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large number of first-time voters on the outcome is an unknown, as they tend not to have any party identification and do not turn out at the polls in such large percentages as the older voters. The addition of local and provincial contests to the national elections has also stimulated the growth of ad hoc political coalitions and greater stress on individuals than on ideology. Compounding all these uncertainties is the fact that the complicated system for deciding which man won which seat may delay the announcement of the final outcome for some 10 days after the polls have closed.

There is no doubt that the transition to a directly elected unicameral parliament will make Swedish politics more exciting and more dramatic in the 1970s than ever before. Aside from the elections themselves, the shorter, three-year term of office means that governments will be constantly campaigning for public support, while the more even balance between the socialist and bourgeois parties will probably encourage efforts to bring down the government by votes of confidence and other parliamentary devices.

For all the uncertainties about the outcome and the shape of future Swedish politics, it would seem that Olof Palme has the best chance to continue in power, though as the head of a minority government. This does not rule out a revived coalition between the Social Democrats and Center, but there is serious question whether Gunnar Hedlund could agree to accept Palme's leadership. If the bourgeois parties were to be the victors, a three-party coalition led by Hedlund would probably take shape, though recalcitrants within the middle parties might force a centerliberal minority government, dependent on Conservative sympathy.

Whoever wins, there will be little freedom of movement for striking new policy initiatives. All

four parties are unanimous on the central foreign and security policy questions. Despite their differences in the election campaign on economic issues, the four parties are in fundamental agreement in this area, too. Thus, for example, there is little likelihood of change in the nine-to-one ratio of private to state and cooperative enterprise. The four parties also agree on the broad lines of labor market and social welfare policies. Only in nuances and minor details would one be able to distinguish a post-1970 Social Democratic government from a future bourgeois coalition.

As for personalities, not much is known about the likely cabinet makeup in a post-1970 bourgeois government. On the other hand, a post-1970 Social Democratic government would probably approximate its immediate predecessor. Palme is a subscriber to Erlander's policy of gradual renewal of the cabinet, rather than complete shakeups. There has already been a hint that Commerce Minister Gunnar Lange will retire later in 1970, and Finance Minister Gunnar Strang and "Disarmament" Minister Alva Myrdal may retire within a few years after the election. There are also one or two other cabinet members whose future is uncertain, but they do not occupy major posts.

The end result of the reforms is to inject new life into the Swedish parliamentary system, anesthetized by years of one-party dominance. If a party shift occurs, there will also be an automatic rejuvenation of the losing party and an increased sensitivity to political considerations within the government bureaucracy. Should the reforms prove successful in Sweden, the traditional pacesetter in the Nordic area, there is even the possibility that similar changes will be introduced into neighboring Dermark, Norway, Finland, and even more remote Iceland.

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
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