


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SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

THE MEN IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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5 July 1963

THE MEN IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION

The delegates chosen by the Chinese and the Soviet parties for the bilateral talks--opening today--provide proof, if any more is needed, that the talks will be more bitterly acrimonious and less productive than any that have gone before. Both parties are being represented by top-level, uncom-promising experts in dealing with hostile opponents. The men in each delegation are highly skilled in the particularly nasty infighting that characterizes Communist party life, and they can be counted on by Khrushchev and Mao to convey forcefully the antagonism each feels for the other.

The Chinese Team

The selection of Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen to head the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) delegation means that the Chinese are approaching the talks in a truculent, uncompromising mood. Both these men at past conferences of Communist parties have demonstrated that they are tough, intelligent, and unrelievedly hostile to Soviet policies. Both have had occasion to criticize Khrushchev to his face and are therefore probably personally offensive to him..

A review of recent activities of the Chinese leadership suggests that Teng and Peng have been Mao's chief lieutenants in planning and executing strategy in the anti-Soviet contest. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute surfaced in 1960, they have tirelessly courted representatives of Communist parties and of Asian and African states, soliciting support for revolutionary Chinese views, attacking Soviet policies, and trying

to undermine Soviet influence. In recent months, between infrequent public appearances, they have probably been huddling with Mao to plan Chinese strategy and to help draft the voluminous polemical material Peiping has been issuing.

Teng Hsiao-ping


Teng Hsiao-ping, a hard-driving and aggressive man, appears to rank alongside Chou En-lai in third place in the Chinese Communist hierarchy. One of the youngest of the seven members of the politburo's standing committee, who form the inner circle of power in China, he now holds two key party positions which give him formidable power. As a member of the standing committee, he helps formulate all major policies; as head of the secretariat, he supervises their day-to-day implementation. In the latter role, he also controls important personnel appointments and has often exploited the power this gives to place his protégés on the

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TYPICAL CHINESE VIEWS OF MOSCOW'S LINE

TENG HSIAO-PING:

"The Soviet party is opportunist and revisionist; it lacks any deep knowledge of Marxism; its ideas about disarmament are absurd; peaceful coexistence could mean nothing, except as a tactical weapon to deceive the enemy; the Soviet idea of a division of labor among the countries of the socialist camp is wrong, and China must go her own way." (From his speech on 14 November 1960 at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties)



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KANG SHENG:

"Khrushchev's statements concerning Eisenhower's desire for peace resulted in deluding the people of the world." (Bucharest, 26 June 1960)

LIU NING-I:

"To sit down at the same table with imperialists means a betrayal of all mankind." (2 June 1960, commenting on the Soviet view that disarmament talks are necessary)

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secretariat and in other key positions.

Teng's meteoric rise dates from 1954 and is linked with the purge that year of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, regional leaders who attempted to seize supreme power. Probably as a reward for the part he played in exposing the conspiracy, he became secretary general and a politburo member in 1954. When the standing committee was formed in 1956, Teng was on it.

Since rising to eminence, Teng has been associated only with militant policies. One of his chief and continuing concerns has been discipline in the party. He was an enthusiastic backer of the radical Leap Forward and commune movements. He did not associate himself with Mao's Hundred Flowers movement of early 1957, which he probably regarded as dangerously liberal, nor has he made a major statement on domestic policy since the return to a moderate approach in late 1960.

Teng has been just as concerned about the loss of revolutionary momentum in the international Communist movement as at home. In November 1957 he accompanied Mao to Moscow, where he helped present a stiffened Chinese line at a meeting of Communist parties. In May 1958, at China's most recent party congress, Teng blasted "modern revisionism," the Chinese term for ideological backsliding.

Teng played a key role at the second conference of the

world's Communist parties, held at Moscow in November 1960, after the Sino-Soviet dispute had broken into the open. Although Liu Shao-chi headed the Chinese delegation, Teng made the major speeches. In addition to the usual attacks on the USSR for being too soft in its policies toward the West and underdeveloped countries, Teng is reported to have defended Mao against Khrushchev's criticism of him for being an ivory-tower theorist, to have blamed Khrushchev for causing the deterioration of relations by insisting that other parties accept his dictatorship, and to have charged the Soviets with attempting to subvert the Chinese leadership.

Since 1960 Teng has devoted much time to the task of soliciting support from foreign Communists. In 1961 he led a CCP delegation to North Korea, which is now firmly in the Chinese camp. He has received representatives of many Communist parties which, if not already sympathetic to China, are believed to be susceptible to Chinese arguments or to have factions that are susceptible. The recent growth of Chinese influence in the world movement may be attributed in part to Teng's persuasiveness.

Peng Chen

Peng Chen, a senior politburo member but not on the standing committee, has a party background and a radical leftist outlook very similar to Teng Hsiao-ping's. Peng is on the secretariat. He is also mayor

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THE CHINESE TEAM



TENG HSIAO-PING
Architect of Anti-Soviet
Strategy



PENG CHEN
Held Bitter Face-to-Face
Debate With Khrushchev



KANG SHENG
Intelligence Specialist Who
Has Debated With Khrushchev



YANG SHANG-KUN
Mao's Aide



WU HSIU-CHUAN
Subjected to Catcalls at
European Party Congresses



LIU NING-I
Pushes Anti-Soviet Line
Outside the Bloc



PAN TZU-LI
Undiplomatic Diplomat
With a Tough Line

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of Peiping and first secretary of the Peiping party committee, but in recent years he has delegated much of the responsibility these positions entail in order to devote full time to problems of international communism.

Peng has attended several international conferences where Soviet and Chinese delegates clashed. He presented the Chinese line forcefully in June 1960 at a Rumanian party congress in Bucharest, where he clashed bitterly with Khrushchev after the Soviet leader had contemptuously criticized Mao. There are reports that Peng accused Khrushchev to his face of such things as betraying Marxism-Leninism and of thinking like a capitalist because he lived like one.

Peng was a member of the CCP delegation to the November 1960 Moscow conference. He was also in Chou En-lai's delegation to the 22nd Soviet party congress in 1961, and acted as delegation chief after Soviet attacks on Albania and the CCP caused Chou to leave prematurely. Peng led delegations to North Korea and North Vietnam in 1962. Out of the public eye from 24 April until 15 June, Peng may well have had a hand in drafting Peiping's 25-point letter of 14 June attacking Soviet policies.

Other Members of
The Chinese Delegation

The five lower level members of the Chinese delegation are all party veterans and militant revolutionaries who have been

active recently in international Communist affairs.

Kang Sheng is a Russian-speaking specialist on intelligence matters and an outspoken participant in bloc meetings. He was the leading Chinese observer at a Warsaw Pact meeting in February 1960, backed up Peng Chen at Bucharest in June 1960, was a member of the high-powered delegation at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in November 1960, and accompanied Chou En-lai to the 22nd Soviet congress in 1961. He is an alternate member of the politburo and a member of the secretariat.

Yang Shang-kun was present on three occasions in early 1963 when the Soviet ambassador to Peiping was summoned for preparatory talks on the forthcoming meeting. Yang speaks Russian and attended the 1960 Moscow conference. He has appeared with Mao at receptions for African and Latin American visitors. Only an alternate member of the secretariat, Yang's precise role is unclear. He may be a sort of personal aide to Mao Tse-tung.

Wu Hsiu-chuan heads the CCP's international liaison department, which is responsible for interparty relations. Between November 1962 and January 1963 he ably represented Peiping at four Eastern European party congresses, where he was subjected to catcalls and harassment. As China's last ambassador to Yugoslavia, a post dropped in 1957, he can provide

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eyewitness support to Chinese charges of Titoist "revisionism."

Liu Ning-i attended the 1960 Moscow conference and has vigorously clashed with the Soviets at Communist-oriented meetings held outside the bloc. For example, at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Moshi, Tanganyika, early this year, Liu Ning-i successfully persuaded the conferees to ignore Soviet advice and adopt uninhibited anticolonialist revolutions.

Pan Tzu-li, ambassador to Moscow since last November, earned a reputation for toughness during his tour as ambassador to India from 1956 through 1962. One of his more difficult responsibilities is to disseminate, in defiance of Moscow's wishes, Chinese polemical tracts to Soviet audiences. It was this action that caused the Soviets to declare five Chinese personae non gratae, thereby further straining state as well as party relations.

The Soviet Team

The Chinese delegates will find themselves face to face with the most experienced and hard-headed spokesmen the Kremlin can muster. The four principal Soviet negotiators are all secretaries of the party central committee and thus members of the top leadership. They, like the Chinese, have previously been the central figures in earlier direct meetings with their antagonists. Their specialties--ideology,

propaganda, and liaison with other Communist parties--make it likely that they have played the major role in drafting ideological position papers and the Soviet party's increasingly vituperative answers to Chinese attacks.

Mikhail Suslov

The team is headed by Mikhail Suslov, member of the party presidium as well as the secretariat and long a leading authority on doctrine. Now 60, he is spare, dour, taciturn and, in the opinion of one Western observer, looks like "an embittered civil servant passed over for promotion."

Despite his retiring and generally lackluster nature, Suslov is one of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union. He has been a central party secretary since 1947, longer than Khrushchev himself, and his principal concerns throughout this period have been ideology and relations with foreign Communist parties. In addition to his secretarial post, he served Stalin as head of the party's propaganda and agitation department (Agitprop) during 1947-1948, and later as chief editor of Pravda. Because his job was to push Stalin's policies and programs, he created the impression of being little more than a hard-lining sycophant.

Suslov's performance since March 1953 indicates, however, that he was a Stalinist more of necessity than of conviction. Particularly since the onset of de-Stalinization at

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the 20th party congress in 1956, he has rendered invaluable services to the Khrushchev regime. In 1956, for example, he teamed up with Khrushchev to explain the denigration of Stalin to the befuddled satellite leaders who flocked to Moscow in the wake of the 20th congress. A year later, he stood with Khrushchev against the "anti-party" (and pro-Stalin) group in the presidium, and at the central committee plenum which followed, he helped to seal the fates of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich by manipulating the proceedings so that none of their supporters had a chance to be heard.

In addition to his stand against Stalin's "cult of personality," he has repeatedly upheld those Moscow views which have stuck deepest in Peiping's craw: the correctness of Soviet Marxist theory, the superiority of the Soviet method of building communism, and Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the West. Suslov was a principal spokesman during the long and often acrimonious debates at the 1957 and 1960 world Communist conferences in Moscow. After the latter meeting he apparently took the rostrum at a good many party meetings in order to explain the differences existing between the Soviet and Chinese parties. Speaking in Peiping on the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic in September 1959--and immediately prior to Khrushchev's arrival there from the United States--Suslov reminded the Chinese that

they are still "building socialism," in contrast to the USSR, which had advanced to the higher stage of "full-scale construction of a Communist society."

Suslov's point of view in the Sino-Soviet polemic emerged most clearly from his speech to a national conference of social scientists in February 1962. Addressing himself to the Albanian party leadership--and thus indirectly to the Chinese--he attacked their "dogmatism" and accused them of hiding behind pseudorevolutionary leftist slogans, of being unwilling or unable to evaluate the "new historical situation" and to apply Marxism-Leninism under changed conditions. Branding the Albanian line as malicious, deviationist, slanderous and anti-Leninist, and overtly anti-Soviet, he stated that the Albanian leaders were deliberately undermining the unity of the world Communist movement. It is safe to assume that Suslov took a similar position in his remarks--as yet unpublished--on the Sino-Soviet dispute at a closed session of the party plenum last month.

Suslov will probably deliver the general Soviet position and then rely on his three principal teammates for extrapolation and debate on specific bones of contention. Each has responsibility for supervising a key segment of Moscow's ideological activity in his day-to-day work as a central committee secretary.

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THE SOVIET TEAM



MIKHAIL SUSLOV
The USSR's Chief
Ideological Spokesman



YURI ANDROPOV
Expert on Bloc
Communist Parties



BORIS PONOMAREV
Expert on Parties
Outside the Bloc



LEONID ILICHEV
Sarcastic Debater on
Ideological Matters



STEPAN CHERVONENKO
Soviet Ambassador
to Peiping

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Yuri Andropov has been chief of the Soviet party's department for relations with bloc parties since 1957. He is 49, a party careerist, and a representative of the younger professionals whom Khrushchev has brought into the leadership in increasing numbers. During 1941-51 he worked as a local-level official first in the youth organization (the Komsomol) and then in the party; he subsequently served for two years as head of a subsection in the party central apparatus and transferred to the diplomatic corps in 1953. Assigned to Budapest as counselor of the embassy, he was named ambassador to Hungary in 1954 and remained in that post until his transfer back to the party apparatus in 1957. He was elected to the central committee secretariat at the 22nd party congress in November 1961.

As the Moscow official in charge of relations with bloc parties, Andropov is in very frequent contact with satellite representatives who visit the Soviet capital; in addition, he travels widely throughout the bloc, attending various party conferences, congresses, and celebrations. His personal convictions are probably very similar to those of Khrushchev and Suslov. At least the Albanians see him as being firmly in the opposing camp; last October they described him in the press as a "known proponent of the sinister activities of Khrushchev and his group...."

Boris Ponomarev

Soviet party relations with Communist parties outside the bloc are the responsibility of Boris Ponomarev, head of the central committee's "international department." A historian by training, he has been one of the Soviet Union's most prolific writers on party history; since assuming control of the international department after the 20th congress in 1956, he has emerged as the chief ideological spokesman for Soviet foreign policy and as Khrushchev's principal adviser on the doctrinal aspects of international relations.

Ponomarev is 58 and has been a professional Communist almost all his life. He joined the party when he was 14, fought in the civil war, and has apparently been on the full-time party payroll ever since. He has worked in the central apparatus in Moscow since 1944 and has been concerned with international Communist party liaison since at least 1950.

Election as a candidate member of the central committee at the 19th party congress in 1952 marked the beginning of Ponomarev's rise into the top hierarchy. By 1955 he had impressed the Soviet Union's new leader sufficiently to be taken as an adviser when Khrushchev and Bulganin went to Yugoslavia. At the 20th congress, less than a year later, Ponomarev was elevated to full central committee membership and in addition to his assignment as head

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SOVIET VIEWS OF PEIPING'S DEFIANCE

MIKHAIL SUSLOV:

"The present Albanian (i.e., Chinese) leaders, having slipped into a quagmire of nationalism, are ever more openly going over from dogmatic positions to those of an open struggle against the CPSU and the world communist movement.... Their political line has an undisguised anti-Soviet trend and is of a malicious, slanderous nature." (From a speech on 5 February 1962 to Soviet social scientists)

BORIS PONOMAREV:

"Attempts . . . on the basis of quotations out of context and far-fetched designs, to teach the Communist parties, headed by their tempered Marxist-Leninist leaders, are not only ludicrous but harmful." (in Pravda, 18 November 1962)

LEONID ILICHEV:

"The ideological struggle of our party on two fronts-- against revisionism and against dogmatism and sectarianism--is a struggle for a fundamentally correct solution of the questions of theory and practice, for a creative development of Marxism-Leninism.... We must therefore protect and develop it together, in a single rank; for if Communists disperse to their little national corners and each starts to blow his own national trumpet, without regard for the radical, fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, this will only hamper the final victory of Communism." (Address to the central committee on 18 June 1963)

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of the international department, he was appointed to the editorial board of the party theoretical journal Kommunist. He was named a central committee secretary at the 22nd party congress in November 1961.

Ponomarev's duties have gained him wide experience in dealing with foreign parties. He has maintained extensive contacts with nonbloc Communist leaders and has frequently visited them abroad. He is also reported by several sources to have played an important role in the polemics with Peiping; certainly a large part of his activity in this regard has involved angling for support among foreign--and particularly West European--Communists.

Leonid Ilichev

The chief Soviet asset in give-and-take argumentation with the Chinese will probably be Leonid Ilichev, veteran propagandist-ideologist-journalist, chairman of the Soviet party's ideological commission and a strong proponent of the Khrushchev line. Regarded by most Russian intellectuals as the "Soviet Goebbels," he is stubborn, hard-headed, quick-witted, and sharp-tongued. He has a marked flair for debate and is a master of deadpan sarcasm.

Ilichev is 57; he once taught philosophy but made his career in journalism. He served on the staff of Pravda early in World War II, and then ran the government news-

paper Izvestia for four years. He became deputy chief of Agitprop in early 1948, editor of Pravda in 1951, and a candidate member of the central committee in 1952.

Immediately thereafter, however, Ilichev went into political decline. He was replaced as Pravda chief and dropped from the editorial board of Kommunist. He clearly had incurred Stalin's wrath.

In the shake-up which followed Stalin's death, Ilichev received the relatively minor post of chief of the Foreign Ministry's press department. He held the job for five years, editing foreign news published in the USSR and handling press and public relations for Khrushchev on his travels abroad; he has accompanied Khrushchev on almost all his foreign visits since 1954, including his trip to the United States in 1959.

Ilichev performed well as press chief and by 1958 he was named to head the vast Soviet propaganda machine. At the 22nd party congress, he was elevated to membership on the party secretariat--perhaps as an understudy to Suslov--and was made chief of the party's ideological commission on its formation last November.

Stepan Chervonenko

Moscow's ambassador to Peiping, the fifth member of the Soviet delegation, was probably included for purely protocol reasons and is unlikely to have a major role in the discussions.

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