


1-20
6 May 1966

OCI No. 0288/66

Copy No. 48



WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review
completed

DIA
review(s)
completed.



SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

Page Denied

SECRET

C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EDT, 5 May 1966)

Far East

	<u>Page</u>
VIETNAM	1
Preparations for the constituent assembly elections continue to dominate South Vietnamese politics. The Buddhists, still envisaging greater power for the assembly than that anticipated by the Ky regime, are maneuvering to maintain as much control as possible over selection of candidates. Military operations were generally light this week. The Communists, meanwhile, appear to be moving substantial amounts of supplies along the newly completed roads into the Laos panhandle and to be laying new track to raise the capacity of the rail line which handles the bulk of bloc aid deliveries through China to North Vietnam.	
CHINESE SURFACE VIETNAM AID FIGURES IN ATTACK ON MOSCOW	5
Peking's latest blast, apparently triggered by Malinovsky's recent charges that China was interfering with Soviet shipments of military equipment to North Vietnam, asserts that the Soviets shipped only 43,000 tons to Hanoi via China last year. This figure is close to current intelligence estimates.	
CHINA WELCOMES ALBANIAN PREMIER	6
Peking provided its "biggest and most spectacular welcome," apparently to obscure the fact that its chief May Day guest was from the world's smallest Communist state.	
THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER TENSIONS INCREASING	6
Cambodian efforts to repel attacks by Khmer Serei dissidents operating from neighboring Thailand have led to almost daily fighting between Thai and Cambodian border forces.	
INDONESIA CONTINUES ANTILEFTIST TREND	8
Djakarta's new leaders are continuing efforts to divorce Indonesia from Sukarno's control and leftist policies.	

SECRET

SECRET

Europe

- SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN MAY DAY PARADES 9
While no new military hardware was paraded in Moscow, the East Germans displayed for the first time the longer range version of the Soviet Scud surface-to-surface missile.
- GERMAN NOTE SETS STAGE FOR BARGAINING ON FRANCE'S NATO ROLE 9
The other NATO members have generally endorsed the Germans' tough position toward the French, but some of them, notably the Canadians and Scandinavians, do not appear ready to put up a firm stand against France.
- FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN EASTERN EUROPE 11
Couve de Murville's visit last month to Rumania and Bulgaria was part of France's effort to stress its independent policies toward Eastern Europe. Next to come are French naval visits to Black Sea ports, De Gaulle's visit to the USSR this summer, and perhaps further travels by Couve in Eastern Europe this year.
- WARSAW PACT POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO MEET THIS SUMMER 12
This would provide a timely opportunity for Soviet and East European leaders to review their general European policy in the light of NATO developments, French contacts with bloc countries, and De Gaulle's visit to the USSR this summer.
- FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SPACE ORGANIZATION STILL IN DOUBT 13
The uncertainty arises mainly because the UK, which encouraged European space cooperation in the first place, is now having second thoughts about the costs. Tentative US offers of aid seem to have renewed UK interest.
- WEST-EAST GERMAN SPEAKER EXCHANGE POSTPONED 15
An East German move to postpone an exchange of West and East German party spokesmen affords both sides additional time to consider the complex political and legal implications of the meetings.
- POLISH HARASSMENT OF MILITARY ATTACHES 16
The month-long secret police harassment of US, and later Dutch and UK, military attachés is attributable at least in part to the Gomulka regime's unusual concern about recent signs of domestic instability and tensions.

SECRET

SECRET

Middle East - Africa

- SOVIET JET FIGHTER EXPORTS TO NON-COMMUNIST ASIA AND AFRICA** 17
Beginning last August, the USSR has sent a total of some 140 of its newer model MIG fighters to Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Indonesia, India, and Afghanistan, and may soon export the SU-7 Fitter fighter-bomber outside the bloc also. Older model MIGs are still being delivered too.
- SYRIAN REGIME PUSHING CLOSER TIES WITH MOSCOW** 18
The two-month-old Baath military regime probably hopes this will help bolster its own internal position. The USSR has made its first new economic commitment to Syria since 1957.
- NEW INCIDENTS ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS** 18
The Syrian-supported Fatah terrorist group has sabotaged Israeli installations, Israel has retaliated, and Jordan's and Syria's border units have clashed with Israel's.
- NASIR SPEECH PERILS YEMEN PEACE PROSPECTS** 20
Nasir's bellicose May Day speech, directed mainly at King Faysal, will further impede a personal reconciliation between the two leaders, which must underlie any progress toward an effective peace.
- ALGERIA MODERATES POLICIES UNDER BOUMEDIENE** 21
Boumediene's government has shifted Algeria's course toward the center from the far left of Ben Bella.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME 22
While jockeying between extremist forces and the less radical President continues, there seems to be a general desire to keep open the door for French economic aid.

Western Hemisphere

BOLIVIAN ELECTION PREPARATIONS 22
The junta has extended the registration deadline for this July's elections in an effort to draw out some opposition to Rene Barrientos. Junta leaders doubt that a government elected without opposition can long endure.

DEVELOPMENTS IN ECUADOR 23
After a month in office, the interim regime of Provisional President Yerovi remains weak, unwilling to tackle problems, and tolerant of Communist activities.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 24
The Inter-American Peace Force has largely withdrawn from Santo Domingo, where its duties have been assumed by Dominican police and army units. The provisional government is trying to get the IAPF out of the country before an elected government takes office on 1 July. Meanwhile, political verbiage and violence have picked up as the election campaign enters its final month.

STUDENT STRIKE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO 25
The violence last week was the culmination of a strike begun on 14 March to force a change in the university administration, but the problems it brought to light seem to have broader implications affecting national politics.

NEW COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT 26
The newly elected Lleras will begin his four-year term this August under fairly propitious circumstances for Colombia and will probably have several quiet months to begin coping with the country's economic problems.

SECRET

SECRET

Far East

25X1

VIETNAM

Preparations for the constituent assembly elections continued to dominate the political scene this week in South Vietnam. The secretary general of the ruling Directorate has moved ahead with plans to convene a committee of approximately 34 people to draft an election law. The committee is tentatively composed of ten representatives from the four corps areas and the Saigon region, a few legal technicians, and several notables representing various religious and political groups.

The Buddhist clerics apparently do not view the drafting of election laws with much concern. Instead, they seem to be organizing their efforts toward maintaining as much control as possible over the selection of candidates. Two influential spokesmen have declared that their Buddhist institute will not run its own candidates, but will support the "best" men, meaning those most amenable to the Buddhists. There is some evidence that the bonzes may press for the selection of several candidates from each province, rather than from electoral districts based on population. They apparently believe this will improve Buddhist election chances.

There continues to be a conflict of views between the government and the Buddhists over the powers of the constituent assembly to be elected.

In spite of continuing sporadic Catholic and VNQDD (Nationalist Party) demonstrations during the past week, there is little evidence that the non-Buddhist groups are capable of allying themselves into a force cohesive enough to counter the well-organized Buddhist effort to influence the elections.


Military Situation in South Vietnam

Allied contact with the Viet Cong was generally light this week, after a flurry of action last weekend.

Viet Cong battalion-size attacks were launched against government outposts in Phuoc Tuy and Binh Long provinces on 29 April, but resulted in only light casualties on both sides. Enemy-initiated activity thereafter remained small in scale and generally was scattered, with some concentration of incidents noted in the delta area south of Saigon.

SECRET

SECRET



The Indochina - South China Area



SECRET

SECRET

US troops conducting Operation BIRMINGHAM in Tay Ninh Province clashed with an estimated battalion of Viet Cong for some five hours on 30 April near the Cambodian border. US casualties were six killed and nine wounded; Viet Cong losses totaled 31 killed. Allied forces, supported by B-52 Stratofortress strikes, continued to press their offensive in this area during the rest of the week, but with little enemy contact. However, information from a Viet Cong defector indicates that the Viet Cong 273rd Regiment may be moving into Tay Ninh Province to assist local enemy forces in the defense of Viet Cong installations there. Cumulative enemy losses resulting from BIRMINGHAM since 23 April are 82 killed and nine captured. Numerous enemy base camps and supplies were destroyed and large quantities of supplies were seized. Allied casualties thus far total 41 killed (39 US) and 163 wounded (137 US).

Elsewhere, allied activity continued with little opposition, although US forces in operations MAILI and GEORGIA, in Hau Nghia and Quang Nam provinces respectively, reported brief skirmishes with enemy units on 3 and 4 May.

Communist Supply Effort

The Communists appear to be moving substantial amounts of supplies along the newly completed roads into the Laos Panhandle. Friendly observers

positioned near Route 912, the new road linking North Vietnam with Laos, counted 86 trucks moving into Laos during the period 16-22 April. This rapid exploitation of the new route suggests that the Communists are anxious to replenish their stockpiles in the Laos - South Vietnam border area prior to the onset of the rainy season.

More MIGs Downed

Two more North Vietnamese fighters were shot down by US aircraft on 29 and 30 April, bringing the total number of DRV aircraft downed since 23 April to six. One and possibly two US aircraft have been lost as a result of the air engagements.

Since 30 April, North Vietnamese fighters have reacted daily to US strike activity but no engagements have occurred. Poor weather has restricted the number of sorties flown over the DRV and may account, in part, for the absence of fighter engagements.

DRV Rail Line Converted to Standard Gauge

portions of the Hanoi-Pinghsiang rail line, which handles the bulk of overland deliveries of bloc aid, is being equipped with a third rail which will enable the line to carry either

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

standard- or meter-gauge rolling stock. Elimination of the necessity for transloading at Ping-hsiang will both raise the capacity of the line and speed up freight movement.

25X1

The additional third rail

[redacted]
a three-mile section from Kep northward, but considerable work has been under way on large segments of the line between Kep and Ping-hsiang for some time, including realignment and other improvements. The addition of a third rail will probably be part of the improvement over the entire segment of the line. One other new rail line under construction in North Vietnam is believed to be standard gauge. This line will connect Kep and the Thai Nguyen industrial complex, providing an alternate rail connection between Kep and Hanoi.

DRV Premier's Speech

Premier Pham Van Dong's speech last month to the National Assembly, the complete text of which was received this week, was not only a pep talk to the assembled delegates but also

a relatively frank admission of the difficulties created by the US bombing raids. The premier confessed that the allocation of manpower resources to meet war-time priorities had been a real problem for the DRV. He admitted that the North Vietnamese had been forced to mobilize large segments of the population to keep the transportation routes open and to strengthen civil defense and antiaircraft defenses. Dong asserted that the problem of keeping the transportation routes open was given first priority and that manpower resources were strained to such an extent that at times local provincial officials have had to throw in local manpower reserves on a temporary basis.

The premier praised his people for their past efforts, but warned that conditions could get worse and that North Vietnam would fight on even if invaded by the US. He spoke of building "fighting villages" to counter the invasion. Construction of such "villages" is frequently discussed in the press. They apparently are fortified rural areas defended primarily by local armed forces.

25X1

* * *

SECRET

SECRET

CHINESE SURFACE VIETNAM AID FIGURES IN ATTACK ON MOSCOW

Peking's denunciation on 3 May of Soviet claims that China has been interfering with overland shipments of Soviet military equipment to North Vietnam asserts that only 43,000 tons were sent during 1965. This figure--the first specific information from a Communist source concerning the level of Soviet military assistance to Hanoi--is close to the latest intelligence estimate of the actual military tonnage sent over the Chinese transportation system by the Russians last year.

US military shipments to South Vietnam--for both US and South Vietnamese forces--amounted to more than 12.5 million tons during the same period, and continued at an even higher rate during the first quarter of 1966. The Chinese claim that Soviet shipments of military equipment have continued to lag and assert that in the first three months of this year the USSR actually used only 556 of the 1,730 rail cars the Chinese had made available for military aid shipments at Moscow's request.

The Chinese blast--delivered in the form of a Foreign Ministry statement--is in answer to a speech by Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky on 21 April when he repeated earlier Soviet assertions that the Chinese were impeding the flow of Russian military aid

to North Vietnam. Peking's violent response suggests that the Chinese are increasingly discomfited by Moscow's charges which they first sought to rebut in detail on 15 January by broadcasting the text of an official memorandum given to the Soviet ambassador earlier that month. It probably also reflects concern over the reaction to Moscow's call for "unity" at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress in March. The Foreign Ministry statement specifically mentions the Soviet party meeting and admits that "not a few people" had been taken in by the Russian "posture for unity against imperialism."

Despite Chinese protestations that all Soviet shipments destined for North Vietnam have been forwarded "with priority, at high speed, and free of charge," there are indications that Peking has in fact made difficulties which have slowed down the pace of deliveries. The Foreign Ministry statement points out that Soviet shipments of military equipment could have been sent by sea. Peking notes that Moscow was able to send military goods to India in this way and observes spitefully that although Cuba is far away from the Soviet Union the Russians could ship rockets and nuclear weapons "to and from" the island.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

CHINA WELCOMES ALBANIAN PREMIER

Peking has touted its reception for Albanian premier and politburo member Mehmet Shehu--who arrived in China on 26 April--as the "biggest and most spectacular welcome" ever given a foreign visitor. The main effect of the visit thus far, however, has been to point up China's isolation in the world Communist movement. Shehu--representing the world's smallest Communist state and party with only about 53,000 members--was the principal guest at the Chinese May Day celebration.

According to Chinese news reports, Shehu has talked with every major Chinese leader except Mao Tse-tung, but it appears that little of substance has been achieved. The presence of Abdyl Kellezi, an experienced foreign trade negotiator, in the Albanian delegation suggests that the private talks dealt extensively with Albanian needs for the 1966-70 plan.

Although the Chinese apparently have met previous aid commitments of about a quarter of a billion dollars, mostly in the form of credits, the assistance has not satisfied all Albanian needs. There have been reports that Tirana is dissatis-

fied with the kind of aid the Chinese can provide and has recently attempted to improve economic ties with selected Eastern and Western countries. Further information may be provided if a communiqué is issued when Shehu, now touring the provinces, leaves China.

In public statements, leaders of both sides have lashed out at the Soviet Union and repeated the now-standard Chinese formulations concerning Vietnam--demanding immediate US withdrawal and recognition of the "Liberation Front" as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. An anti-Soviet speech by Chinese chief of state Liu Shao-chi at a banquet on 28 April was so virulent that East European diplomats--with the exception of the Rumanian and Yugoslav representatives--walked out. No one from the Soviet Embassy had been invited.

At a mass rally for the Albanians, Premier Chou En-lai disparaged Soviet aid to Hanoi as meager in quantity and inferior in quality. He once again criticized Moscow for alleged "behind-the-scenes efforts to promote peace talks" and charged that Soviet leaders were "collaborating" with the US.

25X1

THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER TENSIONS INCREASING

Tension is increasing along the 400-mile Thai-Cambodian border as both countries move up reinforcements in reaction to recent skirmishes.

The current round of border disturbances began late last year when dissident Cambodian members of the Khmer Serei (Free Cambodia) organization launched a series of

SECRET


SECRET

attacks from Thailand against isolated Cambodian outposts. The dissidents hoped to establish a Khmer Serei foothold on Cambodian territory from which to gather support for a move to oust Prince Sihanouk. Both Bangkok and Saigon are opposed to Sihanouk's neutralist policies and have long supported the Khmer Serei dissidence as a means of undermining and harassing Sihanouk's regime.

The practical effect of the Khmer Serei attacks was to heighten tension along the Thai-Cambodian border since some of the return fire from Cambodian forces struck regular Thai border defense positions. This created a situation in which fighting between Cambodian and Thai forces has become almost a daily occurrence. The attacks also reinforced Sihanouk's darkest suspicions concerning the territorial ambitions of his neighbors.

Although the fighting has involved only small numbers of troops in isolated areas thus far, more serious incidents may be in the offing. Cambodia has deployed several newly formed battalions to sensitive areas.

[redacted] Sihanouk has also been talking of retaliatory raids into Thailand, and there have been reports of minings in Thai territory in the past week. So far the Thais have acted more cautiously in strengthening their border forces, but there are some indications that they may be prepared



to move more forcefully in the coming months.

As long as Bangkok continues to show restraint, the border situation will probably not get out of hand militarily. Its political impact is likely to be more lasting, however. Sihanouk's recent statements concerning a closer political accommodation with the Communists were accompanied by bitter references to Cambodian lives lost fighting the Thais and their Khmer Serei "lackeys." They demonstrate once again how his sense of isolation and his dependence on his Communist "friends" are increased by developments on the Thai border.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

INDONESIA CONTINUES ANTILEFTIST TREND

Djakarta's new leaders are continuing efforts to divorce Indonesia from Sukarno's control and leftist policies.

The next phase of the campaign to strip President Sukarno of prestige and real power will apparently take place at a meeting of the provisional Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPRS)--the nation's "policy determining" body, which in the past has been a Sukarno rubber stamp. In a speech on 29 April, General Nasution strongly urged that the MPRS, now purged of its leftist members, revoke Sukarno's lifetime term of office and his title of "Great Leader of the Revolution." Other leaders, however, have expressed reluctance to move this far and may intend the session merely to criticize Sukarno's former policies, while allowing him to retain the trappings of power.

25X1 Sukarno is strongly opposing the convening of the MPRS and [redacted] Gen-eral Suharto has temporarily postponed the mid-May opening of the session in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the President. In view of the heavy publicity already given to the convening of the MPRS, it seems unlikely that Sukarno will be able to delay its meeting indefinitely.

Sukarno is still maneuvering to regain the initiative, but without visible success. On 28 April he appointed a number of discredited leftists to the Supreme Advisory Council--an insignificant body with little function. The announcement of the appointments was greeted by

heavy public criticism and a meeting of the body scheduled for May has already been canceled.

On 27 April the leftist leadership of the large Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was swept from office by the party's national convention and replaced by moderates. The PNI, long dominated by its left wing, has been a natural and attractive target for Communist infiltration since the 1 October coup attempt. The purge of the party's leadership was carefully supervised by the Indonesian Army, which prevented some leftist delegates from attending.

In a further indication of the new political atmosphere in Djakarta, Foreign Minister Malik, during a visit last week by a South Korean emissary, agreed to a resumption of relations with Seoul. A South Korean consulate general is expected to be established in Djakarta in the near future.

In a Bangkok meeting between Malik and Philippine Foreign Minister Ramos on 30 April and 1 May, Indonesia apparently succeeded in obtaining a further delay in Manila's proposed recognition of Malaysia. The new Indonesian leaders hope to convince Sukarno to de-emphasize the anti-Malaysia policy before totally committing themselves to this line of action. Manila now apparently intends to recognize Malaysia during the first week in June. Djakarta plans to announce formal recognition of Singapore a few days later.

[redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

Europe

SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN MAY DAY PARADES

No new military equipment was displayed in the Moscow May Day parade.

Neither Air Marshal Sudets, commander in chief of Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO), nor Air Marshal Savitsky, commander of PVO Aviation, were seen with the other high-ranking Soviet officers on the reviewing stand, and US attachés were told only that Sudets was fulfilling a "temporary" assignment. Both Savitsky and Sudets lost their positions on the party central committee last month, and it is likely that either the men or their military positions have

been downgraded within the Soviet military establishment.

The East Germans held a May Day military parade in East Berlin, their second consecutive violation of quadripartite agreements prohibiting the presence of German military forces in the city. The parade included the long-range (150 miles) version of the Soviet Scud surface-to-surface tactical missile, the first identification of this missile in East European armed forces. An East German television commentator boasted that East German "medium-range" missiles could hit any US base in Europe.

25X1

GERMAN NOTE SETS STAGE FOR BARGAINING ON FRANCE'S NATO ROLE

The German note delivered to Paris on 3 May has set the stage for bargaining on which France's future role in NATO may hinge. The note takes the position that in view of France's intention to withdraw its forces from commitment to NATO on 1 July, Paris may no longer station forces in West Germany under the 1954 conventions. Although Bonn offers to negotiate a new arrangement based on "equality and reciprocity," France would have to accept a defined role for these forces and agree to their recommitment to NATO

in time of war. Moreover, the note implies that agreement is also contingent on other issues --such as continued Allied use of French airspace.

This tough position--substantially unchanged from the original German stance--was generally endorsed by the other Allies on 29 April. Whether all of them are in fact ready to accept the confrontation this position may lead to is difficult to say as the Canadians and Scandinavians have questioned the appropriateness of parts of the reply.

SECRET

SECRET

The distrust between Bonn and Paris is evidently growing. Foreign Minister Schroeder told Ambassador McGhee in a "candid conversation" on 29 April that he believes De Gaulle's basic objective to be the same as the USSR's--to push the US out of Europe. Schroeder said that De Gaulle has a "talent for destroying what has been achieved," and for him a fitting role for France requires getting the US out of Europe, keeping the UK out, and controlling Germany.

Preparations for the negotiations on other aspects of France's disengagement from NATO are proceeding slowly--and under pressure from new warnings from French officials. According to a high Foreign Ministry official, De Gaulle may remove all French custodial personnel from SHAPE if talks on the relocation of NATO installations are not under way by 1 July. The official also said that De Gaulle would never accept the American proposal to stretch out the withdrawal of US forces over a two-year period, although he might allow "a little additional time" if some forward motion toward settlement of the withdrawal issue were made soon.

France also has officially informed the US and the UK that permission for overflights of

French territory will be granted on a month-to-month basis. In an oral comment to the British, the French observed that if NATO negotiations did not progress satisfactorily, overflights might have to be reduced.

Meanwhile, some friction may be in the making among the other 14 NATO members over conflicting views on whether and how the present crisis over France should be used to effect some streamlining of NATO. Britain's NATO delegation is reportedly under instruction to sell a scheme which, according to Ambassador Cleveland, is "fundamentally at variance" with present US thinking. Among other things the plan would downgrade SACEUR by transferring his planning functions to a new military committee.

The UK had previously given consideration to calling for creation of a separate NATO nuclear command under an American, thus opening the positions of SACEUR and SACLANT to Europeans. They have now decided to leave this matter to the Special Committee of Defense Ministers studying nuclear sharing arrangements. Britain likewise seems now to be actively campaigning for the transfer of the North Atlantic Council--and the new military committee--to London.

[Redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN EASTERN EUROPE

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's 25-30 April visit to Rumania and Bulgaria was part of France's effort to stress its intention of pursuing independent initiatives toward the USSR and Eastern Europe. This spring's activity will be capped by De Gaulle's trip to the USSR from 20 June to 2 July, and Couve is expected to travel to Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague later this year.

Couve's trip will be followed by visits by French naval vessels to Rumanian and Bulgarian ports early this month (see map). These too will have the effect of emphasizing French independence, coming as they do at the time of the French military withdrawal from NATO. Couve's trip also occurs at a time when several East European regimes may be considering closer ties with Western Europe.

Officially Couve's trip was in return for visits to France by the Bulgarian and Rumanian foreign ministers in 1964 and 1965. Couve stressed France's satisfaction with the five-year trade agreement concluded with Rumania last year. He also indicated that France plans to conclude a commercial and cultural accord with Rumania and that French economic cooperation might go beyond the letter of the agreements.

Although the Bucharest visit appears to have produced little tangible result, it probably served to enhance Rumania's nationalist image. It also per-

BLACK SEA PORTS TO BE VISITED BY FRENCH SHIPS THIS MONTH



25X1

mitted an exchange of views on the Vietnam situation and on France's and Rumania's attitudes toward NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively.

The Bulgarians reportedly made a concerted effort to show that they have better relations with France than with other Western countries. They announced decisions to sign further agreements for cultural exchanges and scientific and technical cooperation and to negotiate a consular convention. Premier Zhivkov accepted Couve's invitation to visit France and extended an invitation to De Gaulle to visit Bulgaria. Apparently Couve made some accommodation to Bulgaria's desire to export more of its manufactured products to France; his visit was promptly followed by the arrival of a French trade delegation.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

WARSAW PACT POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO MEET THIS SUMMER

Moscow reportedly will convene a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at Bucharest early in July. It would provide a timely opportunity for Soviet and East European leaders to review their general European policy in the light of NATO developments, French contacts with bloc countries, and De Gaulle's visit to the USSR in June.

The Warsaw Pact's political body may deal with the question of greater participation by the East European states in the staff work of the Pact, but Moscow would be especially careful to avoid divisive issues at this time of disunity in NATO. The Political Consultative Committee may also consider the expediency of renewing Eastern bloc proposals on European security. The idea of a pan-European conference to discuss collective security in Europe was broached at the committee's last meeting in January 1965. Lately, Soviet and Eastern European officials have again been giving currency to this well-worn proposal. Foreign Minister Gromyko tested Italian reaction to this idea during his recent visit to Rome.

These explorations complement Soviet encouragement of De Gaulle's divisive role in the

Western alliance. The Russians apparently want to foster the belief that their dialogue with De Gaulle will further his grand design of a new Europe, free from US hegemony and the threat of war.

At the same time, the Soviets have an eye fixed on Bonn and there are indications that concern over the growing influence of West Germany is mounting in Moscow and Eastern Europe. The Russians have warned repeatedly that any increase in West Germany's role in NATO nuclear affairs would be met with an "appropriate response" from the Warsaw Pact.

The results of Moscow's talks with De Gaulle and the reaction of Washington and Bonn to his moves undoubtedly will weigh heavily in Warsaw Pact political discussions.

The discussions will also provide an opportunity for the Russians to demonstrate East European support for Moscow's Vietnam policy and to undercut Chinese allegations of Russian perfidy. However, no striking initiative on Vietnam appears likely to emerge from the meeting.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SPACE ORGANIZATION STILL IN DOUBT

Last week's ministerial meeting of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)* adjourned until 9-10 June with the future of the organization still in doubt. At stake may be the extent to which European space developments will be carried out multilaterally or through emphasis on national programs with greater military implications.

Uncertainty over ELDO's future has arisen principally because of Britain's concern over its share of the cost of providing a European satellite launcher, ELDO-A. The ELDO-A program is already two years behind schedule and the cost may be double the original estimate of \$196 million. Britain's share of ELDO costs is about 40 percent. ELDO-A, the only project to which ELDO is now firmly committed, is a booster whose obsolescence makes it increasingly unattractive.

The other ELDO members hope that the organization will survive, while recognizing that its potential is small compared to American and Soviet programs. They hold that ELDO will create the technological basis for future space cooperation both within Europe and with the US--and possibly with the USSR--and will serve as a commercial stimulus for Europe's scientific industries. Pressures even within Britain are not uniform. Some scientific

circles favor a Europe-wide approach, and an "independent" European capability to launch communications satellites. There is also recognition of the embarrassment to Britain of abandoning a project it originally pressed the others to accept--largely in order to retrieve its investment in the Blue Streak rocket, which was to become ELDO-A's first stage.

The possibility of using ELDO-A to launch communications satellites is behind a proposal now being studied by the members to spend an estimated \$90-\$240 million to boost the launcher's capacity. Decisions on this proposal, and on an equatorial launch site (the choices are French Guiana, Port Darwin in Australia, and an Italian-proposed offshore base) are expected to be made at ELDO's June meeting.

25X1

The US has meanwhile made tentative soundings on an offer

* Members are the UK, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Australia, a nonpaying member whose contribution is the use of its Woomera Range for launching facilities.

SECRET

SECRET

of assistance to the European group, and the initial responses have all been favorable. Prime Minister Wilson's decision to "stay the execution" of ELDO was reportedly due to his interest in the possibility of US coop-

eration. The US Embassy in Paris believes the technological and political benefits of US cooperation could be decisive in determining ELDO's fate.



25X1

* * *

SECRET

SECRET

WEST-EAST GERMAN SPEAKER EXCHANGE POSTPONED

An East German move to postpone an exchange of West and East German party spokesmen affords both sides additional time to consider the complex political and legal implications of the meetings.

The proposed meetings grew out of an exchange of letters between the East German Communist party (SED) and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) early this year. In response to an SED initiative, the SPD suggested that Chairman Willy Brandt and two deputy chairmen begin the dialogue by addressing a mid-May meeting in the East German city of Chemnitz with a return appearance of East German leaders in West Germany the following week.

During "technical" discussions between SED and SPD representatives on 29 and 30 April, however, the East Germans suggested postponing the meetings until July. They also held to their original choice of Essen as the site for their speaking engagement in West Germany rather than Hanover as desired by the SPD.

Contacts of this sort are consistent with the East German claim that reunification must be sought by the Germans themselves. The reasons for seeking a postponement are not entirely clear. In view of the SPD insistence on full media coverage for the meetings, the East Germans may want more time

in which to evaluate the political impact of the talks on the East German population.

On the West German side, the delay affords time for Bonn to consider the legal problem arising from the apparent technical culpability under West German law of top East German leaders for various actions such as their orders to shoot persons attempting to flee East Germany.

SPD leaders think such exchanges offer a significant opportunity to bring the two Germans closer. Many leaders of West Germany's ruling Christian Democratic Union, however, are unenthusiastic. They are wary of raising false hopes among the population and unleashing a flood of contacts which could result in a significant upgrading of the East German regime. Thus, although formally approving the talks, the government may not be especially anxious to clear away legal obstacles that may arise.

Sensing an unusual receptiveness among West Germans to increasing contacts with East Germany, the SPD is eager that the talks begin. A prolonged delay could prove embarrassing to the party. Should public enthusiasm wane, opponents would be encouraged to step up their criticism of the SPD initiative, possibly representing it as new evidence of an adventurist tendency in Socialist policy.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

POLISH HARASSMENT OF MILITARY ATTACHES

The month-long Polish secret police harassment of US military attachés has slackened since 21 April, but the Poles broadened their harassment campaign to include the Dutch and the British military attachés. At least a partial explanation for these actions is the Gomulka regime's unusual concern about and preoccupation with recent signs of domestic instability and tensions.

Evidence of domestic troubles is provided by a widened police alert ordered in Poznan on 14 April after discovery of anti-regime and prochurch pamphlets which were said to have been printed at the Cegielski works. The traditionally militant workers of this large factory sparked the June 1956 "bread and freedom" riots. Cegielski workers already were reportedly disaffected because of forced contributions for Vietnam relief. A measure of the regime's alarm over these developments is reflected by the 19 April visit to the plant of politburo member and Defense Minister Spychalski, who represents Poznan in parliament.

A leading party editor recently suggested to the US ambassador that the harassment of the attachés was related to church-state tensions, and ob-

served without clarification that there seemed to be some "monkey business" going on. He may have been referring to the influence on party leaders of hard-line secret police officials who now, as in past periods of domestic difficulties, have sharply increased the vigilance of the security apparatus. Because of deep-seated suspicions about the activities and influence on the population of Western diplomatic personnel, such heightened vigilance often has included harassment of them without regard to the possible adverse consequences.

The provocations against Western attachés are probably also intended to demonstrate anew to party leaders the efficiency and zeal of the secret police. They have recently had one spectacular failure in exercising control over dissidents in the party.

Underlying the harassment may also be an element of reaction to US interest in Polish domestic affairs, such as the church's millennium celebrations. In view of all these circumstances the regime probably will not relax its close vigilance until this period of domestic insecurity is over.

25X1

* * *

SECRET


SECRET

Middle East - Africa

SOVIET JET FIGHTER EXPORTS TO NON-COMMUNIST ASIA AND AFRICA

Last August the USSR began exporting its limited-all-weather jet fighter--the MIG-21FL--to non-Communist countries. Since then, about 140 have been sent outside the bloc. This model, replacing the MIG-21 Fishbed day fighter, is the only currently produced Soviet jet fighter now being exported to nonbloc countries. The USSR may soon, however, begin the export of its SU-7 Fitter fighter bomber.

Egypt, which received the first MIG-21FL exports to the free world, now has at least 61. The most recent delivery took place in April.



During the last month Algeria received two shipments of MIG-21FLs giving it an inventory of ten of this model. Algerian personnel who have undergone training in the USSR are now returning home. Completion of training courses has often been associated with the introduction of major quantities of new military equipment. Some of these trainees apparently are associated with the new fighters, and others with surface-to-air

missile and naval programs in Algeria.

Despite cool relations between Iraq and the USSR for the past year, an Iraqi team is negotiating in Moscow for a new arms agreement which will probably include additional MIG-21FLs. Deliveries of major military equipment under an earlier Soviet-Iraqi military aid pact were completed in December and January when 18 MIG-21FLs and two MIG-21 trainers arrived in Basra.

Indonesia and Afghanistan received the MIG-21FL during late 1965 and it is believed that the 38 MIG-21s delivered to India earlier this year had a limited-all-weather capability.

The USSR is still exporting reconditioned MIG-15 Fagot and MIG-17 Fresco jet fighters. Production of these models ended in the mid-1950s. Somalia received two MIG-15s and four MIG-17s in December 1965 and may have received three more aircraft as part of the military aid shipment which arrived in Mogadiscio in April.

The USSR recently agreed to supply 5 MIG-17s to Cambodia in an attempt to regain an influential position in Phnom Penh. These aircraft are part of a \$2-million arms agreement concluded in March.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET


SYRIAN REGIME PUSHING CLOSER TIES WITH MOSCOW

The two-month-old Baath military regime in Syria is making a strenuous effort to cement closer ties with the Soviet Union, which it probably hopes will help to bolster its own shaky internal position.


A major economic agreement which was signed in Moscow on 22 April will provide \$150-175 million in Soviet credits for construction of Syria's long-planned Euphrates Dam project. The Syrian delegation which negotiated the loan--the first new Soviet commitment to Syria since 1957--was greeted warmly by Moscow and the pact was enthusiastically publicized in both capitals. At the same time, the Soviet press has joined the Syrians in reporting on alleged US plotting against the "progressive regime" in Damascus.

dash, has been allowed to take up residence in Damascus. The regime may still be unwilling to allow domestic Communists real freedom of action or to recognize the party as a legal organization. The one Communist brought into the cabinet in March, Minister of Communications Sami Attiyah, is a comparative nonentity. He had already served under a more moderate Baath regime as a member of Syria's quasi-legislative body.

The present Syrian regime has taken no new initiatives in the way of a domestic economic program, probably because it still is preoccupied with factionalism within its own ranks. In three years of Baathist rule, Syria's economy has already been largely nationalized.



The secretary general of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bak-



25X1

NEW INCIDENTS ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS

A new cycle of terrorism, retaliatory raids, and border clashes along Israel's borders with Jordan and Syria has raised tensions in the area.

Following a period of relative calm, the Syrian-supported

Fatah organization perpetrated three separate acts of sabotage beginning on 11 April. Israel, in retaliation, raided alleged Fatah bases in Jordan on 29 and 30 April. Israeli border units also have recently clashed with Jordanian troops once and with

SECRET

SECRET

25X1


Syrian units twice, most recently on 1 May.

Fatah, an Arabic acronym for the "Palestine Liberation Movement," was formed about 1958 by Palestinians who were disgusted with the inaction of Arab governments on "liberating" their homeland from Israel. It operates independently of the Palestine Liberation Organization sponsored by the Arab League. Fatah's objective apparently is to force an Arab showdown with Israel by provoking Israeli retaliation.

Fatah continues to operate mainly from clandestine bases in Jordan despite that country's efforts to suppress it, but it has also used Lebanese territory. Syria has provided training facilities and a propaganda outlet. Syria probably hopes to enhance its image as an aggressive champion of the Palestinian cause and, by contrast, to embarrass the other Arab states which are more timid about antagonizing Israel. The Israeli Government holds the Jordanians responsible for not curbing Fatah more effectively.

While the situation along the Syrian border remains tense, the possibility of further incidents along the Jordanian border has been reduced by King Husayn's decision not to retaliate "at this time." Despite high Jordanian casualties--reportedly 11 dead and five wounded--Husayn has resisted heavy domestic pressure to react because of Israel's preponderant military strength. However, should he fail to respond to any future Israeli raids, he would risk political trouble at home and propa-

ganda assaults on his Arab patriotism from Cairo and other Arab capitals.

RECENT ISRAELI-ARAB BORDER RAIDS AND CLASHES**SECRET**

SECRET

NASIR SPEECH PERILS YEMEN PEACE PROSPECTS

In his traditional May Day speech President Nasir once more resorted to bombast to cover his frustration in failing to get the Yemen problem settled on his own terms. Despite his bellicosity toward Saudi Arabia and his other Arab "enemies" Nasir's actual moves are still in accord with a defensive strategy.

Nasir's chief target was King Faysal, whom he called the "bearded one" and a "bird-brain" who thought he could build a modern army and air force in Saudi Arabia. "We will destroy these...aircraft in five minutes," Nasir boasted. "They will never be able to form an army which can stand against us."

This speech was in large part an extension of his previous speeches in February and March, but Nasir used stronger language against Faysal and Saudi Arabia than he had done before. Also

for the first time, he identified the Saudi border towns of Jizan and Najran as "bases of aggression," saying that should further aggression occur, he would not only strike them but occupy them. In any event, they were really Yemeni, he said, having been stolen by the Saudis in 1930.

Nasir's object in making these statements, if indeed there was one beyond impressing his own admirers with an oratorical display, may have been to intimidate the Saudis. However, the taunts and jibes he hurled at Faysal will serve to impede further the kind of personal reconciliation which must take place between the two leaders if a Yemen peace plan can ever be effective. At the moment, it appears the Kuwaiti mediation efforts are going ahead despite Saudi anger and Kuwaiti embarrassment with Nasir's speech.

25X1

* * *

SECRET

SECRET

ALGERIA MODERATES POLICIES UNDER BOUMEDIENE

In the nearly 11 months since he overthrew the radical Ben Bella regime in Algeria, Col. Houari Boumediene has at least partially diverted the country into a non-Marxist course free of the Ben Bella personalism. Boumediene and his associates have sought to develop a broad consensus, excluding only extremists like the Communists and the Ben Bellists on the left and the old-line bourgeois and preindependence politicians on the right.

Although the regime avows its socialist character, it has shifted from Ben Bella's far left toward the center. The dominant group within the government is made up of moderate reformists favorably disposed toward De Gaulle's France and other nonsocialist countries. At the same time, the government maintains a practical, basically nonideological relationship with the USSR, which continues to provide the bulk of equipment and training for the Algerian Army. Potential Soviet-financed economic projects are being reappraised, however, with the strong possibility that alternate assistance will be solicited.

A slight warming in the political atmosphere occurred after Boumediene's December visit to Moscow and the establishment of party-to-party contacts by a low-level delegation from Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN) in February. This was all but canceled out, however, by the walkout of the high-level FLN observer delegation from the 23rd Soviet Party Con-

gress when it became evident that the banned Algerian Communist Party would be represented.

Boumediene seems gradually to have gained self-assurance and to have somewhat consolidated his position. He retains the loyalty of the army, which remains the most significant factor in the Algerian power equation. He has managed to balance off rival cliques vying for authority and favor. However, the collegial system has brought excessive dilly-dallying in decision making and implementation, resulting in widespread disillusionment throughout the country, particularly among those groups which expected the new regime to give a lift to the economy.

Boumediene's opponents are largely the Communists and leftist intellectuals, but they are divided and factionalized. The 30 April prison break of Hocine Ait Ahmed, whose Kabylie-based Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) had challenged the consolidation of personal power by Ben Bella, has caused the Boumediene regime to lose face. Although Ait Ahmed probably will be unable to reactivate the FFS maquis to any significant extent, the political scene will remain troubled so long as he is at large. Moreover, the Algerian Government would take a dim view were Morocco, Tunisia, or France to give him sanctuary. The one inevitable result of the escape is to arouse speculation regarding Ben Bella, whose escape would provide a real headache for the regime.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME

Political infighting in the radical Congo (Brazzaville) regime evidently has not yet resulted in a clear-cut victory for either the extremist forces or for more moderate forces led by President Massamba-Debat.

No successor has yet been named to Premier Lissouba, who resigned as of 15 April. There are strong signs that it will be Ambroise Noumzalay, generally regarded as one of the regime's leading extremists. Massamba-Debat's May Day speech nevertheless criticized those who would apply a Soviet or Chinese form of socialism to the Brazzaville situation--a clear dig at the extremists.

Moderates and radicals alike appear apprehensive over the possibility of an army coup, but

there are at present no indications that such a move is in the offing. The army is itself split into factions and is generally passive.

Brazzaville leaders also appear disturbed by the government's fiscal outlook. In his speech Massamba-Debat pointed out that the budgetary deficit must be reduced so that necessary financial assistance can be forthcoming from abroad. He praised French and Common Market assistance on which the country is heavily dependent and compared it favorably with aid from the Communist countries. He probably was mindful of upcoming financial negotiations with the French, who for their part, seem to be basically gratified by current trends within the regime.

25X1

Western Hemisphere

BOLIVIAN ELECTION PREPARATIONS

The Bolivian military junta has extended from 3 May to 3 June the deadline for registering candidates for the 3 July national elections in an attempt to obtain greater participation. Rene Barrientos Ortuno remains the only presidential candidate, and his electoral vehicle, the Bolivian Revolutionary Front, is the only political group that so far definitely plans to participate. This is a matter of great concern to Barrientos and junta president Ovando, who fear widespread abstention by the po-

litical parties will prejudice the legitimacy of a Barrientos victory. They doubt that a government elected without opposition can long endure.

Specifically, the extension is intended to give Victor Andrade of the moderate faction of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement an opportunity to rally the party around his leadership, hold a nominating convention, and inscribe candidates on the electoral rolls. Andrade plans to hold the convention in late May.

SECRET

SECRET

The junta on 3 May declared a general amnesty for all exiles and political prisoners to neutralize opposition charges that the government is not providing a free, democratic climate for the elections. Actually, most of the exiles had already returned to Bolivia, including labor boss Juan Lechin and former president

Hernan Siles Zuazo--half brother of Barrientos' vice-presidential running mate, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas. Some exiles, such as Victor Paz Estenssoro, have criminal charges pending against them, and the government has made it clear that it reserves the right to arrest these people should they return.

25X1

DEVELOPMENTS IN ECUADOR

After a month in office, the interim regime of Provisional President Yerovi in Ecuador remains weak, unwilling to tackle problems, and tolerant of Communist activities.

may return soon from Buenos Aires to press his aspirations for a fifth entry to the palace. As maneuvering gains momentum for probable September elections to a constituent assembly, politics will grow chaotic.

Government finances remain critical. Yerovi has attempted to meet the budgetary problem primarily by firing employees and curtailing services and development, rather than by politically unpopular revenue measures. The usually stable currency has declined sharply as a result of a decree requiring use of free market dollars for certain categories of imports.

The defense minister [redacted] has resigned and been replaced by Fausto Cordovez Chiriboga, a civilian with previous ministerial and legislative experience. Cordovez has often been mentioned as a possible interim president and presidential candidate of the right.

25X6^{25X1}

Although the important Radical Liberal Party appears dedicated to the principle of no presidential re-election, four-time president Velasco Ibarra

The military has abstained from political pressure, but would be obliged to intervene if Yerovi carried out his threats to resign.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Peacekeeping duties in Santo Domingo have now been assumed by Dominican national police and army units, and the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) has moved most of its troops outside the capital.

The provisional government has begun an attempt to bring about the IAPF's departure from the country prior to 1 July when an elected government is scheduled to take office. Without prior consultation with the OAS Committee in Santo Domingo, President Garcia Godoy on 1 May dispatched a personal representative to visit the heads of state of the OAS member nations in what Foreign Minister Perez announced as an effort to "promote unanimous meeting of minds on the question of withdrawal." The US Embassy views Garcia Godoy's unilateral move as an effort to assure his own political future by appearing as the man who restored Dominican sovereignty.

Political verbiage and violence picked up considerably in the past week as the campaign entered its final month. Juan Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer have sharpened their speeches against each other and party activists have clashed in a number of isolated incidents throughout the country. One incident in the Cibao Valley resulted in one death and numerous injuries. Balaguer has addressed himself publicly to this problem, charging Bosch's Dominican Revolution-

ary Party (PRD) with instigating attacks on his followers by young ruffians. He acknowledged that some of his own supporters have been guilty of similar tactics.

The US Embassy reports that Balaguer's campaign appears to have picked up momentum and has for the first time placed Bosch and the PRD on the defensive. Balaguer's Reformist Party has come down hard on the issue of the PRD's favored position in the government-owned sugar industry and reiterated its fear of fraudulent elections because of alleged irregularities in the issuing of identification cards which are used as a voter registration device.

The Reformist Party is making a strong pitch to the country's poorer rural elements by sending campaigners to the interior. It is trying to appeal to women by billing itself as the party of peace.

Bosch's campaign is receiving a boost from the public prediction by Dominican and foreign observers that he will win, but there are some indications that the PRD may have trouble maintaining its pace of recent weeks. A press report from a knowledgeable reporter has for the first time hinted that Bosch may plan to leave his well-guarded home for the hustings in mid-May.

The much-discussed alliance between Rafael Bonnelly, the

SECRET

SECRET

National Integration Movement candidate, and Balaguer has not come about as yet.

25X1

STUDENT STRIKE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO

Under the threat of physical harm, the rector of the National University of Mexico and other top university officials resigned on 27 April. The violence that erupted the previous day at Mexico's largest educational institution was the culmination of a student strike that had simmered since 14 March. Students still control some school buildings and are using the leverage this gives them to try to assure appointment of a new director sympathetic to their demands for administrative and curricular changes.

Perhaps to counter the politically embarrassing rumors of its involvement, the government gave heavy publicity to charges against an extremely weak Trotskyite group which it alleged had exploited the university strike and sought to "establish a Communist government" in Mexico. The charges may also be a harbinger of a crackdown on this extremist element, the members of which had been troublesome during President Johnson's visit to Mexico.

Apparently inspired by the student success at the National University, students have struck at the University of Puebla, demanding the resignation of the rector there and certain other officials. Other students around the country have reportedly pledged support for the Puebla effort, and Puebla police are alerted for violence. Should this student activity continue to spread, the government will probably have to intervene, despite the extreme reluctance of elected officials to provoke the displeasure of the politically minded youth.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

NEW COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT

Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who was elected President of Colombia on 1 May by a two-to-one majority, will be in a favorable position to carry out his moderate reform programs.

According to nearly complete but unofficial returns, Lleras received about 1.7 million votes against 700,000 for Jose Jaramillo Giraldo, his only opponent, who was backed by the National Popular Alliance (ANP). Slightly more than one third of the eligible voters exercised their suffrage, a larger percentage than expected. The vote for Lleras was substantially higher than that received by President Valencia four years ago, which further strengthens Lleras' mandate.

At the same time, Jaramillo received more votes than did the ANP in the March congressional elections. This will permit the ANP to claim that its strength is constantly growing.

The newly elected Congress convenes on 20 July, and Lleras will be inaugurated on 7 August. By strict party definition Lleras will lack the two-thirds majority needed for important legislation, but he appears confident of his ability to build a work-

ing majority by attracting defectors or splitting the opposition.

Lleras will begin his four-year term in fairly propitious circumstances: the problem of violence which has plagued the country for years is largely under control, the political situation is stable, and economic conditions have shown some improvement. However, Lleras can expect some serious congressional opposition, and his approach to economic problems, which remain serious, can be expected to affect future political stability.

Lleras is himself an economist who advocates Alliance for Progress goals and who will probably devote considerable effort to solving such persistent problems as unemployment, inflation, and balance of payments. In so doing he will be limited by the interests of Colombia's powerful conservative elite.

Nevertheless, Lleras probably will have several quiet months in office to prepare his administration to cope with these problems.

25X1



SECRET

Page Denied

SECRET

SECRET