velasco's quiet reaction to cuts in Peru's US sugar quota, are some of the more outstanding examples of the apparent move toward moderation.

The establishment last month of the National System for Support for Social Mobilization (SNAMS) now appears, at least in part, to be an effort to salvage the military government's fading revolutionary image. President Velasco appointed one of his most trusted supporters, General Rodriguez Figueroa, to head the new cabinet-level organization. The stated objectives of the new organization are the training and orientation of the people, the development of social institutions,

and the establishment of a direct line of communication between the government and the people. General Rodriguez, himself one of the more dynamic and radical members of the government, reportedly will be assisted by Carlos Delgado, an adviser to Velasco who is generally believed to have been responsible for the President's more radical and demagogic speeches.

Rodriguez and Delgado have appointed several leftist and pro-Communist officials to aid them in getting the social mobilization organization off the ground.

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President Velasco and General Rodriguez have denied that the social mobilization effort is aimed at creating a government political party, but considerable speculation remains that it will serve that purpose. There is evidence that some elements within the armed forces are becoming more intent on turning the government back to civilians, but this cannot be done until some mechanism has been devised for transferring power to civilians who will continue the revolution the military has begun. Until that time the social mobilization organization, led primarily by radicals, will probably be charged with bolstering the sagging revolutionary image of the Velasco government.

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Costa Rican President Isolated Politically

A chorus of opposition to the establishment of a Soviet presence has developed, as have signs of more general opposition to President Figueres' personalist government.

With the Soviet ambassador expected to arrive at any time, pressure is mounting for Figueres to withdraw his approval of a Soviet mission in San Jose. Although right-wing groups have been sniping at Figueres ever since he began commercial and diplomatic dealings with the USSR, fear that Costa Rica's traditional democratic institutions will be undermined by sophisticated subversive activity has spread to a wide spectrum of the society. The official publication of the Catholic Church has expressed concern over the political disruption that might follow the Soviets' arrival and has joined the conservative Free Costa Rica Movement in its call for a plebiscite on the issue.

The opposition now has extended to the point that Figueres is isolated in his desire to remove Costa Rica from the small company of nations in Latin America without diplomatic ties to Moscow. His two vice presidents have published a letter attempting to remove themselves from responsibility for the Figueres' policies, with which they disagree, and his National Liberation Party (PLN) leaders have strongly criticized Figueres' performance.

Even the coffee growers association, whose members stood to gain financially from anticipated Soviet coffee purchases, this week voted against the government position on diplomatic relations with the USSR. The coffee growers evidently read the broad anti-Soviet sentiment as an overwhelming impediment to a sale to the Soviets, because the barter—rather than cash—desired by Moscow requires legislative approval.

Figueres' policies frequently have been at odds with general PLN positions, and the President regularly pursues his own course without consulting party or cabinet officials. His treatment of the PLN as a "family club" has left deep resentments and divisions in the organization. PLN leaders have decided to put their internal crisis on ice until next month, when they will meet to hammer out suggestions for a cabinet overhaul and a working arrangement with the President.

These political difficulties, combined with the poor prospects that the Central American Common Market can be revived and the deterioration in Costa Rica's monetary and balance-of-payments situations, have made for a tense period. A final vote is due in the assembly this week on the highly controversial constitutional amendment that would permit the Communist Party to function legally. If the amendment is defeated as expected, some of the political heat may be temporarily dissipated.

Haiti: *Under New Management*

President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier continues to display an acute and practical intelligence in his conduct of foreign and domestic policy. From the government's inauguration on 22 April to the dedication of the Peligre hydroelectric project on 22 July, the administration has honored its debt to Papa Doc while departing

markedly in style from that associated with the dead dictator's regime.

The welcome extended to the world press at the beginning of the new government continues in force. Definite but dignified overtures to foreign investors and requests for foreign aid have been

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made. The conditional amnesty for exiles appears to be both an open invitation to expatriates to return and a firm warning to those dedicated to Duvalier's overthrow to keep their distance.



President Duvalier

Young Duvalier is seeking to profit from the more positive aspects of "the Duvalier revolution" engineered by Francois Duvalier while at the same time dissociating the new government from the uglier aspects of his father's regime. Prime examples of the new look are the apparent downgrading of the

National Security Volunteers (VSN), an instrument of intimidation and local control used by the late dictator, and Justice Minister Andre Rousseau's speech at the Estates General, in early July, in which he criticized excesses of the past.

The dangers inherent in an essentially collegial government nominally headed by a young and inexperienced chief executive are obvious, but the decisiveness and cohesion displayed thus far suggest that the participants are not yet inclined to pursue their individual ambitions. The government's durability may be increased by the lack of any realistic alternative, by the unexpectedly permissive atmosphere, and by the government's avowed interest in social and economic development.

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Uruguay's Leftist Challengers Off to a Fast Start

The new leftist coalition, the Frente Amplio, has dominated the political spotlight through the early months of the campaign leading to the general elections in November. The left's free-spending campaign is designed to portray the coalition as a serious electoral threat and, although it has not yet been confronted with full-scale counterefforts by the major parties, it continues to maintain considerable momentum.

With the Colorado and Blanco parties still occupied with internal squabbles, the Frente's high-profile campaign has received the lion's share of publicity. By early July, Frente presidential candidate Seregni had visited all 19 departments in the country. This campaigning, along with his wide-ranging activities in the capital, is designed to portray Seregni as a credible national candi-

date. The Frente strategy is straightforward: portray itself as a popular, realistic alternative to the traditional party structures that, through their century-long political domination, have brought terrorism, corruption, and economic decline. The Blanco and Colorado counterstrategy is to portray the Frente as an upstart, Communist-led attempt to undermine Uruguay's democratic political structure. The Blancos and Colorados have yet to oppose the Frente campaign in force, however. For example, what is probably the strongest faction of the Colorado Party, List 15, will not choose its presidential candidate until after its internal elections in mid-September.

Meanwhile, the Frente campaign is in high gear and suffering from no lack of funds. It seems probable, given the destitution of other Frente

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members, that the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) is supplying most of the finances for the Frente effort, which includes a large dose of radio and TV publicity. The "democratic forces" within the front—the Christian Democrats and the Colorado and Blanco dissidents—maintain that they will control the coalition. However, it is the PCU, and to a lesser extent a political group associated with the terrorist National Liberation Movement, that is concentrating on basic organizational activities.



Seregni also has demonstrated considerable skill in identifying the Frente with opposition causes. Frente legislators are strongly supporting the current congressional effort to impeach President Pacheco for overstepping his authority, an attempt that has cleared the Chamber of Deputies but seems likely to fail in the Senate next week. After a student death during a confused altercation involving police last Saturday, a Frente declaration held the government responsible, and the coalition unsuccessfully attempted to interpellate the minister of interior over the incident.

Public opinion polls in May showed the Frente running even or slightly ahead of the traditional parties in Montevideo. Such a performance



has buoyed Frente supporters' hopes and they now predict they will capture the majority in the capital and contend they have a real chance of winning the national elections. Such claims have yet to be tested by a concerted opposition campaign or by expected anti-Frente administration efforts, however, and even at this early date they appear exaggerated.



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