

this domination, the Punjab and the CML continue to wield far-reaching influence and political clout.

Daultana, a wily veteran politician, is expected to play an important part in any national government. Recently there have been some indications that he is trying to temper his rather conservative image in order to reach an accommodation with Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League. On paper, the programs advocated by the two groups are strikingly similar, and a post-election coalition appears possible.

CML forces were given a boost in July when Air Marshal Nur Khan, former commander of the Pakistani Air Force, announced his decision to join the party. He is among an increasing number of retired military men who have recently entered the political arena. Nur Khan played a significant role in formulating the controversial labor and education reforms in the early days of Yahya's regime, but he subsequently had a falling out with the President. He is a dynamic—although somewhat unapproachable—personality who may be called upon for leadership in future Pakistani governments.

The National Awami Party/Requisitionist (NAP/R), which broke with Bhashani's faction of the NAP in 1968, is to the left of center on the political spectrum. The party claims the Northwest Frontier as its stronghold, and is led by *Abdul Wali Khan*, son of the legendary Pathan leader, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan*, the "Frontier Gandhi." Although locked in a political struggle with *Qaiyum Khan*, *Wali Khan's* party appears to be slightly ahead in the fight for the Northwest Frontier seats. Initially also leading in sparsely populated Baluchistan, the NAP/R now is facing stiff competition for that province's five assembly seats. The NAP/R's program of extensive provincial autonomy and other progressive measures makes it a potential postelection ally of Mujibur Rahman's Awami League and perhaps of *Daultana's* Council Muslim League.


Zulficar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), a tenuous leftist group that revolves around the fiery and controversial former foreign minister, rounds out the list of important parties. Bhutto's regional strength lies in the Sind, but Sindhi politics is so factionalized that the PPP may not gain any great number of seats there. Elsewhere, Bhutto remains an extremely popular figure with students and young people, who are drawn to his program of "Islamic Socialism"—with an emphasis on socialism—and close relations with Communist China. He attracts large, enthusiastic crowds nearly everywhere he goes, but observers doubt that his personal charisma can be turned into many solid votes or can be transferred to other PPP candidates. Nevertheless, Bhutto is young, opportunistic, and ambitious and he will certainly be a familiar figure in Pakistan politics for some time to come. Interestingly enough, Bhutto continues to enjoy good personal relations with many influential members of the establishment of which he was once a part; these friends generally believe that Bhutto has gone off the deep end in politics, but they do not take his activities very seriously.

Other Factors in the Campaign

With constituencies delimited and elections approaching, all Pakistani political parties are frantically searching their ranks for attractive candidates. Having been out of power and restricted in operation for many years, the parties lack the local talent and organization on which successful campaigns are built. Aggravating this problem is the image of corruption and incompetence associated with several of the traditional parties, which may be a factor encouraging potential candidates to seek election as independents.

The strength of the independents, of whom there are likely to be a substantial number, is one of the important unknowns that must be cranked into any prediction of election results. Some of them conceivably could play an important role in

the constituent assembly. The most notable of the already-announced independent candidates is another former commander of the Pakistani Air Force, Asghar Khan, who first involved himself in politics in the waning days of the Ayub regime. Asghar is widely respected for his integrity, but indecision regarding his own political plans has marked him as a political novice.



A Polling Place in the Punjab

Another unknown factor clouding the election scene is the potentially enormous peasant vote. It is widely believed that in East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman has successfully captured the local peasantry under his popular banner of provincial autonomy and "Bengal first." The situation is more complicated in the western wing. Most observers are predicting that ideology will have little influence on Punjabi and Sindhi peasants, who will probably follow traditional voting patterns, i.e., they will vote according to landlord instructions. In other areas of West Pakistan, caste, tribal affiliations, and local issues are expected to be the determining factors. Should these observations be accurate, the traditional, regional parties will emerge victorious, with the Council Muslim League the strongest because it represents the Punjab.

Outlook

Although no date has been set for the convening of the constituent assembly, it is unlikely to precede the provincial elections. Disposing of provincial elections before the first assembly meeting will allow the members to devote full

attention to constitution-making with no worries about campaigning. Presumably, if Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League receive a strong East Pakistani majority, Mujib may be more willing to negotiate his "Six Points" than if he were still under political pressure to prove his credentials as a loyal Bengali.

The newly elected members of the constituent assembly will probably spend the interval between the elections and their first meeting jockeying for position and bargaining to form alliances. Loose, temporary coalitions will probably be formed. In any case, it is generally recognized that success for the constituent assembly hinges on some compromise of East and West Pakistani interests. An Awami League - Council Muslim League axis appears to offer the best hope of a satisfactory agreement. Should this be achieved, a constitution would have one final hurdle: it must pass muster with Yahya and the army.

The representatives, on the other hand, may not be able to come up with a constitution agreeable to a majority. Pakistan's first constituent assembly deliberated nine years before reaching an accord. Should the 120 days expire without agreement, President Yahya will have several options. He may do as he has already suggested—dissolve the assembly and hold new elections. It seems just as likely, however, that he will propose a constitution of his own and demand acceptance. In fact, it is widely rumored that a constitution has already been drafted by Yahya and some of his closest advisers. Such a constitution, while providing for substantial provincial autonomy, would certainly reserve sufficient federal powers to ensure a strong central government.

In any case, any new constitution will probably set up a federal republic of the parliamentary type, with the president and prime minister coming from different parts of the country, the latter probably being a Bengali and the former a Punjabi or a Pathan from the Northwest Frontier.

Even if the political processes should progress this far, such a marriage of hostile regional elements might fall apart within a few years if it failed effectively to solve Pakistan's overwhelming economic, political, and social problems. The similar formula that was the basis of coalition governments before Ayub Khan failed to produce stability, and the politicians do not appear to have changed much in the meantime.

In the long run, then, regional interests and cultural differences may prove stronger than the

ties of religion and common antipathy toward India. Conceivably, the present Pakistan could eventually dissolve into two sovereign states. If secessionist tendencies do grow stronger, the army probably would go only so far in an attempt to counter them. During the chaos of Ayub Khan's final days, the army fully recognized that it would not be able to control a province-wide uprising in East Pakistan. At this point, it would probably not even be willing to pay the tremendous cost of trying

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Haiti: No Present, No Future

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HAITI: NO PRESENT, NO FUTURE

For the past 13 years President Francois Duvalier has ruled Haiti despotically. He personally handles all major administrative matters. The country lacks effective institutions; it is devoid of the leadership and trained personnel that could provide government services and continuity. Duvalier suffered a protracted illness last year and his health may be gradually weakening. A sudden termination of his brutal dictatorship—either through his death or overthrow—would produce turmoil.





On April 24-25 1970, Coast Guard commandant Octave Cayard, who was supposedly loyal to Duvalier, led a futile rebellion following the arrests of several military and civilian figures for alleged coup plotting. The failure of the mutiny probably will discourage other military leaders from moving against the regime in the immediate future. Contingency planning will continue, however, and a rapid deterioration in Duvalier's mental or physical powers could inspire a palace coup.

The extent of turmoil that will follow Duvalier's disappearance from the scene will depend on the ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate power. Available evidence suggests that when change does come, the succession will be controlled by the individual leaders of one or more of the security forces—the army, civil militia, and secret police. They are in the strongest position to act because they are armed and organized, and because their men in the palace will be among the first to know if something happens to Duvalier.

No matter who succeeds Duvalier, Haiti's troubles are not likely to be relieved. The country lacks not only modern government institutions, but also labor organizations, professional associations, and a responsible press. In short, society is as lacking in effective structures as the government itself.

Background

Since Haitian independence in 1804, only five of the 33 presidents have completed their terms of office—three of these during the occupation by US Marines (1915-1934). Violence, intimidation, and dictatorship have been constants of political life. With few exceptions, those who have acquired power have felt no responsibility as public servants but have sought to grasp power permanently while enriching themselves at public expense. Consequently the pitifully poor masses have remained illiterate, superstitious, and apathetic.

The government of Francois Duvalier fits the pattern. Since his accession to power in 1957, he has crushed all sources of internal opposition, including the Communists. He has purged and divided the army, cowed the Roman Catholic church, and subjugated all government organizations to his personal whim. His fanatic concern with political security and his indifference to economic problems have stifled government



President Francois Duvalier

programs for economic development. As a result, the standard of living of the Haitian people has deteriorated steadily. Estimated per capita gross national product has dwindled to about \$100.00, less than 20 percent of the Latin American average. Exports of the principal agricultural product (coffee) have declined. The government has chronic budget deficits and often does not pay its official debts.

Duvalier began his rule by weakening the military leadership, which had played a dominant role in almost every change of government since independence. He systematically purged all competent officers who might oppose him—including the mulattoes who initially made up the majority of the officer corps—and replaced them with his own creatures. On one occasion, for example, he sacked a dynamic, well-trained commander in Cap Haitien who had gained the respect of the people in his department, in favor of a dissolute non-entity capable of neither action nor betrayal.


He also undercut military authority by creating two counterforces, the National Security Volunteer Corps (VSN) popularly known as the civil militia, and a loosely structured investigative unit known as the "Service Duvalier." Until this year the 5,000-7,000-man militia was maintained in a parallel but separate status from the regular armed forces. Recently, however, Duvalier announced that vacancies within the military ranks would be filled by militiamen. It is not clear whether he plans a complete reorganization or simply a token integration of these forces, but his actions probably will have little effect on national security. The militia is not organized, equipped, or trained for major military operations. It has never defeated an invading group with its own resources, but it has assisted the army in patrol and mop-up operations. Only one militia commander, Zacharie Delva, has demonstrated unusual competence as the chief VSN trouble-shooter for Duvalier.

Although Haiti spends more proportionately on defense (approximately 23 percent of the

budget) than other Latin American countries, its only effective military units are located in Port-au-Prince. These include the Presidential Guard of 400 men, the Dessalines Battalion with 800 men, and the Port-au-Prince police with about 800 men. The capability of these organizations, which are directly under the command and supervision of the President, contrasts sharply with that of the remainder of the army, totaling about 5,000 men, most of whom are untrained and poorly armed.

Duvalier's Power Base

The "Service Duvalier," which consists of a handful of Duvalier's favorites, is not a secret police organization in the conventional sense. During the mid-60s, when it was headed by Elois Maitre and Luc Desir, it did acquire a sinister reputation, but now its responsibilities consist of interrogating political prisoners and fulfilling



Minister of Finance Clovis Desinor

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occasional investigative tasks for the President. With Elois Maitre in disfavor at the Palace, the Service Duvalier is nominally led by Luc Desir, but it seems to have little if anything to do. Recently Duvalier created a special staff consisting of four cronies, including his personal physician and Legislative Deputy Luckner Cambronne, to investigate the abortive coup attempt of 24-25 April 1970. Cambronne and Finance Minister Clovis Desinor appear to be the most powerful civilian Ton Ton Macoutes in the government.



Duvalier supporters march through Port-au-Prince following abortive Coast Guard revolt in April.

The Ton Ton Macoutes (Creole for "uncle boogeymen") are a name for active Duvalier supporters who receive special favors from the President and have been given carte blanche to do as they wish without fear of interference from or punishment by civil or military authorities. The most feared group in Haiti, they belong to no organization and include cabinet members as well as ordinary thugs and taxi drivers. They can best be described as a legalized Mafia whose sole mission is to maintain Duvalier in power.

Duvalier has erected a facade of constitutionality around his regime. The legislature and the judiciary, however, like all other organizations and groups, are directly subservient to the Presi-

dent. The Constitution of 1964, which designated Duvalier "President for Life," contains no provision for succession. All political parties except Duvalier's Party of National Unity (PUN) have been suppressed, and PUN exists in name only, lacking even a paper organization.

Rivalries

No one within the government has the strength to challenge Duvalier. Individual members of the President's family, however, have exercised some authority at various times. During the past year personal rivalries within the President's family have resulted in the fall of individuals who once wielded power in the Haitian Government. In December 1968 Duvalier's oldest and reportedly his favorite daughter, Marie Denise, returned to Haiti as private secretary to her father, displacing Madame Yvon St. Victor, a one-time presidential intimate and sister of Luc Foucard, Duvalier's ex-son-in-law. Marie was soon joined in Port-au-Prince by her husband, Max Dominique, who in 1967 had been sentenced to death for treason by a Military Tribunal and had gone into exile in Spain. Dominique, a former member of the Presidential Guard, was officially reinstated and appointed ambassador to France. Madame St. Victor, Luc Foucard, and Elois Maitre, former chief of the Secret Service (reportedly an enemy of Max Dominique), have lost the influence they once had.

Economic Conditions

The standard of living in Haiti, long the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has become still worse under Duvalier. It is said that Haiti's gross national product is less now than it was at the time of independence. The economic problems resulting from declining agricultural production and only a limited growth in the small manufacturing sector are too basic and severe for any quick solution. Yet Duvalier, instead of adopting constructive measures, has consistently ignored the recommendations of international financial organizations to eliminate corruption

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and implement fiscal and administrative reform. Despite continuing pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Duvalier has refused to make a public accounting of the financial operations of the State Monopoly (Regie du Tabac). Its revenues, estimated at \$10-12 million per year, are used to support his security apparatus and regime favorites. Because of his unwillingness to cooperate with international lending agencies, Duvalier has been denied the benefits of external assistance programs large enough to slow the economic and social deterioration.

Since 1963, when the US suspended most forms of direct aid to Haiti, assistance has been limited to a few humanitarian projects (principally malaria eradication and food distribution programs), whose funds are channeled through multilateral or private charitable institutions. Haiti currently receives \$3-4 million annually in assistance from the US and is drawing disbursements from the \$7.2-million loan granted by the Inter-American Development Bank. Haiti has given no indication that it would utilize this financial assistance to alleviate its basic economic problems, however.



Opposition

After 13 years of absolute rule over a largely illiterate society, Duvalier appears to have convinced most people in Haiti that they are benefiting from his rule even though by all objective standards they are not.

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The masses, who have displayed a remarkable endurance for suffering, will not easily be shaken out of their apathy.

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Luxurious summer home outside the capital as contrasted with slums in Port-au-Prince.

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financial mainstay of the Haitian Coalition, which has between 200 and 300 members and is headquartered in New York. It is the largest of the exile groups, but its activity has been declining, and at the moment it appears moribund.


It is doubtful that any of the small exile organizations could become a serious threat to Duvalier without decisive help from a foreign government. Military units from Port-au-Prince so far have defeated all exile incursions, probably because the exiles were poorly led and lacked motivation and adequate support, and because the average Haitian just is not interested in revolution. The most recent exile attempts against Duvalier occurred in June 1969 when ex-Haitian Army Colonel Rene Leon led ten men in an inept bombing attack on the National Palace, doing minimal damage, and in January 1970 when two small exile forays from the Dominican Republic fizzled.

Inside the country only the Communists have demonstrated a capability for sustained, though feeble, subversive activity. In December 1968 two minuscule parties, the United Haitian Democratic Party and the Party of Popular Accord, merged to form the United Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH). After the merger there was a definite increase in terrorist activity, although it did not represent a threat to Duvalier. Following some bombing attempts and the seizure of a few small villages, a number of people who had been to Communist countries were arrested. The government then picked up more than 100 persons, including several leaders of the PUCH, for subversive activities. The crackdown left the party in a shambles, and there has been little militant activity since mid-1969. Apparently the party is undergoing a period of retrenchment and consolidation.

Although Duvalier's public position has been consistently hard-line anti-Communist, his actions have been highly pragmatic. Despite the recent crackdown on Communist activities, a number of intellectuals often reputed to be Communist

oriented have been closely associated with Duvalier throughout his tenure. The government will arrest anyone possessing Communist propaganda leaflets, but Communist books and magazines are sold openly in Port-au-Prince bookstores. Duvalier also continues to tolerate the Polish Commercial Mission despite the low level of trade between the two countries and reports that the mission has served as a channel for funds and communications between the PUCH and Communist parties in Cuba and the Soviet Union.

These two countries provide what little outside assistance the Haitian Communists receive. In the past, both countries have given instruction in Marxist doctrine and guerrilla warfare to selected exiles.




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Radio Havana continues to broadcast in Creole and French 14 hours a week, but there is no evidence that the programs—which condemn Duvalier and the support he is alleged to receive from the United States—have any significant effect on the Haitian people. Broadcasts from both Havana and Moscow play heavily on the theme of armed revolution as the only solution for Haiti.

Recent Developments

Duvalier probably will die in office rather than step down voluntarily.



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Octave Cazard, former commandant of the Coast Guard and leader of abortive mutiny in 1970

had earned Duvalier's confidence by routing exile invasions in 1964 and 1968.

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Since the abortive rebellion, President Duvalier has moved to prevent further dissension within the Haitian armed forces. Although none of the tactical ground units in Port-au-Prince participated in the insurrection, Duvalier has evinced his displeasure with the failure of the police to ferret out alleged conspirators. Several officers reportedly have been arrested, and last month the government created a new position of deputy chief of police for Colonel Frank Romain, who

In spite of this normalization of relations, Duvalier has continued to persecute foreign clergy. In September 1969 all members of the Order of the Holy Ghost, only one of whom was a native Haitian, were accused of collaborating with Communists and forced to leave the country. These priests, who operated the College of St. Martial, had been collaborating with suspect elements and were active in promoting discussion and study groups among young Haitians. The church continues to play an important role in education by providing instruction to between one third and one half of the children who attend school in Haiti. Educational policy guidelines, however, are established by the government; the church schools must conform or risk retribution.

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Although 75-80 percent of the population is ostensibly Roman Catholic, voodoo continues to exert influence in almost all spheres of Haitian life. Consequently Duvalier has capitalized on the ignorance and superstition of his subjects for his own political advantage. He regularly compares

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himself to the ancient leaders of Haiti, as well as to such noted Americans as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, often going so far as to imply that he is their reincarnation.

Conclusions

As long as Duvalier rules, Haiti will remain a one-man dictatorship of the most extreme variety. His passing, however, probably will not affect the lives of most Haitians. Present indications are that there will not be a blood bath, as

the struggle for power probably will be restricted to those who exercise some authority over the command structure and have access to military hardware. The army probably will be in the forefront of the successor movement, but none of the key personnel has demonstrated any special leadership capabilities, and it would be sheer speculation to designate anyone as a probable heir-apparent. It is conceivable that the military would be content with an administrative role and turn to someone outside their ranks to serve as President.



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