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COPY NO. 70

OCI NO. 6088/60

8 December 1960

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed

ARMY review(s)  
completed.



DOCUMENT NO. 4  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SC 1980  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:  
AUTH: HR 70  
DATE: 21-5-80 REVIEWER:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

MOSCOW MEETING CONCLUDES . . . . . Page 1

The three-week-long meeting of world Communist leaders in Moscow in November achieved a 20,000-word statement designed to preserve a facade of unity despite continuing evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreement. The conference may well strengthen Khrushchev's hand in pressing for another major diplomatic confrontation with the West on Berlin and Germany. He may believe that Chinese commitment to a document stressing the overriding importance of continuing bloc unity will inhibit Peiping for a time from open attacks on Soviet policy toward the West. The statement, however, also would seem to commit the USSR to maintain its present aggressive and uncompromising line in support of anti-Western Afro-Asian governments and national liberation movements, and Khrushchev apparently now intends to combine a return to negotiations with the West with a vigorous prosecution of his "anticolonial" policy.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . Page 4

The Soviet UN delegation is attempting to clear the way for top-level contacts with the new US administration at a special session of the General Assembly next spring. Chief Soviet delegate Zorin has argued in private talks that completion of the debates on such "contentious items" as Tibet and Hungary before the new administration takes office would create the atmosphere for a US-Soviet rapprochement. Discussion of disarmament would, according to this line of suggestion, be carried over into a special session of the General Assembly to be attended by the heads of government. The main purpose of such a session from Moscow's viewpoint probably would be to provide an opportunity for Khrushchev to meet with the new President and lay the groundwork for a formal summit conference later in the year.

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FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . Page 6

Concern in France over a possible rightist coup attempt in Algeria increased following the sudden flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagayette and four others on trial for their part in the January insurrection. Tension in Algiers remains high in anticipation of De Gaulle's 9-14 December Algerian tour, which may

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**PART I (continued)**

spark violent outbreaks or an attempt to set up a separate "Government of French Algeria." At the UN the Afro-Asian bloc is pressing for a UN-supervised referendum in Algeria. [redacted]

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**CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA . . . . . Page 7**

The joint communique issued on 6 December at the end of Che Guevara's visit to North Korea endorsed Communist policy goals. The establishment of Cuban diplomatic relations with North Vietnam was announced on 2 December, and relations with Mongolia were announced on 7 December. Cuba has concluded new agreements with the USSR, one of which provides for the addition of Soviet members to the faculty of Havana University. In Central America, El Salvador continues to offer special opportunities for Communist subversion; and army unrest persists in Guatemala. [redacted]

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**CONGO . . . . . Page 10**

Mobutu's capture of ex-premier Lumumba on 2 December has dealt a major blow to Lumumba's followers and his Soviet and African allies, several of which have announced that they intend to withdraw their troops from the UN command. Lumumba's supporters in Orientale Province, however, are continuing efforts to expand their influence in the Congo interior; they may attempt to hold Belgians as hostages for Lumumba. The ineffectiveness of the UN command in Stanleyville suggests that the UN may not be able to prevent clashes between Congolese Army and pro-Lumumba forces. While Lumumba's followers in Stanleyville now have some arms and supplies, they may have difficulties in obtaining their needs in the future. [redacted]

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**LAOS . . . . . Page 11**

The power play of Col. Kouprasith in Vientiane on 8 December appears on the surface at least to be a re-affirmation of support for Premier Souvanna Phouma against both the Pathet Lao and the right as symbolized by General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. Phoumi's forces have crossed the Ca Dinh River and as they advance along the road toward Vientiane appear to be meeting little opposition from the defending forces from the capital. The Soviet airlift of petroleum products to Vientiane began on 4 December. [redacted]

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**PART I (continued)**



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**PART II**

**NOTES AND COMMENTS**

**SOVIET TECHNICIANS WITHDRAWN FROM COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . Page 1**

It now appears that the USSR last summer withdrew the majority of Soviet technicians from Communist China. The withdrawal involved several thousand technicians, including those in key sectors of the economy. The Chinese have described the action as coercion and complain that it is damaging the economy.



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**YUGOSLAVIA'S RELATIONS WITH BLOC UNCHANGED BY MOSCOW CONFERENCE . . . . Page 2**

Recent friendly gestures toward Belgrade by the USSR and most of the satellites appear designed to assure Tito that the condemnation of "Yugoslav revisionism" which issued from the just-concluded Communist conference in Moscow is not intended to affect bloc-Yugoslav governmental relations. The gestures also serve as a rebuff to the Chinese Communists and Albanians, who have deliberately used attacks on Yugoslavia as indirect criticism of Soviet policy. The bloc continues disinclined to assist Yugoslav economic development.




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**SPUTNIK VI . . . . Page 3**

On 1 December the USSR placed into orbit its sixth earth satellite vehicle (Sputnik VI). It is believed that the vehicle was similar in configuration to Sputniks IV and V and that the test objectives, like those of Sputniks IV and V, were directed toward eventual manned space flight.



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
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**PART II (continued)**



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**THE 1961 ECONOMIC PLAN IN RUMANIA . . . . . Page 5**

Rumania is continuing its push toward the ambitious economic goals of its Six-Year Plan (1960-65) by scheduling for 1961 a 13.5-percent rise in industrial output and a 19-percent increase in agricultural production. Most sectors of the economy probably will surpass plans set for 1960, thus providing a foundation for further substantial increases in 1961. In agriculture, however, a very high 1961 target has been necessitated by inadequate progress in 1960. The extent of benefits granted the consumer in 1961 will depend on agricultural performance and on the degree of success in the housing program.

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**USSR AND CAMBODIA DECLARE ACCORD ON KEY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES . . . . . Page 6**

The communique published in Moscow on 3 December following discussions between Prince Sihanouk and Premier Khrushchev reaffirmed Cambodian support of a number of Soviet positions, including those on disarmament, the admission of Communist China and Mongolia to the United Nations, and modification of the UN structure. The communique also indicates that the USSR responded favorably to Sihanouk's overtures for increased economic assistance.

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**SOUTH VIETNAM - NORTH VIETNAM . . . . . Page 7**

President Diem has professed concern over reports that North Vietnam may be preparing overt aggression against South Vietnam or Laos. He has decided to mobilize additional troops; possibly to emphasize continued priority of security needs. Reported troop movements in North Vietnam probably reflect movements to and from field training areas as well as preparations for the country's first nationwide conscription. Hanoi's continued success with Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, however, probably foreshadows intensification of this mode of warfare.

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**MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . Page 8**

The Sudanese military regime is reported to be considering acceptance of further Soviet aid but may act cautiously in order to avoid provoking civil disturbances or even a coup attempt by conservative political and military elements. The new Libyan cabinet, after its first seven weeks of power, appears more susceptible

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than its predecessor both to pro-Nasir and to anti-American pressures from various Libyan politicians.

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**SOMALI REPUBLIC MOVES TOWARD NEUTRALISM . . . . . Page 10**

With the acceptance of a Soviet ambassador to Mogadiscio and the negotiation of an economic agreement with the UAR, the Somali Republic seems to be moving toward a neutralist foreign policy. Pro-Western Premier Abdirascid apparently is motivated chiefly by a desire to break the republic's complete dependence on Western economic aid, but there are some influential Somalis who believe that the government's entire position is too closely identified with the West.

[Redacted]

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**MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA . . . . . Page 11**

Morocco's success--thanks to the USSR's veto--in keeping Mauritania out of the United Nations will be played up by Rabat as proof that King Mohamed V's regime is accomplishing its national objectives. Morocco, having won a respite, may postpone any attempts to employ guerrilla tactics in Mauritania and resort to strengthening pro-Moroccan political groups and subverting officials within the Mauritanian Government.

[Redacted]

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**GREEK GOVERNMENT FACES DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES . . . . . Page 12**

The parliamentary opposition in Greece, led by the Communist-front United Democratic Left (EDA), has been publicly accusing cabinet ministers of corruption and of collaboration with occupation forces during World War II. Price increases have led to new wage demands and strikes, one of which led to violence. With general elections anticipated next year, the badly splintered non-Communist opposition continues futile negotiations to create at least one party which could provide an effective alternative to the present government.

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**ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT FACING LEFTIST ATTACK . . . . . Page 14**

Iceland's Conservative - Social Democratic coalition, which has been in office since November 1959, is under mounting attack from the Communist-dominated opposition Labor Alliance party, and may soon face grave labor difficulties, possibly even a general strike. The government's economic program, designed to arrest the persistent inflation, has been moderately successful but needs more time for its long-range reforms to become fully effective. The Communist elements, which also control the Icelandic Federation of Labor, had previously anticipated that the program's "austerity" features would lead to the government's collapse without their resorting to strikes.

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**VENEZUELA . . . . . Page 15**

By applying strong security measures, the Venezuelan Government on 2 December ended an eight-day period of violence primarily centered in Caracas and spearheaded by leftist students and other pro-Castro elements. President Betancourt's containment of the unrest demonstrated his support among moderates and the majority of the armed forces. The government believes it has indications of Cuban involvement and of further Dominican plotting. The radical opposition can be expected to exploit any opportunities to provoke further trouble.

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**RURAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA . . . . . Page 16**

Since taking office in August 1958 President Lleras has treated as a priority problem the anarchy and violence in Colombia's rural areas that have caused an estimated 250,000 deaths over the past 12 years. The unrest springs largely from a complex of agrarian grievances, regional rivalries, and long-standing antagonisms between Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties, but Communists and pro-Castro elements are actively endeavoring to exploit it. Growing party difficulties in Congress have stymied Lleras' efforts to deal with the situation through agrarian and tax reform legislation.

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

SOVIET AGRICULTURE ON THE EVE OF THE DECEMBER PLENUM . . . Page 1

The Soviet central committee plenum on agriculture, which convenes in Moscow on 13 December, will be faced with the problems arising from the second successive crop year in which little or no progress was made toward meeting goals set by the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) for increasing agricultural production. Discussions at the plenum may reveal the government's intentions for any changes in agricultural price and wage policy, investment and equipment allocations, regional specialization, and the pace toward complete socialization, or even for a major reorganization in agricultural administration. Many party and government leaders will be subject to rebuke for agriculture's poor showing this year.

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POTENTIAL RIVALRIES IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBURO . . Page 4

There are in the North Vietnamese Communist party the basic elements which could produce a power struggle when 70-year-old President Ho Chi Minh is no longer in control. While still in good health, Ho seems to be making a special effort to provide for a smooth transfer of power. He has replaced Truong Chinh as second in command by former guerrilla leader Le Duan. This places Le Duan in a position to succeed to the leadership. Circumstances favor Ho's choice, but Truong Chinh is not likely to subside without a struggle for power with Le Duan.

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THE AGRARIAN REFORM ISSUE IN LATIN AMERICA . . . . . Page 8

The confiscatory land reform program of the Castro regime in Cuba has coincided with growing agitation for similarly radical programs in other Latin American countries. In almost all these countries there is great rural poverty, and in most of them a high percentage of the best land is owned by an elite which exercises considerable national power. In Ecuador and Peru, which have made little progress in land reform, pro-Communist agitators are actively exploiting the issue--as they are also in northeastern Brazil. A comprehensive reform program is under way in Venezuela, while Mexico, Bolivia, and Guatemala undertook extensive land redistribution before the appearance of Castro. However, almost everywhere in Latin America, public pressure for further land reform provides the left with a popular issue for exploitation.

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
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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## MOSCOW MEETING CONCLUDES

The paramount achievement of the three-week meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow in November was a 20,000-word statement which appears to represent a tactical accord to preserve a facade of unity in the world Communist movement despite continuing evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreement. The formulations, for the most part, are Soviet in tone, but on disputed issues they are matched by a clear or implicit reservation by the Chinese. The result is a mixture, but not a reconciliation, of Soviet and Chinese positions on issues on which they have disagreed and apparently continue to disagree.

In terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute the document apparently solves nothing, since, even more than the Moscow Declaration of 1957, it can be cited in support of very different positions.

Content of Moscow Statement

While heavy stress is laid on the continuing importance of maintaining bloc unity, each party has managed to express enough of its own views in the wordy and diffuse statement to assure that within that unity it can maintain independence of action in a given situation.

In dealing with the fundamental issues in dispute between Moscow and Peiping, the statement in most cases either contrives awkward formulations which combine the Soviet and Chinese positions on a given issue or relies on ambiguities which blur or evade the point.

Much of the document is a reaffirmation of positions on which Moscow and Peiping, as well as the other Communist parties, have long agreed. It reaffirms the parties' common views on the rapid growth in power and influence of the bloc, the decline of world capitalism, the disintegration of the colonial system, the aggressive character of imperialism, the menace of Western policies, the importance of avoiding a split in the bloc, and the certainty of an eventual Communist triumph. The agreed positions represent strong cohesive factors in the Sino-Soviet relationship as well as in the Communist movement, and still appear to be stronger than the divisive factors.

The divisive factors, however, remain and will probably soon return to prominence. On the issue of war and peace, the statement repeats Khrushchev's views on the destructive nature of thermonuclear weapons and the terrible consequences of general war in which "hundreds of millions will die," but leans toward the Chinese position in emphasizing imperialist preparations for such a war and makes much of the Chinese insistence that increasing "vigilance" is necessary in the face of this "danger."

The statement confirms the thesis of the preventability of world war while capitalism still exists--advanced by Khrushchev at the 21st Soviet party congress and not previously confirmed by the Chinese--but places the "possibility" further into the future.

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It further defers to the Chinese position that all other types of war cannot be ruled out until socialism is finally triumphant. The document reaffirms the Sino-Soviet agreement that general war can be avoided, but it evades the Chinese contention that local wars may be necessary and even desirable.

A graphic illustration of the attempt to maintain an outward appearance of unity while still disagreeing is presented in the section on relations with the West. At one point, the declaration combines the Soviet and Chinese approaches by stating that "Communists must unflaggingly work among the masses to prevent underestimation of the possibility of peaceful co-existence and at the same time, to prevent underestimation of the danger of war." While the statement advances the Soviet claim that the struggle for peace is the "most vital" task and the long-range economic competition will be decisive, it supports the Chinese view of the United States as the "main enemy of...the world" and, with emphasis of the Chinese variety, castigates the policies of Western imperialist nations.

On other key issues, the document is also ambivalent. In its discussion of the relative dangers of "revisionism" and "dogmatism and sectarianism," the statement allows the Chinese to continue attacking Soviet positions on the pretext of discussing Yugoslavia, and the Russians to continue attacking Chinese positions on the pretext of discussing a theoretical danger. Although it affirms that the Soviet party is "the mutually acknowledged vanguard of the world Communist movement" and the "most experienced and tempered unit," it acknowledges as well the "full equality"

of all parties in the movement.

The Chinese appear to have had some success in gaining a greater voice in Communist policy formulation by committing the USSR, as in the 1957 declaration, to hold bilateral and bloc-wide consultations. The current declaration goes somewhat beyond this and adds, that when points of dispute arise between parties, the leadership of the parties involved will, if necessary, hold meetings and consultations to arrive at joint views. On the other hand, Moscow has gained a commitment from the Chinese to adhere strictly to agreed positions and to bring their disputes to private meetings instead of lobbying in the open press and international bodies.

Subsequent comment by Peiping and Moscow will clarify the intention of each regime to abide by the spirit of unity evoked in the Moscow statement. Initially the two regimes have stressed this solidarity, but a comparison of the first editorial comment by Pravda and People's Daily reveals a divergence of emphasis, with Moscow ignoring the blatant anti-American parts of the declaration and Peiping stressing the attack on imperialism and placing more emphasis on militancy in describing the guidelines laid down in Moscow.

Atmosphere at Moscow Meeting

The indecisive and inadequate statement which issued from the Moscow meeting was the result of fierce infighting. In his four-hour speech, Liu Shao-chi is said to have accused Khrushchev of trying to turn the "socialist camp into a paper tiger" and to have claimed that Khrushchev's letter to President-elect Kennedy showed that he has learned nothing from

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events of the last half-year.

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 Khrushchev "flew off the handle several times against the Chinese," who "made him madder by sitting stonily and then repeating exactly what had made him so mad to begin with."

Several parties are said to have supported the Chinese in varying degrees, with the Albanians providing the strongest support. The atmosphere became so heated, however, that, although the Albanians sided with the Chinese, they succeeded in annoying both sides. Soviet presidium member Suslov at one point told Albanian first secretary Hoxha to "shut up," and the Chinese suggested that he could do his talking some other time.

Bloc Relations With West

In addition to its attention to doctrinal questions and the problem of discipline in the international Communist movement, the Moscow statement represents a program for action in foreign affairs. In this respect, the over-all effect of the Moscow conference may well be to strengthen Khrushchev's hand in pressing for another major diplomatic confrontation with the West on Berlin and Germany.

The declaration specifically confirms that "Communists seek...the solution of controversial international questions by means of negotiations" and warns that the "political quarrels between states must not be settled by war." Such statements, coupled with the reaffirmation of Moscow's predominance in the bloc and among Communist parties, will probably be interpreted by Khrushchev as at least tacit

Chinese consent to his plan of engaging the West in another round of top-level negotiations.

In addition, in dealing with such East-West issues as Khrushchev's proposal for complete and general disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons and cessation of tests, the declaration raises the Soviet position to the level of official bloc policy objectives. Since these issues have played a central role in Khrushchev's summit diplomacy, the USSR appears to have gained by implication Chinese and bloc approval to reactivate the campaign for a summit meeting. Khrushchev may well feel that by committing the Chinese to the continuing importance of bloc unity, Chinese adherence to the declaration will inhibit Peiping from attacking Soviet diplomacy during pre-summit negotiations.

That Khrushchev intends to go forward with such negotiations is indicated by conversations Ambassador Thompson had with Mikoyan and Kosygin on 6 December. Ambassador Thompson noted that he had been surprised to learn from the statement that the United States was a "stronghold of reaction." Kosygin pointed out that this was a Communist party statement and said that the Soviet Government was not only prepared but anxious to reach agreements and establish good relations with the United States.

In a later conversation, Thompson was told by Mikoyan that the strong attack on the United States had been a concession to the Chinese, who had proved to be "a tough negotiating partner." Mikoyan emphasized, however, that this did not in any way change the Soviet Union's desire to have good

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relations with the United States. Other Soviet officials gave the appearance of being both embarrassed and concerned by the anti-US tone of the statement.

Despite Khrushchev's evident desire to continue negotiations with the United States, the militant anti-Western tone of the statement would appear to reduce somewhat the Soviet premier's freedom of maneuver and preclude the kind of unorthodox tactics employed by him in 1959 and early 1960.

The declaration also would seem to commit the USSR to maintain its present aggressive and

uncompromising line in support of anti-Western Afro-Asian governments and national liberation movements. While Khrushchev soft-pedaled his drive to expand Soviet influence in the underdeveloped countries in the period leading up to the Paris meeting last May, he now apparently intends to combine a return to negotiations with the West with a vigorous prosecution of his "anticolonial" policy. Any slackening of militant effort in this direction will undoubtedly call forth a sharp rebuke from the Chinese and the work of this conference would have to be done again.

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## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Soviet UN delegation is attempting to clear the way for top-level contacts with the new US administration at a special session of the General Assembly next spring. Chief Soviet delegate Zorin has argued in private talks that completion of the debates on such "contentious items" as Tibet and Hungary before the new administration takes office would create the atmosphere for a US-Soviet rapprochement. Zorin has suggested that, after a Christmas recess, the assembly reconvene on 3 January to deal with outstanding issues, excepting disarmament which would be carried over into a special session of the assembly to be attended by the heads of government.

General Assembly President Boland has decided to convene the UN General Committee late this week to consider the Soviet

proposal; this committee can set the date for a resumed session of the present assembly, but it cannot make a recommendation with respect to a special session.

The USSR now may be considering, as Boland speculates, the possibility of seeking two resumed sessions, the first to consider all the remaining items except disarmament and the second to consider only the disarmament issue. If the USSR could obtain a General Committee recommendation urging the heads of government to attend the session on disarmament, it would achieve all the advantages of the proposal for a special session. The Soviet delegation has indicated, however, that at the opportune moment a resolution will be introduced calling for a special session.

As often in the past, Moscow has again turned to the disarmament

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issue as the means for advancing broader Soviet objectives. Moscow apparently feels that a proposal for the heads of government to consider the issue of disarmament would command wide support in the UN and be difficult for the West to reject. The main purpose of such a session from Moscow's viewpoint probably would be to provide an opportunity for Khrushchev to meet with the new President and lay the groundwork for a formal summit conference later in the year.

The Soviet premier probably recognizes that his actions since the collapse of the Paris meeting have complicated the convening of another four-power conference this spring. A meeting with Western leaders at the UN would also provide Khrushchev with a justification for further delaying unilateral action on the Berlin question.

Since the Afro-Asian UN delegations favored the abortive five-power resolution of last September calling for renewed contacts between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, the USSR probably feels these states can be brought into line behind a proposal for heads of government to attend a session on disarmament. During negotiations on the Soviet-Finnish communiqué of 24 November, Moscow attempted unsuccessfully to gain Finnish agreement to a statement calling for a special session on disarmament. The Soviet-Cambodian communiqué of 3 December contained

the first formal nonbloc endorsement of the proposal for the special session.

Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

In the final session of the nuclear test ban talks, which recessed on 5 December until 7 February, the Soviet delegate adopted his usual tactics on the eve of recess and sought to create the impression that the Western powers had prevented the successful conclusion of a treaty. Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin stated that the USSR failed to see the necessity for a recess but was forced to agree at the insistence of the US delegation.

Tsarapkin contrasted "excessive" Western demands for control measures with the more limited control features proposed by the Soviet delegation. However, he said that, while the Soviet Union would continue its efforts to reach agreement, "everything" depended on the position of the United States.

The relatively moderate tone of Tsarapkin's statement, the prompt agreement to a recess, and his failure to repeat recent charges that the US is attempting to wreck the conference and resume tests all suggest that the USSR is anxious to underline its willingness to continue negotiations with the new US administration.

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**FRANCE-ALGERIA**

Concern in France over a possible rightist coup attempt in Algeria has increased following the sudden flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagailarde and four others on trial for their part in the January insurrection. Tension in Algiers remains high prior to De Gaulle's 9-14 December Algerian tour, which could spark demonstrations or even an attempt to set up a separate "Government of French Algeria." Meanwhile, at the UN, the Afro-Asian bloc is pressing for a UN-supervised referendum in Algeria.

Three of the five defendants who failed to report at their Paris trial on 5 December are still missing. Lagailarde reportedly is in Spain, and the fifth has surrendered. Reaction to France to their decision to jump bond at this time, especially when the trial seemed to be going in their favor, has been almost completely unfavorable. Their flight suggests they feared that De Gaulle's accelerated pace for a referendum on Algeria would end their last chance to balk him.

Meanwhile, Paris is pressing ahead with its plans to hold a referendum--probably on 8 January--on the Algerian program, which Premier Debré formally presented to the National Assembly on 7 December. De Gaulle will personally take his case to Algeria on his six-day

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trip there, but he will avoid the major cities, where rightist feeling is strongest and the possibility of demonstrations greatest. De Gaulle's advisers have warned him of the danger of assassination during the trip. In any case, the visit could touch off strikes of demonstrations that could get out of control of the police and security forces.

In view of several reports that the new delegate general, Jean Morin, may actually be a partisan of French Algeria rather than of De Gaulle's policy, the possibility cannot be ruled out that he would fail to take sufficiently vigorous measures against any settler demonstrations, thereby precipitating a situation favoring the rightist and military activists.

The atmosphere in Algiers remains quiet but tense. Security precautions continue to be discreet, with the security

police remaining out of sight. Comments and press articles in Algiers tend to place emphasis on the honor-breaking aspects of Lagailarde's flight, but there is speculation that he would not have "crossed the Rubicon" unless he felt that the deadline for action was near.

In the UN Political Committee, Tunisian Ambassador Mongi Slim opened the Afro-Asian bloc's campaign for a UN-supervised referendum in Algeria. The committee may not complete action on the issue before the assembly recesses on 17 December--probably not to reconvene until late February. There already is some sentiment for resumed debate after the 8 January referendum in Algeria. The states of former French Africa may exert enough influence to get General Assembly endorsement of a resolution recognizing UN interest in the problem, but calling for negotiations among the parties concerned.

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## CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA

A joint communiqué issued on 6 December at the end of Che Guevara's six-day visit in North Korea contained an unqualified demand for US withdrawal from the Guantanamo Naval Base. Previous references to US withdrawal from the base by Guevara and other high Cuban officials have been carefully qualified. In the communiqué, Guevara joined the North Koreans in condemning the United States as the "common enemy of the people of

the world and the sworn enemy of the Cuban and Korean peoples." In addition, the Cubans identified themselves with Pyongyang's major policy goals. The two governments also concluded a series of trade, payments, technical-cooperation, and cultural-exchange agreements.

On the departure of his economic mission from Peiping for North Korea on 1 December, Guevara lauded "the world's

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most progressive and finest nation" for its aid and encouragement to the Cuban revolution and referred to the trade protocol and \$60,000,000 Chinese credit to Cuba as examples for other Latin American countries. With regard to Peiping's technical assistance commitments to Cuba, he said 200 Cubans will come to Communist China in the coming year for training in "industrial, agricultural, and other fields," and that Communist Chinese technicians will assist Cuba in building a number of "farm stations" in the next few years.

Cuba's controlled press has praised the Chinese Communist agreements and has stressed the solidarity among nations which have "gained freedom from imperialism" and the proof demonstrated by China's assistance to Cuba that "oppressed peoples everywhere do not stand alone." The Chinese interest-free credit is viewed in Cuba as "a sacrifice and special effort" at a time when China is waging "a gigantic struggle to develop its own economy."

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and North Vietnam was announced on 2 December following the visit to Hanoi by a member of Guevara's mission. On 5 December part of the mission arrived in Ulan Bator, and establishment of Cuban-Mongolian diplomatic relations was announced on 7 December. Guevara left for Moscow on 7 December to conclude trade and assistance negotiations begun in early November. The

mission is scheduled to visit East Germany before returning to Cuba.

Moves have also been made to strengthen Cuban ties with the Soviet Union. On 1 December, Havana announced the conclusion of an agreement for the exchange of tourists between the USSR and Cuba. Groups of Soviet tourists are to begin arriving in Cuba on 26 December, and Cubans are to be offered inexpensive tours of the Soviet Union beginning next summer. An agreement for the exchange of students and professors was also announced.

The chairman of the Cuban University board announced on 3 December, on his return from ceremonies marking the inauguration of Moscow's Friendship University, that Soviet professors will soon be added to the Cuban faculty. The faculty, drastically purged of anti-Communists, is in need of technically qualified professors. 25X1


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
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
A group of Soviet technicians recently visited the expropriated US Government - owned Nicaro nickel mine and processing plant, according to a Havana broadcast of 1 December. The leader of the group is said to have assured the plant workers of Soviet assistance in solving the "technical problems of the plant."

Several other Latin American governments have recently made or plan to make efforts to reduce the threat of Cuban propaganda and subversion in their countries. Argentina closed Prensa Latina's offices on 2 December after the short-lived Peronista rebel attacks on 30 November and after repeated Cuban efforts to introduce subversive propaganda into Argentina through this agency and through its diplomatic mission.

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Meanwhile, Cuba has ordered the immediate departure of the Paraguayan diplomatic mission in Havana because of Paraguay's resistance to accepting a Cuban diplomat in Asuncion.



American Embassy on 1 December that Cuban consular offices are thoroughly penetrated by Communists and that newly appointed Cuban consuls in Mexico, Chile, Spain, Jamaica, and other places are Communists.

Central America

Pro-Castro elements continue to enjoy unusual opportunities in El Salvador, where the six-man junta that came to power on 26 October has still made no move to crack down on Communist and other leftist elements which are engaged in consolidating their influence in the regime and in politically important labor and student groups.

In Guatemala, the army unrest responsible for the abortive military revolt of 13 November still persists, and a new coup may be attempted shortly. Two Guatemalan colonels told an American Embassy officer on 2 December that the army will oust President Ydigoras and assured him that their movement is not Communist inspired. The replacement of the unpopular defense minister on 6 December may, however, tend to ameliorate army grievances and might forestall a revolt.

Meanwhile, leaders of the three strongest opposition political parties, sensing the regime's weakness, signed a unity pact on 2 December in which they agreed to support a new regime in which they would participate. They also agreed to reject dealing with "anyone associated with international Communism."



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
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## CONGO

Mobutu's capture of ex-premier Lumumba on 2 December, under circumstances which re-

and apparently now are regarded as hostages for Lumumba's release.

## REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO



Armed raids into neighboring Equateur Province by Lumumba supporters in Orientale have prompted Mobutu to dispatch 140 paratroopers to maintain order in the border area. UN officials have conceded that the UN presence in Orientale Province has not been effective, and it appears doubtful that the UN could prevent armed clashes at this time. Mobutu has indicated that he does not accept Stanleyville's proclaimed "secession" from the Congo, and President Kasavubu has proclaimed a state of emergency in Orientale Province.

flected favorably on Mobutu's control of the Congolese Army, has dealt a major blow to Lumumba's followers and his Soviet and African allies. His supporters in Orientale Province, however, are continuing efforts to expand their influence in the Congo's interior.

Led by former vice premier Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's one-time secretary Bernard Salumu, and Lumumba's brother Louis, the Stanleyville dissidents have taken aggressive action against both African and European opponents. Pro-Mobutu parliamentarians have been maltreated

Although Mobutu would face major problems in any attempt to assert his control over the dissident area, the Lumumba faction may be disappointed in its hopes for large-scale outside aid. While the Stanleyville stronghold now has arms and supplies, it may have difficulties in meeting its needs over the long run.

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Meanwhile in Katanga Province, depredations by anti-Tshombé tribesmen have increased. Over 2,300 dissident Balubas are reported to have been killed by UN forces in the area between Kamina and Manono on 1 and 2 December; the American Consulate in Elisabethville has characterized UN officials there as disheartened and concerned over the prospect of enlarged UN operations against the dissidents. In Brussels, Katangan President Tshombé has stepped up efforts to secure diplomatic recognition for his regime.

On 5 December, the USSR issued an official statement on the Congo--the second in three days--which scathingly attacked NATO, Hammarskjold and the UN Command, and the "large colonial powers." Asserting that the Congo situation has entered a new and more acute stage, Moscow laid the blame entirely on alleged US inter-

ference in internal Congolese affairs. The Soviet statement voiced displeasure with those African and Asian states which "have not preserved the requisite unity" on the Congo issue and demanded that order be restored in the Congo by releasing Lumumba, reinstating his "legitimate" government, and disarming Mobutu's "terrorist" forces.

A more immediate problem for the UN was posed by the threatened withdrawal of large numbers of Afro-Asian military contingents from the UN force in the Congo. Ceylon announced on 7 December that it was pulling out its 11-man Congo mission, while press reports from Cairo indicate that Nasir plans to call back the 500-man UAR battalion. Yugoslavia has also announced withdrawal of its mission. Countries which may follow suit include Ghana and Guinea, which together have provided over 3,000 of the 20,000-man UN force.

**SITUATION IN LAOS**

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The power play in Vientiane on the morning of 8 December by Col. Kouprasith, the Fifth Military Region commander, has thrown the situation in Laos into further confusion. The early phases of the coup suggest on the surface at least its aim was to buttress Souvanna against both the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao and the anti-Communist right as symbolized by Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee.

The coup group's initial statements indicated strong support for Souvanna's policy of neutrality, while at the same time proclaiming the suppression of the Pathet Lao and other leftist extremist groups as a major aim of the coup. There is some possibility that Kouprasith felt that this was as far as he could go until reinforced by Phoumi troops from outside Vientiane, after which he would come out openly against the Souvanna government and in favor of Savannakhet.

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coup, claiming that it had been conducted by officers loyal to him who supported his policy of neutrality and were equally determined to fight either the Pathet Lao or Phoumi's force. He urged that Phoumi be persuaded to stop his advance along the road from Pak Ca Dinh to Pak Sane and stated that former Premier Tiao Somsanith would shortly suggest that representatives of Vientiane and Savannakhet meet in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, for preliminary negotiations on a political settlement.

Depending on the outcome of these talks, a full-dress conference could be held in Luang Prabang. Souvanna added that he would still prefer to see the Pathet Lao political front--the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS)--included in a compromise

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Three C-47's dropped 60 paratroopers from the pro-Phoumi Luang Prabang garrison in an area near Vientiane several hours after the Kouprasith coup. Additional drops reportedly will be made. What effect these troops are having on the situation in Vientiane is as yet unclear, but they could serve as a rallying point for secret Phoumi adherents in the Vientiane garrison if present indications that Kouprasith was guilty of duplicity in his dealings with Phoumi are borne out.

Souvanna called in Ambassador Brown shortly after the

government, but hinted that he would not insist on this point if both sides agreed to enter into immediate negotiations with the Pathet Lao looking to their reintegration into the national community.

The present status of Captain Kong Le, whose 9 August coup triggered off the crisis in Laos, is uncertain. According to a press report, he was seen driving out of Vientiane later in the day on 8 December with one of the Pathet Lao representatives who had been negotiating with the Souvanna government. Kong Le's main power base, the Second

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Paratroop Battalion, has reportedly sustained severe losses in the fighting on the Ca Dinh front. Such losses would seemingly reduce Kong Le's influence at this critical juncture. The Pathet Lao have not as yet reacted to the Kouprasith coup beyond noting over their radio that "trouble has been stirred up in Vientiane," but they may be in a position to take counter-action if they should so choose.

Phoumi's forces meanwhile have crossed the Ca Dinh River and are apparently moving forward on the road to Vientiane. According to one report, they may already have reached Pak Sane. The Pathet Lao have not as yet played any appreciable role in the fighting on this front, possibly awaiting a favorable opportunity to harrass the advancing Phoumi forces from the rear.

Elsewhere in the country, there have been small clashes between Pathet Lao and Phoumi forces, particularly in the Luang Prabang area, where the Pathet Lao have reportedly been probing the outer defense of the

pro-Phoumi garrison. The Pathet Lao might choose to attack it to offset the apparent reverses to their position in the Vientiane area.

The Souvanna government had been negotiating a cease-fire between Laotian Army units and the Pathet Lao in southeastern Phong Saly Province. Such an accord might free fairly strong Pathet Lao elements for movement down the Nam Hou River to join in an attack on Luang Prabang.

The Soviet airlift of petroleum products to Vientiane from Hanoi began on 4 December with five IL-14 transport aircraft making two round-trip flights daily, carrying a total of about 15 tons of fuel each day. In view of Souvanna's reported expectation of receiving 5,000 tons, the airlift is apparently intended to continue for some months. These aircraft presumably could also be used at any time to bring military supplies to the Souvanna government if requested.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SOVIET TECHNICIANS WITHDRAWN FROM COMMUNIST CHINA

It now appears that the majority of Soviet technicians was withdrawn from Communist China last summer. Information from members of Communist parties both inside and outside the bloc indicates that Moscow ordered the withdrawal for political reasons.

At the Bucharest Conference last June, after Peiping had defied Moscow on doctrinal matters, the USSR circulated a statement of charges against the Chinese and made a thinly veiled threat to pull out Soviet technicians. When the Chinese failed to capitulate, the Soviet Communist party informed the Chinese party in a letter the following month that the technicians would be withdrawn because of China's "unfriendly attitude." Moscow further charged that Soviet technicians had been mistreated, their advice ignored, and that attempts had been made to indoctrinate them in the Chinese position.

Receiving no reply from the Chinese, the Soviet party notified them that all technicians would be withdrawn immediately. The Chinese finally replied with a note expressing astonishment and protesting that the action was "uncomradely" and would damage the Chinese economy. They requested that the decision be reconsidered, but the withdrawal was initiated on schedule.

As to the numbers involved,

[redacted] by late August about 1,000 experts had left China for the USSR. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] there were 3,000 Soviet technicians in China at the beginning of 1960, but that the number had been reduced to 800 by summer. 25X1

[redacted]

[redacted] the withdrawal will cause serious damage to important sectors of the Chinese economy. The Chinese, moreover, have labeled the Soviet tactics coercive. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the recall of technicians has caused "obvious gaps" in the Chinese economy, especially in the planning and construction of large-scale projects, and has brought home to the Chinese their lack of qualified replacements. [redacted] 25X1

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## YUGOSLAVIA'S RELATIONS WITH BLOC UNCHANGED BY MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Recent friendly gestures toward Belgrade by the USSR and most of the satellites are apparently designed to assure Tito that the condemnation of "Yugoslav revisionism" contained in the declaration following the recent Moscow meeting of world Communists does not pre-  
 sage a deterioration of bloc-Yugoslav governmental relations. These gestures also appear intended as rebuffs to the Chinese Communists and Albanians, whose bitter attacks on Yugoslavia have also constituted indirect criticism of Soviet policy.

Bloc countries, with the exception of Communist China and Albania, greeted Yugoslavia on its national day--29 November--with expressions of a desire for improved relations. In addition to the customary telegrams of good wishes from bloc leaders and good turnouts at Yugoslav diplomatic receptions, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow was invited to speak on television for the first time in three years, and most bloc capitals have lauded one or another aspect of Yugoslav foreign policy. Moscow's Izvestia, for example, praised Yugoslav efforts to further peaceful coexistence, and the East German party daily Neues Deutschland applauded Belgrade's opposition to West German "fascism and militarism."

Even in these congratulatory articles, however, most bloc states stressed the USSR's primary role in the World War II liberation of Yugoslavia--a

particularly sensitive point to Belgrade.

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 Yugoslavia is currently negotiating minor border problems with its satellite neighbors, with the specific exception of Albania. Belgrade has long held that such talks are a necessary prelude to any broader negotiations with the Balkan satellites, frequently proposed by Bulgarian and Rumanian leaders to ease tensions in the area. These talks were probably undertaken by the satellites at the Kremlin's prompting.

In sharp contrast to these friendly overtures, Tirana and Peiping have continued to urge that bloc economic and political relations with Yugoslavia be held to a minimum and that the bloc resume an all-out campaign against "Yugoslav revisionism." Inclusion of that epithet in the Moscow declaration will encourage these countries to continue their anti-Yugoslav campaign.

The bloc, moreover, continues to show no inclination to give substantial aid to Yugoslavia's economic development. In its efforts to sign five-year trade pacts (1961-65) with most bloc states, Belgrade has so far reached agreement only with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Yugoslav-Soviet negotiations have dragged on since mid-July because the progress of Yugoslavia's

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economic development has altered its import needs; this factor is also affecting its talks with most of the satellites.

The Tito regime, now concerned primarily with its relations with the uncommitted states, continues to affirm

domestic policies which the bloc has branded heretical. In view of Tito's announcement on 29 November that these policies will be codified in a new constitution by 1962, bloc-Yugoslav ideological differences will probably deepen.

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SPUTNIK VI

On 1 December the USSR placed into orbit its sixth earth satellite vehicle (Sputnik VI). It is believed that the vehicle was similar in configuration to Sputniks IV and

by the Soviet press--appears to have had about the same weight (satellite less last stage) as Sputnik V. Like Sputnik V, it is reported to have carried live animals and instruments

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for scientific investigation leading to manned flight.

SOVIET SPACE CRAFT

	Sputnik IV	Sputnik V	Sputnik VI
Date of Launch	15 May 60	19 Aug 60	1 Dec 60
Approximate Time of launch (GMT)	0001	0845	0730
Weight (lbs.)	10,011	10,143	10,050
Orbit Period (min.)	91.2	90.68	88.6
Apogee (statute miles)	219	196	164
Perigee (statute miles)	194	196	116

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8 DECEMBER 1960

Sputnik VI was launched from the

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that time of launch was set, as in the case of Sputnik V, to

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provide favorable conditions for recovery.

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V and that the test objectives, like those of Sputniks IV and V, were directed toward eventual manned space flight.

The Sputnik VI--or Cosmic Spaceship III as it was called

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**THE 1961 ECONOMIC PLAN IN RUMANIA**

Rumania intends to continue the intensive effort of the past two years aimed at rapid economic growth and continued progress in meeting the goals of the Six-Year Plan (1960-65). Speaking at a plenum of the central committee of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) party in mid-November, First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej predicted that the index of gross industrial production would show an increase of almost 14 percent in 1961, most of which would come from a planned 9-percent increase in labor productivity.

Gross industrial production in 1960 will be about 15.5 percent greater than in 1959--a slight overfulfillment of plan --and labor productivity will show an increase of 10.5 percent. In 1961, as in 1960, some of the greatest increases in output are slated for the machine-building, iron and steel, and electric-power industries.

Investments from state funds are scheduled to increase 24 percent in 1961--as compared with 29 percent claimed for 1960 --with more than 75 percent of industry's share going to the fuel, power, metallurgical, machine-building, chemical, cellulose, and paper industries.


A continued intensive economic effort in 1961 is reflected in the goal for increasing the number of wage earners (roughly, nonagricultural employment). Official data indicate that the number of wage earners in the socialized economic sector declined between 1955 and 1957 but increased by about 60,000 in 1958, by 114,000 in 1959, and by 160,000 this year. An increase of 200,000 has been planned for 1961. Many of these

new workers presumably will be recruited from rural areas. A failure in the plan for increased labor productivity in industry might, therefore, be offset by additions to the industrial labor force.

An increase of 19 percent in agricultural production is planned for 1961 to put the Six-Year Plan back on schedule. This goal seems unattainable, in view of the fact that production in 1960 stayed at the same level as in 1959, the highest in the postwar period.

The goal of a 15-percent increase in national income

**RUMANIA  
INDEXES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
1959-1961**



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 1960 [Dotted Bar] ACTUAL  
 1961 [White Bar] PLANNED

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probably will not be achieved, although industrial production should continue its rapid advance of recent years. There will probably be some increase

in consumer benefits, but the extent will depend largely on developments in agriculture and in housing construction.

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**USSR AND CAMBODIA DECLARE ACCORD ON KEY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES**

The visit of Prince Sihanouk to Moscow has provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to formalize in a joint communiqué long-standing Cambodian support for the USSR's point of view on a number of international questions.

The communiqué, issued on 3 December at the conclusion of talks between Sihanouk and Khrushchev, expressed agreement on the necessity of carrying out general and complete disarmament, on the admission of Communist China and Mongolia into the United Nations, on the policy of nonparticipation in military blocs, and on the need to adapt the UN to "new conditions." Moscow, additionally, secured for the first time Cambodian endorsement of Khrushchev's plan to modify the UN structure.

The statement, capitalizing on Sihanouk's apprehensions over the critical Laotian situation, also advocated backing for the Souvanna Phouma regime against "foreign interference" and a return to the Geneva agreements of 1954, which looked to the complete integration of the Pathet Lao into the national government.

The communiqué endorsed Cambodia's neutral foreign policy and complimented Sihanouk's "personal efforts" in this regard. Sihanouk may interpret

this praise as encouragement for his tentative plans to sponsor a resolution in the United Nations calling for a Cambodian-Laotian neutral zone. The generally anti-Western flavor of the communiqué suggests that Cambodia's relations with the West are again cooling.

Sihanouk's acceptance of Moscow's offer to construct a technical school in Cambodia as a gift is the clearest indication of his newest swing away from the West. Negotiations for an American-built institute were under way at the time the Moscow communiqué was issued. Throughout the negotiations with American officials, Sihanouk emphasized Cambodia's need for its own institute as a means of removing trainees from Communist influences in France.

Sihanouk maintains that his concept of "positive neutralism" enables Cambodia to accept economic assistance from both the bloc and the West while committing itself to neither. However, Moscow's trade feelers recently put out to Thailand and Souvanna's acceptance of Soviet assistance have undoubtedly whetted the Cambodian appetite. Sihanouk is anxious to obtain bloc assistance in financing Cambodia's ambitious five-year development plan, for which about a third of the cost is being sought from foreign sources.

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The statement indicates that the USSR responded favorably to Sihanouk's overtures for increased economic assistance and that it is probably ready to extend credit and technical aid for specific projects. The USSR's only aid project so far in Cambodia is a gift hospital completed on schedule last August. The Moscow communiqué noted Cambodia's desire for technical assistance for a number of hydroelectric proj-

ects, and Moscow has announced its readiness to send a group of specialists for an on-the-spot survey.

Sihanouk will probably play up domestically the Soviet Union's response to his overtures and may make similar requests for assistance, including aid for his proposed Phnom Penh - Sihanoukville railroad, during his scheduled visit to Peiping.

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SOUTH VIETNAM - NORTH VIETNAM

President Diem has professed concern over reports to him

that North Vietnam may be preparing warlike action against South Vietnam in early December. He told the American military aid mission that, as a result, South Vietnam must immediately mobilize additional forces.

crease. By playing up the security problem, Diem may also be trying to put off needed political and social reforms promised in the wake of the abortive coup of 11 November.

Some of the alleged troop movements in and around Hanoi may be those of troops to and from field training areas or may reflect North Vietnam's preparations for its first nationwide annual conscription.

By law, North Vietnamese males between 18 and 45 are liable for military duty, but Hanoi has moved cautiously on inductions among a population with more than average aversion to military service. This year it appears that about 80,000 North Vietnamese will be inducted from an estimated 125,000 reaching draft age. This number would not be adequate to maintain the present manpower level of 277,000 unless the current two-year tour is extended, as seems likely; however, some personnel reductions have been forecast

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Diem may have seized on the reports to reinforce his previous argument that South Vietnam's internal security situation requires raising the ceiling of its armed forces from 150,000 to 170,000 and to justify his decree of 22 November calling up reservists and suspending normal military discharges. He has requested American support of such an in-

Few if any of the 1960 inductees are likely to see

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action below the 17th parallel, where Hanoi directs a force of Communist guerrillas estimated at from 5,000 to 8,000. The guerrillas appear to recruit most of their manpower from dissatisfied peasants or minority tribesmen, filling in key command assignments with cadres trained in the North. Presence of these Northern cadres in the South is probably the basis for the Diem government's recent charges that entire North Vietnamese regular army units were infiltrating South Vietnam.

Hanoi's considerable success with guerrilla operations in the South probably foreshad-

ows further intensification of this mode of warfare rather than an overt attack across the demarcation line which would risk SEATO intervention. The Communist guerrillas have shown continued capability to mount large-scale attacks in the southernmost provinces while stepping up activity in the central mountain regions. The bombing on 4 December of the clubhouse of the Saigon golf course--a site frequented by Americans--suggests that the Communists may plan to increase acts of terrorism in the South Vietnamese capital city and possibly to direct them against American personnel.

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## MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

Sudan

The Abboud military regime, partly as a result of UAR President Nasir's state visit from 15 to 25 November, is moving toward closer ties with the UAR and toward a more typically Arab neutralist policy. Long a recipient of Western assistance, the Sudan accepted its first aid from the bloc in early November when the USSR presented a gift of five armored personnel carriers. Abboud announced on 17 November, the second anniversary of his government's assumption of power, that 25 more would be bought.

The Soviet newspaper Izvestia, taking note of the an-

niversary, praised the Abboud regime for its policy of neutrality and the status of the Sudan's relations with bloc countries. The official Sudanese press has responded by publicizing this and other Soviet newspaper articles attacking American aid policies and lauding the benefits to Sudan of expanded trade with the bloc.

During the past few days Khartoum has completed negotiations for the purchase of 100,000 tons of Soviet wheat during the coming year.

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The Sudanese foreign minister later denied that the USSR had made such an offer. He added that Sudanese development plans do not require an additional loan of this size, but that if the Soviets offered a big cash grant, the Sudan would of course accept it. He said a small Sudanese delegation would soon go to Moscow, but only for routine trade negotiations. US officials in Khartoum nevertheless believe the Soviet Union is ready to provide large credits whenever Khartoum requests them.

The Abboud government may be handling the Soviet aid question with particular caution in order to avoid provoking possible civil disturbances or even a coup attempt by conservative political and military elements. The head of the large and influential Ansar religious sect, which has many adherents in the army itself, is one of 18 prominent opposition leaders who are pressing their demands for a return to civilian government. The military regime is maintaining strong security precautions, is soliciting statements of support from the citizenry, and has ordered all army commanders to a meeting in Khartoum to try to assure the continued loyalty of the forces of the five regional army commands.

Libya

During the seven weeks since the new cabinet headed by

Prime Minister Muhammad Ben Uthman was appointed by King Idris, political maneuvering in Libya has been intensive. It appears at this stage that the Uthman government is more susceptible than its predecessor both to pro-Nasir and anti-American pressures exerted by certain of the palace advisers, by a strong minority bloc in parliament, and by a number of provincial officials.

The new primeminister and foreign minister have told US officials that they intend to maintain close, friendly relations, and their words have been supported, in two cases, by actions. Ben Uthman has intervened with Libyan customs officials who had been holding up delivery to Wheelus air base of badly needed supplies. His cabinet has set aside, temporarily at least, the tentative agreement for the Soviet Union to build two hospitals in Libya and is planning, with US assistance, to undertake construction of the first one itself.

On the other hand, the Uthman cabinet has made several moves toward loosening Libya's ties with the West. On 9 November it made a unilateral decision for immediate dissolution of the Libyan-American Joint Services (LAJS), which had been one of the main channels for American aid. The US and Libya agreed long ago that LAJS should be gradually phased out, but a program for its orderly dissolution was still being planned.

The new government has reduced the number of army officers

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it plans to send to the United Kingdom for training and presumably will try to have more trained in the UAR or other Arab states. In addition, a strongly anti-American lawyer and former newspaper publisher has been named to head the new Tripolitanian Executive Council, one of the top government organs in the province where Wheelus Field is located.

The announcement by palace officials in late November that the King had accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union seems to have been merely a gesture by Idris himself to show his people that he is no Western puppet. No date has been set for the visit

Abu Dhabi

The discovery of oil in commercial quantities has been confirmed in the sparsely populated Trucial Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi, located along the Persian Gulf between Qatar and Oman. Exports from offshore wells are expected to begin in early 1962; exports from the promising Murban field, a year or two later. The prospect of large oil earnings from the onshore fields may sharpen Abu Dhabi's dispute with Saudi Arabia, which lays claim to much of the Sheikdom's territory including the Buraimi Oasis.

Aside from the continuing increase in nationalistic sentiment in Libya, the point of greatest friction in Libyan-US relations is the Algerian issue. Libyan officials are disappointed that the United States has not "compelled" France to reach a settlement with the Algerian rebels and are dismayed over the prospect of intensified Sino-Soviet bloc involvement, which they fear may eventually have an unfortunate effect in Libya itself.

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SOMALI REPUBLIC MOVES TOWARD NEUTRALISM

With the acceptance of a Soviet ambassador to Mogadiscio and the negotiation of an economic and technical accord with the UAR, the Somali Republic

seems to be moving toward a neutralist foreign policy. Pro-Western Premier Abdirascid Ali Scermarche apparently desires to expand the republic's contacts

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with the bloc and the UAR in order to break the complete Somali dependence on Western economic aid. Moreover, there are some influential Somalis, reportedly including three cabinet members, who believe that the government's entire position is too closely identified with the West.

Since the country attained independence in July 1960, the Somali Government's foreign policy has been dominated by the need to seek foreign aid to cover both its ordinary budget deficits and its developmental expenditures. To date, aid has been supplied by Italy, Britain, and the United States. However, both Italy and Britain are reluctant to continue indefinitely their assistance at the present level, although Italy is reported recently to have committed itself to increased short-term aid.

Both the UAR and the Communists have sought to exploit Somali dissatisfaction with the amount of Western assist-

ance. The UAR in particular has actively tried to extend its influence, both overtly through a program of supplying teachers to Somali schools and covertly by assistance to the virulently anti-Western Great Somalia League (GSL), the main opposition party. The GSL apparently receives financial support from Communist sources as well, and has sent substantial numbers of students to Moscow and Peiping.

The Abdirascid government reportedly moved recently to reduce the GSL's influence by helping a moderate faction in its efforts to remove the party's extremist leadership. Pressure for more extensive ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the UAR continues, however. The Somalis have already agreed to exchange diplomatic missions with four Communist countries in addition to the USSR, and similar agreements with other nations, including Communist China, may not be long delayed. In addition, the UAR has offered small arms and training to the Somali Army.

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**MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA**

Morocco's success in keeping Mauritania out of the United Nations this year almost certainly will be played up by King Mohamed V's government as proof that the regime is accomplishing its national objectives. This victory, however, is not likely to impress left-wing opposition elements, which almost certainly will continue to criticize the government. Moreover, the King probably will objectively appraise the Soviet veto of Mauritania's application for UN membership as a not unmixed blessing and find it difficult to resist Soviet pressures for practical expressions of gratitude.

The USSR's decision to veto Mauritania's admission, despite the approval of the majority of non-Arab African states, was apparently taken in the hope of consolidating recently expanded Soviet ties with Morocco. In mid-November, Rabat accepted a gift of 14 Soviet aircraft and allegedly held out the possibility of purchasing other military materiel if the USSR would use its veto in the Security Council.

Moscow probably also hopes that its action in the case of Mauritania, together with increased Soviet support for the Algerian rebels, will strengthen anti-Western sentiment in Morocco

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and intensify pressure for early withdrawal of French and US military forces from Moroccan bases. The King, however, while apparently intent on repudiating his 1 September base agreement with France, has recently renewed earlier assurances that he would honor his American base commitments.

Having recalled the Moroccan ambassador to Tunis in retaliation for Tunisia's backing of Mauritania's case, Rabat appears to be taking steps to indicate its displeasure to other governments which opposed it on the issue. This may effectively isolate Rabat from most African states.

As a result of the Soviet veto, Morocco may postpone any plans it may have been developing to employ guerrilla tactics in Mauritania. The commander of French forces in Mauritania, which are remaining there in agreement with the government of Premier Mokhtar Ould Daddah, considers that guerrilla efforts would in any event be easily suppressed--in contrast with the difficulties France and Spain encountered in obliterating Moroccan marauders in 1957 and early 1958.



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Morocco probably will attempt, however, to strengthen and expand pro-Moroccan political groups in northern Mauritania and to subvert officials within the Ould Daddah government. Efforts may also be under way to attempt to persuade Ould Daddah himself to pledge allegiance to the Moroccan crown.

The American ambassador in Rabat feels that Morocco's real motive in this dispute may be to limit the territory and power of an independent Algeria, and hence that its moves are, in fact, part of a calculated, long-range policy.

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**GREEK GOVERNMENT FACES DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES**

The Greek Government is facing increasing political and economic difficulties as the country points toward elections

to be held sometime during the next 18 months.

The parliamentary opposition, led by the Communist-front

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United Democratic Left (EDA), has stepped up its attacks on cabinet ministers, charging them with corruption and with collaborating with occupation forces during World War II. EDA spokesmen have been trying, probably with some success, to create a suspicion in the minds of the Greek people that there is "something" behind the charges of collaboration originally brought by a West German lawyer and convicted war criminal against several cabinet members last September. The under minister of housing has already resigned following charges of scandal, and other resignations may occur.

The recent rapid rise in consumer prices has led to new wage demands and strikes, and more are likely. Communist agitators are believed to have taken a prominent part in directing a protest demonstration by several thousand members of the Federation of Construction Workers in Athens on 1 December. The resulting five-hour clash with the police produced about 100 casualties.

The constitutional requirement that elections be held by May 1962 is inspiring opposition demands for a new electoral law. While most opposition parties favor incorporating some form of proportional representation in the new law, the government will probably propose a majority system for most areas of the country.

The badly splintered non-Communist opposition continues futile negotiations to create at least one party which could provide an effective alternative to the present government. Neither the National Renewal Movement, recently launched by former Cypriot underground leader George Grivas, nor a proposed anti-Grivas faction headed by Progressive party leader Markezinis appears likely to gain significant support.

EDA, meanwhile, probably will make further gains from the domestic difficulties facing the government and the apparent impotence of the non-Communist opposition.

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**ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT FACING LEFTIST ATTACK**

Iceland's Conservative - Social Democratic coalition, which has been in office since November 1959, is under mounting attack from the Communist-dominated opposition Labor Alliance party and may soon face grave

labor difficulties. The government's economic program, designed to arrest the almost runaway inflation of recent years, has been moderately successful but needs more time for its long-range reforms to become fully

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
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effective. The Communist elements, which also control the Icelandic Federation of Labor (IFL), had previously anticipated that the program's "austerity" features would lead to the government's collapse without their having to resort to strikes.

**ICELANDIC PARLIAMENT**

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The losses suffered by the Conservative and Social Democratic trade unionists, who support the government's austerity program, in the election of the delegates to the IFL biennial congress held in November have encouraged the Communists to believe that the workers are discontented and would be willing to strike in an effort to topple the government. At the November convention the IFL called for a 12- to 20-percent wage increase. The Communists do not expect these exorbitant demands to be granted, and the IFL will offer to take over coordinated bargaining in the late winter and threaten a general strike.

strikes, the economic stability program will be jeopardized and any gains realized thus far will be nullified.

The Communists and their Progressive Agrarian party allies apparently are confident they can topple the cabinet. If the government makes excessive concessions to labor to avoid

The Progressives and the Communists are seeking to stir up popular discontent on other issues as well. The IFL has demanded that the government break off its negotiations with Britain for a settlement of the long-standing dispute over Iceland's unilateral extension of fishing limits to 12 miles. The leftists are also continuing their campaign against the presence of US troops at the NATO base at Keflavik. While most people appear satisfied with the base arrangement and also desire a settlement of the fisheries dispute, the government does not dare make any concessions on either question which could be interpreted as irresolution in the defense of Iceland's interests.

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**VENEZUELA**

By applying strong security measures the Venezuelan Government on 2 December ended an eight-day period of violence which was centered primarily in Caracas and spearheaded by Communist and leftist students and other pro-Castro elements. The government, which suspended constitutional guarantees on 28 No-

vember, rounded up large numbers of suspected leaders of the unrest, searched the homes of others, banned Communist and other antigovernment publications, and raided the headquarters of the Venezuelan Communist party (PCV). President Betancourt has told Ambassador Sparks that while he is not ready to

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outlaw the PCV--the third largest Communist party in Latin America--he is planning to purge Communists from the teaching profession.

Betancourt's containment of the unrest--a more dangerous threat to his position than the pro-Castro violence in late October--again demonstrated his support among moderates, most of the armed forces, and the controlling elements in organized labor, which cooperated with the regime in blocking the agitators' attempt to bring about a general strike. The opposition, though somewhat discredited as a result of the casualties and extensive damage from the recent disturbances, can be expected to exploit unfavorable economic conditions and any other opportunities to provoke additional unrest.

Betancourt, who was gravely injured by a Dominican-backed assassination attempt last June, has requested the Organization of American States to consider charges of further Trujillo plotting against Venezuela. The

presence in the Dominican Republic of Venezuelan exiles previously associated with Dominican schemes against Venezuela suggests that Trujillo may be organizing another move against Betancourt.

Top Venezuelan officials have also indicated their concern over possible Cuban involvement in the recent violence but have issued no formal public charges. The Venezuelan Government recently expelled two Cuban student leaders and arrested a number of other Cubans--including two who were operating a powerful radio transmitter. All were apparently suspected of participating in the recent disturbances.

Moreover, the principal Venezuelan labor confederation, which signed a mutual security pact with its Cuban counterpart last July, accused the Cuban organization of breaking the pact by expressing support for insurrectionary groups. The controlled Cuban press has renewed its strident attacks on Betancourt.

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**RURAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA**

Banditry and other outbreaks of violence in rural areas of Colombia, which have caused an estimated 250,000 deaths over the past 12 years, have recently increased following a two-year decline. This unrest springs largely from a complex of agrar-

ian grievances, regional rivalries, and sharp party antagonisms, but Communists and pro-Castro elements are actively endeavoring to exploit it.

Disputes between factions and parties have paralyzed local governments, impelling many Colombians to take justice into their own hands and destroying respect for law and order in the areas of violence.

About 21,000 of Colombia's 35,000-man

**BACKGROUND**

*A half century of representative constitutional government in Colombia was interrupted in 1948 with widespread rioting sparked by the assassination of a popular leftist Liberal leader. Subsequent bitterness between the Liberal and Conservative parties was reflected in rural violence and banditry which the Rojas military dictatorship of 1953-57 was unable to control. A constitutional system adopted in early 1958 gives the two parties parity in appointive and elective offices at all levels and alternates the presidency between them at four-year intervals until 1974. The system now is faltering, largely because of factional rivalries within the parties.*

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
army and 8,000 of its 26,000-man national police are assigned to violence areas, but they have been unable to suppress the guerrillas. Improved police measures and limited rehabilitation programs for ex-guerrillas had improved the situation to some extent, but interparty and intraparty bickering have stymied congressional action on much-needed reform legislation to improve the basic causes of unrest.

The Colombian Communist party, which has an estimated membership of 7,500 and has had legal status since 1958, has had some success in exploiting peasant unrest. Communist guerrillas have for some years had absolute control over the Sumapaz and Viota regions in central Colombia. Now pro-Castro and other leftist elements are agitating for land reform among Colombia's peasants.



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President Lleras has given priority to the problem since taking office in August 1958, but his growing difficulties in maintaining his coalition government have kept him from getting the needed

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tax and agrarian reform legis-  
lation. A substantial worsen-  
ing of rural violence now  
would undermine Lleras' pres-

tige--particularly in view of  
his pledge to solve this com-  
plex problem--and aggravate  
tensions within the government.



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**PART III****PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES****SOVIET AGRICULTURE ON THE EVE OF THE DECEMBER PLENUM**

The Soviet central committee plenum on agriculture, which convenes in Moscow on 13 December, will be faced with the problems arising from the second successive crop year in which little or no progress was made toward meeting goals set by the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) for increasing agricultural production. Discussions at the plenum may reveal the regime's intentions for any changes in agricultural price and wage policy, investment and equipment allocations, regime specialization, and the pace toward complete socialization, or even for a major reorganization in agricultural administration. Many party and government leaders will be subject to rebuke for agriculture's poor showing in the past year.

**Agriculture in 1960**


Grain crops sown in the fall of 1959 were damaged by winterkill and, during the spring, by dust storms, necessitating the reseeded to spring crops of nearly 20,000,000 acres. Although unfavorable weather in some areas delayed spring field work, larger acreages were planted to spring wheat, corn, vegetables, and industrial crops than in 1959.

In a conversation in September with a US official, Khrushchev admitted that weather had been unfavorable for crops in the Moscow area and portions of the Ukraine, but he said the New Lands area, which provides nearly one third of all Soviet grain, was having the best crop ever. He added, however, that the crop had yet to be harvested.

Khrushchev's concern for the New Lands harvest was well founded. Frequent rains and

strong winds beat down the grain and promoted a heavy growth of weeds in various areas from the Urals eastward, and unusually cool weather retarded the ripening of grain. Although the Soviet press claimed that harvesting had been completed before the onset of severe winter weather, the losses prior to and during harvesting must have been large, and the quality of

**SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF SELECTED ITEMS 1955-60** 25X1  
(MILLION METRIC TONS)



much of the grain harvested and stored was undoubtedly substandard.

Poor weather also hampered the harvesting of other crops. Abnormally heavy rainfall during October interfered with the harvesting of such late crops as sugar beets, corn, sunflowers, potatoes, and late vegetables.

There have also been serious difficulties in the livestock

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industry this year. Pravda reported in October that the growth of livestock production was lagging and that in a number of republics and oblasts the output of meat, milk, and other products of the industry had actually declined. For example, pork production in the Ukraine during the first eight months of 1960 declined a substantial 19 percent.

While meat and milk sales to the state as of 1 November were somewhat above the 1959 figures for the same period, over-all production of these commodities will likely show little if any gain over last year. Heavy slaughtering during the first six months of 1960 will probably be offset by a correspondingly greater build-up of herds in the latter half of the year.

The number of privately owned cows decreased by 1,400,000 head in 1959--mainly because the owners sold them to collective and state farms--and further decreases undoubtedly have taken place this year. This probably accounts for the increase in state purchases of milk, most of which comes from the socialized sector of agriculture.

#### The Plenum

This year's plenum has been given the trappings of a routine forum for discussing state plan and pledge fulfillment and measures for the further development of agriculture. However, unlike the plenum on agriculture last December--announced six months in advance and preceded by widespread press discussion--this year's plenum was not announced until the end of October. The brief summary of the agenda which has been released gives no clues as to the scope of the discussions intended.

Soviet press comment on agriculture this year has centered

on specific, often local farm problems or has fallen back on the standard formula of exhorting better management as a key to increases in agricultural productivity. Controversial proposals, such as those pertaining to the creation of kolkhoz unions at various levels to administer the collective farm system, have been given scant public attention since they were side-stepped last year.

This year's plenum may shed light on the extent of recent conversions of collective farms into state farms. In the 1960 semiannual plan-fulfillment report, it was reported that as of 1 July the number of state farm workers had increased by 1,700,000 during the year because of the conversion of a certain part of the collectives into state farms. This sizable increase indicates that the pace of conversion may have been stepped up considerably in the first half of this year.

There has been a conflict between proponents of kolkhoz unions and those who support a continuation and strengthening of the administration of collective farms through the government bureaucracy. The unpublicized strengthening of the state farm system could be the first signal that the conflict has been resolved in favor of the latter. This dispute--which involves important administrative relationships among party officials, managerial personnel, and specialists--became a national issue at the time of the machine-tractor-station (MTS) reorganization in 1958.

The proposal for collective farm unions received widespread publicity throughout 1959, but Minister of Agriculture Matskevich (who visited the United States in 1955) insisted at the plenum that unions be limited to the rayon level and that their activities be coordinated within the oblast agricultural directorates

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of his ministry. The plenum postponed decision on the issue, directing the party presidium to study the question further.

The Soviet journalist Ivan Vinnichenko, who forecast the MTS reform, has been a proponent of collective farm unions at all levels and last June came out again in favor of unions as the most flexible and desirable form of collective farm administration. At an all-union conference of agricultural specialists held that same month in Moscow, Matskevich offered a rather detailed blueprint for the reorganization of agriculture--a reform which would parallel the 1957 industrial reorganization. He advocated the elevation of his oblast agricultural directorates to a position of authority in agriculture comparable to that of the councils of the national economy in industry.

Matskevich also recommended that collective farm unions be established only at the rayon level under the control of the staff of specialists attached to his rayon agricultural inspectorates. He called for greater rights for agricultural specialists, emphasizing that no one should be able to reverse their instructions when they pertained directly to the fulfillment of production obligations. In July a party journal advocated greater independence for agricultural specialists and warned local officials against ignoring the recommendations of these men.

If Matskevich's proposals are implemented, the resulting change in administration could have a favorable effect on Soviet agricultural output. The main characteristics of the Seven-Year Plan--regional crop specialization, higher yields, and increased labor productivity--appear to call for greater

dependence on managerial decisions and the recommendations of specialists.

The role of socialist pledges as a means of speeding up production, especially of livestock and livestock products, should get a thorough airing at the forthcoming plenum. Khrushchev has repeatedly emphasized that pledges should not be undertaken lightly or irrationally, and that everyone is responsible for their fulfillment. The great amount of publicity in recent months about failure to fulfill agricultural pledges may be leading to a public scandal.

Increased transfers of livestock from private to collective and state ownership may be used to reaffirm officially the superiority of socialized agriculture. As Soviet animal husbandry as a whole has not shown progress, increases in the output of livestock products in the socialized sector may be used to justify an intensification of the drive for collective farmers to sell their privately owned livestock "voluntarily" to the collective farms.

The plenum will also consider the shortcomings in the introduction of the monthly cash-wage-payment system on collective farms. This method of payment has been adopted by many farms as a replacement for the traditional workday calculation of earnings.

Moscow views the system as a device for gradually giving farm workers the status of industrial workers. Moreover, by eliminating payments in kind, the regime reduces the independent marketing activities of the farm worker, gains better control over his income, and gives farm managers a more accurate means of determining labor costs than the workday

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system, under which costs cannot be calculated until the year's end. Despite these advantages the Soviet press in recent months has cautioned collective farms not to convert to the new system until sufficient cash reserves are built up.

Agricultural financing will be in the background of

all discussions at the plenum. Problems associated with the financing of intercollective farm enterprises, newly established state farms, and recent increases in equipment allocations such as those for tractors and grain combines may come under review.   
(Prepared by ORR)

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**POTENTIAL RIVALRIES IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBURO**

Sprightly at seventy, North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh seems to be planning for that phenomenon rare in the Communist world--the smooth transfer of power to a second-generation leadership. Ho once was premier, party secretary general and chairman, and president, but he has given up the first two posts and has designated former guerrilla leader Le Duan as heir apparent.

According to the constitution, Ho would be succeeded as President by Ton Duc Thang. Thang, two years Ho's senior, was named to the vice presidency

last July, filling a vacancy which had existed for 14 years. A respected old revolutionary, Thang can and does take some of the protocol burden from Ho, but he is politically innocuous. Should he survive Ho, Thang is expected to be little more than a figurehead until a new president is elected.

The Contenders

Le Duan, 53, first appeared publicly as a top member of the Hanoi elite in 1957. His participation in the Communist movement, however, goes back at least to 1931, when he began the first



TRUONG CHINH



HO CHI MINH



LE DUAN

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of several sojourns in French colonial jails on charges of political agitation. Between the end of World War II and 1956, Le Duan, who has a well-earned reputation for ruthlessness, incited and led guerrilla warfare in southern Vietnam. The present Communist guerrilla organization there is considered largely his legacy, and he probably still has a considerable hand in directing it.

Like Ho, Le Duan is a native of central Vietnam. While Le Duan probably earned Ho's patronage by demonstrated organizational ability and fanatic dedication, it is possible that Ho also was seeking to provide regional balance in the North Vietnamese hierarchy, in which natives of the northern provinces predominate.

The international Communist community met Le Duan in November 1957 when he accompanied Ho to the important conclave held during the celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution's 40th anniversary. Returning from Moscow, Le Duan quickly identified himself as a key regime spokesman with major pronouncements on domestic and international affairs. Last June he represented Hanoi at the Bucharest conference, and he went with Ho to the November meeting in Moscow where the bloc attempted to patch over Sino-Soviet differences.

An advocate of doctrinal conformity, Le Duan has attacked revisionism in the past, but since this topic became a sensitive issue in the Moscow-Peiping feud he has carefully steered toward neutral ground in his ideological statements. In this as in other policy positions, Le Duan reflects the views of Ho Chi Minh, for whom he often acts as spokesman.

Le Duan's meteoric rise has been at the expense of Truong Chinh, once second only to Ho but now the party's number-three man. The militant, Chinese-trained Truong Chinh served as secretary general of the party from 1941 until 1956, when he resigned--probably at the suggestion of Ho, who took the job himself. Consistently the leading proponent of rapid and enforced collectivization, Truong Chinh fell from grace as a result of failures in the regime's land reform program. His views have earned him the enmity of a sizable portion of the North Vietnamese peasant population and reportedly that of some of his politburo colleagues as well. Nevertheless, he took all the blame for difficulties in which the entire hierarchy had a hand.

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Despite the failure of his forced-draft policies, Truong Chinh, considered to have one of the best minds on Ho's staff, retained his politburo membership and his reputation as the leading ideologist. In an exhibition of political resiliency unusual in a Communist regime, Truong Chinh was made a deputy premier in 1958 and gave up that job to become chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee in July 1960. This latter office is one for semiretired septuagenarians in most Communist countries, but it is unlikely to be the end of the road for the 53-year-old Truong Chinh. Despite his unimpressive appearance at the September party congress, he has once more associated his name with the collectivization effort.

Premier Pham Van Dong lacks the party strength of Le Duan and Truong Chinh, but he would be a valuable ally to either. The urbane, Moscow-trained Dong is a close personal friend of Ho, follows Ho's moderate approach

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TON DUC THANG



NGUYEN CHI THANH



PHAM VAN DONG



VO NGUYEN GIAP

to domestic questions, and probably would be inclined to favor Le Duan rather than Truong Chinh in any factional maneuvering. At 55, Pham Van Dong is said to be in poor health, although he obviously is not incapacitated.

Pham Hung, reportedly a protégé of Pham Van Dong, ranks next in the politburo. Like Pham Van Dong, Pham Hung probably could not achieve sole power in his own right but certainly could influence the outcome of any power struggle. There is little doubt that his loyalty is to Le Duan, with whom he shared guerrilla experiences in the South as well as the rise to prominence since 1957. At the party congress this September, Pham Hung and Le Duc Tho, another guerrilla associate of Le Duan, were both elevated in the politburo's order of precedence.

The political alignment of General Vo Nguyen Giap, defense minister and chief of staff, also must be considered by aspirants to total leadership. Giap, who defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, is as much a soldier as a Communist, devoting himself to the effort to standardize and modernize the North Vietnamese armed forces. Use of the army as a vast labor corps in recent years reportedly has put a strain on relations between Giap and Truong Chinh, who, along with other members of the regime, advocated it.

In 1959, Nguyen Chi Thanh, a Truong Chinh protégé, was given equal rank with Giap and made top military political commissar. Speaking to the party congress, Giap seemed to show some irritation with this development and implicitly suggested that political officers confine themselves to the ideological welfare of the troops and leave army administration to soldiers.

#### Potential Factions

Hanoi's leadership has been immune to the violent factionalism that has shaken other Communist regimes. Ho Chi Minh, who worked with Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Trotsky in Moscow during the 1920s, has seen his old comrades fall in fierce fighting. To ensure Hanoi's record of stability, he has used his personal prestige, his authority, and his ability to arbitrate among lieutenants unquestionably loyal to him. When he is gone as the central pivot for this unity, however, factionalism may well emerge.

Ho's heirs are unlikely to make any drastic change in the regime's two key objectives--the socialization of industry and agriculture in the North and the reunification of North and South Vietnam. Some differences may appear, however, over the pace at which these objectives should be pursued and the degree of emphasis to be placed on each.

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Truong Chinh would most likely advocate concentration on rapid development of industry and agriculture. Judging from the past performance, he would demand ruthless enforcement of directives aimed at whipping North Vietnam's apathetic peasantry into a disciplined national labor force. In his effort, Truong Chinh probably could count on politburo support from Nguyen Chi Thanh and Hoang Van Hoan, former ambassador to Peiping. All three show affinity for those Chinese concepts they feel are applicable in North Vietnam, but they are North Vietnamese first and foremost--not a "Chinese clique" in the sense that they endorse slavish imitation of Peiping.

This group would almost certainly be opposed not only by Le Duan and his henchmen from guerrilla days but also by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, both of whom seem to prefer a more gradual approach to socialization, taking into account the difficulties presented by the peasants, the underdeveloped economy, and the religious and racial minority elements.

As the regime's authority on clandestine action in the South, Le Duan is linked to this year's sharp increase in guerrilla activity below the 17th parallel. There is no indication that anyone opposed the renewed emphasis on overthrowing South Vietnam's President

Diem, although the Truong Chinh camp may feel that Le Duan has used the reunification policy as a vehicle to solidify his personal power. This probably is true, but it is a difficult position for a rival to assail unless guerrilla operations in the South suffer a series of conspicuous failures.

Conclusions

Despite Ho Chi Minh's effort to leave his house in order, the North Vietnamese Communist party contains the basic elements which could produce a power struggle. When Ho no longer wields power, personal ambitions, jealousy, and different approaches to policy may be submerged under collective leadership. During such a period, Le Duan probably would head the party, with Vice President Ton Duc Thang serving as titular chief of state until the election of a new president. Policy decisions would be worked out by Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong.

With Ho's benediction and control of the party administrative machinery, Le Duan certainly has a good head start toward total power. His most likely challenger is Truong Chinh. Both men can line up support, but Le Duan's position, if present alignments hold, seems 25X1 the stronger, and he would probably emerge the victor from any contest for supremacy.

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**THE AGRARIAN REFORM ISSUE IN LATIN AMERICA**

The confiscatory land reform program of the Castro regime in Cuba and growing agitation among peasant groups in other countries for similar radical reform measures have focused considerable political interest on a long-standing problem in Latin America. Nearly all of the Latin American countries are predominantly rural, and in most of them a high percentage of the best land is still owned by a relatively small and privileged aristocracy wielding disproportionate national power. This pattern of land tenure, inherited from the colonial period, is frequently accompanied by absentee landlordism and the widespread exploitation of Indian populations.

Much of the land is farmed by primitive or inefficient methods, and most of the rural populations live in abject poverty. In many regions, a one- or two-crop economy adds to the difficulties, all of which are compounded by the inadequacy of rural roads and schools and of agrarian credit, marketing, and other facilities.

Reform Efforts

Moves for agrarian reform thus spring from a mixture of enlightened national self-inter-

motivation is in many countries probably the dominant force.

The revolutions in Mexico in 1910, Guatemala in 1944, and Bolivia in 1952 all resulted in extensive land redistribution programs, and political parties in many other countries endorse at least the general idea of land reform. Frequently, however, this endorsement is mere lip service. Many governments not only fear losing the support of the powerful aristocracy through land redistribution or land tax reform, but also lack the financial resources essential for a comprehensive program which would require technical aid and training, agrarian credits for new owners, and development of roads, housing, marketing, irrigation, warehousing, and other facilities.

The agrarian reform undertaken by the Castro regime in early 1959 has led to the confiscation of private rural property and replaced the former private landlords with a single master--the government. The Cuban program, nevertheless, has had a strong political appeal and has brought a sense of urgency to the problem of land reform to moderate and moderate leftist leaders elsewhere in Latin America.

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**CUBA'S AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM**

*Under the agrarian reform law promulgated in May 1959, the Cuban peasant, who generally owned no land before Castro came to power, is entitled to own at least 60 acres of "fertile" land. In practice, however, most agricultural holdings have come into the hands of the government's National Institute of Agrarian Reform. The law provides that former owners be compensated with 20-year redeemable bonds at interest rates of up to 4.5 percent, but this provision has largely been ignored by the regime.*

est--stressing such programs as crop diversification and improvement in agricultural techniques --and an only partly articulate demand for social justice by the agrarian masses. The latter

Pre-Castro Programs

The Mexican, Guatemalan, and Bolivian programs were the chief land reform efforts in Latin America prior to Castro.

Mexico's agrarian reform, one of the major objectives of the revolution of 1910, is the principal historical precedent for the area. Highly controversial.

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from the standpoint of results and concepts, it has been endorsed and carried on by all subsequent regimes, and President Lopez has considerably accelerated land distribution during his first two years in office. The reform forced the division of most of the large private estates by procedures which were often confiscatory in practice, especially during the early years of the revolution, and was designed to provide land to the landless rural population by granting titles to individuals in small- or medium-size holdings and to collectives.

Mexican governments in recent years have considerably expanded their agrarian development and assistance programs. The agrarian reform has been a major factor in Mexico's attainment of self-sufficiency in basic food crops and its development of important commercial crops for export.

In neighboring Guatemala, the Communist-influenced regime of President Arbenz (1951-54) launched a sweeping land redistribution program in 1952, resorting to wholesale confiscation of large private estates. In 1954, when Arbenz was ousted and his agrarian reform nullified, 80,000 persons had received new land titles, although only a small fraction of them had actually settled on their lands.

Successor governments have implemented a more orderly, moderate program, which respects existing private holdings and emphasizes use of state land for new grants. Agrarian reform continues to be an important political issue in Guatemala, and the government has been heavily criticized recently for distributing land too slowly.

Bolivia has made substantial progress in carrying out the agrarian reform law decreed

in 1953, one year after the revolution which brought the present ruling party to power, but may take at least ten more years to complete it. Official statistics indicate that 46,000 titles representing about 1,680,000 acres had been distributed by the end of 1959 to individuals and collectives, including 26,000 heads of families.

The redistribution program has been one of the most successful results of the revolution from the standpoint of the social and economic benefits for the landless Indian population, which now is entering the money economy. On the other hand, agricultural production available in local markets declined sharply during the early years of the reform, a trend which apparently has been reversed.

The Bolivian reform called for expropriation of large estates, but in fact the procedure was confiscatory because of the inflationary trend and methods of land valuation. The disorderly seizure of land by peasants and the lack of technical and administrative competence in land surveys and grants will probably lead to extensive disputes over boundaries and titles.

Middle America

Cuba, Mexico, and Guatemala are the only countries in Middle America where basic agrarian reform programs are under way. In Haiti, Costa Rica, and Honduras, where land is widely held, there are apparently no strong pressures for land redistribution, although Honduran President Villeda has announced his intention to distribute extensive underdeveloped government lands to landless peasants. In El Salvador and Panama, where the small oligarchies monopolize the agrarian economy, signs of agitation for reform are mounting.

Even the Salvadoran military now recognizes the need for land

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