

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SYRIA

Syrian army leaders who assumed power on 3 April have reached an impasse as to how to rule the country. While they want to throw a cloak of constitutionality over their regime by returning the country to civilian hands, they also want to retain ultimate control. Since no strong man has emerged from among the military leaders, the present prospect for a military dictatorship without further upheavals does not seem bright.

Civilian political leaders, on the other hand--especially imprisoned President Qudsi--are loath to take responsibility. Qudsi is reluctant to reassume office without guarantees from the military that they will back a constitutional regime and refrain from constant interference in governmental operations. The fate of the former cabinet, also now in prison, adds to this reluctance. The military leaders seized power without considering the constitutional and practical consequences, while the political

leaders appear to have learned little from recent Syrian history. Neither group seems prepared to compromise.

The military command also seems overconfident regarding the extent of its suppression of the recent pro-Nasir upsurge in the country and, while still paying some lip service to the idea of a loose union with Egypt, hedges on its previous promise for a plebiscite on the union question. The command's present middle-of-the-road ideas run counter to the interests of the country's two most important political groupings--the extremely conservative business and property-owning elements who backed the Qudsi-Dawalibi regime and brought on its downfall, and the leftist-socialist pan-Arabists. As the present junta lacks support of either right or left, its life is likely to be short. Any change in the composition of the ruling group will probably involve a shift to the left.

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FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES

One consequence of the emerging settlement in Algeria is likely to be an early resumption of French diplomatic relations with the six Middle Eastern Arab states which broke with France at the time of the Suez affair in 1956. Arab solidarity with the Algerian rebels has prevented these states from re-establishing diplomatic ties with Paris, as all except Saudi Arabia have done with London. The rapid change in the political climate made by the 19 March


cease-fire announcement, however, was underlined by a resolution passed by the Arab League on 3 April predicting "a new era of equitable and fruitful relations" with France.

French and Syrian officials expect informal conversations held in Paris in late March to lead "soon" to the re-establishment of full diplomatic ties, following which Paris plans to renew relations

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with Saudi Arabia and "probably Jordan." Iraq foresees "a gradual resumption of contact" over a period of months.

Nasir's opposition to French retention of military bases in Algeria and nuclear testing in the Sahara may delay an early reconciliation on his part with France. However, a major step in that direction was the release on 7 April of the four French property commission members on trial in Cairo as "spies" since November. Paris had insisted on the release of the men before "any talk of renewed relations." According to a 10 April press report, Egypt's deputy foreign minister will probably visit Paris in May.

All the other North African states--Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya--as well as the Sudan appear eager to renew close relations and secure French economic assistance. However, the Bizerte base issue with Tunisia and the objection of all North Africa

to French nuclear testing in the Sahara continue to be major obstacles. Tunisia is hopeful that France will be ready at least by July to set a date for evacuating Bizerte and, since the Algerian cease-fire, has twice made overtures for French economic assistance. The Moroccan minister of national economy and finance early this month also expressed hope that France will "resume its aid and return to first place in Moroccan life."

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Popular support for the Dominican Republic's governing seven-man Council of State has been on the decline for several weeks, partly because of continuing economic difficulties and partly because of political attacks by the National Civic Union (UCN)--the country's largest political party. Ever since the council came to power in January, the generally moderate UCN has supplied most of its popular support, but it is worried by the competition of more leftist parties. The UCN leaders, who are identified in the public's mind with the government but in fact are unable to control its policy, apparently feel they must assail the council's record for campaigning purposes in the national elections scheduled for December.

The members of the council face the difficult political transition from dictatorship to democracy simultaneously with such pressing economic problems as unemployment, and they have little practical political experience to draw on. There has been discord among them, partly over the demands for immediate social and economic reforms, which some of them regard as too drastic. Most of them believe that the national election should be postponed for a year while moderate parties develop leadership and organization. The UCN continues to insist on elections

as scheduled, and on 31 March it sharpened the council's fears of a coup by publicly demanding "revolutionary" measures to purge the armed forces of officers guilty of crimes under the dictatorship.

In retaliation, some members of the council have made moves toward inviting other parties of the center and left to join the government, and the UCN now is scaling down its demands. Meanwhile, however, the pro-Castro 14th of June party and other extreme leftists continue their attacks on the government and were responsible for sporadic outbursts of violence at the end of March.

The council for the present retains the loyalty of the top military leadership. This group, however, consists of young and inexperienced officers preoccupied with reorganizing the armed forces into a professional nonpolitical body modeled on US lines. The danger of antigovernment action comes from the reactionary officers who are gradually being eased out. These may eventually gain significant support among other officers if the dissension within the Council of State worsens and disputes among the moderate parties begin to seem like anarchy or an impending Communist takeover to military men unaccustomed to a free political system.

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NIGERIA^A

The former British territory of Nigeria, independent since 1960, is preparing to become a republic, but it will remain in the Commonwealth. This constitutional change will give it a status like that of Ghana, India, and Pakistan.

The principal formal adjustment involved is the sub-

stitution of an elected president for a Governor General appointed by the Crown on advice of the Nigerian Government. The present Governor General is Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the earliest and most radical of Nigeria's three main parties, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which controls the Eastern Region of

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southern Nigeria. The idea of "completing Nigeria's independence" and dropping the vestiges of formal ties to Britain has wide popular appeal in the south. Leaders of the conservative Northern Region, however, have regarded the connection with Britain as a kind of guarantee of their feudal positions and view the republic proposal with distrust.

Regional differences over the pace of change can become critical problems at the national level, because the government is a coalition of the NCNC and the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which reflects the views of the long-established northern Moslem leaders and is bossed by the formidable Sardauna of Sokoto--Northern Region premier--and his "lieutenant," Federal Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Balewa. The NPC-NCNC coalition, in which the NPC is the senior partner, has been in existence since December 1959. Although strange bedfellows by outlook and ideology, the two parties have exhibited a noteworthy willingness to compromise, and because of NPC objections Azikiwe had until recently soft-pedaled the republic proposal.

The issue was first agitated actively over a year ago by Chief

Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group (AG), Nigeria's third major party, which controls the Western Region and is in opposition on the national level. Awolowo, who hoped the move would set the NCNC at odds with the NPC and strain the coalition, had some success at first. Last October, Azikiwe, chafing under the restrictions on his largely ceremonial office, came out for a republic, obviously visualizing himself as president, with a division of executive power between a president and prime minister. Northern leaders promptly threatened to force a popular vote on the issue--which the North, with 19 million people compared with 16 million Southerners, could win. Azikiwe and the NCNC then backed off, while making their point as to the wide popularity of a new "anticolonial" gesture.

The upshot has been that the NCNC leaders are on record as favoring a "harmless" type of republic having a president with only limited power, as in India; in return, the Northern leaders have agreed not to contest Azikiwe's candidacy as first president.

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DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AMONG SOVIET WRITERS

Recent developments on the Soviet literary scene show the regime moving with new vigor to contain but not to extinguish the ferment among writers. The extremists have been rebuked, but the rebukes have been couched in relatively mild terms and have been balanced by crumbs of praise for the more moderate liberal authors.

An authoritative party voice, that of the central committee organ Kommunist, in late March defended the political line of novelist Vsevolod Kochetov's The Obkom Secretary, which had been attacked by lib-

eral writers on the sensitive issue of the hero's reluctance to accept the denigration of Stalin. The leaders in this attack--the newspaper Literary Gazette and the monthly journal New World--were themselves criticized by Kommunist for raising the issue. The article also reiterated previous criticism of Vasily Aksenov's novel Ticket to the Stars for its picture of disoriented Soviet youth.

At the same time, the article admitted the artistic weakness of Kochetov's novel and criticized the unqualified praise of the novel by such conservative

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publications as Literary Gazette's rival, the newspaper Literature and Life. Moreover, it praised the work of the moderate liberals Vladimir Soloukhin and Vladimir Tendryakov, who have managed to avoid belaboring questions of allegiance to regime goals.

Other official moves appeared equally carefully calculated to maintain the equilibrium between the conservatives and liberals. The award of an Order of Lenin to Kochetov, the leader of the militantly conformist writers, on the occasion of his 50th birthday in early February was soon counterbalanced by an Order of Lenin for moderate Konstantin Fedin on his 70th birthday.

Last January, much public interest was aroused by a lecture in which Ilya Ehrenburg criticized Soviet handling of the Pasternak affair and explained that "we were all accomplices in a vast conspiracy of silence" under Stalin. Probably for this reason, a lecture on his autobiography scheduled to be delivered by Ehrenburg in mid-March was abruptly canceled. He appeared in Vienna the following week, however, for a meeting of the steering committee of the World Peace Council.

Despite sharp criticism of the editorial policies of Literary Gazette, New World, and the magazine Youth at both the 22nd party congress in October and the All-Union Conference on Ideological Work in December, the editorial boards of the first two are still intact. Valentin Katayev was replaced as chief editor of Youth by the highly conformist Boris Polevoy in January, but the rest of the editorial board has not been changed. Most notably, the much-criticized Victor Rozov, whose movie script "A.B.C.D.E..." has shared angry conservative attacks equally with Aksenov's Ticket to the Stars, remains on the board.

The disciplinary measures directed against established professional writers are unlikely to provide more than a temporary check to efforts by the nonconformists to expand their area of creative freedom. It is a measure of the freedom already gained that Soloukhin and Tendryakov appear to occupy a middle-of-the road position in Kommunist's eyes. Despite the party's often reiterated demand that writers assist in the formation of the new Communist man and contribute to the building of communism, neither author has produced politically oriented propaganda. Soloukhin is known primarily as a lyric poet, but has also written some prose on pastoral scenes of village life. Tendryakov has recently been concerned with timeless problems of conscience in terms of good and evil, without reference to political systems.

It must be noted, moreover, that these liberal writers, even in their most nonconformist moods, are overtly loyal to the Soviet system. Nor are Aksenov's disoriented youths in active opposition; they merely lack emotional involvement in building communism. Within the limits of this loyalty to the system, the liberal writers can be expected to continue to press for greater freedom in realism and the portrayal of nonpolitical psychological factors, as well as greater attention to artistic merit in writing techniques.

The relative immunity which these authors enjoy, however, has not been extended to the active dissenters. According to a recent report in the French press, one such novelist, a professor in Leningrad who was imprisoned for ten years under Stalin, was recently rearrested after his anti-Soviet novel was smuggled out of the USSR and published abroad.

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EVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNITY OF STATES

De Gaulle sees a Paris-oriented Eurafrikan community as a means of bolstering France's claim to be a world power, and has recently referred to France's present relations with its former colonial territories in Black Africa as a model of what may be achieved in French-Algerian cooperation. In his 1958 plan for the French Community a "special place" was reserved for Algeria, and De Gaulle apparently still hopes that the now-much-modified concept of the Community can accommodate an FLN-governed Algeria. In his 26 March address on the Algerian peace accords, he looked to future Franco-Algerian cooperation as a logical development of French policy, spoke of a continuing high level of aid to the area, and emphasized the transformation of France's colonial policy which has permitted Black Africa to "cooperate" with France.


France's present relations with the 12 independent "Brazzaville states" and the former UN trust territory of Togo are very different from what De Gaulle envisaged in 1958, and the political structure devised then is a dead letter now. France does, however, continue to exercise a high degree of influence in most of these states, largely as a result of its extensive aid program.

Growth of the Community

The French constitution approved in September 1958 provided the framework for France's colonies to become autonomous republics in which French hegemony would be safeguarded by the retention of broad decision-making powers in the hands of the President of the Community--who was also

the President of France. All the African colonies accepted this status, except Guinea, which voted against the constitution in the referendum to approve it and opted instead for complete independence. Soon after the Community was inaugurated in April 1959, however, De Gaulle began to acknowledge publicly its "evolutionary character," and he made little effort to deter movements for full independence in the other 12 former colonies.

By late 1960 all of the ex-colonies and UN trust territories in Black Africa except French Somaliland had juridical independence. While all except Guinea quickly signed cooperation agreements with France, only Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, the Central African Republic, Senegal, and the Malagasy Republic retained Community membership. A new agreement with Mali signed in March 1962 may presage improved



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French-Malian relations, and a rapprochement with Guinea could follow the Algerian settlement. Nevertheless, the de facto demise of the Community as a formal institution was apparent in 1960, and the Community articles of France's constitution may be abrogated this year.

Despite the eclipse of the Community, France continues to hold a pre-eminent position in the affairs of all the former Community states except Mali, as well as in the former UN trust territory of Cameroon. Bilateral agreements assign Paris a paramount position in many areas, including preferential commercial relations, a veto over requests for non-French defense assistance, priority claims on strategic raw materials, monetary control, and such cultural preferences as establishment of French as official language. Each of the governments remains heavily dependent on French assistance, but Paris has on the whole been remarkably circumspect in exerting political pressure. When pressure has been applied--as on the Algerian issue in the UN--it has not always been successful.

Aid: Direct and Indirect

In recent years, France has allocated 2.5 to 3 percent of its GNP--about \$66 billion in 1961--to assistance programs in the less developed countries. This is generally recognized as the highest percentage of any country in the world. Over four fifths of the total aid figure is apportioned to the franc zone. Direct economic aid--largely grants--to the Brazzaville states and Togo has increased from an estimated \$300 million in 1959 to a projected figure of almost \$400 million in 1962. While French expenditures for military assistance to these states are decreasing, they are still probably close to \$200 million annually. In addition, private French investment, according to a recent statement

FRENCH AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD

The virtually complete dependence on France of such poorer states as the Central African Republic, Mauritania, Niger, and Dahomey is illustrated by the situation in Chad, an arid, landlocked, resource-poor state of about three million people. Its GNP for 1961 was estimated at \$153 million, about two fifths of which consisted of food products outside the money economy. Although Prime Minister Tombalbaye is considered "pro-French," any public indication of subservience to Paris would probably be politically fatal. Nevertheless, more than half the government's budget for 1962--estimated at \$22 million--is directly or indirectly subsidized by France.

Paris' contributions for this year include \$2.5 million in an outright budget subsidy, \$6.4 million for investment programs under the Fund for Aid and Cooperation (FAC) and the Common Organization of Saharan Regions (OCRS), \$700,000 to complete the 1960 FAC program, \$3.5 million to pay FAC technicians, \$600,000 for the gendarmerie, and \$1.6 million to subsidize the cotton crop. This listing excludes expenditures for the 4,000 French troops in Chad, long-term loans, Paris' contributions to the Common Market Economic Development Fund, and private French investment.

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by the minister of cooperation, reaches "several dozen billion old francs each year"--i.e., at least \$75,000,000.

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France also subsidizes the budgets of all 12 Brazzaville states.

There are also several types of indirect French assistance to the Brazzaville states and Togo, the "cost" of which to France is counterbalanced to some degree by reciprocal advantages. Preferential commercial agreements provide price supports and guaranteed markets for many of the primary products which are the principal source of income in all of these states. Ivory Coast, for example, sells coffee to France at prices about 50 percent above world market levels. The French have put a value of \$72,000,000 per year on such commodity price stabilization efforts. France, in turn, benefits in the form of a tightly protected market for its high-priced exports; in some

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of these states, over 90 percent of the foreign trade is still with France. Paris has been meeting balance-of-payments deficits for all of them.

Furthermore, under the 1957 EEC convention regarding African territories, these African states enjoy tariff preferences in the other five EEC countries and share in a five-year \$581,000,-000 development fund with the other former African colonial territories. The level of African tariff preferences will be reduced when this convention expires at the end of 1962, but Paris, by way of compensation, is seeking a substantial increase in the EEC's development aid to Africa.

Defense Responsibilities

France places extreme importance on the mutual security agreements it has signed with all of the former French territories except Guinea and Mali. These accords give France the exclusive right to form, supply, and train an indigenous force in each republic, and they provide for French base and troop-stationing rights in all except Upper Volta. At the end of 1961, about 43,000 French troops were stationed in the former French territories of sub-Saharan Africa. Military assistance funds have been decreasing slightly since 1959, and Paris plans further cuts as French troops are replaced by indigenous forces. However, there is a possibility that battalions of the Foreign Legion,

which cannot legally be withdrawn from Algeria to metropolitan France, may be stationed in the African states.

France has reluctantly accepted the idea of American supplementary military aid to its former territories in Africa, but as recently as last month the French secretary of state for sub-Saharan affairs, in a conversation with a US Embassy officer, objected strenuously over tentative American plans to provide training for African forces.

Education and Technical Personnel

The Fifth Republic has placed particular emphasis on its education and training program for African personnel. Paris hopes to maintain its tradition of educating in France the elite of French-speaking Africa and to this end is currently providing 1,350 scholarships for prospective teachers and 520 for the military training of young Africans in France.

Within the 14 sub-Saharan former French territories there were at the beginning of 1961 between 10,000 and 11,000 French teachers and nonmilitary technicians--about half of them in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and the Malagasy Republic. While the French officials and technical personnel are slowly being replaced by native cadres, the number of French teachers has actually been rising--from 2,416 in 1960 to 3,364 in March 1962, with 800 positions scheduled to be filled with Frenchmen during this year. The French "adviser" continues to play an essential role in administration and education. Every Malagasy minister, for instance, has his French alter ego--who either does all the real work or carefully guides the minister's moves.

View From the African Side

African impatience over the progress attainable under

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a policy of "Africanization" has encouraged dependence on French administrators and technicians, and French assistance is generally the main factor making for stability in each state. At the same time, however, this assistance has occasioned charges from strident nationalist groups that the African political leaders relying on it are French "puppets" and dupes of French "neocolonialism." The presence of French troops has also become an increasingly controversial political question in some of these states. The Sino-Soviet bloc can be expected to do what it can to sharpen these points of irritation--especially by offers of aid "without strings."

There seems little prospect of an early change in this situation. It is true that the Brazzaville states--indirectly stimulated by the French--have set up ambitious joint programs which could eventually lead to effective inter-African economic and military cooperation and a consequent reduction in their dependence on France. There is, however, almost no inter-African trade at present, the economies are still extremely underdeveloped, and it is to be expected that all will be economically dependent on France to a considerable degree for many years. The African Malagasy Union (UAM), the organization established last fall by the Brazzaville states to coordinate defense and economic policies, is similarly dependent on French guarantees and troops.

Paris is likely to resist any movement--such as that initiated by President Senghor of Senegal at the late March meeting of UAM representatives--to replace its present policy of bilateral aid agreements with a French-African "vertical organization" in which aid would be channeled on a "multilateral" basis.

Outlook for Continuing French Aid

Despite the anticipated requirements of an independent Algeria for aid, recent official statements indicate that De Gaulle has no intention of reducing the volume of French economic assistance of sub-Saharan Africa in the near future. While France envisages substantial increases in its financial assistance to underdeveloped countries outside the franc zone, this will be contingent on other countries' sharing the burden France now carries in Africa on a bilateral basis.

The African area as a whole will retain a high priority in France's aid program, despite changes in types of aid or in particular countries. The minister of cooperation said in March that budget subsidy aid is "due to disappear quickly" in favor of increased investments, and Paris apparently will not hesitate to risk a possible rupture in relations by withholding budget funds in order to repress financial irresponsibility. For example, although France finally decided to provide a sizable subsidy advance to Dahomey this month in order to relieve temporarily the chronic financial crisis, it was made clear to President Maga that the present scale of sumptuary expenses would have to be curtailed.

There is also a reportedly growing segment of opinion in France that the continuation of aid depends "to a very large degree" on the political conduct of the recipient governments. France will, however, probably be wary of repeating its mistake of 1958, when the abrupt termination of all aid to Guinea made possible rapid Communist penetration there.

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PRESIDENT AYUB AND PAKISTAN

Throughout his three and a half years of rule, Pakistani President Ayub has had two basic objectives: first, to create political and economic stability through administrative reforms and improvement of Pakistan's means of production; and second, to create a sense of responsibility among the people and gradually lead them back to full civil government. During 1961, increased rumblings of popular discontent produced the first doubt in Ayub's mind that he was making satisfactory progress. Therefore, along with intensifying efforts to achieve his political and economic goals, he took several steps to protect his own position from attack.

Conflicts produced by these opposing progressive and defensive efforts may lead this year to increased popular dissatisfaction and to rising political tension. Such tension would not be likely to deter Ayub from his basic aims, but it could result both in requests to the West for additional support and in criticism of the US in particular for not supporting Pakistan as strongly as Ayub desires.

Domestic Conditions

Over the past three years, industry and business have made significant gains. The industrial production index (1953=100) rose from 208 in 1958 to 261 in 1960, and continued to rise in 1961. Production of cotton cloth and jute goods has increased steadily. West Pakistan produced a surplus of cement for the first time in 1961, but East Pakistan continues to suffer a short supply. Construction of Pakistan's first steel mill was approved in December 1961, and development in oil

exploration, refining, and marketing is proceeding apace. Trade is booming, although the problem of balancing imports and exports remains acute.

Many of the financial, industrial, and business advances made between 1958 and 1961 are of an intangible nature not felt by Pakistan's overwhelmingly rural population. Others affect mainly the urban areas. Ayub, therefore, has begun to feel increased pressure, especially from rural East Pakistan, to show visible signs of progress. As of early 1962, however, he has little with which to pacify the peasants despite his efforts to intensify activity on various fronts.

During Pakistan's First Five-Year Plan (1955-60), development expenditures fell 10 percent below planned targets, per capita income rose only 1 percent instead of 7 percent as expected, and the average annual per capita income in East Pakistan in 1959-60 was still only \$45. The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) was designed to increase national income 20 percent, with an annual increase of nearly 2 percent in per capita income. By the spring of 1961, however, prices for projects had already risen 21 percent and Pakistan's population--at 93.8 million--was 5 percent higher than previously estimated.

The index of total agricultural production (1952-54=100) rose from 105 in 1958 to 117 in 1960 and then fell to 114 in 1961. From 1958 through 1961, however, the index of per capita production was only 95, 102, 101, and 97, indicating that after three years of military rule Pakistan's people

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were perhaps not even as well fed as in 1952. A limited land reform program carried out in West Pakistan between 1959 and 1961 demonstrated that significant increases in agricultural production would not appear for some time; between 1951 and 1961, Pakistan changed from a nation self-sufficient in food grains to a net importer.

Production of cloth has gone up steadily during Ayub's rule, but because export promotion schemes have limited the amounts available locally, the domestic price remains fairly high. Prices of other consumer goods are also generally above the 1958 level, despite a drop shortly after Ayub's takeover.

National taxes, at least on business, were reported down 10 percent in 1960-61, but this was said to be more than offset by provincial and local taxes. At the village level, some councils empowered under Ayub's rule to collect new taxes are reported to have done so too heavily; others failed to tax at all.

From the peasant's point of view, the availability and price of food and cloth and the rate of taxation are factors of far greater importance than the industrial production index or the balance of trade. With rural areas worse off in matters of food and no better off than in 1958 in respect to cloth supply and consumer prices, Ayub has real cause for concern.

Ayub's efforts to build a new spirit of political responsibility, initiative, and self-reliance among the people have met only limited success. The President's major effort along these lines is the system of basic democracies (village, township, district, divisional, and provincial councils) which

provide limited self-government. Two years after their establishment, however, these basic democracies are still suffering growing pains, and many government officials remain skeptical of their eventual success.

International Problems

In the international field as well, Ayub has failed to achieve his major goals. Possibly emboldened, following his visit to Washington last July, by a belief that the United States would condone, if not support, action against Afghanistan, Ayub in late August took new steps to implement the hard-line policy he has long advocated. By closing Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan, he provoked Afghanistan's Prime Minister Daud into closing the border and breaking off diplomatic relations. Kabul has probably been less affected by the border closure than Ayub hoped, however, since it has been able to use its trade outlet through the USSR and has developed new outlets through Iran.

Ayub in December 1961 turned once more to the dispute with India over Kashmir, threatening to call for a UN Security Council meeting on the subject. Despite opposition from various quarters, a pro forma meeting was held on 2 February, but there has been no substantive discussion to date. Efforts to arrange for bilateral negotiations outside the UN have been fruitless so far, and Ayub has no more reason than before to believe that India will agree to a solution satisfactory to him.

Growing Internal Opposition

The Pakistani public in 1961 became more openly critical

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of military rule. Criticism grew to major proportions in East Pakistan, where people feel their province is discriminated against politically as well as economically. Students, a traditionally volatile group, were in a state of unrest throughout the year in both West and East Pakistan. Lawyers and intellectuals remained restive under the restraints of martial law. Religious leaders were aroused over Ayub's failure to give more than lip service to Islamic principles in the new constitution he was preparing. Politicians and their followers, despite some preventive arrests, prepared during the latter part of 1961 and early 1962 to oppose restrictive conditions in the new constitution and to contest elections in the hope of altering the constitution after being elected. Tribesmen along the Afghan frontier and traders near the border became uneasy over ramifications of Ayub's anti-Afghan policy.

Partly because of existing situations and partly to prevent future trouble, Ayub in 1961 and early 1962 instituted a series of security measures. In both West and East Pakistan he strengthened laws under which persons could be detained without trial. He took steps to limit control by the regular courts over martial law personnel and curtailed the authority of religious leaders. Most important of all, however, Ayub ensured the incorporation into the new national constitution, promulgated on 1 March 1962, of restrictions permitting him to retain control over virtually all legislative actions of the new parliament to be elected on 28 April. Finally, Ayub made a serious effort to retain the support of the armed forces. He reconfirmed the tenure of the army and air force commanders in chief, raised the rank of the navy commander in chief, promoted an East Pakistani to

general officer rank for the first time, and increased recruitment of East Pakistanis.

The growing opposition to Ayub is not coordinated and it still lacks leadership. Fear of swift reprisal under martial law discourages overt antigovernment activity. Ayub, however, apparently has at last reached the point where he must soon decide whether to remain a dictator or restore democratic rights. To date, his contradictory actions on this score have created uncertainties among all classes. If his future course does not soon become clearer, he is almost certain to be faced with an increasingly restive population.

Outlook

Except as a last resort, Ayub is unlikely to return to single-handed rule with military support. He is much more likely to continue holding out hopes of more democratic government while taking measures to prevent its being achieved until he feels the people are "ready." Thus, he is likely to come increasingly into conflict with political groups attempting to broaden their base of power under the new constitution. Should Ayub respond to these groups with harsh measures, he would find himself having to rule with less and less popular support.

In these circumstances, Ayub would probably press even harder for economic advances and call on Western countries to increase their financial assistance. He might also request token aid from the Soviet bloc as a means of maintaining pressure on the West. Should he fail to make readily demonstrable progress in the near future, Ayub might be inclined to shift the blame for his own failures to others. This could lead to a deterioration in relations with a number of Pakistan's friends and neighbors.

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