


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
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# SPECIAL REPORT

INDEPENDENT KENYA 'S PROSPECTS UNDER JOMO KENYATTA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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**INDEPENDENT KENYA'S PROSPECTS UNDER JOMO KENYATTA**

The future stability of Kenya, which becomes independent on 12 December, will hinge largely on Prime Minister Kenyatta's ability to control the more radical elements in his party and to restore economic confidence. In the two years since the British released him from detention he has translated his position as the symbol of Kenyan nationalism into an effective political leadership, but diverse tribal and racial elements remain intensely antagonistic barely below the surface. Personal rivalries among Kenyatta's lieutenants are also keen, based partly on their orientation to either the West or the Communist bloc. Kenyatta's own neutralist attitude toward international affairs will probably permit a rapid increase in the influence of Communist countries in Kenya.

The Kenyan Population

Kenya's white minority, although comprising less than one percent of the country's nine million people, is larger than in any other African colony south of the Sahara yet to attain independence. Because of the vital role the Europeans have played in the country's primarily agricultural economy, their gradual withdrawal is already having serious repercussions. The somewhat larger Asiatic minority dominates the retail trade, and will be vulnerable to Africanization pressures.

The Africans themselves are divided into some 40 distinguishable tribes, ranging from those scarcely touched by modern civilization to the energetic Kikuyu, who have adapted to changing conditions and gained the enmity of others. Only the Somali tribesmen in the Northeastern Region, with ties to the Somali

Republic, pose an immediate security threat, however.


The Political Environment

In the years of preparing Kenya for independence, the British tried to provide a political framework in which no single authority, party, or tribe could control the rest.

The complicated constitution provides for a modified federal structure consisting of central, regional, and local governments. There are specified powers for the regions and other powers shared between the regions and the central government. All residual powers go to the central government, which, by a critical preindependence British decision, will also control the police, civil service, and regional finances.

The trend, nevertheless, is unmistakably toward rule by one

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party--Kenya's National Union (KANU), which is dominated by members of Kenya's two largest and politically most active tribes, the Kikuyu and Luo. KANU won an overwhelming victory in last May's preindependence elections and has since consolidated its position. The victory gave KANU control of both houses of the National Assembly--including two thirds of the all-important lower house--and three of the six regional assemblies.


The opposition party, the Democratic Union (KADU), is a loose federation of political groups representing the smaller tribes formed largely out of fear of Kikuyu domination. Under strong European influence, it has doggedly fought to preserve the rights and identity of tribal and racial minorities in the face of persistent KANU demands for a strongly centralized government. Although able to win only 24 percent of the popular vote, KADU captured nearly half the seats in the Senate--more than enough to block senatorial approval of constitutional amendments. This KADU power is offset, however, by the government's right to submit to popular referendum any amendments disapproved by parliament.

Since June, when Kenya attained self-government, KANU has scored some impressive gains in local elections in KADU areas, and KADU defections have increased KANU's majority in

the house to 75 percent. The absence of basic convictions among Kenya politicians is evidenced by the fact that three of these aisle-crossers come from the Rift Valley, whose people have been the most passionate supporters of KADU and its regionalist principles.

Prime Minister Kenyatta

Jomo Kenyatta, who was imprisoned as a Mau Mau leader, became KANU's president after his release in August 1961. He has spent most of his 65 years working for the Kikuyu cause, and is the embodiment of Kenyan nationalism. An orator and a man of great personal magnetism, he is the only Kenyan who might be able to instill in his divided countrymen some real sense of national unity. He reportedly joined the Communist Party in 1930 and later attended the Lenin Institute in Moscow, but his earlier extremist and violently



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antiwhite attitudes appear to have moderated.

Since taking power in June, Kenyatta has proved to be a stronger, more decisive leader than many observers had expected. He has endeavored to create a feeling of national purpose to override traditional tribal rivalries, and his statements have done much to allay the fears of white settlers and Asian merchants. The skeptics fear, however, that his conduct during this transitional period is merely a mask to ensure early independence. By expertly tailoring his remarks to suit his audiences, Kenyatta has succeeded in building up confidence in his moderation, statesmanship, and good intentions. At the same time he has avoided committing himself on a number of controversial issues. Thus he continues to be largely an unknown quantity.

Kenyatta's 16-man cabinet is a comparatively moderate

group, well representative of the country's tribes and regions. The prime minister has balanced the various KANU factions with evident success and preserved full flexibility for eventually designating his heir apparent.

The Chief Lieutenants

The 33-year-old Tom Mboya, KANU's capable secretary general, is the only figure in Kenya, other than Kenyatta, who has a national political following. He is the top contender for the post of foreign minister after 12 December. As minister of justice and constitutional affairs, he has been responsible for negotiating with Britain the final matters relating to Kenya's constitution.

Mboya is a Luo, but he finds his greatest strength among the new, urbanized African "proletariat." He is former head of the Kenya Federation of Labor and the Ministry of Labor,



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and his labor backing is the foundation for his political success. However, Mboya's Western connections expose him to charges of UK-US domination and, together with his driving ambition and arrogant manner, have earned him many personal enemies.

Mboya's bitterest opponent is Oginga Odinga, the strongly pro-Luo vice president of KANU. Oginga, who now heads the Ministry of Home Affairs, has long sought also to be Kenya's first minister of defense and may be shifted to that post.

Oginga's political influence and strength depend on a continuation of the patronage he dispenses in the form of Communist money and scholarships. He is no ideological convert--but an opportunist whose association with the Communist bloc has stemmed directly from his long-standing political feud with Mboya, and his yearning for the distinction of foreign sponsorship to match that of his younger rival. Oginga, 51, is typical of the old-style African politician who owes his position more to age and tribal status than to intellectual merit and ability. In the past eight months there have been reports that the Communists--both Soviet and Chinese--have been reappraising their relationship with him, but so far there is no indication that they have replaced him as their chosen instrument.

Kenyatta is closer to Oginga, from whom he has received financial support, than to the ambitious Mboya, whom he does not really trust, but he could not tab either as his successor without risking destruction of the party. He opposes Oginga on tribal, rather than ideological, grounds.

Kenyatta's current choice as his understudy and probable successor is a fellow Kikuyu, James Gichuru, the 49-year-old minister of finance and economic planning. Intelligent and able but without strong personal ambitions, Gichuru is considered a moderating influence among the Kikuyu and with KANU--where he is generally identified with the Mboya faction.

Joseph Murumbi, 52, whose position is minister of state in the Prime Minister's Office, is another figure of rising influence. Although he is a Goan-Masai half-caste educated in India, and is therefore unlikely to become the next prime minister, he is a hard-working, able executive. Because he has had experience in Somalia, he has been Kenyatta's principal aid in handling the Somali problem and might become foreign minister if Mboya is passed over.

#### Authoritarian Trend

After independence Kenyatta is likely to grasp the reins of government firmly as an


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increasingly more authoritarian leader. He may become impatient with any element of society which he believes is acting irresponsibly or is failing to work for the good of the state, and his objectives will coincide with those of Oginga and the radical elements of KANU.

Recent agitation within KANU for government control of the trade union movement is in line with Oginga's past futile efforts to undermine the Kenya Federation of Labor--the base of Mboya's power. In this campaign Oginga has had financial backing from both the USSR and Ghana.

Any criticism of the government by the press or the independent radio and television networks is certain to bring increased government control. Achieng Oneko, the minister of information, broadcasting, and tourism, said in October that "all media of information must uphold the activities, the plans, and the needs of the state to create the true African image." A Luo and one of several old-guard extremists in the present cabinet, Oneko was Kenyatta's private secretary and co-defendant in the 1952 Mau Mau trial and has long been one of Oginga's closest associates.



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#### Economic Plans

The Kenyatta government talks of creating a socialist society. It nevertheless recognizes the need to retain and attract private capital, and publicly welcomes foreign investment which "genuinely" contributes to the country's economic well-being. For basic industrial and commercial enterprises, in any case, it appears to be thinking in terms of joint participation by government and private investors rather than outright public ownership.

At present, however, the economy is suffering severely from the departure of thousands of Europeans who fear what may ensue after independence. The monetary economy is essentially owned and managed by European and Asian immigrants and depends on them

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for consumption as well as production and investment capital. Their leaving has caused a gradual shrinking of economic activity and serious unemployment.

Kenyatta's stress on the need for a nonracist society in which foreign skills can be retained has slowed the exodus for the moment, but the Asians in particular will probably be subjected to increasing demands for Africanization of their jobs. A moderate government would do much to restore economic confidence and attract private foreign capital, but for some time to come Kenya will need outside financial support. Its present budgetary deficit is about 14 percent of total spending, and its adverse balance of payments will persist as long as the country imports twice as much as it exports. This year the British Government is contributing about \$18 million directly to meet the budget deficit and is also providing \$29 million for development. In addition, it is estimated that the presence of British forces and their dependents contribute some \$28 million annually to the colony's economy.

Kenya's economy depends partly on the country's maintenance of its close links with neighboring and already independent Uganda and Tanganyika. At the present time the currency and common services such as railroads, airlines, posts, and telegraphs are jointly managed. Efforts to build these ties into a political federation

have not borne fruit, however. Kenyan and Tanganyikan leaders had hoped to federate by the end of this year, but the Ugandans, who had the least to gain from the arrangement, blocked any rapid progress. The question probably will be discussed further, but the best chance for federation appears to have been lost, and in the absence of any such political bond a steady erosion of the cooperative economic arrangements may transpire.

#### Foreign Relations

Although Kenyatta professes a belief in "positive neutralism" and a desire to keep the cold war out of Kenya, his anticolonial bias and his earlier Marxist proclivities suggest that there will be few barriers to a rapid build-up of Communist representation in Kenya after the British departure. The Kenyan Government is already seeking formal ties with the Communist countries as a counterbalance to those with the West.

Kenya plans to impose a personnel limit on all non-Commonwealth embassies. In Tanganyika a similar limitation has had the effect of increasing the ratio of Communist representation, as the Western embassies have become outnumbered. The six Communist countries which have embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika's capital, can be expected to move quickly to establish themselves in Nairobi as well. TASS and the New China News Agency have recently set up permanent offices there--outside the anticipated quota.

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The Kenyan cabinet agreed last July that contacts with the bloc countries must be increased and strengthened as soon as possible. A Kenyan ministerial-level trade mission recently visited East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR in search of a market for Kenya's surplus coffee and pyrethrum. The delegation found that substantial sales were likely only on a balanced-trade basis, but the countries visited agreed to send delegations after independence to survey Kenya's needs and potentials. The Kenyan agricultural minister has stated that his country intends to provide trade openings for the Eastern Europeans by restricting Japanese imports.

In Yugoslavia and Poland, the Kenyan mission discussed technical aid, particularly for agricultural cooperatives. Although they found the terms expensive, agreement is likely after further negotiation. These two countries were the first to sign both trade and aid agreements with Tanganyika.

#### Present Ties With the Bloc

The number of Kenyans traveling to the bloc is increasing. In the past few months, Oginga has organized several tours to the USSR and Communist China for large delegations of KANU politicians and labor leaders.

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As of last July there were about 400 students in the bloc, according to Kenyan Government records, but the actual number may be as high as 700.

Oginga's staff--which includes representatives in London and Cairo--has made the arrangements for most students reaching the bloc during the past four years. He has usually by-passed the Kenyan Government's student processing mechanism and has often acted without official KANU approval. In September 1962 Kenyatta was moved--either by Kikuyu pressure or by a desire to counterbalance Oginga's rising personal influence--to obtain on his own initiative scholarships from Bulgaria for some 60 Kikuyus

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Roughly 50 percent of the Kenyans in Communist countries are Kikuyu, while only 25 percent are Luo.

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
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The Somali Problem


The most pressing security issue facing the Kenyatta government is the status of the Somali-inhabited Northeastern Region, an isolated, semidesert area claimed by the Somali Republic.




Kenya recognizes Somalia's interest in the area, but has refused its demand that the region be administered jointly or by the UN pending further negotiations. The boycott of last May's elections by the region's nomadic inhabitants--who appear almost unanimous in their desire to join the Somali Republic--left the region without local government. Because of Somali dislike for the African Bantu, Kenyatta plans to retain there some 30 British administrators and hopes to launch an extensive development program in this area--where political and economic progress has lagged far behind the rest of Kenya.

The determination of the Somalis to secede could--with a minimum of outside support--result in a prolonged guerrilla war and a severe economic drain on independent Kenya. The campaign may have already begun. In November groups of well-armed Somalis conducted at least ten raids into the Northeastern

Region from safe havens across Somalia's border. The imminent delivery of Soviet arms to the Somali Army will make the older British and Italian arms available for guerrilla operations and increase the likelihood of serious clashes within Kenya.



Kenya also can be expected to seek a navy and air force of its own and new arms to expand its 2,500-man army.



The 5,000 British troops in Kenya are scheduled to leave within the next year, but in view of the Somali threat, the Kenyatta government may wish to slow their departure--both to utilize British training facilities and to avoid the resulting dislocation of Kenya's economy.

Outlook

As KADU strength declines in the future, the principal threat to Kenya's political stability--apart from the Somali problem--will be the growth of disunity within KANU. Given the fluidity of Kenyan politics, a power struggle between the Kikuyu and the Luo also seems inevitable. Already there is agitation among the Kikuyu for

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a greater share of the political spoils which they consider their due, while the Luo remain particularly sensitive to any advantages, real or imagined, which go to the Kikuyu.

Kenya's stability therefore will depend not only on Kenyatta's agility to overcome tribalism, but also on his agility in

balancing intraparty Mboya-Oginga factional rivalry, which already has East-West overtones. The course that Kenyatta takes will depend, in the final analysis, on the degree of influence which the extremist elements of the party are able to exercise over him.



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