

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report

African Nationalism in Rhodesia

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AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN RHODESIA

Rhodesian Africans today are apathetic, or withdrawn, notwithstanding their many grievances against the white-controlled government. The relative prosperity of many has made them hesitant to speak out against the regime, and most appear resigned to something less than the militants among them demand. White attitudes in Rhodesia have hardened and British policy has only stiffened white resistance to any liberalization. Indeed, the economic sanctions against Rhodesia are hurting the Africans far more than the whites, and it is apparent that Rhodesia's economy can function for quite a while with little damage to the white standard of living. The two major African nationalist organizations continue to be weak and ineffective. They are factionalized and strife ridden, and efficient police operations have made it virtually impossible for either group to launch a large-scale operation against the government forces any time soon.

The African Mood

Conditions in Rhodesia today would appear conducive to widespread discontent and dissension: 225,000 whites have complete political and economic control over more than 4,000,000 blacks; Africans are permitted only a token legal voice in the government; African political organizations have been banned and their leaders jailed or detained; government security forces are thorough and often brutal, and security legislation is openly directed at the suppression of African political activity.


A great economic and social gulf separates the affluent whites

from most urban Africans, who are excluded from the skilled trades and have little chance of obtaining more education. The relatively few educated Africans find that there is really no place for them, and among the whites they are often even suspect because of their education. The wage-earning African receives only one tenth the pay a white man gets for the same job. The government has done little to improve African education, and in fact has recently initiated cutbacks in African teacher training, citing lack of funds. It is more likely, however, that political considerations are behind this move, as Africans below a certain level of education are prohibited from voting.

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Prospects for Africans have been made even bleaker by the general increase in urban African unemployment since the imposition of the economic sanctions. Moreover, large areas of good whiteowned land lie unused, while the rural Africans are restricted to the areas of poorer land. At the present rate of growth, the African population will double within 20 years, and the land presently available to Africans is already becoming overcrowded.

Despite these frustrations, the mood of Africans in Rhodesia remains singularly calm, and there are no outward signs of widespread discontent. The urban Africans, in spite of the inferior economic and social status accorded them, have benefited from Rhodesia's over-all prosperity, are still considerably better off than Africans in most of the neighboring countries, and are well aware of this. Many live quite comfortably and are able to

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help support less fortunate relatives. They have shown themselves generally unwilling to jeopardize their jobs and security by involving themselves in antigovernment activity.

Many urban Africans undoubtedly believe that they have valid grievances, and are probably in sympathy with the nationalists' goal of bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia. Nonetheless, they often deplore the violence and irresponsibility of the nationalists—frequently directed more against Africans than against whites—and are realistic enough to realize that the end of white rule is not yet in sight.

Rhodesia's rural Africans have little contact with politics and the central government; indeed, they probably have little sense of national identification. Historically unwarlike, they have shown little interest in the militant nationalist cause, and the nationalists have made few efforts to establish themselves in the rural areas.

The tribal chiefs are often the only point of contact the rural Africans have with the government, and as semiofficial government appointees, the chiefs must promote government programs and policy in order to protect their own positions. The nationalists have attempted to undermine them by accusing them of being stooges of the whites, but in large parts of the country the chiefs are still held in great respect by many of their people.

As the rural Africans become more "modernized," the influence of the chiefs may wane, as it already has in the urban areas, but this modernization is still a long way off.

Although the harsh security legislation and police activity may antagonize the Africans, it has disrupted African organizational activities and has kept would-be agitators out of circulation. The leaders of the nationalist organizations are almost all in jail, in detention, or in exile.

White-Black Relations

The racial attitudes of Rhodesian whites have been growing more unyielding since the late The emergence of the more 1950s. urbanized, politically aware African in Rhodesia has combined with the success of independence movements in other African countries and the violence in the Congo to make the Rhodesian whites uneasy about their own future. The successively more conservative leaders elected by the whites passed security legislation aimed at curbing African political activity, and between 1959 and 1964 one African political organization after another was declared illegal. The shift of white political

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sentiment to the right culminated in the victory of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party in the May 1965 parliamentary elections, and the "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI) in November 1965.

African political leaders, originally dedicated to obtaining for their people a more effective legal voice in the government, became more militant after they were forced out of the legal political arena. They began to advocate violence and the eventual overthrow of the whites. As their militancy increased, white attitudes hardened further, and communication between the races-never good in Rhodesia--virtually ceased. Thus, at a time when African grievances were increasing, the possibility of rational discussion became even more remote.

Racial animosities have been exacerbated by the more recent white immigrants, whose racially privileged position gives them a much higher standard of living and social position than they enjoyed in their home countries. They are most outspoken in their condemnation of Africans and of African efforts toward self-determination. Moreover, pressure from Britain in the form of economic sanctions and a distrust of British Prime Minister Wilson have only stiffened white opposition to any prospect of majority rule, under which most Rhodesian whites fear they will lose everything.

The Nationalists

The only significant African nationalist organizations today are the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). was formed in 1963 by ZAPU members who were dissatisfied with the leadership of ZAPU's president, Joshua Nkomo. The split was followed by a protracted period of violence and infighting in which each group tried to intimidate uninvolved Africans but which left many Africans with a profound distaste for the nationalists and their methods. Both organizations cite majority rule in Rhodesia as their goal, and their differences have been based more on personalities and tribal factors than on ideology. The principal leaders of each group who are still at liberty are in exile in neighboring Zambia.

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ZAPU, traditionally more influential and still the larger of the two major nationalist organizations, has been on the decline for the past year. It receives financial support from the Organization of African Unity, the USSR, and several African countries. These sources have also provided some equipment and training, but ZAPU has been unable to infiltrate enough trained men into Rhodesia from its base in Zambia to pose any serious threat to the Rhodesian security forces.

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ZAPU has always refused to consider any plan for unification with ZANU, although ZANU has often said that it would work with ZAPU under certain conditions. Some observers attribute this obstinacy to the suspected "messiah complex" of Joshua Nkomo. The ZAPU leader-who has been in detention for three years--is said to believe that he is destined to be the

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Kenyatta of the Rhodesian peoples and wants no competition for this role.

ZANU, on the other hand, was comparatively active throughout much of 1966, after having been virtually dormant since late 1964. ZANU was responsible for several terrorist incidents during 1966,

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Although both organizations have accepted funds from Communist countries -- ZAPU chiefly from the USSR and ZANU from Communist China--there are no indications that either has come under the political influence of these Both ZAPU and ZANU donors. espouse the vaguely defined ideal of "African Socialism" and appear ready to accept aid from anyone willing to give it.

Outlook

A popular uprising by the mass of Rhodesian Africans is almost inconceivable at this time. Increasing African unemployment brought on by the economic sanctions against Rhodesia may lead to greater unrest, but many unemployed can still fall back on the land if necessary, and life for Africans in Rhodesia is still much better than that in many other African countries. The pressure of the growing population on the subsistence agriculture and poor land will undoubtedly bring economic problems in the rural areas, but irrigation schemes and the introduction of modern farming methods into the African areas could forestall trouble for many years.

The nationalists reportedly are now taking the line that Rhodesia's Africans must take a harder stand against the whites,

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without relying on the outside world, and are attempting to whip up sentiment for the native use of force to bring down the Smith government. The fact remains, however, that the nationalists do not now have the organization, leadership, or popular support

necessary to cause the government any grave harm. As long as conditions in Rhodesia remain within limits of toleration for Africans, the Rhodesian African will probably continue to accept what life brings.

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