


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19 June 1964

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# SPECIAL REPORT

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

State Dept. review  
completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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**CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA**

The Chinese Communists view Africa as a land of opportunity, an area where long-term gains in their drive for international recognition and influence are assured and even immediate gains might be won. Challenged by increased Russian activity in the area and anxious to play a leading role at the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled for next March, the Chinese have intensified their efforts to expand political, cultural, and economic contacts on the continent. This campaign has had some success but performance to date has been spotty.


The Chinese are new to Africa and still feeling their way. With relatively few representatives and limited resources, they are attempting to win over shrewd African nationalists reluctant to become embroiled in the cold war or the Sino-Soviet dispute. Despite their handicaps, the Chinese are confident that the tide of history is running with them in underdeveloped areas. They go all out to identify China with the experience of the underdeveloped, convinced that in time Africans will recognize Peiping as their staunchest supporter and the real revolutionary fountainhead.

Tactics

Peiping's immediate objective is to establish a larger presence in Africa, to obtain a wider base from which it can work toward longer range goals. Although Chinese propagandists sometimes write enthusiastically about a "wave of revolution" sweeping over the continent, Peiping probably regards this as a hope for the future and accepts the present necessity for working with the bourgeois nationalists who have come to power in most of the newly independent African states.

Unable to afford massive economic and technical assistance programs, the Chinese rely mainly on propaganda, diplomatic maneuver, and personal contact. Their most dramatic recent venture in face-to-face persuasion was the ten-country tour of Africa last winter by Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi. No other major world power has ever sent two such high-ranking officials on a grand tour of the continent. When they wound up their seven-week trip last February, they had scored no startling gains but had put down a solid

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foundation for subsequent efforts to boost Peiping's stock.

Chou En-lai's Trip

The Chinese premier during his travels took a generally cautious line calculated to win over moderate African opinion, and made a favorable impression almost everywhere he went. Both he and Foreign Minister Chen sought to refurbish Peiping's image--tarnished in the eyes of some African leaders by its opposition to the nuclear test ban accord and by its border war with India in 1962. They repeatedly endeavored to counter Soviet propaganda depicting China's leaders as irresponsible militants and to present China as a responsible power with world-wide influence.

They tried with considerable success to drum up support for the Second Afro-Asian Conference, to be held in Africa, which Peiping clearly hopes to dominate as it did the 1955 meeting in Bandung. At the same time Chou and Chen attempted to play down the rival meeting of nonaligned nations, strongly backed by Yugoslavia and the UAR, which is to take place in Cairo this fall and at which China will not be represented.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the trip was the opportunity it provided for the Chinese leaders to get top-level, first-hand impressions of a part of the world in which Peiping's

newly posted representatives find themselves in an unfamiliar but potentially exploitable situation.

"People's Diplomacy"

The sharp rise in the number of African delegations traveling to Peiping in recent years illustrates the high priority given to "people's diplomacy" in Peiping's drive for greater influence. More than 70 assorted delegations arrived last year, compared with about 25 in 1961, and this year the figure is likely to rise even more sharply. African officials are treated to red-carpet tours of the mainland, and those of any importance are showered with attention by top Chinese leaders, including Mao himself.

The Chinese have recently played host to a number of African leaders. Among these have been President Abboud of the Sudan, the Kenyan ministers of state and home affairs, Prime Minister Abdirascid of the Somali Republic, a delegation of key parliament members from Burundi, former Zanzibari foreign minister Babu, and a vice president of the new Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Visits by the presidents of Mali, Algeria, and the Somali Republic are scheduled later this year and invitations have been extended to King Hassan of Morocco and other chiefs of state.

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### Chinese Representation In Africa

Peiping's efforts to promote more tours of China by African leaders is accompanied by a corresponding attempt to send more Chinese to Africa. Peiping's minister of education, the chairman of its Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and the head of the committee for the promotion of international trade have all visited the continent in the past eight months.

Peiping now maintains diplomatic ties with 15 African nations to Taipei's 18. Five countries--Burundi, Tunisia, Kenya, Zanzibar, and Congo (Brazzaville)--have established relations in the past six months, and further gains are in prospect. Ethiopia indicated during Chou's visit that it was moving toward formal ties, and Northern Rhodesia may also agree to Chinese Communist representation when it becomes independent later this year. In addition, some of the French-speaking West African nations now recognizing Nationalist China may before very long follow the example of Congo (Brazzaville) and France by switching to relations with Peiping. At this point, however, many moderate African governments--Cameroon and Nigeria are notable examples--are genuinely suspicious of the Chinese Communists and their

potential for subversion and are not anxious to see them established locally.

### Propaganda

Chinese Communist posts abroad serve as major propaganda outlets. Chinese diplomats and press representatives throughout Africa, as well as Chou and other lesser figures touring the continent, assiduously echo Peiping's radio and press outpourings. Peiping is depicted as Africa's best friend, overflowing with understanding of African problems and sharing a common experience of foreign exploitation. The US is crudely and blatantly attacked.

The Chinese now beam more than 75 hours of radio propaganda to Africa each week, as compared with about 55 hours two years ago. Languages include English, French, Arabic, Cantonese, Swahili, and Hausa--the nearest thing to a lingua franca in west Africa below the Sahara. The Cantonese-language broadcasts are directed toward the more than 40,000 overseas Chinese in east Africa, nearly half of whom inhabit Mauritius, the tiny British island in the Indian Ocean.

High-quality pamphlets and periodicals in both English and French are widely distributed

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in Africa, and China Pictorial, the glossy LIFE-size propaganda magazine, appeared in Swahili for the first time this past spring.

New China News Agency (NCNA), Peiping's principal agency for dissemination of propaganda and collection of intelligence, now maintains about 25 Chinese correspondents in Africa in addition to numerous effective and often influential local stringers. Zanzibar's ex-foreign minister Babu, now a minister in the new union's Directorate of Planning, formerly served as an NCNA representative in East Africa.

#### Areas of Special Interest

The Congo and East Africa are two areas of special interest to the Chinese Communists and the focal points for Peiping's current small-scale efforts in support of revolutionary activity. A lead editorial in Peiping's People's Daily last month hailed the "battle cries coming from the jungle." It pointedly accused the Soviets not only of failing to support "national independence movements" wholeheartedly but of actually attempting to "frighten" the Congolese into "submitting" to the US.

The Chinese maintain embassies in the Brazzaville Congo and Burundi--staging areas for activity by the Committee of National Liberation (CNL) made up of exiles from the Leopoldville Congo dedicated to over-

throwing the Adoula regime there. Chinese diplomats are known to be in regular contact with CNL leaders in both Brazzaville and Bujumbura, Burundi's capital.

Peiping has given the CNL some aid and financial backing, and the Chinese presence in the area is expanding. The US Embassy in Brazzaville, however, reports that Chinese diplomatic activity there has been low key and circumspect. CNL unreliability is an obvious cause for Peiping's concern. A Chinese diplomat has complained that the leading CNL representative in Burundi squandered funds given him on beer and women. For the present Chinese aid is primarily confined to advice and moral, rather than monetary and material, support.

The Chinese are eager to appear the staunch supporters of revolutionaries around the world, but reluctant to expend their limited resources on faction-ridden exile groups of unproven capability--a description which, in addition to the CNL, fits revolutionaries from the Portuguese territories as well. The contacts have been made, however, and if the CNL or Angolan exiles demonstrate greater effectiveness the Chinese will

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probably come through with more substantial support.

In East Africa also, the Chinese are in contact with exile groups from southern Africa. Dar es Salaam, the Tanganyikan capital, is at present the area's most important center for this activity. Over 20 Chinese are assigned to the embassy there. In Tanganyika influential exiles are signed up for bloc tours, and promising young Africans are recruited for bloc study--some for academic programs, others for training in terrorist techniques. In Dar the Chinese are busy cultivating refugee groups from Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and South Africa; they are probably hopeful over the long run of developing a disciplined corps of cadres effective in local liberation struggles and at the same time responsive to Peiping.

In Zanzibar, a 1,600-student university is reportedly planned, probably with Chinese aid and destined to house refugees undergoing political indoctrination. Over 60 Chinese are on the island now.

Peiping has also provided Zanzibar with about \$500,000 in direct budgetary support, and \$14 million in interest-free developmental credit.

In East Africa the Chinese also work through established

government leaders. Zanzibar's Babu has made frequent visits to Peiping and has received funds from the Chinese. In Uganda, Peiping is reported to have made cash payments to several prominent members of the ruling Uganda People's Congress. Oginga Odinga, Kenya's ambitious and influential minister of home affairs, has been in contact with the Chinese and visited Peiping this spring. He has selected and dispatched Kenyans for training in the bloc; 20 were sent to Communist China for guerrilla training

Odinga, a radical African, has long received funds from both the Chinese and the Soviets.

Sino-Soviet Competition

The Soviet Union has recently moved to counter Chinese efforts in Africa, and Sino-Soviet competition for influence there is becoming increasingly apparent. Algerian President Ben Bella's visit to the USSR in May and Khrushchev's trip to Egypt were exploited to demonstrate Soviet support for "national liberation movements" and to gain endorsement by important neutralist leaders of a wide range of Soviet policy objectives. The Soviet Union has sought inclusion in the Afro-Asian conference on the grounds that it is an Asian state. The

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
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magnitude of Moscow's recent aid promises in part reflects the campaign to contrast Soviet ability to render tangible help to emerging countries with the slogans and more nebulous promises of the Chinese.

While the Chinese premier steered clear of anti-Soviet polemics in public speeches during his African tour--probably at his hosts' insistence--it was clear from the start that an important objective of the trip was to undercut Moscow's influence.



In Algiers, Chou cited China's early support for Algerian revolutionaries--support which actually predated that of the USSR.

The Soviets retaliated as best they could. At the airport in Mali when Chou landed, natives were plying the crowd with anti-Chinese pamphlets--clearly echoing Moscow's polemical tracts.

Earlier last winter the Chinese in Mali outmaneuvered the Soviets, pre-empting a Soviet trade fair site for a propagandistic show of their own. The Chinese pitch at this exhibit,

**COMMUNIST ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES**  
MILLION US DOLLARS

AFRICAN COUNTRIES	COMMUNIST CHINA	USSR	EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ALGERIA	51.8	228.0	7.4
ETHIOPIA	-	101.8	11.8
GHANA	19.6	88.8	81.5
GUINEA	26.5	73.1	25.2
KENYA	18.0	?	-
MALI	19.6	55.5	22.6
MOROCCO	-	-	17.2
SOMALI REPUBLIC	21.6	57.2	5.6
SUDAN	-	23.0	-
TUNISIA	-	27.8	19.5
UAR	4.7	833.0	182.9
ZANZIBAR	14.5	-	14.0
TOTAL	176.3	1,488.2	387.7

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as elsewhere in Africa, was clear and unmistakable. "We're like you--backward, but we're making big strides. We've had your problems and we've learned the hard way. Now you can learn from us--no strings attached."

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In Mali, as in Guinea and Ghana, where Peiping is building a wide variety of small factories, Chinese technicians are skillfully gaining grassroots good will at the expense of Moscow and the West. Peiping's advisers reportedly "blend" readily into the African landscape. They do not ask for cars, refrigerators, or luxurious houses. They are prepared to live on a small amount of rice, ride bicycles or walk, and to accept the same hardships as their Malian counterparts. Most importantly,

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Peiping has a reputation for sending these technicians more quickly than any other country in the world. Mali's minister of development recently remarked that to get technicians from the US takes "one year to never," from the Soviet Union, "six months to a year," from Communist China, "forty-five days."

Peiping's use of racism in the struggle with Moscow is a key element of the Chinese offensive in Africa. At Afro-Asian gatherings, such as the Cairo Writers Conference in 1962, the major meeting in Moshi, Tanganyika, last year, and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers this spring, Chinese representatives have conducted high-pressure lobbying with African delegates to persuade them of an identity of Chinese and African interests --the need for the nonwhites to stand together. In approaching Africans the Chinese lump Western Europeans, Americans, and Russians together in general opposition to the colored, down-trodden, have-nots of the world. Chou En-lai used this line constantly during his tour of Africa.

Peiping's racism by innuendo has raised cries of dirty pool from Moscow. Izvestia has accused Peiping of building a "Chinese wall" between Moscow and Afro-Asian nations, and the chief Soviet delegates at the Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers angrily berated those who set "peoples, countries, and continents," against each other.

Africans are increasingly disgruntled by such airing of the Sino-Soviet quarrel in Afro-Asian forums, and the haranguing of Peiping's representatives has brought sharp criticism on several occasions.

Chinese Obstacles in Africa

In efforts to enlarge their role in Africa the Chinese face several formidable obstacles.

They are clearly not in a position to satisfy all African wants and, although sympathetic words can make modest credits appear more generous, hardheaded African nationalist leaders may increasingly come to seek sizable material aid instead of ideological palaver and the flowery words of friendship.

In North Africa, Peiping finds itself confronted with Cairo's own ambitions in the Afro-Asian world. North Africa was the least successful portion of Chou En-lai's tour. Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, with their greater sophistication, European orientation, and relatively higher standard of living, received the premier with polite reserve. Certainly they were less receptive than the more militantly anticolonial, authoritarian regimes of Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.

Even in wooing militant revolutionaries the prospects may not be altogether rosy. Peiping undoubtedly has few illusions about the long-term

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reliability of many of those it trains and hopes to influence. For many, African nationalism comes first and Communism second, and a potential recruit can be nurtured on scholarships and small handouts only to sour into an unresponsive bourgeois nationalist, self-indulgently squandering Peiping's funds.

Although there is no firm evidence of Chinese involvement in the army mutinies in East Africa and the coup in Zanzibar, the doubts that led to the abrupt cancellation of Chou's visits to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika last winter persist. In addition, widespread East African distrust of Asians already in the area, primarily emigré Indians and Pakistanis, may carry over to the Chinese, offsetting their most assiduous propaganda efforts.

Curiously, the Chinese may also be vulnerable on the very issue of racial discrimination they are pushing so hard against the US and the Soviet Union. Dozens of African students who went to China three or four years ago have returned disillusioned and openly critical. They were appalled at the low standard of living, the heavy-handed political indoctrination, and the obvious efforts to segregate them. Racial pride and cultural arrogance have often hurt Peiping's prospects where the Chinese have come into close contact with Africans.

### Outlook

Despite obvious handicaps the Chinese are determined to press forward, and their drive for influence will gain momentum. Chou En-lai, speaking this spring before a joint session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council, revealed plans for sharp increases in the number of Chinese stationed in Africa and an expansion of economic aid projects in the area.

As a useful tool in the two-pronged drive against the US and the USSR, Peiping will probably play up the racial theme ever more stridently. In public statements and private conversations with Africans, China's diplomats will continue to berate Washington as champion of the status quo and vestigial colonialism, and at the same time take snide pokes at Moscow for laggard support of revolutionary struggle. What the Chinese are unable to provide in material assistance they will attempt to make up for in sympathetic counseling and voluminous propaganda support.

However, until they can convince the continent's leaders that African nationalism is being supported for its own sake and not for ulterior Chinese motives, a degree of native African suspicion and doubt as to Peiping's real intentions will remain.

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