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CONTENTS

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Page

MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Egypt: Post-Nasir Maneuvering 1

Middle East: Moscow Retaliates to Charges of Cease-fire Violations 2

Jordan: Another Agreement with the Fedayeen 3

Rhodesia: Sanctions Not Working 5



25X1

Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Opts for Force 7

Central African Republic: The President Lives Dangerously 7

Indian Aircraft Industry Plods Along 8

FAR EAST

Vietnam: Yeas and Nays for Peace Plan 10

Cambodia: Harassing Probes Greet New Republic 12

Laos: What Price Peace? 13

Communist China: Joining the World 14

Communist China: Provincial Permutations 15

OSD review completed

SECRET

SECRET

EUROPE

25X6



NATO Probes Uncertain Future 17

Italy: Social Reforms Inch Ahead 17

Europe Calm About Oil Situation 18

Yugoslavia - Communist China: Economic Relations Expand 19

Soviet Economy: A Moscow Economist's Glum View 19

USSR-Iran: New Economic Pact 20

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Chilean Leftists Having Problems 21

Bolivia: Torres' First Moves 22

Brazil: Church-State Problems 23

Cuba: "Motivating" the People 24

NOTES: Africa; Turkey; Nigeria; Romania; Cuba - Warsaw Pact

SECRET

SECRET

MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Egypt: Post-Nasir Maneuvering

The election of Anwar Sadat to the presidency in the national plebiscite on 15 October marks the end of what is probably only the first round in a protracted struggle for power within the Egyptian hierarchy.

Behind-the-scenes jockeying continues apace, with no single individual strong enough to take complete control. The three identifiable leaders who now share the reins of power have apparently agreed—if only tacitly—to continue their collegial leadership for the moment. Sadat has the presidency, but he and the other two members of the triumvirate—Minister of Interior Sharawi Jumah and former prime minister Ali Sabri—are still attempting to decide how to allot the three sensitive posts of prime minister, minister of interior, and secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union, the only legal political party.

An inherently unstable hierarchical structure thus seems to be taking form. No member of the ruling triumvirate has Nasir's hold on the Egyptian people nor is especially popular among such influential groups as students, intellectuals, the middle class, or the army. Perhaps reflecting a growing preoccupation with internal security, there have already been reports of the arrest of students and the dispatch of troops to quell possible disturbances. There are some indications that the Egyptian leadership is especially concerned about the attitude of the armed services, but for the moment the military is staying on the sidelines.

The triumvirate is also attempting to squelch any possible challenge by three other former associates of Nasir: Minister of Guidance Haykal; Kamal ad-Din Husayn, a member of Nasir's original revolutionary group; and ex-premier Zakariya

Muhyeddin, who is reputed to be popular among military officers, students, and the managerial class. Press reports from apparently authoritative diplomatic sources state that all three have been placed under house arrest. Unsure of its own popular standing, the regime is particularly concerned that Muhyeddin's supporters might pose a threat to its rule, particularly if Cairo suffers a setback in any aspect of the confrontation with Israel.

The Diplomatic Front

The Egyptian leadership's weakness at home severely restricts its ability to make any meaningful concessions in negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement. Nevertheless, the Egyptians have seized the diplomatic initiative in an attempt to put Washington and Tel Aviv on the defensive. Foreign Minister Riad, who arrived in New York this week, apparently intends to remain for an extended stay at the UN. He is expected to place before the General Assembly a resolution calling for—at a minimum—an extension of the cease-fire beyond 5 November, but on the condition that there is an early resumption of the Jarring talks. The Egyptians apparently believe that such an offer saddles Israel with the onus for letting the cease-fire expire and for continuing the stalemate of the Jarring mission.

The Israeli Posture

For its part, Israel is standing pat on its position that it will extend the cease-fire along the canal but would resume talks under Ambassador Jarring only if the "Egyptians and Soviets take action for the return of the situation in the military standstill zone to what it was before." The Israelis were, of course, heartened last week

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when the US took a similar position in withdrawing from the deputy-level four-power meetings (the ambassadorial meetings are to continue).

Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad's remark on 10 October that Egypt could not extend the cease-fire unless Israel returned to the peace talks has created some uncertainty in Tel Aviv. The Israeli press generally treated Riad's remarks as propaganda preliminary to the UN meetings and wagered that the deciding vote would be cast by the Soviet Union—which the Israelis believe wants an extension. Officials in the Foreign Ministry, however, think Egypt will not formally renew the arrangement, but will instead permit a de facto cease-fire to continue. They believe that Cairo

sees this as a way to relieve itself from any legal obligation regarding the standstill zone, although they do not expect the Egyptians to renew the war now. The officials hedge this prediction, however, with a reminder that hostilities could break out if Egypt were carried away by its own rhetoric, or got too involved in an internal power struggle. 25X1



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Middle East: *Moscow Retaliates to Charges of Cease-fire Violations*

Moscow has recently mounted a vituperative propaganda campaign intended to counter US charges of Soviet complicity in Middle East cease-fire violations and to shift blame to the US and Israel for the failure so far of the Jarring mission.

The campaign was spearheaded by a rare official Foreign Ministry statement, publicized on 8 October, which reflects Moscow's sensitivity to charges that it bears a heavy share of the responsibility for violations of the cease-fire/standstill along the Suez Canal. The statement makes an outright rejection of charges by "officials in the US" of Soviet violations and emphasizes that the cease-fire was arranged solely by the US without any participation by the USSR in drafting its terms. The statement also rejects as a "deliberate fraud" assertions that Soviet-manned SAM missiles have appeared in the Canal zone. This is the

first time Moscow has discussed in any detail the charges against it.

Seeking to place responsibility for continued tension in the Middle East on the US and Israel, the statement accused the US of taking actions leading to an "exacerbation" of the situation, including "the demonstration of strength by the Sixth Fleet, whose ostentatious nature is emphasized by the fact that the US President took part." It also denounced additional US arms and economic aid to Israel. Finally, making a public issue of the matter for the first time, the statement attacked US reconnaissance flights in the cease-fire zone as a "gross violation" of Egyptian sovereignty.

The Soviet media have subsequently taken their cue from the Foreign Ministry statement. One of the toughest commentaries, issued by

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TASS on 9 October, accused the US press of waging a "slanderous anti-Soviet campaign claiming that the Soviet Union has allegedly broken certain obligations connected with the cease-fire." The commentary went beyond the Foreign Ministry statement by claiming that the USSR "is not a party to any agreement" and that "the USSR is not able to break obligations which it has not assumed."

The TASS commentary also took a swing at Tel Aviv, detailing alleged Israeli violations of the cease-fire, including the construction of a "mighty belt" of fortifications along the Suez Canal. Moreover, TASS and the other Soviet news media have charged that the "press campaign"

against the USSR is a US attempt to "divest itself and its wards" of responsibility for the stalling of the Jarring mission.

The unyielding and sometimes belligerent statements from Moscow in recent days are no doubt an outgrowth of a considered decision to undertake a political offensive aimed at squelching US charges of Soviet responsibility for "alleged" cease-fire violations. At the same time, the Soviets are trying to attribute the failure of diplomatic efforts in the Middle East to US actions, which they claim have encouraged Israel to stay away from the talks. The tough Soviet line is probably also intended to serve as an earnest of continued support for Nasir's successors.

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Jordan: *Another Agreement With the Fedayeen*

Government-fedayeen negotiations have produced an agreement that does not represent a clear victory for either side. Many of the government's chief aims have been realized but were somewhat weakened by vaguely worded exceptions whose full extent still remains to be seen. One article, for example, seems to bring the fedayeen under the rule of law—long an aim of the government—but promptly waters down the point by mentioning unspecified exceptions. The fedayeen are barred from carrying weapons in town, but again, provision is made for "certain exceptional cases." Commandos are apparently answerable to the civil courts for ordinary crimes, although the fedayeen command seems to be responsible for general discipline.

Nevertheless, the government has made some clear gains. The provision specifying the location of fedayeen bases has not been made public, but the government has been promised that they will

not be near cities and villages—a major point of contention. Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Organization's central committee has been made fully responsible for enforcing its obligations on all fedayeen groups.

The fedayeen, however, were given concessions that the government earlier seemed determined not to grant. The Amman headquarters of the central committee, for example, will be protected by fedayeen guards and is apparently free to conduct a wide range of activities, including military. The government has also agreed that no one is to be detained or suspended because of the recent incidents. In addition, the commandos have been promised that the government will not establish or operate organizations "contrary to the interests of the Palestine revolution," but there is no indication that the fedayeen have any clear-cut veto power over government departments or personnel.

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The crucial issue of implementation has been left to a joint committee composed of one member from the government, one from the fedayeen, and of either Tunisian Premier Bahi Ladgham or his representative. Because the written agreement is so ambiguous, the stand taken by the joint committee will probably be decisive in determining which side eventually comes out on top. A continuing pan-Arab presence in Jordan is also guaranteed by the creation of a military subcommittee, made up of the observers from various Arab countries already in Jordan, which is presumably intended to prevent a new outbreak of fighting.

Meanwhile, the cease-fire continues to hold without serious incident, although there have been occasional minor clashes. A number of violations of the agreement by both sides have been investigated by the Arab supervisory committee,

which has successfully prevented them from escalating. The fedayeen are dragging their heels in moving out of Irbid and Ramtha; press correspondents returning from northern towns state that fedayeen influence is predominant in some areas, almost to the complete exclusion of the government.

Amman is peaceful and under effective government control. Yasir Arafat apparently made a triumphant return to the Wahdat refugee camp on 10 October, however. His entry was marked by a general firing of weapons that appeared "out of nowhere," after which Arafat and an armed fedayeen escort toured the camp. Large numbers of fedayeen have unquestionably gone underground in Amman, and it remains to be seen whether the government will live up to its oft-stated intention to deal firmly with the commandos. 25X1

AFRICA: President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is currently leading a prestigious delegation of black African officials on a week-long tour of Western Europe and the US to lobby for black African positions on issues dealing with white southern Africa. The delegation is visiting Bonn, Paris, and London in the name of the Organization of African Unity to protest past and proposed arms sales to South Africa. In addition, the recent Nonaligned Conference held in Zambia broadened the mission's "mandate" by commissioning it to press for the elimination of all Western economic and military ties with South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia. Kaunda also will report to the UN General Assembly next Monday on the accomplishments of the Nonaligned Conference. His speech is expected to be an earnest presenta-

tion of the standard Third World platitudes adopted by the gathering.

Kaunda realizes that his mission will accomplish little in the way of persuading Western governments and business interests actually to cut their ties with white southern Africa. He hopes, however, to generate enough favorable public sympathy to induce the UK to reverse its announced intention to sell maritime defense equipment to South Africa, but it is doubtful that he will succeed. The mission's other specific goal—convincing Western interests to withdraw from a large hydroelectric project in Portuguese Mozambique—also will almost certainly fail. 25X1

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Rhodesia: *Sanctions Not Working*

Rhodesia's economic performance this year, despite some agricultural setbacks due to drought, has been the best since sanctions were imposed five years ago and, in some sectors, the most notable in the history of the former British colony. UK and UN sanctions have not caused severe economic difficulties and they did not bring the Ian Smith government to terms. Indeed, the overall impact of the sanctions probably has lessened each year, despite measures taken to strengthen them.

Rhodesia's economic gains have been wide-ranging. In June the index of manufacturing production was some 61 percent higher than in 1966, reflecting primarily an increase in local production of goods to replace former imports. Both industrial and residential building also have increased substantially. During the first half of 1970, the value of new industrial building was about 65 percent above the same period last year. The mining industry increased its output in 1969 by \$28 million to reach a record level of \$122

million, and thus far in 1970 production is up more than 20 percent over last year's output. Most of the mineral production, moreover, has been sold abroad despite sanctions.

Demand for imports stemming from last year's extraordinary economic growth placed heavy pressure on Rhodesia's already low foreign-exchange reserves. The government last week introduced selective curbs on foreign exchange to favor import needs of Rhodesia's vital industries. Because foreign-exchange earnings from agricultural exports this year probably will be reduced, the pinch is expected to continue.

Nonetheless, Rhodesia's economic outlook is brighter than it has been since 1966. The country's economy is more diversified than before sanctions and therefore is better equipped to weather economic crises than in the past. If British sanctions are relaxed, as some conservatives in Prime Minister Heath's party indicate might be the case in another year, Rhodesia's economy would boom. [REDACTED]

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TURKEY: Although Prime Minister Demirel has been under considerable fire since last spring, he should be able to maintain his leadership of the ruling Justice Party (JP) at its national convention next week. He may face a serious challenge when parliament reconvenes on 1 November, however. The government's slim majority of eight votes is by no means firm and could easily fall apart. The 26 dissident members who were ousted from the JP last summer are still determined to dump

Demirel somehow, and are trying to form a new party that might draw away other deputies—possibly even the speaker of the lower house. Parliament will almost immediately be faced with several controversial items, including the proposed opium control bill and the question of corruption charges still hanging over the Demirel family. Either of these could be exploited further to undermine the prime minister's control of both the party and the government. [REDACTED]

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Sierra Leone: *Prime Minister Opts for Force*

Prime Minister Stevens resorted last week to illegal force to silence a strong political challenge, increasing the possibility that his opponents will turn to large-scale violence. Moreover, his strong-arm tactics probably will alienate moderate politicians who presently support the government, adding to the factionalism within his already-divided All People's Congress (APC) Party.

Stevens apparently acted in response to the insistent demands of hard liners within his party when on 8 October he outlawed the newly formed United Democratic Party (UDP). Over 20 UDP leaders have now been arrested, including the party's three most important spokesmen. The new opposition group had been part of the disparate ruling coalition until last month, when it broke with Stevens over his plans to introduce a new constitution, which they saw as the first step toward one-man rule. Stevens and his supporters view the new party as a particularly serious threat because its leaders command a large following in the north, traditionally a stronghold of the ruling party.

Stevens claims to be acting under a state of emergency that he declared last month when opposition efforts to organize in the north first sparked violent clashes with armed APC supporters. The declaration is without legal basis, however, as the constitution reserves that power to parliament. So far, UDP followers are trying legal measures to free their leaders, but they say that if this fails, they will use "other methods," presumably including violence.

Thus far, the security forces, which mirror the country's general political fragmentation, have gone along with the prime minister. The police and army chiefs, as well as some other security officers, are clearly unhappy over Stevens' resort to illegal suppression of his opponents, however. Stevens mistrusts both security heads, but so far has not moved to replace them.

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At the same time, the prime minister conjured up a foreign scapegoat by linking a US Embassy official—who was ordered out of the country—with one of the plotters. Sierra Leone's official press also has mounted a no-holds-barred attack on the US, precipitating an anti-American demonstration at the US Embassy on Thursday.

Although Stevens' crackdown has temporarily silenced his most vocal opponents, it probably has accelerated the erosion of his overall political position. His capitulation to extremist advisers will alienate APC moderates, requiring an even greater reliance on force if he is to maintain his position. Moreover, the new opposition has split Stevens' following among the northern Temnes—Sierra Leone's second largest tribe—while at the same time his traditional southern-based opposition remains intact. Support for Stevens' policies will be tested next week, when parliament is expected to consider his emergency declaration and other measures he has taken.

25X1

Central African Republic: *The President Lives Dangerously*

President Bokassa has recently appeared to be going out of his way to irritate France, his country's patron, while continuing to move closer to Communist and other anti-Western countries.

In 1966, to justify the coup that put him in power, Bokassa made much of the need to forestall alleged Communist subversion and to restore bonds with Paris that had eroded under the

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previous regime. Immediately after his take-over, the Chinese Communists were expelled and Western influence rebounded. Bokassa soon proved himself to be one of Paris' more erratic and difficult African clients, however.

Bokassa signaled the beginning of his more friendly attitude toward Communist and radical Arab and African countries with the announcement in mid-1969 that the CAR's diplomacy would no longer be bound by "ideology." As his foreign minister he soon installed an avowed leftist who has arranged relations with Cairo and with every Communist state save China and Cuba, and has even recognized Sihanouk's Cambodian exile government. In support of this swing to the left, Bokassa traveled during the past year to Egypt, Sudan, Congo (Brazzaville), the Soviet Union, and Rumania, and announced his support for some of these countries' policies.

Bokassa's prime motivation seems to be his dissatisfaction with the low level of aid his financially pressed country has obtained from the West. He apparently hoped his new path would jolt France and other Western countries into increasing their aid, or would possibly encourage the Communist countries to give supplemental assistance. Instead, the shift has failed to generate

significant additional aid from any quarter and has jeopardized relations with France.

Bokassa's latest and most serious tiff with Paris began in July with the French ambassador's public censure of the CAR's leftward drift. Bokassa replied with spirited defenses of his policies and with blunt attacks on "neocolonialists" and their institutions, such as the French-inspired Afro-Malagasy Common Organization. Last month, Bokassa suddenly expelled most French agricultural advisers and then stripped the French ambassador of his deanship of the diplomatic corps. Paris, which has usually adopted a detached approach toward Bokassa, is now searching for discreet ways to indicate its irritation. One approved proposal calls for continuing existing aid projects without making any new commitments until Bokassa reverses his course.

Any lasting aid shutoff would have a calamitous effect on the CAR's economy. Moreover, Bokassa's refusal to come to terms could become a factor inspiring domestic elements—already disgruntled with growing repression and lack of progress—to coalesce in opposition. Bangui has been beset for weeks with coup rumors, but there probably is no immediate threat of an overthrow as Bokassa apparently is still backed by the army, which remains the key to any successful attempt.

25X1

Indian Aircraft Industry Plods Along

The first MIG-21FL Fishbed fighter-interceptor to be manufactured primarily in India has been successfully test flown and, according to press reports, will be delivered to the Indian Air Force later this month.

The MIG-21FL is produced at three widely separated plants of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., India's state-owned aircraft manufacturing firm, under a 1962 license arrangement with the Soviet

Union. The program has developed in phases. At first India merely assembled the aircraft from imported subassemblies, then began manufacturing some of the components, and finally has undertaken "indigenous" production. In this last phase, India manufactures most of the engine and airframe and assembles the complete aircraft. New Delhi will, however, continue to rely on the Soviet Union for major accessories such as electronics.

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During the first two major phases of the production program, India turned out as many as 120 aircraft.




Difficulties in designing a sufficiently powerful engine for the HF-24 have caused the program to fall far behind schedule. India has turned to the Soviet Union for SU-7 fighter-bombers to fill the role intended for the HF-24s. Of the 139 SU-7s India ordered, about 100 have been delivered.



India is also producing two other fighter aircraft, the Gnat and the HF-24. The Gnat is a subsonic day fighter produced under license with the UK. The Indian Air Force ordered about 215 Gnats for delivery by 1969. Again, production delays have prevented the accomplishment of this objective and it probably will be mid-1971 before the production program for the Gnat can be completed.


The HF-24, a supersonic twin-engine jet fighter of Indian - West German design, was intended to replace the British Hawker Hunters and the French Mysteres now in the Indian inventory.

India will continue to attempt to improve its aircraft production capabilities to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. If past performance is any guide, however, it is unlikely that India will attain an independent production capability for the foreseeable future.



NIGERIA: The military government's announcement on 1 October that it intends to retain power for six more years has sparked little overt opposition, but discontent beneath the surface is growing. The press has generally approved the nine-point program for a return to civilian rule announced by General Gowon. Public reaction has been slow and diffuse, except among politicians who have a personal interest in a quicker turnover of power. Northern politicians are reportedly restless and annoyed at the delay. The always turbulent Yorubas of the Western State, although not entirely happy with the prospects of continued rule by a particularly corrupt military governor, appear to have adopted at least a momentary wait-and-see attitude.

General Gowon conceded that the army might be able to finish its program sooner, and pressures to shorten the timetable can be expected. It is unlikely that 61-year-old Yoruba Chief Awolowo, the highest ranking civilian in the government, will be willing to check his ambitions for such a long period.



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FAR EAST

Vietnam: *Yeas and Nays for Peace Plan*

Hanoi's "categorical rejection" of the Nixon initiative on 14 October contains few if any openings. Hanoi did seem to invite further elaboration of Washington's position on withdrawals and the shape of the postwar government in Saigon by charging that the Nixon address was "vague" on these two key issues. The statement makes it plain, however, that the Communists are sticking for now to the Viet Cong eight points as the "correct" basis for a settlement in Vietnam.

Hanoi's rejection, along with a similar statement by the president of the Provisional Revolutionary Government also issued on the 14th, caps a week of decidedly negative reactions by Vietnamese Communist spokesmen and by Moscow and Peking. The Communists have attacked the US proposal as "old wine in new bottles," a frivolous piece of electioneering, and an appeal for Viet Cong surrender. They have tried to rebut Washington by calling attention to their own demands, most of which are embodied in the eight points.

The Communists' public stance suggests that any exploration of the various "points" now lying on the table in Paris will be slow going indeed. The Communists could hew to their line for a long time, especially if they are satisfied that their position on the ground will see them through Washington's next major troop withdrawal announcement, scheduled for late next spring.

Mixed Reaction in Saigon

Many South Vietnamese have publicly welcomed the Nixon proposals, but there are indica-

tions that some of them have misgivings over the possibility of a cease-fire. High government officials have expressed approval of the plan and are pleased by the favorable reception it has been getting in South Vietnam. Some have noted in private that it puts the Communists on the defensive in the eyes of the world and also helps to defuse South Vietnamese peace advocates.

For their part, proponents of an early peace have received the proposal very well, and a few reportedly have begun to consider new initiatives of their own. The An Quang Buddhists and militant antigovernment students have commented favorably, and an outspoken Saigon daily described the initiative as "quite a big step forward compared with those announced with fanfare in the past." Some opposition leaders have suggested that President Thieu should have offered similar proposals on his own long ago. A few hard-line elements, on the other hand, have voiced considerable displeasure over the proposals.

That there have been few expressions of concern stems in part from the fact that most politically conscious South Vietnamese believed that Hanoi would not accept the offer. Saigon will undoubtedly be relieved by Hanoi's "categorical" rejection of the proposals. Remarks by some senior South Vietnamese military officers indicate that any improvement in the prospects for a settlement would substantially increase fears and uncertainty in Saigon. They believe that a standstill cease-fire would be very difficult to supervise and that the Communists would be able to take advantage of such a situation in the

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countryside. They also fear that it might lower morale and sharply increase desertion in the armed forces.

Devaluation Doldrums

The new proposal has taken some of the play away from the partial devaluation of the piaster and other economic reform measures announced by the government last week. Reaction in Saigon political circles to these measures has been mixed, with many observers reserving final judgment until the long-term effect of the program becomes clearer. Partly because the government made an extensive effort to explain its actions, there has been no sharp increase in prices or any expressions of shock and anger of the kind that followed the imposition of austerity taxes and led to the political crisis last October.

Casualty Trends

The enemy's losses may be easier to make up this year than last. The Communists' casualties have dropped sharply during the past summer and their losses for the whole year in South Vietnam have been reduced by about one third compared with 1969. they still

are suffering an average of over 2,000 killed a week, however. On an average, the Communists sustained some 3,000 combat deaths each week in South Vietnam last year, 3,500 in 1968, and about 1,700 a week in 1967.

The war also remains costly for South Vietnamese Government forces. This year, an average of 360 have been killed each week, the same rate as last year. In 1968, the year of the most intense fighting, their weekly losses were 465. Weekly casualties on the government side have declined this summer to about 230 dead, according to preliminary estimates. US losses have averaged some 95 killed each week this year, approximately half the 1969 toll, and in recent months they have been lower than that. These casualty trends have resulted in part from continued Communist emphasis on guerrilla-type fighting and the emergence of a new enemy military front in Cambodia. Also, significant enemy attacks have normally declined during the summer, when much of Vietnam is flooded by monsoon rains.

If the Communists follow past patterns, higher allied casualties can be expected from increased guerrilla activity and some main-force action during the coming winter-spring dry season.

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Cambodia: *Harassing Probes Greet New Republic*

There were no major military engagements during the week, but the Communists continued to keep the large government task force on Route 6 on the defensive. Government spokesmen in Phnom Penh greatly exaggerated the number of enemy troops involved in ground attacks against the column, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] more enemy troops and supplies were being moved into positions that could support fresh attacks on the column, now numbering 11,000 men. Thus far, Phnom Penh has suffered approximately 73 killed and at least 500 wounded in its stymied operation to reach Kompong Thom city since the offensive began in early September. Undaunted by its difficulties with this operation, the government this week sent 13 battalions on a three-day road-clearing maneuver south of Phnom Penh.


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A few enemy probing attacks along Route 7, between Skoun and Kompong Cham city, also were reported, but they did not appear to add up to any new Communist move to isolate the city and sever its supply line to the column on Route 6.

In the northwest, the Communists made more harassing attacks in the Siem Reap area. Government positions near Siem Reap city continued to be subjected to light enemy shelling, and Communist troops also attacked and damaged three bridges on Route 6 between Siem Reap and the crossroads town of Kralanh, which was occupied briefly by the enemy in mid-August.

A few small enemy actions were reported near Phnom Penh, but they did not dampen the enthusiastic celebrations in the capital over the declaration of a republic. The declaration may serve in part to improve army morale, in that it will give Cambodian soldiers a fresh and seemingly more democratic symbol to fight for. [REDACTED]

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Laos: *What Price Peace?*

The reaction in Vientiane to President Nixon's recent Indochina peace proposals has been favorable, but it is apparent that many leading political and military figures there are apprehensive about its implications for Laos. With Communist forces controlling as much if not more territory than ever before, the prospect of a cease-fire along present battle lines is not welcome. Moreover, a number of officials fear that the US peace plan could undercut their own efforts to start substantive negotiations with the Laotian Communists.

Although some hard-line rightists feel that the President's statement was not tough enough, much of the uneasiness is traceable to questions about what it implied for Laos' political position, particularly with respect to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which the Lao regard as the cornerstone of their foreign policy. The statement raised nagging fears that Laotian interests could be sacrificed in the US search for a settlement in Indochina.


Souvanna may express this concern to US officials during his visit to New York from 14 to 24 October to attend the 25th anniversary meetings of the UN. The prime minister also intends to confer here with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. In speaking with US diplomats in Paris this week, Souvanna said he had asked President Pompidou during his visit to Moscow to request that the USSR press Hanoi to respect the 1962 Accords.

There have been rumors that Souvanna himself would return to Laos via Moscow, but nothing definite has emerged so far. The prime minister is scheduled to return to Vientiane by 29 October, the anniversary of the death of the former king.

Government units succeeded this week in occupying Muong Soui west of the Plaine des Jarres. The former neutralist headquarters has little military value. The government made little progress, however, south of the Plaine. General Vang Pao's failure to push back enemy forces from within striking distance of the Long Tieng complex this summer means that he will face the Communists' anticipated fall campaign at something of a disadvantage.

In south Laos, three government guerrilla battalions were pulled out of the Toumlane Valley area after successfully completing an operation along Route 23. No major fighting developed on the Bolovens Plateau.

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Communist China: *Joining the World*

Tuesday's announcement that the long-drawn-out negotiations on diplomatic recognition between Peking and Ottawa had been successfully concluded is likely to reinforce and perhaps accelerate trends toward Communist China's assumption of its "rightful place in the world." Two intertwined issues are involved: recognition of Peking per se and the question of China's seat in the United Nations.

Sentiment favoring Peking seems to be slowly rising on both issues. There has been a gradual movement in this direction for some years—movement that was only temporarily arrested by the events surrounding China's Cultural Revolution. In 1964 France recognized Peking, and in 1965 the UN Assembly vote on the traditional "Albanian" resolution, which calls for the seating of Peking and the corollary expulsion of the Taipei government, produced a tie vote—the high-water mark, from Peking's point of view, on the issue. China's subsequent absorption in domestic matters and the self-imposed isolation that followed, coupled with the chaos and confusion that accompanied the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, somewhat undermined the tendency to consider Peking a full-fledged member of the international community.

In the past year, however, the appearance of renewed stability on the mainland, coupled with Peking's general campaign to improve relations with a wide variety of states and, more recently, with specific assurances that it is again "interested" in taking the Chinese seat at the UN, have mollified many who doubt that Communist China actually intends to become a "responsible member" of the international community. The leaders of several states have recently remarked that the present situation, which tends to "freeze out" a government that controls upwards of 800 million people, is anomalous. In other cases, Peking's more "reasonable" posture has reinforced domestic pressures for a change in attitude toward the mainland.

In these circumstances, the successful conclusion of the Sino-Canadian recognition talks will certainly add additional incentive to states, particularly Italy, Belgium, and Ethiopia, that are currently considering similar moves. Rome has already indicated that it may feel impelled to follow rapidly in Ottawa's footsteps, and the lengthy Italian negotiations on recognition may soon be concluded. Belgium will probably also follow, although at a slower pace. For its part, Addis Ababa is awaiting the outcome of the UN voting before considering renewing efforts to formalize its 1964 agreement in principle to recognize Peking. Despite mutual interest in expanded contracts, however, it is not likely that the conclusion of negotiations with these states would presage a wholesale granting of recognition by Peking to all comers. Each nation will almost certainly have to move at its own pace toward resolution of specific bilateral differences.

The well-publicized interest of many states in expanding ties with the mainland has also eroded support for Taipei as the sole representative of China in the UN. Canadian recognition, and that of Italy if it comes next month, may precipitate reconsideration of several undecided votes on the representation issue in the General Assembly in mid-November. Although the exact vote cannot yet be predicted with accuracy, the chances that Peking may receive for the first time a small majority on the "Albanian" resolution have grown. It remains unlikely, however, that even the largest probable realignment will result either in Peking's admission or the expulsion of Taipei from the world body this year, because Peking almost certainly lacks the votes to defeat the "important question" ruling that makes admission dependent on a two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, even a tie vote on the "Albanian" resolution would reinforce other factors causing various states to improve relations with Peking and could also inspire more forceful challenges to Taipei's credentials in other UN organizations over the next year.

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Communist China: *Provincial Permutations*

The nationwide rallies held earlier this month to celebrate China's National Day made it clear that the top provincial leadership endorsed by Peking at the ninth party congress in April 1969 remains largely intact but that the end of the regime's difficult consolidation process is not yet in sight. Interprovincial shifts of secondary military and civilian administrators are apparently still continuing and some political settlements that have been hanging fire for more than a year have yet to be worked out. The top leaders in five long-troubled provinces have been quietly removed, and the situation within the Peking city government itself is uncertain now that former municipal boss Hsieh Fu-chih has dropped into political limbo. The continued dominance of most provincial governments by military men and reinstated veteran civilian officials was strikingly reaffirmed, but their ability to work together remains open to question in a number of localities and the regime's efforts to get on with party and government reconstruction continues to be hampered by persistent local political combat.

One regime spokesman recently admitted that the inability of some provincial leaders "to put their houses in order" is a primary reason for Peking's delay in convening the long-awaited National People's Congress. Although the spokesman failed to identify the provinces, Hunan, Kweichow, Inner Mongolia, Shantung, and Shansi have all been politically unstable since the ninth congress, and Peking has apparently been temporizing in appointing new provincial revolutionary committee chairmen.

In Shansi and Shantung provinces, two military officials who have been active in local affairs in recent months headed up the National Day rallies, suggesting that Peking may be moving to confirm them as replacements for two civilian administrators whose political problems had been the subject of intense debate at the highest levels long after the close of the ninth congress. The confirmation of army men in the top spots in Shansi and Shantung would bring to 20 the number of provinces headed by military officials. Least progress toward a political settlement appears to have been achieved in Inner Mongolia and Kweichow, with the affairs of both areas apparently being handled on an ad hoc basis by military trouble shooters recently transferred in from other areas.

It seems likely that there have been more transfers of military and civilian officials between provinces than have been publicly disclosed, and this process of political checkers is probably continuing as Peking moves to deal with officials whose factional quarrels have been undermining the effectiveness of the various provincial governments. Shifts have also been made to fill long-standing vacancies, and this seems to be the case in the most important interregional transfer revealed by the National Day turnouts—the appointment of P'i Ting-chun, former deputy head of the Fukien provincial government and deputy commander of the Foochow Military Region, to military and civilian positions within the Lanchow Military Region. A subsequent radio-broadcast suggested that P'i may be the new Lanchow Military Region commander—a major command post on the sensitive Sino-Soviet frontier.

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
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ROMANIA: In conjunction with his attendance at the UN commemorative session, President Ceausescu is currently making an unofficial coast-to-coast tour of the US, meeting with bankers and businessmen and touring industrial plants and a nuclear power plant. He is interested in gaining an insight into how US capitalism works and into American industry's use of scientific and technological expertise. He also hopes that his exposure here will facilitate Romania's acquisition of US credit and technology. When Ceau-

sescu addresses the UN General Assembly on 19 October, he will probably make a strong plea for general acceptance of the principles of national independence and the participation of small states in major world decisions. At his meeting with President Nixon on 26 October, Ceausescu will undoubtedly stress the importance to Romania of its good political relations with the US and press for closer economic ties. He may also urge better relations between Washington and Peking. [REDACTED]

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NATO Probes Uncertain Future

The Allied study of NATO defense in the 1970s—called AD-70—apparently will come out strongly for the maintenance of present Alliance force levels and strategies. The AD-70 report, now in draft form, also stresses that the European allies must carry a greater share of the NATO burden in the years ahead. It remains unclear, however, whether the Europeans will succeed in their current efforts to embody this principle in a multilateral burden-sharing offer to the US.

The AD-70 study was proposed by Secretary General Brosio, acting on a suggestion made in President Nixon's foreign-policy report to Congress, as a thorough review of the military and strategic problems that NATO will face in the next ten years. The emerging draft report concludes that NATO's approach to security in the 1970s should continue to be based on the dual concepts of detente and defense.

The report comments that the next decade could develop into an era of "successful negotiations," possibly including agreements on Berlin, strategic arms limitations, other arms control measures, and one or more conferences on "European security and cooperation." Despite this optimism, the study observes that the Soviet Union still seems bent on extending and strengthening its political power and, therefore, whether East-West relations can be improved will depend on Moscow.

Because of the continuing nature of the Soviet threat as seen by the Alliance, the report goes on to reaffirm the Allied commitment to a deterrent defense based on both nuclear and conventional capabilities as well as the strategy of flexible response and forward defense. The study maintains that there is no substitute for the presence of American troops in Europe to preserve a credible deterrent, but exhorts the Europeans to allocate to defense purposes a "stable and possibly larger proportion" of their national wealth.

The defense ministers of the European NATO members—excluding France, Iceland, and Portugal—meeting as the "Eurogroup" on 1 October pledged in principle to contribute more to the common defense. They hope to make the US a specific offer before December, encompassing both a monetary contribution—the approach that West Germany had urged—and ways of improving their own defense efforts. But the prospects are not bright. The Europeans in general are reluctant to increase their national defense efforts given present public and parliamentary sentiment, and are in any case uncertain as to whether any plan they could produce would actually ward off significant US troop reductions.

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Italy: *Social Reforms Inch Ahead*

Prime Minister Emilio Colombo, one of Italy's chief economic experts, is making some progress toward the enactment of social reforms, and at the same time is exerting pressure for equilibrium in the economy. The government's most pressing task now is to meet a deadline of

26 October in winning approval of the Chamber of Deputies for a key fiscal and economic package.

The government and organized labor reached agreement early this month on the broad outlines

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of health and housing reforms. The labor federations had also demanded reforms in transportation, schools, and old-age care during a series of expensive strikes last spring, but union leaders seem satisfied for the time being with the present rate of progress.

The long-pending bill permitting divorce in Italy also moved this month markedly closer to the status of law and may receive final parliamentary approval next month. The issue in the past has disrupted Christian Democratic - Socialist cooperation and threatened government stability, but tension now seems considerably reduced.

Parliament is also reconsidering the government's designation of Catanzaro as the regional capital of Calabria. These second thoughts are in direct response to the continuing violent protest in the city of Reggio Calabria, which seeks the

economic benefits of capital status. [REDACTED]

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The crowded parliamentary calendar has delayed debate on the fiscal and economic decrees that the Colombo government elaborated during its first weeks in office last August. The decrees took effect immediately but must have parliamentary approval by 26 October to remain in force. The Senate made a variety of minor amendments but retained the thrust of the original measures—including the substantial gasoline-tax increase—in the version it approved on 11 October. The Chamber of Deputies, which must also face the recommitted divorce bill, has thus been allotted only 15 days to approve the package, which is pivotal to Colombo's program of accomplishing social reform without seriously increasing government deficits. [REDACTED]

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Europe Calm About Oil Situation

As oil producers fell into line and concluded new tax and price agreements with Libya recently, one major threat to West European oil supplies abated.

Production cuts in short-haul Libyan oil imposed by the government during negotiations have been largely restored. European consumers, however, head into winter with a tight supply of tankers, which stems from the continued closure of the Suez Canal. This situation was compounded this year by the shutdown in May of Tapline, which delivers significant quantities of Saudi Arabian oil, and by the unanticipated growth in Western Europe's demand for oil. Nevertheless, West European countries seem chiefly concerned with the resultant price increases: short-term tanker charter rates, for example, have doubled since May.

At last week's Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development meeting on the oil

supply situation, participating delegates expressed the view that there would be little ground for concern unless further production cutbacks in the Mediterranean area occur or the winter proves abnormally harsh. If present conditions prevail, Western Europe expects to meet normal winter oil demands through moderate drawdowns of existing oil stocks, which at present probably amount to two to three months' needs.

France faces particular problems. It soon will resume contentious negotiations with Algeria, from which it procures 30 percent of its oil. The fact that it provides a market for 60 percent of Algerian oil exports may, however, prevent any stoppage of exports as a negotiating technique.

Oil supply problems will persist until the current tanker situation is alleviated. Scheduled completion next year of tankers under construction is expected to ease the tight supply considerably. [REDACTED]

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Yugoslavia - Communist China: *Economic Relations Expand*

Since resuming diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level earlier this year, economic and governmental relations between Peking and Belgrade have expanded considerably.

For the first time in ten years, an official Chinese delegation attended the fall trade fair in Zagreb. The group stayed in Yugoslavia two weeks touring industrial establishments and meeting with top government officials. During the visit, substantive talks touched on a possible Chinese purchase of freighters and tankers ranging in size from 15,000 to 70,000 tons. The Yugoslavs are already building six 12,000-hp. marine engines worth more than \$1 million for the Chinese shipping industry for delivery next year. A Sino-Yugoslav shipping service was inaugurated earlier this year, and Belgrade is encouraging its East European neighbors to use Yugoslav ports for trade with Communist China.

Spade work for the current upswing in Yugoslav-Chinese economic relations was done in March 1969 when an official Yugoslav trade delegation visited Peking and, for the first time in over a decade, signed a trade-and-payments agreement with the Communist Chinese. Although potentially beneficial to both countries, trade expansion faces problems. Because trade between the two, totaling \$1.6 million last year, is settled in convertible currency, both will probably seek balanced exchanges so as to minimize drains on

their limited hard-currency holdings. China will be particularly cautious in making new purchases because its charter of about ten Yugoslav flag ships already represents an existing drain on its hard-currency holdings. Nevertheless, there is likely to be a measured increase in trade approaching and perhaps exceeding the postwar high in 1957 of about \$11 million for total trade.

In addition to economic advantages, the upturn in economic relations provides political dividends for both Peking and Belgrade, although ideologically the two remain miles apart and party relations between them are nonexistent. Both, however, have a common cause in resisting Soviet hegemony. Yugoslavia's new ambassador to China, General Orescanin, was well received in Peking last May and within a matter of weeks met with top Chinese officials, including Premier Chou En-lai. Belgrade responded in kind, and Tseng Tao, the new Chinese envoy to Yugoslavia, was received by President Tito and Premier Ribicic a few weeks after his mid-August arrival in Yugoslavia.

Relations probably will continue to improve. The Yugoslavs recently established a special section in the Federal Economic Chamber to monitor trade with China. Moreover, Ambassador Tseng Tao's recent meeting with the Yugoslav federal cultural relations chief, Dr. Dusan Vejinovic, could indicate that a cultural agreement is in the offing.

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Soviet Economy: *A Moscow Economist's Glum View*

In a public lecture in Moscow on 25 September a State Planning Committee economist gave an unusually frank exposition of the profound problems facing the Soviet economy. He made

few promises about the future to his listeners, whose hostile questions reflected keen popular dissatisfaction and anxiety over the country's economic performance.

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The lecturer was especially explicit in discussing the "social" problems besetting the country. The housing shortage remains acute, he admitted, and has even grown worse in some areas since the current five-year plan began in 1966. He pointed to "serious lags" in public services and acknowledged that there are "low income" families in the Soviet Union. At the same time he hinted at inflationary pressures by complaining that monetary income had grown faster than envisaged by the plan. He cited production losses as evidence that the country had not been prepared for the transfer to the five-day work week, a program announced by party chief Brezhnev at the 23rd party congress in 1966.

Enormous resources must be applied to solve these problems, the speaker said, but he also suggested that there are several obstacles to carrying this out. Agricultural difficulties are "problem number one," and the need to develop natural resources in the east and to expand the transportation network will raise costs in these sectors. With rare candor he told his audience that the USSR must bear a heavier defense burden than the US because it must match US defense spending despite a smaller economy.

The lecturer recited standard formulas for economic progress. These included faster technological development, better production organization and discipline, and more efficient use of capital investment and output. He refused, however, to comment on what measures will be taken under the new five-year plan (1971-75) and promised only that its much delayed directives would be published in two or three months.

The economist said he found many of the queries by the audience too "unpleasant" to answer. One questioned his suitability as a lecturer inasmuch as his organization was the one most responsible for the economic slowdown. Another asked why the economic reform had failed to justify itself. While denying that this was the case, the speaker said that a joint committee had submitted a report to the party central committee outlining the reform's defects and suggesting corrections. He also answered many questions reflecting anxiety over price increases with assurances that the prices of "mass" consumer goods would not be raised.

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USSR-Iran: *New Economic Pact*

With the signing of a 15-year trade and economic cooperation protocol last week, the Soviets underscored their intent to assist Iran's economic development in a manner promising the greatest potential benefit to the USSR. In particular, Moscow focused on the expansion of the Iranian natural gas industry and in principle agreed to double its imports of this fuel. An Iranian official has commented, however, that projects under the protocol will be undertaken only if Tehran considers them economically feasible.

Under the agreement, Soviet technicians will study two Iranian proposals to cover the cost of a

second gas pipeline to the USSR. Under one proposal, the USSR would install the pipeline and amortize its cost by importing agreed amounts of Iranian gas. Under a second plan, Iran would bear the cost of the pipeline with the stipulation that the USSR would buy the gas at the prevailing West European market price.

The first Soviet-Iranian pipeline went into operation last week. This system, extending from southern Iran to the USSR, is capable of delivering six billion cubic meters of gas annually. With the scheduled addition of more compressor stations, annual deliveries are expected to increase

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to 10 billion cubic meters in 1974. Iran is committed under existing pacts to deliver about 140 billion cubic meters of gas valued at about \$1 billion over the next 15 years.

The two countries also agreed to explore jointly for gas in the northeast frontier region. Soviet technicians are expected to go to Iran shortly to study construction of plants to produce petrochemicals of interest to the USSR. Soviet interest in Iranian oil was limited to proposed exploration in the Caspian Sea and central province areas.

In the nonfuel area, the Soviets are planning to expand the 1.2-million-ton capacity of the Isfahan steel mill that they are now constructing to four million tons per year, if this proves economically sound. The Soviets will submit a report on the plant's expansion to Iranian officials

within three months, and Tehran will make the final decision.

Measures to expand trade between the two countries over the next 15 years were also discussed. The USSR agreed to increase its purchases of some industrial products and to collaborate with Tehran on the import of agricultural goods during this period.

Moscow has also extended two credits to Iran. The first—valued at \$10 million—will be used to establish eight vocational training centers, and the second—amounting to \$44 million—will be used to develop Iranian industries. It is unclear whether the two credits are indeed new, long-term extensions of aid. Iran has drawn less than \$100 million under two lines of credit totaling more than \$483 million extended by the USSR during 1966-68.

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Chilean Leftists Having Problems

Salvador Allende is rapidly consolidating his power, but there is increasing evidence of dissension among his backers. Some extremist leaders within his own Socialist Party distrust Allende, and they reportedly are vetoing cabinet choices and political decisions. They are suspicious of the influence of the orthodox Communist and "bourgeois" Radical parties, the two largest members of Allende's six-party Popular Unity (UP) coalition. Rivalry with the Communists is deep, although the two Marxist parties have been political collaborators for years. In particular, many Socialists fear that the demonstrated organizational abilities of the Communist Party will be used to dominate Allende's government. They are frantically trying to improve the slipshod Socialist organization.

The Communists are using their many assets to ensure a strong but unobtrusive role and to

organize agitation in Chile and other Latin American countries against any attempt to deny Allende the presidency. They opposed, however, the actions last week by the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) that provoked military and police reaction. The Communist daily attacked MIR slum leader Victor Toro as a "paid ally of the conspiratorial right," and the UP directorate publicly condemned the action and disavowed any connection with the MIR. Allende did not comment, probably because of pressure from his radical Socialist colleagues who support the MIR. Even though the revolutionaries reluctantly agreed to lie low during the electoral period in order not to damage Allende's chances, the Communists were planning ways to destroy the MIR. MIR leaders call their UP critics "Stalinists" and compromisers and vow to maintain the MIR's "political-military structure until capitalism has been eliminated in Chile."


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Another problem for Allende is the continuing strike at two large copper mines in which the Chilean Government has a majority interest. He has warned the well-paid copper workers that their refusal of a proffered wage increase is costly to the country and prejudicial to his future administration. The strike is costing Chile about \$1.2 million in lost production and about \$0.5 million daily in government revenues.

ruptcies could cause industrial unemployment to increase dramatically by the end of October.

The economic situation continues to deteriorate and the inflation rate is rising. Industrial firms report widespread declines in orders, sales, and production. Many firms paid neither their suppliers nor taxes in September but did pay their wages. Although few firms have laid off workers because of Chile's strict labor legislation, bank-



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Bolivia: *Torres' First Moves*

President Torres' first week in power produced cabinet appointments and policy statements that appear to be responsive to military pressure, falling far short of demands of his radical supporters in labor and student groups.

Torres' appointment of a moderate leftist cabinet and his failure to espouse radical policies publicly appear to reflect military pressure and his realization that vocal support from urban-based groups could not overcome determined military opposition to his government. The first overt indication of military fears was the statement on 7 October by the commander of a major La Paz unit, concurred in by other La Paz army elements, that his unit was armed and ready to "defend institutional unity, threatened today by irresponsible extremism." Although this state-

ment was later "clarified" and stripped of its anti-Torres threat, the President presumably realized that the major units in La Paz were willing to act to ensure the type of government they wanted. The same point may have been made in a meeting on 10 October between Torres and leading military commanders, including some who had opposed his original assumption of power.



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Although Torres appears to have muted immediate military opposition to his leadership, his actions have produced dismay among his civilian supporters. Leftist parties and the national student confederation already have condemned the

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naming of "gorilla imperialists" to the new cabinet, which includes seven military officers and four holdovers from Ovando's cabinet. Additional opposition from the left is almost inevitable in reaction to Torres' statements to the press. He has refused to revoke the announced compensation to the Gulf Oil Company for its nationalized Bolivian holdings and did not announce plans for the immediate nationalization of foreign-owned industrial and commercial installations. Torres said, however, that he favored commercial and diplomatic relations with all countries and would consider the re-establishment of relations with Cuba. He also affirmed the state's right to control basic industry, specifically mineral resources, and called for the "progressive nationalization" of foreign capital.

Torres' refusal to bring prominent extremists into the government or to espouse decidedly leftist policies appears to be the surest way to retain the support of leading military commanders. He also must maintain the unity of the armed forces as the strongest element for stability within the country. One way to achieve this would be by minimizing moves against officers who originally opposed his claim to the presidency.

Because of his early and enthusiastic acceptance of leftist support in his bid for the presidency, Torres probably will be forced at least to consider some of the demands made by these groups. On 13 October, the government acted on two of the lesser demands by repealing a law permitting the deportation of five leftist clergymen and another that prohibited hunger strikes, a tactic commonly used by the opposition.

As was the case with Ovando, Torres' tenure will depend on his ability to handle leftist demands without alienating his crucial military backing. Depending on the latitude granted him by the military and on his own political skill, Torres' early policy statements leave him room to accommodate himself to important changes. Among the options open to him are nationalization of the US-owned Matilde tin mine or other industries, probably with some form of compensation; the extension of wage increases to miners and other groups; a degree of worker participation in some industries; and the establishment of some form of relations with Cuba.

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Brazil: *Church-State Problems*

Arrests and alleged police mistreatment of persons connected with the Roman Catholic Church are causing tension between the government and the religious hierarchy in the world's largest Catholic country.

The recent allegations are a revival of a long-standing issue. Moderate church leaders, such as the primate of Brazil, Cardinal Sales, have attempted to persuade government and security officials of the moral wrongness of torture, while at the same time keeping their campaign in low key to avoid antagonizing the military and police. They fear that by open criticism they would lose any chance of acting as a moderating influence.

This policy of restraint was evident at the 11th annual assembly of the Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) last May. Liberal prelates wanted a declaration condemning the government for torturing prisoners, but the government used pressure to prevent any mention of torture. A compromise statement was issued condemning violence in any form. Another result of the CNBB meeting was a tacit understanding that the church would refrain from public criticism of the government on the torture issue in return for an administration agreement not to arrest clerics until it had consulted with the CNBB. There was a notable decline in the number of allegations of torture following the conference, probably in part a

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25X1 result of the understanding reached as well as of the decline in the level of terrorism and consequently of arrests of fewer suspects. Late in August, however, 15 bishops in the northeast claimed that security officials had tortured two priests accused of subversion. [redacted]

[redacted] Despite avowals from President Medici that he is eliminating from the security services persons who have records of mistreating prisoners, and official denials that the priests had been tortured, the CNBB has called upon the President to investigate the charges thoroughly. It has set up its own committee to examine the case.

In late September, police arrested four priests and several youths connected with the Young Catholic Workers' movement (JOC) and with a church-sponsored leadership training institute (IBRADES). Both organizations have a somewhat leftist orientation. Cardinal Barros Camara of Rio de Janeiro protested the arrests to the President and other government officials. Additional friction was caused by new arrests of IBRADES employees on 7 October, bringing to 11 the number of church-associated persons being held by Rio de Janeiro police, according to the

CNBB. When CNBB secretary general Bishop Lorscheider went to the IBRADES headquarters to look into the arrests, he was detained by police for more than four hours.

An emergency meeting of the directorate of the CNBB reportedly has been called to examine the arrests and charges that the government is engaging in a campaign to discredit controversial Archbishop Helder Camara. Dom Helder recently accused the government of carrying on a mud-slinging campaign to try to ruin his chances of winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Several high prelates who often have attempted to curb Dom Helder's outspokenness now have come to his defense on the grounds that the attack on him is an attack on the church.

These incidents appear to have brought relations between the church and state to their lowest point in recent years. Cardinal Sales has stated that the policy of trying privately to influence the government would be maintained only as long as it showed some promise of producing results. If such hope fades, the church is prepared to take a public and more militant stand, even at the risk of further antagonizing the government. [redacted]

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Cuba: *"Motivating" the People*

Implementation of the rehabilitative measures introduced by Fidel Castro following this year's disappointing sugar harvest is in full swing. The militarization of all senior high schools, formally announced on 29 September, is perhaps the most far-reaching of the measures. Students will receive military instruction in addition to their regular academic study. They will be under "strict military discipline" and will be credited with having served time toward completing their military service obligation. All technological institutes already have been incorporated into this system. In addition, junior high school students

will be exempted from the draft as long as they remain in school. The regime plans eventually to make education up to the university level mandatory for both males and females. This program would in effect establish universal compulsory military service.


Meetings to combat absenteeism and promote worker efficiency are being held at all work centers to explain a complex system of merits and demerits that will be applied against each laborer's work record. Later, additional meetings will be held so that the "working masses" can

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"consider and discuss" a proposed law on vagrancy. Still more meetings will take place in November for union elections. The positive results to be gained from these repetitious discussion periods are questionable; it is more likely that the assemblies will only serve to irritate further a population fed up with what is already considered excessive regimentation.

Castro's latest ministerial shift elevated a relative unknown, Nora Frometa Silva, to the post of minister of light industry. The appointment is a departure from Castro's practice of naming trusted military officers or competent technicians to high-level administrative positions. Frometa has occupied key leadership posts in the Cuba Women's Federation since 1965, but her background shows little evidence that she is technically qualified for her new position. Her appointment may indicate that Castro is sensitive



Senior High School Students Prepare 240-mm. Rocket Launcher for Firing

to the charge that no women occupy top-level posts in his administration. [REDACTED]

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CUBA - WARSAW PACT: A high-level Cuban military delegation headed by Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro arrived in East Germany on 12 October to observe the Warsaw Pact "Comrades in Arms" exercise. According to a TASS announcement, Castro met with Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko during a stopover in

Moscow on 11 October. Also attending the meeting were representatives from Mongolia and North Vietnam. Raul Castro also headed the last Cuban delegation to observe Warsaw Pact maneuvers in late 1965. At that time he held lengthy conversations with top Soviet officials and paid a visit to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. [REDACTED]

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