


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed

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22 November 1968
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(Information as of noon EST, 21 November 1968)

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
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Middle East - Africa

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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

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


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JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS OVERTHROW KEITA REGIME IN MALI

22

The junior army officers who overthrew the radical regime of President Modibo Keita on Tuesday appear to be firmly in control, at least for the present. They have formed a provisional military government council and have lined up the support of most up-country army garrisons.



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RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS STALEMATED

23

The latest round of British-Rhodesian talks on terms for Rhodesian independence ended without a solution and it is unclear when discussion might resume, or at what level.

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PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS SPARK VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE 24
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enlarge its fishing fleet in order to develop a new
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has implications for potential subversive activity.

VENEZUELAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL DAYS 29
The campaign in Venezuela for the elections on 1
December is drawing to a close amid tightened secu-
rity precautions and a spurt of activity by the
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FAR EAST

The current limited upsurge of Communist activity in South Vietnam seems largely tailored for political effect. Carefully calibrated by Hanoi, the renewed action serves Communist purposes by probing for the limits of the bombing halt "understanding," fanning US - South Vietnamese differences, heightening Saigon's apprehensions about US and Communist intentions, and reminding all concerned of the Vietnamese Communists' continued military capabilities.

Military action which the Communists conceive to be below the threshold of a major US response is likely to continue. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some of this planning may have been stimulated by the Communist leadership mainly for morale purposes, extensive small-scale activity in support of the Communists' efforts to extend their network of village-level administrative committees almost certainly is in prospect.

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The extent to which this kind of activity is supplemented by mortar and rocket spectaculars and large-unit attacks will depend on Hanoi's continuing assessment of a number of political variables, including trends in the Paris talks.

In China, the central committee plenum last month apparently did little to resolve divisions in the leadership on many key policy issues. Continuing debate on these matters, especially on the touchy question of rebuilding the shattered party apparatus, may again force postponement of the party congress called for in the plenum communique. Maoist radicals, apparently trying to delay a congress which might be dominated by the moderates, are warning of the dangers of allowing experienced party cadres to dominate the new party structure and have made thinly veiled demands for a continued purge of old-line party officials. [REDACTED]

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VIETNAM

Recent Communist military activity in South Vietnam seems tailored largely for political effect. Limited military initiatives in the Demilitarized Zone area and against South Vietnamese cities, towns and administrative centers, probably were conducted under close supervision from Hanoi. The incidents, apparently intended to probe the limits of the US-Hanoi "understanding" which led to the bombing halt, are likely to continue. The Communists doubtless also calculate that this measured activity will exacerbate US-Saigon differences and heighten Saigon's apprehensions about US and Communist intentions.

The Communists parried US objections to their military activity by insisting that the bombing halt was "unconditional" and that unrestricted operations will continue in the South. North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry asserted on 16 November that Hanoi has "always respected" the Demilitarized Zone and charged the US with launching attacks there since 1 November. Ha Van Lau told a French magazine that any Communist actions in the Demilitarized Zone area were being carried out by "patriotic forces of the South." Like Hanoi's propaganda, Lau asserted that the Communists were free to operate anywhere in South Vietnam to counter "US imperialist aggression."

The Vietnamese Communists seem ready for the next phase of the Paris talks. Politburo

member and chief Hanoi negotiator Le Duc Tho is on his way back to Paris, presumably with a set of new instructions following month-long consultations in Hanoi and stopovers in Peking and Moscow.

Despite the fact that the Communists have taken a tough public stance on all issues since the bombing halt, they have not raised new conditions for moving on in Paris. For the moment, Hanoi is attributing the stalemate to Saigon's recalcitrance, but the stage has been set for a prolonged procedural hassle should the Communists insist that the Liberation Front delegation be treated as an independent and equal entity.

During the past week the Communists increased their efforts to enhance the status of the Liberation Front at the expense of the Saigon government. Liberation Front and Hanoi spokesmen in Paris frequently met with the press to further these ends. Madame Binh played the part of a full-fledged member of the diplomatic community by making "courtesy calls" on several foreign embassies and the French Foreign Ministry. Vietnamese Communist diplomats elsewhere were similarly active in spreading the current line.


Military Developments
In South Vietnam

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were generally light. Communist tactics in the Da Nang area allegedly call for local force elements to lead off with shellings and localized attacks; main force units, including the North Vietnamese 2nd Division, would be committed if the opening phase is successful.

The Communists will probably continue to stress economy-of-force tactics together with well-planned but limited large-scale actions in key sectors of the country. By such tactics, the enemy would hope to show some degree of military initiative in order to maintain their aura of strength. The major emphasis during the week was along the coastal flatlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, with emphasis on military installations near the city of Da Nang.


It is not clear whether the two multibattalion attacks launched late last week in northeastern Tay Ninh Province were intended

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the current disposition of many enemy main force units suggests that only very limited action could be mounted on a large-scale, country-wide basis unless a major reshuffling of units takes place. This would involve the redeployment of many combat forces presently out of country, in border sanctuaries, and in remote areas.

The Communist rocket and mortar attacks on allied installations at Da Nang early this week were coupled with an increase in terrorism and harassment within the city and sharp skirmishes in the surrounding areas. Allied casualties and damage inflicted by these actions



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as the beginning of a new offensive drive in northern III Corps in coordination with the renewed fighting in southern I Corps or were merely localized affairs reflecting enemy sensitivity to aggressive allied operations near the Cambodian border.

Political Developments
In South Vietnam

The Saigon leadership appears to be moving toward resolving its differences with the US on terms for South Vietnamese participation in the Paris talks.

Meanwhile, the government is continuing its country-wide indoctrination and propaganda campaign to exploit and nurture the upswelling of support that followed President Thieu's speech on 2 November. This campaign seems designed to head off possible adverse reactions to a government announcement that it will join the talks and, in the longer term, to bolster anti-Communist forces for future struggle during protracted negotiations.

Support remains strong for the government's refusal to deal with the Liberation Front as a co-equal partner in the talks, although the militant Buddhists are taking a neutral position regarding the Front. Some criticism of Thieu's stand has developed, however. A group of 14 Senate lead-

ers have sent a signed appeal to Thieu urging him to reach a common position with the US regarding the talks.

Some of the criticism is probably motivated by political opportunism. Renewed attacks from such elements as the Revolutionary Dai Viet party and from northern Catholics seem intended mainly to capitalize on the President's difficulties in finding a way to enter the Paris talks without great loss of face.

Vice President Ky, who has strongly supported Thieu on this issue, apparently hopes to take advantage of Thieu's need for solid national support to return some members of his team to key positions. Rumors are circulating once again that Prime Minister Huong, Information Minister Thien, and Foreign Minister Thanh, none of whom is close to Ky, may soon be replaced.

Ironically, during recent weeks, when the government has been receiving more public support than at any time since the overthrow of President Diem, 13 publications have been suspended, mostly on charges of failing to uphold the national position. This new intolerance of public criticism suggests that Thieu and his colleagues are more nervous about the possible political repercussions of the present crisis than their outward confidence would indicate.

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THAI GOVERNMENT'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN DISORGANIZED

The Thanom regime continues to have trouble getting organized to campaign for next February's legislative elections.

The initial session of the government's Saha Pracha Thai party failed to live up to the expectations of government leaders. The meeting in Bangkok was designed to generate enthusiasm among the party's rank and file and to move ahead with organizational details, but was marked instead by factional quarrels and heated attacks on the high-handed tactics of government spokesmen.

Most of the protests came from politicians close to Deputy Prime Minister Praphat. Brought into the government party via the Praphat-organized Free People's League, these men may believe they had certain assurances about their role in the government party that are now being circumvented by the party's organizers. Their protests apparently were similar to those they made earlier about not being consulted on such fundamental issues as party membership and campaign tactics. Conciliatory gestures by Prime Minister Thanom and other government leaders during the meeting have so far forestalled an open split, but their differences obviously have

their differences obviously have not been reconciled.

Dissatisfaction among the rank and file has come at a time when party leaders have only begun to smooth over their own differences about party policies. One government official claims that the factions are still working at cross-purposes in recruiting members and potential candidates for the government party.

It seems likely that Praphat's rival, Prime Minister Thanom, who has been criticized for his leadership deficiencies, has lost some ground in the current situation. Thanom was unusually caustic in discussing his political woes during a recent press conference in Bangkok. He made it clear that he has little appetite for the give-and-take of party politics.

The campaign itself is off to a fairly slow start. Much of the activity thus far has centered in the northeast, where antigovernment sentiment is strongest. Leftist splinter parties, which hope to deny the government a clear majority in the legislature, have held rallies in a number of the region's larger towns. The government party's efforts have been desultory so far.

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STRUGGLE ON POLICY ISSUES CONTINUES IN CHINA

The recent central committee plenum--the first in over two years--has not resolved and may have exacerbated debate on a variety of key policy issues. Many of these issues have been sources of friction throughout the Cultural Revolution.

Perhaps the most important issue is the touchy question of rebuilding the shattered party apparatus. Radical voices in the leadership appear to be engaged in a polemic with forces working toward stabilization. They have been expressing themselves through Shanghai newspapers which have frequently served as an outlet for the views of Maoist radicals in Peking. Since September, Shanghai media have been underscoring the radical position. By contrast, the Peking press has been taking an ambiguous line. This difference in emphasis became more evident while the plenum was meeting in secret in October. Ignoring some points and stressing others, the Shanghai media expanded on official Peking editorials to warn of the dangers of allowing experienced party cadres to dominate the new party structure.

The plenum clearly failed to end the debate. Two weeks after the final plenum communiqué was issued, a Shanghai newspaper went far beyond Peking commentary in demanding a new purge of party officials, making it clear that it had in mind individuals who still held important posts. The editorial accused these unnamed

individuals of using their positions to exclude "rebels" from influential posts in the nascent party organization and of protecting old colleagues who have been "proved" guilty of political crimes.

Provincial congresses of party members are meeting now to study a draft charter for the new party organization, produced by the plenum, in preparation for the long-postponed Ninth Party Congress. As if sensing that this congress may be stacked against the "radicals," one recent Shanghai editorial went to the extraordinary length of insisting that party members "have the right to go over the heads of their superiors to report to the central authorities and the Chairman." Division on this issue runs very deep. Commenting on the problem [redacted]

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[redacted] Foreign Minister Chen Yi recently remarked that continued disagreements could again force postponement of the party congress.

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Other divisive issues, deriving from the Maoist drive toward a greater degree of social equalitarianism, which was partially frustrated in the years immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution, also appear to be surfacing. Several social and political experiments reminiscent of the mid-1960s are being introduced selectively and in very tentative fashion. The more extreme experiments have not yet been mentioned in the official press.

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A drive to "simplify administration," involving the wholesale displacement of administrative personnel and a segment of the urban work forces is now in full swing. Large numbers of people are being sent to the countryside on what is intended to be a semipermanent basis to work in agriculture. [redacted]

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[redacted] this drive has already caused severe dislocations in administrative work, and leadership elements intent on restoring order in China can be expected to drag their feet.

At the same time innovations are being introduced in the educational field. State-run primary schools in the countryside, formerly attended mainly by children of local cadres, are being abandoned in favor of schools run and paid for by local commune farm brigades; the new schools presumably will be more egalitarian.

These efforts have received official sanction, but in south and east China individual communes are announcing plans--apparently hastily prepared--to confiscate or reduce peasant's private plots, and abandon or modify the work-point system--the present basis of payment for nonsalaried work throughout the country.

These reports may be related to another drive involving a wholesale re-examination and reclassification of individual's official "social classification"--

landlord, rich peasant, poor peasant, and so forth--which is now under way in Kwangtung and perhaps other provinces in east and south China. Because job assignments, privileges, and official attitudes toward individuals depend largely on such classifications, this drive has been causing considerable anxiety wherever it has been implemented.

Some land unofficially acquired by peasants when controls were relaxed during Cultural Revolution confusion may be reclaimed by commune authorities, and the work-point accounting tem may be modified "to reduce inequities." There is no sign, however, that a thorough revamping along these lines, modifying rural institutions introduced after the Great Leap Forward failed, is contemplated. Such measures would almost certainly meet fierce resistance on the part of both the general population and much of the entrenched bureaucracy.

The new experiments, shadowy as they are, bear a strong family resemblance to those measures introduced in the period just preceding the Cultural Revolution, and are probably motivated by social, rather than economic, considerations. Maoist radicals have claimed that the earlier measures were vitiated by entrenched officials intent on protecting their own positions and privileges, and the present measures, even if formally adopted, are likely to meet a similar fate. [redacted]

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EUROPE

During the past week two important Communist party meetings in Eastern Europe provided insight into the possible future course of political developments in the Communist world. In general, a harder ideological line and tightening of domestic policies seem likely.

The Czechoslovak party's central committee plenary meeting established a new eight-man party executive body, carefully balanced politically so that neither liberals nor conservatives would have excessive influence. Conservative Lubomir Strougal, who was appointed to the new body and to several other top posts, now appears to be Dubcek's leading rival.

The Polish party congress re-elected Gomulka as first secretary but also altered the factional balance in the party. As a consequence, the rising generation of tough, pragmatic, and nationalistic party officials will have a greater but not immediately decisive influence on party policy. Stagnation and indecision are coming to an end in Poland, though the new men will, for a time, have to work under old policy guidelines.

Meanwhile, the representatives of more than 60 Communist parties gathered in Budapest to discuss rescheduling the world conference of Communist parties. The talks are part of the continuing struggle between Moscow, which seeks to enforce discipline in the movement, and the more important of the West European parties, which do not wish to be subservient. The Soviets have exerted considerable pressure and probably will be satisfied with a world conference in Moscow in the spring.



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The international financial crisis bordered on chaos during the week, as massive speculation against the French franc and in favor of the Deutsche mark forced the closing of almost all the important foreign exchange markets of Western Europe. The Basel meeting last weekend of the West's important central bankers—aimed at producing some agreement between Bonn and Paris on how to alter their exchange rate parities—failed dismally. The problem is now being discussed by the finance ministers and central bank chiefs of the Group of Ten countries amid continuing disagreement.



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THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Against the background of the Czechoslovak crisis, the NATO ministerial conference in Brussels last week seems to have generated a renewed sense of solidarity among the allies, but the long-range results will probably fall short of the high promise of the communiqué.

All 15 members supported statements warning the Soviets against other threatening actions not only in Europe and the Mediterranean but also in the so-called "gray areas" on NATO's periphery--implicitly Austria, Yugoslavia and perhaps even Rumania. Moreover, 14 endorsed continuation of the alliance for "an indefinite period." France, in an ostensibly "concurring opinion," accepted NATO's retention for only "as long as it appears necessary."

Despite these surface agreements, however, significant differences on the nature of the Soviet threat must still be reconciled. The French, Danes, Norwegians and Canadians, all anxious to resume detente, continue to believe the Soviet threat is only temporary and will be reduced once Soviet troops leave Czechoslovakia. West Germany, Britain and the Mediterranean allies are much less optimistic. They view the new Soviet doctrine of intervention as a permanent threat if only because of the increased uncertainty.

To the satisfaction of this more pessimistic group, the communiqué's clear warning to the USSR was couched in firm lan-

guage and extended to cover the Mediterranean as well as Western Europe. The French view prevailed, however, in the preparation of the statement covering the peripheral areas. This was watered down to suggest only that the allies would not remain indifferent to further Soviet actions there.

In preministerial discussions Paris had opposed making a pledge to continue the alliance beyond its twentieth anniversary next year. Canada and Portugal joined the French, claiming that any explicit commitment would create constitutional problems. A final compromise was adopted only because it did not firmly commit the allies to remain in NATO after the option comes up for review next year.

Most of the European allies offered to do more for the common defense. Not until NATO's new five-year plan is completed in January, however, will it be clear whether they will meet their commitments.

They also seem to have recognized that Europe can continue to count on American support only by doing more for and by itself. Accordingly, during the course of the week the British reached agreement with West Germany and several other European allies on the need for joint consultations on defense matters. It will be difficult, however, to make such an accord meaningful so long as Bonn remains reluctant to become involved in anything that might split the alliance and offend President de Gaulle.

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ICELAND TAKES STEPS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC CRISIS

Iceland's worst economic crisis in this century has required the government to take a number of drastic measures at the risk of political and labor turmoil.

On 11 November, the government announced a 35.2-percent devaluation of the krona, the second within a year. The objective was to reduce the high domestic costs of the fishing and fish products industries. These industries account for 92 percent of Iceland's exports and 20 percent of its gross national product. The fishing and fish products industries have been suffering from a sharp drop in the size of the herring catch, a decline in world prices, and the loss of some traditional markets.

To hold down inflation resulting from devaluation, the government is enforcing strict price controls and is urging labor to forgo wage increases for the duration of the crisis. After last year's devaluation,

the trade unions demanded wage increases to match the initial price increases and called a general strike to back up their demands. Facing increased unemployment resulting from cutbacks in the fishing industry and possible closures of economically marginal industries, Iceland's trade unions are not inclined to cooperate in stabilization measures at their expense.

If a general strike takes place, the government--a coalition of the conservative Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party--would probably have to resign and call new parliamentary elections. The government tried to get the support of the opposition parties--the agrarian Progressives and the Communist-dominated Labor Alliance--in a national coalition, but they refused to share responsibility for the nation's economic disarray. The government hopes that it can stay in power at least until next spring, the earliest time at which elections might practicably be held.

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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS MOVE TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD

The Czechoslovak Communist Party's collective leadership has taken on a centrist political coloration which will lessen the influence of both the liberal and conservative factions.

Party first secretary Dubcek, President Svoboda, Premier Cernik, and National Assembly President Smrkovsky all retained their posts after a stormy central committee plenum between 14-17 November. Their collective authority has been diluted, however, by the creation of a new eight-member Executive Committee of the Presidium. This new "inner group"--in which real power resides--is charged with settling urgent political problems. Its majority of moderates will prevent either the liberals or conservatives from seizing control of the party.

Dubcek now appears to have a potential rival in conservative Lubomir Strougal, who was installed in four top party positions. Once a personal friend of former party boss Novotny, Strougal is a pragmatic Communist without scruples who has bent with the Soviet wind and has apparently gained Moscow's support. If the Russians maintain their heavy pressure on Prague, Strougal is in a good position ultimately to challenge Dubcek for the party leadership.

In addition to his elevation to the presidium's executive committee where he will

represent conservative interests, Strougal was also designated chief of the new party bureau for the Czech lands. This bureau has broad powers to organize a Czech party, paralleling the Slovak party organization.

The conservatives made substantial gains during the plenum. The increase in the number of party secretaries from three to eight brought conservatives into a position where they can influence policy. In addition, the bureau of the Czech lands, which the liberals had hoped to use as a base of operations, now appears to be dominated by conservatives and moderates. One of the most significant personnel changes was the resignation of Zdenek Mlynar, a prominent liberal, from the party presidium and secretariat.

Czechoslovak students staged nonviolent demonstrations throughout the week in support of Dubcek and the reform program. They were supported by some workers and the majority of journalists. Some factory workers conducted 15-minute sympathy strikes. The railway workers threatened that if the authorities took action against the students, not one train would move out of Prague. Czechoslovak leaders pleaded all week for an end to the sit-ins, and by 21 November there were indications that students were ready to return to class.

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CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KSC)**EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PRESIDUM**

★ Cernik, Oldrich	★ Sadovsky, Stefan
★ Dubcek, Alexander	★ Smrkovsky, Josef
★ Erban, Evzen	★ Svoboda, Ludvik
★ Husak, Gustav	★ Strougal, Lubomir

MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM

Bilak, Vasil	Kabrna, Vladimir	Slavik, Vaclav
Cernik, Oldrich	Neubert, Vaclav	Smrkovsky, Josef
Dubcek, Alexander	Piller, Jan	Spacek, Josef
Erban, Evzen	Pinkava, Josef	★ Strougal, Lubomir
Hettes, Jarolim	Sadovsky, Stefan	Svoboda, Ludvik (Honorary)
Hrdinova, Libuse	Simecek, Vaclav	Tazky, Anton
Husak, Gustav	Simon, Bohumil	Zrak, Jozef

CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM

Barbirek, Frantisek	Lenart, Jozef	Polacek, Karel
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FIRST SECRETARY

Dubcek, Alexander

SECRETARIES

★ Bilak, Vasil	Lenart, Jozef
★ Hettes, Jarolim	★ Penc, Frantisek
Indra, Alois	Spacek, Josef
★ Kempny, Josef	★ Strougal, Lubomir

OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT

Sekera, Jiri	Slavik, Vaclav
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POLISH PARTY CONCEDES MODEST GAINS TO NEW GENERATION

The Polish party's fifth congress has endorsed a new factional balance under Gomulka's leadership, giving significant, but not decisive power to a rising generation of hard liners. New blood was infused into the leadership at the end of the six-day meeting on 16 November, but Gomulka's losses were not as extensive as his opponents probably had hoped.

Three dispensable veterans, Foreign Minister Rapacki and two deputy premiers, were dropped from the policy-making politburo, and one from the party secretariat. Rapacki dissociated himself from the regime's policies in April when he went on leave of absence. Of the four, he was the only one removed from the central committee. With the ouster of deputy premier Szyr, no Jews remain in the politburo. The "token" Jew in the new top leadership is party secretary Starewicz.

Three of the four newcomers are youthful, provincial party leaders associated with Gomulka's main factional rivals, tough but pragmatic politburo member Gierek and candidate politburo member Moczar, leader of the hard-line, chauvinistic faction in the party. Significantly, the new men were promoted over the heads of other veteran leaders, including Moczar himself.

The most significant gains for the new generation are in the central committee, where most of the new faces are those of young and forceful critics of

Gomulka's stagnant policies. As a result, shifts can be expected in the central committee apparatus (Poland's government-within-the-government), which will enable these newcomers to extend their influence to all party levels.

Moczar's failure to gain a full politburo seat somewhat trims his personal ambitions, but this probably reflects an earlier compromise on the sharing of power between Gomulka and him. Gomulka has partially deflected his main challenger, but only by giving the younger generation--represented by Moczar--a mandate for change.

The factional struggle probably will continue on the lower levels of the party, under the guise of the militant "anti-revisionist" policy endorsed by the congress. It will be carried on in Gomulka's name by tough newcomers, some of whom will seek reform but without any liberal overtones.

Government changes resulting from the party shifts probably will be announced at an early parliamentary session. Defense Minister Jaruzelski's failure to gain a politburo seat suggests that defense, as well as foreign policy, will remain under Gomulka's personal purview. There have been no changes in either domestic or foreign policies. In Gomulka's words, "unshakable loyalty to our alliance with the Soviet Union, for better or worse," will remain the main feature of foreign policy.

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In the economic sector also, the congress reaffirmed the status quo. No greater role for free market forces is planned. Agriculture will remain largely in private hands. Modest organizational streamlining in industry has been approved to facilitate foreign trade, and the need for

some reorientation of investment toward the consumer sector has been conceded. It is doubtful, however, that any marked improvement in living standards will be achieved beyond the two percent annual increase in real wages registered annually since 1964.

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**Changes in Polish Party Leadership at Fifth Congress
11-16 November 1968**

**POLITBURO
(12 Members)**

- Old*
- Cyrankiewicz
 - Gomulka
 - Gierek
 - Jaszczuk
 - Jedrychowski
 - Kliszko

 - Loga-Sowinski
 - Rapacki
 - Spychalski
 - Strzelecki
 - Szyr

 - Waniolka

- New*
- Cyrankiewicz
 - Gomulka
 - Gierek
 - Jaszczuk
 - Jedrychowski
 - Kliszko
 - Kociolek
 - Kruczek
 - Loga-Sowinski

 - Spychalski
 - Strzelecki

 - Tejchma

SECRETARIAT

- Old*
8 Members
- Gomulka
 - Jarosinski
 - Jaszczuk
 - Kliszko
 - Moczar

 - Starewicz
 - Strzelecki

 - Tejchma

- New*
9 Members
- Gomulka

 - Jaszczuk
 - Kliszko
 - Moczar
 - Olszowski
 - Starewicz
 - Strzelecki
 - Szydlak
 - Tejchma

CANDIDATE POLITBURO

- Old*
3 Members
- Jagielski
 - Jaroszewicz
 - Moczar

- New*
4 Members
- Jagielski
 - Jaroszewicz
 - Moczar
 - Szydlak

**CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Numerical Shifts**

Old
85 Members

52 re-elected
32 dropped
1 died in office

New
91 Members

39 additional:
14 promoted from
candidate Central
Committee,
25 newly elected

CANDIDATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Old
75 Members

34 re-elected
1 died in office
40 removed:
14 promoted to
Central Committee,
26 dropped

New
91 Members

57 newly elected

- Pro-Gomulka
- New generation of hardliners of various hues
- Associated with hardliners on selected issues

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ITALIAN AND FRENCH COMMUNISTS FACE SOVIET PRESSURE

The Italian and French Communist parties, the two largest in Western Europe, continue to be under considerable pressure from Moscow to bring their views concerning both Czechoslovakia and the scheduling of a world Communist conference into line with those of the Soviets.

Both parties have rejected a Japanese proposal for a separate conference of Communist parties from capitalist countries, but neither is enthusiastic about Soviet moves to convoke the long-planned world Communist conference. Both the Italians and the French fear that if a conference were held soon, they would appear to have reversed themselves and endorsed the Soviet intervention.

The Italian party has been in the forefront of world Communist criticism of the intervention and has been attacked in the Soviet, East German, and Polish press. Meetings with Soviet party leaders both in Italy and in the USSR have made Italian Communists apprehensive. Even Secretary General Longo's thrombosis in October was blamed by his wife on the rigors of dealing with the Soviets.

Several Italian party leaders have suggested that the party's criticism has gone too far, and some believe replacing Longo would smooth relations with Mos-

cow. The Soviet Embassy in Rome is credited with promoting this dissidence, and foreign Communists report a Soviet threat to split the party.

Nevertheless, the Italian Communists appear to be giving little ground to the Soviets on the Czechoslovak question. The Italians immediately contradicted a TASS claim of 15 November that the Italian party had approved the intervention. The Italians, even after a visit of party leaders to Moscow last week, maintain their position remains unchanged since August.

During earlier talks between Soviet and French party leaders in Moscow, the Soviets bluntly threatened to force a formal split in the French party. Under this strong pressure the French tempered their previous opposition to convoking an international conference, and agreed to attempt to create favorable conditions for such a meeting. The French remained adamant, however, in criticizing the Czechoslovak invasion during the Moscow meeting. Since then the party has decided not to allow its differences with the Soviets to be quietly forgotten. On 12 November, just one week after the party delegation returned from Moscow, the official party organ L'Humanité editorially repeated the criticism of the intervention.

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Both the French and the Italians are likely to continue to drag their feet on the issue of the international conference. French Communists describe their position as being halfway between that of the Soviets, who want the conference soon, and the Italians, who would like to postpone it indefinitely. This week in Budapest,

at the Communist preliminary conference which Moscow organized primarily to set a firm date for a world conference, the Italians reportedly are seeking further delays. Relations between the USSR and the two Western parties are therefore likely to continue to be strained for the foreseeable future.

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SOVIET AID ACTIVITY TO INCREASE IN ALGERIA

The tempo of Soviet activity in Algeria probably will accelerate in the coming months. A Soviet delegation is now in Algiers to work out the final details of the economic arrangements drawn up in Moscow during the July visit of the Algerian minister of industry and energy. In addition, negotiations for a new arms pact may have been held last month when a Soviet military delegation visited Algeria.

The economic talks probably are concentrating on the Soviet promise to purchase five million hectoliters of wine annually in 1969-70 and to make similarly high purchases during 1971-75. Algeria is particularly anxious to see a long-term contract concluded, because it plans to use a portion of the earnings from the sales to finance Soviet aid projects, including the cost of technicians.

Little has been achieved under the USSR's economic aid program, in large part because of serious deficiencies in Algerian planning and management in aid projects. Few of the major construction projects under credit agreements dating as far back as 1963 have been started. Some progress has been made, however, on projects involving substantial technical assistance, such as geological and petroleum exploration and the establishment of technical institutes. There currently are almost 1,900 Soviet economic technicians in Algeria, the largest single contingent from the USSR in any underdeveloped country.

The number of Soviet technicians will rise still further with the implementation of the July agreements. Moscow soon will expand its mineral exploration work

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by undertaking a seven-year program which eventually will involve 700 specialists. It also has agreed to send additional engineers and technicians to help run recently nationalized firms.

The beginning of construction on such projects as a power plant in the Annaba area, a cognac plant, a plate glass factory, fish canning and refrigeration facilities as well as vocational training schools will require additional Soviet personnel. Moscow also can be expected to try to speed up work on the prestigious Annaba steel complex, scheduled for completion next year but which now is far behind.

Unlike its economic aid program, the USSR's military aid pro-

gram in Algeria has been implemented rapidly. Although Soviet military shipments continue--six P-6 motor torpedo boats were delivered last week--the rate of shipments has fallen off this year, probably reflecting the approaching fulfillment of the 1963-65 arms agreements.

Both countries are believed to be negotiating a new formal arms pact. Soviet Defense Minister Grechko toured Algerian military bases in July, and in mid-October a Soviet military delegation visited Algeria at the invitation of the Algerian defense minister, presumably to discuss the details of a new agreement.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

No major incidents have occurred recently on the Arab-Israeli borders, but the usual cross-border firefights continue. King Husayn is holding his own vis-a-vis the terrorists and treading a delicate line. The Jordanians are now promoting the idea of another Arab summit conference, but King Faysal is unlikely to accept another summit until the Jarring mission is officially pronounced dead. Meanwhile, Jarring, still in New York, will probably leave at the end of the month if no new initiative is taken.

Fighting in the Nigerian civil war has intensified, but neither side has scored any major victories. The Biafran counterattack on the town of Onitsha continues, with entrenched federal troops there providing stiff resistance. Both sides are receiving fresh arms supplies, and the federal government has finally agreed to the presence of a Soviet military attaché in Lagos.

Elsewhere in Africa, a coup by junior officers has overthrown the radical regime of President Modibo Keita, and Sierra Leone's Prime Minister Stevens declared a nation-wide state of emergency following election violence. Tanzanian mainland police, supported by Zanzibar army units, seized control of the Zanzibar capital on 20 November in an unprecedented surprise maneuver. The efficiency of the operation is bound to impress the island's perennial plotters and pro-Communist hoodlums, and President Nyerere may also have intended to show the recalcitrant Zanzibar government that Dar es Salaam is the locus of power.

The Mobutu regime celebrates its third anniversary in power this weekend. Congo (Kinshasa) has had a greater measure of political stability under Mobutu than at any time since independence, but the regime is still unpopular with the masses.

In West Pakistan, antigovernment disorders subsided following the arrest of former Foreign Minister Bhutto on 13 November. The political scene was complicated, however, by the entry of Asghar Khan—the respected former chief of the Pakistan Air Force—into opposition politics.

Turkish political conventions are now being held with an eye toward next year's elections. Meanwhile, the leftist-inspired "anti-imperialist" campaign has attracted little support, as both government and opposition leaders have suggested they mistimed their efforts.

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JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS OVERTHROW KEITA REGIME IN MALI

The junior army officers who overthrew the radical regime of President Modibo Keita on 19 November appear to be firmly in control at least for the present. They have formed a 14-man provisional military government council, called the "Military Committee of National Liberation," and have lined up the support of most upcountry army garrisons.

The swift and well-executed coup met with little or no resistance. Participating army units, including US-trained paratroopers, seized control of all strategic points in Bamako and effectively neutralized the main camp there of the Popular Militia, the paramilitary arm of Mali's single party. The population has remained calm and a night curfew is in effect.

Keita, who was visiting upcountry at the time of the coup, probably has been taken into custody and returned to Bamako. There have been selective arrests of cabinet ministers and left-wing party militants. The fate of senior army officers is not known, but some, including the army commander, are reported to be under detention.

Moussa Traore, a heretofore obscure French-trained lieutenant, has emerged as the apparent leader of the coup. He has been named President of the Military Committee, five members of which have received training in the US. Although the political orientation of the group is not yet known, preliminary indications suggest

that they are less radical and less favorably disposed to the Soviets and Chinese than the leaders of the previous regime. Apparently lacking any specific programs of their own, they have called for the cooperation of civil servants to keep the government functioning. They are also seeking advice from leaders of the former regime who have supported Mali's rapprochement with France.

Intense friction between the army and the militia was probably an important factor in the decision to move against the regime. The army had resented the increased authority given the militia after mid-1967 when the regime took on a more rigidly left-wing cast. In addition, popular discontent with the Keita regime had increased because of the troubled state of the economy and differences over whether Mali should maintain its revolutionary socialist course or pursue more pragmatic policies.

Paris recently made high-level remonstrances to Keita over the failure of his government to carry out promised economic reforms, and French officials have been increasingly disturbed by Mali's tendency to look toward the Chinese Communist regime as a model.

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RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS STALEMATED

The latest round of British-Rhodesian talks on terms for Rhodesian independence ended on 16 November with no solution in sight.

Negotiations were stalemated on the issue of an external safeguard for the political rights of Rhodesian blacks, and on a number of closely related points of difference, although initially there appeared to be some movement toward a settlement. Smith has refused to go much beyond the terms which he accepted in early October--token African representation in his government and an elected bloc of Africans comprising one fourth of the Rhodesian parliament. When

voting as a unit, the Africans could then block retrogressive legislation.

Even as the latest talks broke up, the British seemed to be leaving the way open for further contacts. It is unclear, however, when discussions might resume, or at what level. Smith, for his part, seems willing to let negotiations drag out, but he may try to pressure London into offering more acceptable terms. He may, for example, set a date for referendums on the retrogressive constitutional changes approved by the Rhodesian Front Congress in September, and on the proposal to declare Rhodesia a republic. [REDACTED]

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PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS SPARK VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE

Heated politicking in parliamentary by-elections has sparked violent clashes between supporters of the country's two tribally and regionally disparate parties. Prime Minister Siaka Stevens, faced with a fractious army and unable to control extremists in his northern-based All People's Congress (APC), has declared a nationwide state of emergency and for the second time has postponed elections in two key southern districts.

The by-elections are for nearly one third of the seats in parliament lost by the opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) through government-initiated court action. The elections have been going on since mid-October and would have ended next week if Stevens had not ordered the postponement.

Youthful bands of APC toughs, mostly Temne tribesmen, have been a major irritant. They have waged an unrelenting campaign of harassment and intimidation against SLPP candidates, provoking violence in all districts where seats are being contested. The youths, who reportedly received some guerrilla training in nearby Guinea earlier this year, are apparently operating

as an action arm of the APC's Marxist-oriented left-wing. Their heavy-handed tactics have paid off. The APC now holds 42 seats in parliament to only eight for the SLPP. In the most recent by-election, for example, the APC won four of eight seats in traditional SLPP southern bailiwicks.

Although disorganized and divided, the more tradition-oriented SLPP has begun to fight back. SLPP leaders have made blatant appeals to the tribal feelings of their supporters, primarily Mende tribesmen, and efforts are being made to disrupt the freewheeling activities of the APC guerrillas.

Stevens' past failure to exercise leadership at the top has contributed heavily to current tensions. His decision to declare a state of emergency probably stemmed from the fear that serious tribal polarization could engulf his regime. Moreover, Stevens is acutely aware that his control of army troops, whose mutiny last April catapulted him into power, remains tenuous. Mende soldiers are reportedly disturbed by rumors that the government is planning to replace them with APC guerrillas.


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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The hemisphere's most dramatic event this week occurred on 20 November when two Venezuelan frigates fired upon and captured a Cuban fishing trawler off Venezuela's eastern coast.

Venezuelan military leaders have been extremely concerned that Cuban-trained guerrillas might attempt a landing to aid insurgency forces now operating in the country and to harass the general elections on 1 December. The Cuban military has almost no ability to retaliate, but Fidel Castro has launched a bitter propaganda and diplomatic offensive against Caracas.



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The four-month-old student-government conflict in Mexico may be heating up again. Allegations that a student was shot by a policeman have helped strike leaders maintain solidarity in the boycott of classes. Sentiment in favor of returning to classes appears to be dissolving.

In Peru, the prime minister has announced that constitutional guarantees, suspended by the Belaunde administration, would be restored this week in view of the "calm in the country and the mass support for the military government." He also said that civilians would be appointed to the cabinet, but declined to fix a specific date.

Costa Rican Government officials have confirmed a \$5-million coffee sale to the Soviet Union. The cash sale cuts the country's large coffee surplus by about a third, and will ease the serious balance-of-payments deficit. The foreign minister has denied that the sale has any "strings attached."


The municipal elections in 11 of Brazil's 22 states on 15 November were held in an atmosphere of calm. ARENA, the government party, is winning nearly all the mayoralty and municipal council races as expected. The Brazilian Democratic Movement—the only opposition party—is doing well in the larger cities, however.



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
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Cuban Trawler Seized by Venezuela



Trawler *Alecrin*, seized by Venezuelan navy on 20 November

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VENEZUELA SEIZES A CUBAN FISHING TRAWLER

The seizure of the Cuban fishing trawler Alecrin on 20 November appears to be the forerunner of similar moves to prevent the Cuban fishing fleets from infiltrating agents and guerrillas into Venezuela. Cuba is extremely limited in its ability to retaliate, but has launched a shrill propaganda offensive and has undertaken diplomatic moves to condemn Venezuela.

The navy is acting on direct government orders that any Cuban vessels sighted within or outside territorial waters claimed by Venezuela were to be boarded and towed into port.

Venezuela claims a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, from base lines drawn through islands located some 40-80 miles north of the mainland. The government also claims the right of hot pursuit into international waters of any ship sighted within Venezuelan territorial waters.

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President Leoni told US Ambassador Bernbaum, however, that the trawler was caught within territorial waters.

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The Alecrin is sister-ship of the Sierra, which was used in May 1967 to infiltrate Cuban agents, Cuban-trained Venezuelan guerrillas, and supplies into Venezuela at Machurucuto, on the northeast coast.

In the meantime President Leoni has asked US support for its action. In an emotional discussion with US Ambassador Bernbaum over the incident, Leoni asserted that the seizure of the Alecrin would have to be accepted by Castro in the same way that the United States has had to accept the seizure of the Pueblo by the North Koreans. He made it clear that Venezuela's patience with Cuban subversion was exhausted. The Alecrin has been confined at the naval base at Carupano. There is no indication what the Leoni government plans to do with the ship or its crew of 37 Cubans and one Japanese fishing expert.

Fidel Castro has little capability to retaliate militarily against Venezuela. There have been no indications that the Cuban military has been placed on alert, and its naval and air forces have almost no long-range capability. The Komar

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guided-missile patrol boats, however, could intercept, or attack Venezuelan ships within a few hundred miles of the Cuban coast, and Havana's MIG aircraft could also be used offensively on short-range missions. Tensions in the Caribbean area are, therefore, likely to remain high. On 21 November, for example, the captain of a Venezuelan freighter requested US protection while transiting the Mona Passage be-

tween Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

Cuban reaction, however, is likely to be limited for the time being to a bitter propaganda and diplomatic offensive. In addition, it is possible that Cuban agents or sympathizers may attempt to hijack Venezuelan aircraft in an attempt to put Castro in a better bargaining position.

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CUBA EXPANDS ITS FISHING INDUSTRY

Cuba's government-controlled fishing industry has embarked on an extensive expansion program in order to develop a new source of foreign exchange. This program entails increased contacts in the Caribbean area and has implications for potential subversive activity.

Prior to Castro's revolution, the fishing industry played an insignificant role in the Cuban economy. Now, however, the National Fishing Institute controls four separate fleets with more than 3,200 fishing boats ranging from small one- and two-man lobster boats to large, steel-hulled trawlers of more than 500 tons.

Castro's efforts to expand the industry are focused pri-

marily on two of the four fleets--the Cuban Fishing Fleet and the Caribbean Fishing Fleet. The latter organized just this year, operates out of Havana at present but by 1970 will be based at a large new port facility under construction near Cienfuegos on the south coast of Las Villas Province. The fleet currently has fewer than two dozen 97-ton LAMBDA-class boats but will eventually consist of 136 trawlers, including 90 shrimp boats being built in Spain at a cost of \$8 million. The National Fishing Institute is presently negotiating with French and Dutch authorities in an effort to obtain port privileges for the shrimp fleet in French Guiana and Surinam.

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In addition to the 90 shrimp boats on order from Spain, Cuba has contracted with East Germany for five ATLANTIK-class stern trawlers and 15 CUTTER-class trawlers for the Cuban Fishing Fleet. These will be delivered in the next two years. Three large refrigerated trawlers have been ordered from Spain for an additional \$8 million, and Italy is supplying an undetermined number of fishing boats in return for \$35 million in seafood. The Cuban Fishing Fleet is made up of about 50 steel-hulled trawlers built in Japan, the USSR, and Spain. These fish in waters ranging from the Grand Banks of Newfoundland south to the coasts of Argentina and Brazil.

The Cuban Fishing Fleet and the Gulf Fleet are both based in Havana and use the facilities of the new \$35 million Soviet-financed fishing terminal. The Gulf Fleet has about 200 Cuban-built LAMBDA, SIGMA, and RO-class fishing boats that operate in the Gulf of Mexico and off the Yucatan Peninsula.

The fourth fleet has close to 3,000 small coastal boats or-

ganized into 32 fishing cooperatives located in ports along the island's north and south coasts.

Cuba's fishing industry, which already employs over 2,000 workers, will continue to grow as boats now under contract are delivered. As the fishing grounds are expanded throughout the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic, Havana will realize a significant return on its investment.

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VENEZUELAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL DAYS

The campaign in Venezuela for the election on 1 December is drawing to a close amid tightened security precautions and a spurt of activity by the four major presidential candidates.

None of the four--Gonzalo Barrios, Rafael Caldera, Luis Prieto, and Miguel Angel Burelli

Rivas--appears to be appreciably ahead. The Christian Democratic Party, operating from its strong base in the west, is buoyed by large crowds drawn by Rafael Caldera in Caracas. In addition, as the party's chances have improved, dissident party leaders have subordinated their private ambitions until after the elections.

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Barrios, whose Democratic Action Party looked like a certain loser in January, has made a remarkable comeback. He has used government power and money to support a vigorous and intelligent nationwide campaign. In addition to the government's normal rural strength, Barrios enjoys broad middle-class support because he represents stability and a continuance of the steady progress that has characterized his party in power.

Prieto is counting on the traditional opposition to the Democratic Action Party in the major urban centers to win the race for his Popular Electoral Movement.

Burelli's three-party coalition is not given much of a chance to win. Its major role may evolve into depriving the Christian Democrats of the small margin of urban votes that could give Caldera the presidency.

Meanwhile, security measures have been increased following a rise in terrorist activity. On 17 November terrorists attempted to assassinate a high-ranking army officer in western Venezuela, in an area infested by Douglas Bravo's dissident Communist Armed Forces of National Liberation.

In the east, guerrillas belonging to the Castro-lining Movement of the Revolutionary Left have clashed with government troops on at least four occasions. This band, which has been quiet for months, has reportedly received reinforcements and supplies, chiefly from a consolidation of its forces and the withdrawal of

one of its bands from the mountains south of Caracas. Terrorists are likely to make other attempts to disrupt the elections but government forces appear sufficient to handle them. Nevertheless, the government's plan to withdraw some units from rural areas beginning 27 November to protect voting sites in major urban centers could have some isolated areas open to attack.

President Leoni has approved plans to arrest large numbers of Communists and "other political figures" who promote disturbances before or after the elections. He also has authorized the police and national guard to put severe limitations on political activities of the Communist-front Union For Advancement on the grounds that its meetings are centers for subversives and provocateurs.

A close outcome may cause some strain in the immediate postelection period, particularly if Gonzalo Barrios wins. Demonstrations and small-scale disorders are possible. The Communists are likely to try to aggravate any unrest in order to force military intervention on the broadest possible scale.

The military are expected to accept the victory of any candidate other than Prieto. Their concern arises from thinly veiled support given Prieto by leftists and Communists and from fears that Prieto will not be able to control left wingers in his party, however hard he tries. There are indications, however, of strong opposition within the armed forces to a military move against any government in the absence of a clear threat to the national interest.

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