


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SPECIAL REPORT

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER AYUB AND BHUTTO

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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16 April 1965

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER AYUB AND BHUTTO

Pakistan's fears of India continue to dominate its foreign policy. In an effort to gain support against New Delhi, President Ayub and his neutralist Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto have set an increasingly independent course in international affairs over the past two years, even while keeping Pakistan nominally tied to the Western alliance system. Their attention has moved first to Communist China and now to Indonesia, and they are not entirely discounting the Soviet Union as a potential source of help. Ayub probably views his official visit to Washington on 26 and 27 April as an opportunity to balance his recent cultivation of Communist and neutralist countries.

Defense vs. Development

Suffering from roughly a four-to-one disadvantage in size, population, and military and economic strength, Pakistan remains as preoccupied today with the threat posed by India as it was during the bloody religious massacres that followed independence and the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

These fears and the concomitant hostility have grown since the Chinese attack on India's borders in the fall of 1962, when New Delhi embarked on an ambitious military expansion and modernization program with US and Soviet aid. With the intention of building an army large enough to face Pakistan and China simultaneously, India has added about 300,000 men to its forces since then, a little more than the


total in service in all of Pakistan's forces.

Pakistan has not increased its forces further, however. Ayub apparently decided that the required diversion of resources would be too costly. This has helped Pakistan to post an impressive record of economic development, and most of its second five-year plan (1961-1966) goals are likely to be achieved. Pakistan's leaders view this record, when contrasted with India's economic difficulties in recent years--most notably its continuing food crisis--as an important source of strength.

While helping his pro-American economic adviser, Finance Minister Shoaib, marshal the resources to raise the national standard of living--if only slightly--President Ayub has relied heavily on the fertile



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imagination of 
Foreign Minister Bhutto to de-
velop diplomatic strengths to
counter India's military growth.


Bhutto's Role

Ayub's association with
Bhutto began when he chose him
at the age of 30 to represent
the Sind region of southern West
Pakistan in the national cabinet
in 1958. Since then, Ayub has
come to regard him as a special
protege. When Bhutto, as min-
ister of commerce, took an in-
terest in foreign affairs, Ayub
gave him wide discretion. A
\$30-million oil exploration as-
sistance agreement from the USSR
was Bhutto's most dramatic suc-
cess in this post.

When foreign minister
Mohammad Ali died in March 1963,
Bhutto was named to succeed him.
This was at the height of the
reaction to the US decision to
provide military aid to India




BHUTTO



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following the Chinese attack
on India's Himalayan border-
lands. Since that time, Ayub
has come to depend heavily on
Bhutto for conceiving and
carrying out new foreign policy
initiatives.

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Gestures and Threats

During 1963 and early 1964
Pakistan concentrated its ef-
forts on a series of gestures
toward Peiping. Border, trade,
and civil air agreements were
concluded, and cultural ties
expanded. In a complementary
effort, Bhutto began re-estab-
lishing ties with the Afro-Asian
group which Pakistan had left a
decade earlier when it joined
the Western alliance system. At
the same time, cooperation and

participation in SEATO and CENTO was reduced.

The Pakistanis calculated that New Delhi would be far more nervous about China coming to the aid of Pakistan in the event of Indo-Pakistani hostilities than it would be about possible US assistance to Pakistan, especially in view of the closer relations that were developing between the US and India. By cultivating Sino-Pakistani friendship, they hoped to discourage India from deploying its growing army almost entirely against Pakistan alone.

During this period Ayub and Bhutto apparently hoped that gestures toward Communist China might also inhibit the new US support for India. Pakistani pressure on the United States reached a peak in late May 1964 in the form of an official warning that Pakistan might lose interest in free world concerns



AYUB

and interests in Asia and "concentrate on the narrower field of the preservation of its own vital national interests."

When it was notified a few days later that the US would provide India with military grants and credits totaling \$100 million for fiscal 1965, Pakistan seemed to be searching for some way to strike back. Consideration was given to formal withdrawal from SEATO.


Since late last summer, Pakistan seems to have become more resigned to continued US military assistance to India as a fact of life beyond its power to change. It has considerably reduced the frequency and intensity of its pleas for a cessation of US military aid to India.

Seeking New Friends

Somewhat later--last October and November--Pakistan also became convinced that the new Shastri government in India--despite early signs of some flexibility--would never be able to enter into serious negotiations on the all-important disputed territory of Kashmir. Pakistan therefore has concentrated its efforts on putting India on the defensive diplomatically. Appreciating full well that Pakistan lacks the power to force India out of the coveted Vale of Kashmir, Ayub and Bhutto are trying to line up new friends in the Afro-Asian world.

The most telling tactic in this effort continues to be the

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development of relations with China. Every new Pakistani visit to Peiping or statement on China arouses fresh rage in India, but Pakistan seems to have gone about as far as it is now willing to go in establishing areas of cooperation with China. The Ayub visit to Peiping in early March did little more than dramatize previous positions and call for more of the same, but the heated response from India must have been gratifying.

In a more recent development, Bhutto seems to have consulted with the Chinese Communists about their invitation to Kashmir leader Sheikh Abdullah to visit Peiping to plead the cause of Kashmir self-determination against India. Since Bhutto's announcement of this invitation in late March, the Shastri government has come under heavy fire from government and opposition benches alike for allowing the Sheikh to travel abroad despite his refusal to describe himself as an Indian citizen on his passport application. Such successes as this in keeping India off balance continue to justify Bhutto's brand of foreign policy in Ayub's eyes.

Since last fall Pakistan has moved to consolidate its relations with Sukarno's Indonesia, once a close friend of India. A cooling of Indian-Indonesian relations since 1961 provided the opportunity. Indonesia's support for Pakistan on Kashmir has won it Pakistani neutrality in the Malaysian con-

frontation, despite Pakistan's Commonwealth ties to Malaysia.


Under Bhutto's direction, economic cooperation between the two countries is being expanded. There are even unsubstantiated reports that serious consideration is being given to some forms of limited military cooperation, including the supply of spare parts for Indonesia's US-built aircraft.

Bhutto may even have convinced Ayub that Moscow might eventually decide that supporting India on Kashmir is detrimental to the Soviet position in Africa and Asia. If the USSR could be persuaded to adopt a more neutral position on Kashmir, India would no longer be able to hide behind the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council, and new avenues of attack would be opened on India's occupation of the Vale of Kashmir.


Such an eventuality still seems remote, however, since Russia has clearly placed a good many of its eggs in the Indian basket. Initial reports on Ayub's recent visit to the USSR, which ended on 11 April, indicate that he received the coolest reception of any visiting chief of state in recent memory. Ayub's recent busy schedule of talks with Chinese Communist leaders undoubtedly did him no good in Moscow. Nonetheless, Bhutto will probably see to it that efforts are continued to soften Russia's attitude toward Pakistan.

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
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Ayub's Position

Although Ayub allows his foreign minister considerable latitude, the Sandhurst-trained President evidently remains insistent that Pakistan preserve a substantial part of its ties with the West

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Ayub was probably the first guest in Peiping to urge an even-handed foreign policy view on a mass audience when on 5 March he stated that Communist China and the US "must arrive at an understanding on the basis of equality and mutual recognition of interests." He also refused to join in a statement calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam as a precondition for a settlement there, and no statement on Vietnam appeared in the final communiqué.


Nevertheless, Ayub has set the main outlines of the

recent reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy. In his personal role, he clearly aspires to acquire Nehru's unclaimed title to leadership in the Asian-African world. At the present time he is mindful of the opportunities that may be presented at the Asian-African conference scheduled for late June in Algiers. He has already firmly grasped Nehru's mantle as chief spokesman for the new members of the Commonwealth.

Having just visited Peiping and Moscow, Ayub will probably see his trip to Washington as an opportunity to restore the rather delicate balance he tries to maintain in his international posture. While he will probably press his objections to US military aid to India, especially to nonofficial audiences, he seems to have given up any hope of persuading the US to change this policy.


Ayub will probably keep Bhutto well in the background. However much Bhutto's voice is muted during the Washington meetings, however, he will again emerge as Pakistan's chief idea man and foreign policy spokesman after Ayub return to Pakistan

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