


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review
completed

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24 April 1970
No. 0367/70

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(Information as of noon EST, 23 April 1970)

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- TRINIDAD AND BLACK RADICALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN 31
- Developments of the past week in Trinidad suggest that black radical groups in the Caribbean have a strong potential to bring considerable pressure on governments of the region. During the past year the influence of "black power" advocates, "black nationalists," and other groups with similar goals seems to have grown in a number of countries.

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CARLOS MARIGHELLA'S MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
The publication by the Cubans of Marighella's article
supporting urban terrorism may result in wide reader-
ship and more imitators.

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FAR EAST

Hanoi appears to be moving to expand its options throughout Indochina. The Vietnamese Communists are rapidly taking advantage of the Cambodian situation to consolidate their hold over border sanctuaries, as well as to keep the new government off balance and unable to move effectively against them. In South Vietnam, although the Communists' military offensive activity has slackened, they demonstrated their ability to strike throughout the country simultaneously and boosted allied casualties sharply. Periodic heightened action of this kind serves to shake the self-confidence of South Vietnamese troops and helps ease pressures on Communist political activity among the populace.

On the international scene, Hanoi has announced the formation of a new political front for all Indochina that will help justify and cover up increased North Vietnamese involvement in Laos and Cambodia as well as foster increased opposition to the US presence in the area. Hanoi may also deem the front useful in maneuvering toward a new multilateral conference on Indochina, a notion that the Vietnamese Communists and the USSR are approaching with a great deal of care.

On the occasion of the Lenin centenary observations the two principal Communist powers, China and the USSR, resumed the level of invective that existed before the border talks began last fall. This upsurge strongly suggests that fundamental disagreement over border problems continues to block progress at the Peking talks, and emphasizes the continuing ideological split between the two.

In the process of renewing the semiofficial trade agreement with Japan, Communist China also managed to hurl considerable abuse at Prime Minister Sato and his government.

Increasing signs of discontent are appearing on the Malaysian domestic scene. A leading Malay newspaper has pointedly editorialized on the advantages of military coups, citing a number of countries where corrupt and ineffectual civilian governments were replaced by the military. Malaysia's leaders have done nothing to solve the country's deep racial conflict between Malays and Chinese, and rumors about a military take-over have been circulating recently. Although an outbreak of serious trouble does not seem to be imminent, the military might be impelled to move if serious communal rioting breaks out during the anniversary this May of last year's riots.

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VIETNAM

Hanoi is Expanding Its Options

The Vietnamese Communists are approaching the question of an international congress on Indochina with a great deal of care, mixing hints of interest with dashes of cold water. Using the recent French proposal as a point of departure, Hanoi and some of its friends appear to have begun a cautious effort to ferret out Western thinking on the idea and, not incidentally, to see how much mileage they can make just by keeping the proposal alive.

Probably with Hanoi's approval, Soviet UN Ambassador Malik started the probing last week with a hint that a new Geneva conference would be necessary to resolve the burgeoning problems in Indochina, but he pulled back the next day. Moreover, the Soviet press has neither reported nor commented on any of his remarks. Nevertheless, the point was made and Communist interest in the idea is clearly on record.

The chief Viet Cong spokesman in Paris, Madame Binh, took a similar line that "conditions" were not appropriate for an international gathering at a press conference this week. Like Malik's "clarification", however, her remarks fell far short of an outright rejection of the French idea. Rather, they simply make

it clear that the Communists are in no hurry and are keeping their options open. Moreover, during the past fortnight, a handful of Vietnamese diplomats have echoed in private Madame Binh's and Malik's public signals.

If indeed the Communists are inclining toward an international conference, they have significantly shifted their thinking about the modalities and venue for a Vietnam settlement. Heretofore they have consistently held that a resolution of the Vietnam problem must precede any regional settlement and that the quadripartite talks in Paris would suffice for this purpose. There have been hints in North Vietnamese writings and speeches for the past several months, however, that Hanoi was rethinking this position and perhaps laying the groundwork for a new line. Recent events, particularly the upheaval in Cambodia, may have forced the issue.

What the Communists have in mind next is not altogether clear, but they are unlikely to move much faster in coming weeks. The course they may be setting contains a good many inherent dangers and imponderables, and they may encounter trouble in bringing along militants like the Chinese, without whose acquiescence any international conference would founder.

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All this probably helps to explain Le Duan's current mission to Peking and Moscow. He arrived in Peking on 14 April, was met at the airport by Chou En-lai without the normal Chinese welcoming fanfare, and was immediately hustled off for a round of obviously sensitive talks. After three days of apparently sticky going (neither the Chinese nor North Vietnamese press has even mentioned his stopover), Duan moved on to Moscow, ostensibly to head Hanoi's delegation to the Lenin observances. He joined chief Paris negotiator Le Duc Tho, who had been there for more than a week, presumably conferring with Soviet officials about diplomatic strategy.

Perhaps partly with an eye toward a multilateral conference, Hanoi announced on 21 April that it was forming a new political front for Indochina as a whole. Speaking at Lenin centennial observances in Hanoi on the 21st, politburo member Truong Chinh indicated that the front is to include the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao, and Sihanouk's faction. He hinted that the Communists would use it to promote their terms for a political settlement in the three Indochinese countries. The front would initially focus on proposals that have already been advanced--the Viet Cong's ten points, the Pathet Lao's five points, and Sihanouk's 23 March proclamation--but it obviously could serve as a useful rallying point for Hanoi and its Indochinese friends in a Geneva-type venue.

A detailed platform for the front has not been announced, but it will certainly focus on a demand from all three groups for total US disengagement from the entire Indochina area. Hanoi probably hopes to use the front to foster an impression of widespread opposition to US involvement in the area, and to cover up its own involvement in Laos and Cambodia in much the same way it justifies its support of the Viet Cong.

Military Activity Slackens
in the South

The first phase of the Communist spring offensive, which began on 31 March, now has tapered off

The enemy's recent spurt of activity was of greater scope and magnitude than anything the Communists have mounted for some months. They were nevertheless unable, or unwilling, to sustain it for very long, with the notable exception of the central highlands area. There, in the remote reaches of northwestern Kontum Province, the Communists are continuing their drive begun in late March against several allied Special Forces camps and outposts, but the effort has cost them dearly in terms of manpower. Last week, some 225 Communists were killed in fighting around the Dak Pek camp.

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Despite the relatively limited nature of their spring offensive, the Communists probably view the first phase as a success. Relying primarily on small-unit operations, sappers, and mortar and rocket attacks such as those against Saigon, the Communists have demonstrated that they are still quite capable of striking simultaneously throughout the country and of sharply boosting allied casualties when they so choose. Although they appear to have scored no significant gains against government areas, they have probably accomplished their principal purposes of jolting the self-confidence of South Vietnamese Government troops and bolstering the morale of their own forces.

The Communists therefore are probably encouraged to continue with the second phase of their offensive, for which many of their units now seem to be completing preparations. The next round is likely to be less intensive than the first, however, not only because of allied spoiling operations but because of the Communists' own mounting involvement in Cambodia.

Since the ouster of Sihanouk in late March, South Vietnamese units have been making shallow raids across the border almost daily. So far, these raids have disrupted enemy base areas and operations, although there is little evidence that the Communists have been seriously hurt.

President Thieu, meanwhile, has recently reiterated that he

recognizes the danger of moving too aggressively against the Communists on the other side of the border. He stated privately that Saigon's forces would continue to harass the enemy there, but with the aim of assisting the Cambodian Army and with carefully measured pressure so as not to oblige the Communists to risk an attack on Phnom Penh.

Political Pressures on Thieu Remain Strong

Pressures building up as a result of South Vietnam's worsening economic situation are affecting the outlook of growing numbers of government officials, including President Thieu himself and Prime Minister Khiem. Khiem appears extremely pessimistic about the chances of his cabinet surviving much longer, unless it can find a way to deal more effectively with the economic ills. Thieu has taken the brunt of popular criticism over the rising cost of living, and he has become increasingly frustrated over the failure by his ministers to curb inflation. The National Assembly appears in no mood to grant the President special economic powers, and Thieu probably would not hesitate to scrap the Khiem cabinet if he thought this would help strengthen his over-all political position.

Adding to Thieu's problems was a scathing public attack upon his administration last week by an old nemesis, the An Quang Buddhists, who are re-emerging as a leading antigovernment political force. In a communiqué,

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the An Quang charged the government with failing to solve any of the nation's serious problems and questioned its right to rule. This strong political stance suggests that the Buddhist leadership may have resolved some of its internal disputes and may be prepared to join forces with other opposition elements.

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In addition, reports of atrocities committed against Vietnamese living in Cambodia may add another element of unrest in South Vietnam. Already there have been mounting popular and legislative demands that Saigon do something to guarantee the safety of ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. The Thieu government will probably move to respond quickly to Phnom Penh's recent agreement to allow a private group into Cambodia to assist the Vietnamese who may be in danger there.

Meanwhile, the Thieu government is trying to ease other political tensions in Saigon by acceding to some of the demands of discontented groups. Apparently

on orders from above, the military tribunal, which began this week to try 21 students on various charges of collusion with the Communists, abruptly suspended the proceedings to allow the Supreme Court to rule on its jurisdiction in the case. Although the military court is empowered to try all national security cases, its constitutionality is in doubt and, in addition, it has developed a reputation for handing out overly severe sentences. Student protesters may be partly mollified by the suspension of the hearings, but they may also be encouraged to renew their demands that the accused students be tried in a civil court.


In another move, the government appears to have made a deal with the disaffected Theravada Buddhist monks of Cambodian descent.

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the government has agreed to seek new legislation to restore special minority status to Cambodians living in South Vietnam. In return, the monks have promised to call off their antiregime agitation, which has been going on intermittently since last November. President Thieu probably hopes to duplicate his recent success in halting disabled veterans' demonstrations by seeking quick action in the National Assembly to increase veterans' benefits.

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ENEMY IN LAOS BUILDING UP NEAR LONG TIENG

Communist military activity during the past week continued to be focused in the immediate vicinity of Long Tieng. For the most part, it consisted of efforts by the enemy to improve its tactical position around the Meo stronghold and to launch occasional harassing attacks. Although all signs indicate that North Vietnamese forces in the area are still committed to a major assault on Vang Pao's headquarters, for the moment they appear to be occupied with replacing losses in personnel and supplies incurred during the recent campaign for the Plaine des Jarres.

At the same time, the Communists have been attempting to keep the Meo forces in the vicinity of Long Tieng off balance with a series of rocket and shelling attacks, punctuated by small-unit actions. North Vietnamese elements struck at Sam Thong and Tha Tam Bleung during the week and twice directed 122-mm. rocket fire on Long Tieng itself. No major damage resulted from these attacks, but the enemy's tactics succeeded in maintaining pressure on the government forces and in masking Communist preparations for

more-substantial assaults in the future.

In other areas of the country, North Vietnamese units have advanced into more forward positions and increased the threat to some government outposts. The sole remaining government base north of the Plaine at Bouam Long has experienced mounting pressure during the past week.


There is still no firm indication of when the Communists intend to kick off their offensive against Long Tieng. Experience indicates it should get under way soon if any conclusion is to be attempted before the heavy rains start in early June. On the other hand, last year's post-dry season attack on Muong Soui showed that the North Vietnamese can continue major actions into the rainy season if they deem it important enough. The elimination of Vang Pao's forces at Long Tieng this year could be viewed by Hanoi in this light. Accordingly, the enemy may continue to strengthen its forces for some time longer to improve its chances for success.

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Cambodia: Communists Increase Military Pressure



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CAMBODIAN CRISIS DEEPENS

The Communists are intensifying military pressure against the government. During the past week, the heaviest action was concentrated in Kandal and Takeo provinces, south of Phnom Penh, and was highlighted by the enemy's temporary occupation of a village within 20 miles of the Cambodian capital. Farther south, the Communists again raided the provincial capital of Takeo, knocking out a bridge and cutting the rail line that runs through the town to Sihanoukville.

Renewed fighting was also reported in Svay Rieng Province, where South Vietnamese forces have been raiding Communist bases almost daily. The government's position in Mondolkiri Province, on the northeastern border, also appears to be deteriorating. Dependents are being airlifted from the provincial capital at Senmonorom in the wake of enemy attacks against important border posts and roads linking Mondolkiri with adjacent Kratie Province. The situation is far from stable and could deteriorate rapidly.

The diplomatic community in Phnom Penh is growing apprehensive that the Communists may soon forcibly bring down the Lon Nol government. Rumors are now rampant that the enemy intends either to move directly on Phnom Penh or to bring it under a virtual state of siege. Various embassies appear to be spreading such predictions, along with US reporters in the country, who have been shocked at the ineptness of Cambodian security forces.

There are few outward signs of crisis in the capital, however, and although the leadership is indeed concerned over the whole situation, so far there is no evidence they believe the capital is in imminent danger.

It is abundantly clear that Cambodian forces are no match for the Communists. If a limited number of main-force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units move westward out of their border bases, they could, in conjunction with indigenous and other forces already operating in the interior, overrun most of eastern Cambodia, including Phnom Penh, in a matter of days. The Communists probably could retain enough troops in their bases to hold off South Vietnamese forces. However, such an operation would run certain military and political risks, which the Communists may believe are unnecessary under present circumstances.

The Communists probably believe that they can force Lon Nol and Sirik Matak out without taking the risks involved in actually moving troops into Phnom Penh. The isolation of the capital from the eastern portions of the country, increased pressure in the countryside, and the capture of some provincial capitals might cause Lon Nol's support within the army to crumble. Under these circumstances, those who are only lukewarm supporters of the regime might join a move to return Sinanouk as the "savior" of the country.

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THE PEKING-MOSCOW WAR OF WORDS

The upsurge of Chinese polemical attacks against Moscow over the past week suggests that fundamental disagreement over border problems continues to block substantial progress at the Peking talks. The Chinese directly blasted the Soviets over the frontier dispute for the first time since the talks began and accused Moscow of encroaching on Chinese territory and of making nuclear threats against China.

The revived Chinese attacks appear to discredit reports earlier this month that there had been some progress at the talks. A few reports had suggested, for example, that Moscow had made some token troop withdrawals from the border. Recent Chinese charges of Soviet "encroachment" along the frontier, however, seem to indicate that these withdrawals--if indeed they did take place--were not sufficient to meet China's demand for a military pullback from all sectors of the border.

The Chinese have chosen to focus their new charges directly against the Brezhnev leadership in order to discredit the Kremlin chiefs during Moscow's widely touted Lenin centenary celebrations. At the same time, the Chinese recriminations clearly testify

to Peking's unwillingness to remain silent in the face of Moscow's continued sharp attacks against China. In a speech at the Lenin centennial celebrations this week, for example, Soviet party chief Brezhnev placed full blame on Peking for the continuing dispute and charged that China's "nationalistic policy" was undermining Communist unity.

It is unclear whether these revived polemics will interfere with the reported Sino-Soviet agreement to exchange ambassadors. According to one recent report, the Chinese have finally agreed to formally accept Soviet ambassador-designate Vladimir Stepanov and have named an ambassador of their own. There still has been no confirmation of this from either Soviet or Chinese officials, however.

Meanwhile, chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov has returned to Moscow, ostensibly for the centenary celebrations. The absence of official announcements of his departure from Peking or his arrival in Moscow suggests that neither side views his visit as an immediate prelude to his possible withdrawal from the talks. A Soviet official has told Ambassador Beam that Kuznetsov will be returning "shortly" to Peking. 25X1

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MALAYSIA'S FUTURE BECOMES MORE AND MORE UNCERTAIN

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Continuing indecisiveness by the leadership of the governing National Operations Council (NOC) and its failure both to assuage Malaysia's deep racial conflict and to return the country to parliamentary democracy have fueled tensions that could be exploited by politically ambitious Malays. A leading Malay newspaper in an editorial on 15 April came close to advocating a military coup, thereby suggesting that the political situation is deteriorating with some rapidity.

The article pointed out that more and more educated people are entering the police and military, and raised the question, "Is it not a fact that world history has shown that there are times when civil administration has to be taken over by the police and military such as in Burma, Pakistan, and other countries in the world?" The story may have been floated as a trial balloon at a time when a number of top civilian leaders are abroad, some on prolonged medical leave.

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[REDACTED]

These disturbing notes are counterbalanced in part, however, by other developments. Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman publicly stated after the 15 April editorial was published that he has no doubts about the loyalty of the armed forces [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The strong rivalry between the military and police could make cooperation 25X1 difficult to achieve; coup participants would also run into trouble from the predominantly Chinese staff in the technical and logistics units in the army. In addition, British-instilled traditions of loyalty to the administration might dissuade many members of the armed forces from participating in any antigovernment action.

Despite all the rumors and rumblings of discontent both among the general populace and junior officers, an outbreak of serious trouble does not appear likely in the next few weeks. The government may face, however, the possibility of some kind of move by the military if intense communal disturbances break out during the anniversary of the postelection riots that took place in May of last year. [REDACTED]

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EUROPE

Soviet public discussion of SALT continues to be restrained. Brezhnev has alluded to the negotiations by restating Moscow's general disarmament goals but at the same time has reiterated the standard pledges about strengthening Soviet defenses.

Soviet Ambassador to the UN Malik hinted in a press conference last week that the Soviets might actually support the French proposal to convene a new Geneva conference on Indochina. Subsequently, Moscow tried to make it appear that Malik had exceeded his instructions. The balance of evidence, however, still suggests that his remarks were intended to probe Western reactions.

A threatened civil servant strike in France was averted this week, and an agreement was reached on 20 April between employers and workers to extend a government-initiated program for shifting blue-collar workers from hourly to monthly wages. These developments have created a social climate that will seriously hamper the efforts of the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor to organize a "week of action" for next week. Scattered strikes and labor demonstrations are certain to occur this spring, but widespread civil unrest is unlikely.

Widespread European support has developed in NATO for an allied initiative on mutual and balanced reductions (MBFR) of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces. A possible MBFR proposal and the related question of growing European interest in a Conference on European Security will continue to occupy allied attention in the remaining weeks before the NATO Ministerial to be held in Rome this May.

The Council of Ministers of the European Communities (EC) at a meeting early this week formally adopted a regulation on EC financing and amendments to the Treaty of Rome increasing somewhat the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. By so doing, the Council eliminated an obstacle to the opening of negotiations with the UK and other membership applicants this summer. Agreement at the meeting on a common marketing policy for wine, which the Council has been trying to achieve for months, opened the way for the formal adoption of the financing package.

Bonn has launched a world-wide effort to defeat the East German bid for membership in the UN's World Health Organization (WHO), because a successful application by Pankow would measurably improve its status under the so-called Vienna formula. Under its terms a member of the UN, any of its specialized agencies, the IAEA, or parties to the statute of the International Court of Justice can accede to international treaties and participate in international conferences. Pankow has an outside chance to succeed in its bid because, admission to WHO unlike accession to the other specialized agencies, is decided by a simple majority of members present and voting.

The US this week presented at the Geneva arms control talks a paper on toxins that may bolster support for the UK draft convention on BW. The British have not yet decided how to incorporate language on toxins in their draft, but the US paper may persuade a number of delegates to regard the UK text as the most feasible for dealing with the subject inasmuch as agreement on the Soviet CBW draft is not possible.,

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POPOVIC ILLNESS EMPHASIZES YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION PROBLEM

The serious illness of Milentije Popovic, president of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly and technically number-two man in the government, may have brought home to President Tito the importance of soon legislating provisions for an orderly transfer of power.

Under the constitution, Popovic fills in when the 77-year-old Tito is out of the country or incapacitated. Since this is the only legal provision Tito has made for succession in the government, whoever holds the post when he leaves the scene will be interim president and as such might have an inside track to power. Thus as Tito ages, the Assembly presidency, which in the past has been mainly a protocol post, becomes

increasingly more attractive as a political plum.

The revelation of Popovic's ailment may complicate Tito's efforts to maintain the precarious balance in top Federal offices among Yugoslavia's six republics. It has been Yugoslav practice to rotate high-level federal offices among representatives of the republics. Popovic is a Serb and, if he is forced to step aside, Serbia will undoubtedly try to have one of its men succeed him--at least for the ailing Assembly president's remaining year in office. Thus Popovic's illness, by setting the stage for an early and potentially fierce contest for the Assembly presidency next year, illustrates the basic flaws and inadequacies in the Yugoslav system.

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SOVIET CELEBRATION OF LENIN CENTENNIAL

The Soviet celebration of the centennial of Vladimir Ilich Lenin was dominated by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. It is not clear, however, whether Brezhnev was merely taking advantage of the publicity opportunities afforded him as party boss or has actually enhanced his position in the leadership.

Brezhnev's speech on 21 April, his fourth televised address in ten days, marked the climax of the months-long "Leniniana." The gap between the personal publicity for Brezhnev and that received by his colleagues has been even greater than in 1967 when he stole the show at the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. At the same time, the celebration this week marks the first time in four months that all 11 politburo members appeared together publicly, and the display of their portraits in the proper alphabetical order is another sign of "normalcy." The sudden withdrawal on 20 April of invitations to non-Communist diplomatic personnel for the 22 April Kremlin reception suggests, however, that plans for the centennial remained somewhat confused right up to the eve of the celebration.

Brezhnev delivered a routine but somewhat defensive assessment of the current situation in the USSR. He repeated the vague formulations standard

since the December plenum that new economic policies and methods are needed to meet the country's current stage of development. He said, however, that party decisions since 1965 have only "made it possible" to advance in this direction and that the approaching party congress and the next five-year plan will be occasions for "new and major decisions." Brezhnev again chose to dwell on economic tasks and to ignore the substance of any new policies. His attention to better planning suggests that he views this as a principal key to economic progress. His sharp attack on the economic planners, however, injected a partisan note into the festivities, and his comments about party unity and collective leadership smacked of an attempt to interpret them to his own advantage.

More routine were his warning about the danger of "bourgeois ideology," which he equated with "revisionism," and his comment that the task of improving living conditions cannot be accomplished "in one fell swoop." Brezhnev also reiterated the standard pledge to continue to strengthen the country's armed forces, but gave no indication that the USSR is about to accelerate its defense buildup.

Brezhnev offered a sop to West European Communist parties in his reference to Lenin's recognition of the theoretical possibility of a peaceful road to socialism but quickly noted that

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the Russian Revolution "went differently." He was also adamant in insisting that Leninism is an international, not a Russian, creed. He raised the issue of the "cult of personality," the standard euphemism for the bloodshed of the Stalin years, but quickly swept it under the rug with the claim that the party had uncovered and condemned it. He followed the current Soviet practice of equating the "cult" with the Khrushchevian evil of "subjectivism," also uncovered and condemned by the party.

Brezhnev broke no new ground on foreign policy. Speaking of the present condition of world Communism, he warned of the growing dangers posed by nationalism and by "right and left opportunism." Proponents of these deviations came in for strong criticism. Brezhnev reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to disarmament, but on other world issues his remarks were unexceptional.

Kosygin finally returned to the spotlight with a brief speech closing the two-day ceremonial meeting. He also presented an award in Kursk last week. Podgorny made a similar appearance in Orenburg and Kirilenko in Armenia. Shelepin spoke at an international trade-union meeting in Lenin's birthplace, Ulyanovsk, but like his three seniors, received minimal coverage in the Soviet media.

All East European leaders attended the Moscow celebration

except Tito, who sent a lesser ranking man to mark his disapproval of the present Soviet leaders' policy toward Yugoslavia. The Albanians, who revere Mao and Stalin as the only true Leninists, of course were not represented.

Like Tito, Romania's Ceausescu made clear his differences with the Soviets in an article that appeared this week in Pravda. In addition, in a speech before his departure for the USSR, Ceausescu indirectly excoriated the "Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty, objecting by implication to Moscow's "great-power chauvinism and hegemonistic tendencies." He seemed to edge toward attacking Brezhnev personally for his inconsiderate attitude toward other Communist leaders.

In his precelebration Pravda article, Hungary's Kadar was much more proper, but he nevertheless evidenced continuing concern about Soviet suspicions as regards his economic reform program, coming out against blind adaptation of the Soviet model. Celebrations in East Germany took on a special character because party boss Ulbricht is the only surviving Communist leader who knew Lenin personally. Elsewhere the festivities were predictably dull. In Czechoslovakia, the occasion was overshadowed by preparations for the 25th anniversary of the Soviet liberation on 9 May, when top Soviet leaders are expected in Prague to sign a new friendship treaty.

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SOVIET-ROMANIAN DIFFERENCES PERSIST

The Soviets were able to count Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian Communist Party leader, among their foreign guests at Lenin Centenary celebrations on 21-22 April, but his presence did little more than point up the differences between him and his Soviet hosts. Not surprisingly, Ceausescu failed to applaud Soviet party leader Brezhnev's pointed criticism of the errors of "nationalism" within the Communist movement. Instead, he made a low-key defense of Romania's policy.

There is little reason to doubt that the Soviets took advantage of Ceausescu's presence to press on him their view of the obligations of "socialist solidarity," although apparently with little success. Significantly, politburo member Petr Shelest was given the task of greeting him in Moscow. Shelest had violently denounced unnamed "splitters" and "opportunists"--in a speech only three days earlier--and may well have had some tough words for Ceausescu.

A Soviet correspondent in Bucharest claimed earlier this year that Ceausescu had been asked to extend his April stay in Moscow. Last month, however, the same correspondent said that he--and perhaps the Soviet Embassy--had been misled about Ceausescu's plans for a longer stay. This suggests that the Romanians may have refused a Soviet request for discussions.

The Soviets have long been nettled by Romanian "obstructionism" within the bloc and "opportunism" in its relations with the non-Communist world. The Soviets are probably most irked by Bucharest's efforts to stall or block their attempts to strengthen East European unity through bolstering the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and Warsaw Pact organizations.

In contrast with CEMA, where the Soviets have not succeeded in creating a consensus behind any of their frequently ill-defined proposals for "socialist economic integration," the Romanians are more isolated in their open opposition to the Soviets in the Warsaw Pact. In addition to proposals aimed at strengthening Pact organization, the Soviets have long urged the Romanians to host a Pact exercise and otherwise to improve their cooperation with the Pact. The Romanians understandably fear that the Soviets would use such cooperation to put pressure on Bucharest.

There is still no indication that Moscow has managed to get Bucharest's agreement to host anything more than limited command post exercises, and even the latter is in doubt. It is likely, however, that the matter of an exercise has not been put to rest, and the Soviets may bring it up with more persistence once the Lenin celebrations are over.

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POLAND EASES STRICT CONTROLS

The Warsaw regime's apparent willingness at this time to emphasize the carrot over the stick in its relations with the cultural milieu is symptomatic of its pursuit of a more flexible, although not always more liberal, domestic policy since mid-1969.

Last week the party secretary for propaganda, Stefan Olszowski, virtually apologized in public for past excesses in implementing cultural policy. Taking unusual note of criticism directed at censorship, Olszowski denied any intent to dictate form and style, reserving for the party only the right to proscribe antisocialist, but not nonsocialist, works. He added that "only people" are responsible for implementation of this policy and, as a result, "some mistakes" may have occurred.

In late March two prominent blacklisted intellectuals, poet Jerzy Andrzejewski and composer Zygmunt Micielski, reappeared in public and were allowed to return to work, a privilege they lost in October 1968. Both had written and publicized letters to their Czechoslovak colleagues expressing shame at Poland's participation in the invasion of that country, which clearly echoed the sentiments of other liberal intellectuals.

The most telling evidence of some easing, however, has been the regime's disposition of a series of political trials over the past 18 months. The first involved the ring-leaders of Poland's March 1968 student demonstrations, and the second those who protested against the in-

vasion of Czechoslovakia. Most of those sentenced reportedly have been released or have had their sentences substantially reduced under the terms of an amnesty proclaimed in July 1969. Moreover, some 30 young intellectuals who have been in prison for months while their role in an alleged anti-regime conspiracy was investigated were reportedly released early this year and the charges against them dropped. The trial of the remaining members of this group was postponed to last February, reportedly in order that the more lenient provisions in the new Polish criminal code effective 1 January 1970 might apply.

These signs of increased flexibility are not, however, indicative of a new trend toward liberalization, nor do they yet appear designed to do more than heal old wounds. Many prominent intellectuals remain on the blacklist and in professional limbo; moreover, alternating periods of repression and relaxation are characteristic of Warsaw's policy of keeping domestic opposition intimidated and quiet. Nevertheless, the recent developments in the cultural sphere suggest that, as in other policy areas, the new men introduced into the party at the end of 1968--young, tough, but pragmatic "rationalizers" of whom Olszowski is one--are making their presence felt by contributing tangibly to the over-all regime effort to refurbish its image at home and abroad.

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INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES CONSIDER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) affirmed up last week its work plans for the year on environmental problems, including air pollution, disaster relief, and road safety. The NATO program is only one example of recently heightened concern with the need for an international attack on problems that are not only shared but increasingly extend beyond national boundaries.

Established at the suggestion of President Nixon, the CCMS initially got a lukewarm response from several Alliance members, who were dubious that NATO had a role to play in the environmental field or who were worried about the relationship the CCMS would have to other institutions created earlier to deal with such problems. These skeptics seem subsequently to have warmed to the CCMS idea, and last week the CCMS representatives agreed to recommend to their governments that observers from other international agencies be invited to CCMS meetings on a case-by-case basis.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is also becoming more deeply involved in environmental issues, but will handle them from an economic point of view to avoid duplicating the work of other agencies. It has established an ad hoc committee, which met this week to identify the most urgent problems and possible approaches to their resolution. A ministerial-level discussion of the OECD's future work in this area is scheduled for 20-22 May.

The Council of Europe, basically a forum for debating political issues, has for several years had a committee on conservation. In February the Council sponsored a conference at Strasbourg, which issued a declaration urging the convening of a European ministerial conference on environmental problems. The Council has also designated 1970 as European Nature Conservation Year.

Because of its mixed membership, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has seemed a logical agency to enhance East-West cooperation on environmental matters. For more than a decade it has conducted a number of programs in the field. An ECE conference on the subject will be held in Prague in May 1971, and moves are afoot to upgrade its level of representation.

The UN itself has been active on a world-wide scale and will convene a Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. The conference may issue a declaration on the environment similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, also launched by the UN. There are a number of advocates of a global system to monitor the environment, but the Soviets oppose this approach as an encroachment on national sovereignty. Another key issue at the 1972 conference may be that of the need to combat pollution of an international character caused by attempts to exploit natural resources.

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SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE UP IN 1969

A \$1-billion increase in trade with the free world--just over half the growth in Soviet trade last year--is the largest absolute increase in over a decade.

Soviet foreign trade last year registered another ten-percent increase. According to data released by First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister M. R. Kuzmin, total trade amounted to \$22 billion, up \$1.9 billion from 1968. Exports and imports were not broken out.

Trade with the less developed countries, after remaining stagnant at around \$1.8 billion since 1965, rose by \$450 million. Trade with three countries--Egypt, Iran, and Algeria--accounted for over half of this increase. Augmented Soviet aid deliveries to Egypt and Iran, and Soviet purchases of Algerian wine and Egyptian crude oil were contributing factors.

Soviet purchases of machinery and steel pipe from the industrial West helped boost trade with that area by \$500 million. Both Italy and West Germany showed gains of \$100 million. Finland, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan were the other major Western trading partners.

Trade with the six East European CEMA nations in 1969, which accounts for over one half of Soviet foreign trade, increased by some \$880 million. This is slightly less than the annual average rate of growth of ten percent since 1966. No basic change occurred in the traditional exchange of Soviet raw materials, fuels, food, and machinery for East European machinery and consumer goods. Moscow's trade with North Vietnam and North Korea increased last year, but this was more than offset by declines in trade with Cuba and Yugoslavia. Moscow's trade with Communist China plummeted \$40 million, totaling a mere \$56 million.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Anti-US sentiment, high during Assistant Secretary Sisco's fact-finding visit to the Middle East last week, has now cooled. Sisco was received in relative calm in Cairo and Beirut. Expectations of his arrival in Amman, however, led to fedayeen-sparked violence against US facilities, which in turn resulted in the deferral of the visit and the transfer at Jordan's request of US Ambassador Symmes.

Arab-Israeli military activity was marked by several Egyptian air raids against Israeli positions in Sinai, apparently without major effect. Israeli aircraft continued to strike along the Suez Canal, and there was desultory ground activity on other fronts.

In Jordan, King Husayn's long-heralded cabinet reshuffle has been announced, but the few substitutions made do not seem to foreshadow any major changes in policy.

Iran's claim to hegemony over the Persian Gulf island of Bahrain may soon be settled. A UN-sponsored public opinion poll presumably has shown that the Bahrainis have opted for independence. The UN Security Council is expected to endorse the findings about mid-May. Whether the Bahrainis will then seek entry into the Federation of Arab Emirates is uncertain, but the departure of the British from the Gulf in 1971 may induce them to seek some sort of protection.

The preparatory meeting for the third summit conference of nonaligned nations, which met in Tanzania last week, demonstrated the continued inability of the nonaligned countries to reach agreement on specific issues. Controversial questions such as representation of the Provisional Government of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and several "liberation" movements were referred to the summit. General agreement was reached, however, on a broadly worded, six-point agenda. The summit will be held in Lusaka, Zambia, before the opening of the UN General Assembly this September.

In Nigeria, General Gowon has announced the federation's first postwar budget and indicated that a Reconstruction and Development Plan for 1970-74 is being prepared. Economic policy, as revealed in the new budget, is designed to strengthen the federation's 12-state administrative structure that replaced the old regional system. In his budget speech, Gowon clearly indicated that there are no plans for an early return to civilian rule.

Ghana's Prime Minister Busia this week refused to accept a Supreme Court ruling that in effect requires him to reinstate a recently fired civil servant. He publicly vilified the court for its decision. The prime minister's excessive response to the relatively unimportant case highlights his minimal respect for the independence of the judiciary and once again demonstrates his lack of political finesse.

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NO LETUP IN MIDDLE EAST STRIFE

Israel and Egypt traded air strikes and artillery fire across the Suez Canal this week, and sporadic ground actions occurred on other fronts. In Jordan King Husayn made some shifts in his cabinet and security services in the aftermath of the aborted visit of Assistant Secretary Sisco, while behind the scenes Palestinian leaders wrangled over the excesses of the fedayeen demonstrators against the visit. Premier Qaddafi of Libya literally dropped in on the Algerian Government during the week for an impromptu discussion of intra-Arab affairs.

Military Action

Egyptian aircraft were unusually active in conducting air strikes against Israeli military targets along the Suez Canal. In addition to sporadic exchanges of small-arms and artillery fire across the canal, Egypt sent its aircraft into action against Israeli positions at least three times during the past week. Tel Aviv admitted that three of its soldiers were killed and eight wounded in air raids last Saturday. The Egyptians lost at least one of their fighter-bombers to an Israeli Hawk missile during the attacks, and Tel Aviv claimed that two other Egyptian planes were downed.

Israel refuted Cairo's claim of another raid on Sunday, but

struck back itself on Monday, hitting Egyptian positions along the central sector of the canal. On Tuesday Cairo again sent its aircraft into action but apparently inflicted no casualties on the Israelis although it lost another aircraft, a MIG-17. This brings the total number of Egyptian aircraft lost since the June 1967 war to 87. Cairo is apparently willing to accept occasional losses of aircraft as the price it must pay for demonstrating to domestic and foreign audiences that it is still actively opposing the Israeli presence on Egyptian soil.

Sporadic ground action occurred along the other cease-fire lines. In addition to the sabotage of a kibbutz site in the Golan Heights on Monday by infiltrators from Syria, there were several exchanges of gunfire along the Lebanese and Jordanian frontiers.

Jordan: Sisco Visit

Jordan's pro forma cabinet reshuffle early this week reflects King Husayn's intention to follow a policy of coexistence with the fedayeen and to take no initiatives. He had been mulling over a cabinet shake-up since February, and the breakdown in security that attended the demonstrations against the Sisco visit probably provided the impetus for carrying

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it through. Although some individual ministers who had lost favor with the King were removed, the premier, foreign minister, and most cabinet officials retained their positions. The former minister of defense was elevated to deputy premier, the army chief of staff moved up to become minister of defense, and the respected governor of Amman replaced the minister of interior. The director of security was also replaced by an able deputy experienced in dealing with the fedayeen.

Husayn's appointment of three military men who helped push through the last settlement with the fedayeen underscores the King's continued reliance on the army as his chief executor. It may also be a reflection of his privately expressed disappointment with the "old politicians" who make up the cabinet.

The attacks on the US Embassy and cultural center in Amman on 15 April have increased the likelihood of a split between Fatah on the one hand and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) on the other. Representatives of the PFLP and the PDFLP took control of a demonstration organized by the United Fedayeen Command (UFC) to protest the impending Sisco visit and UFC security guards were unable to prevent some of the demonstrators from damaging the embassy and burning the cultural center.

That evening, at an emergency meeting of the UFC, Fatah representatives denounced the attacks and threatened to leave the UFC if any new attacks against the embassy or US Government agencies occurred. During the next two days, UFC security elements had to disperse mobs led by the PFLP and PDFLP moving on the embassy. Fatah officials have stated that had Sisco's visit taken place, they were prepared to oppose any fedayeen organization that attempted to disrupt public order. Should the PFLP and the PDFLP continue to challenge Fatah's leadership of the fedayeen movement, a clash between them and the more moderate Fatah seems likely.

Libyan-Algerian Relations

Libyan junta leader Qaddafi's sudden trip to Algiers last week could be an indication that Egypt's influence in Libya has passed its apogee. Qaddafi's arrival on 16 April came as a surprise in both Tripoli and Algiers, and there has been much speculation about his motives.

One possibility is that he wanted to consult Boumediene on the issue of most immediate concern to Libya--the negotiations between Libya and the American oil companies that have been stalemated since January; Libya's petroleum minister was already in Algiers. In a joint communiqué, the two governments expressed satisfaction with agreements for

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cooperation in the exploitation of their oil resources and the amalgamation of these resources.

There is also the possibility that Qaddafi suddenly realized the advantages, both domestic and international, of playing Algeria off against Egypt. In the communiqué, the two governments reiterated Qaddafi's demand for the unification of the Palestinian commando organizations, which have Egyptian backing, and implicitly criticized them for their ineffectiveness.

Algeria and Egypt have been rivals for influence over Libya

ever since the coup toppled the Libyan monarchy last September, and Qaddafi's dependence on Egypt has made the new regime unpopular with a large segment of the Libyan population which fears Egyptian expansionism. Libya's failure to attend the conference of Maghreb economic ministers last March was taken as an indication that the regime was drawing even closer to Egypt. Qaddafi's trip to Algiers may help to restore some balance to Libya's foreign relations and to lessen antiregime sentiment in the country.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Attention in Latin America this week focused on Trinidad, where a mutiny in the Defense Force threatened the government of Prime Minister Eric Williams. The mutiny was the latest expression of the black-power movement, which is increasing in importance in the Caribbean.

The Sixth Caribbean Commonwealth Summit Conference held in Jamaica from 13 to 17 April was beset with dissension and sharply vindictive personal criticism. Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham led an attack against British influence in the Caribbean and called on the conference to push for economic independence. The US and Canada were also criticized. Little progress was made toward solving mutual problems, although a few resolutions on economic development, land resources, and double taxation were passed.

On 17 April a group of Cuban exiles infiltrated Cuba, prompting a blast from Fidel Castro against the United States. Speaking at the funeral for the five Cubans killed in early action against the invaders, Castro accused the US of plotting against his government. He later claimed that the invaders had come from the US naval base at Guantanamo. Castro probably is aware that his charges are untrue, but he may believe that a manufactured threat will serve to revitalize flagging Cuban enthusiasm for domestic problems. For example, the most productive phase of the 1970 sugar harvest is coming to an end almost two weeks behind schedule, and the ten-million-ton goal is almost certainly beyond reach.

The murder of West German Ambassador von Spreti in Guatemala has touched off dissension within the Cuban-oriented Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), with some members believing their image has suffered. The Guatemalan Communist Party also reacted negatively. Both groups intend to continue terrorism, however, and the FAR hopes that further action will push the Von Spreti incident into the background. The Guatemalan Government has imposed strict censorship, in part to black out international criticism of its failure to protect the diplomatic community.

A new law governing mining in Peru was announced on 17 April. The legislation calls for considerably greater state participation in the mining industry, hitherto dominated by large US companies. Primary emphasis was put on marketing and refining, which will be reserved to the state. Refineries currently operated by US companies apparently will not be affected. It is not yet clear, however, how the new law will affect the Southern Peru Copper Company's recent agreement to invest about \$350 million for the development of its Cujone concessions.

The Canadian Government's draft bill on Arctic pollution control won a unanimous vote (198-0) in the key second reading on Wednesday in the House of Commons. The House will now review it in a committee for the third and final reading, which is expected to be pro forma in view of the unanimity of the vote.

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DOMINICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL PHASE

A hectic, if abbreviated, campaign for the presidential election on 16 May is now under way. The return of former president Juan Bosch, the death of one of the presidential candidates, and rumors of a possible opposition coalition to thwart President Joaquin Balaguer's re-election bid have further complicated the fluid political situation.

Balaguer's temporary resignation for 36 days, or until the election results have been validated, and other political concessions lured four parties back into the race. The major opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), led by Juan Bosch, maintains, however, that it will continue to boycott the contest. Both former president Bosch, recently returned from self-imposed European exile, and the PRD secretary general have repeated that the turnabout decision to participate by the four other opposition parties will not affect the PRD's position.

The PRD has not announced any plans for public rallies, which could set up a serious clash between tense security forces and crowds attracted by the still popular Bosch. Nevertheless, three were killed and more than a dozen wounded in shooting incidents between army patrols and PRD supporters when Bosch arrived last week.

The four parties contesting the elections have begun preliminary discussions aimed at forming a coalition. The death

of former provisional president and presidential candidate Garcia-Godoy on 20 April could incline his relatively small, personalistic party toward such an alliance. Leaders of the four parties have also reportedly decided to seek PRD support for a possible unity ticket.

There are, however, major political impediments to such an agreement in addition to the legal obstacles to be overcome in the short time before elections. The moderate Social Christians, badly stung by their nearly disastrous electoral alliance with the PRD in 1966, will be reluctant to accede to a coalition. Further, neither of the two major opposition candidates, former General Wessin y Wessin and recently resigned vice president Lora has indicated much willingness to step aside for the other.

The government, now under the provisional leadership of the Supreme Court president, has continued army patrolling in the capital. The university remains blocked off and some union headquarters are still under the control of troops. The 24 and 28 April anniversary of the 1965 revolution and landing of US troops could prompt new disorders.

The rural vote--66 percent of the Dominican electorate--heavily favored Balaguer in the last presidential election in 1966. The opposition parties have precious little time to erode Balaguer's support, even if they succeed in working together.

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
COMMUNIST GAINS CONCERN PERUVIAN MODERATES

The growing strength and influence of the Communists in Peru are causing increasing concern among moderate elements in both the government and armed forces. Apparently aware that such concern might eventually threaten his position, President Velasco strongly denied charges of Communist influence in his government in a speech on 20 March. Despite the President's seeming rejection of the Communists' embrace, the party has continued to be Velasco's most outspoken supporter and has intensified its activity in recent weeks.

The establishment of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) has provided the Communists with their best opportunity to build a mass organization. The CDR concept, which bears many similarities to its namesake in Cuba, apparently was first proposed by the Interior Ministry as a means of achieving organized mass support for the military government. The Communist Party, however, immediately seized the initiative in organizing the CDRs and already controls many of them.

onstrated his sensitivity to charges of growing Communist influence in Peru. He reiterated his denial that the government was influenced by Communists and challenged his detractors to identify publicly the so-called "Communist advisers." He also clarified his position on the CDRs, saying that the government would direct them itself "because we do not wish that small and discredited political groups that obey foreign orders to take advantage of them."

Nevertheless, Communist inroads into the government are likely to remain an issue that will be exploited by those who oppose the Velasco government. Recent reforms in the fishmeal and mining industries probably only coincidentally conform to Communist recommendations, but opponents of the reforms may make the most of the coincidence. For example, General Jose Benavides, who aspires to the presidency himself, plans to alert his friends in the military that a known Communist in the Ministry of Industry participated in the drafting of the radical industrial reform law presently under consideration by the government. Such warnings of increasing Communist influence will not fall on deaf ears among the reformist-minded but strongly anti-Communist generals who fill the top command positions in the Peruvian Army.


in a speech on 22 April President Velasco again dem-

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
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MORE DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN COLOMBIA

Daily nationwide demonstrations in behalf of General Rojas since last Sunday's elections have been generally peaceful, but violence could erupt when final presidential returns are made public on 26 April. Rojas and his followers are convinced that the government is stealing his victory in favor of National Front candidate Misael Pastrana, who leads by less than 100,000 votes.

Rojas' political party, the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), has called for continuous demonstrations and strikes in a last-ditch effort to persuade the government to give Rojas his victory. In addition, ANAPO is trying to convince the public that the government has perpetrated a fraud against Rojas in the hope that it will engage in popular uprisings. Rojas' politically astute daughter, in the meantime, has proposed that ANAPO lay the groundwork for armed insurrection and call the people to arms.

The military and police have controlled the situation thus far, and the state of siege proclaimed on Tuesday night may ease some of the pressure. [redacted]



The government is acting from a position of strength. Moreover, General Rojas appears to have lost the initiative by not calling for violent demonstrations immediately, when his position appeared stronger. Sentiment among high-ranking officials and indeed, that of President Lleras himself, indicates that Rojas would be denied the presidency even if he should win. 25X1

Lleras is known to be a forceful and direct leader who would not hesitate to act promptly to preserve public order. This, in itself, may have a dampening effect on future demonstrations. Moreover, it is clear to old-line Colombian politicians that Pastrana will have a most difficult time in governing the country as more than a caretaker or a volcano sitter. Pastrana's slim lead is likely to keep tensions high for some time to come. [redacted]

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Gustav Rojas Pinilla



Misael Pastrana Borrero

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TRINIDAD AND BLACK RADICALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN

Developments of the past week in Trinidad suggest that black radical groups in the Caribbean have a strong potential to bring considerable pressure on governments of the region. During the past year the influence of "black-power" advocates, "black nationalists," and other groups with similar goals seems to have grown in a number of countries.

This influence is reflected in the apparently greater willingness by established political groups in Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados, and elsewhere to adopt black-power slogans. Also, there is more caution on the part of government leaders to avoid actions that could reflect disagreement with ideas of the black radicals.

The black-power groups and other radicals have made relatively few gains in developing an organizational structure, although a few small groups have become more active. This is true in a number of small islands, such as Antigua, and St. Vincent, as well as in the larger states. A few spokesmen for black power have attained prominence, however. Geddes Granger of Trinidad, for example, has become a recognized leader of the black-power movement there, mainly because of his surprising success in arousing considerable public support for protest demonstrations. There is still no evi-

dence of a coordinated regional movement among black radicals, however.

Black radicals are putting pressure on governments to achieve "economic independence" to match the political independence that most of the region has attained. They argue that although Negroes hold most of the political power, the economies are dominated by whites who are generally foreign based. This theme has touched the sensitive nerves of Prime Ministers Pindling of the Bahamas, Burnham of Guyana, and other government leaders, who in turn have been pushing for greater local economic control. At the recent "Caribbean Summit Meeting" in Jamaica, Burnham devoted a major speech to criticizing foreign interests in the region and urging nationalistic policies.

Trinidad has been experiencing frequent black-power demonstrations, some of which have resulted in violence. On 21 April the government declared a state of emergency in the face of threats of further demonstrations and labor agitation. A "mutiny" by some 30 to 50 members of the Defense Force on the same day led Prime Minister Williams to request immediate US military assistance to restore order. There is some evidence that black extremists had gained sympathy among junior officers and enlisted men in the Defense Force.

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Earlier in the month Trinidad's External Affairs Minister Robinson, who is leader of the black-nationalist wing of the ruling party, resigned and presumably plans to devote more effort to black power activities. Trinidad has banned a possible visit by Stokely Carmichael, who has also been invited to visit Guyana next month by a black-power group there. Another development possibly related to the Trinidad Government's concern over black extremism is its private request that the US relinquish control over all of its facilities on the island.

Sensitivity to the importance of black power in Barbados has caused an open clash between Prime Minister Barrows and his cabinet. During Barrows' recent absence abroad, the cabinet announced that two black-power militants from Trinidad would be prohibited from entering Barbados. This caused Barrows to issue a strong public disavowal of the cabinet's decision. The incident has become a hotly debated public issue that has special significance in view of the Second Caribbean Black-Power Conference scheduled in Barbados for July. According to the US Embassy, "even moderate groups seem anxious to hop on the black-power bandwagon."

Guyana Prime Minister Burnham considers black radical influence in his country an important enough force to warrant special attention. He seems determined to maintain a

cordial relationship with ASCRIA, the major black-power group. Eusi Kwayana, head of ASCRIA, holds two important government posts and is frequently consulted by Burnham. Unlike Williams in Trinidad, who has failed to establish rapport with black radicals, Burnham shows evidence of having at least partially succeeded, although one militant group (Ratoon) remains strongly opposed to him.

For the foreseeable future, extremist groups throughout the Caribbean probably will identify increasingly with the themes of black power and black nationalism. More and more governments are likely to show at least ostensible interest in promoting economic nationalism and other goals of the black radicals out of political expediency. Some leaders will also use black-power slogans to their advantage as a means of consolidating political support at home and of strengthening their bargaining position abroad.

Granger's rise in Trinidad, for example, is due at least as much to the undercurrent of social unrest and government ineptness as to his personal effectiveness. Through good timing and revolutionary rhetoric others may be able to convert resentment among workers, students, and others into open protest. Conditions similar to those in Trinidad exist elsewhere in the Caribbean, providing opportunities for radicals to exploit.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla

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24 April 1970
No. 0367/70A

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CARLOS MARIGHELLA'S MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

The recent success of Latin American urban terrorists in such activities as the kidnaping and ransoming of foreign diplomats, as well as their proven ability to create at least limited disorder, apparently has prompted the ever-pragmatic Fidel Castro to accept and give some endorsement to urban terrorism as a revolutionary strategy. *Tricontinental*, a magazine published by the Cuba-based Asia, Africa, Latin America Peoples Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), is currently circulating a handbook for the revolutionist called the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. It was written last June by Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella, who was killed by police in November. (In 1967 *Tricontinental* published letters and pictures received from Che Guevara when he was in Bolivia). The manual is clearly designed to foster terrorist activities in Latin America's growing urban areas. It is too early to tell whether the handbook will be regarded as important as or with the esteem accorded the writings on rural guerrilla activities by Che Guevara and Regis Debray, but its publishers claim that "it will become one of the principal books of every man who, as a consequence of the inevitable battle against the bourgeoisie and imperialism, takes the road of armed rebellion."

BACKGROUND

Handbooks on revolution in Latin America have been published before. Che Guevara published several articles on rural guerrilla struggles in the early 1960s, and his *Guerra de las Guerrillas* was once considered the basic book on guerrilla warfare in Latin America. Regis Debray, who is still languishing in a Bolivian jail for taking part in Guevara's ill-fated Bolivian adventure in 1967, later became the primary spokesman for the rural guerrillas with his *Revolution Within the Revolution*, published by the Cubans in May 1967, and two earlier papers.

Guevara's death in October 1967, however, forced the Cubans to reappraise the efficacy of a rural-based guerrilla struggle. Moreover, domestic considerations, including the national objective of producing a ten-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970, compelled the Cubans to reduce their hemisphere-wide revolutionary activities.

This re-evaluation probably led to the conclusion that the typical Latin American peasant, because of his conservative nature, is not a solid base on which to develop revolutionary awareness and antigovernment activity without considerable ideological preparation at least at the present time. Growing urban populations, especially their student and labor sectors, and many young priests, however, are already seedbeds of unrest and antigovernment activity. It is only natural, therefore, that the revolution should be advanced in the urban areas until the rural peasants are sufficiently indoctrinated to administer the final coup de grace to the "establishment." The Cubans can argue, therefore, that their original emphasis on rural guerrilla activity is correct but may need original impetus from the urban areas. This point was made by Marighella.

In addition to this logical extension of revolutionary theory, urban-based guerrilla activity is not wholly at odds with the Castro-Guevara-Debray approach. Debray stated that the "cities

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
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are the graveyards for revolutionaries; city party backers tend to abandon guerrilla warfare when it suits their purpose; it is a mistake for guerrilla movements to become overly dependent on urban support and leadership." On the other hand, the mobility and small size of the extra-party military organization of the urban terrorist groups were considered useful by Debray. Moreover, he maintained that by sharing common experiences in the guerrilla struggle, the urban recruits would gradually be integrated into the rural environment and would gain an appreciation of peasant problems while the peasants themselves were improving their ideological understanding of revolution.

CARLOS MARIGHELLA

The author of the *Minimanual* Carlos Marighella, is really an excellent authority for a possible new aspect of Cuban revolutionary strategy. In the first place, the circumstances of his death (he was ambushed by Sao Paulo police) have made him something of a revolutionary martyr. Perhaps, some of the charisma surrounding Marighella resulted from accounts of his capture by Brazilian police in 1964. For instance, Luis Carrera in January 1969 wrote, "Five agents of the secret police opened fire on a robust man, age 56, who was hit twice in the lungs. Blood comes out of his mouth, but he manages to scream, 'You are going to kill a manly Communist.'" The fact that Marighella is already dead and cannot fall victim to some unglamorous end is an asset. He was always viewed by Castro as one of the most important revolutionary leaders in Latin America and,



Marighella

despite his demise, his organization is still considered promising by the Cubans. Formerly a top leader of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), Marighella submitted his resignation in 1966 to form his own more militant group, which achieved notoriety through terrorism, robberies, bombings, airliner highjackings, and the kidnaping of US Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick last September.

Marighella was dedicated to the idea of violent revolution. He may have been recruited by the Cubans from 1962 to 1964 when they had diplomatic representation in Brazil. He was responsible at that time for contacts between the Brazilian Communist Party and the Cuban Embassy. On leaving the party he indicated his distress at the conservatism and lack of revolutionary dedication of the regular party—a theme repeatedly stressed by Fidel Castro. Marighella said, "I am ready to take part in the revolutionary struggle with the masses but never to play a waiting game in bureaucratic politics pending its consideration....There is a lack of revolutionary impulse, a revolutionary conscience which is generated by struggle."

Marighella repeated his position in Havana in August 1967 at the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference. He stated that the Brazilian revolution would be against "the common enemy—American imperialism," and that the way to unify revolutionary movements is through armed struggle.

In February 1968 he issued a document outlining the objectives and modus operandi of a new revolutionary organization dedicated to "action now" through the recruitment and training of guerrilla fighters and the eventual formation of a people's liberation army. LASO's political line was adopted; a complete break with the PCB was announced; and a loosely structured organization was advocated.

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In August 1968, Marighella published another document in Cuba on tactics and strategy of guerrilla warfare, which he dedicated to Che Guevara. Basic to this strategy is the "existence of a small nucleus of combatants." The ideological struggle must be made known to the people in a vastly bold, confident, and widespread manner, with a view to ensuring the political and revolutionary support of the masses. Moreover, the guerrilla forces "must have proper training, which begins with the careful selection of men, who should come in particular from the workers' and peasants' sectors." Eventually the elements of this stage, it was contended, would lead to a revolutionary army of peasants and workers, joined by students and intellectuals.

In December 1968, Marighella produced his "Message to the Brazilians," which was published in *Granma*, the official organ of the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party on 1 February 1969. In it he spelled out the tasks of his "revolutionary" government. It was in fact a call to arms, advocating the elimination of all North American interests. It called for a prolonged war to be launched in the blood of students, in the action of the clergy, and in workers' strikes. Moreover, it urged guerrillas to capture police and military personnel to be exchanged for political prisoners.

Subsequent information indicates that Marighella was planning attacks against Americans as early as 1968 in order to make the Brazilian population aware that there were persons willing to fight against US imperialism and to provoke the US Government into intervention in Brazil (a continuation of Guevara's "many Vietnams" theory). Kidnaping of important persons, both Brazilians and Americans, was advocated in 1968 with the objective of demoralizing the government and securing the release of important prisoners.

In September 1969, Marighella was interviewed by a correspondent from Paris *Front*. In answer to a question on the continental aspects of his revolutionary strategy Marighella replied, "We must respond to the global plans of North American imperialism with a global plan for Latin America. We have ties with the Latin American Solidarity Organization, as do many other revolutionary organizations on the continent, particularly those in neighboring countries that are struggling in the same direction as we are. And of course, it is our duty toward Cuba to free it from the imperialism encirclement, or to lighten the burden on it by fighting everywhere else. The Cuban revolution is the vanguard of the Latin American revolution, and that vanguard must survive."


THE MINIMANUAL

Marighella's latest document, the *Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla*, was written in June 1969, five months before his death. The direct link between Marighella's thoughts and the Guevara-Castro-Debray thesis is provided in the introduction, which is taken from the resolutions of the LASO conference: "The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution." Furthermore, he reiterates his pronouncement that the function of urban guerrilla warfare is to "demoralize and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare, which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war." He adds that presently the men and women chosen for urban guerrilla warfare are "workers, peasants that the city has attracted as a market for manpower and who return to the countryside indoctrinated and politically and technically prepared, students, intellectuals, and priests. This is the material with which we are building—starting with urban guerrilla warfare—the armed alliance of workers and peasants, with students, intellectuals, and priests."

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Brazilian Generals Examining Terrorist Damage

The article defines the urban guerrilla as a man who fights the military dictatorship with arms, using unconventional methods. "He is a political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, a fighter for his country's liberation, and a friend of the people and freedom." The urban guerrilla is opposed to and attacks the "government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans." Thus, the urban guerrilla in order to exist must aim at the "physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and the police" and expropriate government resources and those belonging to capitalists.

The *Minimanual* provides detailed guidance for sniping, ambushes, hijacking of aircraft, executions, riots, sabotage, assassinations, strikes,

and work interruptions as well as the occupation of factories and schools, and cites a variety of preferred targets including banks, local businesses, and US-owned companies. Terrorism, Marighella says, "is an action the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest cold-bloodedness, calmness, and decision."

EXECUTION AND KIDNAPING

Of particular interest, especially at the present time, is Marighella's discussion of execution and kidnaping as weapons of the urban terrorist. As examples of execution, the manual cited the killing of a North American spy (the assassination of a US Army captain in Brazil); of an agent of the dictatorship (opposition political figures in Guatemala); of a police torturer (the murder of the chief of the Montevideo police quick reaction unit on 13 April 1970 by the Uruguayan Tupamaros); of a fascist personality involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots; and of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent or police provocateur. In many cases, according to the article, these executions should be carried out by a solitary sniper operating in absolute secrecy.

Kidnaping is described as "capturing and holding in a secret place a police agent, a North American spy, a political personality, or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement." According to the *Minimanual*, kidnaping is used to force the exchange or the liberation of imprisoned revolutionary comrades, or to force the suspension of torture in the jail cells of the military dictatorship. The kidnappings of US Ambassador Elbrick and the Japanese consul general in Sao Paulo were used for these purposes. The communiqué issued by the terrorists following the Japanese consul's abduction, for example, stated that the act was committed "to obtain the freedom and ensure the physical integrity of some political detainees who are in the prisons of Sao

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Paulo....We would not have taken this attitude if there was no extreme necessity to save the lives of some comrades whose physical condition has become alarming.”

The kidnaping of noted nonpolitical persons is also advocated inasmuch as the ensuing publicity can generate propaganda for the guerrilla cause. The kidnaping of North Americans resident in Brazil or visiting there is also considered useful since it publicizes the involvement of US imperialism in the country.

The kidnapings of political personalities thus far—the US ambassador to Brazil, the Japanese consul general in Brazil, the Paraguayan consul in Argentina, the US air attaché in the Dominican Republic, and the US Embassy labor attaché and the West German ambassador in Guatemala, have apparently been carried out by what Marighella described as a “firing group.” This group consists of no more than four or five persons and constitutes the basic urban guerrilla organizational unit. It plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and guards arms, and studies and corrects its own tactics.

According to Marighella, “No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act.” Moreover, any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a “firing group” can do so. This organizational structure leads to free initiative and security. Two “firing groups,” separated and sealed off from other firing groups, make up a “firing team.”

Marighella concludes his article with a lengthy treatise on guerrilla security and the seven “deadly sins” of the urban guerrilla: inexperience, boastfulness, vanity, exaggeration of numbers, precipitate action, poor tactics, and poor planning.

By maintaining good security, by sustaining pressure on the police and armed forces, and by propagandizing governmental failures, Marighella says the urban guerrillas will not only preserve themselves but will also win the support of the people. As this support grows, the rural guerrilla war will develop rapidly and a solid infrastructure will be created. This group will be composed of peasants, who know the land; of students, who, although politically crude and coarse, have a special talent for revolutionary violence and have plenty of free time on their hands to spend on revolution; of intellectuals, who spread the revolutionary call and influence the people; of churchmen, who have the ability to communicate with the people; and of women, who have demonstrated unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity. In 1969, these processes were under way and there were reports that Marighella was preparing to undertake rural guerrilla activity in conjunction with the urban effort already in progress.



Fidel Castro in Animated Conversation with the Brazilian Revolutionaries at the Havana Airport

CONCLUSION

The *Minimanual* appears to represent a logical extension of the Guevara, Castro, and Debray revolutionary thesis. The already-widespread publicity of the various kidnapings and terrorist

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activities as well as the publication of the article in *Tricontinental* may result in its wide readership. It is conceivable, therefore, that the document may become a principal statement for any-

one who "takes the road of armed struggle." Marighella, at least, maintains that to be a "terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable man." [redacted]

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