


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Brazil: New Direction in Foreign Policy*

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No. 42

13 October 1967  
No. 0311/67A

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Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100010002-4

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**BRAZIL: NEW DIRECTION IN FOREIGN POLICY**

The seven months since President Costa e Silva's inauguration have seen a shift in the direction of Brazilian foreign policy. Although Brazil's basically pro-Western outlook remains unquestioned, an "independent" policy is replacing the unfailingly pro-US stance of the Castello Branco days.

Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, who nurtures strong presidential ambitions, has had the leading voice in creating the "New Look." He has pushed for more nationalistic foreign policy stands, accurately gauging not only their popular appeal but also their attraction to many Brazilian military men. Brazil's foreign policy is likely to continue to follow this new path, more frequently diverging from US views, but perhaps more nearly reflecting national aspirations.

Background

Most Brazilians regard their country as ready for "Great Power" status--primarily by virtue of its vast size (larger than the continental US), burgeoning population (85 million plus), and tremendous natural resources. Few of them, however, would deny that only rarely has any Brazilian government used these advantages to exert significant international--or even domestic--leadership.

Under Presidents Quadros and Goulart a strongly nationalistic foreign policy developed, including harassment of foreign companies, criticism of the Alliance for Progress, and espousal of "third world" doctrines. Relations between Brazil and the US deteriorated greatly as Brazil forged new links with the Commu-

nist countries of Europe and with the more vocal of the underdeveloped "socialist" states.

The revolt by military and civilian leaders that ousted Goulart in April 1964 quickly led to a distinct change in foreign policy orientation. Under President Castello Branco, Brazil not only returned to its traditionally close ties with the US, but strengthened them to the point that many Brazilians accused the government of "selling itself to the Yankees." Encouraged by opposition politicians and leftists of all stripes, the public tended to associate unpopular government economic stabilization programs with the US.

When Arthur da Costa e Silva succeeded Castello Branco as president in March 1967, many

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Brazilians considered this shift simply a changing of the guard. In practice, however, Costa e Silva has proved considerably different from his predecessor. He has sought to broaden his administration's political base--still essentially military--often by disassociating himself from some of the policies and practices of Castello Branco. Stringent economic controls have been relaxed to some extent, producing an upswing both in business confidence and in general popular approval of the administration's announced intent to "humanize" the revolution. Foreign policy emphasis has been shifted to more popular, nationalistic lines.

Costa e Silva's method of operating has also had a considerable impact on foreign policy. He encourages his cabinet ministers to operate independently--within broad policy guidelines. He apparently does not exercise tight day-to-day control nor does he provide the leadership and guidance so obviously exercised by Castello Branco. This has resulted in considerable independence in enunciating policy, as well as a good deal of jockeying for position among the more ambitious cabinet ministers, particularly by Foreign Minister Jose Magalhaes Pinto.

#### The Foreign Minister

Magalhaes Pinto ardently desires the Brazilian presidency, and many of his actions are predicated upon this desire. He is an extremely clever politician

who does not operate from any fixed ideological base or belief. Over the years he has allied himself with conservatives or leftists as circumstances dictated. He is noted for his ability to manipulate opposing factions for his own political profit without antagonizing either side. His ability to wheel and deal has been honed by years of political infighting both in his home state of Minas Gerais, where he served as governor from 1961 to 1966, and in national campaigning. He received more votes for federal deputy than any other candidate in the 1966 congressional elections.

Magalhaes Pinto was one of the key supporters of the 1964 revolution. He broke with Castello Branco, however, when the federal government decided to permit direct gubernatorial elections, thwarting his bid to have his own term extended and in his view compromising his political prestige.

Now a member of the pro-government ARENA party, Magalhaes Pinto was long associated with conservative former Guanabara governor Carlos Lacerda and the more progressive wing of the conservative National Democratic Union which was abolished along with all other political parties by Castello Branco in October 1965. During the political maneuvering prior to Costa e Silva's assumption of office, it was rumored that Magalhaes Pinto might again join forces with Lacerda. The offer of the

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Foreign Ministry post was designed to prevent this and--if possible--to keep him from dabbling in domestic politics.

The latter hope, at least, has failed. Magalhaes Pinto's use of his position to further his political ambitions has reportedly caused Costa e Silva some uneasiness, although not enough to risk driving the foreign minister into opposition by replacing him. It seems likely that the foreign minister will continue to use his office to project himself into a leading position in national politics.

He has not hesitated to use the always-popular theme of nationalism, with its attendant anti-US implications. Although it is unlikely that he would ever openly back anti-US issues, and thus jeopardize what he recognizes to be essential US support for and aid to Brazil, he is not loath to exploit the popular benefits of "Brazil first" issues.

The "New Look"  
And Nuclear Development

Probably the most important evidence of Brazil's "independent" foreign policy has been the heavy emphasis placed on nuclear development. President Costa e Silva set the tone in one of his first official statements, stressing the importance of nuclear energy for the development of Latin America and citing its "transcendental role in the scientific revolution." He said further that this powerful resource should be made available

to all developing countries in order to reduce the distance separating them from the industrialized nations, and he called for the full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful means.

Magalhaes Pinto has exploited this theme in full measure. He has guided Brazil into a stand of clear opposition to the draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. He has repeatedly stated that Brazil will not accept any limitation of its nuclear energy development program, including its right to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices. He has criticized the US and Soviet positions for failing to draw a distinction between nuclear weapons and unlimited peaceful nuclear



Foreign Minister  
José Magalhães Pinto

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development.



Other Foreign Policy Changes

Further, Magalhaes Pinto believes that it is unrealistic to assume that most nations would relinquish the option to develop nuclear weapons without security guarantees and unrestricted access to the fruits of nuclear research. Although Costa e Silva has clearly repudiated nuclear arms for his country, Magalhaes Pinto recently said that Brazil would accept limits on military nuclear development only within a treaty applying to all countries.

President Costa e Silva's own views on the treaty are not clear. Although he may not like the foreign minister's grandstanding, he has made no move to rebuff him publicly. On the other hand, he has reportedly given at least tacit encouragement to the minister of mines and energy, Jose Costa Cavalcanti, whose public statements on the subject have been less aggressively nationalistic and have attracted little public attention. Magalhaes Pinto's defense of what is regarded as a sovereign right is obviously a position that could attract widespread popular support. Moreover, it is equally appealing to many Brazilian military men, a point that has not been lost on the foreign minister.

There are several other instances of important policy shifts. Brazil has traditionally supported international peace efforts, contributing troops in World War II and to the United Nations peacekeeping force in the Gaza strip. Brazil was in the front rank of countries supporting the US in the Dominican Republic crisis in April 1965, sending the largest Latin American military contingent as well as providing leadership for the Inter-American Peace Force. The Castello Branco government strongly supported the creation of such a force on a permanent basis and engaged in diplomatic efforts to attain hemispheric support for it.

The Costa e Silva administration, however, turned its back on this stand. Instead it is espousing economic and social development as the best remedy for the causes of hemispheric unrest. Magalhaes Pinto on several recent occasions has emphasized Brazil's devotion to the principle of non-intervention. He says that Brazil puts economic development above security and believes that the armed forces of each nation are responsible for national sovereignty. Intervention, according

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to the foreign minister, could be acceptable only if requested by the nation involved and preferably should be handled by means of bilateral agreements. He has not favored strong sanctions against Cuba and, in fact, would probably be willing to re-establish relations, if it were politically expedient.

Another example of foreign policy change under Costa e Silva is provided by the Brazilian Government's present attitude toward the US effort in Vietnam. The Castello Branco government strongly supported the US and contributed medicine and supplies--notably coffee--to the South Vietnamese Government. Shortly after taking office, however, Magalhaes Pinto became the first authoritative Brazilian spokesman in several years to fail to indicate solidarity with the US. In an appearance before the Brazilian Congress, he commented that Brazil will instead remain "distant" from that conflict.

Outlook

The trend of foreign policy development under the Costa e Silva government indicates that Brazil's views are likely to diverge more frequently from those of the US. To a large extent, this situation reflects genuine Brazilian nationalism and ambition for "great power" status. Such stands, however, are highly susceptible to exploitation by opportunistic politicians--the present foreign minister is only one of many capable of using these issues for personal political gain.

President Costa e Silva and most Brazilians almost assuredly wish to continue their close relationship with the US. Without stronger policy formulation and coordination within the government, however, policies cumulatively detrimental to US-Brazilian relations may develop into a pattern that could be difficult to change.

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