


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

State Dept. review completed.

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No. 0371/69

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(Information as of noon EDT, 22 May 1969)

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
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The political crisis, which mushroomed in Turkey this past week over the issue of restoring full political rights to those ousted in the military revolution nine years ago, has eased.

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Referendums on Prime Minister Smith's proposed constitution and on declaring Rhodesia a republic will be held on 20 June. If the proposals pass, as expected, Rhodesia will be within a step of severing all remaining ties with Britain.

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**FAR EAST**

The Vietnamese Communists have indicated by their detailed response to President Nixon's proposals on Vietnam that they now are prepared for some further substantive dialogue. The Communists may well go no further themselves, however, until they have assessed the presidential conference to take place on Midway early next month. They will be especially watchful for signs of strains between Washington and Saigon.

Meanwhile, the Communists are trying to regain the diplomatic initiative by giving heavy propaganda play to the Liberation Front's ten-point program. They have not gone beyond nor clarified the language contained in their initial announcement.

South Vietnamese reaction to President Nixon's proposals has been generally favorable but cautious.

The evident intention of Malay political leaders to exclude Malaysia's Chinese community from any significant political role will widen the breach between the two racial groups. In the wake of last week's communal rioting, Malay leaders suspended the constitutional government and established an all-powerful National Operations Council under control of Deputy Prime Minister Razak.

[REDACTED]

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The government ignored repeated offers by Chinese opposition leaders to assist in restoring order during the riots and its insistence on blaming the opposition for starting the postelection disturbances has further alienated the mass of Chinese.

The Chinese Communist regime has not embarked on any major policy initiatives in the wake of the much heralded ninth party congress. It appears merely to be marking time on all major issues.

The dispatch of ambassadors, both central committee members, to Paris and Tirana this week indicates that the Chinese leadership is paying more attention to foreign affairs, but Peking will probably take its time in filling vacant ambassadorial slots. [REDACTED]

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VIETNAM

The first significant Communist responses to President Nixon's Vietnam address focused on two key issues--future political arrangements in South Vietnam and troop withdrawals. Commentaries broadcast by the North Vietnamese and the Liberation Front and statements by their spokesmen in Paris have come down hard on these questions.

The Communists have again denounced US proposals for mutual troop withdrawals and insisted that a complete and unconditional US military pull-out is essential for a settlement. They contend that to permit some American troops to remain and to leave the South Vietnam armed forces intact while processes leading to a political arrangement are in motion is tantamount to demanding a Communist surrender to Saigon.

Similarly, the Communists scored the US for failing to respond to their demand for a "provisional coalition" prior to elections and for implying that such elections would take place under the aegis of the present South Vietnamese Government.

The Communists did not reject President Nixon's proposals outright, however, nor did they rule them out as a basis for ne-

gotiations in Paris. Indeed, by taking up the US initiative in some detail, and by spelling out their objections, the Communists appear to be inviting further substantive dialogue.

During the next week or so the Communists probably will not go much beyond what they have said already as they attempt to come to grips with the President's proposals and to assess their impact on the total situation. Hanoi will be especially watchful of the presidential conference on Midway for signs of a fissure in Washington-Saigon relations. Major new public pronouncements may well be held up pending an assessment of this meeting.

Meanwhile, the Communists appear to be trying to regain their balance and the diplomatic initiative through heavy public relations exploitation of the Front's new ten-point program. They are playing up the ten points on a grand scale with only passing reference to the President's speech. Their leading negotiators in Paris have trumpeted the Front's proposals at an unusual number of press conferences, interviews and social functions during the past several days without going beyond the language contained in their initial announcement.

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President Thieu Responds

The US peace initiative has prompted President Thieu to make his most flexible statement yet on a political settlement. Speaking to US newsmen on 17 May, Thieu said he was willing to abide by the results of free national elections, even if a coalition or pro-Communist government were chosen. Thieu probably believes such forthcoming remarks will allay American press criticism of his attitude toward dealing with the Communists; he probably has little fear that a coalition or pro-Communist government would actually be elected.

Thieu was careful to distinguish between interim political arrangements in connection with a negotiated settlement to end the war, and final arrangements resulting from new elections. He rejected the establishment of a coalition or any other type of new interim government before elections, but he said he was willing to discuss arrangements for elections with the Communists. A political settlement, he said, might include a general amnesty so that everyone could vote. Another point for negotiation would be the manner in which members of the National Liberation Front might participate as voters or as candidates. Thieu said he would even consider allowing them to run as "Communists," but he did not believe they would be "stupid enough" to do so.

Other South Vietnamese Reactions

South Vietnam's cautious reading of President Nixon's

proposals was reflected in the government's initial lukewarm statement which described the US proposals as "not contrary to" the spirit of Thieu's six-point peace program. The government later revised this statement and called the proposals "consistent with" Thieu's program.

Press reaction to the President's proposals was divided. Two papers which took a critical line were quickly closed and their publishers are awaiting an investigation and possible legal action by the government. Most of the concern focused on the issues of the elections, the regroupment of foreign troops, and international supervision. Politicians and National Assembly deputies were particularly worried about the implications of elections without reference to the present constitution.

The Military Situation

The upsurge of Communist military activity during the period 11-13 May was apparently a high point of the enemy's so-called "May Action Phase"; the tempo of enemy-initiated action fell off this week to a level similar to other periods between enemy offensives. Nevertheless, heavy ground fighting took place in several places, largely as the result of allied drives against enemy redoubts and base areas.

The disposition of most Communist main force combat units and other available evidence points to June or shortly thereafter as the most likely time for the enemy to start their "summer" campaign. Some parts of

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South Vietnam, however, are threatened by concentrations of enemy forces. These areas include northern Quang Tri Province, the central highlands, and the peripheral areas of South Vietnam's III Corps to the northwest and east of Saigon.

The heaviest fighting this week occurred in western Thua Thien Province where combined US and South Vietnamese forces are


sweeping the northern end of the A Shau Valley. A strongly defended hilltop position--dubbed Hamburger Hill by American troops--was seized on 20 May after days of fierce fighting. US losses were 44 killed, 297 wounded, and one missing, compared with known enemy losses of 505 killed.

In southwestern Kontum Province, military action seesawed between the enemy's occasional shellings coupled with limited ground probes, and allied-initiated engagements with elements of North Vietnamese regiments threatening allied targets spread throughout the area.

In III Corps, sporadic ground contacts between allied and Communist units were punctuated by generally light enemy bombardments of allied field positions and base camps. The most significant ground battle developed near the Long Khanh provincial capital of Xuan Loc where allied forces engaged elements of the Viet Cong 5th Division which attacked targets in the area after being refitted in War Zone "D."

Small-unit contacts also flared up near the Demilitarized Zone, south of Da Nang, and in the delta provinces. Rocket and mortar attacks were also directed at scattered US air bases in mid-week but they caused little damage. This type of military action is expected to continue as enemy forces get set for their next offensive campaign, but another spate of country-wide shellings could come at any time.

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## POST-CONGRESS EVENTS BELIEVE CHINESE UNITY CLAIMS

The regime has not embarked on any major policy initiatives in the wake of the ninth party congress and in many senses appears to be merely marking time. Domestic political issues remain much as they were before the meeting began, and the congress seems to have done little to resolve difficult policy questions.

Mammoth meetings are now being held in most provinces to "convey the spirit" of the congress to party activists. Speeches and communiqués connected with these meetings largely repeat the opaque and ambiguous language of Lin Piao's report to the congress. The "revolutionary" themes of the Cultural Revolution and more constructive slogans calling for administrative rebuilding and greater economic growth are frequently bracketed together at these provincial meetings.

A recent article in Peking Daily has renewed complaints that many revolutionary committees--the new organs of administration at the provincial and lower levels--are beset by factionalism, by power struggles, and by other signs of disunity. As a result, the article says, the revolutionary committees have difficulty in firmly establishing their authority and in getting their directives obeyed. Similar complaints were frequently aired in the months preceding the congress and, although the conclave was billed as a triumph of "unity," it does not seem to have done much to resolve persistent factional problems.

Propaganda remains focused on the complicated and divisive question of cadre "rehabilitation"--a

subject that has wide-ranging implications for every political interest group within the regime. Most pronouncements on rehabilitation have excoriated "extreme leftists" who are said to be blocking progress in this field and have called for the exoneration of most officials who were severely criticized at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, several broadcasts and newspaper articles from central China have warned that "rightists" have been taking advantage of the rehabilitation process to protect "class enemies."

One sign that at least some progress has been made in the area of cadre rehabilitation was the presence at a meeting of "activists" in Peking on 19 May of three former army marshals--Chen Yi, Hsu Hsiang-chien, and Nieh Jung-chen--who had been dropped from the new politburo announced after the party congress. All three were listed as vice chairmen of the important Military Affairs Commission. Despite this indication that these men are not totally in disfavor, their role on the commission in the future is likely to be largely ceremonial.

Chen Yi continues to absent himself from the Foreign Ministry and almost certainly has been permanently removed from that office. Nieh Jung-chen, who was chief of the Chinese advanced weapons program before the Cultural Revolution, may still retain some authority in this important area, but his removal from the politburo means that China's technological and scientific establishment now lacks a voice at the highest policy-making levels.

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## MALAYS TAKE CONTROL IN AFTERMATH OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

Malay political leaders have assumed virtually exclusive authority in the wake of last week's communal violence in Malaysia. Their evident intention to exclude the Chinese community from any significant national political role will aggravate the breach between the two racial groups caused by the rioting. These developments threaten to inflict irreparable damage to the Malaysian goal of building a multiracial society and could result in further outbreaks of violence.

An emergency National Operations Council, established on 17 May under Deputy Prime Minister Razak, wields unlimited powers at the national level, and also at the local level through its control of operations councils in each state. All parliamentary government on national and state levels has been suspended. The Malays' determination to direct matters is evident in the assignment of portfolios in the largely advisory emergency cabinet announced on 20 May. All portfolios are held by Malays, except for two assigned to representatives of the Malaysian Indian Congress. Four members of the Malaysian Chinese Association, two of whom previously held cabinet posts, were also appointed to the cabinet but their "special functions" were not identified.

During the riots the government ignored repeated offers by opposition leaders to assist in restoring order, and apparently has made no effort since then to approach responsible opposition figures for help to decrease tensions. Instead Razak and others have continued to blame the opposition for starting the post-election disturbances even though Malay elements appear equally responsible.

Whatever constitutional or organizational changes may be made by the Operations Council, it seems increasingly likely that 66-year old Prime Minister Rahman will be eased out of power. This would lead to further alienation of the Chinese, most of whom regard Rahman as a moderate.

Razak's decision to recruit three regular army battalions and one additional territorial battalion, all of them Malay, will strengthen the Malay hold on power. These units are to be in addition to the armed vigilante groups that are already being organized.

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THE AFTERMATH OF RIOTING IN KUALA LUMPUR


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Sarawak and Sabah have remained quiet in the wake of the government announcement suspending incomplete elections there. The general sentiment, especially in Sarawak, is that Kuala Lumpur has exploited rioting in West Malaysia to interfere in the democratic process in the two East Malaysia states. Kuala Lumpur's action has dimmed hopes for a stable federal-state relationship in Sarawak, where a "state's rights" atmosphere has

been strong since its incorporation in Malaysia in 1963. Any long-term suspension of the elections will only increase the probability of serious trouble in East Malaysia.

In neighboring Singapore, security forces were placed on alert early this week after scattered incidents of violence between Chinese and Malays. The trouble thus far seems to be largely between criminal elements, but racial violence similar to that in Malaysia could easily flare up in Singapore.



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### EUROPE

As the last week of the presidential campaign begins, opinion poles indicate a tight race between centrist Alain Poher and Gaullist Georges Pompidou on the first ballot. Pompidou is trying to hold on to his Gaullists and also widen his appeal by indicating flexibility. Poher is taking advantage of the French weariness with De Gaulle's authoritarianism.

Two important NATO meetings take place next week. The Defense Planning Committee will discuss force planning and political control of the on-call Mediterranean naval force, and the seven-member Nuclear Planning Group will consider political guidelines for the tactical use of nuclear weapons and consultation procedures for weapons release.

Representatives of most of the world's Communist parties gathered in Moscow for the "final" preparatory session before the International Communist Conference, scheduled to open on 5 June. There were some signs that the combination of Soviet pressure and watered-down wording in the main conference documents would bring wavering parties into line. Given the checkered history of this project, however, Moscow could hardly feel certain that it had finally found the formula that would both keep some key parties from walking off at the last minute and produce agreed documents with some substantive meaning.

Rumania still has problems accepting the documents. Ceausescu was in Moscow for ten hours to meet with the Soviet leaders a week ago, one of a number of fence-mending consultations prior to the preparatory meeting. He followed this visit with a two-day visit to Warsaw for talks with Polish leader Gomulka. In neither case does there seem to have been more than an exchange of views, and no meeting of the minds was evident.

Czechoslovak leader Husak has moved to establish more effective party control over key elements of society. In doing this, however, he appears to be inadvertently strengthening regime conservatives at the expense of his own moderate leadership. He may soon be forced to take steps against the pro-Soviet conservatives and their spokesman, Czech party bureau leader Strougal, in order to keep his regime intact.

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### WARSAW PACT COMMAND IS REALIGNED

Articles in the Soviet and East European press marking the Warsaw Pact's fourteenth anniversary last week provided new information on recent changes in its Joint Armed Forces Command. The changes, approved at the Budapest meeting of the Pact's top leadership in March, appear designed to give the East European member states a somewhat stronger voice in the conduct of Pact military affairs.

One of the resolutions adopted at the meeting stipulates that each member state will appoint a deputy to the Soviet commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. The deputies will be in charge of the forces which their countries have committed to the Pact. They apparently will be senior commanders but not the national defense ministers, who heretofore have been nominal deputy commanders in chief.

The removal of the defense ministers from the chain of command will mean that they will no longer be directly subordinate to the Pact commander, who is also a Soviet first deputy defense minister. Inasmuch as the new Pact deputies presumably will be accountable to their respective defense ministers as well as to the Pact commander, the East European countries may acquire somewhat greater leverage in matters relating to their own armed forces.

The member states also agreed to assign "a suitable number of generals and officers for work in the leading organs" of the Pact. One of the organs to which these officers will be assigned is a newly created committee for coordinating the de-

velopment and standardization of weapon systems within the Pact.

Other officers may be assigned to the staff of the Joint Command. Rumania and Czechoslovakia have long been calling for organizational changes which would give the East European states meaningful representation on this body. Presently, each country is represented in Moscow by a single officer who has only a liaison function in contrast to the sizable Soviet staff in each East European capital. The chief of the Pact staff has always been a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, which does most of the military planning for the Pact.

By establishing a Committee of Defense Ministers, the Budapest meeting formalized the practice of having the national defense ministers meet periodically to discuss matters of common concern. The committee will review the Pact's military requirements, draw up proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the joint armed forces, and submit recommendations to "organs competent to make decisions." All major decisions presumably will be made by the Political Consultative Committee, the Pact's highest policy-making body.

These changes in the Joint Command do not constitute a major reorganization of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet chairmanship of the Pact's various organs will ensure Moscow's continued dominance of the alliance and, to a large extent, counterbalance any increased autonomy which the East European members may have gained through the organizational changes.

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## TWO NATO MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETINGS SCHEDULED NEXT WEEK

The Defense Planning Committee, consisting of all NATO members except France, will convene at Brussels on 28 May, while the seven-nation Nuclear Planning Group meets in London on 29-30 May, two ministerial-level meetings of unusual importance.

The main topics for discussion at the Defense Planning Committee meeting are expected to be the on-call naval force for the Mediterranean, and force planning. The principal issue relating to the on-call naval force is the question of providing for political control over its employment, especially in times of crisis.

Regarding force planning, the defense ministers will review last January's decision after the invasion of Czechoslovakia to upgrade military forces and will provide policy guidance for the preparation of force-level proposals for the 1971-1975 period. The West European governments are likely to press the US concerning its intentions on future force levels before they offer any changes in their own force commitments.

The Canadian decision to reduce its forces in Western Europe, announced in April, is also certain to receive considerable attention.



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Discussion at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting will center on political guidelines for the tactical use of nuclear weapons and consultation procedures for crisis situations. The British and the Germans will present a draft of a policy statement on NATO's use of tactical nuclear weapons. The West Europeans have been pressing for firm crisis consultation procedures.



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## DISARMAMENT TALKS FOCUS ON SEABED CONTROLS

The first of the 1969 sessions of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) ends 23 May in Geneva, without agreement on any new disarmament measure, but with seabeds arms control established as the main focus of attention when the second session begins early in July.

Draft treaties on seabeds introduced by the US and USSR are rather far apart, and there is growing pressure to work out a compromise. Most ENDC members are anxious to show progress to the 24th UN General Assembly this fall, however, and the US and USSR, in view of their commitments under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, are under pressure to resolve their differences.

The Soviet draft treaty, with its sweeping proscription of all military uses of the seabed and its verification scheme that includes reciprocal inspection rights, has generated a favorable response from a number of ENDC members. The Soviets have hinted that they are flexible and may move toward the US position. This favors a less comprehensive ban, to cover only nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons fixed to the seabeds but does not include any formal procedure for inspection.

General feeling among most ENDC members is that the US draft is too restrictive, but nonetheless represents a constructive first effort. It was tabled on 22 May with the consent of NATO countries as a tactical maneuver to provide an alternative to the Soviet draft before adjournment. A number of the Allies have reservations regarding some of its

provisions, however, and they may press for changes when the ENDC reconvenes. Canada, for example, favors including conventional military activities in the ban, but would spell out an exception for "limited defensive activities" such as submarine detection devices. Denmark and Belgium appear to agree with Canada that coverage should be broader than that proposed by the US, but not so broad as suggested by the USSR.


Most of the nonaligned countries at the ENDC can be expected to support a more far-reaching weapons ban than in the US formulation, but will probably let the US and the Soviet Union take the lead in this area. They will, however, probably urge that a compromise draft include a verification provision guaranteeing rights of inspection indiscriminately to all pact adherents. One procedure discussed calls for the establishment of a new international agency with authority to inspect all signatories' underseas installations. Another suggests a guarantee that countries without the technical capabilities to perform deep sea inspections be afforded the mandatory assistance of any other state having that capability.

Considerable controversy surrounds the question of territorial coverage. Several countries, including some NATO members, support the Soviet preference for applying the ban beyond the twelve-mile limit, rather than the US proposed three-mile delineation. Bilateral discussions on this and the various other issues can be expected to continue during the ENDC recess.

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**Civil Air Routes of the USSR  
into the Free World**



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*\*Also shown are air routes to selected Communist countries.*

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## SOVIETS PUSHING CIVIL AIR ROUTES ABROAD

The USSR continues to expand its world-wide network of civil air routes. In the past two months Aeroflot, the Soviet commercial carrier, has made inaugural flights to four countries-- Norway, Uganda, Southern Yemen and Singapore; this raises to 40 the number of free world countries now served by Aeroflot. The Soviets also have moved rapidly to replace the obsolete twin-jet TU-104 as well as the aging TU-114 and IL-18 turboprop transports on Aeroflot's free world routes with two of the USSR's newest jets, the long-range IL-62 and the short-to-medium haul TU-134.

A recent significant development in Soviet civil aviation has been the opening of airspace over Siberia to international air travel. The decision to permit independent Japanese flights over Siberia by next March probably resulted in part from Moscow's search for a trans-Pacific route, which hinges on securing onward rights from Tokyo. In line with this, the USSR probably will initiate serious negotiations to join the International Civil Air Organization.

A high-level Soviet spokesman recently said that Aeroflot is interested in obtaining from the US the right to operate IL-62 flights between Tokyo and San Francisco/Los Angeles via Honolulu. Moscow also may be planning to initiate talks with Australia in the hope

of acquiring onward rights from Sydney, which eventually could provide the basis for an around-the-world service by the Soviet carrier.

Once the trans-Siberian route is inaugurated, Japan Air Lines will have the initial edge over other foreign carriers. Western airlines such as KLM, SAS, BOAC and Air France, however, will quickly press for a share in this potentially lucrative air route.

Inauguration of Aeroflot service to Singapore on 18 May presages further expansion into Southeast Asia; attempts to secure air agreements with Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia probably will be intensified. After three years of intermittent negotiations Moscow succeeded in March in opening a new air route to Hanoi through South Asia, avoiding Communist China.

Moscow also has achieved partial success in its longstanding efforts to open air service to East Africa via the Sudan. Flights to both Uganda and Tanzania now have been added to Aeroflot's regularly scheduled service to Khartoum. With the inauguration of this flight, Aeroflot has been able to abandon its more circuitous route to Tanzania. That flight via Egypt, Yemen, and a new stop at Aden now terminates in the Somali Republic.

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## FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN GATHERS MOMENTUM

With elections for the presidency a little over a week away, centrist Alain Poher not only is eating into the lead which the polls give Georges Pompidou on the first ballot but he has overtaken the former prime minister on the crucial second ballot. The two front runners continue to conduct campaigns which are quite similar.

Pompidou, stressing that he is open to change but within the context of stability and continuity, is trying both to keep dedicated Gaullists in his camp and to woo the opposition. Poher, taking advantage of the hostility which many Frenchmen felt about De Gaulle's authoritarian handling of the presidential office, is emphasizing that he will be a "president for all the French."

Pompidou has stepped up his campaign efforts, because of the slippage in his standing in the polls and the fact that he is the principal target of all six other candidates. In a TV address this week, Pompidou raised again the specter of Communism, a tactic used effectively by the Gaullists in the past. He charged that Poher, if elected, would be the "prisoner of his electorate, including the Communists." In coming days, Pompidou doubtless will try to put Poher on the defensive by questioning how the interim president can hope to carry out his plans when the parliamentary majority is against him.

Poher is conducting his campaign in a low key and, unlike

Pompidou, is avoiding numerous public appearances and rallies. Although he has stated that he will do everything possible to avoid dissolving the National Assembly, he has failed to explain how he would proceed. He probably will try, despite prodding by Pompidou, to remain ambiguous on the subject.

Foreign policy, as usual, is taking a back seat to the domestic issues in the campaign. Both major candidates are trying not to stray too far from their traditional foreign policy positions while giving the electorate the impression of an open mind. Pompidou's effort to take off in new directions has been complicated by ardent Gaullist Foreign Minister Michel Debré's repeated public statements on the need to continue De Gaulle's policies. Poher, meanwhile, is seeking to shed the "European at any price" label which Gaullist opponents are trying to attach to him.

By the time the campaign ends on 30 May, each candidate will have appeared on radio and TV on seven different occasions. Such exposure usually works to the advantage of lesser known figures--as it did in the 1965 presidential race; Poher should derive particular benefit from his appearances. He has made the need for objectivity in the French radio and TV organization one of his main campaign issues, and, as interim president, he has already objected to the generous coverage given Pompidou on news programs.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKS STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL OVER SOCIETY

Party chief Husak last week introduced additional measures to assert more effective party control over key elements of Czechoslovak society. In so doing he appears inadvertently to be strengthening regime conservatives at the expense of his own moderate leadership.

The regime banned or suspended a number of prominent liberal non-party publications and forced changes in the editorial boards of several others for failure to heed previously imposed press restrictions. The crackdown on nonparty media, which followed a successful effort to muzzle outspoken party publications, probably presages further actions against those dissident publications that continue to use veiled language and subtle cartoons to voice their dissent.

Husak also reshuffled personnel in the Interior Ministry's party committees in order to tighten the party's grip on the police and security apparatus. This move may increase the influence of pro-Soviet hard liners who are seeking the ouster of progressives through a sweeping personnel shake-up at the working levels of the ministry.

Encouraged by Husak's apparent desire to appease Moscow, Czechoslovak conservatives have become more openly active in their drive to intimidate the liberals and moderates who supported Dubcek and the reform program last year. In a Rude Pravo declaration last week, 1,300 conservative journalists appealed to all media officials to fall in line behind party policy.

In addition, conservative Czech party bureau leader Strougal seems to be attempting to build his own power base in the Czech lands--probably to put him in a better position to challenge Husak in the future. Strougal is about to place his own supporters on the North Moravian regional party committee. They will replace 12 officials of the once-liberal committee who have either been dismissed or felt compelled to resign after the committee rescinded resolutions, passed last year, which no longer conform to the party line. Strougal probably will try to pull off similar power shifts in other regions within his political domain.

Consequently, Husak may ultimately be forced to move against Strougal and the conservatives in order to keep his regime intact. Given the politics and the backgrounds of the two leaders a clash over various issues appears inevitable, possibly as early as the next central committee plenum tentatively set for 29 May.

Husak, meanwhile, continued to renew relations with the invasion powers. He went to Budapest, apparently alone, to establish a personal rapport with Hungarian party boss Kadar on 15 and 16 May.

In Moscow, however, the Soviet press is maintaining a wait-and-see attitude, reporting anti-Sovietism still exists in the Czechoslovak party. The implication is that Husak's firmness has not yet been enough to bring stability.

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## WARSAW SEEKS A FLEXIBLE POLICY TOWARD BONN

A new initiative by Polish party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka has pointed up Warsaw's desire for a more flexible policy toward Bonn. In a major speech on 17 May Gomulka indirectly indicated that Warsaw wants to improve its relations with Bonn. He implicitly admitted that fundamental issues, such as the final recognition of frontiers, cannot be solved bilaterally because they are too closely tied up with broader East-West relationships.

Mindful of his critics at home and among his Warsaw Pact allies, Gomulka focused on the proposition, patently unrealistic, that Bonn sign a treaty with Warsaw along the lines of the 1950 Polish treaty with East Germany providing de jure recognition of Poland's western frontier. Once again, he rejected West German Foreign Minister Brandt's proposal of March 1968 for a nonaggression pact with a de facto recognition of the Polish border. He suggested that Bonn seek the advice of the four major signatories of the Potsdam agreement on the legality of a treaty containing de jure recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, thus implicitly throwing the issue into the sphere of great power relations.

In other respects, Gomulka appeared to be treading the line between a moderate approach to Bonn and an attempt to avoid alarming his East European colleagues. Gomulka apparently de-

liberately avoided comment on certain aspects of Poland's improving relations with West Germany. He said nothing of the well-established trade relations between the two, or about budding private political contacts. For the first time in recent years there were no rigid preconditions even for diplomatic relations with the West Germans. The matter was just ignored, implying it might be negotiable. Gomulka even failed to voice support for East Germany's Ulbricht, who in late April demanded diplomatic recognition from Bonn. Warsaw may believe that this latest East German ploy blocks improvement of the situation in central Europe.

Having set the stage, Gomulka counted on a careful reading in Bonn to get the message across that Warsaw intends to be flexible and invites an intensified bilateral dialogue. Foreign Minister Brandt promptly welcomed Gomulka's speech, restating Bonn's readiness to engage in bilateral talks. He rejected, however, any de jure recognition of Poland's borders except by a reunified Germany, i.e., after a final peace treaty.

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
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Gomulka undoubtedly was aware his statements would stir up the pre-election political atmosphere in Bonn, and domestically would be well received prior to Poland's national elections slated for 1 June. More fundamentally, however, the speech is another indication of Poland's anxiety over recent bilateral contacts between Bonn and Moscow, as well as East German pressure for a resumption of talks between the two Germanies.

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**MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA**

Israel continued to issue tough statements this past week, both on the military situation and on the possibility of a Middle East settlement.

[redacted] Israeli leaders seemed to be hardening even further their opposition to the four-power and US-Soviet talks, reiterating that they will reject "external" suggestions for a settlement.

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In the Nigerian civil war neither side has made any significant military gains, although the Biafrans are still counterattacking at Umuahia and remain on the offensive along the southern front. The secessionists have evidently continued to receive substantial munitions shipments over the French-supported arms airlift from Gabon.

The beleaguered Dahomey Government has had some success in disrupting labor solidarity, and a threatened general strike again failed to materialize this week. The situation remains volatile, however, with secondary school teachers, students, and some civil servants still on strike.

Political activity in Pakistan maintained its gradual upswing, highlighted by rumors of mergers among various existing parties. Meanwhile, President Yahya Khan's anticorruption drive may suffer a loss of credibility unless some action is taken against members of former President Ayub Khan's family.

Student demonstrations in Afghanistan reached sizable proportions during the last ten days, provoking more vigorous government action than was the case last year. Political elements of the extreme right and left are probably partially responsible for encouraging the students to take to the streets in seeking redress of their grievances, which focus on unsatisfactory academic conditions. The government is prepared to take more forceful action if necessary, and presumably wants to be sure that Kabul remains quiet during Kosygin's five-day visit beginning 26 May.

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
### MIDDLE EAST REMAINS VOLATILE

Rashid Karami agreed to form a new Lebanese cabinet this week which may end the month-long political crisis that has paralyzed the government. His new cabinet is expected to be as broadly based as possible, with the probable exclusion of ex-President Chamoun's party.

The cabinet will probably soon be faced with the same dilemma that forced the downfall of its predecessor--how to deal with the fedayeen. The fedayeen have found it increasingly difficult to mount guerrilla operations into Israel from Jordan and are seeking new bases in Lebanon. President Hilu is convinced that Lebanon's existence as a state in its present form will come to an end if the terrorists are permitted to establish new bases. He anticipates that either Israel will retaliate against Lebanon for allowing anti-Israel fedayeen operations, or the fedayeen will engage in subversive activities against the Lebanese Government in order to bring about one that is more sympathetic to their cause.


There have been no further clashes this past week between the Lebanese Army and the fedayeen, who are presumably waiting to see what the new cabinet's policies are. The fedayeen's inactivity may also be due to pressure from their friends.

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
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The Soviets have promised to protect Palestinian rights in any settlement that is reached.



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The Middle East cease-fire lines remained tense this past week as fighting flared on two fronts.



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Israel claimed it shot down three Egyptian MIG-21s Wednesday in an air battle along the northern section of the Suez Canal. Egypt has denied losing any aircraft.

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## TURKISH POLITICAL CRISIS EASES

The political crisis, which mushroomed in Turkey this past week over the issue of restoring full political rights to those overthrown nine years ago, has eased. The government sent the controversial bill back to committee for further study. It will remain there at least until after the elections in October.

Amnesty was a hot issue within the ruling Justice Party as ousted President Bayar maneuvered to regain his rights and influence. Prime Minister Demirel, realizing the strong military opposition to amnesty, and possibly concerned over Bayar's potential influence within the party, was able to keep the situation under control. When major opposition leader, Inonu, publicly declared his party's support for amnesty, however, Demirel speedily introduced the measure in Parliament.

Inonu almost certainly realized his announcement would be a political bombshell, but he probably didn't expect to be the main target of the resultant rancor in both military and youth circles.

Most of the minor parties, affirmed support for the proposed

amnesty measure. The Turkish Labor Party, however, warned of dire consequences and threatened to take the issue to the Constitutional Court.

The military brought its full weight against the measure, proving once again that they are the ultimate source of power in the political structure. The military recalled ships, canceled leaves,

Tanks rumbling through Ankara were probably a show of force.

This highly controversial issue has been shelved, but its introduction probably has weakened the political structure and the democratic process in Turkey. Old wounds have been opened; much of the goodwill between military and political leaders has been dissipated; and the bitterness will infect the election campaign.

Only the extremist elements of both the left and right, too weak to gain power through normal democratic procedures, stand to gain from a period of renewed political instability and military involvement. Some military officers might even be tempted to seek a Greek solution of the dilemma-- a military junta in command of the government to "re-educate" political circles in the "responsibilities of citizenship," but no such group is identifiable at this time.

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## RHODESIA PREPARES FOR REFERENDUMS

Prime Minister Ian Smith plans to hold referendums on 20 June on his new draft constitution and on the proposal to declare Rhodesia a republic. If the proposals pass, as expected, Rhodesia will be within a step of severing all remaining ties with Britain.

Students and lecturers at the multiracial University College in Salisbury held four days of peaceful demonstrations this week to voice their strong opposition to the referendums which they believe will not only end all hope for a settlement with London but lead to a more formal and stricter form of racial segregation. Several prominent church leaders, the college principal, and a former prime minister publicly endorsed the protest.

A small but vocal white supremacist group has also come out against Smith's constitution as being too liberal, and the moderate, pro-settlement Centre Party has begun a campaign to bring out a large "no" vote. Smith's proposals provide, in essence, for eventual racial parity in the national parliament (although not for many decades at best), thus precluding any chance of ultimate majority rule and ensuring continued white dominance.

No one really doubts that the Rhodesian Front government will win the referendums, although some opponents believe that there

may be a significant number of abstentions. The government, apparently worried about abstentions, indicated general elections may be held if it wins a weak mandate.

Smith's opponents seem to be hoping for a party split. Some Front supporters, and presumably some party members, are unhappy with the government's handling of the constitutional issue. This is partly because the government was so slow in drafting its constitutional proposals--they were not published until 21 May--and because neither the party membership nor parliament will have a chance to debate the proposals before they are submitted to the voters.

Smith must rally the Front if he is to win the strong mandate he seeks; he should be able to do so. Kicking off his own campaign on 7 May Smith declared somewhat melodramatically that his constitution would "sound the death knell" for majority rule. Such appeals should find plenty of support within the overwhelmingly white electorate.

The British, moreover, expect Smith to buttress his campaign by publishing their diplomatic exchanges soon, in edited form, to convince the voters that Prime Minister Wilson, not Smith, has been unwilling to compromise, and that Rhodesia thus has no choice but to go its own way.

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### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Student unrest has again erupted in a number of Latin American countries.

In Argentina, universities in five provincial cities have been closed and the country's second largest city, Rosario, has been put under military rule as a result of student violence. Leftist extremists are turning the deaths of five students into a major political issue; student indignation is running high, and, because of the new martyrs, more trouble can be expected.

In Brazil, students took to the streets for the first time since December to protest the forced retirement of many popular professors. In Ecuador, secondary school and university students, egged on by radical leftists and opportunistic politicians, have briefly occupied three universities to push their demands for an easing of entrance requirements.

In Venezuela, a nationwide student strike is in effect as a result of the death of two students involved in clashes with police last week. The demonstrations are being led by anarchists and independent student leaders who have been interested in "academic renovation" rather than in traditional politics or rebellion against the state.

Antigovernment demonstrations are continuing in Honduras in the wake of Governor Rockefeller's recent visit. Although the Lopez government is the main target of the demonstrators, there is much latent hostility toward the US, especially among leftist university students who are using the killing of one of their colleagues during the governor's visit as a rallying cry for the riots.

The first of Governor Rockefeller's four trips to Latin America ended on 19 May. The second will begin 27 May in Colombia. Colombian students reportedly are planning disturbances, as are students in Bolivia and Ecuador. Venezuelan authorities also fear demonstrations against the governor during his visit there on 2 June.

Relations between the US and Peru deteriorated even further this week. On 20 May the military government issued a communiqué asserting that the US military missions "no longer have any purpose" in Peru and that the scheduled visit of Governor Rockefeller on 30 May would be "inopportune." The communiqué was released after the cabinet discussed the suspension of US military sales because of the seizure of a US fishing boat last February. Charges have also been made by Peru against the US schools in Lima. The minister of transportation and communications has said that all communications systems in Peru should be nationalized.

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## US-PERUVIAN RELATIONS DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER

Peru's military government reacted strongly to the public disclosure that the US had suspended military sales to the Peruvian armed forces. An official government communiqué, unanimously endorsed by the cabinet, said that if the suspension was officially confirmed there would no longer be any need for the US military missions and that Governor Rockefeller's scheduled visit to Lima would be "inopportune."

According to US law military sales to any country that seizes US fishing boats must be suspended. The suspension was invoked against Peru after its navy seized a fishing boat last February, but it was not made public until after Peru seized and fined another boat on 16 May. The story of the suspension made headlines in the Lima press, putting pressure on the Velasco government to take some retaliatory action.

There has been confusion in Peru as to what precisely is included in the suspension. Despite explanations that only official military sales and not military grant aid or commercial sales have been suspended, the official government response and the press treatment of the matter have reflected the opinion that all US military assistance has been cut off.

Further complicating the over-all situation, many Peruvians have linked the suspension of sales with the resignation

of Ambassador Jones and the continuing intensive efforts to find a solution to the dispute over the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company.

President Velasco and many other high-ranking military officers have for some time been thinking of replacing the US military missions with advisers from France and other European countries. Such a move has met with some opposition--particularly from the navy--but the events of the past week appear to have provided the needed ammunition for its proponents.

A high-level military mission, headed by army chief of staff General Winklereid, is currently touring Western Europe at the invitation of the host countries. The trip, which is spotlighting France, has been described as necessary to "observe the variety and quality of armaments" available. Peru has already purchased Mirage aircraft and tanks from France and brought in technicians to advise the Peruvians on the operation and maintenance of the equipment.

The government's communiqué can also be seen as an attempt to gain political advantage by rallying nationalistic support for President Velasco's strong stand against the "yankees" and perhaps by further isolating some of the moderates in the government who would have preferred a less drastic reaction. It also has given the Velasco government another

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opportunity to make a play for Latin American support for Peru in its problems with the US by declaring that the US had "uni-

laterally" broken the military assistance agreement signed in 1952. [redacted]

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### STUDENT LEADERSHIP SHIFTING IN VENEZUELA

The recent outburst of student violence points up a fundamental change in student politics.

Clashes between students and police in the western Venezuelan town of Merida last week led to a riot in which one student was killed by gunfire and at least six others were hospitalized. Violence then broke out in other cities, culminating in a nationwide strike by university and secondary students.

Student unrest has been rising throughout the country since last March. The new activism is led by anarchists and independents rather than by the traditional student leaders, who are affiliated with political parties and have tried to mobilize student support for party policies. The most militant of the traditional leaders have been the leftists, who used the universities as head-

quarters in their armed rebellion against the government.

The new activists, although exhibiting a strong Marxist cast, have shown no interest in traditional politics or rebellion against the state. Instead they have directed their efforts against the universities themselves in a vague movement for "academic renovation." They have resorted to widespread violence in support of such demands as abolition of entrance examinations, new school buildings and facilities, and reformed curricula. The renovation movement has also had a strong impact on secondary students.

The traditional leaders were successful last week in regaining control of the students by calling for and imposing the general strike, but it is not likely that they will succeed in controlling or stilling the new activists for long. [redacted]

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TENSIONS RISE IN BRAZIL

Political tension is building up between the government and the disparate opposition forces in the church, the schools, and the increasingly disenchanting populace.

A student strike has occurred in Rio de Janeiro and police have arrested the presidents of several student councils. On 16 May students took to the streets for the first time since the government's assumption of broad new powers last December to denounce the government's forced retirement of numerous popular professors.



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In the northeastern city of Recife, the army is attempting to weed out all "subversive" students. For example, all 800 engineering students at the federal university have been required to submit a written defense or face expulsion. Some 70 other Recife students have already been expelled, and more seem likely to follow.

The government's hard line with students may well swell the ranks of protesters, but factionalism among student leaders and the government's determination to stamp out "subversion" will probably prevent effective protests on a nationwide scale for the time being. The tough policy is, how-

ever, angering many moderates who previously had supported the government.

Adding to the unsettled atmosphere is a military court's sentencing of a northeastern priest to one year in prison for making "critical and offensive" statements about the armed forces. This is the first action against a priest since December; it seems likely to alienate even further progressive churchmen such as Archbishop Dom Helder Camara, who is already heavily involved in defending the Recife students.

Undeterred by the signs of growing disaffection, the Costa e Silva government issued Institutional Act 10 on 16 May. The act extends and amplifies the government's power to punish persons who lose their political rights. The terms are so broad that if vigorously applied, they could prohibit practically any gainful employment for such persons.

The government is also undertaking steps aimed at a major restructuring of the political system--specifically measures designed to increase control over elections, politicians, and parties prior to the reopening of Congress. President Costa e Silva reportedly hopes to reopen congress by August as a step toward restoring a more normal political life. Military and civilian hard liners, however, may not be prepared for such liberalization.

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The pattern of protest and reaction is not yet broad enough to threaten the government's stability, but it could increase tensions between hard liners and mod-

erates in the government. If the President pushes his liberalization plans too vigorously, this tension could erupt abruptly, perhaps even jeopardizing his own position.

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### LABOR SUFFERS SETBACK IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

The Trinidad Government has squelched a month-long, illegal strike by transport workers, but faces growing problems in the labor sector.

The arrest of leaders of the small but militant Transport and Industrial Workers Union (TIWU) on 13 May for disrupting traffic signaled the effective end of their strike effort and the union formally capitulated on 19 May. Public and labor response to the walkout--begun in protest against a court wage award--had been only lukewarm at best and the government clearly has the upper hand over labor at present. Indeed, the administration may be planning to withdraw recognition from the TIWU and thereby deprive militants of an important protest vehicle.

Despite these temporary gains for the government, labor is likely to pose increasing difficulties for Prime Minister Eric Williams. Economic growth has slowed since 1961 and the government's investment policies have

not stemmed the rise in unemployment, now estimated to be about 20 percent of the work force. In addition, labor leaders have a tempting political target in the government's Industrial Stabilization Act. The act, hurriedly passed in 1965 to deal with labor problems at the time, virtually prohibits the right to strike and has drawn increasing fire in the last year. The transport strike was viewed as a challenge to the act.

Prime Minister Williams has maintained firm control of the country since it became independent in 1962; he was re-elected in 1966. In part, his success can be attributed to the disunity of the opposition. Labor, however, promises to become a focal point for political dissent. Extremists, who played a prominent part in the current strike, will probably also continue their efforts to exploit the issue of the controversial ban on strikes despite their temporary setback.

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