


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DIRECTORATE OF
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WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report


Rumania's Second Generation Communist Leadership

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RUMANIA'S SECOND GENERATION COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

The Rumanian party and government are now under the command of "second generation" Communists, to a greater degree than all others in Eastern Europe. This new generation's leader, party Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu, since coming to power in March 1965, has revitalized the party and government by bringing in younger, better educated men who want to bring controlled change to a conservative hierarchy. Ceausescu's approach has been piecemeal and gradual; he has eased the old guard to the sidelines rather than purging it and has expanded rather than reduced the size of party and state agencies.

The leadership is young, united and competent. Party careerists dominate the elite bodies of the party and government, but the leadership makes wholesale use of technical and administrative personnel, both to serve its own interests and to broaden its popular support.

The "new" leadership has in recent years slowly begun to substitute discussion for ceremony, innovation for repetition, and inquiry for rationalization. It seems intent on shifting attention from exclusive preoccupation with the performance of individuals to shortcomings in the system itself. Moreover, it is using its new-found popularity at home, stemming in large part from its firm opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, to promote increased contact with its people.

CEAUSESCU'S GUIDING HAND

Circumstances gave Ceausescu the reins of his party at a fortuitous time. As Gheorghiu-Dej's chosen successor, he assumed power only after Dej had set Rumania firmly on the path to greater economic and political autonomy. Significantly, however, Ceausescu assumed power just before the ninth party congress at which party statutes were revised and the new constitution approved. Thus from the beginning Ceausescu was able to influence the country's economic and political policies along lines reflecting his own background, personality, and goals.

Guided by idealism in his ideology and puritanism in his personal life, Ceausescu is deeply committed to national Communism. He appears

to believe that Communist tenets provide a workable base for a society that can satisfy its citizens. He has repeatedly stumped the country calling for an improvement in attitudes toward everything from eliminating ethnic prejudices and increasing work discipline to giving greater honor to motherhood. Although the practical results of such exhortations are difficult to measure, he has established at least a civic consciousness which has narrowed the traditional gap between the provinces and central authority in Bucharest.

THE NEW GENERATION

Ceausescu has assembled a body of subordinates of his own generation, outlook, and inclination. They are for the most part men from small towns and of peasant stock, more

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CEAUSESCU AND HIS TOP SUBORDINATES



Nicolae Ceausescu

Age : 51 years
Titles : Secretary General of the RCP; President, Council of State; Supreme Commander, Armed Forces; Chairman, Front for Socialist Unity
Member : Party Presidium, Secretariat, and Executive Committee

Ion G. Maurer



Age : 67 years
Titles : Premier
Member : Party Presidium and Executive Committee
Responsibility : International Relations
Remarks : Most important carryover from Dej era; highly effective representative of regime's national Communist course at international forums; likely to retire soon



Paul Niculescu-Mizil

Age : 46 years
Member : Party Presidium, Secretariat, and Executive Committee
Responsibility : Leading ideologue; also oversees culture and agitation-propaganda
Remarks : Close to Ceausescu; very effective representative of party in interparty contacts and meetings



Llie Verdet

Age : 44 years
Title : First Deputy Premier
Member : Party Presidium and Executive Committee
Responsibility : Maurer's alter ego; also state administration
Remarks : Like Niculescu-Mizil, Verdet has had a meteoric rise in party and state complex

Manea Manescu



Age : 53 years
Titles : Chairman, Economic Council; Vice President, Council of State
Member : Party Secretariat and Executive Committee



Vasile Patilinet

Age : 53 years
Member : Party Secretariat
Responsibility : Security and military affairs

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nationalistic in attitude than the holdovers from the older generation.

These new, younger officials escaped the strict discipline imposed on Dej's generation by the Soviet-led Comintern. Moreover, they do not owe their accession to authority directly to the Soviet Union as did Dej, who assumed power when Soviet troops occupied the country. Most of them have not studied extensively at higher party schools in the USSR; the majority acquired their ideology from Rumanian teachers.

His own background enabled Ceausescu to make sound choices. He had, for example, been working extensively with youth organizations and the party cadres. This gave him the opportunity to size up promising personnel, and later to further the careers of many whom he has since promoted to prominent positions on the national level. He also had extensive experience with minority groups in Rumania, notably the Hungarians, from whom he acquired insights about their problems useful for formulating policies once he took over the reins of power.

Ceausescu has favored technicians, specialists, and administrative types in his appointments, particularly in the economic area, but he has carefully controlled their influence by bringing into the party apparatus officials who came up through the party ranks. Within the party's elite agencies—the Permanent Presidium, Secretariat, and Executive Committee—17 officials are men who have spent their entire careers in the party. Three are economists, and one is an attorney.

In contrast, the Rumanian governmental structure at the ministerial level includes 18 engineers, seven economists, four attorneys, and two social scientists. Thus technical expertise is readily available to carry out the regime's programs to develop the country's industrial base.

Rounding out the ministerial level personnel are 13 party types, some with technical expertise, who are in a position to use their party and technical experience in the governmental sector. This presumably is part of Ceausescu's policy to fuse party and government responsibilities.

HAND-PICKED YOUTH

Ceausescu's emphasis on youth is reflected in the sharp decline in the average age of party elite during the past four years. In the Presidium, the party's policy-making body, the average age of new members is 44.3 years; in 1965 the average age was 55.4 years. In the Party Secretariat, the average has dropped to about 45 from about 48 years. Average ages of new members also have declined in the Executive Committee, the party's largest elite body, even though it was formed as recently as 1965.

A more youthful central committee also seems in store. As a result of a recent reshuffle, 15 of 27 new members of the expanded Council of State are not yet members of the central committee, but they probably will be raised to this level at the party congress expected to convene this year. Also five of the 14 persons either promoted or shifted to new ministerial slots on the Council of Ministers can expect to be elected to the central committee. The same trend is discernible among first secretaries at the county levels.

The average age of officials in national-level governmental positions, on the other hand, has risen. This in part reflects Ceausescu's method for dealing with some "old guardists" whom he has removed from policy-making positions in the party to less influential posts in the government. At the executive level of the Council of State, for example, the average age of office holders has increased from 54.6 in 1965 to about 59 now. Significantly, Ceausescu also has placed several

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Romania: Changes in Leading Party Bodies Since Ninth Party Congress, July 1965

July 1965	PERMANENT PRESIDUM (Established July 1965)	May 1969	Estimated Career Status	
AGE		AGE		
47	CEAUSESCU, N., Chmn.	51	CEAUSESCU, N.	↕
52	APOSTOL, G.	46	NICULESCU-MIZIL, P. ¹	↕
54	BIRLADEANU, A.	43	TROFIN, V. ¹	↕
61	BODNARAS, E.	44	VERDET, I. ¹	↕
52	DRAGHICI, A.	65	BODNARAS, E.	↕
63	MAURER, I.G.	67	MAURER, I.G.	↕
57	STOICA, C.	56	APOSTOL, G.	↕
		61	STOICA, C.	↕
	SECRETARIAT			
47	CEAUSESCU, N., Gen. Sec.	51	CEAUSESCU, N.	↕
48	DALEA, M.	52	DALEA, M.	↕
52	DRAGHICI, A.	53	MANESCU, M.	↕
49	MANESCU, M.	46	NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.	↕
51	MOGHIOROS, A.	53	PATILINET, V.	↕
42	NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.	41	POPESCU, D. ²	↕
49	PATILINET, V.	43	TROFIN, V.	↕
55	RAUTU, L.	48	GERE, M. ²	↕
39	TROFIN, V.	61	STOICA, C.	↕
	EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Established July 1965)			
47	CEAUSESCU, N.	51	CEAUSESCU, N.	↕
52	APOSTOL, G.	43	FAZEKAS, J.	↕
59	BORILA, P.	47	LUPU, P. ³	↕
61	BODNARAS, E.	53	MANESCU, M.	↕
52	DRAGHICI, A.	46	NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.	↕
43	DRAGAN, C.	55	RADULESCU, G.	↕
54	BIRLADEANU, A.	43	TROFIN, V.	↕
51	MOGHIOROS, A.	44	VERDET, I. ³	↕
50	SALAJAN, L.	47	BERGHIANU, M. ³	↕
63	MAURER, I.G.	65	BODNARAS, E.	↕
42	NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.	54	DANALACHE, F. ³	↕
51	RADULESCU, G.	47	DRAGAN, C.	↕
55	RAUTU, L.	67	MAURER, I.G.	↕
57	STOICA, C.	59	VILCU, V. ³	↕
65	VOITEC, S.	56	APOSTOL, G.	↕
		59	RAUTU, L.	↕
		61	STOICA, C.	↕
		65	STOICA, G.	↕
		69	VOITEC, S.	↕
39	BANC, I.	43	BANC, I.	↕
42	BLAJOVICI, P.	-	DRAGANESCU, E. ⁴	↕
58	COLIU, D.	44	POPA, D.	↕
43	BERGHIANU, M.	41	POPESCU, D. ⁴	↕
44	GERE, M.	46	BLAJOVICI, P.	↕
50	DANALACHE, F.	48	GERE, M.	↕
39	FAZEKAS, J.	62	COLIU, D.	↕
43	LUPU, P.			
40	VERDET, I.			
55	VILCU, V.			

Full Members

Alternates

1. Strong supporters of Ceausescu promoted into party's top policy-making body
2. Backers of Ceausescu added to Secretariat
3. Supporters of Ceausescu advanced from alternate to full membership
4. Ceausescu "comers" who have acquired alternate membership

NOTE: Names in blue are changes since July 1965

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younger men in the Council, in order to have a majority to which he can turn if need be.

The trend toward increased influence for the younger generation also is evident in the composition of parliament, a unicameral body consisting of 465 deputies. In the new parliament elected last March, 16 percent of the members are less than 35 years old, 58 percent are between 35 and 50, while only 26 percent are more than 50. The Rumanian parliament is one of the youngest in Eastern Europe.

Ceausescu has brought a number of new men, almost all under 50, into the middle levels of the party and government apparatus. They share a number of characteristics: unusual ability, the outlook of administrators with technical expertise, and loyalty to Ceausescu rather than party seniority.

PARTY RANK-AND-FILE

Since 1965, there has been a notable increase in party membership, from about 1,300,000 in July 1965 to more than 1,860,000 at present. The party has never expanded so rapidly, and rarely, if ever, has the average age of members been as low. The purpose of this drive has been to rejuvenate the party, to broaden its popular base, and particularly to win greater backing from peasants and intellectuals, as well as from the minorities which have been the most alienated from previous regimes. There are efforts to flesh out the party organization in the countryside in order to meet the increased demands there. By appealing to intellectuals, the party obviously wants to enhance its prestige as well as attract into the party-state apparatus those persons having skills needed to achieve regime goals.

The effort toward making the party more of a mass organization is an indirect expression of a more liberal policy by the younger leadership

toward the population at large, but there has, as yet, been no other genuine manifestation of liberalization.

UNITY

Party unity remains a hallmark of Ceausescu's even though he has shunted aside the older leaders, and the Soviets apparently have tried, both before and after the Czechoslovak invasion, to subvert his leadership. Ceausescu has adroitly used the threat of invasion to popularize his policies. In May 1967 he sharply, albeit indirectly, criticized the Soviets for "contacts outside the organized framework." He said that "under such circumstances, each party is fully entitled to take every measure it considers necessary so as to ensure its political and organizational unity, the implementation of its political line." Last August, Ceausescu again drove home this message of a united party and government by having all party and government bodies unanimously endorse a resolution condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia and reaffirming the right of national sovereignty.

Ceausescu remains fully in charge. Differences that do emerge within the hierarchy reflect conflicting views on degree, tactics, and timing rather than on major substantive matters. There is no reliable evidence that any individual or faction opposes Ceausescu, even on such thorny issues as the Arab-Israeli war, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Rumania's role in the Warsaw Pact or in the bloc economic organization, CEMA. These issues have subjected the unity of the leadership to a series of severe tests, all of which it weathered intact.

This apparent absence of sharp differences attests to the unity and homogeneity characterizing the Rumanian party since 1957. It also attests to the deftness with which Ceausescu has nudged aside the "old guardists" in favor of his

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Changes in Rumanian Government Since August 1965

OLD Government			NEW Government	
1965		COUNCIL OF STATE	1969	
AGE			AGE	
57	STOICA, Chivu	<i>President</i>	51	CEAUSESUCU, Nicolae
50	CRACIUN, Constanta	<i>Vice President</i>	55	BODNARAS, Emil
44	GERE, Mihai	<i>Vice President</i>	53	MANESCU, Manea
59	BORILA, Petre	<i>Vice President</i>	63	PETRESCU, Dumitru
63	MURGULESCU, G.	<i>Vice President</i>	63	PETERFI, Stefan
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS				
63	MAURER, Ion G.	<i>Premier</i>	67	MAURER, Ion G.
52	APOSTOL, Gheorghe	<i>First Deputy Premier</i>	44	VERDET, I. (not applicable)
61	BODNARAS, Emil	<i>First Deputy Premier</i>		(not applicable)
54	BIRLADEANU, Alex.	<i>First Deputy Premier</i>	43	BANC, Iosif
39	BANC, Iosif	<i>Deputy Premier</i>		DRAGANESCU, Emil
47	GASTON-MARIN, G.	<i>Deputy Premier</i>	43	FAZEKAS, Janos
39	FAZEKAS, Janos	<i>Deputy Premier</i>	51	MARINESCU, Mahati
42	BLAJOVICI, Petre	<i>Deputy Premier</i>	48	PATAN, Ion
40	VERDET, Ilie	<i>Deputy Premier</i>	55	RADULESCU, G.
50	RADULESCU, G. (not applicable)	<i>Deputy Premier</i>	59	RAUTU, Leonte

Other members of Council

	AGE	
BOABA, Alex. CIOARA, G.	Under 40	BURTICA, Cornel HIESCU, I.
ALMASAN, Bujor DRAGAN, Const. DUMITRU, A. GIOSAN, Nicolae LEVENTE, Mikhail MANESCU, Corneliu MARINESCU, Mihai MARINESCU, Ion MOSORA, Dumitru	40 to 50	AGACHI, Nicolae ALMASAN, Bujor AVRAM, Ion BERGHIANU, M. BLAJOVICI, Petre BOABA, Alex. BOZDOG, Nicolae GIOSAN, Nicolae GROZA, Octavian LUPU, Petre MOSORA, Dumeru
BALAN, Stefan FLORESCU, Mihai MACOVEI, P. MARINESCU, Voinea MOLDOVAN, R. SALAJAN, L. Gen. SCHIOPU, Bucur SENCOVICI, Alex. SIMULESCU, D. SUDER, Mihai VIJOLI, Aurel	50 to 66	APOSTOL, G. BALAN, Stefan BUGHICI, Simion DANALACHE, F. DUMITRIU, A. GASTON-MARIN, G. IONITA, Ion Gen. MACOVEI, P. MANESCU, Cornel MOGA, Aurel SUDER, Mihai VILCU, Vasile
DRAGANESCU, E. ONESCU, Cornel	Age not known	BAICU, Ion BALANESCU, M. CHACIUN, Ion GHIGIU, Matei MURGULET, N. ONESCU, Cornel PIRVU, Virgil STANESCU, Ion TOADER, Nicolae

NOTE: Names in blue are changes since July 1965

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younger generation men. Moreover, for all his alleged impulsiveness, Ceausescu apparently makes an effort to obtain the views of everyone before making a decision. He also stresses accountability among the party leaders for actions taken at policy-making sessions.

Moreover, Ceausescu seeks to prevent potential conflict in the party and government hierarchy by warily bypassing technocrats in forming the power elite. He studiously avoids overdependence on technocratic-intellectual elements lest this generate pressures for change that would be anathema to his leadership at this time. Thus the party jealously guards its prerogatives, including the economic sector, where technicians have come to the fore in other countries. There has been little decentralization of economic decision making in Rumania. Even the economic "reform" program, approved late in 1967, was modestly conceived and, unlike those of many of the other Eastern Europe countries, was not drafted under pressure to resolve immediate economic problems. Rather, it seeks to deal with a long-range slowdown in the currently high rate of industrial growth.

The new leadership also has been trying to reduce the potential for conflict between party and government officials. Ceausescu laid the cornerstone for this policy at a national party conference in December 1967. That conference authorized a wholesale revamping of the national administrative structure involving the fusion of party and governmental positions at various levels. Specifically, the conference approved the principle that "a single comrade in the leadership should take care of a specific field of activity in both the party and state spheres," and that in each of the 39 then newly constituted counties the posts of the party first secretary and chairman of the People's Councils should be held by the same person.

COMMITMENT TO CONTROLLED CHANGE

The new generation leadership has developed a style of ruling which mirrors the conservatism of Rumania's political heritage and takes account of its geographical setting, but nevertheless allows controlled political change. Committed to the primacy of the party, the leadership, however, does not insist on maintaining the political status quo or reluctantly dole out concessions only because of popular or other pressures. Its views as to relinquishing or retaining internal political controls change with the circumstances.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, the regime established a new "mass" organization, the Front for Socialist Unity, which may in time gain a political significance of its own. It already offers an avenue for political consultation and discussion within a single national organization in the image of Yugoslavia's mass organization, the Socialist Alliance. In practical terms, it could act as a lightning rod for the party, providing a device through which the population could discuss fully as many opinions and views as possible before the draft laws, and especially the draft plans, are sanctioned by constitutional organs.

The party's commitment to restricting sharply the powers of the secret police, streamlining the state and economic apparatus, and liberalizing cultural and educational standards to some degree meets popular aspirations for a more relaxed relationship between the regime and the people. These aspirations, on the other hand, are not uniform, nor are they expressed with continuous vigor. Moreover, the leadership's task in maintaining centralized control is simplified by Rumania's lack of a democratic tradition.

The roles assigned to governmental institutions are, however, changing. The Council of State, which Ceausescu has headed since

December 1967, is fast taking on the power that the constitution assigns to it as the supreme body of the state. A party central committee plenum last March and a session of parliament a few days later drove home the message of an enlarged role for the Council. The Council has since been expanded from 19 to 27 members, and it has been made more representative of the body politic; it now includes the chairmen of the German and Hungarian nationality councils and the president of the Union of Writers.

As the authority of the Council of State has increased, however, the role of the Council of Ministers, traditionally the locus of governmental power, has correspondingly diminished. Shorn of its authority over the Economic Council, which is now a superagency responsible both to the central committee and the Council of State, the Council of Ministers' prerogatives were further curtailed in March by the formal creation of the Council of Defense. The establishment of this body, also headed by Ceausescu, presumably reduces the Council of Ministers' role in defense policy.

At the same time, Ceausescu has moved to beef up the role of the Grand National Assembly by expanding from six to ten the number of its standing parliamentary commissions. The election of strong, predominantly Ceausescu men to head up these commissions and the expanded membership now authorized for these commissions contributes to the increased role for parliament.

DECISION-MAKING

Ceausescu controls a majority of members in the central committee, which meets about every two months to formulate and to endorse tactical policy. Policy decisions during the periods between its meetings presumably are made either in the Presidium or the Executive Committee. In addition, the power elite convenes en masse at least twice a year—usually in July and January—to

thrash out general policy guidelines. These latter sessions often are followed by speeches or statements by Ceausescu or by someone else speaking for the party and government. These pronouncements seem designed to “clue in” the party's rank-and-file, the Rumanian populace, as well as the other Communist parties.

The orchestrated deployment of personnel comprising the party's elite bodies is a hallmark of Ceausescu's leadership. During frequent trips to the provinces, particularly to minority areas, Ceausescu invariably includes in his entourage leading party figures who came from the areas visited. Janos Fazekas, a deputy premier and an ethnic Hungarian, often is a companion of Ceausescu when the latter ventures into Transylvania, while Premier Maurer frequently accompanies Ceausescu to Germanic sections of the country. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he dispatched to the provinces virtually the entire party elite, to give speeches whipping up support in the hope of deterring like actions against Rumania. On earlier occasions there was some skepticism over this practice but the invasion greatly helped Ceausescu's effort to develop rapport with the provinces.

OUTLOOK

Ceausescu will continue to try to make Rumania an efficient and modern state through the creation of an integrated and centrally oriented party and state apparatus. He undoubtedly sees this as the best way of ensuring the nation's independence in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the implicit threat posed by the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of “limited sovereignty.”

The leadership is aware that its ability to sustain its national Communist course depends in large part on maintaining a solid front internally, and policies are shaped accordingly. Youth and

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HIGHLIGHTS OF CEAUSESCU'S RULE

Date	Party or Government Initiated	Character of the Action
24 March 1965	Party	Ceausescu succeeds the deceased Gheorghiu-Dej
19 June	Government	Draft constitution proclaims Rumania a "socialist republic" and stresses independent approach to national Communism
19-24 July	Party	Ninth party congress is held
20-21 August	Government	Parliament adopts new constitution and approves changes in government personnel
27-28 June 1966	Party	P. Niculescu-Mizil and I. Verdet, proteges of Ceausescu, promoted to party presidium
3 January 1967	Government	Verdet promoted to first deputy premier
26-27 June	Government	Ministry of Internal Affairs is reorganized
30 October	Party	Ceausescu cautiously encourages "cultural thaw" that he started in May 1965
6-8 December	Party	Party national conference approves territorial-administrative changes, economic reorganization, and further promotion of Ceausescu supporters
9 December 1967	Government	Parliament approves fusion of party and government at national and local levels
6-8 February 1968	Government	Draft legislation liberalizes higher education
21-22 March	Party	Ceausescu announces 30-percent cut in salaried party positions
6 April	Government	Draft penal code emphasizes "socialist humanism"
22-25 April	Party	Party ousts Alexandry Draghici from leading party and government posts, continues to rehabilitate "nationalists," and openly denigrates Gheorghiu-Dej for "misdeeds"
24-25 October 1968	Party and Government	New "mass" organization, Front for Socialist Unity, established
11 March 1969	Party	Central committee plenum further strengthens Ceausescu's hold on party and state complex
14 March	Government	Parliament formally establishes the Council of Defenses with Ceausescu as chairman
August 1969 or later	Party	Tenth party congress slated

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ability in the party and state apparatus, will continue to be emphasized, but prerequisites will also include loyalty to Ceausescu, dedication to party supremacy, and nationalism.


For now, Rumania has rejected the concept of a pluralistic society that is gaining ground in other countries of Eastern Europe and Bucharest jealously preserves both its control over and its responsibility for nearly all organized activities. The future trend was clearly set by the reorganization last March when it became more evident than ever that the party's elite agencies will continue to direct the four most important spheres of the country's life—ideology, foreign affairs, defense, and the economy. In less important sectors, however, the party leadership more and more takes the position that, on a pragmatic basis, control can be shifted to the state apparatus.

The Rumanian leadership appears stable and committed to its present course. When changes in the composition of the elite bodies take place, they probably will strengthen the forces of the younger, better educated technical and party

elements, who are among the most enthusiastic champions of Rumanian independence.

The Ceausescu regime is highly nationalistic, but it is not an ultraconservative force such as that which controlled the country during the 1930s. The regime instead avoids encouraging the revival of old national and ethnic rivalries and is increasingly responsive to the major needs of the country.

This quest for independence is foremost in the expansion of the Rumanian's ties with the non-Communist world. These political, economic, and cultural ties increasingly expose Rumanian officials and the Rumanian people to other ways of doing things and will inevitably make a lasting impression. What is more, the promotion of these ties seems likely to expose, as never before, political and economic contradictions in the Communist system that a younger generation will find increasingly difficult to deny and to which it will have to find a means to reconcile itself, a not impossible task.



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