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26 October 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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State Dept. review completed



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USAF review(s) completed.

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26 October 1962

THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EDT 25 Oct)

THE CUBAN CRISIS Page 1

The Soviet leaders, faced with the dangerous consequences of a major miscalculation of US intentions, have taken a variety of measures to minimize the danger to the USSR's prestige and interests and to deter direct US military intervention in Cuba. Moscow's cautious reaction to President Kennedy's 22 October address on Cuba was contrived to avoid commitments to specific Soviet countermeasures without giving an appearance of acquiescing to the measures announced by the President. Khrushchev's present intention, as reflected in the diversion of Soviet ships away from the US quarantine zone and in his call for a summit meeting, apparently is to avoid incidents which might make the crisis more difficult to control and to rely primarily on political pressures to forestall further US actions in Cuba. There are no indications that the USSR is planning retaliatory action in other areas, such as Berlin or Southeast Asia.

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SINO-INDIAN BORDER FIGHTING Page 6

Chinese Communist military action against India appears aimed at clearing away Indian outposts in areas at both ends of the frontier, improving Peiping's bargaining position by seizing new territory, and teaching New Delhi a lesson in border warfare. New Delhi has rejected Peiping's Moscow-supported proposals for negotiations

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THE YEMENI SITUATION Page 9

Crown Prince Faysal, who returned home this week to assume leadership of the Saudi Government, has become a particular target of Cairo's propaganda attacks. Inside Yemen, there continues to be friction between Prime Minister Sallal and Cairo's hand-picked man, Deputy Prime Minister Baydani.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS Page 9

Souvanna this week went to Hanoi to urge complete withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos. Souvanna's apparent determination to chart an independent course has drawn strong criticism from the Pathet Lao.

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CONGO DEVELOPMENTS Page 10

No further progress has been made on the UN reconcilia-
tion plan. Although Adoula has repudiated the cease-fire
and financial agreements, at the same time he is demanding
that Tshombé comply rigidly with the plan in its entirety.
Tshombé now says that any attempt by Adoula to renegotiate
the cease-fire agreement will delay a settlement for a
long time. UN Under Secretary Bunche arrived in Leopold-
ville on 22 October, presumably to try to break the impasse.

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NORTHERN RHODESIAN ELECTIONS FAVOR AFRICAN NATIONALISTS . Page 11

Elections in Northern Rhodesia on 30 October are ex-
pected to give African nationalists a decisive role in
the legislature for the first time. Africans opposed to
the present structure of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland will thus be in a strong position in both Nyasa-
land and Northern Rhodesia. Pressure then will mount to
revise the federal constitution in the direction of a much
looser union, especially between the two northern territories
and white-dominated Southern Rhodesia.

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PROSPECTS FOR THE REFERENDUM IN FRANCE Page 12

[Redacted]

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The Cuban crisis will incline many voters to cling to a
strong leader. In any case the opposition political parties
are concentrating on the National Assembly elections in
late November.

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SPECIAL ARTICLE

SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FACTIONALISM Page 1

The overthrow of civilian government in South Korea
last year by a military clique has made army factionalism
a major factor in political affairs. Two principal groups--
subdivided into numerous factions--are maneuvering for in-
fluence, and a third group is beginning to emerge. The
maneuvering is likely to increase in intensity during the
transition to the civilian regime promised for mid-1963.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**WEEKLY REVIEW**THE CUBAN CRISIS**

The Soviet leaders, faced with the dangerous consequences of a major miscalculation of US intentions regarding strategic missiles in Cuba, have taken a variety of measures to minimize the damage to the USSR's prestige and interests and to deter direct US military intervention in Cuba. Moscow's cautious reaction to President Kennedy's 22 October speech was contrived to avoid commitments to specific countermeasures without giving an appearance of acquiescing to the measures announced by the President. Khrushchev's present intention, as reflected in the diversion of Soviet ships away from the US quarantine zone and in his call for a summit meeting, apparently is to avoid incidents which might make the crisis more difficult to control and to rely primarily on political pressures to forestall further US actions in Cuba. There are no indications that the USSR is planning retaliatory actions in other areas, such as Berlin or Southeast Asia.

Moscow's initial reaction to President Kennedy's speech was intended to underscore the USSR's military preparedness to meet any eventualities. The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal Grechko, ordered pact representatives in Moscow to increase the military readiness of member nations. Defense Minister Malinovsky reported to the Soviet Government on measures to raise the "battle readiness" of Soviet armed forces. Two days later, Malinovsky repeated earlier Soviet claims of a "mighty and invulnerable" global rocket and of the capability to destroy enemy rockets in flight. Moscow also announced that all military leaves had been canceled and that release from active duty for members of the strategic rocket forces, anti-

aircraft defense forces, and the submarine fleet had been postponed until further notice.

The Soviet Government statement of 23 October, warning that the US is "recklessly playing with fire," was aimed primarily at gaining time and placing the US on the defensive while Moscow attempts to generate growing pressures on the US which, the Soviets hope, will deter further US military action and oblige the US to ease the quarantine on shipping. The statement carefully refrained from specifying the USSR's reaction to the quarantine and to possible US military action to remove the strategic missiles in Cuba. It evaded the central issue of the missiles and reaffirmed the claim in Moscow's statements in September that the military equipment being sent to Cuba is "designed exclusively for defensive purposes." It sought to play down the USSR's role in the crisis by portraying the conflict as one between Cuba and the US.

Moscow's statement replied only indirectly to President Kennedy's warning of US nuclear retaliation against the USSR if any nuclear missiles should be launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere. It stated that Soviet nuclear weapons will never be used for aggressive purposes but added a vague and ambiguous warning that the "Soviet Union will strike a very powerful retaliatory blow" if the "aggressors touch off a war."

Although the statement denounced the US quarantine and denied Washington's right to halt and inspect foreign vessels on the open seas, it avoided any hints of Soviet reaction beyond stating that

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the USSR "resolutely rejects such claims." The statement also implied that the USSR will seek to circumvent the US demand for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons by contending that all military equipment in Cuba is defensive and owned by Cuba. Moscow termed the US demand as one which "naturally no state which values its independence can meet."

Although the Soviet statement did not unequivocally deny President Kennedy's statement about the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba, Soviet spokesmen and propaganda have attempted to cast doubt on the authenticity of US information. The statement dealt only indirectly with this question by noting that the US accuses Cuba of "allegedly creating a threat to US security" and termed this allegation "hypocrisy." Soviet UN delegate Zorin, however, charged that US "fabrications" were designed to persuade the UN Security Council to "approve retroactively" US aggressive acts against Cuba. He claimed that the US had failed to present proof of its charges. Moscow radio on 24 October asserted that the US Defense Department had produced "some kind of faked photographs taken from spy planes" to justify its "aggressive acts." It said the "big lie" spread by Washington is aimed at justifying "far-reaching aggressive actions." The Soviet ambassador to Mexico publicly denied that there is an "arsenal of Soviet arms" in Cuba, and a Soviet diplomat in Britain said Soviet weapons supplied to Cuba are not equipped with nuclear warheads.

The Soviet statement of 23 October again sought to justify Moscow's military presence in Cuba by pointing to the deployment of US forces and armaments throughout the world and to US rejection of Soviet proposals

for withdrawal of all foreign forces from alien territories.

Future Tactics

Khrushchev's call for a "meeting at the highest level" suggests that the Soviet leaders believe that time will work to their advantage and provide growing opportunities to press the US to agree to enter negotiations with Cuba and the USSR and possibly to suspend implementation of the quarantine and other measures. In his reply to a message from Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev sought to contrast Soviet and US positions by pledging that the USSR will do everything in its power to avert war. He said Moscow will avoid "reckless decisions" and will not allow itself to be "provoked" by US actions. He also tried to enhance the urgency of a summit meeting by warning that if the US carries out its announced "program of pirate action," the USSR would have no alternative but to "make use of the means of defense against the aggressor." He added that US "aggression" against Cuba would render a summit meeting "impossible and useless."

The Soviet leaders are seeking to convey an impression of composure and discipline in dealing with the Cuban crisis. Khrushchev and other top Soviet leaders went backstage to greet an American opera singer after a performance on 24 October. The performances of other US cultural groups in the USSR received an unusually cordial reception on 23 October. The demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Moscow on 24 October were perfunctory by comparison with other demonstrations.

Gromyko made a demonstrative stop in East Berlin on his trip back to Moscow from New York. His public remarks there on 24 October, however, contained no


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hint of Soviet retaliatory action against the Western position in Berlin. He restated the Soviet position that an agreement with the West is possible but only on the condition that Western "occupation troops" are withdrawn and East German sovereignty is respected. He avoided any mention of a deadline but declared that the West should realize that the East German

There are nine Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Five sites--all for 1,100-mile medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)--appear to be fully operational. One additional MRBM site is expected to become fully operational on 28 October. One 2,200-mile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) site may become operational by 1 December, the other two by 15 December.

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frontiers are "firmly and reliably secured." Soviet propaganda continued to play down the possibility of a "new Berlin crisis" in the near future and professed to see a "more realistic approach" to the German problem at the UN General Assembly.

Missiles in Cuba


It now is apparent that the deployment to Cuba of Soviet offensive missiles and associated construction equipment and prefabricated materials began last spring. Necessary surveying, road construction, and initial building construction were mostly concentrated in August, September, and October.

Four MRBM sites are grouped in the San Cristobal area of western Cuba, and two are near Sagua la Grande. Each has or will have four launchers with at least two missiles for each launcher.

Two fixed sites for IRBM missiles are in the Guanajay area near Havana. One IRBM site is near Remedios, and there probably is a second, companion site there. Each of the IRBM sites has four launch pads.

There is no positive evidence that nuclear warheads for these missiles are present in Cuba. However, certain buildings under construction at the sites appear to be for storage of nuclear weapons.

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The 24 Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) sites in Cuba now are in operational status and give air defense cover to most of Cuba.

Other Weapons

In addition to the MRBM and IRBM deployment and the SAM defensive system, there are three known short-range cruise-missile sites in Cuba and 12 short-range missile-equipped KOMAR motor torpedo boats.

Aircraft counts at the various fields show a total of 22 IL-28 (Beagle) medium jet bombers at San Julian in extreme western Cuba. None have been observed elsewhere.

Jet fighters are concentrated in areas near surface-to-surface missile installations. All 39 known MIG-21s (Fishbeds) are at Santa Clara airfield in central Cuba, about midway be-

tween the Sagua Grande MRBM site and the IRBM site near Guanajay.

As many as 26 MIG-15s (Fagots) and 9 MIG-19s (Farmers) recently have been located at the Cuban Air Force Headquarters base at San Antonio de los Banos, south of Havana and near both the IRBM installation at Guanajay and the MRBM sites at San Cristobal.

Thirteen IL-14 (Crate) transport aircraft have been noted at nearby Playa Baracoa. Two other unidentified transports are located here also, and there is one apiece at San Antonio de los Banos and at Camaguey. As many as 40 helicopters have been reported at Playa Baracoa airfield, Cuba's major heliport.

Cuban Reaction to President's Speech

Cuba's reaction to the US moves of 22 October has been

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cautious. The high level of military alert continues, but Castro's public response to the crisis has been relatively restrained. His speech on 23 October--unusual in that it was not the occasion for a mass public demonstration--was comparatively mild, full of stereotyped references to "the inevitable triumph" of the Cuban revolution over "Yankee imperialism." The speech explicitly rejected any inspection of Cuban territory by foreign nationals. The subdued tone of the Castro speech and the lack of significant comment by other Cuban leaders since may be a result of close consultation with Soviet authorities.

Non-Cuban press representatives in Cuba report the city to be calm and relatively normal, with none of the confusion and disorganization that accompanied the mobilization prior to the invasion of 1961.

Nonbloc Reaction

Official and unofficial expressions of support, sympathy, or understanding for the US position on Cuba--either overtly or privately expressed by government leaders--have reached an impressive volume from all parts of the world. Nations from which such expressions have recently been received are Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland, Iran, India, Thailand, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica, and Panama. Among the very few nations or groups expressing open opposition to the US stand was the Algerian National Liberation Front, which terms the quarantine of Cuba an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of that country." An official Iraqi statement also says the US quarantine is a "flagrant violation of the principle of freedom of the international seas" and a "regression for the organization of international society."

An Air Cubana plane coming from Prague made a technical stop at Goose Bay, Labrador, on 23 October and was searched by Canadian authorities before being allowed to continue to Havana. Two East German missile technicians and five Czech technicians were on board.

In Latin America, military support for the quarantine action has been offered by Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Enthusiastic backing for the US position is reported among the Chilean armed forces, particularly on the part of air force officers. The Argentine Government has offered two destroyers on three days' notice, with a submarine, a marine battalion with transport, and other units if required later. The Argentine Air Force commander has sent messages to General LeMay and other hemisphere air force commanders pledging readiness to participate in any joint measures required by the Cuban crisis.

The Peruvian offer is qualified by a requirement of unanimous approval of the OAS resolution. The Uruguayan Government, according to press reports, has now decided to support the OAS resolution, but with certain reservations on the use of armed force.

President Duvalier of Haiti and President Rivera of El Salvador have announced support for the quarantine policy. President Goulart of Brazil, however, apparently seeks a mediatory role.

Demonstrations of opposition in Latin America remain scattered and ineffective. The Communists appear reluctant to commit themselves to a major effort in the face of widespread official and public acceptance of the US position.

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
SINO-INDIAN BORDER FIGHTING

After a week of heavy fighting at at least seven points along the Indo-Tibetan frontier, Chinese military action against India appears to be taking on some of the characteristics of a large-scale "punitive expedition."

larly active during the past four months, the Chinese have moved well beyond their previous advance positions. The key local headquarters town of Towang in the northeast fell on 24 October and the Chinese have surrounded the Indian strongpoint and re-supply base of Chushul in Ladakh.

In addition to clearing away Indian outposts in areas at both ends of the border where the Indians have been particu-

The Chinese offensive seems designed to discourage New Delhi's hopes and weaken its capabilities



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
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to make any gains along the border by force and to bring the Indians to the negotiating table on Chinese terms.

The Chinese have been successful on all military fronts,

largely by employing numerically superior forces, better supplied and more heavily armed than their Indian adversaries. Casualties on both sides have been heavy, running to more than 2,000 on the Indian side in the first four days of fighting.



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In an effort to consolidate its gains and emphasize its "reasonableness" Peiping on 23 October called for an end to the border warfare and for both sides to draw back 12 miles from the positions as of that date along the whole border. The Chinese also proposed a further Chinese pull-back in the northeast and a renewal of negotiations between Nehru and Chou En-lai in either New Delhi or Peiping.

On 25 October, a Pravda editorial called for a negotiated settlement of the border dispute on the basis of the Chinese proposals.

This editorial is the first Soviet statement on the border issue since the recent outbreak of fighting. It indicates some shift from the careful neutrality which Moscow has heretofore maintained in dealing with the issue. The editorial, adverting to the "notorious" McMahon Line, indirectly characterizes the Indian position as chauvinistic. The Chinese proposals, on the other hand, are regarded as "constructive," taking "due account" of the interests of both parties.

On 20 October the Soviet ambassador delivered a letter from Khrushchev to Nehru urging a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

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Recent Soviet moves indicate that the delicate balance Moscow has sought to maintain in relations with both parties has been disturbed by the Cuban situation, which has made bloc solidarity paramount for the USSR, as well as by the latest fighting on the border.

The Indians, who have cultivated Moscow's "neutrality" on the border question, have termed Peiping's repetition at this time of its mutual withdrawal proposal "hypocrisy."

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India has also rejected mediation offers by the UAR and Liberia.

According to Foreign Secretary Desai, Indian policy at the present time will be to hold on, to make the Chinese pay dearly for every advance until winter hampers operations, and then to prepare for fighting in the spring. The Indians are probably counting also on the fact that as the Chinese penetrate deeper into the northern area, poor communications and rough terrain will impair Chinese logistics as they have Indian. New Delhi may hope that reinforced Indian troops, being pushed closer to their own sources of supply, will be able to stop the Chinese even before winter.

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THE YEMENI SITUATION

The forces of the Yemeni revolutionary government remain in control of the greater part of the country. Additional arrivals have brought the total strength of Egyptian ground forces--largely "blitz" troops and paratroops--to an estimated 2,500-3,000 men.

especially between Prime Minister Sallal and Cairo's hand-picked man, Deputy Prime Minister Baydani. In a conversation with the US chargé on 19 October, Sallal said that the US should not believe statements made by certain ministers, particularly Baydani, which might give the impression of UAR domination over Yemen. Yemeni policy will be made, he claimed, by "Yemenis who stayed home and created the revolution, not by returning exiles."

It seems clear, despite mutual distrust between him and the UAR Government, that Sallal is likely to remain responsive to Cairo's wishes as long as he needs Egyptian military assistance to protect the revolution and as long as large numbers of Egyptian troops remain in the Yemen. If and when the Egyptians pull out, there will probably be an extensive shake-up of the Yemeni Government.

Nasir apparently hopes that he can take advantage of the momentum generated by the Yemeni revolution to undermine the Saudi monarchy. Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" broadcasts, as well as its clandestine radio output, are sharply attacking Crown Prince Faysal, who returned home this week to assume leadership of the Saudi Government. The Egyptian radio has urged the Saudi Army to rise against Faysal and has called him "a treacherous fox," "an agent of the foreigners," and a man "as evil as Saud."

In Yemen itself, there continues to be friction among top-level revolutionary leaders, and

DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS

Premier Souvanna Phouma has returned to Vientiane after a trip to Hanoi to urge the complete withdrawal from Laos of North Vietnamese military elements.

kok to confer with Marshal Sarit, his dealings with the rightist-controlled National Assembly, and his efforts to remove the North Vietnamese military presence from Laos have combined to alienate the Pathet Lao at least temporarily.

Souvanna's apparent determination to chart an independent course has drawn strong criticism from left-wing elements in Laos. His recent trip to Bang-

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CONGO DEVELOPMENTS**

No progress has been made on the UN reconciliation plan for the Congo since Adoula repudiated the cease-fire and financial agreements on 17 October, despite his expression of full support for the UN plan and the statement in his communiqué with Under Secretary McGhee that the "bridges are not cut." He has ordered a halt to any reactivation of joint commission talks in Elisabethville pending talks with UN Under Secretary Bunche, who arrived in Leopoldville on 22 October.

Adoula told Ambassador Gullion that his action did not mean a rupture of the talks, but rather a suspension. The tone of his 18 October press conference, however, indicates that Adoula's position has considerably stiffened. Stressing the 27-month delay in attaining a Katanga settlement, Adoula said again that the UN plan could not be negotiated, that it constituted a whole which must be accepted or rejected by Tshombé, and that he would not enter into any talks with Tshombé.

Tshombé has reacted slowly, but on 22 October he informed UN officials in Elisabethville that any attempt by Adoula to renegotiate the cease-fire signed on 16 October would raise new problems and result in long delay. The Katangan leader has not yet commented on the UN-drafted constitution.

Two railroad cars containing 70 tons of copper crossed the reopened Lubilash bridge on 17 October, but Union Miniere officials say that no other shipments are planned. The route remains open

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UN air reconnaissance supports previous reports that Tshombé has added Vampire jets to his air force. One such aircraft was sighted at Kolwezi airport, and there may be a total of four. Reports on the fighting between Katangan and Congolese forces which occurred in northern Katanga just prior to the cease-fire indicated that the Katangans were using their recently acquired Harvard piston trainers to strafe and possibly bomb Congolese positions.

In Brussels, Adoula's recent moves have produced a highly adverse reaction. Foreign Minister Spaak's chances of obtaining domestic support for economic pressures on Tshombé have been further reduced. Spaak has indicated, moreover, that any Belgian decision to increase economic assistance to Leopoldville would have to await a more constructive attitude on Adoula's part.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****NORTHERN RHODESIAN ELECTIONS FAVOR AFRICAN NATIONALISTS**

Elections in Northern Rhodesia on 30 October are expected to give African nationalists a decisive role in the protectorate's legislature for the first time. Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), the principal African party, will hold probably the largest single bloc of seats and possibly an absolute majority.

The new legislature has 45 seats. Fifteen members will be chosen by an "upper voters' roll," which is predominantly European but also contains a significant number of Africans. Another fifteen will be elected by a largely African "lower roll." One member will be chosen by the protectorate's Asians and mulattoes. Fourteen so-called "national members" will be chosen under a complicated procedure designed to ensure the election of moderates.

UNIP has been waging a vigorous campaign. Since the only other African party is discredited and demoralized, Kaunda and his followers hope to take all but one or two of

the "lower roll" seats. They also hope that their efforts to present their party as moderate and responsible will lead to the election of UNIP Africans or UNIP-sympathizing whites in some "upper roll" and many "national" seats. The only other large bloc is likely to be Sir Roy Welensky's United Federal Party, which expects to take most of the upper roll seats.

Kaunda, like Nyasaland's Hastings Banda, has been campaigning for the breakup of the present Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which joins Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the white-dominated colony of Southern Rhodesia. Banda's party is already the predominant one in Nyasaland. With Africans in a strong position in both northern territories, drastic revision to loosen the federation's structure, especially these territories' ties with southern Rhodesia, may get under way as early as mid-1963. Thereafter, African pressure for early independence for Northern Rhodesia will probably increase rapidly.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****PROSPECTS FOR THE REFERENDUM IN FRANCE**

De Gaulle has threatened to resign if he does not get a solid majority in the 28 October referendum on his proposal to have the next president of France elected by popular vote. The Cuban crisis will incline many voters to cling to a strong leader, but will not deter the opposition political parties in their attempt to win control of the National Assembly in the late November elections.

The five parties responsible for the downfall of the Pompidou government have urged defeat of De Gaulle's proposal, and the French press is almost unanimously opposed. Other than the National Assembly, opposition has also been expressed by the Senate, the Council of State, the Constitutional Council, and the Law Faculty of the University of Paris.

It is generally recognized that De Gaulle has the easier proposition to defend when he argues that all French voters should have a direct voice in electing a president. The niceties of the argument about the relative advantages of one constitutional article over another are too abstract for the average voter, who is inured to charges that De Gaulle is violating the constitution. The more sophisticated remember that some of De Gaulle's severest critics today were not overly conscientious themselves about the constitutional limitations

under the Fourth Republic when they seized opposition newspapers or ordered the Suez attack.

In his public statements De Gaulle has avoided any distinction between majorities of eligible and actual voters

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A cabinet minister told the American Embassy that support in the range of 48 to 52 percent of the eligible voters would be satisfactory. A public opinion poll of early October favored De Gaulle.

A high abstention rate in the referendum would probably work to De Gaulle's disadvantage. The vehemence of his opponents' attacks may make many voters hesitate to approve the proposal, but rather than vote against De Gaulle they will tend to abstain. This tendency may be countered, however, by concern over the possibility of a leaderless France in the midst of an international crisis over Cuba and Berlin.

Despite their public concentration on the referendum, the party machines are really preoccupied with the elections of 18 and 25 November. Maurice-René Simmonet, secretary general of the Popular Republican Movement (MRP), told an American Embassy official that, while the idea

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of unified opposition with a single anti-Gaullist campaign is appealing to political theorists, it is not practical because the four non-Communist opposition parties have different electorates. With few exceptions, each party will run its own candidates on the first round. In the runoff however, only the strongest Socialist, Radical, Popular Republican or Independent candidate will continue. Simmonet admitted that national headquarters had little means of enforcing this policy on the local federations, but he expects it to be followed in most constituencies.

The Socialists are touchy about the competition of the small Unified Socialist Party, which quickly rejected the possibility of joining the Socialists in cooperating with the rightist Independent Party. Its campaign may weaken Socialist candidates decisively in some districts. Socialist Secretary

General Guy Mollet also fears popular front tendencies may develop because he is convinced the Communists will assure the election of some Socialist candidates in the runoff round.

Simmonet admits that the MRP will have a difficult time in the elections if De Gaulle campaigns actively for the Union for the New Republic (UNR) --the only party committed to back him in the referendum and electoral campaigns. 25X1

Cultural Affairs Minister André Malraux, however, is organizing an Association for the Fifth Republic as a Gaullist electoral machine to approve candidates who agree to support De Gaulle. This move would permit the President to back individual candidates without openly committing him to a specific party. 25X1

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**SPECIAL ARTICLES**SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FACTIONALISM**

The military coup in South Korea in May 1961 placed the political future of the country directly in the hands of its armed forces. While officers who led the coup denounced the infighting and corruption of the civilian politicians, they have brought into the government their own personal quarrels and long-standing factional struggles. As the present regime tries to find a solid base on which to erect a new civil government structure, the attitudes and ambitions of a variety of military groups will play a prominent role.

Development of Military Factionalism

Intense factional feeling is characteristic of Koreans. Ambitious men have relied almost exclusively on creating a group of personally loyal henchmen rather than on attracting support for a cause. Fierce competition among dominant personalities rather than ideological division has been the rule.

Before the 1961 coup, factionalism in the military related largely to purely military affairs--such as promotions, assignments, and control of the various services. These matters were the concern of competing groups of senior generals, whose associations were largely determined by their regional origins and the place and character of their early military training while Korea was under Japanese rule.

With the coup, however, a new group emerged--the "colonels," whose distinctive characteristic is that their early professional training consisted

of a very rapid course in South Korea's own Officer Candidate School. Since the coup, a third major group has gradually become apparent. This consists of those officers, still junior for the most part, who have received full four-year professional training at the South Korean Military Academy.

Identification of any officer's factional attachment is complicated by the fact that some have ties with more than one group. Moreover, a number of senior generals have joined with the "colonels" because the latter were the driving force behind the 1961 coup.

Conflicts between the "colonels" and the senior generals have been the principal cause of friction within the government leadership. Assisted by his reputation for personal honesty, junta leader General Pak Chong-hui has managed to keep himself above the factional struggles and has maintained a balance among the factions. Even he, however, may be unable to keep the situation in check during the coming months as individuals and factions scramble for political advantage in the civilian government which has been promised for mid-1963.

The Senior Generals

Among the senior generals, probably the two strongest factions consist of officers who have a common provincial origin--either the Hamgyong or Pyongan provinces of what is now North Korea. The pre-eminence of men from this area in the South Korean Army after World War II was due partly to a martial tradition in these provinces but mainly to the fact that many came from careers in Japan's

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Kwantung Army. Not only did they find that opportunity for advancement was limited in North Korea, but many had been strongly indoctrinated with anti-Communism.

With the dissolution of the Japanese armies and the division of Korea, these officers found their way south and entered the South Korean military establishment. Having no local or family ties in the South, they formed tight factions on the basis of their origin in order to protect and advance their careers.

The Hamgyong faction is led by retired General Chong Il-kwon, the South Korean ambassador in Washington. Chong served as army chief of staff longer than any other officer and is still influential in the military. His influence is not confined to senior officers, as his adherents hold important positions throughout the army and the bureaucracy. Two Hamgyong generals, Lt. Gen. Yi Chu-il, the vice chairman of the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, and Marine Maj. Gen. Kim Tong-ha lead opposition to the "colonels" from within the junta.

A purge soon after the military coup greatly reduced the influence of the Pyongan faction. Pyongan officers nevertheless still hold important economic and government positions, and the group could probably obtain the support of their provincial compatriots, now in South Korea, including several thousand civilian refugees.

A "Manchurian" faction, consisting of officers who received their education at the Japanese military academies in Manchuria, cuts across both the provincial groups, being especially heavily represented in the Hamgyong faction.

The Kwantung Army experience of these senior officers has some ideological importance beyond anti-Communism. An unusually intense distaste for civilian politics and politicians was typical of that army's outlook. Moreover, the Kwantung vision of economic growth under "efficient" military auspices may well have influenced Pak Chong-hui's ideas on the infusion by the military of a spirit of dynamism into South Korea.

The senior officers group now farthest in the background seems nevertheless to have the best chance of making a comeback under civilian rule. This is the "Japan" group, consisting of men of great prestige who were educated at the imperial military academies or the more prestigious universities in Japan. These officers are mostly of South Korean origin and are linked by educational background and family ties to some of the country's most prominent civilian political and financial figures.

Other lesser factions are unlikely to regain prominence. Members of the once important "Chinese" faction, made up of officers who began their careers with the Chinese Nationalists, are generally too old to be active political leaders. One of them, however, is retired Lt. Gen. Yi Pom-sek, an early lieutenant of former president Rhee. His Racial Youth Corps might possibly provide a base for a political comeback.

The "Colonels"

During the past two years, the senior generals' principal opponents have come from the so-called "eighth class"--field-grade officers who were the real moving spirits behind the 1961 coup. The group has been designated as the eighth class to graduate from the Korean Military Academy, but it actually

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is a composite of short-term OCS graduates.

It is led by security chief Colonel Kim Chong-pil, the second man in the ruling junta and the chief lieutenant of General Pak Chong-hui.

This eighth class has a number of unique characteristics. It was the first to begin training after the founding of the republic, and was the first to begin training under native leadership. It was exceptionally large, in part, because of the need to replace officers purged for Communism in 1948. Between January and May 1949 a total of 1,801 officers were graduated. Although the bonds of loyalty are strongest within the individual sections, the heavy casualties suffered by the class as a whole during the Korean War and the leadership of a few exceptional officers gave it a sense of cohesion.

After the war the eighth class along with surviving members of some other OCS groups felt frustrated because they had to serve in the middle ranks under generals little older than themselves. An attempt was made in 1960 by "colonels" from the eighth and two earlier classes to have the general-officer ranks thinned out. Although this effort was not immediately successful, it served to focus sentiment within the ranks of the field-grade officers and thereby strengthened their position.

Since then, however, members of the eighth class have gradually maneuvered members of the earlier classes out of position, so that the general accrual of influence to the "colonels" has more and more been an accrual to the eighth class. This maneuvering is only one of the factors working to divide the "colonels." There continue to be rivalries within the class itself. Eighth-class

members close to Kim Chong-pil, for example, enjoy select positions in his security organization, while other members of the class are on active army duty far removed from the prestige and pleasures of Seoul. Eighth-class members who serve on the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction are special objects of resentment. Such schisms are likely to become increasingly acute.

"Four-Year" Men

The break between these field-grade officers and the four-year Military Academy graduates is far sharper than that between the "colonels" and the generals. Not only do the four-year graduates--now mostly company-grade officers--share the common experience of an extended period together in one institution, but they have established distinct traditions of their own. Better trained than the short-term graduates, they regard themselves as an elite corps and tend to look down on all their predecessors as corrupt and unprofessional.

The four-year graduates have been strongly indoctrinated against involvement of the military in politics and presently restrict themselves to their professional duties. However, should the present regime continue too long in power and become corrupted, the chances of a reaction from this group would seem good.

Attitudes Toward US

Regardless of factional affiliations, the officer corps generally tends to identify the country's future with continued close ties with the United States. The "colonels," however, have had the least exposure to American influence and tend to be antagonistic toward what they regard as intervention in South Korea's internal affairs. Thus as long as Kim Chong-pil's eighth class retains a pervasive influence in the government, US - 25X1 South Korean relations are likely to be bumpy.

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