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
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# SPECIAL REPORT

RUMANIA ON THE EVE OF ITS FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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**RUMANIA ON THE EVE OF ITS FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS**

Rumanian nationalism promises to be the driving force behind the activities of party leaders at the fourth Rumanian party congress which convenes in Bucharest on 19 July. Meeting within four months after the death of party first secretary Gheorghie Gheorghiu-Dej, the congress will be under the leadership of his successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, and will enunciate programs at least as stridently nationalistic as any that would probably have been advanced by Gheorghiu-Dej. Although Moscow has shown its displeasure with Rumania's increasingly independent policies over the past several years, the congress is expected to strengthen the already firm party control of Ceausescu, to adopt certain Yugoslav party practices, and to advance Rumania's ambitions in the Communist world.

Background

Unlike earlier Rumanian party congresses--the last held five years ago--the upcoming fourth congress will serve as a public platform for summing up past achievements and listing the future goals of Rumania's evolutionary course toward national Communism.

The accomplishments likely to be stressed include completion of agriculture collectivization in 1962, the regime's successful defiance of the Moscow-directed Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in 1963, the April 1964 declaration of Rumania's independent role, progressive "Rumanization" of national minorities, and successful completion of most goals of the six-year plan (1960-65) establishing a broad industrial base.

The outline of the future course the leadership wishes to

take is contained in a series of documents, including new party statutes, an economic plan, and a revised constitution, which it will be the business of the congress to adopt or endorse. All of these papers bear Ceausescu's personal stamp and are strongly nationalistic in character. Together, they provide for the further evolution of Rumanian national Communism. Their adoption by the congress at a time of heightened friction with the Soviet Union over Warsaw Pact matters will be hailed in Rumania as the beginning of a new era.

The Party Statutes

Prepared by the 31 May - 2 June central committee plenum, the draft party statutes emphasize Rumanian national interests as distinct from those of the Soviet Union. The preamble underscores this by stating that the party "bases all its activity on Marxist-Leninist learning,

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applied creatively to the conditions and specific peculiarities of our country." The new statutes are replete with references to "patriotism" and "love of fatherland," and the nationalistic line is pointedly advanced in the section on the armed forces. This section, in contrast to other East European Communist party statutes, specifically charges that Rumania's army is to be educated for "defending revolutionary victories, the nation's borders, independence, national sovereignty, and peace." The draft also includes a number of provisions presently unique to the Yugoslav party, the pioneer developer of national Communism. One of these, for example, changes the title of the party chief to secretary general, and another eliminates candidate party membership.

The statutes also call for changing the name of the Rumanian Workers' Party to the Rumanian Communist Party in conformity with the "present stage of development of our society, the stage of the completion of socialist construction, and to the final aim of the party--the building of the Communist society." Only two other parties in Eastern Europe have claimed to have reached this stage of development, Czechoslovakia in 1960 and Yugoslavia in 1963. To be consistent with this change the revised draft constitution calls for Rumania to be designated a "Socialist Republic"--rather than a "Peoples Republic" as it now is--upon final approval of the new constitution by the Grand National Assembly in late July.

Aside from the possibility of gaining a certain prestige for the Rumanian party in Communist circles, these changes in the name of the party and the state also indicate that the regime is taking pains to make clear it remains Communist.

The continuing goal of the party to establish "close bonds with the masses" also is apparent in the draft statutes. Thus, party seniority is to be granted to former "revolutionary" elements such as ex - Social Democrats who now are party members. Included in this concession would be all who participated in strikes during the 1930s as well as a number of moderate leftist elements.

With the abolition of the probationary period for memberships, the party is reflecting its new view of itself as a less militant leader in a more mature society. Unprecedented in Eastern Europe except for Yugoslavia, this step will ease the admission of young professionals and white-collar workers, particularly from the party's Union of Working Youth. The resulting enlargement of party ranks, while presumably intended to improve and extend political control throughout the country, will probably also bring new ideas and new energies into the party.

The Revised Constitution

Consonant with the draft statutes of the party, the draft constitution enunciates an unswerving independent policy

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course and prepares for further evolution toward achievement of a national Communist society.

In contrast to the constitution adopted in 1952 which contained glowing tributes to the Soviet Union in its preamble, the new constitution makes no reference to that country. The pervasive independent line of the revised document is reinforced by language drawn from the April 1964 declaration. Rumanian foreign policy will strive for "relations of friendship and fraternal cooperation with socialist states and cooperative relations with countries of other sociopolitical systems" based on "principles of respect for sovereignty and independence, equality of rights and mutual advantage, and non-interference in internal affairs.

As a hedge against the automaticity clauses in existing military alliances, including the Warsaw Pact, the draft spells out the conditions under which the Grand National Assembly can declare war. The new constitution states that "war can be declared only in case of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Rumania (SRR) or against another state toward which the SRR has mutual defense obligations assumed in international treaties, if the situation has developed for which an obligation of war is established."

The draft constitution clearly is designed to rally popular support behind the government, stressing as it does the "democratic" privileges of na-

tionalities and intellectuals. The effectiveness of such an effort may be limited, however, because the constitution also indicates that assimilation of the minority groups will continue.

The draft also emphasizes collective work in the government and moderately strengthens the role of the State Council by granting it stand-by powers to act when the Grand National Assembly is unable to meet.

#### The State of the Party

The stability and strength of the Rumanian party leadership now and during the past decade have stemmed from its unusual unity. The present group comprises 19 individuals, most of whom have been members of either the secretariat or the politburo since 1957.

The smoothness of succession following the death last March of long-time party boss, Gheorghiu-Dej, was a good illustration of the party leadership's homogeneity. At that time, the key party posts were quickly filled, apparently without consultation with Moscow. Besides Ceausescu, the top leadership includes three other politburo members, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, head of state Chivu Stoica, and Gheorghe Apostol.

During the preparations for the congress, this group has continued to depict itself as "collective." As they did during the period of succession to Gheorghiu-Dej, these four men, like most of

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**COMPOSITION OF RUMANIAN POLITBURO & SECRETARIAT**

	3rd Party Congress, June 1960	March 1965	16 July 1965
<b>POLITBURO</b>	GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G.	GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G. (1)	
	CEAUSESCU, N.	CEAUSESCU, N.	CEAUSESCU, N.
	MAURER, I.G.	MAURER, I.G.	MAURER, I.G.
	APOSTOL, G.	APOSTOL, G.	APOSTOL, G.
	STOICA, C.	STOICA, C.	STOICA, C.
	BODNARAS, E.	BODNARAS, E.	BODNARAS, E.
	BORILA, P.	BORILA, P.	BORILA, P.
	DRAGHICI, A.	DRAGHICI, A.	DRAGHICI, A.
	MOGHIOROS, A.	MOGHIOROS, A.	MOGHIOROS, A.
			BIRLADEANU, A. (2)
<b>CANDIDATES</b>		BIRLADEANU, A. (3)	
	COLIU, D.	COLIU, D.	COLIU, D.
	RAUTU, L.	RAUTU, L.	RAUTU, L.
	SALAJAN, L.	SALAJAN, L.	SALAJAN, L.
	VOITEC, S.	VOITEC, S.	VOITEC, S.
<b>SECRETARIAT</b>	GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G., 1st Sec'y	GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G., 1st Sec'y	
	CEAUSESCU, N.	CEAUSESCU, N.	CEAUSESCU, N., 1st Sec'y
	DALEA, M.	DALEA, M.	DALEA, M.
	FAZEKAS, J. (4)		
		STOICA, C. (5)	STOICA, C.
			RAUTU, L. (6)
			NICULESCU-MIZIL, P. (6)
		VERDET, I. (6)	

- (1) Died on 19 March 1965
- (2) Promoted to full politburo member in late March 1965
- (3) Elected to candidate membership in November 1962
- (4) Dropped from membership in March 1961
- (5) Elected to membership in March 1961
- (6) Elected to membership in March 1965

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## RUMANIA'S FOUR PIVOTAL LEADERS



CEAUSESCU



MAURER



STOICA



APOSTOL

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the party hierarchy in the weeks preceding the congress, have addressed the customary meetings of the Bucharest city committee, the regional party meetings, and conferences of mass organizations. In addition, Ceausescu, Stoica, and Maurer also have jointly spoken for the first time before special sessions of high-ranking officials from the ministries of the armed forces and of internal affairs. While the intention has been to gain backing and allegiance, especially of the latter two groups, these joint appearances have underlined the collective character of the leadership. The joint appearances may also have served to disabuse those who might hope for differences in the hierarchy on defense and security policies.

However, it seems inevitable in most collective leaderships that one man rises to a position of "first among equals," and in-

formed observers believe that Ceausescu is just such a man. Moreover, despite the outward appearances of unity, it will not be surprising to find other leaders jockeying for relative increases in power as the party congress approaches.

Ceausescu is apparently attempting to consolidate and fortify his own position inside as well as outside the party by placing men he trusts in responsible positions. Within the party, he reportedly intends to diminish the role of the politburo and increase the authority of the secretariat, which he heads.

The deft hand of Ceausescu seems evident in the treatment given party leadership in the revised statutes. These enunciate the principle of collective leadership. A new provision specifies, however, that a "party

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member may hold only a single post of political leadership that demands permanent activity, whether in party or state organs." Ceausescu could apply this provision to relieve President Stoica of his position as a central committee secretary and thus add to his own relative influence within the collective leadership.

Ceausescu may also try to reduce the power of internal affairs minister and politburo member Alexandru Draghici who could pose a threat to his pre-eminent position. Aware of the challenge Draghici represents through his control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and his considerable influence in the army, Ceausescu may plan to remove him from the ministerial post at the coming congress. Cornel Onescu, whom Ceausescu recently appointed deputy internal affairs minister, is rumored to be Draghici's replacement.

Commentary in the party press suggests that the party positions of still other members of the hierarchy may also be affected at the coming congress. Alexandru Moghioros and Petre Borila, each of whom is known to be seriously ill, may not be re-elected to the politburo. Moghioros and Borila are the only two members of the party hierarchy who have not addressed any of the pre-congress meetings. Stefan Voitec, a candidate politburo member and Ceausescu supporter, may replace Moghioros. There is no information available on Borila's possible successor. Apostol and Maurer may also be overshadowed by Ceausescu's influence at the congress.

Their background and political style do not seem compatible with those of the increasingly assertive party first secretary.

Domestic Policy Changes

The fourth party congress will endorse Rumania's gradual move away from Soviet influence in the past year or so, the expansion of cultural and other contacts with the West, and the accompanying modest slackening of internal discipline over the populace. Like its counterparts in Hungary and Poland, the Rumanian leadership has become increasingly convinced of the wisdom and necessity of winning at least the grudging cooperation of the population in order to assure attainment of the regime's ambitious foreign and domestic plans. In its drive for acceptance, the regime has imitated some of the devices used by the Hungarians and the Poles. Wherever possible, it has substituted persuasion for coercion--a practice to which the coming congress is expected to give added impetus.

Perhaps the most obvious area of internal liberalization is the cultural sector. Initiated in mid-1963 and consisting of three broad stages--de-Russification, glorification of Rumania's national cultural heritage, and re-establishment of Rumania's cultural ties with Western Europe--this liberalization policy continues in force, subject to close control and scrutiny by policy-making bodies in the government.

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Ever conscious of their nationality and proud of the Latin origin of their language, Rumania's leaders chose the Maxim Gorky Institute in Bucharest as one of the first important targets of de-Russification. Closed down in September 1963, the institute, which specialized in providing Russian-language training, became part of the Slavic Languages and Literature Department at the University of Bucharest.

A number of other steps also have been taken since the latter half of 1963 which have had the net effect of removing the USSR and the Russian language from any special position in Rumanian life. The activities of a Soviet reading room in the center of Bucharest have been discontinued; obtrusive Russian names recalling the first flush of postwar "friendship" have vanished from the fronts of movie houses and theaters and have been replaced by their original nonpolitical names; and streets named after Soviet party figures, military leaders, and scientists have been renamed. Implemented without any formal declaration of policy by the leadership, these changes serve as surface indicators of possibly more basic changes to come in Rumanian policy.

The regime also has given greater attention to Rumania's national cultural heritage--particularly in the literary sector--by the frequent recalling of the names of famous Rumanian authors and composers from the past. Paralleling this has been the almost frenetic movement to


re-establish contact with Western literature. At a recent meeting between party leaders and representatives of cultural life, party first secretary Ceausescu gave additional impetus to the gradual cultural thaw by calling for diversity and individualism in literary style and by emphasizing the value of direct contacts with writers and artists from all countries. He added a cautionary word, however, by citing the need to analyze artistic and literary works from a Marxist-Leninist--and by implication a Rumanian nationalist--standpoint.

As a result of cultural liberalization, Rumania has in the past year endorsed such previously taboo authors as Kafka, permitted displays of abstract art by Rumanian artists, and allowed more frequent performances of modern Western music. In addition, de-Russification and attention to national traditions have brought about the partial rehabilitation of several leading bourgeois scholars of the interwar period.

While relaxation of regime controls over the cultural sector is probably designed to satisfy the ever-increasing desires of the intellectuals for greater freedom and easier contacts with the West, these concessions also advance the regime's campaign to broaden its base of support. This careful liberalization of cultural policy may eventually lead to a relaxation in domestic policy of benefit to the general populace.

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The Economy

As Rumania approaches its fourth party congress, its leaders have reason for satisfaction with the economy's performance. Most of the goals for economic growth during the 1960-65 plan probably will be met. Since 1959, Rumania has sustained one of the highest industrial growth rates in the world, 15 percent a year, and has more than doubled both capital investment and foreign trade turnover. Agriculture, however, remains a major cause for concern since output increased little after 1959 and has fallen far short of plan goals.

The Rumanian leaders are confident of the soundness of their new economic policy. After many years of subservience to Moscow, they have decided to set their own industrialization goals and to conduct their foreign trade so as to best serve their national interests. Accordingly, they are willing to cooperate with CEMA only to a limited degree, have greatly expanded trade with free world countries, and negotiated substantial medium-term credits from these countries.

The economic plan for 1966-70, to be approved by the congress, provides for a continuation of the successful policies of the past plan period. Emphasizing rapid industrial growth and development of a broad industrial base, the plan continues to give priority to

the chemical, machine building, metallurgical, and electric power industries. Apparently no significant changes in the still highly centralized system of economic planning and management are contemplated, presumably because of the success of the present system. Rumania is the only Eastern European country that has not recognized a need for major economic reforms in industry.

Rates of planned economic growth during 1966-70 are to be high but not as high as during the past few years. The planned annual rate of growth for national income is 7 percent, compared with 9 percent achieved during 1960-64. The rate for industrial production is to be about 11 percent compared with 15 percent during 1960-64. The industrial goals appear generally realistic, since a large number of plants currently under construction will come into production during the next plan period.

The difficulties encountered in raising agricultural production during 1960-64 have led the regime to set for 1966-70 more realistic and lower goals in agriculture than in the previous plan. These call for an increase of only 20 percent in total agricultural output above the 1961-65 average, to be accomplished largely by expanding programs of mechanization, land improvement, and use of chemical fertilizer.

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The expected slowdown in over-all economic growth will not greatly affect the growth of consumption. Real wages of workers are to increase 4 to 4.5 percent a year, almost as fast as in 1960-64, and farmers also are to receive a share of the planned 30-percent increase in total consumption. Compared with the anticipated results of 1961-64, capital investment from state funds will increase 50 percent during 1966-70. Based on the expected level for 1965, the annual rate of growth is only 6-7 percent, less than half the annual rate achieved during the 1960-64 period. The allocation of investment will be similar to that during 1960-65, with industry receiving over half the total and agriculture about 14 percent.

According to the plan, foreign trade turnover is to increase, but at the annual rate of 7 percent rather than the 16 percent achieved in 1960-64. Requirements for imported machinery and equipment are likely to grow far less than during 1960-64 because of the much slower growth planned for investment. Growth of trade with the free world, which increased 232 percent during 1960-64, is expected to slow down, although the regime will reportedly seek to increase the free world's share to 35-40 percent of total foreign trade during 1966-70, compared with 32 percent at present.

Although the Rumanians hope to import \$1 billion worth of machinery and equipment from the free world during 1966-70, the

main problem will be to expand exports rapidly enough to cover imports. During 1958-64, Rumania incurred a cumulative commodity trade deficit with the free world of \$150 million, which was approximately covered by medium-term credits. Although free-world countries may be willing to extend additional medium-term credits to Rumania, repayments will soon become a problem, and Rumania will probably wish to limit its imports in order to keep total indebtedness at a reasonable level.

Foreign Policy

The Fourth Congress will lay the basis for continuation of the main lines of Rumania's foreign policy, incorporating the changes that have occurred in this field since the last party congress in June 1960. Taking advantage of the increased maneuverability afforded by dissension in the Communist world, Bucharest has conspicuously broadened its contacts with both the non-CEMA Communist states and the free world, while at the same time largely eliminating its subservience to the USSR. It has maintained friendly relations with the other Eastern European countries, including Albania and Yugoslavia, and taken some small steps to improve its political and cultural ties with Communist China. At least indirectly, some of the Eastern European countries have been influenced in their thinking by the successes of the Rumanian policy.

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Bucharest has from the beginning supported Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although this support has become progressively less evident. At least since April 1964, when the Rumanian party issued its so-called declaration of independence and followed up with a flurry of explicitly anti-Soviet speeches, Bucharest has repeatedly demonstrated its disagreement with selected aspects of Soviet policy. Most dramatically, it refused to bend to pressures to attend the international Communist meeting held in Moscow last March. The Rumanian position has been to refrain from participation in international Communist party meetings which might formalize the intra-Communist split and detract from regime efforts to build an image of "neutralism" within the world Communist movement.

This position, together with Rumania's emphasis on its historical attachment to Bessarabia and the regime's de-Russification campaign, has underscored Bucharest's determination to insist upon recognition of its national sovereignty. Rumania may even intend to reduce its Warsaw Pact commitments and ties. This would be a final and most significant step, since the pact is the only formal instrument of control over Rumania remaining in Moscow's hands.

Rumania's dissatisfaction with its Warsaw Pact obligations came into sharp focus at last January's pact conference. At that meeting, then party leader Gheorghiu Dej reportedly objected strongly to a proposal for increased integration of Rumanian

military units under the Warsaw Pact Joint Command--headed by Soviet Marshal Grechko. Although an integrated command would have been consistent with Soviet efforts to transform the pact from a device for political control over Eastern Europe into something closer to a true military alliance, Bucharest had already expressed its strong disapproval of precisely this kind of alliance.

Grechko then visited Bucharest on 24 May and 15 June, suggesting that Rumanian-Soviet friction over pact affairs had become more intense. This was also the impression left by party chief Ceausescu when he failed to make any mention of the pact or the USSR in his address to the mid-June meeting of the Rumanian armed forces party organization. This speech was delivered in the interval between Grechko's two visits.

Rumanian Armed Forces Minister Salajan is technically one of Grechko's deputies within the Warsaw Pact Joint Command. Recurring examples of lack of coordination between them, however, indicate a breakdown of communications which detract from pact capabilities. Moreover, the Rumanian regime has exhibited little interest in improving its lackluster air and air defense forces--from the standpoint of equipment and performance the poorest of any in the pact. It also had reduced the basic conscript term from 24 months to 16 months--the shortest of any Communist country--almost certainly over Moscow's objections. During the last

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three years, however, the regime has modestly improved its ground forces, particularly through the acquisition of tactical surface-to-surface missiles (FROG and Scud).

Rumania's efforts to expand relations with the non-Communist world, especially Western Europe, also reflect its quest for increased independence. The level of diplomatic representation has been raised with a number of Western European countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, and Great Britain. Bucharest has entered into a variety of technical, scientific, and cultural accords with individual Western countries. These accords have been supplemented by increased exchanges of visits by governmental, parliamentary, technical-scientific, and academic delegations, as well as artistic groups.

Rumanian-US relations also have improved considerably since 1960. Agreements have been concluded for the settlement of claims of US nationals arising out of war damages, nationalization of American property, and commercial and financial debts. Since the Rumanian party's declaration of independence in April 1964, diplomatic representation between the two countries has been raised to ambassadorial level and negotiation for economic, cultural, and political exchanges have increased.

US-Rumanian relations presently are under some strain. Difficulties in negotiations with US suppliers for key industrial installations have disturbed regime officials. However, Bucharest has hewed to a reasonably restrained line on Vietnam, probably because of its desire for closer US ties, the economic aspects of which could be of great importance in the regime's drive for independence. Despite such restraint, the foreign policy report at the coming party congress will be critical of certain US policies, particularly those involving Vietnam.

The Uncertain Outlook

With the April 1964 declaration, Rumania's leaders established policy lines from which it would be difficult--if not disastrous--to turn, and about which they cannot procrastinate. What the leadership appears to want is a degree of independence from the USSR approximating that enjoyed by the Yugoslavs. The upcoming congress will undoubtedly establish the basis for arriving at this goal.

To achieve it will require continued successful resistance to Soviet pressures, adroit handling of the country's expanding relations with the free world, continued economic growth, and the loyalty of the party, police, and army to Ceausescu. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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