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JORDAN UNDER PRESSURE TO ACCEPT FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS

Jordan will again confront its radical Arab neighbors on the issue of stationing foreign Arab troops on its territory at a meeting in Cairo of the United Arab Command scheduled for 24 December. The meeting has been called to arrange the entry of Iraqi and Saudi troops into Jordan in accordance with the Arab Defense Council's decision of 10 December. These forces are supposed to move in by 10 February.

King Husayn felt compelled to agree to the defense council's decision but hopes to avoid the actual entry of the foreign Arab forces. The issue is a critical one. Ever since Israel's large-scale raid into west Jordan on 13 November, the King has been under strong pressure from within Jordan as well as from the radical Arab states to strengthen defenses along the Israeli border.

Husayn may decide to accept the Iraqi and Saudi troops in order to appease his internal and external opponents, and to take some of the steam out of the propaganda against him emanating from Damascus and Cairo. His refusal, on the other hand, would intensify the verbal onslaught from these capitals, and probably

would stimulate new agitation in Palestinian west Jordan. The King's most radical enemies, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), are unlikely to be deterred from their efforts to bring him down no matter which course he chooses.

Iraqi troops have taken positions near the Jordanian border in preparation for entering Jordan, Iraqi Defense Minister Shukri said last weekend. He also stressed that Iraq supports the entry into Jordan of the PLO's "army." Jordan refused to accept the PLO forces at the Arab Defense Council meeting and almost certainly will adhere to that position.

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ZAMBIA SEEKING COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE

Zambia is moving cautiously to broaden its relations with Communist countries.

Zambia is short of qualified technicians to carry out its burgeoning development program, and this, combined with Zambian distrust of resident expatriates from Rhodesia, South Africa, and the UK makes the government receptive to Communist assistance. Moreover, the Zambian Government's irritation at major Western countries which refuse to break commercial ties with Rhodesia is causing it to turn increasingly to lesser Western powers and the Communists. For example, it has begun to sponsor secondary and university education in the USSR and Poland, and has accepted a group of some 80 Yugoslav road construction technicians.

Since mid-1966, Zambia has established diplomatic relations with Poland and Hungary and has exchanged several trade and cultural missions with Communist countries. President Kaunda included China and the USSR in his official world tour last August.

It also appears that a series of preliminary trade and aid discussions begun in mid-October will result in Soviet technical help to Zambia--probably to develop roads, rural electrical power, and university-level education.

[redacted] the two countries probably have also agreed to expand the almost non-

existent trade between them. It is most likely that this would involve an exchange of Zambian copper for Soviet construction equipment or manufactured goods to be used in development projects. A Chinese offer of economic assistance is under consideration.

Even though it has supported some Communist positions--defending Chinese nuclear testing, for example--Kaunda's government has been suspicious of Communist motives and is determined to avoid introducing the East-West ideological struggle into volatile southern Africa. Furthermore, even the most militant Zambian leaders do not wish to alienate the Western powers, who in their eyes, hold the key to any realistic chance for bringing majority rule to southern Africa. Despite this wariness, the Zambians' susceptibility in certain respects to Communist pressures may bring them new problems.

Recently the Soviets were able to circumvent strict Zambian limitations on the number of foreign diplomatic personnel assigned to Lusaka by insisting on and obtaining permission to post there some 25 "couriers." Their presence in Lusaka and that of Communist technicians in the countryside will increase opportunities for Communist contacts with the many Zambian-based African nationalist groups and refugees and with local Zambian groups who are disgruntled with the central government. [redacted]

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MOBUTU TIGHTENS SCREWS ON THE BELGIANS

Congolese President Mobutu is once again at odds with Union Miniere, the Belgian mining concern, as his 1 January deadline for the transfer of the Belgian company's headquarters to Kinshasa approaches.

Mobutu and the company, who have long deeply distrusted one another, very nearly reached an agreement late in November. This would have provided that the Congolese operations of Union Miniere be run by a Kinshasa-based company, half of whose shares would be held by the Congolese Government. The firm's extensive holdings outside the Congo would have been controlled by a Brussels-based company, in which Mobutu's government would retain its present holdings of about 17 percent.

Union Miniere actually secured Mobutu's tentative agreement to this arrangement, but he broke off talks just before the agreement was to have been signed and reverted to his demand that the entire company move its headquarters to Kinshasa. The last-minute snag arose over the rate at which the profits of the prospective Congo-based company could be repatriated to Belgium and over the ownership of minerals already

mined and in the pipeline--which the Congolese discovered the company had been keeping at abnormally high levels.

Mobutu has now given a "solemn commitment before the people" that he will implement a law already on the books to revoke Union Miniere's concessions unless an agreement is reached, and he claims to be willing to accept the economic consequences of such a move. He has also moved army units notorious for their indiscipline into the mining region in Sud-Katanga Province. This ostensibly is to protect the region against an alleged plot by former premier Tshombé, but Mobutu quite clearly is also reminding the company that its personnel and investments in the Congo can be used as hostages.

Previous confrontations between the Congolese President and Union Miniere have had in them a large element of brinksmanship, and there is a good chance that the two sides will reach an accommodation before the deadline. Nevertheless, their mutual distrust is genuine, and either may push the other into a position in which compromise is impossible.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Border disputes have come into the spotlight in Latin America with new developments in three long-standing bilateral quarrels over territory. Many other similar disputes in the area continue dormant. Although they seldom blow up into serious military confrontations, they frequently have a highly important effect on both bilateral and multilateral relations.

Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham is becoming increasingly disturbed over Venezuela's responses to Guyana's efforts to take the sting out of a quarrel over ownership of a small river island on the border. Venezuelan officials claim heatedly that Ankoko Island is and always has been occupied by Venezuela and they appear to be hardening their position against any concession to Burnham on the matter. The impasse, should it last much longer, could increase the possibility of a shooting incident. It might also lead Burnham to seek relief in the UN Security Council/

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The attendance of Peru or Ecuador at any of several coming inter-American meetings may be jeopardized by the emergence of a new round in the old border dispute between those two countries. In view of recent Ecuadorean statements, Peru has asked the guarantor powers--Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US--of the 1942 protocol establishing the present boundary to issue a statement reaffirming the validity of the protocol. The guarantor powers are discussing the request under full realization that making such a statement would inflame Ecuadorean emotions while remaining silent would offend the Peruvians.

An old Chilean-Argentine quarrel over the ownership of some 230 square miles of territory in the southern Andean highlands near Palena, Chile, was officially resolved by a British arbitral settlement announced on 14 December. The award gives Argentina most of the territory and Chile most of the usable land. Other areas along this border remain in contention, however.

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STRIKE THREATENS CHILEAN GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Chile's public health workers are now in the third week of an illegal strike for wage rises higher than are offered them under the government's wage readjustment program. The government is determined not to exceed its offer of a 20-percent increase. Failure to maintain this position would deal a severe blow to the government's economic stabilization policy, and would hamper other measures aimed at stemming inflation. Several smaller sympathy strikes have been called, but there is as yet no major labor tie-up.

Unless the strike is settled soon, growing public indignation and the health hazard may force the government to take drastic measures. President Frei has alerted the army to be ready to deal with any disorders. Several deaths are attributed to the lack of medical services. Frei is under some pressure to use the army to run the

hospitals, but is reluctant to do so.

The public health workers are among the lowest paid government employees, and there is considerable sympathy for their position both within and outside the government. They appear to have strong backing from the Communist-Socialist labor central (CUTCh). The Communists

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have seized on the issue to embarrass the government and to criticize the over-all economic program.

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VENEZUELAN-GUYANESE BORDER DISPUTE BECOMING MORE HEATED

The dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over ownership of small Ankoko Island is becoming increasingly thorny. The inability of the parties to agree on the proper forum in which to discuss a solution is the latest difficulty.


The Venezuelans insist that any discussions be held in the joint Venezuelan-Guyanese commission which is examining Venezuela's earlier claim to some 60 percent of Guyana. They maintain that An-

koko was always theirs and that because Guyana is asserting a new claim, it must be discussed in the joint commission.

The Guyanese maintain that by setting up a base on the island in October, Venezuela violated an agreement to maintain the territorial status quo until the commission made its final report. As authority for their territorial claim with respect to Ankoko, the Guyanese point to an official 1905

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VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE

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map which shows half of Ankoko to be Guyanese. Although they contend that the commission has no jurisdiction and that the Ankoko issue should be settled in separate bilateral talks, they have suggested various formulas by which the dispute could be taken to the joint commission.

Venezuela has refused so far to accept any of these proposals on grounds they would unduly limit the scope of the talks. The Venezuelans insist that commission talks on Ankoko begin unconditionally.

Venezuela appears to be using Ankoko as a means of pressure in its larger campaign to acquire territory now held by Guyana.



Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham stands to lose prestige unless he can handle the Ankoko issue in a way that seems to give strong protection to Guyana's interests. Opposition leader Cheddi Jagan stands ready to accuse Burnham of weakness. In order to counter Jagan's charges, Burnham might take the issue to the UN Security Council, where he would expect US support, or take some other rash action in the name of "national pride."

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
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VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WINS ROUND AGAINST TERRORISTS

The Venezuelan public seems to have approved the government's measures to curb terrorist action in Caracas, and the terrorists have so far been unable to react.

More than a week has passed since the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the occupation of Central University. The lack of adverse reaction and the failure of the Communists to retaliate leave the government in a strong position to continue its antiterrorist campaign.



The government, having yielded to military pressure for decisive action against the terrorists, is in a difficult position vis-a-vis the military. If it gives the officers free rein in an anti-Communist campaign, further encroachment on civilian prerogatives is possible. The public can be expected to react unfavorably if it appears that the military are exercising undue influence on the government. On the other hand, the military are likely to resist firmly any relaxation of the government's present strong stand against the terrorists or any too-hasty move by the government to reassert its authority over the military.

Failure of the terrorists to react immediately does not necessarily mean that their organization in Caracas has been crippled. Furthermore, the Communists remain a threat elsewhere in the country, since military operations this year against renewed guerrilla activity have not yielded significant results.

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