


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
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WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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
C O N T E N T S

(Information as of 1200 EST, 3 December 1964)

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OPERATIONS ON THE USSR'S NORTHERN SEA ROUTE IN 1964 Cargo carried during the four-month season reached a record level of 2.25 million metric tons, 13 percent more than last year.	1
YUGOSLAVIA'S EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS Despite controversy over extending economic and political decentralization, the congress is certain to endorse the party leaders' relatively liberal policies. Implementation, however, may be hampered by regional and political rivalries.	2
CHINESE COMMUNISTS BRING NEW PRESSURE ON TOKYO Peiping has stalled negotiations for a large part of next year's Sino-Japanese trade in a move to press Tokyo for a more "friendly" attitude.	4
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SECRETTHE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)Page**VIET CONG INFILTRATION**

7

Recent information from captured documents and prisoners of war pictures an extensive and sophisticated infiltration network that has moved possibly as many as 34,000 men into South Vietnam since 1959.

ASIA-AFRICA**BUDDHISTS THREATEN NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME**

9

Although Premier Huong appears temporarily to have restored order in Saigon, Buddhist leaders in central Vietnam as well as in the capital now are insisting that the government resign or be revised.

NEW ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA


9

Sukarno is tolerating the "Sukarnoists," who are seeking to block the further growth of Communist power in the country. He may hope to use them in connection with his own domestic and foreign policy moves.

AREA NOTES

11

On Laos, Pakistan, Turkey, Cyprus, and Sudan.



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CONGO GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO ADVANCE

14

Leopoldville's military campaign was going well this week, but it lacks troops to garrison captured areas, and new aid for the rebels may be imminent.

EUROPE**ITALIAN COALITION WEAKENED BY LOCAL ELECTION LOSSES**

15

While election losses by the Christian Democrats and Socialists will make it difficult to regroup center-left majorities in many local administrations, the effects on the national center-left coalition could be far more serious.

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EUROPE (continued)

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

[Redacted]

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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMINICAN STRIKE 19
The regime appears to be winning its battle to thwart
a general strike

[Redacted]

AREA NOTE 20
On Argentina

BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT ORDERS INTERVENTION IN GOIAS STATE 21
Despite some criticism of his handling of the Goias affair,
Castello Branco has probably not suffered any signifi-
cant loss of political control. The military "hard-
liners," however, may now be encouraged to go after
other political targets.

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The Communist World

USSR'S NEW GENERAL STAFF CHIEF

The recent recall of Marshal Matvey Zakharov to serve again as chief of the Soviet General Staff and presumably as a first deputy defense minister has the earmarks of an interim assignment.

Zakharov is 66 [redacted]

[redacted] His selection to replace the late Marshal Biryuzov suggests a continuing reluctance by political leaders to entrust key military posts to younger officers who lack wartime experience at the army or army group level.

Zakharov was chief of staff of the 64th Army at Stalingrad and subsequently was Malinovsky's staff chief in central Europe and the Far East. He was first named general staff chief and first deputy defense

minister in 1960, after he had served a three-year tour as commander of the Soviet forces in Germany. He lost these two posts to Biryuzov in March 1963, amid speculation that he had become a scapegoat for the Cuban missile crisis or the Penkovsky espionage case, or that he had been involved in a dispute over military allocations. The real reasons for his removal have never become clear, but his age and health may have been factors.

Zakharov is said to be a tough and brilliant soldier, popular with the army. Although he allegedly favors traditional weaponry and methods, his public statements have consistently echoed the party line on troop cuts, nuclear surprise, rocket forces, and party control of the military establishment. [redacted]

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OPERATIONS ON THE USSR'S NORTHERN SEA ROUTE IN 1964

Despite severe climatic conditions, 1964 operations on the USSR's Northern Sea Route were at a record level. An estimated 2.25 million metric tons of cargo were carried during the four-month season. This was an increase of 13 percent

over freight volume in 1963 and was approximately 3 percent above plan.


This year's ice conditions were about as severe as in 1962 and 1963. For the first

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time three large icebreakers, including the atomic-powered Lenin, were used simultaneously in the western Arctic.

The annual naval convoy from west to east transited the route, delivering one new guided-missile destroyer, four submarines, and several auxiliary ships to the Pacific Fleet. A total of 100 river ships--compared with an average of 50 in the past--moved from Eastern Europe and the Western USSR to the Siberian rivers. These vessels carried cargo for the first time.

In still another first, Siberian timber was shipped

to Japan via the Northern Sea Route in 1964. This development may be related to a February 1964 statement that it made economic sense to expand exports of timber and pulp rather than gold to earn foreign exchange.

On 31 March the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route was abolished after certain of its functions had been transferred to other directorates. It was replaced by the Chief Directorate of Navigation, indicating that the USSR now considers use of the Northern Sea Route a more routine annual operation.

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YUGOLSAVIA'S EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS

The eighth congress of the Yugoslav party will open on 7 December amid considerable controversy within the regime over the proper pace and means of extending economic and political decentralization. The congress is certain to endorse the party leaders' relatively liberal policies, including the new party statutes, but the regional and political rivalries which lie behind the controversy

will hamper, if not hamstring, their effective implementation.

The top leaders enjoy the support of most of the managerial class and the younger party members. Arguing that Yugoslavia has developed beyond the point where the economy can be efficiently operated from the center, they will have the initiative at the congress.

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The conservative opposition is made up primarily of middle-level party functionaries whose power is likely to be undermined by further decentralization. Their claims that decentralization has led and will lead to diffusion of effort, wasted resources, and economic imbalances will probably be overruled, but they can later frustrate the policies adopted by failing to implement party directives.

The confrontation of these groups is complicated by the increasingly open rivalry of Yugoslavia's nationalities, a problem with which the congress will also have to deal. The parties of the more developed republics, Slovenia and Croatia, favor greater decentralization as a means of retaining more funds for local development. The parties of the less developed republics generally wish to ensure that further decentralization will not lessen the amount of federal funds committed for their development. In an effort to quiet this rivalry, the authors of the seven-year plan (1964-70), which will be adopted at the congress, have emphasized raising the living standard of all republics.

In keeping with the endorsement of decentralization, the

new party statutes to be presented at the congress are designed to restrict direct party interference in everyday government and economic affairs and to introduce a measure of democracy into the operations of lower level party organizations. The statutes call for replacement of one fourth of the central committee members at each congress and periodic changes in the membership of executive committees--principles adopted by the government in 1963.

This year's congress will probably see the first substantial personnel changes in leading party bodies since 1952. Implementation of the new statutes, which are designed to promote efficiency and broader based decision making, would also open the way for the new generation of party members to move up in party ranks.

The conservatives will probably be the main losers, in that the party's moderate leadership can manipulate the changes to get rid of ineffective officials--particularly World War II partisans who have failed to adapt to the needs of Yugoslavia's now more complex society. The top leadership--Tito, Rankovic, Kardelj--undoubtedly will remain.

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Communist World

CHINESE COMMUNISTS BRING NEW PRESSURE ON TOKYO

Peiping may be launching a new campaign of political and economic pressure against the Japanese Government. On 27 November, Chinese officials in Tokyo suddenly postponed signing contracts covering a substantial portion of next year's Sino-Japanese trade. They said Peiping had ordered them to delay final formalities on transactions involving purchase of fertilizer worth \$80 million and about \$20 million in contracts for Japanese steel and Chinese iron ore.

friendly attitude" at an Albanian Embassy reception on 28 November.

Peiping probably calculates that the threat of a break in trade relations will generate domestic pressure in Japan for changes in policy. An attempt to influence the Japanese by cutting off commercial relations in 1958 was not successful, however, and the Chinese have thus far been careful to avoid steps which would foreclose the possibility of further political bargaining.

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Peiping's latest move is probably intended to add weight to public attacks on the Sato government which began on 21 November with a formal Foreign Ministry statement protesting the decision to bar the high-level Chinese party group, headed by politburo member Peng Chen, from Japan. The statement was followed by vitriolic commentary in People's Daily attacking the Japanese prime minister by name and openly hinting at the possibility of retaliation for his "unreasonable" actions. Chou En-lai also criticized Tokyo's "un-

The Chinese will probably seek to probe Tokyo's intentions more deeply--and to bring new pressure to bear--when influential Japanese Diet member Chuji Kuno visits China on 8 December.

Sato will probably meet the Chinese moves initially by maintaining a firm line on Japan's declared policy of separating politics from economics in dealing with the mainland. It seems likely that he will insist that all contacts with the Chinese be handled through channels he can control.

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The Communist World

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Recent developments in China's modern weapons industry contrast sharply with continued stagnation in the general economy.

The detonation of a nuclear device, the testing of missiles at Shuangchengtzu, the production of a ballistic missile submarine at Dairen, and renewed construction of conventional patrol submarines at Shanghai have emphasized the high priority accorded modern weapons.

The hiatus in production of military aircraft and submarines over the past few years resulted from technical problems related to the withdrawal of Soviet specialists in 1960 as well as the general chaos caused by the aborted "leap forward." Resumption of production reflects not only the substantial earlier Soviet aid in plants and designs but also a decision to concentrate China's limited technical resources on a few military projects of highest priority.

These developments have taken place within the context of a depressed economy in which agriculture continues to stagnate and the population to rise, forcing Peiping to import food this year at a record level. Plans for the lagging agricultural sector are partially revealed in a recent People's Daily editorial on water conservation which stated flatly that rural areas should not count on state funds. The editorial pointed out that if the peasants rely on revolutionary enthusiasm the state will be able to use funds in a more concentrated way in areas of "most urgent need," probably an indirect reference to crash efforts in the special weapons field.

While the regime has been concentrating on developing prestige weapons, the general economy has limped along with surprisingly little long-range guidance. Although China will soon enter the third year of its Third Five-Year Plan (1963-67), there is still no evidence that Peiping has been able to draft a workable plan. Furthermore, the declining per capita output of grain leaves the regime with little margin for financing investment in future growth.

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THE MILITIA BUILDUP IN COMMUNIST CHINA

A major buildup of Communist China's civilian People's Militia, virtually dormant for four years, has been under way for five months. In its external propaganda, Peiping has encouraged the impression that the chief purpose of the buildup is to defend China from "imperialist invaders." Domestic propaganda, however, makes clear that a more important aim is to create a tool for curbing dissidence.

For example, overseas broadcasts of parts of a key editorial from People's Daily of 17 November played up the militia's potential as a defense reserve which can release regular troops for duty elsewhere. The full text, however, emphasizes the militia's role in helping the public security forces and the army "enforce the people's dictatorship" at home. The editorial demands that the militia participate in the socialist education movement, which it indicates will soon be as repressive as the bloody land reform movement of 1950.

The present buildup takes place against a history of ten years in which the militia grew rapidly, then almost totally collapsed. In the heady atmosphere of the "leap forward,"

militia ranks swelled suddenly to a claimed 230 million, with predictably chaotic results. The authorities soon lost all firm knowledge of the actual number of men or units, their political reliability, what weapons they possessed, even what they were capable of doing.

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[redacted] a Military Affairs Committee conference in October 1960 all but disbanded the militia. A year or so later, the regime began cautiously to reorganize it, using demobilized army men and some active army personnel as the hard core. Nevertheless, [redacted] militia activity remained limited even through early 1964.

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The buildup began in earnest about June 1964, at a time when regime policies, both foreign and domestic, appeared to be generally hardening. [redacted] news stories reveal increased recruiting and training, with the emphasis at first

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on urban students, workers, and junior party officials. There are tenuous indications that the militia by now may have regained a strength of about 20-30 million. The extent of current official interest in the subject is shown by the many militia demonstrations and conferences since June, which have been attended by Mao Tse-tung and other top military and political officials.

Despite the regime's seeming surge of confidence in the loyalty of the new militiamen,

its worries over their political reliability are far from overcome. Its propaganda calls for further purification of militia ranks and for distribution of weapons to only the most reliable peasants and workers. There are already indications that supplies of ammunition for local militia forces are being tightly controlled. In the continuing absence of broad popular support for regime policies, it is questionable whether a trustworthy militia force can be organized on a large scale.

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VIET CONG INFILTRATION

Recently available information [redacted]

has provided a clearer picture of the magnitude of the Communist apparatus used to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam. This information also indicates that the number of men infiltrated may be much higher than previously believed.

Since 1959 when the first unit of 400 men was assigned by Hanoi to set up an infiltration route, North Vietnam has created a sophisticated and highly secure system which handles the flow of men and materiel from the north, through Laos, and into the Viet Cong organization.

The 70th Transportation Group, directly subordinate to Hanoi, controls that portion of the system from North Vietnam to the South Vietnam - Laos border near the junction of Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces. Some 2,000 men, many of them porters, are used in this part of the operation. Viet Cong authorities take control of the infiltrating groups and materiel once they reach the South Vietnamese border.

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Although only portions of the total infiltration system have been reliably indentified, established routes extend as far south as Tay Ninh Province. There are over 100 stations employing up to 6,000 men in this

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part of the system. If, as seems likely, the system extends to the tip of South Vietnam, as many as 10,000 may be involved. The extent of this operation and the number of men involved help explain Viet Cong ability to acquire large quantities of bloc-manufactured weapons and ammunition over the last two years.

Most of the people employed in the infiltration system are coolies assigned to the transportation of goods. The transportation stations are generally only a half-day's march apart, while the way stations for personnel are a whole day apart. There are 400-600 men for every ten transportation stations, and each relay station has three to seven guides. To maximize security the guides are kept ignorant of the exact location of the adjacent way stations, meeting incoming groups about halfway between stations.

many way stations are protected by up to a platoon of guards, and [redacted] armed units of company size have been assigned by the 70th Group to protect the infiltration corridor from attack either from Laos or South Vietnam. There can be little doubt that the present infiltra-

tion system is capable of maintaining, and even increasing, the flow of men and arms to the Viet Cong.

[redacted] a minimum of 19,000 Viet Cong infiltrators entered South Vietnam between January 1959 and August 1964. [redacted]

[redacted] the total number is probably closer to 34,000.

A unique aspect of the 1964 infiltration is that the overwhelming majority of those reported coming into South Vietnam have been native northerners, drafted specifically for service in the south. The typical infiltrator of earlier years had been drawn from a pool of southerners regrouped in North Vietnam following the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The present extensive use of native northern draftees suggests that few of the remaining members of the pool are physically fit for the rigors of guerrilla war. It also demonstrates Hanoi's increased willingness to risk exposure of its active involvement in the war in order to improve Viet Cong capabilities. [redacted]

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Asia-Africa

BUDDHISTS THREATEN NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME

South Vietnamese Premier Huong has remained firm in the face of pressures from student and Buddhist groups to resign or to reshuffle his government. Although he appears for the present to have restored order in Saigon under martial law, the decision of central Vietnam Buddhist leader Tri Quang to oppose Huong openly poses the threat of a concerted Buddhist campaign to topple the new regime.

Quang, who was in the forefront of Buddhist efforts against the Diem regime, had hitherto stayed aloof from the effort exerted by the hierarchy in Saigon to have the High National Council replace Huong's government. Quang now has told US officials, however, that he will order agitation against Huong if the entire government does not resign in the near future. Quang accused the government of being anti-Buddhist and repressive in using security forces against student demonstrators.

Huong so far is still receiving firm support from most of the key military and police officials, although the position of Commander in Chief General Khanh is somewhat ambiguous. Khanh absented himself from Saigon during last week's demonstrations and has avoided any clear statement of support for Huong. Dissatisfaction among younger generals over Khanh's reinstatement in the army high command of most of the leaders of the former Minh junta appears to be sharpening as a result of suspicions that Khanh may be maneuvering to undermine Premier Huong.

The military situation during the past week was highlighted by several tactical successes scored by government troops in scattered security operations. Viet Cong activity, following the pattern of over a month, remained relatively low.

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NEW ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

A new non-Communist Indonesian political movement calling itself "Sukarnoism" surfaced while President Sukarno was abroad this fall and is continuing its activity. Various political figures, in either the knowledge or the belief that Sukarno wants to see how the new group develops and behaves, for the time being consider it safe or expedient to ally themselves with it.

The group, whose immediate objective is to block the further rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), is led by Minister of Trade Adam Malik. Chaerul Saleh, third deputy prime minister and minister of development, also appears to be deeply involved. Malik, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Saleh are ideologically attuned to the "right wing" of the

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Murba (Proletarian) Party, usually described as the "national Communist" party of Indonesia. With Indonesia moving to the left under Sukarno, Malik and Saleh have come to represent a "moderate" position, and their activities, which seem oblique to Westerners, are arousing the hopeful interest of individuals who stand further to the right.

The "Sukarnoists" base their attack on the PKI largely on "Pantjasila"--Sukarno's "Five Principles" to which all officially recognized Indonesian political parties are obliged to subscribe. The new group's ultimate argument--which is usually implied rather than directly stated--is that the PKI does not sincerely accept Pantjasila but is pursuing its own objectives and insidiously challenging Sukarno himself and his associates.

The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the only large legal Muslim party in Indonesia, earlier had withdrawn from the Sukarnoist movement but apparently now considers it safe to join again. According to Malik, an NU official received Sukarno's personal consent to "endorse non-Communist ideas" during a speaking tour of East and Central Java. Leaders of the right wing of the National Party have also aligned themselves with Sukarnoism. Malik claims that he has the support of the lower levels of these political parties and of the government bureaucracy. The movement also has the backing of a majority of the newspapers in Djakarta as well as of some papers in North Sumatra and East Java.

The army until recently had carefully avoided supporting the movement publicly. At a recent


labor conference, however, Army Commander General Jani and the West Java territorial commander made strong statements in behalf of Pantjasila, and thereby appeared to align themselves with the Sukarnoists. Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Martadinata and Minister of Defense General Nasution have openly encouraged Sukarnoism.

The future of the movement nevertheless rests with Sukarno himself. Although the president is opposed to divisive political tendencies, he is at the same time even willing to find effective pro-Sukarno elements that can be used in his political balancing game. If he now is concerned that the PKI is pushing too hard, he might be willing to overlook for a time the fact that there are elements within Sukarnoist ranks whom he distrusts and whom he has even considered casting into political limbo.

Another factor in Sukarno's mind could be a hope that he can use the Sukarnoists in diplomatic maneuvering on the Malaysia issue. He may even believe they would be useful in getting economic assistance from the West. Sukarnoist spokesmen are urging the US Embassy in Djakarta to encourage UK-Indonesian or Indonesian-Malaysian talks. They state that unless the Malaysia issue is settled peacefully, their movement will be smothered in the continuing anti-Malaysia clamor and that efforts to remedy Indonesia's deteriorating economy will fail. Although the Sukarnoists are not necessarily being directed by Sukarno to approach the Americans, their needs and strategy for the moment seem to coincide with his.

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AREA NOTES

Laos: Communist forces have stepped up the tempo of their operations in widely scattered areas of central and northern Laos.

Government forces have abandoned several positions along Route 13 northwest of Thakhek in the face of increased Communist activity earlier this week. Rightist military leaders have ordered reinforcements for friendly units defending the northern approaches to Thakhek.

Farther north, Pathet Lao troops [redacted] have been increasingly aggressive in their moves in the hills surrounding the Plaine des Jarres. Communist patrols have

pressed to within four miles of Tha Thom, southeast of the Plaine, while to the northwest vigorous clearing operations have been mounted against Meo units guarding mountain positions near Muong Soui. [redacted]

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Neutralist forces, meanwhile, have launched an effort to recapture Phou Kout, a strategic hill commanding the eastern approaches to Muong Soui. The neutralist drive is being coordinated with Meo diversionary moves in the flanking hills, and supported by T-28 strikes flown by the Laotian Air Force. [redacted]

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Pakistan: The presidential election has been advanced from March to 2 January, and campaign activity is intensifying. President Ayub's forces, as well as the combined opposition backing his opponent, Miss Jinnah, now are giving their undivided attention to winning support among the 80,000 local government council members, elected in November, who also

serve as Pakistan's electoral college. The government has put off planned negotiations with India and with Afghanistan because key leaders are preoccupied with the campaign.

Neither side yet seems able to make a firm judgment of its strength among the electors. The government apparently has the support of something over

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65 percent of the 40,000 electors in West Pakistan, but of less than half of the 40,000 in East Pakistan. It can be expected to exert all possible pressures to give Ayub a safe

majority. A narrow margin would give the opposition a moral victory and encourage it to greater activity during Ayub's next administration than it has shown during the past few years. [REDACTED]

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Turkey: The recent attempt by Turkish military leaders to intimidate the Justice Party (JP), the major opposition party, appears to have had some success. The military's campaign, which started with a letter from General Staff chief Sunay warning against further JP criticism of the army, has probably not ended, but may have passed its most critical stage.

likely be to be approved by the military high command. Demirel came from behind to win by almost a two to one margin. If the JP should win next year's elections, as now appears likely, its president-general would become Turkey's prime minister.

The army's major immediate objective may have been to ensure the election by the JP of a party leader whom the military could accept. In its national convention from 27 to 29 November, the party did just that, choosing as its president-general Suleyman Demirel the most moderate of the candidates and the only one

Although the army apparently has gained its immediate goal with regard to the JP, it still distrusts the party, which is generally regarded as the successor to the defunct Democratic Party whose regime the military overthrew in 1960. The high command may be reconciled to the JP's coming to power eventually, but will probably continue its efforts to influence party policy. [REDACTED]

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Cyprus: The Cyprus dispute is again moving toward the United Nations. The present mandate for the UN force stationed on the island expires on 26 December, and the Security Council is expected to extend it for another three-month period. However, another Cyprus debate is to occur in this session of the General Assembly. The precise timing is uncertain, but it is not likely to take place before February. Both sides, meanwhile, are seeking international support. At that time, the Greek Cypriots

presumably will ask for unfettered independence and self-determination; the Turkish Government will insist that previous treaties limiting Cypriot independence remain in effect. UN mediator Galo Plaza's latest soundings indicate little or no change in positions. His report apparently will not now be issued until sometime after the General Assembly debate.

Turkish officials remain bitter at both the US and NATO. Moreover, they have become increasingly intransigent since Foreign

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Minister Erkin returned from Moscow with what he regarded as Soviet support for the Turkish view: i.e., an independent, but federated Cyprus. Greek Cypriot officials, on the other hand, insist that they have been reassured that the USSR will continue to support them. In Athens, Premier Papandreu has reiterated his view that negotiations with Turkey would not now be productive. Greek officials maintain that no sud-

Sudan: The Sudanese leadership is polarizing into increasingly antagonistic blocs, one represented by the Communist-led Professional Front and the other by the more moderate National Political Party Front. The latter group, led by the conservative Ansar politico-religious brotherhood, has held demonstrations aimed at countering Communist calls for abolition of the political parties. The parties are also opposing Communist influence in cabinet deliberations.

Recent major cabinet decisions have increasingly favored leftist interests. Committees have been established to supervise widespread purges in the government ministries, with the generally pro-Western civil service a prime target. Two Communist newspapers have been reinstated, and a Communist-backed provision setting aside 15 legislative seats for "graduates"--presumably university--has been included in plans for

den proclamation of enosis--union of Cyprus with Greece--is contemplated, but they note that moves toward "de facto enosis" are already under way and are expected to continue until union is achieved.

There has been no significant outbreak of violence on the island, but there have been only minor breakthroughs in UN efforts to re-establish a more normal life. [redacted]

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elections this March. [redacted]


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[redacted] The Communists' ability to organize street mobs quickly has also strengthened their bargaining position.

However, the Communists' acceptance on 3 December of a moderate-backed plan for a five-man Supreme Sovereignty Council represents an apparent victory for the moderates. The Communists may have given in on this issue in order to avoid a showdown at this time. A cabinet decision favoring the Communist-backed plan for a three-man council of "independents" might have incited strong pressures from the traditional parties for a reshuffle of the cabinet and thereby threatened the Communists' present disproportionately strong position on that body. [redacted]

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Asia-Africa

CONGO GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO ADVANCE

Leopoldville's military campaigns are for the moment going well, but its lack of troops to garrison captured areas and the imminence of arms shipments to the rebels from other African nations will make for further difficulties.

The security situation in Stanleyville improved during the week, according to Tshombé's top Belgian military adviser, Colonel Van der Walle. Although desultory sniping continues in the African quarters of the town, organized resistance for the most part has subsided.


In the northeastern Congo, a combined mercenary - Congo Army unit has been pushing from Bumba since 23 November, and has almost reached Paulis. Another government column about 300 miles north of Bukavu captured Bunia on 1 December.



Elsewhere, Tshombé's lack of reliable troops with which to garrison captured towns is beginning to tell. Rebels have retaken Punia, astride the land supply route between Stanleyville and Kindu, and are said to threaten Kindu itself.

Arms shipments to the rebels appear to be imminent if they have not occurred already. As yet no "volunteers" for the rebel forces have appeared in the Congo, but Algeria has said publicly that it may send some.

Amid the African outcry over the US-Belgian parachute drops to rescue hostages, Tshombé's government has become increasingly unpopular among African governments. On 28 November, the Organization of African Unity's ad hoc commission on the Congo, sitting in Nairobi, adopted a series of recommendations which protested the parachute drops and asked for a cease-fire, a general amnesty for the rebels, and a halt to foreign military intervention in the Congo. Representatives of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Upper Volta, and Tunisia--all hitherto considered moderate--joined in the recommendations. The Nigerian Government has since in effect repudiated the signature of its representatives.

To drum up support, Tshombé saw De Gaulle in Paris on 2 December. He was unable to get any commitment of help beyond a vague promise of "technical assistance" in the undefined future. 

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RESULTS OF ITALIAN ELECTIONS
(As published by Italy's Interior Ministry)

PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS (held in 74 of Italy's 92 provinces)

	Provincial Elections 1964		Provincial Elections 1960		Parliamentary Elections 1963		
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	
Christian Democrats	9,476,812	37.36	10,021,718	40.3	10,163,176	38.2	
Republicans	297,800	1.17	319,978	1.3	352,241	1.3	NATIONAL CENTER-LEFT COALITION
Social Democrats	1,674,871	6.68	1,426,363	5.7	1,671,144	6.3	
Socialists (PSI)	2,866,346	11.30	3,580,338	14.4	3,772,314	14.2	
PSIUP *	737,079	2.91	--	--	--	--	
Communists	6,600,887	26.02	6,085,848	24.2	6,778,709	25.6	
Liberals	2,018,780	7.96	998,504	4.0	1,846,402	7.0	
Neo-Fascists	1,265,919	4.99	1,473,835	5.9	1,325,112	5.0	
Monarchists	236,952	0.93	715,499	2.9	448,658	1.7	
Others	189,962	0.76	240,531	1.0	194,229	0.7	
TOTALS	25,365,408		24,862,614		26,551,985		

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS (Figures cover only cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants) **

	Municipal Elections 1964			Municipal Elections 1960			Parliamentary Elections 1963	
	Votes	Seats	%	Votes	Seats	%	Votes	%
Christian Democrats	5,163,087	9,205	35.8	5,158,795	9,533	37.8	4,959,648	33.3
Republicans	166,859	223	1.2	166,341	178	1.2	214,613	1.4
Social Democrats	911,894	1,014	6.3	739,064	745	5.4	958,114	6.4
Socialists (PSI)	1,638,312	2,412	11.4	2,072,316	3,355	15.2	2,147,840	14.4
PSIUP *	391,060	447	2.7	--	--	--	--	--
Communists	3,838,157	5,951	26.5	3,371,324	5,472	24.7	4,096,058	27.5
Liberals	1,217,464	955	8.4	468,523	385	3.4	1,268,999	8.5
Neo-Fascists	655,294	713	4.5	687,971	798	5.1	826,970	5.6
Monarchists	122,283	64	0.8	402,611	222	2.9	305,405	2.1
Others	347,588	1,016	2.4	595,099	1,514	4.3	111,637	0.8
TOTALS	14,451,998	22,000		13,662,004	22,202		14,889,284	

* The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity, created in January 1964 when the largely pro-Communist left wing split with the PSI.

** Approximately 14.5 million votes were cast in cities and towns with a population below 10,000.

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ITALIAN COALITION WEAKENED BY LOCAL ELECTION LOSSES

The heavy loss of seats in Italy's local governing councils by the Christian Democrats (CD) and the Socialists (PSI) in last week's provincial and municipal elections has created an immediate problem in a number of key cities, where center-left majorities cannot be mustered to regroup local administrations. The political effects on CD-PSI cooperation on the national scale, however, could far exceed the local significance. The Communist gain of many council seats carries with it considerable benefit in terms of local patronage and propaganda opportunities, and the party's chances for upsetting the coalition government have been somewhat improved.

In such major cities as Milan, Florence, Naples, and Genoa the only solution will probably be to set up caretaker governments under a commissioner pending new elections. In other cities the CD will exert pressure on the PSI not to ally with the Communists. Elsewhere, all three of the CD's coalition partners will try either to prevent it from forming all-CD administrations, or to block CD efforts to align with the conservative Liberal Party.

A principal effect on the national coalition will be that both the CD and the PSI will adopt more rigid bargaining positions on a number of important issues which must soon be faced. PSI chief Nenni will be intent on controlling dissatisfaction within his party over heavy losses mainly to the Socialist splinter party (PSIUP). He will want the coalition to show some progress on its reform programs in time for him to counter an increase in left-wing strength in the elections for the PSI congress, planned for February or March.

The CD can take some comfort from its increase this time in percent of the municipal vote as compared with the total vote in last year's parliamentary elections (see table on facing page). The party reaffirmed the validity of the center-left concept at the CD congress in September and during the electoral campaign. However, factional differences over the nature and scope of the coalition's course have not been resolved. Elements in the party who oppose the center-left and its program will probably be emboldened by the loss of seats in the local councils to press for a reorientation when a

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prospective meeting to "reorgan-
ize" the party's directorate is
held. All of these positions
are now held only by the largest
of the party's five factions.

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Another serious immediate
problem is the necessity of
electing a successor to ailing
President Segni--a divisive
issue both within the CD and
between the CD and its coalition
partners.

The parliamentary
electoral college must be con-
vened with 15 days after either
resignation or a declaration of
permanent disability. Preoc-
cupation with the presidential
election, followed by the custom-
ary year-end recess, will stall
legislative activity until par-
liament reconvenes in early
February.

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Western Hemisphere

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMINICAN STRIKE

The Dominican Government appears to be winning its battle to thwart a general strike that was to have begun in Santo Domingo on 2 December, despite support for the walkout from opportunistic politicians of both the right and left.

By the end of the first day, however, only a few taxi-drivers had joined sugar workers in walking off their jobs.

The strike, which has been relatively free from violence, brought a quick response from the ruling triumvirate. Troops and national police were alerted in Santo Domingo, and strike leaders and agitators were arrested. Triumvirate President Donald Reid Cabral undercut some of the support for the strike by announcing that, despite the government's financial difficulties, part of the traditional Christmas bonus would be paid to public employees.

What started out as a protest by irresponsible leftist unions against the government's refusal to pay sugar workers a harvest bonus was quickly seized by political interests which

hope to topple the Reid Cabral regime. An unlikely coalition of ex-President Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party, ex-President Balaguer's Reformist Party, the right-wing Liberal Evolutionist Party, and the leftist Revolutionary Social Christian Party appeared to be collaborating in support of the strike.

Communist elements, which have been relatively inactive for several months, also eagerly joined the strike efforts. On 27 November two bombs were exploded in Santo Domingo

A day later the home of a cabinet minister was machine-gunned.

For the moment, Reid's position appears reasonably secure despite the dissident army faction, since he has the support of key elements of the military.

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Western Hemisphere

AREA NOTE

Argentina: The threat of possibly violent demonstrations in Argentina in support of Juan Peron's return was averted on 2 December when Brazil forced the ex-dictator to go back to Madrid on the same day he arrived in Rio. The Argentine military, standing firmly behind the Illia administration, adamantly oppose Peron's return and were ready to aid the police to quell any internal disturbances.

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Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay --in addition to Brazil--had all finally indicated willingness to assist the Argentine Government in preventing Peron's return. Such evidence of international support may tend to strengthen the internal position of the Illia administration. Brazil's action will not only enhance its standing in Argentine eyes but may also improve its position in Uruguay, where it has been trying to persuade the government to curb the activities of Brazilian exiles.

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Western Hemisphere

BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT ORDERS INTERVENTION IN GOIAS STATE

Brazilian President Castello Branco's order imposing federal intervention in Goias State and Congress' approval of the decree have reduced tensions raised by the prolonged efforts of military "hard-liners" to oust Governor Mauro Borges. Under the presidential decree, which became effective on 26 November, Borges has been removed from office and replaced by a federal "interventor," who will administer the state government for a maximum of 60 days.

The President justified his action against Borges by publicly charging him with subversion and involvement in a Communist-inspired plot to overthrow the federal government by force. While it is not clear that the latter charge can be proved, there seems to be considerable evidence that Borges tolerated Communist infiltration in his own administration, collaborated with "agents" of a Communist bloc embassy, and permitted armed groups of extremists to operate in Goias. Borges' fate is in doubt, but presumably he will remain free as long as his party's majority in the state legislature prevents his formal impeachment--which would allow his case to be tried in a military court.

In connection with Borges' ouster, the army arrested more

than 200 persons in Goias and elsewhere for allegedly preparing to launch a "counterrevolution." [REDACTED]

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Despite some unfavorable criticism of his handling of the Goias affair, Castello Branco probably has not incurred any significant damage to his political control. The 52-vote margin in the Federal Chamber of Deputies supporting the intervention is a substantial show of confidence, considering that administration supporters hold less than one third of the 409 chamber seats. In the senate, the government's action received overwhelming approval.

Castello Branco, anxious to prevent further political interruptions of his efforts in the fields of economic development and social reform, will probably now seek to persuade the military "hard-liners" to moderate their tactics in any future cases. These elements, however, may be encouraged by their victory in Goias to go after other political targets. [REDACTED]

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