


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15 October 1965

OCI No. 0311/65

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# WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

ARMY review(s) completed.

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EDT, 14 October 1965)

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<b>VIETNAM</b>	1
Although there was a relative decline in large-scale military engagements in South Vietnam last week, the number of Viet Cong incidents reached the highest level in over a year amid indications that the Communists may be planning to step up their terrorist activity. The Communists are also nearing completion of considerable construction and improvement work on roads in southern Laos which will extend their infiltration routes into South Vietnam. The number of confirmed surface-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam reached 29 last week, but it is estimated that the DRV has only enough equipment for six to ten of these. Hanoi has intensified its propaganda alleging US air strikes against civil targets.	
<u>The Communist World</u>	
<b>UNANNOUNCED HIGH-LEVEL PARTY MEETING IN COMMUNIST CHINA</b>	4
Recent regime pronouncements suggest that the leaders are frustrated by a wide range of foreign and domestic problems, and an important unannounced conference has apparently been under way since at least 27 September to discuss and act on them.	
<b>WARSAW PACT EXERCISE IMMINENT IN EAST GERMANY</b>	6
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**KOSYGIN'S PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZING SOVIET ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT**

The Soviet premier's 27 September speech to the central committee was short on the details and vague as to the timing of the extensive changes he proposed in industrial management. The probable impact of the new program on Soviet economic performance is therefore difficult to judge. The proposals appear to go far enough to bring some slight improvements in management, but not far enough to give the economy the sharp boost it needs. (Published separately as Special Report OCI No. 0311/65A)

Asia-Africa

**INDONESIA**

The army, proceeding with its investigation of the 30 September coup, remains determined to build a case against the individuals responsible. It is keeping Sukarno and the Communist Party on the defensive, but still appears reluctant to defy the President by a major crackdown on the party.

8

**INDIA-PAKISTAN**

There has been little change in the basic situation. Cease-fire violations remain at a relatively low level, but neither side has pulled its troops back from forward positions. Pakistan continues its attempts to stir the US and UK into more immediate action on the Kashmir question, and India still claims Kashmir is not a subject for discussions at all.

9

**PRO-WESTERN JUSTICE PARTY WINS TURKISH ELECTIONS**

The party's solid majority clears the way for a strong government, after four years of weak coalitions. The government will maintain Turkey's pro-Western orientation. The military can be expected to lend its support.

12

**BRITISH-RHODESIAN TALKS FAIL**

Prime Minister Wilson made clear to Rhodesia's Ian Smith that a unilateral declaration of independence would mean strict sanctions by the UK. Nevertheless Smith and his cabinet are likely to decide soon to take this step, although the announcement may be delayed for several months.

13

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**ACCRA TO HOST AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING**

16

Most of the 36 countries belonging to the Organization of African Unity will send high-level representatives, although some heads of state will not attend. African problems will be of primary concern, but some touchy East-West issues may also come up.

**TSHOMBE OUSTED IN THE CONGO**

15

President Kasavubu's dismissal of Premier Tshombé almost certainly presages a period of political turmoil and possibly violence. Moreover, Leopoldville still faces a long campaign to re-establish its authority in large rebel-infested areas, although mercenary forces captured the last major rebel stronghold last week.

Europe

**SCANDINAVIA AND NATO**

16

Swedish Prime Minister Erlander's recent cautious allusion to the possibility of a Scandinavian defense pact raises the question of whether Norway and Denmark will continue their NATO membership after 1969 when they may opt to withdraw. Opinion in those two countries will be affected as always by Soviet moves but also by how French NATO policy develops and by their latent fear of Germany as Bonn seeks a greater nuclear role in NATO.

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Western Hemisphere

**THE CANADIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN**

18

Few issues are well defined at this point, but the campaign for the 8 November parliamentary election is beginning to heat up. Opposition leader Diefenbaker seems to have lost considerable ground since the last election, and Prime Minister Pearson's Liberal Party, which is favored by the polls, is confident of victory.

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**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

19

As preparations for expected elections get under way, even moderate forces seem to be seeking popularity by espousing anti-Americanism. Juan Bosch has put out vague feelers to the US Embassy about cooperating on "anti-Communist" strategy. Some progress has been made in reintegrating the rebel zone, but it remains to be seen whether President Garcia Godoy will now take a stronger stand against leftist inroads in the government.

**ECUADOR'S MILITARY JUNTA REMAINS UNCHALLENGED**

20

The political parties are determined to press the regime to accelerate or otherwise alter its plan for a return to constitutional rule by September 1966, but they have failed in their attempts to arouse popular support--most recently during a patriotic holiday celebration in Guayaquil on 9 October.

**REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS**

21

Political conditions remain unsettled as President Castello Branco plans measures to ease the tensions caused by the military's strong reaction to the election results.

United Nations

**FRANCE TRIES TO CURB UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S POWERS**

22

France, anxious to assure great-power predominance in the UN through the Security Council, has seized upon the Kashmir crisis to introduce a resolution which would have the effect of curbing the role and influence of the secretary general and his staff, particularly in peace-keeping operations.

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VIETNAM

The Communists may be planning to step up their terrorist activity in South Vietnam. Recent broadcasts by the Viet Cong's clandestine Liberation Radio have placed unusual emphasis on appeals for a "month of hatred" of the US, scheduled to begin on 15 October. All Vietnamese are being urged to observe an hour of silence that morning and to participate in a general strike in cities throughout the country. Appeals have also gone out to the people to assist in a stepped-up campaign of terrorism and sabotage.

Meanwhile, the number of Viet Cong incidents during the past week increased to the highest level in over a year.

Major Vietnamese-Allied operations last week against suspected enemy troop concentrations in Binh Duong Province, north of Saigon, and in the northern coastal province of Binh Dinh failed to establish major contact with the Viet Cong, but did serve to open areas previously denied to the government. Reflecting the recent decline in large-scale fighting, Viet Cong casualties during the week ending on 9 October totaled 668, a sharp drop from the average of 1,760 sustained during each of the previous two weeks.

The recent command reorganization in Saigon has caused some discontent among government and military circles. Defense Minis-

ter General Co, who was elevated to deputy premier for war and reconstruction while losing his position as chief of the Joint General Staff, was particularly dissatisfied with the prospect of increased political responsibilities and fewer military duties. After reaching an agreement with Ky and others which served to allay his fears concerning his position in the military chain of command, Co publicly reaffirmed the unity of the military leadership.

[Redacted]

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DRV Army Units in South Vietnam

[Redacted]

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the DRV's 325th Infantry Division in South Vietnam

[Redacted] had infiltrated in four phases from late 1964 through mid-1965. In addition to the three organic infantry regiments now accented by MACV as being in the South

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[Redacted] a transportation battalion, a guard company, a medical company, an engineer company, a signals company, and possibly a chemical company had also infiltrated.

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New Infiltration Routes in Laos

The Communists have worked through the current rainy season

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to complete roads in southern Laos started in mid-1964. When the dry season arrives in a few weeks they will have more than 150 miles of roads flanking the South Vietnamese border to a point 90 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ)--some 55 miles farther than a year ago.

The general plan appears to be to extend Laotian route 92--which parallels the South Vietnamese border at an average distance of about 25 miles--to the vicinity of Ban Phone and to open branches from route 92 toward the border both with new construction and by upgrading existing trails. As of the end of September, the branches which can be confirmed by photography consist of one from Ban Phone completed to the border, a second from Muong Nong com-


pleted to within five miles of the border. A third road starting from Ban Bac, in an early stage of construction, may also lead to the South Vietnamese border.

Development of route 92 and its branches is almost certain to be stepped up when the dry season arrives. This will probably include the provision of more off-road support facilities and bridging and the further extension of route 92 from the latitude of Saravane to Ban Phone, a gap crossed in 1964 by using large canoes on the Se Kong River..

More SAM Sites in the DRV

The total number of confirmed surface-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam reached 29 this week with the confirmation of seven new sites. Despite this increase it is estimated that at present there is only enough SAM equipment in the DRV to equip six to ten sites. The largest number of operational sites--those equipped with missiles and ready to fire--noted at any one time was five on 8 October. Many of the newly confirmed sites are in groups of two or three within a few miles of one another, probably to make the most effective use of the available equipment.

SOUTHERN LAOS: Roads Built or Improved Since Mid-1964



the Vietnamese have taken over SAM operations after only three months' training instead of the nine to

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to twelve months normally required.

#### Alleged Bombing of Civil Targets

Hanoi's propaganda charges denouncing alleged US bombing and strafing of civil targets in the DRV have recently been intensified. Part of the DRV campaign involved a guided tour of the damaged areas for a group of journalists from Japan, Indonesia, and the UAR. Initial reports from the newsmen describe urban centers in the southern DRV as "virtually flattened," and claim "indescribable damage to civilian establishment" including over 40,000 dead from the raids. After a spate of new charges over damage to hospitals and other medical facilities, Hanoi on 12 October released a detailed list of 124 "educational institutions" it claims were hit by US planes.

Beyond the general intention of arousing additional free world sentiment against the air raids it is not clear exactly what has sparked the heightened DRV propaganda charges. Hanoi may hope to provide some specific detail and background music for leftist and Communist spokesmen at a series of upcoming free world student protest demonstrations over US policy in Vietnam. In its declaration on the alleged bombing of schools, Hanoi called on "educational circles in all countries" to launch a "powerful movement of protests."

#### DRV Assembly Postponed

Indicative of the problems caused in the DRV by the bombing is Hanoi's decision to "postpone" the upcoming fall session of its national assembly. The postponement will allow state organs and cadres to concentrate on resisting US "aggression," according to Hanoi. The move probably also reflects anticipation of difficulties in transporting delegates to Hanoi and a reluctance to concentrate many key cadres in one large assembly.

#### Hungarian Mission to DRV

A high-level Hungarian delegation led by politburo member Jenő Fock arrived in Hanoi on 7 October. The delegation, which included both economic and military specialists, met with party First Secretary Le Duan and DRV economic and military officials on 10 October. Hanoi described the talks only as an "exchange of views on problems of common interests."

The full purpose of the visit is not clear. North Vietnam relies on Hungary for some telecommunications and electronic equipment and may be seeking additional assistance of this type, probably for military purposes. It is likely, however, that the subject of a settlement of the war will also be discussed, with the Hungarians probably urging a policy of moderation.

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On 6 October, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter hinted in a speech before the UN General Assembly that North Vietnam might be more amenable to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese war if the US stopped its bombings. In subsequent conversations with US officials, however, he was unable to offer any earnest of North Vietnam's intentions to agree to talks. Peter's remarks parallel other claims [redacted]

[redacted] that a halt to the bombings is mandatory before there can be any movement toward talks.

#### Soviet Attitudes

The Soviet posture on Vietnam remains unchanged. The Russian leaders fully realize their

lack of influence over Vietnamese developments and consequently their limited room for maneuver. These considerations together with their current preoccupation with their problems at home would seem at present to preclude any strong Russian initiative on Vietnam unless events take some drastic turn. In his recent talks with Secretary Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko apparently went out of his way to avoid discussing the Vietnam issue in any provocative way. The general tenor of his remarks on East-West relations provided a further indication that underneath the public display of anti-US sentiment, Soviet leaders are intent on preventing relations from falling into complete disrepair. [redacted]

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#### The Communist World

##### UNANNOUNCED HIGH-LEVEL PARTY MEETING IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Recent regime pronouncements suggest that Chinese Communist leaders are frustrated by a wide range of foreign and domestic problems. An important unannounced conference of leaders has apparently been under way since at least 27 September to cope with these problems.

Several regional and provincial party leaders, who seldom show up in Peking except for "enlarged politburo meetings," have been noted in the capital since 27 September, and all five known regional leaders were there on 2 and 10 October. It is particularly unusual for them to be

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absent from their own areas in early October, when they normally preside over local National Day celebrations. This strongly suggests that the activity in Peking was unscheduled and possibly urgent.

Any meeting at this time may have been triggered by foreign policy problems, such as recent developments in Vietnam, China's role in the Kashmir crisis, and difficulties in extending Chinese influence in Africa and Latin America. Foreign Minister Chen Yi's truculent and wide-ranging press conference on 29 September suggests that a decision had already been reached by then to take a generally harder line in foreign policy.

The enlarged group meets so seldom that, once together, it would undoubtedly also consider domestic affairs, including personnel appointments. No change in domestic policies is evident yet, but the stress on domestic problems evident in National Day editorials and speeches suggests that new approaches are being considered. Although these contained the usual claims that the situation at home and abroad was "excellent," the regime in fact appears to be disappointed by its mediocre achievements and frustrated over the intractability of its long-term problems. In the keynote National Day

address, politburo member Peng Chen claimed that agricultural production had increased over 1964, but he warned that "quite a few areas had suffered serious natural disasters," an admission probably designed to condition the populace to expect some belt tightening next spring. Other information on grain crop conditions indicates no increase over the mediocre 1964 level.

The absence of a strong popular commitment to regime policies also continues to worry Peking. Chen Yi admitted there were "revisionists" in China but claimed they represent no threat. The National Day editorial in the party journal Red Flag--reflecting a long-standing fear of top leaders that China, like the USSR, might some day backslide--was devoted entirely to the problem of inculcating people with Maoist beliefs through "socialist education" campaigns.

Both Chen Yi in his press conference and Premier Chou En-lai in a National Day speech alluded to the third five-year plan, which is to start in 1966, but neither gave details and both stressed that it would take decades--30 to 50 years according to Chen--to build a strong China.

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**WARSAW PACT EXERCISE IMMINENT IN EAST GERMANY**


Preparations for the announced Warsaw Pact exercise are now virtually complete. Military activity in southwestern East Germany is expected to accelerate during the next few days as Soviet, East German, Polish, and Czech forces deploy for the event.

During the past week intensive preparations for the large maneuvers focused particularly on arrangements for the air movement of Soviet and Polish airborne forces from their home bases to East Germany. The airborne phase of the exercise is expected to be the largest

operation of its type ever conducted by bloc forces in Eastern Europe. Observation of the major military activity--which may involve the actual participation of elements of as many as ten divisions--will be denied to Allied liaison personnel. A large area in southern East Germany has been closed to them from 9 through 27 October.

The theme of the exercise will probably be the blunting of a NATO attack into East Germany followed by a counteroffensive through the Fulda Gap to West Germany. Simulated tactical and strategic nuclear blows

**WARSAW PACT EXERCISE AREA IN EAST GERMANY**



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- Road
- Railroad
- ▲ Army level Hq.
- ▨ Training area
- Area closed to Allied Liaison Mission travel for the period 9-27 October.

Note: Marshal Grechko states that Soviet forces in East Germany, as the main Warsaw Pact "striking force," will provide heavy troop participation.

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are expected to play a major role.

Propaganda to date, plus Warsaw Pact commander Marshal Grechko's statement that the

exercise will be the "largest ever," suggests that the Soviets intend to use the exercise as a demonstration of bloc preparedness to counter "the West German threat to peace." 25X1

#### ANOTHER SOVIET LUNAR PROBE FAILS

The increasing frequency of Soviet lunar probes suggests that the USSR is feeling a sense of urgency to show some results from this program. Luna 7, launched on 4 October, was the most recent probe and was intended to make a soft landing. Its retrorocket system apparently malfunctioned, however, and the vehicle crashed on the moon on 7 October.

A TASS announcement released some 13 hours after the impact stated that the probe's operation was generally successful. While Luna 7 must be charged off as the latest failure in a notably unsuccessful program, it undoubtedly did produce some data

which will be useful in further efforts to perfect a soft-landing system.

So far this year the Soviets have announced three lunar probe launchings, none of which has been wholly successful. They now appear to be stepping up their program to develop a soft-landing technique, possibly in an attempt to obtain lunar surface data for an eventual manned lunar landing. In addition, Moscow certainly feels the need to show some results from a program which has suffered badly in comparison with US lunar exploration. 25X1

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
Asia-Africa

INDONESIA

The army continues to keep Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on the defensive, but still appears reluctant to defy the President by a major crackdown on the party.

The army is proceeding with its investigation of the 30 September coup and will try to build a case against the individuals responsible. The investigations permit the arrest and interrogation of relatively large numbers of leftist suspects and are within the terms of Sukarno's orders. Instead of taking direct action against the PKI and its affiliates, the army is relying on anti-Communist civilian organizations. These groups have been active chiefly in destroying buildings used by the party and its front groups. There seems to have been relatively little personal violence.

In accordance with army wishes, Sukarno has appointed Maj. Gen. Suharto commander of the army. Suharto led the army's counteraction against the 30 September coup. He replaces Maj. Gen. Yani, who was murdered on 1 October.



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The PKI's central committee had made no pronouncements since its statement on 5 October claiming that it was not implicated in the coup attempt. Chairman Aidit's whereabouts remains unknown, although the army still believes he is in central Java.

Indications are mounting that Sukarno and the party are willing to make Aidit the major scapegoat of the affair and that they will try to form a "new" Communist party. Several Djakarta newspapers have printed stories to the effect that there are two kinds of Communists: "extreme Communists," who are

Sukarno returned to Djakarta from his palace at Bogor on 10 October. Although he has taken relatively little action since then, his presence in the capital strengthens his position by discounting reports that he is ill or in protective custody.

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un-Indonesian and who serve foreign interests, and "decent Communists," who could take a rightful place in Sukarno's nationalist-religious-Communist concept of government.

Moscow has treated events in Indonesia with caution. The Soviet press has reported and deplored the moves against the PKI but has stopped short of attempting to assess the situation, routinely indicting alleged "im-

perialist intrigue." [redacted]

[redacted] however, Soviet officials have implicated pro-Chinese elements in the PKI. Moscow probably views the situation in Indonesia as an advantageous one which reinforces the Soviet argument that Peking's advocacy of violent revolutionary tactics can lead to disaster for many Communist parties in Asia and Africa. [redacted]

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#### INDIA-PAKISTAN

There has been little change in the basic military-diplomatic confrontation between India and Pakistan. Cease-fire violations remain at a relatively low level. UN Secretary General Thant told members of the Security Council last week end that the situation on the cease-fire line had improved, but he saw considerable room for further improvement. Neither side has made any move to pull its troops back from forward positions.

General MacDonald, commander of the UN observer group in the Punjab, believes senior military commanders on both sides are sincere in their assurances to him that they will honor the cease-fire. He feels his most pressing problem is to bring about the disengagement of forward elements, but he is hampered in effecting this, as well as in verifying reported cease-fire violations, by limited communications and logistics. MacDonald hopes to take up


the withdrawal issue with the chiefs of staffs of the opposing armies.

General Musa, the Pakistani Army commander, has already indicated, however, that Pakistan has no intention of withdrawing its troops from Kashmir until real progress has been made in moving the Kashmir issue toward a permanent solution.

Unrest has plagued Srinagar, the chief city of Indian-held Kashmir, in the past week. A number of people were killed in riots last week end, and several more were killed or wounded in a subsequent incident on 11 October. The Indian press reported on 12 October that Srinagar schools had been closed for three days. The rioting has resulted in a nighttime curfew and the arrest of several opposition political leaders. Indian authorities can be expected to react quickly and harshly to further disorders.

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
# INDIA-PAKISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE





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There has been little progress toward a substantive discussion of the Kashmir issue in the UN, despite Pakistani prodding. Foreign Minister Bhutto now is in New York for a further exploration of this question. The idea of a four-power commission to assist U Thant on this issue appears to be fading, largely as a result of Soviet and French objections. Thant still favors this approach to the problem, however.

Pakistani Foreign Secretary Ahmed has told Ambassador McConaughy that his country anticipated little effective action within the UN on this issue, adding that Pakistan was again considering the Soviet offer of its "good offices" in an effort to resolve the problem. Pakistani officials, probably hoping to stir the US and UK into more immediate action, have recently raised this possibility with a number of diplomats.

Ahmed also suggested that Pakistan was coming to the con-

clusion that the UN was unable to preserve the cease-fire, and that accordingly Pakistan may have to fall back on its own resources, taking a number of actions "which together may lead to escalation." Ambassador McConaughy has noticed a number of signs that the Pakistanis may make important decisions around 15-16 October. He believes it prudent to anticipate a stiffer Pakistani response to cease-fire violations. It is likely, however, that again the Pakistani warning is primarily intended to stimulate Western action on the Kashmir problem.

India continues to claim that Kashmir is not a subject for discussion at all. In a recent magazine interview Prime Minister Shastri asserted that Pakistani "aggression" was encouraged by the fact that "some of the big powers" not only condoned crime but wanted to make aggression pay. He reportedly was "particularly distressed" at the British.

There are continuing indications that India's efforts to cope with its critical food supply problem have been unsuccessful. Residents of Calcutta are finding that food-grain rations set during the hostilities are inadequate, and recourse to the black market is increasingly common. Nevertheless, the state government plans temporarily to cut rations even more until additional food-grain can be obtained from other states.

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### **PRO-WEST JUSTICE PARTY WINS TURKISH ELECTIONS**

The solid popular majority won by the conservative Justice Party (JP) in the 10 October parliamentary elections clears the way for restoration of strong government in Turkey after four years of weak coalitions. Unofficial returns give the JP an estimated 60 percent of the popular vote and about 250 of the 450 seats in the National Assembly. Its leader, Suleyman Demirel, will almost certainly be the new prime minister.

The Republican Peoples' Party (RPP), led by the venerable Ismet Inonu, suffered a serious defeat. It received less than 30 percent of the vote, but will remain the major opposition with 130-140 assembly seats. The remaining 60-70 seats will be split among the four minor parties, with the leftist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) winning about 10 seats, assuring it a parliamentary sounding board for its strong anti-American attacks. The extreme rightist Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP), headed by retired Colonel Turkes, former member of the revolutionary Committee of National Union, made a poor showing at the polls but party leaders hope to attract support from "friends" in the assembly.

The JP victory should favor US interests in Turkey and maintain Turkey's Western orientation. The party leadership is

basically pro-American and realizes the importance of sound, moderate, effective government. The JP favors flexible, rather than rigid economic planning, is oriented toward private enterprise rather than state ownership, and while trying to maintain good relations with the USSR, will probably try to slow down the current Soviet economic offensive in Turkey.

The new government will remain firm in its strong support and direction of the Turkish community on Cyprus. At the same time it will be in a better position to accept compromise if indeed compromise becomes possible. Like its predecessors, it will look to the United States and the UK, rather than the United Nations, for the ultimate resolution of this sticky problem.

The new government will face many knotty problems, not the least of which will be the limited number of JP leaders with top government experience. There will be continuing pressure from both the left--the TLP--and the right--the RPNP--as well as persistent badgering from the RPP.

The new government probably will also encounter intermittent criticism from elements within the military who either fear political revenge for the revolution of 1960 or who want a stronger

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military voice in the affairs of government. Unless the new government reverts to the dictatorial tendencies of the prerevolutionary regime, however, or threatens to undermine the position of the

military, or neglects the country's social and economic development, the military can be expected to support the Demirel regime. 25X1

### BRITISH-RHODESIAN TALKS FAIL

Last week's talks in London between Prime Ministers Wilson and Smith on the question of Rhodesian independence ended in failure. Smith and his cabinet remain uncompromising and are likely to decide soon to make a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), although the announcement may be delayed for several months.

Wilson made clear to Smith that UDI would be met by strict political and economic sanctions from the UK and might lead to open racial conflict in central Africa. In an effort to put the onus for such action on Rhodesia, Wilson requested in a nationwide television address that Rhodesia accept a mission of senior Commonwealth prime ministers to assist in reaching a negotiated settlement.

The UN General Assembly passed a resolution this week calling on the UK to take all steps necessary to halt UDI. However, international pressures are unlikely to do more than tem-

porarily delay Rhodesian independence.

Most of Rhodesia's white electorate is reported anxious for an early decision, but some are having second thoughts about the wisdom of UDI. Business and industrial leaders, who last year declared that UDI would have disastrous economic consequences for Rhodesia, have reaffirmed their opposition to rash action and apparently are considering ways of putting pressure on Smith. Leading newspapers are encouraging Smith to consider carefully and to consult public opinion before reaching his decision.

Nevertheless, Smith announced on his return from London that further negotiations were out of the question, and that Rhodesia would probably have its independence by Christmas. He is now so firmly committed to immediate action that he will probably have to declare UDI before too many months or resign his office. 25X1

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ACCRA TO HOST AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING

African heads of state and government will convene in the capital of Ghana from 21 to 27 October for the second time since they established the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa in 1963. Most of the 36 member countries are expected to be represented at the meeting, although not by the top leader in some cases.

The dispute between radical Ghana and the conservative French-speaking states, which has threatened to split the OAU, appears to have been deferred for the sake of preserving African unity. The argument revolved around Ghanaian President Nkrumah's active support of subversive elements from independent African countries. This was discussed at an emergency OAU foreign ministers' conference in June, which confirmed the Accra site for the summit in exchange for Ghana's guarantee to expel undesirable political refugees. Nkrumah has made token compliance, but no one believes he has given up subversion, and some of the conservatives may still refuse to attend.

Although the OAU conference will be concerned primarily with African problems, some touchy East-West issues may also come up. Moderates, who put Vietnam on the summit agenda, successfully blocked preliminary efforts by radical members to present a one-sided version of the conflict, and the moderates' bid to ensure a mild African position on Vietnam may well succeed. The question of Chinese Communist admission to the UN, on the other hand, would, if it arises, be supported by some moderates as well as by the radicals.

Of the specifically African issues on the agenda, the most urgent will be the working out of responses to a possible unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia as well as an OAU stand on recent Congo developments. Previous strong resolutions on the Portuguese African territories, on South Africa's racial policies and on its mandate over South West Africa, are likely to be reiterated.

There are numerous indications that a disguised form of Nkrumah's old dream of a continental union government will be given considerable attention at the summit.

Diallo Telli, the OAU's ambitious secretary general, may push to make the OAU the voice for all aspects of African affairs. In close collaboration with Nkrumah and the radicals, Diallo has apparently written a subtle resolution to this effect for Ghana to present to the summit.

A somewhat different push toward centralization will come from Ethiopia, which wants to house the OAU's many commissions in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia may also propose holding all future summit meetings there to avoid repetition of the recent disagreement over the Accra site.

Previous efforts to establish union government have met with no success. Many African leaders have been troubled by recent displays of disunity, however, and may be more receptive than formerly to such suggestions.

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### TSHOMBE OUSTED IN THE CONGO

Congolese President Kasavubu's dismissal of Premier Tshombé on 13 October almost certainly presages a period of political turmoil in Leopoldville.

In essence the conflict between the two men is a struggle for the presidency, the locus of ultimate political power in the Congo. Presidential elections are due in six months, and the intervening period is likely to be marked by vigorous and sometimes violent politicking throughout the country.

Kasavubu apparently is working with Interior Minister Nendaka to cut away Tshombé's power. Evariste Kimba, whom Kasavubu named to form a new government, is a fairly able politician but lacks a national political base of his own. He will be heavily dependent on Kasavubu's support, on Nendaka's anti-Tshombé parliamentary alliance, and probably on the goon squad Nendaka is assembling in Leopoldville.

Tshombé seems likely to remain in Leopoldville for the

present and to use his considerable parliamentary strength to block attempts by Kimba and others to form a government. Under such circumstances Kimba faces an uphill struggle in his efforts to get parliamentary approval. Given the volatile nature of Congolese politics, however, his outlook is far from hopeless.

On the rebel front, the capture of Fizi cuts off the last insurgent area with channels for large-scale supply of outside aid. Rebel resistance to Colonel Hoare's mercenaries suddenly faded away, but there apparently are still many insurgents in the mountains west of Fizi.

The Leopoldville government still faces a long campaign to re-establish its authority in large sections which remain rebel infested. In many cases these are areas where rebel activity, local rivalries, and banditry are intermixed, where the populations are frequently antipathetic to the government, and where the terrain provides a base for antigovernment activities.

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Europe

SCANDINAVIA AND NATO

Sweden apparently has not completely dismissed the possibility of reviving its 1948 proposal for a Scandinavian defense pact. In a recent public discussion, Prime Minister Erlander noted that "pressure from both East and West" had prevented such an alliance in 1948 and subsequently led Norway and Denmark to join NATO. He suggested that this question might again become topical in 1969 when the NATO members may exercise their option to withdraw from the alliance.

Erlander's cautious allusion to this question comes at a time when the moderate group he represents is being challenged by the younger more radical wing of his Social Democratic Party. Pressure from this faction, which believes that Swedish nonalignment must give way to a more positive foreign policy, has already led the government to speak out on such controversial questions as the US role in Vietnam and disengagement in Central Europe. In the future Stockholm may feel compelled to involve itself more actively with sensitive issues closer to home--i.e., Northern Europe and its position between the Western and Communist worlds.

The success which this radical group can hope for in pursuing its objectives will not be determined in Sweden alone, but will depend to a large degree on Norwegian and Danish opinion as

it is affected by developments outside Scandinavia--particularly in Moscow. In recent years a major objective of Soviet policy in Northern Europe has been to weaken the NATO commitments of Norway and Denmark from NATO. Moscow's sabre-rattling actions, however, only served to convince most Norwegians and Danes that they could enjoy no measure of security outside an alliance with the US and Britain.

This attitude might change rapidly if there were a prolonged detente between the USSR and the West, if De Gaulle were to withdraw France from meaningful participation in the alliance, and if Bonn's pursuit of a greater role in its nuclear activities revives latent fears of West Germany. Under such conditions, public opinion might look beyond NATO for other solutions to the problem of national security. Both Oslo and Copenhagen already are under domestic pressure to hold referendums before committing their governments to continued membership in NATO.

If Norway and Denmark were to contemplate withdrawing from NATO, all three Scandinavian countries would have to reconsider the basic question of whether their combined population and resources would be adequate to organize and maintain a defense credible enough to deter aggression.

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Western Hemisphere

THE CANADIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The campaign for Canada's 8 November parliamentary election is beginning to heat up although few issues are well defined at this point. Tory chief John Diefenbaker and leaders of the minority New Democratic and Social Credit parties have charged Prime Minister Pearson's Liberal government with incompetence and corruption, and have criticized its auto trade agreement with the US.

Diefenbaker appears to have lost considerable ground since the last election. There is a general feeling in Tory circles that the charismatic quality which propelled him into office twice before is lacking this time. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker hopes to benefit from dissatisfaction of farmers with the government's agricultural policies, and the Tories are reported showing more strength in the wheat belt than in 1963.

New Democratic chief Douglas and Social Credit leader Thompson are stumping the country in efforts labeled by some commentators as decisive for their respective parties. They are given little chance of substantially increasing their parties' small representations in Commons, and Thompson may himself not be returned to Parliament. The New Democrats are making a special effort to capitalize on discontent among

Quebec farmers, and are given a good chance to win several seats from that province.

Pearson has yet to take an active role in the campaign. The US Embassy in Ottawa views this as being in harmony with Liberal Party strategy which dictates that he remain aloof from political activity as a conscientious prime minister concerned with affairs of state. The decision to protect Pearson from the rough-and-tumble of political campaigning also reflects his aversion to politicking and the fear that unfavorable comparisons could be drawn with Diefenbaker's popular style.

[REDACTED] The latest Gallup poll shows over 48 percent of decided voters favoring the Liberals compared with 28 percent for the Conservatives. The Liberals have gained in every region since the last survey of political standings in July. At the same time, however, the undecided segment among the voting population has reached a new high. Nationally the level of undecided is 36 percent--up 6 percent since July. Even in Quebec, a Liberal stronghold, the undecided voters now number 42 percent. [REDACTED]

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

As preparations for the Dominican Republic's expected elections get under way, anti-Americanism is likely to grow, both as an excuse for the country's problems and as an easy way to popularity.

The autonomous Confederation of Christian Trade Unions, for instance, reportedly plans to join the campaign against the presence of foreign troops--not because it doubts the Inter-American Peace Force is necessary to stability in the republic, but because it feels it must do so to keep its membership. The provisional government is urging the IAPF to hold on to its unpopular public-order duties rather than turn them over to the Dominican police, while at the same time the government-controlled radio station is attacking the IAPF for doing so.

Important progress was made on extending government control over the rebel zone in Santo Domingo when, on 13 October, rebel military troops started moving to an IAPF camp outside the zone. This makes easier the work of government police, who began occupying the zone earlier in the week. It also raises the question as to whether President

Garcia Godoy will not be able to deal effectively with extreme leftist attempts to infiltrate government departments and take over various institutions. He has insisted that he could not do so until the rebel zone was disbanded.

The leaders of the two main political parties--Juan Bosch of the Liberal Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and Joaquin Balaguer of the conservative Reformist Party--both are representing themselves to the US Embassy as moderates. Balaguer apparently is using his influence with the military leadership to urge patience with Garcia Godoy in his problems with the left. Bosch claims to be shocked by the extent of Communist penetration of his party. The PRD leadership plans to enlist the aid of a labor expert from Venezuela to regain control from the Communists of its own labor organization, and Bosch has put out vague feelers to the US Embassy about cooperation with US officials and Balaguer on "anti-Communist" strategy in the coming months. Bosch is, however, so embittered about the US intervention that more and more of his supporters say his judgment on all issues is clouded.

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The country remains bitterly divided, with its basic problems far from solution. The longer it takes Garcia Godoy to put the rebels under firm government

control the more difficult his job will be, and the more frustrated and desperate right-wing "vigilante" groups are likely to grow. [REDACTED]

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#### ECUADOR'S MILITARY JUNTA REMAINS UNCHALLENGED

Ecuador's military junta went unchallenged during the 9 October celebration of the 145th anniversary of Guayaquil's independence from Spain, an occasion when the boisterous regionalism of that coastal city has often found expression in antigovernment demonstrations. Although opportunists were prepared to exploit disturbances, the national police were ready and politicians proved unable to concert action.

Despite this failure, the political parties remain determined to press the regime to accelerate or otherwise alter its plan for return to constitutional rule by September 1966. Basically distrusted by the people, poli-

ticians have shown no ability to arouse support since their maximum effort of July. The junta has played upon traditional religious attitudes by announcing that it will consider subsidizing parochial schools, a ploy designed to divide the anticlerical Liberals and Socialists from the Conservatives and hinder formation of an effective anti-junta ad hoc coalition.

Only repercussions of a sharply declining economy or exacerbation of the perennial boundary problem with Peru now appear able to threaten the government's resolve to maintain the pace of its present transition plan. [REDACTED]

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REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

President Castello Branco is attempting to ease the tensions caused by heated reactions of political and military leaders to results of Brazil's 3 October gubernatorial elections. The government's present difficulties stem from the strong showing made by several candidates of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) who are linked to opposition forces. Many senior army officers have blamed Castello Branco for the outcome, charging that subversive and corrupt politicians will now have access to influential positions, particularly in the politically important states of Guanabara and Minas Gerais.

Partly as a result of pressure from the military, the administration is planning to present several proposals to Congress designed to increase the federal government's authority, especially over security matters, at both the national and state levels.

Governor Carlos Lacerda, a presidential contender and present governor of Guanabara, has added to the administration's

troubles by increasing his severe attacks on Castello Branco. In several public statements during the past week, Lacerda accused the President of betraying the March 1964 revolution and failing to provide effective leadership. Lacerda's renewed outbursts reflect his anger at the loss to his personal prestige caused by his personal candidate's defeat in the Guanabara gubernatorial race. Lacerda has announced that he may withdraw as a candidate for the presidency until his party, the National Democratic Union (UDN), has considered whether or not it wants to continue with his nomination.

Castello Branco, with the cooperation of War Minister Costa e Silva, seems to have succeeded, at least for the moment, in reassuring the armed forces that the regime intends to remain firm against subversion and corruption. At the same time he has pledged to uphold the election results.

Political conditions will remain unsettled, however, as the various power elements vie for advantage. The government will have to reappraise its relations both with the UDN, which now generally supports Castello Branco, and with the restrengthened Social Democrats.

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United Nations

FRANCE TRIES TO CURB UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S POWERS

France has seized upon the Kashmir crisis to revive issues regarding the future development of the United Nations. The main objective as in the past is to assure the maintenance of great-power predominance through the Security Council. The result will be to curb the role and influence of the secretary general and his staff, particularly in peace-keeping operations.

The French delegation has been vigorously maintaining that the Security Council should have complete authority over all details of Secretary General Thant's actions with regard to financing and staffing the UN observer groups in Kashmir. The resolution the French have proposed for Security Council approval would set budgetary limits, approve measures taken so far, and authorize the secretary general to recruit more personnel to a certain limit.

The French have always maintained that the Security Council must approve financing as well as the initiation of peacekeeping operations. They have said they intend to produce a definitive change in the practice previously followed by the Security Council and seem unconcerned by Western warnings that such a change would enable the USSR to impose spe-

cific requirements for these operations, such as troika composition of forces.

The French attitude also reflects De Gaulle's distaste for any multilateral encroachment on national sovereignty. According to members of the French delegation, it was France's experience with the "usurpation of power" by the EEC Commission that has influenced its present determination to check similar usurpation by the UN Secretariat.

The controversy recalls the split over the Congo operation which led to the financial crisis of the past year. Both the Soviet Union and France then maintained that the secretary general had gone beyond his authority in the Congo. They now are arguing the same for Kashmir.

The Soviets are probably happy to have France taking the lead in trying to limit the power of the secretary general. Soviet delegate Morozov has professed "dismay" that Thant has gone beyond his mandate and complained that the council in its resolutions of 20 and 27 September did not give him "carte blanche."

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