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28 December 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 27 Dec)

CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS Page 1

There continues to be no evidence that the USSR is preparing to withdraw its armored forces from the four encampments in Cuba. Preparations are under way for a massive military display on 2 January when the regime observes its fourth anniversary in power. Fidel Castro is scheduled to be the main speaker on this occasion. The recent publication in a Havana newspaper of a particularly anti-Soviet Chinese Communist newspaper editorial [redacted]

suggests that Castro may have some major political moves under consideration. [redacted]

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CONGO Page 3

Adoula, following a series of increasingly effective attacks on his government, plans to recess parliament until March. Tshombé continues to block the start of negotiations on the Belgian proposal that Union Miniere make tax payments to both Leopoldville and Katanga. Tensions between the UN and Katanga are high and erupted into a military clash on 24 December outside Elisabethville. [redacted]

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JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND YEMEN Page 5

Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which continue to support the Yemeni royalists, are bitter over US recognition of the republican regime in Yemen. Jordan has suggested that Saudi Arabia join it in reappraising their pro-Western orientation and in considering "the utility of dealings with Communist bloc nations." Although it seems unlikely that King Husayn's regime will in the final analysis turn to the bloc, it may seek lesser ways to register its displeasure. In Yemen, the military situation has not changed significantly during the past week. [redacted]

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THE SITUATION IN LAOS Page 6

Kong Le's recent criticisms of the Pathet Lao and equally sharp Pathet Lao attacks on the neutralists reflect a serious deterioration in the relations between the rival factions. Meanwhile, in response to a request from the Lao Government, the International Control Commission (ICC) will probably soon investigate charges that foreign troops remain in Laos. The ICC protested the government's severe restrictions on team operations, however, and asserted its right to undertake future investigations on its own initiative, free from government control. [redacted]

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SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY Page 7

The signing of a Chinese-Mongolian border treaty was announced on 26 December at the same time as a boundary agreement "in principle" with Pakistan was revealed. Peiping

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will use both to underscore its point that New Delhi's intransigence is the principal obstacle to settlement of Sino-Indian frontier differences. The new accord will probably not budge the Mongolians from their pro-Moscow alignment in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

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TIGHTENING OF PARTY CONTROL OVER SOVIET CULTURE Page 9

A "hard-line" policy for Soviet culture was laid down by party secretary Leonid Ilichev at a recent meeting between Soviet intellectuals and top party leaders. Signs of a crackdown have been evident since Khrushchev's 1 December visit to an abstract art exhibit, and Ilichev's statement that experimentation in the arts will not be tolerated and that the party is the only source of "truth" for the arts apparently signals an end to the regime's toleration of a trend toward liberalization during the past year. However, the openly defiant reaction of liberal intellectuals to the regime's efforts since early December to crack down on culture will make it difficult for the party to reimpose total control over the arts.

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SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE PLAN FOR 1963 Page 11

For the first time in three years the USSR's annual economic plan, recently presented to the Supreme Soviet, failed to specify the planned percentage increase in total foreign trade for the coming year. Soviet statements on the subject appear to reflect uncertainties about the course of trade, particularly with Communist China and the industrial West. Soviet trade with the European satellites probably will continue to expand and trade with underdeveloped countries is scheduled to increase sharply.

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TITO'S VISIT TO THE USSR Page 12

During Tito's 4-21 December visit to the USSR, he and Khrushchev apparently agreed on steps which they expect will result in continuing expansion of their economic and political relations and a gradual elimination of the issues which admittedly still divide them. The similarity between Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policies was repeatedly cited in public statements. Obviously pleased by the red carpet treatment given him, Tito has ordered that Yugoslavia "must avoid everything that might disturb relations with other socialist countries." Nevertheless, the visit may aggravate divisive tendencies within the Soviet bloc.

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ALBANIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION Page 14

The Albanian leadership, with the economic and political support of Communist China, has been able to maintain internal stability since the USSR severed all relations with Tirana a year ago. Despite mounting Soviet bloc pressures as evidenced at recent Communist congresses, there is no sign of any rift in the ruling hierarchy over the

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pro-Chinese, anti-Soviet line, and little indication of popular unrest. The large and efficient security apparatus has dealt quickly with the few centers of real or potential disaffection. Despite claims of satisfactory growth in the economy, difficulties in agriculture and in construction are being encountered.

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COMMON MARKET AND NATO DEVELOPMENTS Page 15

The UK-EEC accession talks have been adjourned until mid-January. Bonn and Paris, despite some apparent misgivings in both capitals, have agreed on detailed arrangements for special bilateral consultation. The Macmillan talks with President Kennedy in Nassau have made the military implications of closer European unity an immediate issue rather than a matter for consideration after the completion of the Brussels talks.

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PROBLEMS IN EXTENDING SPANISH-US BASES AGREEMENT Page 17

The Spaniards may be considering asking for political guarantees in return for extending the US bases agreement, which expires in September 1963. Madrid would prefer continued US military and economic aid on something like the former scale, but failing this the government may feel that it must have some political gains to show. There is some evidence that a proposal for an entirely new form of US-Spanish treaty relationship may be in the wind.

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POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Page 18

The chances for peaceful and orderly transition to constitutional government in the Dominican Republic have been substantially improved by the heavy victory of the Dominican Revolutionary Party in the national elections on 20 December. President-elect Juan Bosch will take office on 27 February. He has indicated that he plans a reformist domestic policy and a "dynamic, different, and democratic" foreign policy not unfriendly to the US. Various groups that had been plotting to seize the government will probably lie low, at least for the time being.

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COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN PERU Page 20

Communist agitators were clearly responsible for the recent violence by striking miners in La Oroya and by Indian tenant-farmers near Cusco. The governing junta, however, has charged the anti-Communist APRA with complicity in the incidents at La Oroya and continues to neglect action to curb the Communists. The junta appears to consider APRA a greater danger to its position than the Communists. Continued outbreaks of violence may create such political instability that the junta will cancel the elections promised for June 1963.

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

DE GAULLE'S CONTROL OF FRENCH NATIONAL POLICY Page 1

National policy in France is conceived and formed by President de Gaulle. Invested by the constitution with broad executive powers, he exercises close direct control in foreign affairs and military matters, and follows the political if not the economic aspects of the Common Market with great alertness. Even his closest long-time associates, whose views are close to his own, have only limited opportunity to influence his decisions.

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NORTH KOREA'S ARMED FORCES Page 6

North Korea's 330,000-man army is the third largest and its air force the fifth largest in the bloc. These forces have been maintained and improved by Soviet aid.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**WEEKLY REVIEWCUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

25X1 Aerial photographs of the four Soviet armored group encampments in Cuba [redacted] reveal no evidence of an impending withdrawal of the personnel or equipment located there. From 200 to 250 vehicles, including about 35 tanks, remained at each site on 22 December, and continuing construction of barracks-type buildings was observed at the encampment near Artemisa in eastern Pinar del Rio Province.

Premier Castro is scheduled as the main speaker for the 2 January event. He has used such occasions in the past for major policy announcements. His prolonged official silence--his last public speech having been delivered on 1 November--has heightened speculation that on 2 January he will speak on a topic of particular significance. Castro had been scheduled to address a sugar workers' meeting on 19 December, for which he had been widely advertised for weeks as the featured speaker. Minister of Industries Guevara appeared in Castro's place at the last moment, while Castro himself paid a visit, as he frequently has done in the last two months, to the University of Havana.

25X1 Cuban military units evidently are continuing to prepare for what promises to be a military display of unprecedented size at the Castro regime's celebration on 2 January of its fourth anniversary in power. Photography [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1 the regime's new political machine, the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS), will be announced. The "election" of members of this organization from among the ranks of Cuba's most "revolutionary-minded" citizens and the country's "most exemplary" workers has been going on for some time, and the 2 January occasion would be a logical one for the official inauguration of the PURS.

25X1 [redacted] has revealed more than 200 tanks and several hundred other military vehicles practicing parade formations in a staging area near Havana.

25X1 [redacted] the build-up of military vehicles in this area is for purposes of drilling for the parade. The purpose of the mammoth military show being planned may well be to impress Cubans as well as foreign observers at the celebration with the Castro regime's own military capabilities and to attempt to soften the impact of the Soviet removal of offensive missiles and jet bombers from Cuba.

The celebration could also provide a suitable occasion for the announcement of some change affecting the course of the revolution itself, although there are no clear indications that such a decision has been made or what its nature might be.

There are signs that a revision of Cuba's policy regarding the Sino-Soviet bloc at least has been contemplated. On 17 December the Havana


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newspaper Revolucion, one of the three major Cuban dailies, featured prominently a verbatim translation of a bitterly anti-Khrushchev editorial appearing on 15 December in the Chinese Communist party organ People's Daily. All Cuban newspapers usually have taken pains to avoid publicizing the Sino-Soviet dispute but have generally given greater coverage to the Soviet Union than to Communist China. The appearance of the 17 December article suggests that Castro at least condoned if he did not order its inclusion in Revolucion,





Cuban economists are continuing to work out the details of Havana's economic agreements for 1963 with bloc countries. The first stage of Soviet-Cuban economic negotiations for next year was completed in Moscow on 18 December, but there is little indication of the results achieved. A joint communiqué published on 20 December stated that full agreement was reached on "basic" trade issues, including the level of exchange, credits, transportation, and "other important questions." Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, head of the Cuban mission, left for home via Prague on 19 December, while the rest of the delegation, headed by Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora, remained in Moscow to complete negotiations there. The delegation is scheduled to go on to Peiping to negotiate the Cuban - Chinese Communist trade pact for 1963.

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Before leaving Moscow, Rodriguez expressed satisfaction with the preliminary talks, citing in particular the "understanding" shown by the USSR toward questions of credits and deliveries of "most important commodities." The final communiqué, rather than stating that Soviet-Cuban trade will increase next year, says that there was agreement on a "broadening" of trade. Originally scheduled to reach some \$750 million in 1962, total Soviet-Cuban trade this year probably fell short of this figure by \$75 million to \$100 million because of Cuban export deficiencies. Soviet aid almost certainly will be required to sustain the volume of trade in 1963.

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WEEKLY REVIEW

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CONGO**

After much hesitation and indecision Premier Adoula has decided to recess the Congo Parliament until March. A statement to that effect has been drafted and presumably will be issued in a few days.

Opposition attacks on the government have become increasingly effective since late November. The unanimous resolution by the lower house on 21 December calling for release of the leftist former Stanleyville leader, Antoine Gizenga, and a near-censure of a second one of Adoula's ministers, apparently convinced the premier he must make a decisive move if the government were to stay in office.

Adoula's reluctance to recess parliament is evident in the draft order. It contains no criticism of the opposition and clearly states that parliament is only being put on vacation, not dissolved, and that the next session will resume in March. In the interim, Adoula says, the government will concentrate on solving the Katangan problem and revising the Congo economy.

Congo army troops in Leopoldville were alerted on 23 December and restricted to barracks, but Adoula dropped earlier plans to arrest 19 opposition deputies. Outcries from the opposition are certain, but

Adoula's continuation of parliamentary salaries and Mobutu's support of the move should prevent any serious anti-government demonstrations.

The latest effort to get Tshombé to end his secession is at a standstill. The Belgian proposal that Union Miniere (UMHK) henceforth split its export tax payments and foreign exchange earnings between Katanga and the central government--accepted by Tshombé on 12 December--is stalled over the arrangements for negotiations on its details.

Tshombé maintains that only the Katangan government, not UMHK, is competent to discuss the payment plan, and he has vetoed a UN invitation to the Belgian head of the Katangan National Bank and local UMHK financial officials to begin discussions in Leopoldville. The bank official refuses to go without Tshombé's approval, and UMHK officials insist they cannot expose their facilities and personnel to Katangan retaliation by taking unilateral action. Tshombé charges that U Thant's call for an economic embargo against Katanga, and US and UN intentions to impose a solution by force, as indicated by the visit of a US military mission to the Congo, have changed the previous atmosphere of detente.

UN Under Secretary Bunche told US officials on 20 December that were it not for fear of jeopardizing the impending negotiations on the payment plan, the UN would have already demanded that Tshombé remove

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
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Katangan roadblocks around Elisabethville.

Tensions between the UN and Katangan forces were further increased by a military clash on 24 December in which a UN helicopter was downed by Katangan gunfire and an Indian crew member killed. When the Indian commander of UN forces in Elisabethville brought up a reinforced Indian battalion, the Katangans returned the helicopter and the crew. Bunche warned Tshombé that this would be the last time the UN would "waste time" in protesting and negotiating such incidents.

Soviet propaganda has attacked the US military mission to the Congo as an attempt to assure a political solution favorable to US interests.



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JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND YEMEN

US recognition of the republican regime in Yemen has caused predictable bitterness in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which continue to support the Yemeni royalists.

undertake a joint reappraisal. Faysal probably will welcome the proposal.

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The Jordanian Government has threatened to reappraise its pro-Western orientation and to consider "the utility of dealings with Communist bloc nations." Prime Minister Tal told US Ambassador Macomber that Jordan might accept Soviet aid missions as a prelude to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Both governments are convinced that the US action will encourage Nasir to foment and support revolutions against them. New sharp verbal attacks on the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies, as well as the UK, by Nasir and Prime Minister Salal of the Yemeni republican government will reinforce Saudi and Jordanian determination to continue aiding the Yemeni royalists.

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Although King Husayn's regime is unlikely in the final analysis to jeopardize vitally needed American aid by turning to the bloc, Ambassador Macomber believes Husayn and Tal nevertheless may search for lesser ways to show their displeasure. Tal said it apparently was essential to increase their "nuisance value" to get the US to pay attention to their views.

The military situation in Yemen has not changed significantly during the past week. The UAR has resorted to night bombing of Yemeni royalist supply lines and positions. Although pro-royalist villages have been destroyed, the Imam's forces appear to have suffered little damage from these forays. Tribal loyalties continue to shift.

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Tal indicated he has sent a message to Saudi Prime Minister Prince Faysal suggesting that their two governments

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****THE SITUATION IN LAOS**

Relations between the Pathet Lao and the neutralists, never smooth, have deteriorated seriously in recent weeks. Kong Le, the neutralist leader once sympathetic to Pathet Lao policies, has charged that the Pathet Lao are not Lao nationalists, but in fact the "same thing as the Viet Minh." He even struck out at Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena, nominally a neutralist though in fact a consistent supporter of the Pathet Lao position, accusing him of having abandoned neutralism and being pro-Communist.

Pathet Lao military commander Singkapo has added fuel to the fire with his charges that Kong Le troops have been harassing villagers. As a result, Singkapo claimed, many neutralist troops had been turning to Colonel Deuane--a pro-Pathet Lao neutralist involved in the November downing of a plane resupplying Kong Le's forces--who was "following a straight path."

Meanwhile, there are indications that the International Control Commission (ICC), inactive since the expiration of the troop withdrawal period on 7 October, will soon send teams to investigate charges that foreign troops--Nationalist Chinese and North Vietnamese--remain in Laos. The coalition government on 19 December called for inspections at Long Kou, a

village east of Sam Neua Town, and Ban Thone Pheung, situated near Ban Houei Sai in northwestern Laos.

The request stipulated that the inspections should be restricted to the "limits of the village" and last only two days. In its response to the Lao Government, the ICC, while noting that it was prepared to conduct the requested investigations on the basis outlined, insisted upon its right to conduct future investigations on its own initiative, free of government control.

Operating under such stringent restrictions, it is not likely that the inspection teams will come up with much in the way of positive evidence. At Long Kou, the almost certain evacuation of North Vietnamese troops, coupled with the villagers' fear of subsequent Pathet Lao reprisals, should make it very difficult for the teams to unearth any significant information.

On the other hand, the inspection at Ban Thone Pheung may well produce evidence supporting charges that Chinese Nationalist troops are present in the region. Small numbers of these irregular forces, which have been in the Laos-Thailand-Burma border area since 1949, have remained in northwestern Laos, engaged in the opium traffic. They have resisted repeated efforts by the Lao Government to drive them out. 25X1

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

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SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY

The Sino-Mongolian border treaty concluded on 26 December reflects Peiping's endeavor to restore its waning prestige in Mongolia, to improve its position in the Sino-Soviet controversy, and to strengthen its negotiating hand on the Sino-Indian frontier.

There had been no public mention of Sino-Mongolian talks

before the 23 December announcement that Tsedenbal was coming to Peiping to sign the treaty. 25X1



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25X1 Animosity over boundary differences was also recently indicated [redacted]

[redacted] Typ-
ical of the Chinese actions which infuriated the Mongolians was the shifting of boundary markers in the spring of 1962. The Mongolians moved the markers back, and the markers were shuffled back and forth several times before a detachment of Mongolian troops arrived to put an end to the incident.

The exact terms of the accord have not been made public, but the Chinese may have made the greater part of the concessions. The difficulties of reaching agreement with India have inclined Peiping to a demonstrative flexibility in its negotiations with other neighbors. With minor exceptions, the boundary agreements reached with Burma in 1960 and with Nepal in 1961 followed the alignments claimed by Rangoon and Katmandu.

The Chinese are probably particularly anxious to project an image of reasonableness just before the arrival in Peiping of Ceylon's Prime Minister Bandaranaike, who is coming next week to press the Colombo Conference's proposals for an accommodation along the

Sino-Indian border. Mrs. Bandaranaike will probably also be briefed by the Chinese on their boundary agreement "in principle" with the Pakistanis, which was announced in Rawalpindi on 26 December.

The fanfare attending Tsedenbal's reception in Peiping was probably in part a measure of Communist China's interest in affecting Mongolia's attitude toward the Sino-Soviet controversy. Originally disposed to a cautious neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Mongolians are now unequivocally in Moscow's camp. The Mongolian party leaders have gone so far in the past year as to criticize the Chinese explicitly.

Present indications are that the boundary treaty will not budge the Mongolians from this alignment. Recent radio commentary from Ulan Bator has enlarged on Mongolia's support for Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis and has condemned the "hopeless dogmatists" who opposed him. In Peiping, Tsedenbal reiterated Mongolia's approval of the Soviet role in Cuba at the same time that he voiced the expected platitudes about Sino-Mongolian friendship. [redacted]

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****TIGHTENING OF PARTY CONTROL OVER SOVIET CULTURE**

A "hard-line" policy for Soviet culture was laid down by party secretary Leonid Ilichev at a recent meeting between Soviet intellectuals and top party leaders. Signs of a crack-down have been evident since Khrushchev's 1 December visit to an abstract art exhibit, but Ilichev's speech, which stated that experimentation in the arts will not be tolerated and that the party is the only source of "truth" for the arts, is the first high-level pronouncement to be published. His remarks apparently signal an end to the regime's toleration of a trend toward liberalization which has gone virtually unchecked since the 22nd party congress in October 1961. Hopes among Soviet intellectuals for greater creative freedom aroused by the recent renewal of de-Stalinization have been dashed, and some form of tightened party control seems inevitable.

Until recently, the liberal factions of Soviet artists, writers, and musicians were rapidly gaining control of the cultural organizations, apparently with Khrushchev's general, if not always specific, support. Encouraged by the renewal of de-Stalinization in mid-October and by reports that Khrushchev specifically called for greater creative freedom for Soviet writers in his still unpublished speech to the central committee plenum on 23 November, the liberals appeared well on their way to winning a decisive victory over the conservative faction of cultural administrators and party-lining hacks who controlled the cultural organizations.

These developments encouraged Moscow's numerous "under-

ground" artists to exhibit their works publicly for the first time. However, cultural bureaucrats, whose authority had been undermined by recent liberalization moves, deliberately arranged for Khrushchev to be shown some of the avant-garde paintings on 1 December, knowing what his reaction would probably be.

Khrushchev's visit was followed by "hard-line" editorials in all major newspapers and official controls over the arts were noticeably tightened. At the 17 December meeting between top party leaders and intellectuals, both Ilichev and Khrushchev apparently laid down a "hard-line" policy. The latter's speech has not yet been published, but Ilichev, whose speech appeared in Pravda on 22 December, harshly attacked formalistic and Western trends not only in art, but also in literature, music, and cinematography. He stated that "any deviations from the main line of development of our literature and art are intolerable," and strongly reasserted the principles of socialist realism and party orientation in the arts. He further warned that some people had wrongly interpreted the policy of de-Stalinization: "...we cannot allow the struggle against the personality cult to be used as a disguise for undermining and weakening socialist society, ideology, and culture."

At least until now, Soviet liberal intellectuals have appeared determined to put up a fight to retain the limited measure of creative freedom they have managed to win. In a

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lecture of 3 December, an art professor at Moscow University openly criticized a Pravda editorial which condemned modernistic tendencies in the arts. On the same day, Mikhail Romm, a prominent film director, delivered a passionate speech against conservative cultural officials at a writers' meeting. He opened by saying that he had been through much in his life and at his age it did not matter to him whether he was permitted to continue directing films or not. Therefore he could speak his mind about the weekend's "despicable provocation" by the enemies of true art. The incident showed, he continued, that Soviet creative artists could make no real progress until they succeeded in removing hacks and sycophants from positions where they could strangle creativity. He concluded that Khrushchev was in favor of greater freedom for the creative artists, but that lower level officials either thwarted his will or misled him,

and that the only solution was to throw them out.

The openly defiant reaction of liberal intellectuals to the regime's most recent effort to tighten controls on culture is a vivid illustration of the changes which have occurred in Soviet intellectual life since Stalin's death. Periodic freezes and thaws have been characteristic of the post-Stalin era, but the limits of cultural freedom have gradually broadened. When Soviet officials now attempt to bring the arts into line, they face a more mature, sophisticated, and powerful creative intelligentsia than at any time during the past three decades, and it becomes increasingly difficult for the regime to reverse a liberalization policy. The party can, of course, always enforce its will, but only at the price of adopting cruder forms of repression which it has shown increasing unwillingness to use in recent years. 25X1

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE PLAN FOR 1963**

For the first time in three years, the USSR's annual economic plan, recently presented to the Supreme Soviet, failed to specify the planned percentage increase in total Soviet foreign trade for the coming year. The vagueness of some statements on trade for 1963 appears to reflect uncertainties about the course of trade, particularly with Communist China and the industrial West.

In discussing the plan for trade with the bloc, V. Dymshits, chairman of the newly created USSR Council of the National Economy, stated only that foreign trade with other "socialist countries" will increase. Uncertainty with respect to this trade is probably related chiefly to trade with Communist China; trade with the European satellites is expected to increase at about the same rate it has since 1958--by approximately \$600 million annually. Soviet trade with China apparently declined somewhat in 1962--probably reaching a new low--and the present state of Sino-Soviet relations seems to preclude any significant growth of this trade in the near future.

In contrast to statements on bloc trade, the 1963 foreign trade plan is quite specific in dealing with Soviet trade with

nonbloc underdeveloped countries. According to Dymshits, this trade will rise some 24 percent over the 1962 level, which is estimated at about \$1.6 billion or almost the same as in 1961. The \$2 billion volume of trade with these countries implicit in the plan partly reflects expected step-ups in credit-financed deliveries of complete plan equipment, which reportedly will rise by almost 30 percent in 1963. Such deliveries were scheduled at approximately \$280 million in 1962, implying that the 1963 level will be about \$360 million, or more than one-third of estimated total Soviet exports to underdeveloped countries.

Dymshits commented only vaguely on planned Soviet trade with industrial Western countries, possibly reflecting an anticipated slowdown in the growth of this trade. Soviet orders for Western capital goods have declined considerably since 1961, but Soviet spokesmen continue to stress the importance of advanced Western technology and equipment to the USSR's economic development. Khrushchev reflected this viewpoint in his speech at the recent central committee plenum when he urged utilization of Western techniques where "economically advantageous," and cited Lenin on the merits of borrowing from "capitalists...anything clever and profitable that they have."

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TITO'S VISIT TO THE USSR

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During Tito's 4-21 December "business vacation" in the USSR, he and Khrushchev repeatedly stressed that their countries share the goals of peace and Communism. Cooperation in pursuit of these goals has been sanctioned as the basis for a continuing improvement in economic and political relations and a gradual elimination of the issues which still divide them.

Tito was given red carpet treatment comparable to that of his last visit to the USSR in 1956, when Yugoslav-Soviet relations were also on the mend. Although Tito's attitude throughout the recent visit has been characterized as cautious, the appeal to his vanity apparently had its effect. Upon returning home, Tito cited his treatment as evidence of Moscow's good intentions.

Foreign policy constituted a particularly important force for unity; the similarity between Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policies was repeatedly cited in public statements. Khrushchev explicitly thanked Belgrade for its support during the Cuban crisis. The two leaders also found common cause in opposing the Chinese Communists, in rejecting nuclear war as a useful instrument of policy, and in advocating closer cooperation between the bloc and the non-aligned states.

A number of nonaligned countries paid close attention to Tito's visit.

Although Tito reaffirmed Yugoslavia's adherence to his policy while in the Soviet Union, he did not mention it in his departing statement or in his statement made on his arrival in Belgrade.

Throughout the visit there was a greater degree of realism than during the 1956 sojourn. Neither side made any effort to pretend that "serious divergencies," as Khrushchev described them on 12 December, do not remain. These differences concern such basic ideological issues as the role of the Communist Party and state in society and the degree of bloc unity. Because each side understands the other's positions more clearly than in 1956, the present Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation may be considerably more stable.

Khrushchev accepted an invitation to vacation in Yugoslavia at some future date, indicating his deep commitment to the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement and his refusal to allow Peiping to influence Soviet policies.

In order to bring Soviet ideology into closer accord with reality, Khrushchev implicitly downgraded "Yugoslav revisionism" from "the main danger" to international communism to a danger co-equal with "dogmatism"--Communist China's heresy. Khrushchev also explicitly defined the criteria for status as a "socialist state" and proclaimed that Yugoslavia met them. For his part, Tito decreed that Yugoslavia "must avoid everything that might disturb relations with other socialist countries."

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Upon returning home, Tito stated that remaining Soviet-Yugoslav differences "will be liquidated by practice, without any forcing." Probably both he and Khrushchev approve of the other's pragmatic approach to domestic and foreign problems and see in this willingness to experiment the possibility that their two parties will move closer together in doctrinal matters. Tito probably finds particular encouragement in such recent Soviet developments as the discussion of introducing profitability into the Soviet economy and Khrushchev's proposing a larger role for workers in industrial management.

This visit, unlike that of 1956, produced no final communiqué. Neither was any specific advance in economic relations revealed, although the bloc's economic organization may soon meet at the highest level and

Yugoslavia may be granted some type of observer status.

Although Khrushchev restored Yugoslavia to "socialist" respectability, he drew up short of declaring the Yugoslav party an equal of the CPSU-- as he did in 1956. He presumably hopes to preclude any Yugoslav involvement in the revived de-Stalinization campaigns in the satellites, an involvement which in 1956 threatened the stability of these regimes. Even though liberals in the satellites may not feel they can use Yugoslav practices as arguing points, they will probably be encouraged by the trend of events to press even harder for domestic changes. At the same time, the conservatives, the backbone of some satellite parties, will probably also be moved to greater activity. 25X1

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****ALBANIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION**

The regime of party boss Enver Hoxha and Premier Mehmet Shehu, with the economic and political support of Communist China, has been able to maintain internal stability since the USSR severed all relations with Tirana a year ago.

There is no evidence that elements in the regime, either because of dissatisfaction, disillusionment, or prodding from the Soviets or Yugoslavs, have attempted to overthrow the Hoxha-Shehu leadership. Whatever doubts members of the ruling elite may hold privately about their anti-Soviet course, the party politburo and central committee to all outward appearances remain united. There have been no purges in the top party bodies since the fall of 1960, nor in the central government apparatus; the old cabinet, in fact, was reappointed in July after the national "elections" in early June.

There were some changes this year in the composition of the 27 district party and government organizations, but the changes apparently were only routine annual shifts. The chairmen of six executive committees--the top government organization in the districts--and the first secretaries of eight district party committees were replaced; two of the latter, however, took over the reins in other districts.

The security organization--the Sigurimi--has remained loyal and has prevented dissatisfaction from crystallizing in any group. The bulk of the population remains anti-Communist, but afraid and apathetic.

Since economic ties with the USSR were cut late in 1961, the backward and primarily agricultural economy of Albania has limped along with Chinese Communist help. Albania is now relying heavily on assistance from China, which was scheduled to account for 60 percent of Albanian trade in 1962. Although trade with the European satellites apparently has declined, the Hoxha regime is still able to obtain some needed machinery and spare parts from these countries. Most satellite technicians have left Albania.

Tirana has shown increased interest in trade with Western Europe since the break with the USSR. This trade remains small, however, and there are no indications that aid will be sought from the West.

The regime claims that its modest goals for industrial production this year are being fulfilled. It appears, however, that difficulties are being encountered in the construction program. Although the leadership has indicated that most industrial projects started with Soviet aid would be continued with Chinese support, Chinese credits appear thus far to have been used mainly for food and agricultural equipment.

According to preliminary estimates, Albanian agricultural production in 1962 was somewhat higher than during the previous two years. Albania will, however, have to ^{25X1} continue imports of grain to maintain even its substandard level of food consumption.

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Current economic difficulties in Albania are not expected to endanger the stability of the Hoxha regime. Unless Communist China materially reduces its present level of aid and trade, the economy of Albania, which is about the size of Maryland and has less than two million people, should ^{25X1} be able to continue to grow, although not at as rapid a rate as desired by the leaders.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****COMMON MARKET AND NATO DEVELOPMENTS**

Prior to their adjournment on 20 December the UK-EEC accession talks appear to have laid the groundwork for a series of protracted showdown sessions when the talks resume in mid-January. Bonn and Paris, despite some apparent misgivings in both capitals, have agreed on detailed arrangements for special bilateral consultation. The Macmillan talks with President Kennedy in Nassau have made the military implications of closer European unity an immediate issue rather than a matter for consideration after the completion of the Brussels talks.

Brussels Talks

The two-day meeting of UK-EEC ministers which preceded the adjournment of the accession talks was highlighted by a major UK statement on the EEC's institutions. Britain asked for parity of representation with France, West Germany, and Italy in community institutions, recognition of English as the fifth official language, and the gradual introduction of British nationals into the burgeoning bureaucracy in Brussels. The UK statement formally raised possibly the last of the major issues in the accession talks, and the initial EEC reaction was favorable. Pro-integration elements were impressed in particular by Britain's support for the majority voting rules as set forth in the Common Market treaty.

On the key question of arrangements for Britain's domestic agriculture, the ministers received an interim report from the committee of agricultural ministers which has been

meeting the last few weeks under the chairmanship of Commissioner Mansholt. While the "big divergence" between the UK and EEC positions remains, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the Mansholt committee has had considerable success in unfreezing the atmosphere and in bringing the increasingly emotional discussion of the farm problem back to a consideration of the facts. A final report from the committee is anticipated early in January, and the negotiating session opening on 14 January is expected to be almost continuous until either agreement is reached or the talks collapse.

French-German Relations

Despite the measure of progress being achieved at Brussels, the European policies of both Bonn and Paris remain ambiguous. The German delegation at Brussels has apparently been told to try to help the talks along, and on 19 December, after the new Adenauer cabinet's inaugural meeting, Bonn issued a statement expressing the "particular emphasis" it places on the earliest possible conclusion of a UK-EEC agreement. However, the Germans do not appear to be putting pressure for early agreement on the French, and continue to go along with De Gaulle's efforts to strengthen the special ties between Paris and Bonn.

At their 16-17 December meeting in Paris, Foreign Ministers Couve de Murville and Schroeder agreed that there should be monthly exchanges of visits between French and German officials at the lower level, quarterly meetings of

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foreign, defense, and economic ministers, and semi-annual meetings of heads of governments.

Adenauer's scheduled retirement, however, has apparently raised some doubts in Paris over the future course of French-German relations. Although De Gaulle's reaction is unknown, Couve has expressed himself pessimistically about the prospects in West Germany after Adenauer steps aside. Although discounting the likelihood Germans would revert to an anti-French attitude, he anticipated in effect a period of disorientation in which West Germany would be "soft and without particular leadership."

Reactions to the
Nassau Agreement

Owing in part to these uncertainties, official reactions to the Nassau agreement have been reticent. The press both in Britain and to some extent on the Continent has taken the view that the agreement marks the end of the "special relationship"--in the nuclear

field, at least--that has prevailed between the UK and the US, and the beginning of the end of Britain's effort to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent. Preliminary official German comment has suggested that Bonn is concerned lest the agreement result in permanent discrimination in favor of the present nuclear powers, Britain and France.

The initial French reaction to the American Polaris offer has been cautious and somewhat negative. After a meeting with De Gaulle on 22 December, Couve indicated that the offer required considerable study and that a reply would not be forthcoming until after 1 January. De Gaulle has scheduled a press conference early in January which he may use for a public comment on the offer.

On 23 December, Couve told the US Embassy that the Nassau agreement would render Britain's EEC entry more difficult. Couve held that the trip to Nassau proves Macmillan has not yet decided to be really "European," but is still holding on to the UK's special relationship with the US. Moreover, he added, "any arrangement which envisaged a close linkage--UK-Europe-US--would result in all becoming Americanized," and Europe must maintain its "individuality."

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****PROBLEMS IN EXTENDING SPANISH-US BASES AGREEMENT**

The Spaniards may be considering asking for political guarantees in return for extending the US bases agreement, which expires in September 1963. Madrid would prefer continued US military and economic aid on something like the former scale, but failing this the government may feel that it must have some form of payment to show. There is some evidence that a proposal for an entirely new form of US-Spanish treaty relationship may be in the wind.

Franco first publicly raised the bases question in October 1961, saying that the bases agreement needed revision to bring it into harmony with international technological advances. Top Spanish military leaders have repeatedly stressed their desire for more modern military equipment, and appear to be thinking in terms of a \$200 million annual price tag--probably as a lead-off for bargaining purposes. Spanish economic ministers in turn have been pressing for continued large-scale economic aid in the form of low-interest loans from AID.

Both groups are attempting to build up a strong case against the reduction of military and economic assistance which the US is applying to all NATO members except Greece and Turkey. Madrid insists that the current American balance of payments position is temporary and does not warrant US efforts to have Spain spend \$175 million for the purchase of US military equipment over the next five years and to be satisfied with \$75 million in grant aid under the Military Assistance Program for the same period.

The Spaniards have indicated their dissatisfaction over the trend in military aid talks, and Commerce Minister Ullastres told the US Embassy early in

December that the American and Spanish positions on military and economic aid were so far apart that the present approach would lead to a "dead end." The embassy feels that in such a situation, the Spaniards may resort to political demands in an effort to obtain a "quid pro quo" on the bases deal on the grounds that the Spanish people must be shown some form of payment.

Relations with Morocco and the fate of the Salazar regime are the Spanish Government's most pressing foreign policy problems. Madrid might demand a pledge of firm US support against Moroccan claims on the Spanish Sahara and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The Spaniards might also press the US to commit itself more forcefully in defense of Portugal in the UN if difficulties in Portugal's African territories threatened Salazar's position at home. Madrid is also anxious to ward off increased nationalist pressure within and outside of the UN on Spain's African provinces of Fernando Poo and Rio Muni, and to achieve greater international acceptance by membership in NATO and the European Economic Community at an early date.

The statement by Spanish Ambassador Garrigues to the State Department last September that perhaps some new form of alliance between Spain and the US was necessary suggests that Spain might also press for converting the present bases agreement into a formal mutual defense treaty. Such a treaty would increase the anti-Americanism of democratic opposition elements in Spain, which have long ascribed Franco's durability to US support.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

The chances for peaceful and orderly transition to constitutional government in the Dominican Republic have been substantially improved by the heavy victory of the Dominican Revolutionary Party in the national elections on 20 December. President-elect Juan Bosch will take office on 27 February. He has indicated that he plans a reformist domestic policy, and a "dynamic, different, and democratic" foreign policy not unfriendly to the US. Various groups that had been plotting to seize the government will probably lie low, at least for the time being, and President Duvalier of Haiti apparently has thought better of getting involved with exiled remnants of the Trujillo family in order to try to make trouble.

The US ambassador to the Dominican Republic regards the success of the country's first free election in 38 years as "fantastic." An estimated one million people, or about a third of the population, voted on 20 December in an atmosphere of relative calm. Just before the election, fears had been aroused by the rough campaign tactics of the two main parties and by reports of plotting by exiled Trujillo elements with the connivance of Haitian dictator Duvalier. Still other opportunists were known to be trying to thwart the electoral process in order to gain power for themselves later.


The threat that these forces would produce chaos ap-

pears, at least for the moment, to have receded. The two-to-one margin of victory of Juan Bosch, the President-elect, and his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) over the National Civic Union (UCN) should give pause to several groups that were considering plans to prevent the elected government from assuming office on 27 February.

The five other parties that participated received less than ten percent of the vote. Armed forces leaders have expressed pride in the elections and awareness that an economic and social revolution is inevitable and that it will be better for it to occur under an elected government.

Bosch told reporters during the elections that his party's objective "is the welfare of the little man," and that his foreign policy would not bring a renewal of relations with Cuba or the USSR. He reportedly said some Latin American governments had erred in handling the Cuban situation in a fashion that showed that they are under UN influence. He indicated that he favored the Alliance for Progress, but placed greater emphasis on self-help measures.

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Meanwhile, the ruling Council of State apparently intends to take no actions that would upset the situation before Bosch can take office. Although some of its members have considered resigning before Bosch is installed, or demanding that Bosch share interim responsibility with them, no such moves have yet occurred. However, it is possible that the Council's very inaction in the next few weeks could bring trouble in the form of strikes or trouble-making by political elements not reconciled to acceptance of the elections.

Bosch has mapped out a reform program intended to cope with the country's disorganization inherited from the passing of the Trujillos. Not the least of Bosch's problems is arranging a means of equitable distribution

of former Trujillo properties, which are estimated to comprise over 50 percent of the country's most productive lands and industry. These properties are now in the hands of the state. His program--which seems virtually assured of legislative enactment because of his overwhelming congressional majority--is ambitious. It provides for a large-scale redistribution of farming land to peasants; the organization of cooperatives to assist sugar growers, cattle raisers, and fishermen; and the encouragement of industrial development by native and foreign capital. The most controversial plans are for the introduction of "people's stores" in rural areas and the extension or cancellation of certain mortgages.

These latter devices are aimed at destroying inequitable forms of landholding dating from early colonial times, and are regarded as especially drastic by the business and professional classes which form the backbone of the opposition UCN.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN PERU**

Communist agitators were clearly responsible for the 17 December violence by striking miners in La Oroya, which resulted in damage estimated at \$4 million to installations of the US-owned Cerro de Pasco mine. Three of the agitators have been identified as Cuban nationals. On 22 December the governing junta suspended constitutional guarantees in two provinces where miners are on strike.

The Cerro de Pasco corporation has a file of Communist activities in the mining region dating from August, and had been alerted to the probability of violence by the strikers. At least 5 days in advance, the governing junta was warned of Communist plans for violence. The Peruvian authorities prepared a plan--Operacion Preencion--to circumvent the Communists in La Oroya and elsewhere, but the plan was not put into operation.

After the incident, top-ranking junta leaders General Perez Godoy and General Lindley Lopez publicly accused the leftist, anti-Communist APRA of complicity in the violence. The junta had previously attempted unsuccessfully to use Communist labor leaders to force APRA members out of key union positions. Two Communists recently received appointments to a commission charged with drafting new labor regulations.

Communist agitators have also recently been active among the campesinos--tenant farmers, mostly Indian--of La Convencion Valley near Cusco. The usually docile Indians have invaded several haciendas, driving their livestock onto private grazing land and terrorizing the landowners and their families. Many of the latter have fled to Cusco and Lima to escape the armed Indians. On 26 December,

the junta suspended constitutional guarantees in Cusco Province.

The junta thus far appears to have ignored evidence of Communist direction of the Indian bands. The only effort to provide protection to the besieged haciendas has been the recent dispatch of an army engineer battalion to La Convencion Valley, ostensibly to build a road. Junta spokesmen still claim that no problem exists that will not be solved by its new agrarian reform law, but no plans for implementing the law have been forthcoming.

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The junta appears more than ever to be intent upon the suppression of APRA, which the junta apparently believes presents a

greater danger to its position than the Communists.

The junta promised when it took over the government that free elections would be held in June 1963. It has since become evident that the junta intends to block the possibility of an APRA victory, either by discrediting the party or by supporting an anti-APRA coalition. If outbreaks of violence continue, however, the junta may cancel the election entirely on the grounds that the situation is too unstable to risk the stresses of a campaign. 

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**SPECIAL ARTICLES**DE GAULLE'S CONTROL OF FRENCH NATIONAL POLICY**

National policy in France is conceived and formed by President de Gaulle. In a fashion unique among modern democratic statesmen, his decisions are taken almost entirely without the assistance of his ministers. Invested by the constitution with broad executive powers, he exercises close direct control in foreign affairs and military matters, and follows the political if not the economic aspects of the Common Market with great alertness. Even his closest long-time associates, whose views are close to his own, have only limited opportunity to influence his decisions.

De Gaulle's normal procedure in matters that particularly interest him is to lay down broad but rigid policy guidelines, and only occasionally to specify details. In the complex field of European integration, for example, he has defined general policy principles to guide Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and his two top economic advisers, Olivier Wormser and Bernard Clappier, leaving them considerable leeway to decide on negotiating tactics.

The general's concern over the long-range implications for France of the UK's involvement with the Continent has caused him to emphasize the political aspects of integration at the expense of the economic, in which he has little interest. He personally has drafted a political treaty for the Common Market countries.

Foreign Policy

There is ample evidence of De Gaulle's close personal control of the conduct of for-

ign relations. One vivid example is the case of a US request for a Mercury capsule recovery station on Tahiti, and a navigational satellite tracking station in the Kerguelen Islands. French Government scientists endorsed the US request, but approval has been held up by the general, who left no doubt that the decision to cooperate rested with him, and no one else.

Part of the explanation of De Gaulle's behavior in these relatively apolitical matters is his jealous concern for national prestige. He recently hauled a top government science adviser on the carpet over foreign military scientific research being carried out in French laboratories, and was mollified only by the adviser's assurance that such research was a sign of the prestige which French science has attained in the eyes of others.

Foreign Ministry officials have admitted that their desire to cooperate with the US on African matters has been hampered by De Gaulle's policy of maintaining a special, "spiritual" relationship with "French" Africa. Stringent controls have been instituted over US military aid,

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foreign ministry official suggested that only a direct approach to De Gaulle by the secretary of state or the ambassador would help overcome De Gaulle's objection in one US aid matter. He said the Foreign Ministry has taken the US side to some extent in discussions with lesser Elysee officials, but that he could hardly do the same with De Gaulle.

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De Gaulle's direct control of foreign affairs is also clearly evident in France's reaction to Prince Sihanouk's proposal in August for an international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality. Immediately after receipt of Sihanouk's proposal, one Foreign Ministry spokesman said France would probably reject the idea, and another suggested it might be preferable to inform Sihanouk that it was under study. Less than a week later De Gaulle has sent a note to Sihanouk accepting key elements of the Cambodian proposal.

The Council of Ministers

Even in matters which De Gaulle does not follow avidly, his ministers have little voice in determining policy and are sometimes not informed about decisions directly affecting their responsibilities. The government's marching orders are often formally announced following regular Council of Ministers meetings, over which De Gaulle presides, usually on Wednesdays. However, the frequency with which the gist of these meetings is foreshadowed in the press beforehand suggests that the ministerial discussions are largely pro forma.

While ministers have frequently been reported irked because of De Gaulle's propensity to ignore them in making policy, his increasing reliance on non-party technicians has reduced the likelihood that any minister advocating divergent policies would keep his job. The resignation in May 1962 of five Popular Republican (MRP) ministers illustrated De Gaulle's highhanded methods and the sacrifice of political independence which is entailed in accepting a post in a De Gaulle cabinet.

The MRP ministers thought they had a presidential commitment that the government would

take no position on European integration until the issue had been debated in the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, before any such debate was held, De Gaulle blandly expounded his antifederalist policy at a press conference, where council solidarity was implied by the presence of the ministers on the platform.

Within the council, those generally considered to have easiest access to De Gaulle, aside from the premier, are André Malraux, minister of state for cultural affairs; Gaston Palewski, minister of state for scientific research, nuclear and space matters; and Louis Joxe, minister of state for administrative reform.

The Premier

De Gaulle's prime ministers seem to have little success in changing his mind. It is difficult to cite specific instances in which either Debré or Pompidou succeeded.

Debré has been described as a man who intensely dislikes being contradicted, but many of the policies he is known to have sponsored personally during his term of office gave way to De Gaulle's wishes. Debré opposed independence for the French African territories and France's military withdrawal from Tunisia. He favored maintenance of a French Algeria. Debré opposed moves toward European integration, but when De Gaulle saw advantages for France in economic and political cooperation on the Continent, Debré fell in line.

After De Gaulle's Algerian policy won a 90-percent endorsement in the April 1962 referendum, Debré pushed hard for immediate dissolution of the National Assembly. De Gaulle accepted Debré's resignation, and forthwith appointed another premier. Debré still sees De Gaulle on occasion, but there is nothing to indicate he is exerting any significant influence on the President.

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Like Debré, Premier Georges Pompidou has had a long relationship with De Gaulle, but in a more subtle, more personal way, which perhaps may give him more intimate access to De Gaulle's thinking.

The other major group within the Elysee with direct responsibility for advising the President is the General Secretariat to the President of the Republic for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, headed by Jacques Foccart. This was originally formed to handle the problems expected to fall on the French President in his capacity of President of the French Community. Even though the Community now is largely defunct, the Foccart group plays a key role in monitoring African affairs for De Gaulle. Because of his lively interest in Africa, it probably exercises a greater influence on French policy there than either the Ministry of Cooperation With the African States or the responsible sections of the Foreign Ministry.

An indication of the confidence De Gaulle has in his personal staff may be his decision to appoint Burin des Roziers' predecessor, Geoffroy de Courcel, ambassador to Britain while British accession to the Common Market is under negotiations. Burin des Roziers, who became secretary general on 15 February 1962, was close to De Gaulle during World War II and in the immediate postwar period. Less is known about his relationship to De Gaulle than about De Courcel's, but the two occupants of the top personal cabinet position have similar backgrounds and probably operate in a similar fashion.

The Personal Cabinet

By virtue of their regular access to De Gaulle and knowledge of his personal predilections and operating procedures, the members of De Gaulle's personal cabinet have the best opportunity to influence him.

The cabinet consists of two major groups. One of these has broad responsibilities in administration, military matters, and protocol. Members of this group, which controls visitors and handles the paper flow, have developed intimate relationships with De Gaulle over years of service. Its three sections include a General Secretariat under Etienne Burin des Roziers, the Cabinet of the President of the Republic under Georges Galichon, and the Personal Military Staff of the President of the Republic which Air Force General Gabriel Gauthier will head on 1 January 1963.

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The Military

De Gaulle has never concealed his low opinion of the political sagacity of other military officers. Changes he has brought about in the organization of the French defense establishment have tended to increase civilian authority. Last summer he brought top-level military planning more directly under his personal control. The position of chief of staff for national defense, which has been held by such officers as General Paul Ely and Jean Olie, was downgraded, and many of its functions turned over to the administrative staff of the National Defense Committee, over which De Gaulle presides. This staff now is headed by Air Force General Michel Fourquet.

While De Gaulle respects technical competence, he has had little patience with military advisers who have differed with him on matters of grand strategy ranging from Algeria to the development of a national nuclear striking force. Many high officers who have been outspoken in opposition have been shifted

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to posts of little importance or have been made to feel obliged to accept early retirement. The winnowing process has brought to the top of the military structure a group of officers who adhere closely to the De Gaulle strategy.

De Gaulle's professional military background occasionally leads him to interfere in purely operational matters. One example was the Bizerte incident in August 1961, when he evidently communicated directly with the admiral commanding the forces in the field, neither seeking the advice of his military staff nor transmitting his orders through the chain of command.

Nongovernmental Contacts

Of particular interest among nonofficial organizations with possible influence on De Gaulle is the French Center for the Study of International Politics. This is an informal organization headed by Jacques Vernant, and includes among its members retired Air Force General Pierre Gallois, noted French columnist Raymond Aron, Francois de Rose, civilian deputy to the chief of staff for national defense, and General André Beaufré. Primarily concerned with international strategic problems, this group has held discussions with similar British and German groups. Its importance derives not so much from its influence on official policy as from the role of some of its members in bringing public consideration of political/military problems more closely into line with De Gaulle's views.

De Gaulle receives many foreign visitors--usually formally, as in the case of the heads of state of the former French African states. Invariably, these leaders come away from the meeting feeling that they have brought De Gaulle to agree with them. Of the other foreign leaders, Chancellor

Adenauer is sometimes credited with the most influence, although the record of their close personal association seems to show that De Gaulle's is the more formidable personality.

Because of the clanlike aspect of De Gaulle's entourage, suspicions arose in the early months of the Fifth Republic that individual members of the personal cabinet and some ministerial staffs were deliberately distorting information on which he based major political decisions, and that they were also misrepresenting these decisions when made. Other critics of De Gaulle hold that he is not only insulated from reality by his staff, but is in fact almost its prisoner.

Such views, however, do not square with the fact that De Gaulle has never tolerated isolation. He makes an almost daily practice of receiving visitors without regard to their social or economic position, to whom he listens attentively. He often talks with party leaders, including those of the opposition, and discusses major policies in a frank and open way.

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While many of these visitors may leave with an inflated opinion of the impression they have made on him, ideas that have been presented to him in these interviews are frequently embodied in his public statements and influence his policy decisions. By such means De Gaulle judiciously accommodates his unshakable faith in France's global destiny to the political realities of the moment, confident that his personal views will prevail in determining the broad lines of policy.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****NORTH KOREA'S ARMED FORCES**

North Korea's 330,000-man army is the third largest and its air force the fifth largest in the bloc. Firmly ensconced in defensive positions, these forces have been maintained and improved by Soviet aid. Without Chinese Communist or Soviet assistance, however, the North Koreans alone are not capable of sustaining an all-out attack against South Korea.

The Army

Since the 1953 truce, the North Korean Army has steadily developed from a broken, thoroughly routed force to a relatively modern, well-balanced organization. Improvements in mobility, firepower, and training have been made possible by Soviet aid.

Although the regular forces have remained at the level of 330,000 for the past four years steps have been taken to develop a ready reserve force. Five infantry brigades, which share the role of coastal security with elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, have an organizational structure that can be readily expanded to division size.

Efforts are also being made to modernize the 400,000-man militia. At least a third of this force is considered well armed and reliable.

Doctrine and Training

There are indications that the Ministry of National Defense will try to establish a

more mobile concept of defense. Widely dispersed units would be linked together by vehicular-mounted radio communications and equipped with adequate transportation to move them quickly to a trouble area. The development of a truly mobile defense force is not contemplated. An elaborate system of static defense installations has already been established north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

The North Koreans have always stressed the value of artillery superiority on the battlefield and, until recently, have enjoyed a decided advantage over the South Koreans. In addition to the normal complement of divisional and corps artillery, both the 1st and 2nd Army Groups are reinforced with a heavy mortar brigade and a howitzer brigade, the latter probably armed with the tractor-towed 152-mm. howitzer or gun-howitzer or both.

Moreover, there have been sightings along the DMZ of heavy artillery pieces as large as the 203-mm. (8-inch) howitzer. Elements of a rocket launcher brigade have also been spotted near the armistice line. These units are probably armed with the versatile, truck-mounted 132-mm. (16-round) rocket launcher used in World War II.

North Korean soldiers are well versed in modern battlefield concepts, including defense against atomic attack. There has been increasing emphasis over the past few years on modern, realistic combined-arms training.

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Large-scale maneuvers are the culmination of a nine-month training program designed to maintain a high state of "combat preparedness." In general, units stationed along the DMZ receive the most intensive training, which includes live-artillery practice.

North Korean Air Force (NKAF)

With a population only a third the size of South Korea's, North Korea does not plan to man an army that will numerically match the ROK armed forces. In the air, however, the North

**NORTH KOREA
ORDER OF BATTLE**



MILITARY STRENGTHS

Army	331,700
Air Force	18,000
Navy	7,000
Security Forces	26,500
total	383,200

AIR FORCE

Jet fighter	330
Jet light bomber	80
Transport	20
Helicopter	20
total	450

-  Antiaircraft division
-  Armored division
-  Corps
-  Army group
-  Naval base
-  Military airfield

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Koreans have clear superiority. Among Communist bloc countries their air force is exceeded in size only by those of the USSR, Communist China, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. With over 400 aircraft, it greatly outnumbers South Korea's air arm of 250 aircraft.

The NKAF is organized into three fighter divisions, a ground-attack division, and a light-bomber division; it is equipped with over 300 MIG-15 (Fagot) and -17 (Fresco) jet fighters and about 80 IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers. As an integral part of the Sino-Soviet bloc air defense system, the NKAF has the primary mission of air defense. However, it also has the capability for close-in air support of ground forces and air assault against strategic bases in South Korea.

The latter, probably under Soviet control, is the only such site identified in the Far East outside of the USSR. Spoon Rest radar, which can be used as acquisition radar for the SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, has also been detected in North Korea, but the presence of missiles in the country has not been confirmed. Known anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) includes three divisions, armed with the 85/100mm. AAA gun.

The Navy

In sharp contrast to the relatively large air and ground forces, North Korea's Navy is a small, poorly equipped coastal force with only about 7,000 officers and men. Since the over-all defense effort is presently oriented to the ground forces, there will probably be little effort to modernize existing maritime equipment or add an amphibious capability.

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Air Defense

Pyongyang's defense posture already features a modern early-warning complex of some 20 primary radar sites, including at least one Tall King station.

The navy's present capabilities include in-shore coastal defense and early-warning. Its current activities are confined to harassment of ROK fishing vessels and agent infiltration into South Korea.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**Outlook

Although North Korea is making considerable progress in reorganizing and re-equipping its army and air force, several basic problems will limit advances in over-all tactical capability for the foreseeable future. The greatest difficulty is the shortage of skilled technicians needed to operate the sophisticated machinery of modern warfare. Related to this deficiency is the country's backward industrial complex, which can provide neither major items of equipment nor logistical support for sustained operations.

In view of their economic and technical deficiencies, the North Koreans have probably

sought more military aid from the USSR. On 29 November a North Korean military delegation headed by former defense minister Kim Kwang Hyop arrived at Moscow for talks with key Soviet military and foreign aid officials. This visit was followed by a meeting of the Korean party's central committee on 10-14 December, which issued a communiqué on 16 December calling for a strengthening of the country's military force.

Communist China, which already enjoys considerable political prestige in Pyongyang, may be attempting to increase its military influence also. Peiping, like Moscow, has a mutual defense treaty with Pyongyang signed in July 1961.

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