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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

NAVY review  
completed.

State Dept. review  
completed

Not referred to CBO. Waiver  
applies.

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15 May 1970  
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(Information as of noon EDT, 14 May 1970)

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SUHARTO'S INDONESIA

Indonesian President Suharto, who visits Washington on 26-27 May, has cautiously and patiently set out to restructure the economic and political institutions that his predecessor, Sukarno, left in ruins. Despite the steady progress made so far, Indonesia still faces enormous problems. Suharto and the army, however, intend to remain in power until economic recovery is achieved.



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21

Israel has described its military thrust into southern Lebanon early this week as a combing and screening operation directed exclusively against the fedayeen. Casualties on both sides were said to be light.

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22

If the newly established central committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization proves to be more than merely a paper entity, it could affect the position of Yasir Arafat and other fedayeen leaders by ushering in a period of collective leadership.

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**FAR EAST**

Communist military forces and insurgents are now on the offensive in areas throughout Indochina. The Cambodian Government has been giving ground in the face of expanding Communist drives not only in many areas of the country east of the Mekong River, but also in some areas in the west and north. There is no evidence that allied operations along the South Vietnamese - Cambodian border have seriously impeded greater Communist activity in the Cambodian interior. The Djakarta conference on Cambodia (16-17 May), whose participants generally are pro-Western, will probably offer little more than moral encouragement to the Phnom Penh government.

A number of indicators suggest that North Vietnam intends a tough response to US policy in Indochina. Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's top negotiator in Paris, has left for home, and Viet Cong delegate Madame Binh may leave soon. Further, North Vietnamese party first secretary Le Duan's unusually warm reception in Peking, after his cool send-off from Moscow, strongly implies that Hanoi has reached policy decisions that are in keeping with Peking's hard-line approach.

In South Vietnam the Communists have increased their attacks in the northern provinces and have shelled Saigon and several other government centers farther south. These Communist raids come at a time when the Saigon government appears under increasing strain in carrying out its day-to-day duties, and when a political crisis is building. Prime Minister Khiem may be on the way out after less than a year in office.

The Communists in Laos have been concentrating their offensive efforts on clearing government forces from the southeastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. The recent upsurge of Communist activity in South Laos has begun to rattle government leaders, and the Communists are playing on the pessimism within government ranks by circulating rumors that certain provincial capitals in the south will soon be attacked.


Communist guerrilla operations are also on the rise in the northern and mid-South regions of Thailand. The security situation has deteriorated especially along the northern border with Laos. The Thai Government has had some success in joint operations with Malaysia against Malaysian Communists based in southern Thailand, however. Several insurgent camps have been uprooted.

The anniversary of last year's communal riots in Malaysia passed almost without incident this week. Stringent government security measures prevented any serious trouble. Nevertheless, two Chinese died as a result of Malay-initiated incidents, and the country remains a racial tinder-box.

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### Cambodia



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## CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SUFFERS MORE MILITARY SETBACKS

Communist operations are keeping Cambodian Army troops off balance and restricting the government's overland access to its eastern, northern, and southern provinces. Communist inroads in these provinces, as well as elsewhere, indicate that allied operations along the South Vietnam border have not impeded greater Communist activity in the Cambodian interior.

Phnom Penh appears to be growing more concerned over the deteriorating situation in Kompong Cham Province, where Communist forces reportedly have been moving westward in recent weeks. Enemy troops have attacked several towns in the province and have cut roads and telephone wires. In the adjacent province of Kratie, whose capital was captured by the Communists on 6 May, local reports claim some Communist forces are moving north toward Stung Treng Province, but thus far no major attacks have been reported in that area.

In the south, the Communists are still surrounding and attacking the towns of Angtassom and Takeo, and they also have cut the main roads north and south of the two towns. In Kampot Province, the government still holds the provincial capital, but scattered enemy attacks have been reported along the coast. Increased Communist activity was also reported in Kompong Speu Province, where the closure of the main road between Phnom Penh and the key seaport of

Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) apparently is the primary objective of Communist forces there.

The Communists suffered one significant military reverse during the week, however, when South Vietnamese Marines regained control of the Neak Luong ferry south of Phnom Penh. Western journalists reported that some North Vietnamese Army troops were among enemy casualties. It is doubtful that the Cambodians can hold this position without the continuing presence of South Vietnamese forces.

In Peking, meanwhile, Sihanouk has postponed his return to Cambodia. He said during a recent television interview there that "resistance fighters" in Cambodia had told him to wait for better conditions before joining them. In a message addressed to his "army," Sihanouk said he was entrusting the management of "liberated areas" to three leftist ministers of his recently formed "Royal Government of National Union" who he claimed were already in Cambodia.

On the political front, Phnom Penh and Bangkok have agreed to resume full diplomatic and commercial relations, and it appears likely that the Lon Nol government will soon follow suit with Saigon. Hanoi and the Viet Cong have decided to withdraw their few remaining diplomats in Phnom Penh. They did not, however, follow the Chinese Communist example and announce a formal break in relations.

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VIETNAM

After its initial temporizing and indecision in the wake of US actions in Indochina, Hanoi has now begun to take a stand. The Communists recalled their top negotiator Xuan Thuy from Paris on 11 May, and Viet Cong delegate Madame Binh is expected to leave later this month. Some Communist staffers will probably continue to attend the weekly sessions, but the Communists obviously do not expect worthwhile negotiations in this forum for some time. Hanoi has also underscored its rejection of recent proposals for wider consultations on all of Indochina.

Moscow's treatment of North Vietnamese party first secretary Le Duan when he departed after three weeks of high-level talks with the Soviets on 9 May suggests that Hanoi has opted for a tough stance. The atmospherics surrounding his departure intimate that Moscow--which has always counseled moderation--was extremely displeased with the line Hanoi has chosen to follow. TASS described Le Duan's discussions with Brezhnev as merely an "exchange of opinions on Indochina," and the Vietnamese leader was allowed to depart without any gesture of support or any formal farewell ceremonies.

Whatever decisions Hanoi has made obviously have been well received in Peking. Instead of ignoring Le Duan, as has frequently been the case in the past, Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and a host of other leading military and party figures turned out to welcome him when he arrived. The

implication is strong that the North Vietnamese have moved in a direction that will bring increased material and political support from China for their policy in Cambodia.

Troubles in Saigon

The South Vietnamese Government's inability to come to grips with problems such as student unrest and inflation is hurting working relations among key officials and could lead to a reorganization of the cabinet. Prime Minister Khiem, in particular, has begun to talk of resigning because of differences between President Thieu and himself over economic policies. Thieu has tried to gloss over any friction with Khiem, at least for the moment.

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Meanwhile, both student and An Quang Buddhist leaders have taken steps to control their antigovernment agitation in order to avoid further suppression by the regime. The students reportedly have initiated a three-day truce in demonstrations in Saigon following the government's ban on disruptive meetings and demonstrations. While Saigon schools are closed, however, some student activists have gone to other cities to help organize student protests. Although the An Quang leadership holds the government responsible for its clash with rival Buddhists, they have advised the faithful to heed only the directives of a moderate An Quang spokesman and not the calls to action of younger, more militant monks.

The government has been thrown further off balance by recent Supreme Court rulings striking down tax decrees of the executive branch and declaring the organization and procedures of military field tribunals to be unconstitutional. The court has also signaled that it may soon rule that the celebrated trial and conviction of Lower House deputy Tran Ngoc Chau is invalid. The usually cautious Supreme Court seems to be attempting to strengthen its role under the constitution and to be moving away from its past practice of avoiding decisions that might adversely affect governmental policies and programs. Nevertheless, the court has been careful to announce its decisions at a time when National Assembly legislation that would

reform or rectify such regime malpractices is pending. Because the Saigon government has a large stake in preserving the forms of constitutional government, particularly now that it is under intense pressure from a number of hostile sources, it will be hard put not to abide by the court's rulings.

#### Allied Operations in Cambodia

US - South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia have encountered relatively little ground fighting, but they have seized large quantities of Communist arms and ammunition and have temporarily disrupted the enemy's command and control facilities.


Most of the main force Communist troops and headquarters elements in Cambodian sanctuaries have fallen back and dispersed to avoid the allied operations. As a result, many supply depots have been abandoned by the Communists, and the allies have captured considerably more munitions in the raids than were seized inside South Vietnam during the past year. Enough rice has been captured to feed 30,000 enemy troops for more than three months.

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the provincial capital of Tam Ky that caused heavy casualties and damages. Sporadic heavy fighting between allied units and North Vietnamese regulars also continues in and around the large Hiep Duc refugee center south of Da Nang.

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, the Communists have increased their attacks in the northern provinces and shelled Saigon and several other government centers farther south. Communist sappers and artillerymen attacked numerous targets in southern I Corps, including a thrust into

It appears likely that the Communists intended the recent attacks to be a country-wide effort similar to the upsurge in early April, but enemy units located in the southern half of the country could not participate as planned because of their preoccupation with allied raids into their rear base areas in Cambodia.



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
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## COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE STILL FOCUSING ON SOUTH LAOS

The Communists have again captured the principal artillery base overlooking Attopeu town as they continue trying to clear government forces from the southeastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. Government guerrillas remain in the area, however, and are regrouping in an effort to retake the position.

The recent upsurge of Communist military activity in the south has begun to rattle government leaders. King Savang has instructed the chief of the armed forces to hold the Bolovens Plateau at all costs. Such admonitions usually have little effect on the army's performance, but they do reflect the concern of the top leadership.



The Communists appear to be capitalizing on the pessimism within government ranks. Employing pressure that is more psychological than military, they are circulating reports that the provincial capital of Saravane and Pakxong will soon be hit. The government announced that the threat to Saravane necessitated the evacuation of dependents, and by 12 May it had resettled some 2,700 civilians in the Mekong town of Pakse. 25X1

[redacted] reports of substantial new enemy forces converging on Saravane remain unconfirmed, but it is estimated that the Communists have upwards of 1,000 troops in the area. The Saravane garrison numbers less than 600 army, police, and armed civilian personnel, and it is expected to fall quickly if the Communists apply even light pressure.

In the north the military situation remains quiet. The absence of a major Communist move against Long Tieng in recent weeks has given a needed boost to the morale of the Meo defenders. Civilians have begun to filter back into the Long Tieng Valley, and the base hospital has reopened.

Vang Pao has positioned almost 1,300 troops in the hills immediately north of Tha Tam Bleung and has plans to push north into an enemy staging area near Ban Na. The guerrillas may run into considerable opposition if they move this way, however. The North Vietnamese have been rotating fresh troops into forward positions near Ban Na. [redacted]

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## THAI COMMUNIST INSURGENTS INCREASE ACTIVITY

Communist guerrilla operations, which have been moderate so far this dry season, are on the increase. The major threat remains in the remote north and north-central provinces, where a force of some 1,600 insurgents continues to erode the government's positions along the Lao border. The security situation is especially bad in portions of Nan and Chiang Rai provinces, where guerrillas have harassed several army outposts, forcing the evacuation of at least one.

Bangkok has sought to ease guerrilla pressure by the heavy use of air and artillery strikes. An army sweep operation last month into an insurgent stronghold near the Lao border in eastern Nan Province met with disastrous results, however. The guerrillas shot down two government helicopters besides managing to overrun several government base camps and inflicting a number of casualties on Thai regulars. The operation was sparked by a growing number of reports that the insurgents were trying to seize and administer whole villages in this region.

The security situation is more favorable in the northeast, where the Communists are still on the defensive. The enemy's much-heralded dry-season offensive has not materialized, a development that may further under-

mine the wavering morale of many rank-and-file guerrillas, as well as the appeal of the insurgency to villagers. Guerrilla incidents involving the assassination of informants and ambushes of local security teams remain endemic to the northeast region, however.

Communist guerrillas in the mid-South region have sharply increased their activity in recent months, particularly in the province of Phatthalung. The government's counterinsurgency apparatus has not made any meaningful effort to deal with the marked deterioration of security in this area. As a result, police are reluctant to wear uniforms; travel to outlying villages by provincial and district officials is reported to be at a standstill; and local officials appear uncertain about how to cope with increased guerrilla terrorism.


The counterinsurgency picture is considerably brighter in the southern reaches of the peninsula, where activity by the Malayan Communist Terrorist Organization has been at a fairly low level. In recent weeks joint ground and air operations by Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have uprooted several insurgent base camps along the Malaysian border, one of which was believed to have been the headquarters of the terrorists 12th "regiment."

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### Thailand: Insurgent Activity



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Area of Insurgent Activity

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## COMMUNIST CHINA TAKES OVER TANZANIAN MILITARY PROGRAM

Peking now is virtually the sole provider of military aid and training to Tanzania, following the departure of Soviet and Canadian advisers early this year. A small group of East German advisers in Zanzibar, however, still shares naval training activities with the Chinese.

With the elimination of Soviet and Canadian advisers, work has begun on several long-term projects. A naval base is being constructed, with Chinese assistance, near Dar es Salaam. The base is part of a \$10-million naval development program toward which the Chinese are providing assistance of some \$4 million agreed to in late 1968. In early 1970, over 100 Tanzanians went to China for a long-postponed, one- to two-year naval engineering and technology course. Peking has also started work on an air defense "system" that reportedly will include the construction of an air base, the training of pilots, and

the provision of an undetermined number of aircraft. An unknown number of Chinese military construction experts arrived in the early part of the year, reportedly to begin work on the military airfield.

Chinese military assistance to Dar es Salaam dates back to September 1964, when a small contingent of advisers was sent to familiarize the army with the new Chinese small arms that had been delivered under the first contract signed in February of that year. Since that time, agreements totaling over \$12 million have been signed for military hardware including small arms, antiaircraft guns, medium tanks, patrol boats and landing craft, and an assortment of other military-related equipment. Part of the attraction of Chinese military aid is Peking's willingness to supply equipment free of charge, or, at most, on liberal credit terms.

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**EUROPE**

Early in the week, Moscow made public a telegram from Premier Kosygin to Cambodian Prince Sihanouk, the text of which omitted the formal recognition the latter has already received from Hanoi and Peking. Kosygin's telegram appears to be a holding operation to permit the Russians to decide whether to throw full support to Sihanouk despite his growing dependence on Peking. It will be difficult for the USSR to continue out of step with Hanoi for long on a policy matter of this importance. Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet border talks presumably began again following the return to Peking of Moscow's chief negotiator, Kuznetsov.

In the UN, the US was the primary target of what was probably Moscow's most abusive attack in that forum in several years. Soviet Ambassador Malik charged that under the pretext of outside threats, "the boots of the American military machine are trampling the soil of Cambodia and the Israeli cutthroats are blindly and bloodily copying their teacher."

French-Cambodian relations are steadily deteriorating. The French have cut off arms shipments to Phnom Penh

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Official French opinion is markedly pro-Sihanouk, but no move to recognize his government-in-exile is likely because of the large number of French nationals and investments in Cambodia that would be endangered by such a move.

No substantive details are yet available on the proceedings of the three-day CEMA Council session in Warsaw, which was slated to close on 14 May. Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz told the opening session that economic integration and cooperation were to be examined, and he stressed the need for improved relations among CEMA countries. Creation of an international investment bank, price reforms, and economic relations with Western countries were among subjects to be discussed. The Polish press has called the debates "lively" and "controversial."

The Council of the European Communities (EC) this week made significant progress toward the beginning of entry negotiations with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. It decided to hold a formal opening session with all four applicants in Luxembourg on 30 June, to be followed in July by an exploratory working session with the British.

Irish Prime Minister Lynch has weathered the political storm engendered by the cabinet upheaval last week. His party's acceptance of his nominations for cabinet posts made vacant by dismissals and resignations guarantees that he will win a vote of confidence scheduled for the 15th.

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## SOVIET - WEST GERMAN TALKS RESUME

The focus of Bonn's Ostpolitik returned to Moscow, as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German negotiator Egon Bahr met on 12 May for the first time in almost two months. Following the pattern of earlier meetings, the two negotiators had little to say after the session beyond indicating that they would meet again later this week. Nevertheless, it was apparent that the talks are still mired in "preliminaries," and fall well short of actual treaty drafting.

Bahr apparently had hoped that his previous round with Gromyko in March would allow the two sides to move on to the negotiation of a treaty draft. This proved unrealistic, however, and there has been no suggestion that Bonn this time expects dramatic progress. In fact, there have been no indications that Moscow has any intention of scaling down the demands that have impeded progress so far. As before, Moscow is intent on gaining unequivocal West German recognition of the postwar realignment of German borders and of the division of Germany.

Obviously with the aim of putting pressure on the Germans, the Soviets continue to insist, both publicly and privately, that West German concessions on the territorial question are essential preconditions to any agree-

ment or normalization of relations between Bonn and Moscow or any of the other Warsaw Pact states. The week before Bahr's return to Moscow, the Soviet ambassador to France told a press conference that the Soviets will "tolerate no revision whatsoever of the postwar realities." His point was echoed in an article on 8 May by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko.

Last month the Soviet ambassador in West Germany told the US ambassador--evidently assuming his words would be passed to the West Germans--that Gromyko would begin to find the talks a waste of time unless Bonn soon offered some "specific concessions." The flexibility that Bonn has shown in its talks with Warsaw on the Oder-Neisse border probably has encouraged the Soviets to hope that Bonn may be brought to give way on the general issue of borders.

In spite of the difficulties, Bonn appears firm in its resolve to continue its pursuit of detente with the Soviets and the East Europeans. In particular, the West Germans want to assure themselves of firm Soviet backing for the scheduled meeting between Chancellor Brandt and East German Premier Stoph in Kassel on 21 May. Bonn is also aware that the conclusion of the relatively fast-moving talks with Warsaw is dependent in large measure on developments in Moscow.

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## ILO FACES SUCCESSION PROBLEM

The retirement of US citizen David Morse after 22 years as director-general of the International Labor Organization (ILO) has led to a hot, four-way contest over the succession. The ILO's governing board presumably will elect one of the four announced candidates at next week's special session, and the outcome could have considerable impact on both the direction and efficiency of ILO operations.

The ILO was founded in 1919 under terms of Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty. Seeking to improve conditions of labor by international cooperation and agreement, the ILO is based on the so-called tripartite principle--i.e., the representatives on the policy-making institutions are selected by the employers, workers, and member governments.

In recent years the principal thrust of the ILO's work has been directed at the problems of the less developed countries. Last year, for example, the ILO launched the World Employment Program to encourage ILO members to make their national development programs provide work opportunities and adequate incomes for a broader stratum of their populations. The Soviets have also taken a greater interest in ILO affairs recently, seeking higher positions in the ILO staff but attacking the tripartite principle.

The leading candidate to succeed Morse is his chief deputy, C. W. Jenks of the UK, who has been with the ILO since 1931. In view of Jenks' age, many gov-

erning board members favor his election only to complete the balance of Morse's term, which expires in September of 1973. The interim could then be used to secure interregional support for a younger man, which is presently lacking.

Paris, however, is strongly backing French national Francis Blanchard, another Morse deputy. Blanchard's age would permit him to accept re-election to a full ten-year term in 1973, and the French also argue that it is time for the promotion of a "Latin" candidate after the lengthy tenure of the "Anglo-Saxon" Morse.

Two candidates have emerged from the less developed regions. A third Morse deputy, Albert Tevedjre of Dahomey, recently announced his interest in the position. African ILO members previously had been thinking in terms of the 1973 election, but concern that someone other than Jenks might be selected now has prompted an acceleration of Tevedjre's candidacy.

A fourth candidate, Uruguay's ILO representative Hector Gros Espiell, like Tevedjre, probably would seek to focus ILO activity to an even greater extent on the less developed regions. Moscow's inclinations in dispensing the significant bloc of votes it controls on the governing board are not clear at this point, but it will opt for the candidate it regards as most likely to support Soviet citizens for high posts. 25X1

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## FRENCH GOVERNMENT MOVES TO DEAL WITH SCATTERED VIOLENCE

Over the past two months, there has been enough scattered violence on the part of student radicals and economically threatened small shopkeepers to provoke a strong "law and order" reaction in France. In this climate, the National Assembly recently passed--by a massive majority--extremely harsh legislation that would introduce for the first time a doctrine of collective responsibility of demonstrators present at the scene of a violent confrontation.

This action is a tacit admission that France's far-reaching university reform program, adopted in the fall of 1968, has not had the desired effect of calming France's troubled campuses. In fact, the Pompidou government no longer appears to be firmly committed to the goals of the 1968 reform program, and to date has not been willing to commit the funds necessary even to provide adequate physical facilities and teaching staff for France's rapidly expanding student population.

For the government, as well as for the future of French higher education, this neglect spells serious trouble over the long term. It was precisely the conditions created by lack of facilities and personnel that allowed radical groups to gain widespread support among the majority of moderate students during the student-labor crisis in May 1968. These same conditions, now combined with the lack of leadership and understand-

ing from Pompidou's minister of education, account for the absence of moderate opposition to student riots like those at Nanterre University in March 1970.

Unless it moves quickly to alleviate conditions through an imaginative and well-financed implementation of the 1968 reform program, the government's present "law and order" reaction will probably only increase general student sympathy for the radicals. In any case, scattered student strikes and occasional flare-ups of violence are likely to continue over the next few years.

The size and seriousness of these confrontations will probably depend more on the government's handling of the over-all university crisis than on the activities of the radicals. The radical groups are presently so fragmented that no concerted mass action is possible unless the authorities mishandle a small provocation in such a way as to blow it into a major incident.

Even so, such incidents are not likely to lead to another social crisis on the order of the one of May 1968, primarily because French labor is in no mood for massive strike action. As long as students remain isolated from other numerically significant social groups, they do not pose a serious threat to the Pompidou government.

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## YUGOSLAV PARTY LEADERSHIP TIGHTENS DISCIPLINE

The Yugoslav party presidium seems to believe its programs may be headed for trouble, especially because of opposition within the party bureaucracy. At a meeting on 22 April, the presidium adopted a resolution calling for the rejuvenation of party discipline in an effort to motivate the whole population to identify with the country's controversial self-management system. Under this system, councils are elected by the workers and given the power to manage their enterprise's own affairs.

The presidium's action is partly an attempt to breathe new life into the "liberal" resolutions and statutes adopted at the 9th party congress in March 1969. These provided for the opening of party jobs to better qualified young people as a part of the process of revitalizing the party leadership. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, party decisions were readily accepted as a wave of patriotic fervor swept the federation. The momentum of those days is now gone, and there is once again a general recognition that party members must ensure that the accepted party line is incorporated in the decisions of the self-management councils.

In recent months there has been some opposition to the "self-

management system" by Yugoslavs both in and out of the party. There is even suspicion among some leaders that the Soviets are behind this dissidence. The presidium resolution is aimed at such opposition, specifically requiring that everyone take a stand. Neutrality will not be tolerated.

Specifically, the presidium is intent on ensuring that uncommitted members be rotated out of party jobs and that the economic reforms be reoriented to lessen the gap between the rich and poor regions of Yugoslavia. In addition, the party leadership is interested in fostering an expansion of self-management under enlightened party guidance, and in a democratization of the party's reorganization and its manner of doing things.

Although unity is the keynote of the plan, it will be easier to talk about than to achieve. There is no hint however, that a party purge is under way. How party members are to work for self-management without increasing the party's role in day-to-day decision-making has not been explained. There is, however, a sense of urgency about tightening discipline. This is probably in anticipation of Tito's death or retirement, a time that many Yugoslavs feel is not far off.

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## SOVIET SHIPS VISITING FOREIGN PORTS

Ships of the Soviet Navy have been making a number of foreign port calls since the conclusion of exercise "Ocean" earlier this month.

The latest good-will visit began on 14 May when two anti-submarine ships and two diesel submarines arrived at Cienfuegos, Cuba. These units, which had been operating in the Caribbean for a week, will use Cuban facilities for replenishment.

The ships and two TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft that flew from the USSR to Havana on 13 May may conduct additional operations with a nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine sighted south of Cuba yesterday. Some of these operations may take place in the Gulf of Mexico. TU-95s provide reconnaissance and tar-

get information to missile-armed ships in Soviet naval exercises and may do so for these ships if they conduct missile exercises. A similar group of ships that operated in the Caribbean in 1969 had no aerial support.

A small squadron from the Baltic Fleet recently concluded a five-day visit to Cherbourg, France, to commemorate VE day. Similar courtesy visits were made to Algiers and Casablanca, and on 13 May two guided-missile ships and a tanker called at the Nigerian port of Lagos.

Exercise "Ocean," followed by such a high number of foreign port visits, reflects Moscow's continuing effort to demonstrate the world-wide political and military utility of the Soviet Navy.

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## USSR BECOMES AN EFFLUENT SOCIETY


The Soviets are becoming aware that environmental problems are in inevitable concomitant of industrial development and that their economic system is not immune to these problems. The recent drafting of water-pollution legislation and a willingness to participate in international meetings on the environment illustrate their growing concern. Although their pollution problems are not yet as serious as those of the industrial West, solutions will not come easy.

In the past, the Soviet leadership has been relatively unre-

sponsive to the pleas of conservationists. An example is the 12-year battle to save the unique flora and fauna of Lake Baikal from destruction by pollution from wood-pulp mills. A decree finally adopted last year forbids logging in much of the area and requires lumber enterprises to install purification equipment.

A Soviet agriculture official recently claimed that the government's failure to pursue a coordinated conservation policy has resulted in "immense" damage to the country's natural resources.

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Here we are trying to breed fish in conditions closest to nature.—*Krokodil*, Soviet satirical magazine

He accused the government of ignoring wind and water erosion, water pollution by industrial and municipal waste, overcutting of forests, excessive use of chemicals in agriculture, and air pollution.

Press articles have identified water pollution as the country's most critical environmental problem. Pollution of the Volga and the Caspian Sea, a result of offshore oil drilling and contamination by shipping and industrial sewage, threatens to wipe out the caviar-producing sturgeon. Irrigation projects and hydroelectric dams also have caused the water levels of the Caspian and Aral seas to drop, raising their salinity and destroying plant and animal life.

The most recent evidence of government action to stop this environmental mismanagement is a draft law to protect lakes and rivers from pollution. Violators will be liable to prosecution, and authorities will be able to shut down the polluting facilities. Various officials have urged that a comprehensive conservation program be included in the upcoming five-year plan (1971-75). On the international front, the Soviets have participated in various ecological conferences and are currently helping to plan a global network of stations equipped to monitor changes in the earth's environment.

The Soviets traditionally have been good at launching campaigns but less successful in their effective implementation. Cleaning up polluted areas and preventing further pollution would require tremendous allocations of resources. Competition over resources is already keen, with the military, agriculture, industry, and the consumer constantly fighting for larger allocations. The antipollution forces are probably too weak and unorganized to get even a finger in the pie.

Furthermore, enterprise managers are unlikely to sacrifice fulfillment of production targets in order to introduce antipollution technology. Finally, the slow development of and the diffusion of innovations, largely the reasons for the USSR's present technological lag behind the West, will also retard antipollution technology.

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### GOMULKA ASKS FOUR-POWER ENDORSEMENT OF BORDER


Polish party leader Gomulka has in effect called on the four wartime allies to be prepared publicly to declare their acceptance of any accord on the Oder-Neisse border that Warsaw may reach with Bonn. Speaking on 9 May in Wroclaw, Gomulka also reiterated that Poland wishes to normalize relations with Bonn, but that unqualified recognition of Poland's postwar frontiers, not merely "respect" for them, is the point of departure.

Despite his public position that the borders agreed to at Potsdam are final, Gomulka has been fully aware of the right of the four powers to a final voice in delimiting Germany's frontiers. He now appears to be seeking a commitment from the four governments that when and if a Polish - West German border agreement is reached, they will declare their intent to incorporate it into any future peace treaty.

Gomulka's statement implicitly endorses the formula pre-

sented last week by the French Government to visiting Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski, who responded favorably and offered to sound out the Soviets. France planned to present the proposal to the US and UK in Bonn this week.

With optimism growing in Warsaw that a bilateral border agreement can be reached, the fourth round of the Polish - West German talks is slated to convene in Bonn on 8 June. Bonn's Foreign Minister Scheel reportedly is planning to open the session to lend "solemnity" to the occasion. While he is in Bonn, Poland's chief negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz, is scheduled to meet with Chancellor Brandt. Bilateral economic negotiations, stalled since last January, may also be resumed soon.



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**MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA**

The Israeli thrust into Lebanon earlier this week brought only a temporary lull in fedayeen harassment. Some 12 hours after Tel Aviv's troops withdrew, the fedayeen shelled two Israeli settlements along the border. Israeli's Deputy Prime Minister Allon has already threatened to strike Lebanon again if the fedayeen attacks continue. Along the Suez Canal, action was relatively restrained during the early part of the week, but Wednesday and Thursday saw a renewal of artillery duels and air action. Egypt lost two MIG-21s, and several other of its planes were damaged.

The UN's Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) will defer most of its planned cuts in service to the refugee camps of the Middle East. The move had been protested bitterly by Jordanian and Lebanese officials, who feared it would facilitate fedayeen recruitment. UNRWA faces a large deficit if the cuts are delayed for long, and prospects for a favorable response to a special fund appeal are not good.

The UN Security Council approved independence for Bahrain this week, ending Iran's 150-year-old claim to the Persian Gulf island. The Shah had agreed in advance to accept the findings of Secretary General Thant's representative, who reported that most Bahrainis preferred independence to association with Iran.

Dahomey's new civilian government of "national union" was installed without incident last week, and a threatened general strike has not materialized. The regime is not likely to survive over the long term, however, given the depth of the country's problems and the mutual animosities of the three presidents.


Sporadic Muslim-Hindu rioting still continues in India following the initial outbreak on 7 May in a town near Bombay; so far, 106 people have been killed. Militant Hindu groups have been blamed for heightening the already tense communal feelings, and security officials now are taking extensive precautions to forestall rioting in Bombay proper during an upcoming Muslim holiday.

An apparent attempt by Ceylon's leftist opposition coalition to discredit Prime Minister Senanayake's United National Party (UNP) appears to have been largely ineffective. With elections scheduled for 27 May, the UNP and its allies now seem to be leading in contests for 77 of the 151 elective seats, and 19 more are considered tossups; the opposition is credited with only 42 seats, while independents and others lead in the remaining races.

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## ISRAEL MAKES STRONG MILITARY THRUST INTO LEBANON


An Israeli armored force-- probably no larger than two battalions at the most--made a heavy foray into the southeastern Lebanese districts of Marjayoun and Hasibayyah early on 12 May. The action followed a marked step-up in activity during the previous week by Lebanese-based Arab guerrilla units against Israeli border communities, climaxed by the killing of four civilians in the settlement of Qiryat Shemona. The Israeli strike came after several warnings to the Beirut government and to the fedayeen of imminent retaliation if the terrorist activity was not halted.

Tel Aviv has given only scanty details of the operation, but has flatly denied Arab and fedayeen claims of heavy fighting and large numbers of casualties. Israeli officials have sought-- perhaps for image-making purposes--to depict the foray as a limited one aimed at capturing some guerrillas and destroying their bases. They described the action as both a "combing" and a "screening" operation. An Israeli spokesman said that 30 guerrillas had been killed, 11 taken prisoner, and some vehicles and 40 buildings destroyed. These numbers seem light in an area believed to contain 1,500 to 2,000 fedayeen. The fedayeen themselves claim they resisted valiantly and successfully, and the Israelis have admitted by implication that they

met more resistance than was expected.

Lebanese communiqués on the other hand, made no reference to fedayeen involvement in the foray. Lebanon publicly and privately claimed that it engaged the Israeli force with its own army, destroyed some Israeli tanks, and 25X1 suffered casualties. 

Syria made a token show of support for the fedayeen--and lost three MIG-17s in the process. Other Arab states, while giving strong vocal support, stayed clear of the Israeli force. Iraqi artillery in Jordan shelled Israeli positions along the border, but Iraqi forces did not enter the fighting in Lebanon. President Nasir's contribution was to send his army chief of staff to Beirut with a message for President Hilu.

Lebanon has officially accused Israel of escalating tensions along the border and of using isolated fedayeen incidents as a pretext for aggressive purposes. In a meeting with the Big Four ambassadors, President Hilu warned that the attack could spell the end for policies of moderation in the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli impasse. 

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## FEDAYEEN GROUPS FORM NEW COORDINATING BODY

The 11 major fedayeen organizations announced on 6 May the formation of a new central committee within the structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Membership will include the PLO Executive Committee, the chairman of the Palestine National Council, the Palestine Liberation Army commander, and representatives of the various fedayeen groups as well as of a number of independent, nonmilitary Palestinian organizations. The unified military command, set up in Amman last February, will be dissolved and its functions will be absorbed by the new committee, which is to determine common military and political policies.

According to an unconfirmed Syrian press report, the 11 fedayeen organizations are to be allotted one seat each on the new committee. If this is true, it represents a concession to the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Habbash, and other leaders who have refused to join any such unified grouping unless each organization had equal representation. This insistence on collegiality stems from fears that any other system would lead to eventual domination by Fatah. Since Fatah first gained control of the Palestine Liberation Organization in February 1969, it has in fact sought to do just that.

Acceptance of the equal representation arrangement by Fatah

would be something of a blow to Yasir Arafat's pre-eminent position.

Fatah, of course, retains control of both the Palestine National Council and the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee, and may seek to make the new central committee subservient to these other entities.

This would be opposed by Habbash and the leaders of the other organizations, who will probably attempt to use the central committee as a collegiate grouping that would act as a counterweight to the two bodies already controlled by Fatah. Moreover, the statement issued by the fedayeen when they announced the formation of the central committee underscored the fact that the new body is to play "the command role in the resistance movement."

The coming months could therefore see the emergence of a collective leadership in the fedayeen movement and the gradual eclipse of Yasir Arafat. The possibility remains, however, that the new body will be merely another paper organization and that each fedayeen group will continue to go its own way, cooperating when it is to the group's advantage and disregarding anything considered disadvantageous.

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## RELIGIOUS REACTIONARIES PROTEST IN AFGHANISTAN

In sharp contrast with the agitation for progressive reform troubling many countries, Afghanistan is currently experiencing demonstrations by ultraconservative religious elements opposing the government's cautious program of social and political change.

Afghanistan's Muslim elders--the mullahs--have long disapproved of King Zahir's efforts to nudge his kingdom into the twentieth century. Their discontent has been fed by periodic leftist street disorders in Kabul and by the government's indecisive and ineffective response to the "rabble." Nevertheless, since 1929--when they helped topple a previous regime in Kabul--the mullahs have rarely given vent to their displeasure with the government. Their sporadic, localized outbursts of violence in outlying areas have been handled fairly easily by the authorities.

The election last fall, however, returned a parliament more conservative and more rurally oriented than its predecessor, and the mullahs may have interpreted this as a go-ahead to carry their protests to Kabul. Government cooperation with the Soviet Union on the Lenin centenary celebration in Afghanistan in late April provided the specific occasion for mass demonstrations. The mullahs' demands ranged from suspension of a leftist newspaper to a ban on women appearing in public without the veil. Rumors abounded that elements in the government had initially encouraged the demonstrations in order to

balance leftist protests but that the situation had then gotten out of hand.

As mullahs from the provinces began moving toward Kabul, officials voiced fears that they might clash with leftists celebrating May Day. Security precautions in the capital were the heaviest in recent history, the authorities being fully aware that, in this devoutly religious country, melees involving the mullahs are far more explosive than other disturbances.

The mullahs relinquished the streets to the leftists on May Day, but subsequently resumed their protests. Tensions began to lessen, however, when it appeared that the government had reached an agreement with the mullahs.

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Moreover, the crisis is taking its toll. Executive-legislative relations have been exacerbated by the refusal of the prime minister and his cabinet to appear before the Lower House for questioning, and rumors are circulating that the government may fall. Leftists are again demonstrating, which could provoke further clerical reaction. Most importantly, the mullahs have reminded the government that they still exercise real political power. Official policy over the next few months will be shaped with this very much in mind.

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## IRAN TAKING NEW LOOK AT KURDISH SITUATION

The peace concluded on 11 March between the Baathist government of Iraq and the rebelling Kurds has forced Iran into a re-evaluation of its relations with the tribesmen. The Iranians are aware that previous agreements reached by the Iraqis and Kurds since 1945 have resulted in nothing but renewed hostility. However, the Iranian belief that the Soviet Union was instrumental in the present settlement has now added a new and--for Iran--a sinister facet to the problem.

Some high-level Iranians believe that the announced agreement constitutes merely a cease-fire, and that Kurdish distrust of the central government continues. The token nature of Iraqi concessions to the Kurds tends to substantiate this thesis. A number of Iranians, however, interpret the cease-fire as creating in effect two autonomous sections of Iraq, and the implications of this are causing worry in Tehran.

Although the role played by the USSR is still unclear, the Iranians are extremely suspicious of Soviet motives and believe that the Russians have promised to assist the Kurds in forming an independent state that would include Iranian Kurdistan. This independent Kurdistan would receive Soviet economic and military aid, they fear, and would eventually come under Soviet control. The Iranians have a vivid memory of the Kurdish Mahabal Republic of 1946 that,

supported but not sponsored by Moscow, appeared for a time capable of maintaining its independence.

The Iranians are particularly jumpy because of the possibility that Baghdad will use the Iraqi Kurds to incite the Kurds in Iran. Iraq could also utilize exiled former SAVAK chief Telmur Bakhtiar's knowledge of Iran's security organizations to initiate insurgent operations in several isolated Iranian provinces. Tehran's nervousness is evidenced by its recent, continuing military build-up in this area.

Despite his agreement with the Iraqis, Kurdish rebel leader Barzani continues to express sincerity and loyalty to the Iranians, Iranian aid to Barzani's forces has been halted, however, and contact is being maintained only at a low level. Most Iranians have lost confidence in Barzani

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While the Iranians are still in the process of determining the amount and kind of future aid, if any, they should provide, the Iraqi Kurds, they have begun to pull out vulnerable personnel from Iraqi Kurdish areas. Nevertheless, they are unlikely to abandon the idea of somehow being able to foment a rebellion within Iraq.

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**WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

There has been very little reaction in Latin America outside of Cuba to military developments in Cambodia. In Venezuela Communist youths, mostly high-school students, sponsored some demonstrations but caused little trouble.

Fidel Castro's strong reaction to the most recent operation by Cuban exiles probably is intended to divert attention from the faltering sugar harvest and to promote closer military ties with Moscow. Castro no doubt realizes that his 10-million-ton goal for the sugar harvest cannot be met, and he may plan to use the exile attacks as an explanation. Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro has just concluded a lengthy visit to the Soviet Union, where he probably negotiated for additional Soviet military aid. Charges that the exile attacks are being launched from and sponsored by the US were probably used in these talks. For the second time in less than a year, Soviet naval units are visiting Cuba.

In Brazil security forces continue to pursue a group of terrorists led by renegade army captain Carlos Lamarca.

Authorities now plan an all-out operation to destroy Lamarca's organization.

Late last week the nine Latin American nations attending the territorial-limits conference in Uruguay signed the "Declaration of Montevideo," reinforcing their claims to jurisdictional rights to the waters, seabeds, and subsoil up to 200 miles from their shores. The declaration contends that coastal states have the right to establish the limits of their territorial waters and to set regulations for their use. A larger conference is scheduled for this summer to draw up a common position for use at any international meeting on the law of the sea.

Guyana is moving to extend its control over existing foreign investments. Prime Minister Burnham has notified the major bauxite companies that the government is seeking equity participation in their operations. The extent of participation desired is unclear, but one company fears that a controlling interest will be required. Guyana now requires a 51-percent minimum of Guyanese participation in all concessions to be granted in the future for the exploitation of natural resources.

Private Canadian-US discussions are continuing on preparations for an international conference on the Arctic. Both sides are agreed that a conference should be limited to consideration of pollution control and navigational standards in Arctic waters. No formal date has yet been set pending further talks, and the participation issue is still under consideration.

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CUBA MAY ELIMINATE PRIVATE FARMS

There are signs that the Castro regime is losing patience with the owners of small farms and may be contemplating action against them. A desire for more efficient land management and dissatisfaction with the farmers' performance in the 1970 sugar harvest seem to be the main reasons for the government's attitude.

Any attempt to repossess the small farms, however, will probably be engineered with considerable caution. The farmers, who with their families number over a million, constitute an important segment of the population, and the regime will probably have to sweeten the nationalization measure with some type of compensation to avoid alienating such a key group. If the 200,000 small farms are nationalized, a few taxicabs and some coastal fishing boats will be the only remaining privately owned enterprises in Cuba.

Although the peasants in many areas have been continually reluctant to participate fully in the government's political campaigns and economic schemes, the first sign of official exasperation with small-farm owners was voiced by Fidel Castro during a speech in December 1969. In discussing the mechanization of agriculture, Castro complained that "small landholding is not a proper method of exploiting the land; it is prehistoric. . . . It is not a natural method because small plot ownership is not consistent with technology. . . . Modern technology and highly productive machinery require expanses of land."

More direct criticism of the small-farm owners began to appear early this year when the provincial press and radio in Matanzas, Las Villas, and Oriente provinces laid partial blame for harvest production problems on the farmers and their poor attendance record in the canefields. In one municipality, for example, only 50 of the 200 peasants available showed up in the fields to cut cane. One provincial party official cited poor preparatory political work by the government-controlled National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) as the reason for the farmers' recalcitrant attitude.

Government thinking may have been indicated last January when ANAP president Jose Ramirez headed an agricultural delegation to the USSR to study collective farms. In a speech Ramirez said, "Although there have been great economic and sociopolitical changes among our peasants and rural workers, we must state that we are only beginning the transformation of our agriculture."

The only positive action against the small-farm owners so far has occurred in the past few months. [redacted]

[redacted] in certain provinces livestock is being confiscated. If this practice draws only mild reaction, the government may make more drastic moves. An indication of the government's policy may appear on 17 May, Peasant's Day, and the eleventh anniversary of Cuba's first agrarian reform law, or on 26 July, when Castro is expected to deliver a major speech. [redacted]

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### DOMINICAN PRESIDENT HEADED FOR RE-ELECTION VICTORY

President Balaguer is expected to win re-election on 16 May by a comfortable margin despite shifting opposition political alliances and continuing political violence.

It is doubtful that the opposition parties can overcome Balaguer's lead, even if last-minute agreements result in an outright political alliance between some of the parties or in further abstentions. Balaguer's advantages as an incumbent, his military support, and the general public's respect for his work over the last four years have put him in a commanding position. The negotiations among opposition groups, which are designed to find a common candidate, have continued, but the maneuvering is more indicative of the parties' individual weakness than of their potential strength. OAS observers will be on hand for the contest, which should provide some buffer against expected cries of fraud.

Juan Bosch's major opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), which is abstaining from the elections on grounds of repression, is giving lukewarm support to Vice President Lora for the presidency. Although PRD spokesmen continue to dissociate themselves publicly from the elections, local party organizations reportedly are working for Lora. PRD leaders have

said they will not force their followers to abstain from voting, and Lora's ticket, despite its rightist tinge appears to them to be the least offensive option.

Although Balaguer needs only a plurality of votes to win, he wants a majority in order to avoid being assailed by the PRD and others as a minority president. If he receives less than 50 percent of the vote, it will encourage the opposition to attempt to oust him. If the vote in the cities--where Balaguer is not popular--is low because of PRD abstention, the President stands a good chance of equaling the 57 percent total he achieved in 1966. At that time, however, he faced Bosch in an essentially two-man race.

Pre-election violence, meanwhile, has continued at a relatively high level, with about three dozen persons killed or wounded in the last two weeks. Although the Communists may accelerate their terrorist activities on election day, the violence probably will not disrupt the balloting. The Communists do not seem to be planning a major effort; instead, they apparently hope that some of the opposition parties will attempt to oust Balaguer before the August inauguration.

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### RADICALS REMAIN IN BOLIVIAN CABINET

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The first cabinet crisis since President Ovando took over the government last September was ended--at least temporarily--when a new cabinet was announced on 12 May. The cabinet submitted its collective resignation on 10 May, presumably to give the President a free hand to implement an administrative reorganization of the various ministries.

following the government's total failure to control or even to influence events at the national congress of the Bolivian Labor Central (COB), which finally closed this week. Ovando had been seeking organized labor's support for his "revolutionary" government, but the COB congress took a distinct antigovernment line. The military's old enemy, the fiery labor leader Juan Lechin who has been exiled from Bolivia for most of the past six years, was permitted by Ovando to return to Bolivia and was elected to the top COB leadership position. In addition, a resolution was passed demanding that Bolivia be made a socialist state.

It was in the name of the armed forces that the Ovando government came to power, and many of the top leaders have since become disenchanted with the course the government has taken. The civilians Ovando appointed to give his cabinet a revolutionary image are being blamed for the government's drift to the left and even for the antigovernment and antimilitary line of the COB congress. Military leaders, therefore, have demanded the removal of the leftist civilians and may plan to force the issue or even move against Ovando if he does not soon take steps to replace or at least curb the influence of Minister of Energy Quiroga and Information Minister Bailey.

Labor Minister Rolon was a prime candidate to be replaced

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
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## CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT BLACK POWER

In the aftermath of the Trinidad disorders last month, a majority of the Caribbean governments are reassessing their public positions toward Black Power and are adopting more stringent controls over its proponents.

Many of the Caribbean leaders are concerned that events similar to those in Trinidad could disrupt the peace and prosperity of their states if they permit militants to agitate and preach racial violence. There is general agreement that Trinidad's Prime Minister Williams waited too long before trying to exercise control over Black Power elements whose demonstrations and subsequent arrest led to the recent unrest. As a result, the governments appear to be less reluctant to limit the activities of Black Power elements and more ready to risk political attack from radicals in the interest of appealing instead to broader political sentiment and preserving public safety.



Prime Minister Williams  
(Trinidad and Tobago)

Some governments also seem to be more concerned about the potential loss of tourist revenues than the political risk involved in confronting the militants.



Prime Minister Barrow  
(Barbados)

In Barbados, the site for the second Regional Black Power Conference scheduled for 9 to 12 July, Prime Minister Barrow has proposed legislation that would make it a criminal offense to preach violence or racial hatred. He also intends to prevent nonnationals from

participating in the country's political activity, requiring official clearance of all speakers and topics before permission to hold a meeting is granted. Barrow is apparently determined to maintain the position that militants should not be banned from Barbados but controlled after they get there. Last week Stokely Carmichael was detained at the airport, then permitted to stay overnight, but was not allowed to speak at a political rally in his honor.

Many other Caribbean leaders are also reluctant to give in to the demands of the radicals. Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer has said that he will deal harshly and rapidly with any incipient anarchistic development. Recently, some of the smaller islands have manifested their concern by banning travel of the more prominent Black Power spokesmen.

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

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*WEEKLY SUMMARY*  
*Special Report*

*Subarto's Indonesia*

**Secret**

No 14

15 May 1970  
No. 0370/70A

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### **SUHARTO'S INDONESIA**


Suharto, president of Indonesia for three years, will visit the United States officially and for the first time from 26 May to 2 June. He is expected to discuss the Cambodian situation and Southeast Asian affairs generally, and probably hopes to reach agreement on a modest military acquisitions program that has been under consideration for some weeks. He will express his appreciation of past US economic assistance, and, as a means of maintaining the so-far favorable climate in Washington toward aid to Indonesia, will talk with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and speak to the National Press Club.

The 49-year-old Suharto has placed his stamp of caution and pragmatism on his administration. He has eased forward on a number of problems while consistently maintaining priority on economic improvement. Indonesia under Suharto continues to make progress on the difficult tasks of economic rehabilitation and is preparing for national elections in mid-1971. The proscribed Communist Party, which remains under strong government pressure, is scattered and ineffective.

Although ultimate government control is in the hands of the army, civilian participation is considerable and effective, particularly in the economic sector. The army considers it necessary to perpetuate its political role at least until economic recovery has been achieved, and will seek to do so in the coming elections and to reinforce its position with civilian alliances.

Although Indonesia follows a nonaligned foreign policy, its international relations in recent years have been weighted toward the West, from which it receives critically needed financial assistance. Largely because of Indonesia's strongly anti-Communist domestic stance, relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe have been correct but cool in the post-Sukarno era; ties with China were suspended in 1967, and prospects for an early resumption of diplomatic relations are poor.

Other than continuing negotiations for economic assistance with both non-Communist and Communist nations, Indonesia's principal international objective is to develop its influence in Southeast Asia. Major facets of this policy have been the founding and subsequent support of the five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Djakarta's recent initiative that resulted in the scheduling of an Asian conference on Cambodia.







President Suharto with Madame Suharto and Children

### SOLDIER TO PRESIDENT

Suharto's rise from poor boy to the top ranks of army and political leadership is still fairly unusual in Indonesia, yet not much attention is paid to it. Suharto seems to be accepted for what he is—a disciplined, reliable, capable individual. He cannot inspire the colorful copy that former president Sukarno did, but there seems to be general satisfaction that he does not.

Suharto was born of humble parents in a Central Java village in 1921 and spent a childhood eventful chiefly for being shuttled from relative to relative after his parents' separation. In June 1940, bored with his job as a bank clerk, Suharto volunteered for the Dutch colonial army, and remained in the armed forces under the Japanese. He fought effectively against the Dutch, emerged

with the rank of lieutenant colonel, and then began a steady and quietly distinguished rise in independent Indonesia. By 1963 Suharto had been appointed to the second most senior post in the army as head of the Strategic Command, a combat-ready strike force. It was logical that he should assume temporary leadership of the army when the Communists launched their abortive coup on the morning of 1 October 1965, kidnapping and later murdering army commander General Yani and five other generals.

When President Sukarno, who had been involved in planning the Communists' antiarmy action, instructed army leaders to nominate three candidates for the position of army commander, they submitted only one name—Suharto. Although Sukarno regarded Suharto as "too stubborn and too anti-Communist," he had no

alternative but to install him as army commander and did so on 16 October 1965.

As head of the developing new Indonesian leadership, Suharto believed that his major tasks during the following year and a half were to maintain the cohesiveness of the army, crush the large Communist Party, and so reduce President Sukarno's power and prestige that he could be quietly and peacefully removed from office. Suharto accomplished all three objectives, the last in an elaborately phased program, which at the time was criticized by many of his supporters as needlessly slow. Perhaps it could have been done more rapidly without disruptive consequences, but Suharto's schedule gave him and his military and civilian colleagues time to sort out some of Indonesia's economic and political complexities and to ease the transition from the old order to the new.

On 12 March 1967, the Indonesian Congress unanimously passed a decree declaring Sukarno "no longer capable" of fulfilling his presidential duties and naming General Suharto acting president. A year later, on 27 March, Congress elected him to a five-year term as full president.

Suharto's initial image after the 1965 coup as a strong and resourceful albeit cautious leader has remained valid. He has shown strength and resourcefulness in dealing with the nation's urgent economic and security difficulties. In approaching the baffling problem of the domestic political situation, he has demonstrated cautiousness. The severe economic deterioration and the threat of Communist resurgence both demanded action, and these urgent requirements provided both a valid and a convenient rationale for imposing, until recently, a partial moratorium on political activity. Given the fragmented state of Indonesia's political party system, the task of charting the way toward a predominantly civilian government that would be representative, non-Com-

munist, and still stable is indeed formidable. Suharto's caution, which his critics see as needlessly stalemating the political situation, probably stems from a variety of reasons. These include a basic distrust of politicians, the need to feel his way, the priority given economic improvement, and the lack of a clear idea as to how to restructure and redirect the still-immature Indonesian party system from its present fragmented and parochial base to one along program-oriented lines.

### SUHARTO AND THE MILITARY

Suharto has made no effort to disguise the fact that the army is the major political force in Indonesia and his own chief support. He and his colleagues feel strongly that it is the only organization capable of administering the country during this period of economic rehabilitation and political reorganization. It is the only cohesive, nationally organized group in the country, its loyalties are nationally focused, and with the passing of time, it has increasingly avoided the regional and ethnic divisions that afflict those civilian organizations aspiring to a national role.

When General Suharto, then still commander of the army, assumed the presidency in March 1967, the Indonesian Army achieved greater and more effective participation in government than ever before in its 25-year role of nation building. Although Suharto has since relinquished command of the army, he remains the minister of defense and as such is commander in chief of the armed forces. In the 23-man cabinet the army holds three other portfolios, and the navy and air force hold one each. The military, particularly the army, is well represented in all departments at subministerial levels and in industrial and agricultural state enterprises. Army officers serve as governors in 14 of the nation's 26 provinces, and junior officers and noncommissioned officers hold a substantial proportion of subprovincial

jobs down to the village level. Military appointees constitute 18 percent of the membership of parliament and congress, and hold approximately half of the nation's ambassadorial posts.

Suharto and the army uphold the doctrine of the military's "dual function": the military must participate actively in the nation's political and economic life, as well as provide its defense and security force. Politically, army leaders seek a middle road between what they regard as the "free-for-all" parliamentary democracy of the 1950s and former president Sukarno's subsequent authoritarian rule. This middle way would permit significant popular participation but would retain a strong central leadership and a major political role for the army.

In the economic sector, the army vigorously argues that economic improvement is a prerequisite for political stability and a necessity in countering a future renascent Communist Party. Suharto himself is an especially dedicated supporter of this line, but he has entrusted the formulation of economic policy not to the military but to a group of talented and well-trained nonparty civilians.

From the beginning of his leadership role in October 1965, Suharto has worked to develop a united military team and to eliminate interservice rivalries. Although the navy and air force are much smaller than the army (army-250,000, navy-48,000, air force-30,000), Suharto has consistently included the two smaller services in the military's national role.

A military reorganization announced in October 1969 and gradually being implemented provides for centralized Department of Defense authority over the three services and for an integrated command down to the provincial level. The chain of command runs from Suharto through six inte-

grated theatre commands. The change increases Suharto's personal control over the armed forces and should make for a more flexible and responsive instrument for carrying out the military's functions.

In directing national life and interpreting the role of the military, Suharto has insisted on the observance of legal forms, has tried to listen to the civilian voice—although this effort is sometimes obstructed by the military around him—and has displayed sensitivity to civilian charges of "creeping militarism" and corruption. These traits of sensitivity, caution, and tolerance have inclined Suharto to pursue a considerably more liberal administration than could have developed under more authoritarian military personalities on the scene. Although he is unwilling to diminish the army's ultimate authority—fearing any one of several results such as political instability, a turn toward an Islamic state, or Communist resurgence—he nevertheless strongly believes that the military bears heavy responsibilities not to misuse its power and authority.

For example, when students demonstrated against rising prices early this year, Suharto ordered that not a shot be fired and that cabinet ministers meet with and answer the students' questions. He has told military commanders—who, because of Indonesia's economic predicament and budgeted funds, are compelled to engage in fund-raising activities for troop welfare—that these activities must be truly directed toward this purpose and not be "obstacles to national development." On the whole, his approach to government indicates a continuing intention to avoid military authoritarianism yet to maintain the ascendancy of the military as it guides the nation in achieving economic development and political modernization.

## SUHARTO AND THE CIVILIANS

Although the army is clearly predominant, civilians hold a number of important posts in the cabinet, bureaucracy, and legislature. Those holding the more responsible positions, however, are nonparty technicians or individuals with little political support. Political party members, who had hoped that the downfall of former president Sukarno would restore the parties to greater influence, find that although they have a larger voice than during the last years of Sukarno's rule, their present position falls far short of aspirations.

There are seventeen civilians, eight of whom are members of political parties, in the 23-man cabinet, and civilians predominate in the appointed congress and parliament. Suharto has encouraged these two bodies to carry out their constitutionally prescribed functions (congress makes policy and parliament legislates), and they have indeed from time to time provided a check on the executive. Suharto has urged the army to respect and support civilian officials in the provinces.

At the same time, however, Suharto relies a great deal on a few military colleagues for advice on day-to-day affairs, a fact that tends to insulate him from civilian views other than those of the economists. The inefficiency of the bureaucracy, moreover, has caused Suharto to rely considerably on the army hierarchy for administrative assistance.


Suharto shares the army's distrust of political parties in general and, in particular, of Moslem parties, which account for a plurality of the electorate. This distrust stems from the nation's experience with parliamentary democracy (1949-1956), the parties' irresponsibility during those years, their concern for acquiring greater power rather than for achieving national goals,


and the series of unstable coalition cabinets that characterized that period. The military's particular negativism toward Moslems is rooted in its memory of the fanatical Darul Islam movement, which tried to establish a theocratic state by armed force for more than ten years before it was crushed. The army also remembers that the Masjumi, the modernist Moslem party dissolved in 1960, supported the 1958 provincial revolt, another crisis that the Djakarta government had to settle by military force. Reinforcing these fears is the suspicion that all faithful Moslems, militant or not, want to replace Indonesia's secular society with a Moslem state. Of the three major parties in Indonesia—the Moslem Scholars (the party of traditional Moslems), the Indonesian Moslem Party (modernist and successor to the Masjumi), and the secular National Party, the army clearly prefers the secular Nationalists.

The parties to a considerable extent have earned the army's lack of confidence. As organizations, they are poorly disciplined, indecisive, and unable to formulate a national program. They tend to be special-interest groups that are ethnically or religiously based. Although within the parties, particularly the Moslem Party, there are individuals who have a strong sense of national purpose, they have so far been unable to translate this into a program of action. The army's exclusion from leadership roles, of some of the very individuals in both the Moslem and National parties who might stimulate a healthier development, however, merely perpetuates the present stagnant, unproductive atmosphere pervading the parties.

The army is currently trying to develop an organization of functional groups as another civilian vehicle for political support for the Suharto regime. Functional groups (youth, intellectuals, labor, women) have long been an element of the Indonesian political scene, and the civilians in parliament theoretically are about evenly divided

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between functional group representatives and those of political parties. These groups have had many purposes over the years, but one of them consistently has been to give legislative support to the executive as a counter to opposition from the parties. The army's intended vehicle, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (SEKBER GOLKAR), as presently constituted is a loosely coordinated group of organizations with no significant political experience. It is being reorganized, restaffed, and groomed to participate in the 1971 elections.

Modernizing civilian groups, mostly comprising individuals unaffiliated with the political parties, see SEKBER GOLKAR as possibly offering the opening wedge for the restructuring of the political party system. If SEKBER GOLKAR can indeed be transformed into a political party, it could develop into a broadly based organization neither dependent on one region nor having only a narrow religious appeal. Its candidates would ideally run on a pragmatic platform of economic improvement and social progress. It is unlikely that in the year remaining before elections SEKBER GOLKAR can become a major party, but if it can develop even a small but firm base and a successful working relationship between the army and some nationally focused civilians, it will have achieved a good deal.

#### PROGRAMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: ECONOMY, SECURITY, POLITICS

The primary domestic policies of the Suharto administration are continued economic improvement, the prevention of a Communist resurgence, and movement toward representative, stable, non-Communist government. Given the extreme economic deterioration caused by Sukarno's economic excesses and neglect of basic needs, the Suharto administration has made impressive progress in pursuing these policies. The

major achievement has been to bring the galloping inflation of the early post-Sukarno years to a halt. In April 1969, a modest five-year development program was launched. The program, which calls for an expenditure of roughly US 4.5 billion dollars, is small in terms of the nation's size and needs, but its goals were determined on the basis of Indonesia's capabilities and the estimated availability of funds. The plan emphasizes agriculture, the achievement particularly of self-sufficiency in rice, improved transportation and communications facilities, and public services.

Although all recovery targeted for the first year of the plan was not achieved, some significant gains were registered. Rice production was up in 1969, and most of the main roads in Java were improved. Export earnings increased, and imports—which also increased—showed a substantially higher proportion of capital goods and raw materials in 1969 as compared with consumer goods than in previous years.

Indonesia's economic recovery is being underwritten by a group of Western nations and international organizations with the US and Japan as principal donors. Since 1966, this group has pledged more than \$1.5 billion. These same nations have also annually postponed payments on debts that Indonesia negotiated with them during the Sukarno era. They now have tentatively agreed on a longer term rescheduling of amortization that would permit repayment over a 30-year period, with no interest during the first 15 years.

The Soviet Union, Indonesia's largest single creditor, renegotiated debt payments in 1966, but so far has refused to arrange a longer term rescheduling. It may be willing to do so now that Western creditors have agreed on terms.

The Suharto government welcomes foreign investment. In the past three years, it has signed


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some 30 oil exploration contracts and over 165 other contracts—chiefly in mining and forestry—with foreign companies. Eventually these investments will benefit Indonesia but only after the long period necessary for exploration and survey work. The biggest hope for a quick return is the oil industry, which already nets the government substantial foreign-exchange receipts.

On the debit side, Indonesia starts its development from a low base with a lamentably deteriorated infrastructure and a society oriented toward conformity rather than change. Managerial and technical inadequacies are hampering implementation of the development plan. There is virtually no effective entrepreneurial class beyond the small Chinese minority. The country's most fundamental problems—a rapidly growing population and unavailability of land—resist early solution, and for the present largely negate economic growth. The problem is particularly acute on Java and Madura, where 65 percent of the population, now estimated at 118 million, occupies seven percent of the nation's land area. Family planning is only beginning and on a very small scale.

Suharto and many of his civilian and military colleagues believe the latent appeal of the left can be defeated only through an improved living standard for the average citizen. While giving priority to its long-term economic program, the government maintains a tight intelligence-security effort against Communist Party remnants and has continued to screen military and civilian organizations for Communist elements.

The party, crushed in 1965, suffered a second calamitous defeat in 1968 when it failed in an effort at military resurgence in East Java and lost most of its postcoup leadership. The party's present active strength cannot be calculated, but it is roughly estimated that about 1,000



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Communists still maintain organizational ties and that a far smaller number are engaged in organized work. Active cadres appear to fall into two groups, both of which are pro-Peking in the sense that they see the ultimate need for armed struggle. The larger faction, for the present, however, preaches peaceful rebuilding, while the smaller demands an immediate paramilitary effort. Small groups are reportedly engaged in minor terrorism in Central Java, but whether they are acting out of conviction or have undertaken banditry primarily for economic survival is not known.

The government faces a problem on what to do with imprisoned Communists who now total 67,000, some of whom have been in prison since 1965. These individuals represent a financial burden and an international embarrassment in that their continued incarceration has drawn widespread criticism. The government has released about 4,000 of the some 26,000 Communist prisoners who had little status in the movement, and plans to release more this year.

The better indoctrinated Communist prisoners, about 11,000, are gradually being resettled in agricultural colonies either in "closed villages" or on remote islands. The hard core, some 5,000, will remain in prison and eventually will be brought to trial. Another 27,000—presumably those more recently arrested—have yet to be thoroughly interrogated, and no determination has yet been made as to their status.

As an adjunct to both the security effort and the economic plan, the armed forces conduct a civic action program. This is essentially carried out at the village level, and involves small-scale road and bridge building and irrigation projects. The US has given modest support to civic action and is now expanding its aid program from \$5 million to \$15 million. Washington's military as-

sistance program will continue to be focused on civic action, but some combat material probably will be included.

Despite government misgivings over possible disruption of the economic development program, national elections in mid-1971 now appear definite, but they are unlikely to result in any significant change in parliament and congress unless the army's plans go drastically awry. The two bodies will not be completely elected; instead, their memberships will be chosen by a variety of methods.

Until last fall, the government appeared to be moving toward a second postponement of elections. It argued that such elections would be costly, that the country needed to concentrate on economic development, that elections could disrupt the economic program, or that they might even promote political instability. During a series of consultations that Suharto held with political party leaders last October, however, only one party—the small Catholic Party—took the hint and agreed that elections should be postponed. The other eight pressed Suharto to hold elections on schedule. Apparently on the strength of these consultations and to the considerable surprise of the parties, Suharto decided to move forward. Presumably he believed that, all things considered, it would be unwise to frustrate the parties further by another postponement.

In November, parliament finally passed the enabling legislation; election funds have now been budgeted, and election committees formed. Some of the parties, particularly the National Party and the Indonesian Moslem Party, are actively recruiting. The army is pushing hard in the provinces with its organization of functional groups (SEKBER GOLKAR), and in April it put pressure on the National Party to elect a chairman who showed promise of being susceptible of army direction.

The election bills provide for a 460-member parliament and a 920-seat congress. The government will appoint from the military and from nonmilitary functional groups 100 members of parliament and one third (307) of the congressional membership. The division between military and nonmilitary in this appointed sector is set at three to one. The remaining 360 seats in parliament will be filled by election, using an elaborate system of apportioning seats that should give Java approximately 183 seats and the other islands 177. Parliament sits as a body in congress, and the remaining congressional seats will be partially elected and partially appointed.

Present indications are that the government hopes to prevent the elections from causing either a major disruption of national unity or a serious diversion from the economic program. Although campaigning, as now scheduled, will be permitted for about ten months, parties have been admonished not to discredit other parties or groups, not to take issue with the five basic principles of the Indonesian state (nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God), not to disturb national stability and tranquility, and to stress the government's economic development program. The military will screen all election slates.

President Suharto has suggested that the nine parties and SEKBER GOLKAR organize themselves into three groups—nationalist, religious, and functional—to contest the elections. If he expects thereby to reduce the number of slates from ten to three, he is unlikely to succeed. The parties have “agreed in principle” with Suharto's suggestion but so far have shown no willingness to submerge their respective identities.

The army hopes, through the use of SEKBER GOLKAR and the cultivation of the National Party, to see the election of a substantial number of proadministration candidates. These,

with the appointed membership, would give the government a more than adequate majority in both parliament and congress and would ensure Suharto's re-election by the congress in 1973.

## FOREIGN POLICY

Although Indonesia officially espouses a policy of nonalignment, foreign relations are in fact oriented toward the non-Communist world. This follows partly from the government's domestic anti-Communist position but chiefly from Indonesia's need for foreign economic assistance available largely from the West and from Japan. Nevertheless, Indonesia maintains correct relations with the Soviet Union and with other European bloc nations and has sought assistance from them as well. Relations with Communist China have been suspended since 1967 and show no sign of early improvement.

Other than negotiating foreign aid, Indonesia's principal international interest is that of developing regional influence in Southeast Asia. With the largest population in the area, Indonesia sees itself as the potential area leader, particularly as Western forces either withdraw or reduce their presence. For the time being, Djakarta views the five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which it established in 1967 with Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore, as the principal vehicle for promoting its influence. Indonesia has been the most active member in trying to keep the organization alive.

Indonesia is aware that it needs time to deal with its domestic problems and to develop the economic, political, and military base necessary for the ambitious role it envisions. It is concerned that the US may withdraw from Southeast Asia before the area has achieved reasonably enduring stability and security. At the same time, the Nixon Doctrine neatly complements Indonesia's aspirations.

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Foreign Minister Malik's recent initiative, which led to the scheduling of the 16-17 May conference on Cambodia, reflects one facet of Indonesia's regional ambitions. Although genuinely concerned over developments in Cambodia, Djakarta also sees them as an opportunity permitting Indonesia to assert itself.

Djakarta shares Asia's general ambivalence toward Japan. Although Indonesia needs and encourages Japanese economic assistance and investment, it is concerned over Japan's economic assertiveness throughout the area and over indications of Japan's increased interest in military power. Indonesia fears that the US is pushing Japan toward assuming an increased area role at a time when Tokyo may be becoming less responsive to US influence.

The Suharto government is gradually becoming more active on the international scene, but diplomacy remains secondary except as it supports domestic needs. The government's major preoccupation continues to be with domestic problems.

### THREE YEARS AFTER SUKARNO

Although the Suharto government harbors many weaknesses, its progress to date more than outweighs its defects. The political posturing and economic neglect of the Sukarno era have long since given way to quiet, steady action toward meeting basic economic requirements, to an awareness of the need for a restructuring of the political party system, and to the responsible conduct of foreign affairs.

Least progress has been made in the domestic political sector. Although the government has attempted to move toward modernization, it has been obstructed by the entrenched parties. This

mutual distrust between the military and the parties is more than a military-civilian rivalry. It is also fed by long-standing religious-secular differences and ethnically based cleavages within Indonesian society. Ethnic, regional, and religious loyalties, less submerged now than in the days of Sukarno's emotionally based supernaturalism, are being more openly expressed under Suharto. At this time, however, they do not affect Indonesia's very real sense of nationhood or threaten any dramatic schisms.

The army sees national elections as tending to encourage, under the present party system, the centrifugal forces of Indonesian political life. Although Suharto has reluctantly decided to proceed with elections in 1971, they will be carefully controlled both to prevent a factionalizing effect on political life and to perpetuate the army's role.

Suharto's outstanding qualities as Indonesian leader have been his caution and patient skill in restructuring Sukarno's Indonesia. Although dynamic and modernist elements, both civilian and military, have fretted and criticized, Suharto has slowed the pace, and has achieved dramatic changes without rending Indonesia's delicately structured society. Responsible civilians, both in the parties and outside them, see no immediate alternative to the army's present role, but hope that within ten years enough progress will have been made to permit a return to a predominantly civilian government based on a more modernized political system.

The Suharto government's over-all accomplishments to date, although commendable, are only initial steps toward the economic, social, and political development required if Indonesia is to fulfill the needs of its people, avoid political instability, and achieve the area leadership role to which it aspires.

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

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Detente and Defense: The Issues of the NATO Ministerial*

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No. 15


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*Detente and Defense: The Issues of the NATO Ministerial*



**NATO Headquarters in Brussels**


The role of NATO in both detente and defense is in transition. The meeting of the foreign ministers of the 15 Alliance members in Rome on 26-27 May is a way station on the road to an uncertain destination in both areas. Soviet and East European initiatives for a Conference on European Security—designed to win acceptance of the status quo in Europe—have found popular appeal in some West European countries. The Allies are attempting to find ways to respond that will enhance NATO's detente image without jeopardizing the security of the Alliance. At the same time, they are embarking on a wide-ranging survey of the defense needs of the Alliance in the 1970s, set in the context of growing uncertainty in Europe about what changes will be made in the US commitment to NATO in the future and what the European reaction should be.

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# NATO ..... and the Warsaw Pact



NATO members

Warsaw Pact members

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\*France is a NATO member, but does not participate in the integrated command structure.

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### NATO'S DETENTE ROLE

Determination of the role NATO should play in the pursuit of detente in general and European detente in particular is the most immediate question facing the May ministerial. The NATO ministerial last December steered away from any new initiatives in the area of European security, in spite of the desire of a number of Allies to come up with a more enthusiastic response to Warsaw Pact overtures for a Conference on European Security. The final communiqué turned a cold shoulder to the Pact proposal for early convocation of such a conference on the grounds that Moscow does not intend that such a gathering negotiate basic political issues leading to agreement on a new security arrangement for central Europe. The convening of such a meeting, for the Soviets, would be an end in itself: to confirm the status quo in Europe. The communiqué reiterated the Allied offer to discuss specific issues, such as balanced force reductions; ways to mitigate East-West tensions caused by the military situation in Central Europe; and improved avenues for economic, technical, and cultural exchanges.

Alliance members were encouraged to pursue bilateral contacts with the East, however, and the West Germans were specifically supported in their bid to the Soviet Union for a renunciation of force agreement. A more forthcoming Allied position on the security question was left contingent on visible progress in such bilateral efforts, which presumably would demonstrate a chance for success for broader East-West initiatives.

Bilateral contacts since last December, although not very productive so far, have helped convince a number of the Allies that there is cause to go ahead with a strong NATO overture to the East on European security. They cite West

Germany's negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland, the talks between Chancellor Brandt and East German Premier Stoph, and the recent agreement between Bonn and Pankow on regulating and improving postal and telecommunications traffic. This progress, together with the resumption of the SALT in Vienna and renewed talks on Berlin between the US, the UK, France, and the Soviet Union, has led to concern on the part of some smaller NATO members that decisions affecting their security may be taken without their having been adequately heard. A more ambitious multilateral effort, although it might have no great prospect of success, would at least give these countries a forum.

In any case, the prime consideration for many of these states is their domestic situation. With East-West detente such a popular issue, these governments find it politic to deprive their opposition of the high ground by appearing themselves to be working zealously for detente. It is primarily for this reason that they find US positions inadequate, particularly on a Conference on European Security (CES).

### MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

NATO consideration of the European security question in recent years has revolved around the topic of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968, the NATO ministers signaled the Soviet Union that the Alliance was prepared to discuss MBFR. In answer to the growing domestic pressures in the member states for cuts in defense spending, the ministers also reaffirmed that the over-all military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of mutual and balanced reductions with the Warsaw Pact.

In the spring of 1968, NATO experts had already drawn up some force reduction models as

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a guide for future discussions in the Alliance and a possible basis for negotiations at a later date. Although the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 brought NATO's study of MBFR to a screeching halt and eased domestic pressures for cuts in defense expenditures, the 20th anniversary session of NATO held in Washington in April 1969 again announced NATO's willingness to join with the Warsaw Pact countries in a search for topics that might fruitfully be discussed in an East-West forum. The ministers referred back to the "Reykjavik Signal" on MBFR, to which the Pact countries had not replied. Work was subsequently resumed on the MBFR models, and the continuation of this endeavor was strongly supported at the December ministerial that year.

The working group charged with preparation of the MBFR models has produced five illustrative versions, which after further review are scheduled to be submitted to the May ministerial. The models fall into two categories: one symmetrical and four asymmetrical. The symmetrical version envisions NATO and Warsaw Pact force reductions on an equal basis. The four asymmetrical versions posit a larger draw-down of Warsaw Pact than of NATO forces to take into account the Warsaw Pact's advantages, particularly the relative ease of return of its forces to the central European area.

The models point up but do not resolve a major difficulty that would be involved in any attempt to implement MBFR. To be acceptable to the Soviet Union at all, the proposed reductions would probably have to be symmetrical, but this would pose great difficulties for the West. Moreover, it is not clear how a proposed thinning out of forces in Central Europe would be related to strategic arms limitations. The French lately have been warning that the USSR might try to use MBFR to obtain a "denuclearization" of the areas involved.

## ATTITUDES OF KEY COUNTRIES

The Federal Republic last year was generally dubious about the Warsaw Pact proposals for a Conference on European Security, and it still rejects a conference in the form proposed by the Soviets. Since December, however, West German policy has taken a new tack. The Germans now appear ready to countenance movement toward discussion of European security issues if the main subject is mutual and balanced force reductions.

A principal reason for this is that Bonn, more than other NATO capitals, fears that political and financial pressures will lead the US Government to reduce its forces in Europe after mid-1971. No West German Government would welcome a weakening of Western forces in Europe while Warsaw Pact forces remain undiminished. Yet it would be financially and politically difficult for Bonn to make direct budgetary contributions to the support of US forces. Another option, an increase in West German forces, would not only be costly and unpopular at home, but would also cause a furor abroad and would terminate Chancellor Brandt's detente policy. This policy is based on the strong conviction that the division of Europe must be overcome.

In this situation, Bonn officials view a mutual and balanced force reduction as a desirable program, both for its own value and for tactical reasons. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact reduce their forces at the same time, the US could carry out a reduction without the Soviets gaining a preponderance of strength and without the West Europeans having to make a greater contribution. It is not clear whether West German leaders believe that Moscow would actually be interested in an MBFR centerpiece for a security conference. They have perhaps been encouraged by the Soviets' hints that they would consider discussing the topic, but only at a conference beyond the first CES. Even if the Soviet response is

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ultimately unfavorable, Bonn probably hopes that discussions of the possibility of MBFR will reduce pressure within the US for an American draw-down. Bonn probably also sees a strong NATO stand on MBFR as an aid to West German negotiations with the Soviets, and indeed, Brandt and his colleagues genuinely desire a reduction in armaments in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The Scandinavian NATO members, Denmark and Norway, and Belgium and the Netherlands consistently have been avid advocates of NATO initiatives on European security. Backed strongly by public opinion, their governments are eager to consider anything they believe will advance detente. They support NATO proposals on MBFR but they really would like to see an affirmative Western response to the Warsaw Pact proposal for a Conference on European Security. Although they believe that MBFR can be accomplished only in the context of a general European settlement, these countries would certainly go along with an MBFR initiative in the hope that it would lead to a conference dealing with the broad range of European security questions.

A number of NATO countries are prepared to support a strong initiative on MBFR without necessarily tying it to a broader meeting. Belgium, Canada, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg all share Germany's concern about the ramifications of any US cutback in its commitment to NATO, and therefore regard MBFR as a possible alternative to increasing their own defense efforts. They also are genuinely concerned with the promotion of detente, and, without holding out promises of success that might encourage unrealistic popular expectations, believe that NATO must take some forward-looking steps.

In addition to supporting a strong MBFR declaration, the UK is still pushing its proposal

for a Standing Committee on East-West Relations (SCEWR) as an alternative to the Warsaw Pact call for a security conference in the near future. The SCEWR would provide machinery for more or less regular contact, exploration, and negotiation with the East in an attempt to determine if at some future time a CES might produce meaningful results. This idea, or variants thereof, is supported by several other members, including Belgium, Canada, and Italy. The Italians think that domestic public opinion demands some initiative toward detente, and a "historic event" at the Rome ministerial would undoubtedly please the Rumor government.

One holdout to the desire of NATO's majority for a significant initiative on detente is France. Paris objects to anything that smacks of bloc-to-bloc negotiations and does not like the idea of MBFR as a topic for an East-West conference.

Nonetheless, the French Government is studying the MBFR question internally to assess its potential impact on French security and is keeping a close watch on MBFR developments in NATO. The majority view, moreover, is not popular with the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Portugal, which would prefer to maintain a relatively hard line toward the Pact's security conference proposals. They will go along, however, with as forthcoming an approach as the US will accept.

Moscow may again attempt to nudge NATO toward a more positive position on the European security issue. Often in the past the Soviet Union has convened the Warsaw Pact nations prior to a NATO ministerial in an attempt to upstage the Allies. Whether Moscow decides on a repetition of this procedure or not, no new substantive proposal is expected from the Pact.

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So far it appears that the US will be able to head off any NATO reference to a Conference on European Security in the ministerial communiqué going much beyond the reserved position taken at the December ministerial. Any direct connection between MBFR and a CES can probably be avoided as well. The pressure is on, however, for a stronger signal on MBFR, and a number of the Allies might not be satisfied to see the MBFR question buried in the body of the communiqué. The Germans, for example, favor a separate MBFR declaration, both to highlight its importance and to permit France easily to dissociate itself from the MBFR initiative while participating in the general communiqué. The Federal Republic may be able to win significant Allied support for its claim that anything less than a separate MBFR declaration would be a step backward from the December ministerial.

#### ALLIED DEFENSE PROBLEMS FOR THE 1970s

The NATO members are agreed that while the pursuit of detente is an important Alliance priority, the organization must begin in any case to prepare itself for the uncertainties of the coming decade. Last March, acting on the suggestion made in President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress, Secretary General Brosio proposed that NATO conduct a thorough review of the military and strategic problems it will face in the next ten years, taking into account the political and economic background as well. Starting from the premise that all the Allied countries have a common and equal interest in the defense of Europe, Brosio recommended for particularly close attention the enemy threat, the Allied strategy, the level of forces, the relations between different kinds of weapons, the nature and effectiveness of deterrence, and the distribution of efforts among member countries.



Ambassador Gerard Smith (SALT), Secretary General Brosio, and Ambassador Ellsworth (NATO)

The Allies have not determined precisely how this comprehensive review will be handled. The task is already complicated by France's refusal to participate in the "military aspects" of the study on the grounds that this would not be consistent with its position outside the integrated NATO military command structure. But the French Government is keeping its foot in the door with its intention to participate in any "political" discussions and its willingness to sit in on military talks. A report outlining the plans for the study will be presented to the ministerial, and the Allies will attempt to come up with a substantive report by the next ministerial meeting in December.

The study is likely to open up all of the most important problems of the Alliance, ranging from its strategic theory to the distribution of the defense burden among its members. The latter is already on everyone's mind, the Europeans being fully aware of the possibility of US reductions later in the decade even if the line is held in the next few years. But the individual European states have their own obstacles to any increase in their share of the burden, and they have not come to grips with the question of softening their separate burdens through some form of defense cooperation.

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


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The major difficulty and the reason for the study will in fact be the large number of basic unknowns. What alternative force structures and strategies would preserve a valid deterrent? How will Western Europe's security situation be affected by the Soviets' assessment of their military requirements or opportunities in the Far East or in the Mediterranean? What implications will the SALT have for NATO? Would limitations on or reductions in strategic forces without a reduction in conventional Warsaw Pact forces leave Western Europe more exposed? Will economic integration in Europe, including British entry into the European Communities, provide a context for European defense cooperation? Could a cooperative defensive effort evolve out of the British and French nuclear capabilities, and if so, what role in the effort would the West Germans find acceptable?

THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The increasing Soviet military activity in the Mediterranean has continued to concern the Allies. A report has been prepared describing the general situation and pointing to the threat the Soviet build-up in the area could pose to NATO's southern flank. The US would like Allied agreement on some concrete action, such as the establishment of a special Mediterranean group in NATO for consultations on the problem and a broadening of member-state participation in NATO Mediterranean activities. The report itself will likely be approved. Beyond that, however, most ministers may be unwilling to do more than pledge to consider future additional measures to enhance NATO security and improve the operational effectiveness of Allied Mediterranean forces.



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COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY

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In an area of less controversy, the ministers will note the progress made in the first six months of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern

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Society (CCMS), NATO's contribution to inter-governmental efforts to improve the environment. The Allies, many of whom were dubious about the the efficacy of NATO involvement in this area when it was originally proposed by the US, seem lately to have warmed to the effort. Rapid progress was made in the planning stage, and a CCMS meeting this April firmed up plans for work this year looking toward proposals for governmental action in such areas as air pollution, disaster relief, and road safety.

As the various CCMS projects are about to get under way, NATO is trying to work out a policy that would permit nonmembers to participate in CCMS activities, or to observe them. The US had proposed inviting outside participation to preserve good relations with other organizations working in the environmental field, but some European members were uneasy about working in the company of countries whose governments they find objectionable, such as Spain. A compromise has been worked out, however, whereby outside participation will be judged on a case-by-case basis, giving any NATO member a chance to make a specific objection to any proposed participant or observer.

#### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MINISTERIAL

The May ministerial is likely to leave most of the important questions facing the Alliance unresolved, but it may also mark some advance in the search for answers that will be valid in a decade that may see considerable change in Europe's security situation.

In keeping with NATO's pursuit of an image of detente as well as defense, some initiative on

MBFR probably will be approved and an attempt will be made again to indicate NATO's interest in improving East-West relations in a number of concrete ways. If there is a response or a preministerial initiative from the Warsaw Pact, it is likely to be a renewed call for a Conference on European Security under conditions the Alliance cannot yet countenance. The more skeptical of the Allies will continue to insist on the need to wait for some progress in the various bilateral Allied efforts. Nevertheless, it is by the means of such dialogues that the Alliance will arrive at a realistic assessment of the possibilities for negotiations on basic European issues.

The approval the ministers are expected to give to the study of the defense requirements of the 1970s, even if it is not specifically referred to in the communiqué, may open the door for the eventual frank consideration of some of the internal problems facing the Alliance in the near future. This may help to mitigate the European concern about possible unilateral US reductions in its NATO commitments after mid-1971, but the Europeans have a long way to go in finding a means of coping with such an eventuality. Movement toward defense cooperation would not be easy for Europe for a variety of reasons, including the uncertainty surrounding future French policy toward NATO and the lag behind the US and the USSR in European strategic thinking. The Europeans are likely to work in the review to minimize any US withdrawals and to avoid reopening the debate on the existing strategy of the Alliance. Should it appear that this effort will fail, the Europeans may then be encouraged to devote more serious attention to the problems of defense cooperation.

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