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
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# SPECIAL REPORT

SOVIET MILITARY AID

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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**SOVIET MILITARY AID**

Military aid continues to be an important instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's activities in the field appear to be at an all-time high. More than \$3.2 billion worth of Soviet bloc military hardware and technical assistance has been committed to non-Communist countries (excluding Cuba) since 1955. Two thirds of this has been extended by the USSR since early 1960. The size of new military aid commitments has been reduced in the past two years from the 1960-61 peak, but the number of recipient countries has increased and long-term programs are steadily being carried out. Advanced weapons systems have become a standard aid item, large Soviet military-advisory missions are operating in several countries, military production facilities are being supplied abroad, and on some occasions the USSR has provided personnel to man equipment temporarily.

Evolution of the Program


Soviet military aid originally focused on the same short-term ends as economic aid: establishing a presence, developing ties, fostering neutralism, and stimulating economic relations through repayment obligations. It was used as a means of entry into several countries, even before economic aid. Prior to mid-1960, however, the USSR seemed reluctant to acknowledge its association with arms deals. It avoided undue publicity about the program and sometimes used the European satellites as middlemen.

Moscow probably soon saw the advantages of military assistance: rapid delivery, plentiful supplies to draw on, immediate impact, and the enlargement of Soviet contacts

with elite military circles. As the trade and aid offensive matured and Moscow became embroiled in the complexities and slow fruition of economic development, the military aid program doubtless seemed even more attractive. In 1960 and 1961, when the rate of Soviet economic aid extensions was curtailed, new military aid extensions reached record levels.

In the second half of 1960, soon after the collapse of the summit conference and the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the USSR embarked on an unprecedented wave of military aid activity. This seemed aimed largely at demonstrating militant Soviet support for the "national liberation movement" to the rest of the Communist world.

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NOTE: These figures reflect list prices quoted by the bloc for equipment and technical services. They do not reflect the large price discounts frequently granted by the USSR and they do not indicate the debt obligations of recipients. In most instances the estimates are based on fragmentary information and for some countries they are quite rough. The figures for Iraq, Indonesia, and India, for example, are based largely on reliable documents, while those for Egypt, Syria, and Afghanistan generally lack similar supporting evidence.

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In August-September 1960 the USSR moved rapidly to support pro-Communist forces in the Congo. In September it began to supply arms to Cuba after months of apparent hesitation. In the same month Soviet military shipments to Guinea were initiated and the first major Soviet-Indonesian arms deal was signed. In October the first important arms agreement with the UAR in more than two years was concluded. In November the first Soviet military agreement with India--for transport aircraft--was concluded, a gift of jet fighters was offered to Morocco, and a long-range military program was proposed for Ghana.

In early December 1960, soon after the Moscow conference of Communist parties in which the Soviets were scored by the Chinese for inadequately supporting revolutionary struggles, the USSR began its airlift to aid the neutralist/Communist forces in Laos. Shortly thereafter the first shipments of Soviet weapons were made via Morocco to the Algerian forces.

In January 1961 the first agreement for tactical missilery was concluded with Indonesia; similar agreements were reached with the UAR and Iraq later in the year. For the first time the USSR agreed to supply TU-16 (Badger) jet medium bombers, MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighters, and Komar guided-missile boats, as well as modern armored vehicles and naval ships. Many of these items--still first-line

Soviet weapons--had not then been transferred to other bloc countries.

An innovation in Soviet military aid was introduced under an arms deal with Indonesia in May 1962. Soviet crews were used to man six submarines which

**BACKGROUND**
**SOVIET BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE**  
 Basic Facts and Figures

Since 1955, more than \$3.2 billion worth of Soviet bloc military aid has been committed to 15 non-Communist countries (see map).

Over \$2.5 billion of this has been delivered--a rate of utilization far greater than for economic aid programs.

About \$1.2 billion of total aid--in the form of grants and price discounts--does not require repayment. Most of the remaining \$2 billion has been financed by medium and long-term credits.

The USSR has provided more than 80 percent of total Communist military aid, and much of the rest has been managed by Moscow.

Biggest years for new commitments were 1960 and 1961, when aid extended totaled some \$550 million and \$770 million respectively. Extensions have tapered off somewhat since then, but the size of many new agreements is not yet known.

Arms deals with Indonesia and Egypt account for nearly two-thirds of the entire program.

An estimated \$225 million has been spent on military technical assistance.

Nearly 15,000 foreign nationals have received some type of military training in the Soviet bloc.

An estimated 11,000 Soviet bloc military technicians and advisers have worked abroad for periods of six months or more.

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had been provided on very short notice and deployed during the height of the West Irian crisis. The Soviet crews stayed for several months while Indonesian personnel were trained. Similarly, in early October 1962 Soviet personnel began to help man Egyptian bombers and transports in support of UAR military operations in Yemen.

The development of Cuba as a strategic Soviet base in the summer and autumn of 1962 was carried out under the guise of a military aid program. Much of the intense Soviet activity in the military aid field last year--including that in Indonesia and Yemen--served to mask the nature of the Cuban build-up, even though the Soviets may not have intended this.

Recent Developments

Since the US-Soviet confrontation over Cuba in 1962--a high-water mark in Soviet military activities abroad--Moscow has continued to stress military aid. Throughout 1963 the USSR has supported UAR operations in Yemen and early in the year began supplying the republican government with some equipment directly. In the UAR itself, Soviet activity is concentrated on development of a missile-equipped air defense system, which now includes con-


struction of at least eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and some 60 MIG-21s. The system is not yet in operation.

The program in Iraq was subjected to a severe test in 1963 when Soviet-Iraqi relations were nearly broken off and military aid was halted for two months. Shipments have resumed since then, but parts of the over-all program--including the SAM project--are suspended and the number of Soviet military advisers in the country has been sharply reduced.


In Syria, political instability has hampered Soviet military aid activities. Periodic deliveries are continuing, however. Four Komar guided-missile boats arrived recently.

Apparently under a 1963 military aid pact with Algeria, more than 400 Algerian personnel--mainly naval and air trainees--are receiving instruction in the USSR; aircraft and naval equipment eventually will be supplied. Only one shipment of military equipment, consisting of tanks and other land armaments, was made directly to Algeria from the USSR during the hostilities with Morocco. Moscow, however, probably encouraged UAR military aid to Algeria and at least acquiesced in Cuba's efforts.

# ★ SOME MAJOR ITEMS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY AID PROGRAM





Indonesian MIG-21 jet fighter equipped for air-to-air missiles. MIG-21's have also been supplied to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, India, Finland, Yugoslavia, and Cuba.




Egyptian TU-16 jet medium bomber. TU-16's have also gone to Iraq and to Indonesia; some in Indonesia are equipped for air-to-surface missiles.

Indian AN-12 heavy military transport. AN-12's have also gone to Iraq, Egypt, Ghana, and Cuba.



Egyptian Komar-class guided missile patrol boat. Komars have also been supplied to Cuba, Indonesia, and Syria.



Indonesian Sverdlov-class light cruiser. Indonesia has received more Soviet naval aid than any other country and is the only one to get a cruiser.

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An arms deal with the Somali Republic last October is the first major Soviet military aid agreement in Africa south of the Sahara. More than 200 Somali officers and men are in the USSR for military training. Deliveries of jet fighters, small patrol ships, and land armaments are expected, and may already have begun.

Elsewhere in Africa, Soviet military aid to Guinea--the only African country equipped entirely with bloc military gear--has come to a virtual standstill and no further deliveries are known to be scheduled. A small training program continues, however. In Ghana, where Soviet arms aid has been limited to a small amount of equipment for Nkrumah's personal guard, there are signs that a more extensive program of Soviet military assistance may be in the wind.

For the last two years Soviet military aid to Afghanistan has been focused on training, maintenance, and reorganization. Little additional equipment has been delivered, but local interest in more modern weapons is likely to be fostered by Soviet technicians and advisers working with Afghan personnel.

The nature of Soviet military assistance to India almost certainly has been influenced by Moscow's sensitivity to Peiping's strident denunciations

of Soviet support for the Nehru government. The USSR has been careful to provide only equipment designed to serve primarily defensive purposes in order to avoid the appearance of strengthening India's offensive capabilities against China. The Soviets, however, have shown no signs of backing out of their commitments and now are executing the expanded program agreed to in 1963. Moscow has provided India with a large number of military transports and helicopters, and a few MIG fighters. It has agreed to supply SAMs and is proceeding with plans for setting up production facilities for MIG aircraft and missiles. The USSR has turned down some Indian requests, however, partly for technical reasons, and has refused consistently to liberalize its rather stiff financial terms for military aid to India. This would enable the Soviets to claim that these are commercial sales and do not involve financial assistance.

There have been few new developments in Soviet military aid to Indonesia this year. Construction of new SAM sites continues, and extensive training programs, frequently for officers in the higher ranks, are under way in many fields. Few additional arms shipments are being made pending the assimilation of equipment already on hand.

In Cuba, the remaining Soviet military personnel apparently are being shaped into



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
**SURFACE-TO-AIR  
★ MISSILE (SAM)  
PROGRAM**

In addition to the system established in Cuba, SAM deployment is still under way in Egypt and Indonesia. The program in Iraq has been stalled since last summer and one in India is just beginning.



Test firing of SA-2 missile in Egypt, July 1963.

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


SAM site near Cairo, March 1963.



SA-2 missiles near SAM training area at Kalidjati, Indonesia, December 1963

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a permanent military aid and advisory mission. Intensive training programs for Cuban personnel have led to turnover of much of the equipment brought in as part of the Soviet military build-up.

The amount and make-up of Soviet military aid to Yugoslavia is still uncertain, but a substantial program is being carried out. Deliveries in 1962-63 included tanks, assault guns, MIG fighters, and radars. A SAM system apparently will be established, but the number of sites has not been disclosed.

Impact of the Program

Moscow has registered some significant gains through military aid, and the vigor put into the program in recent years indicates clearly that the Soviets consider their efforts worthwhile. Furthermore, the achievements have proved lasting and may well have greater implications in the long run.

Through its aid programs Moscow has developed close working ties with several key underdeveloped countries--ties virtually nonexistent before 1955. While military aid is only part of the total Soviet approach, countries heavily dependent on Soviet military support frequently develop the most durable and far-reaching relations with Moscow. The durability of military aid ties was proven during the height of Soviet-Iraqi recriminations in mid-1963 when shipments were suspended for a


time but the program itself was not jettisoned.

Military aid results in a dependence unmatched by most economic relationships. A country relying largely on the USSR for military equipment, spare parts, and technical aid must at least consider Moscow's views before embarking on a venture hostile to Soviet interests. Reluctance of local military leaders to jeopardize their source of supply almost certainly has tempered some political decisions. Similarly, military aid stimulates trade and frequently leads rapidly to financial indebtedness, giving the Soviets another instrument to manipulate in support of their local policy objectives.


Provision of military technicians and advisers has resulted in a Soviet presence in many new areas. This technical aid, along with training programs for thousands of foreign nationals, may have increasing important consequences as Soviet-trained personnel advance in military and political hierarchies.

Introduction of advanced weapons systems in technically backward countries has spurred training programs, but even the supply of conventional equipment places a strain on the technical resources of many countries where numbers of qualified personnel are severely limited. Military training is an attractive prospect for many Afro-Asians who lack other means of acquiring the educational attributes needed in a modern society.


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**SOVIET BLOC  
MILITARY HARDWARE IS  
FEATURED ON MANY CEREMONIAL  
OCCASIONS IN AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES**



T-34 tank, Conakry, November 1962




T-54 tanks, Kabul, August 1962.




Twin 57mm. self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, Cairo, July 1963.



SA-2 (GUIDELINE) surface-to-air missile, Cairo, July 1963.



PT-76 amphibious tank, Djakarta, October 1962.



MIG-19 jet fighters in flyby over Cairo, July 1963.

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The Soviets doubtless cultivate this desire and attempt to select the cream of military candidates for higher level instruction.

Although reports of dissatisfaction with Soviet training are frequent, these may originate with malcontents who do not represent a majority of trainees. Moreover, large-scale training programs continue to be planned and carried out despite occasional rumblings of discontent and failures of some training ventures.

More than ever before, large numbers of foreign nationals are receiving high-level military instruction in the USSR. Indonesia is the most striking example of such training, and large programs are also in progress for trainees from the UAR, Afghanistan, and Cuba. More recently, Algeria and the Somali Republic have embarked on military training programs in the USSR as a prerequisite to deliveries of equipment.

No clear-cut gains, such as growth of pro-Soviet attitudes among military circles, are evident from this training, even though the USSR has carefully fostered the anti-Western views of many foreign military men. Moscow probably calculates that working relationships with key military leaders and prolonged exposure to Soviet views and methods may build a reservoir of influence which could be critical in some future power

struggle. In the meantime, short-run objectives will be achieved if Soviet-trained personnel exert any influence on their governments to continue neutralist, if not pro-Soviet, foreign policies.

Fears of these trends are expressed rather frequently by both military and civilian leaders in underdeveloped countries, but rarely do these fears result in curtailment of military programs. King Zahir of Afghanistan, for instance, is said to be concerned with the long-run consequences of Soviet influence in the Afghan military, but he continues to approve additional training programs, both at home and in the USSR. As long as the Soviets remain willing to fulfill desires for military equipment, particularly of the more modern varieties, they will be able to capitalize on the need for training and to insist on the entry of Soviet technicians and advisers.

The most immediate impact of Soviet military aid has been its further injection of the USSR into regional disputes throughout the world. As a supplier of military equipment to one or more of the participants in local conflicts, Moscow often becomes a factor where otherwise it would have little influence. While the Soviets probably welcome these opportunities in general, it seems likely that in some instances they would prefer to be less involved.

The USSR frequently moves cautiously in providing military

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aid, but compared with most Western countries, Moscow has fewer conflicting interests in underdeveloped areas and usually is able to choose sides more rapidly in local disputes. Even where they have conflicting interests, the Soviets usually are more uninhibited in their approach to military aid and are less concerned with the consequences of introducing weapons in trouble spots. This allows rapid Soviet support for nationalist goals and expansionist aspirations of leaders like Sukarno and Nasir, winning laurels for Soviet policies at the expense of the West. Damage to Soviet relations with other countries affected by these methods may well be outweighed by the prospects for eroding Western influence in the area as a whole.

Outlook

Moscow continues to respond favorably to new military aid requests and to seek out new areas of activity. In recent weeks there has been a surge in Soviet military shipments abroad, reflecting new aid agreements as well as maintenance and modernization under well-established programs. There is no sign that the USSR's increased selectiveness in making economic aid offers carries over into the military field. The Soviets are well aware of the limitations of foreign aid diplomacy, but they appear convinced that it retains its usefulness, particularly military aid.

As long as an improvement in East-West relations remains a primary Soviet objective, the USSR is likely to limit its direct involvement in regional crises. In Indonesia, for instance, the Soviets may be exerting a moderating influence on the military aspects of Djakarta's anti-Malaysian policies. In the recent Algerian-Moroccan border fracas, the Soviet Union could have become more deeply involved, but seemed content to work largely in conjunction with the UAR and Cuba, and to carry on its longer range program of military aid to Algeria.

To help protect its image from criticism which may arise from lagging Soviet economic programs, Moscow will be alert for new military aid opportunities. Military aid could help gloss over any Soviet unwillingness to undertake sizable new economic commitments abroad. In Brazil, for instance, the USSR displays a marked reluctance to engage in an expansive economic aid program, but might make an attractive offer of aircraft to the Brazilian Air Force as an inexpensive substitute.

The USSR probably will continue supplying selected countries with advanced weapons systems and sufficient manpower to train local military personnel. Agreements with India and Indonesia for setting up MIG

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fighter assembly plants suggest that provision of military production facilities may become a more important part of the program. Such agreements are unlikely to reduce a recipient's reliance on Soviet military aid in the near future and may even increase it through the need for imported components.

The USSR probably will continue to emphasize the techni-

cal aspects of its military aid program. In addition to operational and maintenance instruction, greater training in theoretical military concepts seems likely as the Soviets seek to cultivate long-range influence with foreign military establishments.

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