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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 8 November 1967)

Far East

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	1
VIETNAM	3
The Communists' current offensive at Loc Ninh appears to be the initial thrust of their anticipated "winter-spring" campaign.	
PEKING EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN RESTORING ORDER	5
Although Peking's propaganda continues to stress the importance of getting students to return to the classroom, there are a number of indications that the central authorities are having trouble convincing militant Red Guards to abandon violence.	
CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EASING	7
Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest overture, but a real reconciliation will depend on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia.	25X1
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 100px; width: 100%;"></div>	
PHILIPPINE SENATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS NEAR	8
Eight Senate seats and all 63 provincial governorships are to be decided in the election on 14 November, and President Marcos looks to the results as an indication of his chances for re-election in 1969.	

SECRET

Europe

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

9



25X1

USSR'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS REACH CLIMAX 11

The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union was primarily a panegyric to past Soviet attainments, but the presentations also exuded great confidence in the future. Five missiles were unveiled in the Moscow parade on 7 November.

THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE 14

The North Atlantic Council has given the green light to the US to negotiate a safeguards article for the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but protracted negotiations are still in store.

YUGOSLAV "EXPOSE" OF CIA REFLECTS PARTY DISSENSION 15

Both supporters and opponents of Yugoslavia's economic and party reforms have used a press exposé of alleged Central Intelligence Agency activities as a device to advance their conflicting views.

Middle East - Africa

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 17

MERCENARIES LEAVE THE CONGO (KINSHASA) 18

The mercenaries and Katangans fled Bukavu on 5 November and are now awaiting evacuation from Rwanda. In Katanga, meanwhile, the new group of mercenaries who invaded on 1 November seems to be running into some difficulties and may have returned to Angola.

SECRET

SECRET

- COUP IN YEMEN IMPROVES CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION 19  
The bloodless coup that took place in republican Yemen on 5 November brought to power a group that enjoys wide tribal support and thus improves the country's long-range chances of achieving an end to the civil war.
- EGYPT MOVES TO EASE CRITICAL PETROLEUM SHORTAGE 20  
Taking steps to replace supplies of refined petroleum products previously obtained from its Suez refineries, Cairo is negotiating for Egyptian crude oil to be refined at a British company's plant in Aden.
- SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY CHOOSES SIDES 21  
A bloody battle last week in Aden ensured the National Liberation Front (NLF) the support of the South Arabian Army. The strength of the army and the pro-NLF police force should enable the NLF to rule South Arabia when the British depart late this month.

Western Hemisphere

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

25X1 23



SECRET

SECRET

## FAR EAST

Hanoi appears to be making a vigorous effort to counter the inauguration of the new South Vietnamese Government with a major show of strength.

North Vietnamese propaganda is portraying last week's attacks at Loc Ninh as retaliation for intensified US air strikes in the Hanoi area and as the opening of a "winter-spring" campaign. Repeated Communist assaults on Loc Ninh, at the cost of nearly 1,000 troops killed in action, suggest an attempt to establish another "front" in the northern III Corps area adjacent to Cambodia, similar to the one in the Demilitarized Zone area, as well as to score a psychological victory. Increased Communist military pressure in III Corps, the Mekong Delta, and the western highlands has been accompanied by a tough restatement of Hanoi's position on negotiations by North Vietnamese party first secretary Le Duan in Moscow.

In China, for the first time since the shift to a moderate course two months ago, there are signs that militant Maoists in Peking are attempting to mount a counterattack. Recent articles in party and army journals have praised Lin Piao, appealed for army loyalty to Mao's thought, and implied that the military has been treating Red Guards too harshly. The extremists apparently are trying to capitalize on Red Guard resistance to army efforts to enforce orders to reopen schools and suppress violence.

Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has signaled his desire to maintain at least a facade of cordial relations with Peking despite his recent criticism of Chinese propaganda activities. In response to a conciliatory message from Premier Chou En-lai, Sihanouk declared his willingness to terminate anti-Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconciliation." He hedged this position, however, by warning that such a reconciliation will depend on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia.

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## VIETNAM

The much-heralded Communist "winter-spring" campaign is apparently under way in the III and IV Corps areas. Moreover, extensive enemy battle preparations in the western highlands indicate a new offensive may soon begin there.

There are signs that elements of the Communist B-3 Front--the over-all command authority in Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac provinces--are preparing to attack US and South Vietnamese installations throughout the area. Several sharp skirmishes and enemy mortar attacks have already occurred in normally calm Darlac and in the Dak To area of Kontum.

The Communists have at least four regiments in Kontum, in addition to the headquarters and associated support elements of the B-3 Front and the North Vietnamese 1st Division. A recent defector claimed a major attack was to have begun on 28 October--coincident with the Loc Ninh offensive--but a "failure in coordinated artillery" forced postponement. This "artillery" could include large-caliber rockets that may be used in a large-scale, well-coordinated assault on allied positions.

The Communist offensive activity in northern III Corps has resulted in extensive enemy losses since the present phase began on 28 October, with nearly 1,000 men reportedly killed thus far. It is possible, however, that the Communists hope to establish a "second front" in this sector, which is similar in many respects

to the area south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The terrain, with its thick stands of rubber trees and dense jungle, is favorable to enemy operations. Furthermore, Cambodia, just a few miles to the north, offers a nearby sanctuary for rest and resupply.

The Communist intention would be to draw in and tie down substantial allied forces in a long, inconclusive campaign. Already, five US Army battalions totaling some 4,000 men--in addition to South Vietnamese reinforcements--have been deployed to the Loc Ninh - Song Be area.

This week's activity in the northern III Corps area included several large-scale enemy assaults on the recently reinforced allied defensive positions. One encounter between South Vietnamese and Communist forces near Song Be on 5 November resulted in high friendly casualties, caused in part by the enemy enjoying the tactical advantage of prepared positions. In the battle, 96 South Vietnamese were killed, 36 were wounded, and 56 weapons were lost.

Throughout the Mekong Delta provinces of IV Corps there has been a sharp increase in enemy attacks against friendly night defensive positions as well as against lightly defended base camps and remote district towns. The attacks inflicted heavy casualties on at least one ARVN unit and almost totally destroyed a Revolutionary Development team. Such casualties have little effect on allied troop strength, but the psychological

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impact on the local populace is considerable because the enemy actions create doubt as to the ability of allied forces to establish and maintain adequate security.

#### South Vietnamese Politics

South Vietnam's new government is getting under way slowly. The failure so far to appoint and announce the full cabinet may give rise to speculation that internal difficulties are already besetting the regime. The lower house, inactive since its inauguration on 31 October, still has to complete the validation of the election of its members. This process may be complicated by the disqualification of one winner in Kien Giang Province on charges of an election law violation.

Even though the house has not met, there is already talk of the formation of at least one political bloc. A former associate of Vice President Ky is taking credit for the election of some 31 members of the house and is referring to them as the "Democratic Bloc." His one attempt to get some 28 of these members to commit themselves to a formal political grouping was a failure, however, largely because the representatives themselves probably have decided to wait and see how alliances shape up when the assembly convenes.

Evidence continues to accumulate indicating dissatisfaction in

the ranks of the Buddhist church over the manner in which the leaders of the militant and moderate factions are handling the current crisis over the charter. Sentiment appears to be growing to bypass both Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau in efforts to reach a settlement. [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] the present split in the Buddhist church can be healed only if the extremists in both factions are bypassed and more moderate elements allowed to work out a solution. 25X1

One possible indicator of a less rigid posture on the part of the militants is their reported order to the clergy to cease self-immolations, to continue nonviolent struggle activities, and to protest directly to President Thieu about government interference in the internal affairs of the Buddhist church.

#### The Soviet Anniversary

Statements by Vietnamese Communist spokesmen in both Moscow and Hanoi on the 50th anniversary of the Soviet revolution have been replete with praise for the USSR and the importance of Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese revolution. Party First Secretary Le Duan, speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 3 November, spelled out Hanoi's toughest terms for talks with the US and for a settlement of the war.

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Ridiculing what he termed "profuse talk about false peace," he restated Hanoi's demand that the "four points" and the program of the Liberation Front serve as the basis for settlement. He added, moreover, that if the US wants talks with the North Vietnamese it must "definitively and unconditionally" end the bombings of the DRV.

Le Duan also provided Hanoi's major pronouncement on the anniversary in an article in the party daily urging socialist unity in the most specific language used

recently by any Vietnamese Communist spokesman.

While the over-all thrust of the article was probably pleasing to the Soviets, Le Duan also stressed the necessity of revolutionary violence as an ingredient of national liberation movements. In keeping with Hanoi's continuing efforts to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Le Duan seemed mainly concerned with reminding both Peking and Moscow that their differences must not be allowed to undermine the Communist effort in Vietnam.

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## PEKING EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN RESTORING ORDER

Although Peking's propaganda continues to stress the importance of getting students to return to the classroom, there are a number of indications that the central authorities are having trouble convincing militant Red Guards to abandon violence, return to their homes, and unite with their more conservative, locally oriented rivals. Tensions between opposing Red Guard organizations remain high in many areas, and clashes between rival groups appear to have increased recently. The level of violence, however, is still far below that of last summer.

Passions aroused in the course of the Cultural Revolution have not yet cooled, and the militants, apparently fearful of being "swallowed up" by their more conservative rivals, are probably attempting to retain some organizational autonomy. Peking's continued exhortations to the Red Guards to join in "revolutionary great alliances" and to return to school strongly suggest that the central authorities are having trouble in getting the young militants to follow these instructions.

The regime continues to publicize the opening of schools

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throughout the country, but scattered reports indicate that some schools, at least, will not be open for awhile. Moreover, clashes between rival Red Guards have taken place within the newly opened schools.

The army remains the principal instrument of the Peking authorities in enforcing their will. Military patrols are continuing to keep order in most cities and in some places these patrols have recently been beefed up. [REDACTED]

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Much of the recent trouble probably results from local resistance to Peking's attempts to restrict and circumscribe militant Red Guard activity. The militants have been steadily losing ground during the two months in which the trend toward moderation has dominated the Chinese political landscape, and they have been appealing to Peking to reverse decisions detrimental to their position.

There are now signs that the militant Maoists in Peking may be

attempting to repair the damage done to their position by exploiting the unhappiness of the radical Red Guard in order to get the Cultural Revolution back in high gear. On 2 November, the army's acting chief of staff published a long article that attacked his discredited predecessor, Lo Jui-ching, called on the army to be loyal to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and lavishly lauded Lin Piao, Mao's radical heir. Lo was first attacked by name in early August at the height of last summer's radical campaign.

A People's Daily editorial on 7 November claimed that mass movements served to "inspire and educate" the army, and called on the military not to "divorce itself from the masses." This line implies that the army has been treating the Red Guards too harshly--an accusation that was frequently raised last spring and summer when radical policies were in the ascendancy. Finally, a Liberation Army Daily editorial of 6 November warned military personnel not to "blindly obey orders" when those orders conflict with the thought of Mao. This line was also used to exhort Red Guards last spring, following the pause in Cultural Revolution activity during February and March. [REDACTED]

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## CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EASING

Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest effort to ease relations with Cambodia.

Sihanouk announced on 1 November that he had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai calling for "re-establishment of sincere friendship" between the two countries. According to Sihanouk, Chou acknowledged Sihanouk's leadership of the Cambodian people and reaffirmed China's adherence to the "Bandung principle" of nonintervention in Cambodia's internal affairs. Sihanouk has charged repeatedly over the past several months that China's propaganda activities in Cambodia amounted to a repudiation of these "principles."

The Chinese premier's message, which played effectively on Sihanouk's personal regard for Chou, appears to be a more artful version of one Chou sent in mid-September which caused Sihanouk to reverse a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking.

In response to the latest message, Sihanouk stated his willingness to terminate anti-Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconciliation." Subsequently, he also called off a referendum he had previously scheduled for early next year. The referendum was intended as a vote of confidence in Sihanouk's government and, as such, would have been embarrassing for the pro-Peking leftists who have called for a change in Sihanouk's policies.

The Prince has also stated, however, that a real reconciliation will depend entirely on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. Thus, continued dissemination of Communist propaganda throughout the country, and a reported renewal of small-scale Communist dissident activity, could prove to be persistent irritants in his relations with China. Nevertheless, although Sihanouk recently again voiced his suspicion that Peking will continue discreet support of Cambodia's pro-Communists, his response to Chou's letter underlines his desire to maintain at least a facade of cordial relations.

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## PHILIPPINE SENATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS NEAR

The Philippine off-year election on 14 November is being viewed, particularly by President Marcos, as a barometer for the 1969 presidential elections. With this in mind, Marcos, who hopes to run again in 1969, has campaigned personally and vigorously for the Nacionalista Party candidates attempting to gain the eight out of 24 national senatorial seats that are being contested. In addition, all 63 provincial governorships and some 1,400 municipal and village posts are up for grabs.

The Nacionalista Party appears to have only a slight edge in the senatorial elections, but seems likely to improve its position in the provincial contests. Whatever the outcome, Philippine-US relations will remain unchanged and President Marcos will continue to have serious difficulties in pushing his legislative programs. Although the Nacionalista Party is now in theoretical control of the Senate--it holds 12 seats as compared with the nine held by the major opposition Liberal Party--party designations are virtually meaningless because Philippine politicians often cross party lines. The Senate is in fact now controlled by a coalition of four Nacionalistas, nine Liberals, and three independents.

In the current campaign, issues have varied from the performance of the Marcos adminis-

tration--emphasized by the senatorial candidates--to purely local matters highlighted in the provinces. Opposition to the Philippines' 2,000-man noncombat force in Vietnam has been raised by Liberal Party candidates but appears to have elicited little interest.

Local elections in the Philippines traditionally inspire more violence than national ones, and the present campaign is no exception. Although this is not the bloodiest in Philippine history, 38 electioneering deaths had been recorded by late October.

The pro-Communist Huks, who are attempting to broaden their political base in central Luzon, have accounted for some of the violence. They have injected themselves into local campaigns with offers of support, threats of coercion, and--in some instances--open terrorism. They are said to be supporting candidates from the gubernatorial to the village level and, in their strongholds, to actually have selected local nominees. They support any candidates who offer them present protection and the prospect of increased influence in the local government. Currently, increased Huk activity does not appear to reflect any significant increase in their still modest numerical strength.

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## EUROPE

In Moscow and throughout the USSR, the Soviet public had four days of holiday speech-making and festivities as the jubilee celebration reached a climax. Not unexpectedly, the central motif of the official rites--capped by Brezhnev's keynote speech on 3 November and the Red Square parade on 7 November--was the USSR's defensive might and readiness.

Yet for all the advance preparations and publicity, the occasion turned out to be as flat and colorless as the "collective leadership" itself. It remained for the Cubans, obviously put out by Moscow's none too subtle admonitions against Castro's revolutionary buccaneering, to introduce a little interest by insulting the Soviets on their 50th birthday.

While Polish party bigwigs were in Moscow, Foreign Minister Rapacki was again trying to drum up Western European interest in plans for a future European security system. He brought up the subject on a visit to Belgium from 2 to 5 November and will discuss it with Norway's foreign minister who is due in Warsaw this week.

In Bonn, meanwhile, it became clear that Foreign Minister Brandt has decided to press for an early resumption of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, a decision that will be applauded in Belgrade. The Yugoslavs, at the same time, have agreed to the opening of an East German consulate in Zagreb, a reassuring gesture for Ulbricht that Belgrade still adheres to the doctrine of two German states. 25X1

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## USSR'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS REACH CLIMAX

For all of the preparation and foreign visitors, the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union was primarily a panegyric to past Soviet attainments. Although the presentations exuded great confidence in the future, there was no indication of how Moscow intends to deal with any of the domestic or foreign problems it faces.

The top three Soviet leaders seemed to play a larger than usual role in the proceedings, and party General Secretary Brezhnev clearly was more prominent than Premier Kosygin or President Podgorny. Brezhnev's formulations on the key domestic issues--including the question of division of investment resources between industry and agriculture--came down on middle ground. His major speech was studded with references to the party's collective wisdom.

The feeling of apprehension that something might occur to mar the celebration seemed to continue throughout the week. Some provocative act by China appeared to be in the forefront of Moscow's thinking.

This preoccupation with the Chinese emerged clearly in Brezhnev's keynote speech. In a passage on defense, Brezhnev claimed the USSR's armed forces were prepared to counter any threat "from wherever it might come--the north or the south, the west or the

east." In renewing the Soviet pledge of support to the Vietnamese Communists, he repeated the Soviet claim that Peking's failure to cooperate with other Communist states in aiding the Vietnamese had hindered their war effort. He also complained of the damage done to socialist unity by the "chauvinistic and great-power course" of the Mao regime, at which point the two Chinese Embassy officials attending--Peking sent no delegation--walked out.

Brezhnev aimed a less direct blow at such Communist mavericks as Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Cuba. All three of these states were probably the intended targets of a remark critical of "nationalist insularity," but Cuba seemed singled out by his observation that "Marxist-Leninists have always understood that socialism cannot be transplanted from one country to another by means of armed force."

Following the death last month of Che Guevara--whom the Soviets properly eulogized--the Soviet press printed articles by two leading Latin American Communists criticizing Fidel Castro's extremist policies, which Guevara's antics in Bolivia seemed to typify. The articles probably accounted for the low level of the Cuban delegation sent to Moscow for the celebrations.

The Cuban reaction to the further provocation by Brezhnev appears to have been the subsequent failure

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of the Cuban ambassador to accompany the diplomatic corps in a courtesy call on President Podgorny on 6 November. The tensions between Moscow and Havana have thus become more apparent, but have as yet had no visible effect on the patron-client relationship between the two.

Another rift in Communist solidarity was also displayed when Brezhnev made a brief statement in support of a new international meeting of Communist parties, a contentious issue of several year's standing. Several key parties, and particularly the Chinese, view this as an unwelcome effort by the Soviet to assert their supremacy and as an essentially anti-Chinese move. Brezhnev was seconded by several party leaders attending the anniversary celebrations, but regular opponents--such as Yugoslavia and Rumania--remained silent. A full-scale meeting does not appear imminent, but some further word on preparations--which the Soviets have previously said must be carefully arranged--may emerge from the present gathering in Moscow.

Brezhnev made few references to the US. His harshest remark came, predictably enough, in connection with Vietnam, where he likened US military actions to those of "fascist monsters." He also gave the ritual characterization of the US as the leader of Communism's imperialist foes, but

nothing he said seemed to foreshadow any change in the Soviet attitude toward matters of mutual Soviet-US interest.

New Military Hardware  
Unveiled

In the Moscow parade on 7 November, the Soviets unveiled five missiles including an ICBM that was probably the widely deployed SS-9. A Soviet commentator said the ICBM missile used a "new and highly efficient" propellant, but gave no details.


A naval missile in the parade was described by the Soviets as underwater launched. It was too big to be launched from a submarine, however. A two-stage, solid-propellant medium- or intermediate-range missile on a trailer may have been the missile carried in the Scamp mobile transporter-launcher, which it followed in the parade. A short-range missile that was shown possibly was the 450-mile-range SS-12.

Another new system consisted of three antiaircraft missiles mounted on a tracked vehicle. The missiles were described as being effective at extremely low altitudes and probably will be used in support of ground forces. Other new equipment included a tracked combat vehicle carrying personnel and mounting an antitank missile and a conventional gun.


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
## Soviet Weapons Systems Unveiled in 7 November Parade




**2-STAGE MRBM/IRBM**




**NAVAL MISSILE**



**ICBM**



**COMBAT VEHICLE**



**TRACKED AA MISSILE**

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## THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has given the green light to the US to negotiate a safeguards article for the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (NPT), but protracted negotiations are still in store before the treaty is ready for signing.

At the NAC meeting on 31 October, the allies agreed the US should work out a safeguards article with the USSR which would take into account the principles drawn up by the EURATOM members, excluding France. One of these principles is that safeguards shall apply only to the use of natural uranium and fissionable material. Another is that EURATOM itself shall have a role in negotiating a safeguards arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to cover EURATOM's members. Finally, the IAEA shall only verify, and not duplicate, EURATOM's safeguards system.

While the West Europeans have been considering their position on safeguards, a number of other countries have raised problems and have proposed amendments to the treaty. Although their objections have focused mainly on the treaty's discrimination between states with nuclear weapons and those without, other issues that have been raised include the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the absence of disarmament obligations for the nuclear powers, and security assurances for nonnuclear states.

Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, and Rumania have proposed amendments that reflect these concerns. The Mexican amendments would make it a duty of nuclear states to undertake disarmament measures and to contribute to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in nonnuclear countries. Brazil wants a treaty that will permit a nonnuclear nation to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Rumania's amendments are in the same vein and may have been put forth as much to make a point of Bucharest's independence of Moscow as for any other purpose.

An Egyptian proposal would have the nuclear states pledge not to use nuclear weapons against countries that have no nuclear weapons deployed in their territory. India, reflecting its special concern with China, wants specific security assurances; to meet these, the US and USSR are beginning negotiations on an agreement separate from the NPT, possibly in the form of a UN resolution.

Given the numerous problems still to be dealt with, it appears unlikely that the Geneva disarmament conference will be able to present an agreed draft treaty to the current session of the UN General Assembly. The Geneva group, however, could forward the US-USSR draft along with the various amendments for preliminary consideration by the assembly.

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## YUGOSLAV "EXPOSÉ" OF CIA REFLECTS PARTY DISSENSION

Both supporters and opponents of Yugoslavia's economic and party reforms have used a press exposé of alleged Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities as a device to continue their quarrel over the future of the reform program.

The exposé, carried by the country's leading daily, Borba, was nominally instigated by secret police and party elements, who professed to be embarrassed by the inability of the police to prevent the recent escape from Yugoslavia of a Nazi war criminal. The real impetus for the series of articles, however, came from opponents of the economic reform who are attempting to brand it as harmful to national security and its backers as subversive. These hard liners have been gaining some influence in recent weeks by playing on Tito's professed fears of an "imperialist" threat to Yugoslavia.

Before the first article appeared in print, however, proreform elements, which include leading party and government officials, succeeded in turning the bias of the series against their opponents. The first article, appearing on 31 October, was mild in its treatment of CIA and scathing in its attack on the antireform elements. They were identified as supporters of ousted secu-

rity boss and former party secretary Aleksandar Rankovic. Borba granted that foreign intelligence services were active in Yugoslavia, but charged that their activities had been deliberately exaggerated to discredit both the reforms and last year's curtailment of the secret police. The article, for example, denounced conservative-inspired rumors that the late Boris Krajer, a primary architect of the economic reform, had grown rich on CIA money.

Subsequent articles, appearing through 4 November, dealt blandly with alleged CIA information-gathering efforts, but complained about the activities of foreign military attachés and called for increased vigilance on the part of all Yugoslavs.

In the final analysis, the effect of the exposé may be to turn public and official opinion against the hard liners who initiated it. They are now accused in the press of creating dissension and undermining public confidence in regime policies. Tito himself apparently has grown concerned about their efforts to hamstring his reforms and may be preparing to act against them.

[redacted] some of the opponents of the reform may lose their party positions at a plenum tentatively scheduled for mid-November. [redacted]

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## MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Several perennial problems in the area have taken a new twist, but no real solution to them is in sight as yet.

As expressed publicly by King Husayn, the Arab attitude toward a peace settlement with Israel seems to have become somewhat more flexible. The Arabs now accept the concepts of "nonbelligerency" and freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, and acknowledge Israel's right to exist. They continue to insist, however, that this entails a reciprocal Israeli acceptance of responsibility for the refugees, involving either repatriation or compensation. Even if some proposal succeeds in the UN, implementation is likely to be a long drawn out process.

The bloodless coup in Yemen probably improves the country's long-range chances of putting an end to the civil war. Although the new leaders are strongly republican and firmly opposed to the royal family, their own tribal affiliations may enable them to deal with tribes that form the bulk of royalist forces and thus pave the way for a general agreement.

Schramme and his mercenaries have fled the Congo and are in the process of being evacuated from Rwanda. Mobutu, however, is demanding their extradition to stand trial. The mercenary thrust from Angola seems to have run out of steam.

In the Nigerian civil war, the federal army is making more thorough preparations before renewing the offensive in the face of strong Biafran resistance. Biafran leader Ojukwu may be taking advantage of the relative lull in the fighting to conclude deals for arms and mercenaries, whose arrival in Biafra could prolong the conflict. The prospects for peace talks under British auspices and for the arrival of the oft-postponed OAU mission are now dimmer than ever.

On 11 November the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia will celebrate its second anniversary, happy in the fact that it has survived the imposition of sanctions.

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## MERCENARIES LEAVE THE CONGO (KINSHASA)

The mercenaries and Katangans led by Lt. Colonel Jean Schramme, who had been in Bukavu since early August, have fled the city and are encamped under Rwandan Army guard a few miles inside Rwanda.


The mercenaries had been under attack by the Congolese National Army (ANC) since 28 October. The ANC apparently kept up a steady barrage of fire and gradually whittled away at the mercenary force. With their ranks depleted and their ammunition and supplies running low, the mercenaries left Bukavu to the "triumphant" ANC.

Rwandan President Kayibanda is now faced with the problem of getting them out of his country. The International Red Cross announced that several countries, including the US, Belgium, France, Canada, and Zambia, have agreed to supply planes for airlifting both the mercenaries and Katangans out of Rwanda. The mercenaries are to be returned to their home countries-- primarily Belgium and France; the Katangans are to be flown to Zambia. Problems arose when Congolese authorities demanded that the mercenaries be extradited to the Congo to stand trial. It seems probable, however, that if the mercenaries can be quickly removed from the scene, Congolese President Mobutu will bellow a bit, but will accept the inevitable.

The mercenaries who invaded Katanga on 1 November seem to have disappeared and may have gone back to Angola. The invasion apparently was only a small diversionary raid designed to create confusion and draw ANC troops toward Katanga. Several accounts report that mercenary leader Bob Denard is in charge of the operation, but his presence inside the Congolese borders has not been confirmed.

The ANC claims to have had several encounters with the mercenaries, the most recent being near Kisenga on 6 November. At any rate, the rail line between Lubumbashi and the Angolan border is now completely open. If the mercenaries are still in the area, they are not making their presence known.

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## COUP IN YEMEN IMPROVES CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION

The bloodless coup that took place in republican Yemen on 5 November improves the country's long-range chances of achieving an end to the civil war.

A group of exiled leaders--recently released from a year's detention in Cairo, where they had been held because of their anti-Egyptian policies--overthrew the regime of unpopular President Sallal, who was en route to Moscow. The provisional head of state is now ex-premier al-Iryani, chairman of a three-man presidential council that also includes Ahmad Numan--a former prime minister dismissed by Sallal in 1965 for his anti-Egyptian tendencies--and Muhammad Ali Uthman, previously vice premier in Sallal's cabinet. The new prime minister of a 16-man cabinet is Muhsin al-Aini, a former Yemeni ambassador to the US. The coup had almost unanimous support in the capital, and its leaders, unlike the Sallal regime, enjoy wide tribal support.

Five of the new Yemeni leaders are members of the Yemen Revolutionary Front (YRF), a group founded to work for the withdrawal of Egyptian armed forces from Yemen. Although dedicated to the preservation of the republic, and firmly opposed to the royal family of Hamid al-Din, the YRF aimed at the achievement of national reconciliation with the royalists.

The new regime has already announced its determination to seek an end to the five-year-old civil war. It has emphasized, however, that the republicans and royalists should talk without any mediator--a reference to a three-nation peace committee established by the Khartoum summit conference to mediate the civil war. Although initial statements by the new regime emphasized the debt of gratitude that Yemen owes to Egypt, the group can be expected to resist any form of Egyptian interference in Yemeni internal affairs.

There is no indication that the Egyptians were informed of the plot in advance, but Egypt no longer has either troops or diplomatic representatives in the Yemeni capital. The authoritative Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, reports that Egypt considers the coup a purely domestic Yemeni affair, and other Egyptian press commentary applauds the new cabinet as representative of all Yemeni republican groups.

The new regime's tribal support will give some cohesion to the disintegrating republic while Egyptian troops are being withdrawn. In addition, this support may enable the regime to deal with the other branches of the same tribes who form the bulk of the royalists forces, and thus pave the way for a national reconciliation.

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## EGYPT MOVES TO EASE CRITICAL PETROLEUM SHORTAGE

Egypt is taking steps to replace supplies of refined petroleum products previously obtained from its Suez refineries. An arrangement apparently is being concluded with the British Petroleum Company under which some Egyptian crude oil from the El Murgan field--current production runs about 320,000 tons per month--will be shipped by tanker to the British refinery at Aden for processing and the products then returned to Egypt.

Only relatively minor adjustments are needed to enable the Aden refinery to handle the Egyptian crude oil. Three tankers, including a 50,000-ton Soviet tanker, have already arrived at Aden with Egyptian crude and are only waiting for the nod from London to begin unloading.

Egypt's supply problem will extend at least to the first quarter of 1968. [REDACTED]

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Domestic refining capacity now in operation consists only of a refinery at Alexandria, which can produce about 125,000 tons of refined products a month--about a quarter of Egypt's domestic consumption. The refinery now operates wholly on imported crude, with Soviet supplies--now averaging about 70,000 tons a month--being supplemented by Algerian crude. [REDACTED]

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
### SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY CHOOSES SIDES

The South Arabian Army has declared its support for the National Liberation Front (NLF).

Despite the overwhelming NFL sympathies of the army, it had acted up to now as a pacifying force in the bloody fighting between the NLF and its rival, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). By not taking sides, the army had hoped to stave off a political split among its officers and to maintain the unity of the army as a force in South Arabian politics.

Then last weekend the fiercest fighting of the civil war broke out in Aden between the NLF and FLOSY, developing into what one leader described as "a war of total extermination." It appeared that the NLF was winning the war by ruthless fighting and by the wholesale removal of an estimated 800 residents to detention in the neighboring state. In five days of fighting, some 100 Arabs were reported dead and over 300 wounded.

At this point, the army announced that it was stepping



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in on the side of the NLF. It requested that the NLF and the British negotiate for immediate independence. The local command of the NLF has asked its leaders, who are negotiating the formation of a unified government with FLOSY in Cairo, to break off talks and come home. The prepon-

derance of support for the NLF, which now controls most of the towns of the hill states, the army, and the South Arabian police, as well as the greater part of Aden, make it likely that the NLF will be able to achieve victory and form a government before the British evacuation late this month.

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## WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Elections are scheduled, or at least anticipated, in several Latin American countries in the next 12 months, and pre-election maneuvering is affecting present political activity.

Peruvians are holding a by-election on 12 November to fill the congressional seat from Lima Department, which has more than 40 percent of the total electorate. The seat had been held by President Belaunde's Popular Action Party, but current reporting gives the opposition APRA a 50-50 chance of winning it this time. The outcome of the vote should indicate the effect of continuing political and economic crises on the President's popularity.

A similar by-election in Chile on 17 December may produce a jolt for President Frei. At stake is a Senate seat formerly held by Frei's Christian Democratic Party. If the leftists--Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and Social Democrats--succeed in uniting behind one candidate, they could bring off a victory that would leave Frei's party with only 12 out of the 45 seats in the Senate.

Accion Democratica, the governing party in Venezuela, is so split by rivalry among its potential presidential candidates for the election in December 1968 that one of the other parties may well win.

In Panama, potential presidential candidates currently holding public office must resign by 12 November if they are to run in next May's election. This puts immediate pressure on Finance Minister Samudio, President Robles' choice. Second Vice President Arango, who is being backed by four dissident parties in the government coalition, is not in the category requiring resignation six months prior to the election.

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