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
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3 November 1960

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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15 MAY 1980

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

3 November 1960

T H E   W E E K   I N   B R I E F

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . Page 1


Recently concluded meetings in Moscow between Soviet and Chinese spokesmen apparently failed to bring their parties closer together and may even have exacerbated their differences. The latest issue of the Chinese party's major theoretical journal, Red Flag, alluding to "fuzzy-minded" and "preposterous" Soviet viewpoints, strongly insists on the necessity of violence in seizing state power and implicitly criticizes Khrushchev's gradualist strategy. This issue of Red Flag, delayed since mid-October while the negotiations with Moscow were under way, probably reflects decisions reached at recent politburo discussions in Peiping. The apparent failure of the preliminary negotiations makes it unlikely that the scheduled November meeting of world Communist parties in Moscow will succeed in achieving any meaningful compromise of opposing views.



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CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . Page 3


Che Guevara arrived in Moscow on 29 October after having negotiated in Prague for the doubling of Czechoslovakia's earlier \$20,000,000 line of credit for Cuba. He is to go on to Peiping and North Korea. On the domestic scene, the government has placed the country on a virtual war footing in anticipation of an "imminent invasion by imperialist-backed forces."



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LEFTIST BID FOR POWER IN EL SALVADOR . . . . . Page 6

A week after the armed forces ousted the Lemus administration, Salvadoran leftists and Communists launched a bid for full power by demanding early national elections and the immediate elimination of the military from the government. Ex-President Osorio, who masterminded the 26 October coup and sought the leftists' support by including them in the provisional government, now is reported to be no longer in full control, and the situation seems to be moving toward open clashes between the military and civilians stirred up by Communist agitation.



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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**3 November 1960**

**PART I (continued)**



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**SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . Page 7**

The formation on 31 October of a Committee for Neutrality and National Unity in Vientiane introduces a potentially dangerous new element into the confused political situation in Laos. The committee is heavily weighted with leftists, including pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat leaders, and its establishment is likely to harden the attitudes of leaders in Luang Prabang and Savannakhet toward any rapprochement with the Souvanna Phouma government. General Phoumi in Savannakhet had already given signs of increased resistance to a compromise with Vientiane.


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**SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . . . . Page 10**

Forces favoring Lumumba are actively strengthening their position in northeastern Congo while the ousted premier plays a waiting game in Leopoldville. The 15-nation UN conciliatory committee is expected soon in the Congo, but its chances of working effectively to bring opposing Congolese leaders together are slim. UN representative Dayal, meanwhile, is exerting pressure on President Tshombé of secessionist Katanga to try to induce him to cooperate with UN efforts to resolve the crisis.

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**PART II**

**NOTES AND COMMENTS**

**ALGERIAN SITUATION . . . . . Page 1**

The leaders of the 11 former French territories in Africa, who met on 24-26 October in Abidjan, have undertaken to seek a negotiated settlement of the Algerian war. While pressure for peace is increasing in France, such rightist opponents of any compromise as Soustelle's Vincennes group may take advantage of the current trial of leaders of the January settlers' uprising in Algiers to intensify their attacks on De Gaulle, who is to address the nation on 4 November. Meanwhile, rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas' firm rejection of cease-fire negotiations, which highlighted his radio address marking the sixth anniversary of the rebellion, reflects the Provisional Algerian Government's markedly improving international position.

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**PART II (continued)**

**INDICATIONS OF SINO-SOVIET BORDER FRICTION . . . . . Page 2**

Within the past few months both Soviet and Chinese newspapers have made oblique, unusual references to military and security developments along widely separated sections of the Sino-Soviet border. In a recent discussion of his differences with Peiping, Khrushchev is reported to have said that the Chinese have "invaded" Soviet territory and started construction of "fortifications" there. Apparently the Chinese have begun activity to renew their ancient border claims against the USSR. [redacted]

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**ALBANIA MAINTAINS SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . Page 5**

Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu on 25 October condemned two Soviet-sanctioned disarmament proposals of European satellite leaders and reiterated Tirana's essentially pro-Chinese interpretations of world affairs. Albania's public alignment with Peiping and Peiping's success in gaining support and influence in a country hitherto considered exclusively a Soviet preserve may encourage opposition to Khrushchev's policies in other European satellite parties and may pose problems for Moscow throughout the Communist movement. [redacted]

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**SOVIET LEADERS MAY DELAY PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . Page 6**

The Soviet 22nd party congress, rumored previously to be planned for the first quarter of next year, may be delayed until late 1961. Although a congress could be called on as short as six weeks' notice, the signs which have usually preceded the convening of a party congress are lacking at this time. The deterioration in relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China this year is undoubtedly a major consideration in any plans for a congress. [redacted]


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**USSR TO INTRODUCE NEW AIRCRAFT INTO CIVIL AIR FLEET . . . Page 8**

The development of two new aircraft, the AN-24 twin turboprop and the TU-124 jet light transport, indicates that the USSR is making progress in its announced program of modernizing the Civil Air Fleet (Aeroflot). Both planes are designed for domestic feeder routes and thus will complement the larger transports being introduced on the long domestic and international flights. The new aircraft will also increase the USSR's military airlift potential in times of emergency. [redacted]

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**PART II (continued)**



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**SOVIET OVERTURES TO TURKEY . . . . . Page 10**

The USSR is continuing its efforts to encourage closer relations with Turkey and to stimulate neutralist sentiments in the Gursel regime through offers of economic aid and proposals for restrictive military arrangements. There are signs that Soviet-Turkish relations have improved to some extent, but Turkish officials emphasize that Ankara's policy toward the bloc has undergone no basic change.

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**MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . Page 12**

Acute tensions between the UAR and Jordan persist, with each government attempting to prevent new clandestine operations by the other. King Husayn has indicated his willingness to tone down Jordan's anti-UAR propaganda, but the UAR propaganda barrage continues unabated. The sudden return to Baghdad last week of two prominent Iraqi officials who were on trips abroad is a further sign that the Qasim regime is in trouble.

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**MOROCCAN LEFTIST OPPOSITION GROWING STRONGER . . . . . Page 15**

The opposition of left-wing Moroccans to the government of King Mohamed V is growing stronger as the regime attempts to stop leftist criticism by curtailing civil liberties. Most leftist leaders probably would still support a constitutional monarchy with the ruler reduced to a figurehead. Considering the constitutional issue too complicated for popular understanding, the leftists have concentrated on anticolonialism, greater support for the Algerian rebellion, and evacuation of foreign troops, including both French and American.

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
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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

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**PART II (continued)**



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**BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE . . . . . Page 16**

President Paz Estenssoro is facing strong economic pressures seriously endangering Bolivia's US-backed economic stabilization program, which since its initiation in December 1956, has succeeded in curbing the country's runaway inflation. Paz fears possible anarchy and chaos and feels that governmental austerity at this time might result in violent outbreaks which would undercut longer term plans for economic progress. Anti-US sentiment--which last erupted violently in March 1959--is reflected in a recent statement of the finance minister that the United States will be to blame if the Bolivian Government cannot pay its November wages.



**MALI . . . . . Page 17**

During the Mali Republic's first month as a separate state, its Marxist-influenced leaders have been concerned chiefly with demonstrating their independence from Western--especially French--domination. Steps have been taken toward early diplomatic and economic ties with Sino-Soviet bloc countries, and Mali's representatives at the UN have attacked France and consistently voted with the Soviet bloc on East-West issues. Western influence seems certain to decline further if extremist elements now reportedly challenging Mali's relatively moderate top leaders should become dominant.



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**PART III**

**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES**

**NONBLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE . . Page 1**

As Moscow prepares for the conclave of world Communist leaders scheduled to begin during the 7 November

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**PART III (continued)**

celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution, the disruptive effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the "unity" of the Communist world has spread to nonbloc Communist parties. Rising out of, and compounding, the problem posed by Chinese deviation, this situation must be a source of deep concern to the Kremlin. Although the leadership of almost all major nonbloc parties has voted in Moscow's favor as a result of the Soviet Union's stepped-up drive to get these leaders committed to its side, support within even these parties appears far from complete. In addition, some parties, in which loyalties are more in balance, are trying to substitute neutrality for commitment in the Sino-Soviet dispute. [redacted]

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**THE KHRUSHCHEV LEADERSHIP . . . . . Page 7**

Stalin, shortly after World War II and at about the age of 67, began to divest himself of many of the day-to-day problems attending the administration of the Soviet state. Khrushchev, at the same age, is apparently doing the same, as his rest and vacation periods grow longer and more frequent. New methods of operation are being developed in the Kremlin to allow the Soviet leader to devote himself almost exclusively to matters of high policy, particularly in external affairs. Kozlov, Suslov, and Kosygin accordingly are assuming the bulk of administrative responsibilities. Nonetheless, Khrushchev retains his hold over the initiation of all major policies, and the cult of the leader continues.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Meetings held in Moscow in October have apparently failed to bring the Chinese Communist and Soviet parties closer together and may even have exacerbated the situation.

Continuing the polemic, the latest issue of the Chinese party's major theoretical journal, Red Flag, published on 31 October, strongly insists on the necessity of violence in seizing state power and implicitly criticizes Khrushchev's gradualist strategy. It devotes two editorials to the Sino-Soviet dispute, one keyed to the Soviet success in seizing power by following Marxist-Leninist concepts of armed revolution and the other to the Chinese success in correctly adhering to these concepts.

The editorials were apparently conceived as refutation of a recent article in the Soviet party's theoretical journal, Kommunist. The Soviet article criticized the "dogmatist" (Chinese) approach to Lenin's theory of revolution, accusing the dogmatists of ignoring the changes in the world since Lenin's time and consequently of rejecting the "new propositions...and tactics" of the world Communist movement.

The first Red Flag editorial in effect attacks the Soviet contention that in the "new epoch," in which the forces of socialism are superior to the forces of imperialism, peaceful accession to power by the Communists is increasingly pos-

sible. Red Flag declares that this "new epoch" of Communist superiority is "unprecedentedly favorable" not for a gradualist strategy but for "proletarian revolution" in various countries of the world, especially in the underdeveloped countries.

The second editorial--in addition to the same stress on force--broadens the argument to include other points of disagreement with the USSR. Citing Chinese experience in seizing power from the Kuomintang, the editorial reiterates basic Chinese contentions that the US is a "paper tiger" and that negotiations with the imperialists are fruitless. In a clear attack on Khrushchev's views, the editorial labels "absolutely preposterous" and fundamentally anti-Marxist the belief of modern revisionists and some "fuzzy-minded" people that armed revolutionary struggle is a threat to world peace.

Delayed since mid-October, this issue of Red Flag probably reflects decisions reached at recent politburo discussions in Peiping. In addition to the Chinese officials who participated in talks in Moscow, most members of the politburo--including regional members who seldom leave the provinces--have recently been identified in Peiping. The gathering of these leaders strongly suggests that a high-level party conference has taken place.

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**Bolshevik Celebrations**

The celebrations of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution invariably open on 6 November with a wide-ranging speech on international and domestic affairs by a member of the party presidium, although not necessarily the first secretary. In view of the importance of the occasion this year, however, Khrushchev himself might choose to speak. In any event, the speech can be expected to set the tone for the Soviet positions to be taken in the conferences that follow, as Khrushchev's speech to the Bucharest conference in June signaled the tough line taken later in the closed meeting.

Recent Soviet commentary suggests that a similarly tough line will be taken when the world Communist leaders convene in Moscow. In a long review of the necessity for unity of economic thinking in "socialist" countries, an article in the latest issue of Problems of Philosophy asserts that "it is impossible in contemporary historical conditions to build socialism in an individual country, cut off from the world system of socialism." The article appears to be warning the Chinese again that their obstinacy may lead to their economic isolation from the USSR and the rest of the bloc.

Peiping has not yet announced whether or not it will send senior party officials to the Bolshevik Revolution celebrations. The North Vietnamese

are sending Ho Chi Minh, who arrived in Peiping on 2 November en route to Moscow. Ho earlier tried to bridge the gap between Khrushchev and Mao and undoubtedly intends to try again. His stopover in Peiping will give him an opportunity to discuss the latest developments in the Sino-Soviet feud with Mao, with whom he had a "cordial talk" on 2 November.

**Satellite Delegations**

Among the European satellites, the Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian parties have each held central committee meetings in the last few days which were addressed by their party first secretaries, and at which delegates to attend the Moscow celebrations were selected.

Only the Bulgarians, however, have announced the composition of their delegation, which is to be led by party First Secretary Zhivkov and includes politburo member and Premier Yugov. At least two members of the delegation, former party boss Chervenkov and agitprop specialist Avramov, can be considered pro-Chinese.

The other satellite delegations will probably be equally high level, although they may not all include pro-Chinese elements. The unusual announcement that the central committees chose the delegations to an off-year anniversary celebration was probably to demonstrate the solidarity of each party behind its

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delegation, and indicates that after the anniversary celebrations there will be a high-level meeting to discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Although the Poles, Czechs, and East Germans have yet to announce recent central committee meetings on their delegates to Moscow, it is probable that they will send similar high-level representatives. [redacted]

Andrzej Werblan, chief of the propaganda section of the Polish party's central committee and considered to be Gomulka's top ideological adviser, was in Moscow in mid-October. He was probably there, as were other important satellite officials, to be briefed on the status of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In any event, Gomulka, in a carefully worded speech on 21 October to the Polish parliament, reaffirmed his support for Soviet policies.

Hermann Axen, editor of the East German party daily, Neues Deutschland, flew to Moscow from Bulgaria on or about 12 October [redacted]

He was joined there by Werner Eberlein, Ulbricht's personal assistant, who acted as interpreter. Presumably these men were also briefed on the Sino-Soviet dis-

pute and have returned to East Berlin, although there has been no report to this effect.

Albania, even at this late date, continues to reaffirm its support for Communist China and its policies. In a major speech to the Albanian National Assembly on 25 October, Premier Shehu directed a large portion of his remarks to Khrushchev's proposals at the UN General Assembly and, in contrast to leaders in the other satellites, strongly implied these proposals were impractical. His remarks again reflected a view of the world situation similar to that held by the Chinese Communists.

Despite the wide gap that continues to separate Moscow and Peiping, both sides reiterate the standard formulations of commitment to bloc solidarity and friendship. These clichés, nevertheless, do not obscure the controversy. The seriousness of the basic disagreement, as well as the apparent lack of success of the preliminary negotiations, makes it extremely unlikely that the November meeting in Moscow will succeed in achieving any meaningful compromise of opposing views. The outlook for even a nominal compromise at these meetings appears bleak. [redacted]

## CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Che Guevara, pro-Communist head of Cuba's banking system who is probably the chief architect of the country's ex-

treme economic policies, arrived on 29 October in Moscow, the second stop on his mission to five Sino-Soviet bloc countries.

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In Prague, he signed an agreement increasing Czechoslovakia's original \$20,000,000 credit to Cuba to \$40,000,000 and negotiated details for the coming year of a general trade agreement signed last June.

The expanded Czech credit is reported in the Cuban press to be for the purpose of "re-activating" Cuba's automotive industry and is to be used to assemble in Cuba Czech tractors, motorcycles, and stationary engines, and eventually trucks and automobiles. Guevara may also have made arrangements to pay the Czechs for the military equipment Cuba has received.

In Moscow, Guevara is reported to be negotiating with Mikoyan, presumably on the details of Cuban-Soviet trade for 1961, and he may attempt to increase the \$100,000,000 Soviet credit negotiated last February. Thus far there is no indication that Cuba has secured promises in the bloc for the purchase of more than the approximately 40 percent of Cuba's sugar exports which the bloc is already committed to buy.

Guevara is scheduled to go next to Peiping, presumably for negotiations similar to those in Moscow. Cuba's trade and technical assistance agreements with Communist China were signed last July. Guevara is to travel from Peiping to North Korea, where trade and cooperation agreements are expected

to be concluded. Guevara's last stop is to be in East Germany; he signed a one-year agreement last March with the East German State Bank and will probably seek an extension during the visit.

There is no indication that Guevara intends at this time to travel to the other bloc countries--Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria--that have concluded trade agreements with the Castro regime.

The American naval attaché has received a report that 25 Czech technicians are in Cuba assisting the Cuban military on the weapons already delivered from the Soviet bloc. The total number of such technicians probably will eventually reach a much higher figure, and more military equipment probably will be sent to Cuba. Further units of the Cuban civilian militia are believed to have been issued Soviet bloc arms during the week of 30 October.

Meanwhile, in his interview with Cuban journalists on 22 October--not released by TASS until the 28th, when Cuban charges of an imminent invasion were reaching a peak--Khrushchev again showed his reluctance to be drawn into too precise a reiteration or elaboration of his 9 July rocket threat. In a reply to a request to comment on statements that the warning was purely symbolic, he said he "would

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like such statements to be really symbolic." For this, he added, it is essential that "imperialists' threat of intervention" not materialize. "Then there will be no need to test the reality of our statement...."

Although the Soviet press has maintained a large volume of comment on alleged US plans for an invasion of Cuba, it has relied heavily on citations from foreign press accounts and avoided official commentary. The US Embassy in Moscow suggests this may reflect a wish not to arouse the Soviet public unduly.

On the domestic scene, the Castro regime has put the country on a virtual war footing in anticipation of what the government repeatedly charges are plans for an imminent invasion of Cuba by US-supported "counterrevolutionary" elements. On 30 October, the national directorate of the Cuban militia called on all male militiamen in the Havana area to assemble at designated points as part of a "national mobilization" to meet the invaders. Some militia units were sent from the Havana area to other points in the country, and assemblies of militiamen took place in many parts of the island. On 1 November, radio stations in the capital urged Cubans to donate blood for "the casualties of a possible imperialist invasion."

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A possible indication of future Cuban tactics with respect to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay came in an interview given by Fidel Castro to a UAR newsman. He is quoted as saying that Cubans are not such "idiots" as to try to seize the base by force. Instead, Cuba will demand through the United Nations that the base be evacuated

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**LEFTIST BID FOR POWER IN EL SALVADOR**

A week after the armed forces ousted the Lemus administration, Salvadoran Communists have joined in a strong bid for power by leftist elements. Manifestoes circulated by the Communist-dominated labor confederation and by other Communist-influenced groups demand the immediate elimination of the military from the government and early national elections. These demands, coupled with vicious attacks against the United States, are also voiced on a daily radio program pre-



OSORIO

pared by Communists and broadcast under instructions from the head of the new government's press office. The leftist demands, which are also supported by non-Communist politicians who had long been in the opposition, bitterly attack ex-President Oscar Osorio, whom they call responsible for "all the political, moral, and administrative ills" of the country.

Osorio, whose 1950-1956 term in the presidency immediately preceded Lemus', master-

mind the 26 October coup. He retains wide popularity among lower income groups for his moderate reforms designed to alleviate the country's deep-seated socio-economic programs, but earned the hatred of the Communists for his strong measures against them. After the 26 October coup, Osorio sought to win leftist backing for the junta by having leftists included in the new government, and apparently intended to play a dominant role from behind the scenes until elections scheduled for 1962 returned him to the presidency.

Osorio, a retired lieutenant colonel, is probably the country's most influential military figure. The three military members of the six-man junta are his supporters, as are the military members of the cabinet--who head the key ministries of defense, interior, and public security. If these individuals leave the government under present circumstances, it would mean turning the regime over to the highly articulate leftists, many of whom appear influenced by the Salvadoran Communist party, which, although small, is endowed with well-trained and capable leaders.

Osorio is reported to be very uneasy and worried by developments following the coup, and some of his friends fear he may lose control. Although the military still holds the key to the situation, [redacted] American Embassy claim that the army is seriously weakened by internal dissension. Even before the leftists launched their attacks, there were reports of a possible countercoup led by

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officers such as General Cordova who had lost their posts in the coup.

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The situation seems to be moving toward open clashes between the military and civilians stirred up by Communist agitation. Unless Osorio or another able military figure is willing to show decisive leadership in meeting the leftist challenge, the government could become dominated by pro-Communist elements. Such an eventuality would have very serious implications for the stability of other Central American governments, particularly in Guatemala and Nicaragua.

**SITUATION IN LAOS**

The formation in Vietiane on 31 October of a Committee for Neutrality and National Unity has introduced a potentially dangerous new element into the confused political scene in Laos. The committee's membership, although including some moderate supporters of Premier Souvanna Phouma, is heavily weighted with various shadings of leftists. In addition to Kong Le and several of his lieutenants, the committee includes Quinim Pholsena, the leftist head of the government's team now negotiating with the Pathet Lao, and Nounhak Phoumsavan, a luminary of the Pathet Lao political front, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS). Souvanna and his half brother, Prince Souphannouvong, head of the NLHS, have been named honorary chairmen.

The aims of the new group, as detailed by the chairman,

Pheng Phongsavan, a former president of the National Assembly and close associate of Souvanna, include harmonization of various political groups looking to the formation of a coalition government, and establishment of a neutral, demilitarized Laos willing to accept aid from all countries as long as such aid is without strings. Although the Souvanna group, Kong Le, and the Pathet Lao have all subscribed to these same aims with varying degrees of emphasis, the language in which Pheng couched his statement is reminiscent of recent Pathet Lao/NLHS propaganda; the NLHS may even have drafted the statement.

The circumstances attending formation of the committee are still obscure, but the initiative probably came from Quinim, the Kong Le group, or the NLHS. Although Souvanna

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
had been reported planning to form a new party, it had been understood that what he envisioned was a centrist group--clearly distinguishable from the NLHS--whose purpose would be to compete with the NLHS while using the same slogans of peace and neutrality which the Kong Le coup revealed had struck a responsive chord among the people. Souvanna may thus have been outmaneuvered. It will be difficult for him to disavow the committee, and it is problematical whether he will now go ahead with his plans to form his own party.

Both Hanoi and Peiping were quick to report formation of the new committee and its political objectives; Communist China has again accused Thailand of fostering civil strife in Laos by supporting Phoumi and blockading Vientiane. With its customary freewheeling approach, Communist China charged that resumption of US aid to Laos was an effort to "interfere"; a few days earlier, Peiping had levied an identical charge against the US for "withholding" aid.

Hanoi on 30 October denied South Vietnamese claims that North Vietnamese troops had crossed Laos to attack the town of Kontum in South Vietnam. This "Western fabrication," Hanoi said, was intended as a pretext for South Vietnamese intervention in Laos. While bloc propaganda seems anxious

to head off outside, pro-Western intervention in Laos, it is not threatening retaliatory action.

Formation of the committee for neutrality and national unity will almost certainly harden the attitudes of Laotian



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leaders in Luang Prabang and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. The Luang Prabang group, which includes Souvanna's armed forces commander, General Ouane, may construe its existence as sufficient justification to carry out previous threats to break away from Vientiane. Phoumi

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meanwhile can be expected to use the existence of the committee as vindication for his frequent assertions that Vientiane is in effect under Pathet control.

Phoumi was already showing signs of increased resistance to compromise with Souvanna. He adamantly refuses to send paymasters to Vientiane, since this would constitute "recognition" of the Souvanna government, and his group insists that Souvanna must resign to allow the King to designate a new premier.

Savannakhet and Luang Prabang, while maintaining some contact, continue to view each other with suspicion, thus impeding joint efforts to achieve their seemingly commonly held purposes of limiting further Pathet Lao gains.

Former Premier Phoui Sananikone now is in Bangkok, where he is assessing the situation pending a possible return to the Laotian political scene. Although Phoui's long absence from the country would seem to place him in a good position to mediate the present crisis, the circumstances of his fall from power nearly a year ago left a residue of bad feeling with the King and Phoumi, among others, which may limit his usefulness.

Soviet Ambassador Abramov returned to Phnom Penh on 28 October, completing a 15-day stay in Laos. During his visit, an offer of Soviet economic assistance was accepted "in principle" by the Souvanna government. The aid offer was not spelled out and will prob-

ably be the subject of protracted negotiations at a later date. Abramov, prior to his departure, told US Ambassador Brown that he would return to Laos in a few weeks.

The Soviet press has not as yet mentioned the aid offer to Laos but has focused attention on what it charges are American plans to establish a new government in Laos, thus plunging the country into renewed civil war. Moscow radio has significantly shifted its endorsement of the Laotian Government from that of "sympathy" for the Laotian people, as expressed in an official government statement of 21 September, to "full support" for the neutralist policy of the Souvanna regime.

Soviet Propaganda on Thailand

The Laotian situation has also precipitated a virulent Soviet propaganda attack on Thailand. Repeated charges of Thai interference in Laotian internal affairs have been a standard theme in Soviet broadcasts to Southeast Asia. A 20 October article in Sovetskaya Rossiya accuses Marshal Sarit of equipping the Thai Army with American rockets as part of a "military build-up" which is related to alleged SEATO plans to intervene in Laos. The article concludes that such "war preparations" undermine Thailand's diplomatic relations with its neighbors and urges Sarit to recall the "recent [redacted] provocations" and the consequent danger to all nations with US bases.

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
**SITUATION IN THE CONGO**

Forces favoring Lumumba are actively strengthening their position in Orientale Province while the ousted premier plays a waiting game in Leopoldville. Army chief Mobutu's government has not been recognized by UN officials, although they continue to work with department heads among the Mobutu-appointed commissioners in an effort to handle day-to-day activities. Officials of the UN Command are putting pressure on all factions--especially Mobutu, Foreign Minister Bomboko, and Katangan President Tshombé--to get them to cooperate in a working agreement.

In furtherance of the UN objective, a committee was formed on 27 October in New York by the nations represented in the Congo operation to work out a reconciliation among opposing Congolese politicians. Such a body had been authorized by the resolution of the special UN session on the Congo in mid-September, and the idea has been strongly backed by such pro-Lumumba states as Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR.

The large size of the committee, which includes 15 African and Asian nations, will tend

to make it unmanageable and less subject to influence by Lumumba's strong supporters. Likewise,



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the membership of at least six moderate nations--Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Malaya, Pakistan, and Tunisia--should serve to neutralize the efforts of those friendly to Lumumba. Kasavubu and Mobutu on 1 November warned, however, they would not cooperate in such efforts to patch up their dispute with Lumumba.

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Lumumba partisans have been increasingly active in parts of the Congo remote from Leopoldville, particularly his political stronghold of Stanleyville and the rest of Orientale Province.

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The Katangan situation threatens to become increasingly serious, and it may be aggravated by the efforts of Dayal to undercut Tshombé's position. Dayal is providing a UN escort for Tshombé's rival, Jason Senwe, to tour Baluba tribal areas in northern Katanga despite Tshombé's threat to use force to prevent the tour. Dayal is also likely to take other measures, such as pressing for an early withdrawal of Belgians from Katanga's military and administrative services and increasing restrictions on the activities of Tshombé's security forces in dissident Baluba tribal areas.

Meanwhile, the presence of a growing number of Belgians in influential positions within both Mobutu's administration and that of Katanga has provoked increasing bitterness on the

part of the UN Command in Leopoldville and several African states.

Some believe Tshombé derives almost his entire support for a secessionist Katanga from the presence of several thousand Belgian military and technical advisers, and that without their aid he would soon have to yield to Leopoldville's authority.

The reported capture of four white officers--including three Belgians--by UN troops attempting to curb Baluba depredations in Kasai Province has been followed by a new Soviet demand that Hammarskjold suppress "the subversive activities of Belgian agents" in the Congo.

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**PART II****NOTES AND COMMENTS****THE ALGERIAN SITUATION**

The leaders of the 11 former French territories in Africa, who met from 24 to 26 October in Abidjan, have undertaken to seek a negotiated settlement of the Algerian war. While pressure for peace is increasing in France, such rightist opponents of any compromise as Jacques Soustelle's Vincennes group may take advantage of the current trial of leaders of the January settlers' uprising in Algiers to intensify their attacks on De Gaulle.

The African leaders met on the initiative of Ivory Coast Premier Felix Houphouet-Boigny. They agreed to try to bring France and the rebels together in new direct talks in the hope of heading off a "strong" Algerian resolution at this year's UN General Assembly. According to Houphouet-Boigny, the conference named a delegation to Paris and appointed another to approach the rebels if the first one finds



HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY

some "flexibility" on the part of the French President.

De Gaulle responded to the Africans' initial gesture by say-

ing he would be pleased to discuss "general problems between France and the African countries" anytime after 4 November, the date set for his radio-televisi-



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sion address. Houphouet indicated he would go only to discuss Algeria.

A continuing series of manifestoes and demonstrations show the wide public appeal negotiations have in France. Two more important groups have spoken out--the Young Catholic Workers on 21 October about the "crisis of conscience" among youths called up to serve in Algeria, and the Protestant Federation of France on 1 November urging all French religious groups to press for a negotiated peace.

Tension and uncertainty are building up among "French Algeria" elements in both Algeria and France. New violence may be sparked as a result of stepped-up slogan painting by the large French Algeria Front, deliberations at the 3 November meeting of the Vincennes group,

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
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and the trial in Paris of Pierre Lagaille, leader of the January revolt in Algiers. In view of the excitement stirred up by the September trial of the leftist Jeanson network for aiding the rebels, the Lagaille case may become a new emotional focus of the extremists.

Meanwhile, rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas' firm rejection of cease-fire negotiations, which highlighted his radio address marking the sixth anniversary of the rebellion, reflects the Provisional Algerian Government's markedly improving international position. This is seen in its de facto recognition and propaganda support by the USSR, promises of massive aid from Peiping, and new public demonstrations of support from Tunisia and Morocco.

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


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**INDICATIONS OF SINO-SOVIET BORDER FRICTION**

Within the past few months both the Soviet and Chinese press have made oblique, unusual references to military and security developments along widely separated sections of the Sino-Soviet border. In a recent discussion of his differ-

ences with Peiping, Khrushchev is reported to have said that the Chinese have "invaded" Soviet territory and started construction of "fortifications" there. Apparently the Chinese have begun actively to renew their ancient border claims against the USSR.



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A Peiping pictorial dated 1 May reported that border defense troops of the People's Liberation (Chinese Communist) Army were building barracks and "homes" at an unspecified location "on the Pamir plateau." While the article could have been referring to developments in a region adjacent to Kashmir, it is more likely that the area in question is farther to the north. Part of the Pamir Plateau is in western China, but most of it is in the USSR's Tadzhik Republic. The commentary noted that to be protected, the border region "must be built up," and observed that the troops engaged in target practice at an elevation of 14,000 feet were "happily defending the border region of the homeland."

Earlier Chinese maps of this area, both Nationalist and

Communist, claimed territory well to the west of the line drawn on Soviet maps. Newer Chinese Communist maps have the same boundary as that on Soviet maps, but--unlike the Soviet maps, which show the border as clearly demarcated--indicate the frontier as "indefinite." Chinese claims within the Tadzhik Republic thus appear not to have been entirely abandoned.

In a speech on Soviet "Border Guard Day"--28 May--a high-ranking Far East Border Guard official, Boris A. Ivanov, stressed the need for border guard vigilance. In a peculiar juxtaposition of thoughts, he said that the frontiers of the Amur and Ussuri rivers "now link two great brotherly nations forever, but Soviet Far Eastern border guards will never forget

that enemies have always tried and will try to hamper Communist construction." In this context he observed that "even now imperialists attempt to send spies and saboteurs into our country"--presumably across these rivers.

In view of the extreme unlikelihood that "imperialist" spies are operating in this area, the official may well have been using his reference to them to cloak a more realistic object of concern--Chinese border crossers.

The speech also carried the implication that it would be necessary to maintain a strong border guard force along at least this part of the



Chinese "border defense troops (in the Pamirs) have built barracks and settled down on a mountain covered by snow all year."  
--Liberation Pictorial, 1 May 1960

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Sino-Soviet frontier. This is rather striking, since the broadcast occurred at a time when the USSR had been widely publicizing the demobilization of servicemen, including border guards, in connection with Khrushchev's troop reduction program.

In mid-July Vladivostok radio claimed the USSR had reached an agreement with Communist China, allegedly for "mutual fire protection." Extensive work to create a "black antifire zone" was alleged to have been started along the Primorskiy Kray's border with northeast China. Forest areas were being plowed, "swamps drained," and rocky hills "overcome." The draining of swamps and the "overcoming" of rocky hills would not seem to be protective measures against fire, and the program might actually have as its purpose the creation of a surveillance zone of the border.

On 4 September a Soviet broadcast to servicemen in the Far East again described the efforts of the Soviet Far East Border Guard to combat "espionage." The announcer related several examples of how "violators"--otherwise unidentified--had been apprehended, and stated that an "enemy spy" had been caught crossing the Amur River from the USSR to China. These statements suggest that some sort of Chinese-Soviet incidents had occurred along the river and other sectors of the border which it was found necessary to explain away as having been caused by "imperialist spies." The commentator also noted, in the first such known reference in Soviet broadcasts, that Chinese border guards patrol the south bank of the Amur.

In July the Soviet publication Problems of History

carried a review of a Soviet book entitled "The Amur Question" which outlined the historical development of the Amur River boundary between China and what is now the USSR. The review described as "unfair" the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), under which Russian-settled territory north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri was ceded to China, and recounted Chinese attacks of this period on undefended Russian settlements in the area. The review concluded that the boundary was justly rectified in the 19th century because of Russian cultural and economic superiority over China.

An article by Engels was cited in support of the contention that Russia was at the time the "first power in Asia," while China was "weak and decaying." This attempt to justify Russian rights to territory north of the Amur and to remind readers of Chinese intrusions in the area may indicate that Chinese claims for territory north of the Amur have been renewed, perhaps on the basis of the Treaty of Nerchinsk.

The Khabarovsk area of the Amur frontier may be particularly significant in any dispute over borders, in view of the direct conflict of claims between Chinese and Soviet maps concerning a large island in the Ussuri-Amur river network.

There is also evidence that the USSR is seriously concerned about Chinese intentions toward Mongolia, where there is also a conflict over where China's border lies.

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Khrushchev was said to have feared that Mongolia would "go the way of Tibet"--presumably meaning that he felt the Chinese intended to occupy the country. Nehru is said also to believe that Khrushchev is concerned over Chinese designs on the Mongol areas of the USSR.

Soviet troop dispositions lend support to the belief that the USSR continues to be concerned with the protection of its border with China despite the advent of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949. Of the 38 line divisions in the Far East and Transbaikal military districts, at least 18 are within 200 miles of the Chinese and Mongolian borders. Major groupings are three divisions near Zabaykalsk, four in the Blagoveshchensk area,

and seven in the Primorskiy Kray. This is approximately the same deployment which has been in effect since the end of World War II and seems inordinately large, in view of the decline of Japan as a military power and the withdrawal of US ground forces from the Far East since the Korean war.

Lending support to the conclusion that Soviet troops have remained deployed in this manner in part to discourage the possibility of Chinese incursions into the USSR is the statement of a refugee who served in 1957 in an artillery regiment attached to a division at Blagoveshchensk. He asserted that the division's mission was to intervene in possible "emergencies on the Sino-Soviet border." 25X1

**ALBANIA MAINTAINS SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST CHINA**

Only four days before the bloc meeting in Moscow scheduled for 7 November, the Albanian regime continues its support of Chinese Communist positions. In an address to the Albanian National Assembly on 25 October, Premier Mehmet Shehu condemned two Soviet-sanctioned disarmament proposals of European satellite leaders and reiterated Tirana's essentially pro-Chinese interpretations of world affairs.

Albania's public alignment with Peiping and Peiping's success in gaining support and influence in a country hitherto considered exclusively a Soviet preserve may encourage opposition to Khrushchev's policies in other European satellite parties and may pose problems for Moscow throughout the Communist movement.

In a reflection of Albania's extreme concern about bloc policies toward Yugoslavia and the Balkans, Shehu in his speech implicitly criticized Khrushchev's meetings in New York with Tito. He also condemned the idea of total disarmament in the Balkans --proposed by Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania and Zhivkov of Bulgaria --as "absurd and dangerous" while "imperialism" surrounds the bloc, and he scored Gomulka's proposal that a first step toward disarmament could be the acceptance of existing military bases on foreign soil as long as new bases are prohibited.

Shehu's speech came at a time of continuing signs of Sino-Albanian amity and of further Soviet-Albanian friction. The Chinese and Albanians have continued to congratulate each other on their "devoted struggle"

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to preserve the "purity" of Marxism-Leninism. In a 24 October cable of thanks for Albania's greetings on China's national holiday, Chinese leaders said their friendship for Albania is based on Marxist principles. On 27 October, Deputy Premier Kellezi, recently returned from a three-week visit to China, hailed China's communes and "leap forward" as "extremely correct."

As a sign of their mutual opposition to any form of bloc cooperation with Yugoslavia--a factor which always conditions Albania's response to initiatives in the Balkans--both the Chinese and Albanian delegates walked out of a Rumanian trade union congress on 28 October when the Yugoslav delegate was speaking. Another sign of Chinese moral support for Albania was the previously unheralded arrival in Tirana on 24 October of a Chinese military delegation which had made an extended visit to the UAR. The group returned to Peiping on 30 October and evidently did not visit any other European satellite.

An official of the French Foreign Ministry has reported--presumably on information received from its legation in Ti-

rana--that the Soviet ambassador to Albania recently was out of the country for five weeks, ostensibly because of illness. 25X1

The Soviet chargé allegedly has been denied access to the Albanian Foreign Ministry, while the Chinese ambassador has daily been received there as well as at the party politburo and central committee headquarters. The French also assert that Moscow has withdrawn Soviet technicians from Albania--a move which would complicate the functioning of the Albanian economy.

A remark by Shehu in his speech indicates, however, that the Albanian party is not united behind the regime's pro-Chinese policy. He stated that "revisionists and opportunists" who claim that the Chinese party is dogmatic and in favor of war--an implicit reference to the Soviet position--can be found in Tirana as well as elsewhere. In this way Shehu may have been warning other Albanian leaders--presumably those favoring a more pro-Soviet orientation--to support the pro-Chinese policy or face demotion or ouster from the party. 25X1

## SOVIET LEADERS MAY DELAY PARTY CONGRESS

It is beginning to look as though the Soviet leaders have no plans at the present time to hold the 22nd party congress

until possibly late next year. There have been rumors in Moscow that it might be held during the first three months of

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1961, but it has not yet been officially convoked--the "irregular" 21st party congress in early 1959 specified only that the next congress be held sometime in 1961--and the Soviet press and radio have been silent on the subject. There is, moreover, no mention of the next congress in the party slogans for the anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution on 7 November. Slogans preceding the 20th party congress in 1956 and the 21st party congress in 1959 both referred to those forthcoming congresses.

In addition, the election and accountancy meetings of primary party organizations began in mid-September without any reference to a forthcoming congress. These meetings, which take place once a year whether a national congress is in the offing or not, are the first stage in the hierarchical system of party meetings, rayon and oblast conferences, and republic congresses which precede a national congress when one is to be held. When these election and accountancy meetings are to lead to a national congress, a Pravda editorial announces that fact. For example, the meetings in late 1955 preceding the party congress in February 1956 were described as "the most important stage in the preparation for the 20th party congress."

The deterioration this summer and fall in relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China has undoubtedly been a major factor affecting Soviet plans for the holding of the next congress. According to a statement by Khrushchev in November 1959, the new party program called for by the 20th party congress in 1956 would be considered by the 22nd congress in 1961. Since the program is

thought of as a guide for the entire international Communist movement, it must be difficult, if not impossible, to formulate in view of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Decisions to draw up a new program to replace the one adopted in 1919 and long outdated have been made by every regular congress beginning with the 18th party congress in 1939, but have never been implemented. There were indications early this year that the program was being actively worked on at last, but for several months there has been no sign of progress. If the instructions of the 20th party congress are followed, a draft program will be published in time for "extensive discussion" before the next congress.

Khrushchev, however, recently told a group of Cuban journalists that it was difficult for him to set a time for a visit to their country because of a party congress "scheduled for 1961," thus indicating that the question of a congress in early 1961 was still open. If the congress were to be held before fall, the Soviet leaders would probably prefer to get it out of the way before April. In the spring and summer months a congress would disrupt agricultural work so severely as probably to constitute an over-riding consideration.

No congress within the past 30 years has been held during those months. There is still time for the necessary preparations if consideration of a new program is put off to a later congress. Party rules require only one and one half months' notice, and the experience of the 19th congress in 1952 shows that this is adequate.

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## USSR TO INTRODUCE NEW AIRCRAFT INTO CIVIL AIR FLEET

As part of its long-term program to improve the Civil Air Fleet (Aeroflot), the Soviet Union has announced the development of two new light transports, the AN-24 (Coke), a turboprop transport, and the TU-124 (Cookpot), a jet transport. Series-produced units of these aircraft are scheduled to enter service on domestic feeder routes sometime in 1961.

The AN-24 twin turboprop feeder-line aircraft was designed to operate from semi-improved fields for flights of 800 to 1,000 miles and to carry from 32 to 42 passengers or equivalent freight. The AN-24's high-wing, low-slung fuselage and large, high tail fin suggest that it is designed to fill a role in the USSR similar to the one already filled to some extent in the free world by the Fokker-Fairchild F-27 twin turboprop transport. The power plants each develop about 2,000 eshp--equivalent shaft horsepower--and enable the AN-24 to fly at a speed of over 300 knots at 20,000 feet. Aeroflot claims that the operating economy of the AN-24 will reduce ton-mile costs about 25 percent from those of the IL-14 piston transport.

The TU-124, believed to be produced [redacted] at Kharkov, is a twin-engine, low-wing transport which resembles the TU-104 but is smaller. The 44-

68 passenger TU-124 was designed to use economical turbofan jet engines which should enable it to fly at a speed of better than 500 knots. The turbofan engine used by the TU-124 is more economical than a conventional jet because it uses an extra turbine stage to compress bypass air to augment thrust without raising fuel consumption.

Two additional versions of the TU-124 have been mentioned



in the Aeroflot publication Civil Aviation. These consist of a tourist-class and an economy-class configuration, seating 55-60 and 68 passengers respectively. This information suggests that the USSR is following the lead of Western airlines in using a basic aircraft in which the internal seating arrangement may be easily converted to accommodate various loading factors on different routes.

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These new transports probably will replace many of the approximately 1,500 LI-2, IL-12, and IL-14 piston-engine aircraft which now constitute about four fifths of Aeroflot, other than small types of aircraft and helicopters. A large amount of the USSR's civil air activity consists of short flights within the country, and the introduction of these new aircraft, from the standpoint of increased operating efficiency, will be a major step forward in the over-all moderation of Aeroflot.

The appearance of these new light transports has been expected for some time. Delays may have been occasioned by higher priorities accorded the development program for larger civil transports--such as the TU-104, TU-114, IL-18, and AN-10. The longer range planes are more important in terms of prestige and propaganda and are essential

for the expansion of Aeroflot's international routes, as well as for providing faster schedules.

Soviet aircraft capabilities for the military forces would be significantly increased by the introduction of sizable numbers of the new transports into Aeroflot, inasmuch as civil aircraft could readily be used to augment Military Transport Aviation in times of emergency. The AN-24, especially, would appear to be easily adaptable to military operating conditions.

Apart from modernizing Aeroflot, the USSR may hope to penetrate free-world markets. In the past the USSR could offer in the light transport class only the relatively obsolete IL- 25X1 14, which did not prove attractive in nonbloc countries even at low prices.   
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**SOVIET OVERTURES TO TURKEY**


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The USSR is continuing its efforts to encourage closer relations with Turkey and to stimulate neutralist sentiments in the Gursel regime.

Since the Turkish coup in May, Soviet officials on a number of occasions have offered economic aid, including credits

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of up to \$500,000,000. Khrushchev, in a talk in New York on 11 October with Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper, reiterated offers of such assistance and, asserting that Turkish membership in NATO and CENTO is not a major obstacle to better relations, suggested that the USSR and Turkey agree to establish a demilitarized zone along their common frontier by withdrawing their military forces a distance of up to "several hundred kilometers." The Soviet premier also observed that the Black Sea should be turned into a "sea of peace" and recalled that the Soviet Government in 1953 had denounced Stalin's policy of maintaining pressure on Turkey.

Soviet policymakers are probably aware that the Gursel government is reluctant to become involved in any restrictive military arrangements with the USSR. By seeking to allay Turkish concern that the USSR may again resort to pressure tactics and demands involving

territorial claims, Moscow is probably hoping to encourage Ankara to accept Soviet aid and demonstrate greater independence of the Western powers in political as well as military matters.

The USSR has also taken a more friendly public attitude toward the Gursel government. In an article on 29 October marking the founding of the Turkish Republic, for example, *Pravda* cited the exchange of messages in June and July between Khrushchev and Gursel as an example of improved relations. However, the clandestine radio station, "Our Radio," which broadcasts in Turkish from East Germany, has criticized the Gursel regime for persisting in many of the policies of the Menderes period and for continuing to suppress Turkish Communists.

There are signs that Soviet-Turkish relations have improved to some extent, particularly in

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the field of cultural exchanges. A professor from Istanbul University lectured in Moscow in late September, after which the Turkish ambassador referred favorably to Soviet achievements in science and culture and expressed the hope that cultural relations would be strengthened. On 30 October a ten-man Turkish commercial delegation arrived in the USSR for talks with Soviet foreign trade officials.

Turkish officials continue to emphasize, nevertheless, that

Ankara's policy toward the Communist bloc has undergone no basic change. While there is apparently a minority in the CNU which favors accepting economic aid from any source, the Gursel regime has thus far displayed reluctance to undertake any new financial obligations or to respond to any Soviet initiatives which might weaken Turkey's ties with the West.

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**MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS**

UAR-Jordan

King Husayn is reported satisfied with the effect of his anti-Nasir speeches in the UN and in Amman and now is willing to allow Jordan's anti-UAR propaganda offensive to taper off. His strong anti-Nasir stand is said to have mollified the Bedouin and Majalli tribal elements in the military who were demanding some satisfaction for the assassination of Prime Minister Majalli in late August. Husayn has recalled the Royal Guard Brigade to Amman from the Syrian-Jordanian border area, but the bulk of the Jordanian forces deployed near the frontier in early September still remain in that area.

Lebanon has complied with UAR demands to curb the activities of anti-UAR elements within its borders by announcing new, strict rules controlling the movements of political refugees.

There is no firm evidence that the UAR has taken positive steps to retaliate in kind for Jordanian acts of terrorism in Syria. No significant change in the readiness posture of Syrian military units near the Jordanian border has been noted. Meanwhile, Cairo and Damascus continue intensive propaganda attacks on Jordan, and have announced the uncovering of an alleged Israeli-Jordanian espionage and sabotage ring in Damascus.

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Iraq

The growing lack of confidence in Prime Minister Qasim's leadership is reflected by reports that he may be faced with wholesale cabinet resignations. Politicians and military personnel in the Iraqi Government have become increasingly reluctant to continue their association with what they are coming to believe is a failing regime.

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
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Two prominent Iraqi officials on trips abroad, apparently having received disturbing information about the situation at home, returned suddenly to Baghdad last week. Foreign Minister Jawad, who had planned a leisurely journey through Europe on his way back from the United Nations meeting in New York, cut short his trip and flew directly from London to Baghdad.

a number of religious and political elements, including the Sudanese Communist party




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Pro-Communist Colonel Mahdawi, head of the notorious People's Court, who had been on a "red-carpet tour" of Communist bloc countries, suddenly arrived back in the Iraqi capital on 27 October. His speech at the airport significantly omitted any mention of Qasim. This could hardly have been an oversight, for in the past Mahdawi has invariably made a point of identifying himself with Qasim, the "sole leader," as closely as possible.

Prime Minister Abboud is not, however, permitting internal difficulties to interfere with his external plans. Having instituted additional security precautions, he and several of his ministers departed on 29 October for a week-long state visit to Ethiopia. He has also been insistent that Nasir's ten-day state visit to the Sudan take place as scheduled beginning on 15 November.

Sudan

The Abboud military regime, which in its less than two years of power has survived a variety of political machinations and several coup attempts, is again in serious trouble. The immediate cause was the government's decision on the resettlement of some 50,000 residents of the Wadi Halfa area, which will be flooded when the UAR's Aswan High Dam reaches advanced stages of construction.



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Riots in Wadi Halfa last week have been followed by demonstrations and disturbances in Khartoum and five other Sudanese cities; these had the backing of

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**MOROCCAN LEFTIST OPPOSITION GROWING STRONGER**

The opposition of left-wing Moroccans to the government of King Mohamed V, long the universal symbol of Moroccan nationalism, is strengthening as the regime attempts to suppress leftist criticism by curtailing civil liberties. Organized leftist activity is centered in the 14-month-old National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) and its labor wing, the Moroccan Union of Labor (UMT). The basic issue in dispute is the constitution, which the King has promised to promulgate before the end of 1962.

UNFP spokesmen insist that the constitution be drafted by "the people" and not imposed by the King. They are agitating for the election of a national assembly to draw one up, and they refuse to sit on the commission appointed late in the summer to prepare a draft. The King apparently hoped to parry leftist attacks by submitting the constitution to a popular referendum, a farcical gesture in a country where at least 85 percent of the people are illiterate, and the vast majority failed to comprehend the significance of the municipal and rural council elections held last May.

Two prominent UNFP chiefs intimated recently to American officials that the removal of the monarchy will eventually be necessary. Most leftist leaders probably would still support a parliamentary monarchy with sharply reduced royal powers. The King, on the other hand, while pledged to establish a constitutional monarchy, wants a strong executive. Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who is being groomed by his father as the heir to the throne and is in fact responsible for the administra-

tion of the country, is suspected by the left of scheming to install an authoritarian government.

The constitutional issue being far too complicated for popular understanding, the UNFP has turned to other issues to arouse popular sentiment for itself and against the King's government. Its focus has been on anticolonialism, greater support for the Algerian rebellion, and the evacuation of foreign troops, including both French and American.

Countering such activities, the government has become more aggressive in explaining its policies. It also has retaliated against leftist propaganda by seizing whole issues of leftist newspapers containing offensive articles. The government's recent action in rescinding legislation requiring governmental approval of the formation of labor unions is widely interpreted as giving a boost to the right-wing labor federation, which seeks to destroy its powerful rival, the UMT, by attracting the UMT's grass-roots following.

The administration's uneasiness over the strength the left is demonstrating was shown on 1 November, when all leftist gatherings were dispersed by police and the UNFP president of the Casablanca municipal council, who served as minister of labor under leftist premier Ibrahim, was arrested. The government had, however, declared the day a national holiday in support of the Algerian rebels after the left had prepared a one-day strike and mass meetings in major cities.

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**BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE**

Strong pressure on President Paz Estenssoro for a new round of wage increases is seriously endangering the US-backed economic stabilization program which	has enabled Bolivia to maintain a stable foreign exchange rate for almost two years after a long period in which the rate deteriorated steadily. Paz fears
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that anarchy and chaos lie barely beneath the surface of the present scene and that governmental austerity at this time might result in violent outbreaks which would undercut the possibility of new foreign investment essential to long-term economic progress.

The government's cash shortage is preventing the payment of social security benefits and of salaries in many government operations, and family allowances for the army are more than two years in arrears. Recent strikes of construction, telephone, newspaper, printer, and railway workers unions were suspended only after "friendly" consideration of wage demands was guaranteed despite the government's cash position and its fear of a new wage-price spiral. New strikes in key unions were announced on 28 October, and government officials expect additional labor halts. Paz does not believe he can declare the strikes illegal, since most of them involve demands for wages legally due.

The Bolivian Government now is particularly interested in possible German and Brazilian investments. Negotiations are under way for a German investment and management contract in the nationalized tin mines. Several key Bolivian officials hope that Brazilian interests will build a modern electrolytic smelter like that constructed

several years ago in Rio de Janeiro State. This type of smelter is able to process any kind of ore, even if it is complex and of low grade like most of that in Bolivia. Labor and congressional groups continue to press strongly for the government to follow up the USSR's offer of a tin smelter. The cabinet met to discuss the question on 29 October but President Paz does not--at least at present--appear to be giving serious consideration to such a step.

Anti-US feeling has previously been strong in periods of financial stringency, apparently because leading Bolivians feel that the extent of US aid is the major factor in Bolivia's economic position.

Bolivian factory workers recently expressed irritation at US exclusion of manufacturing in Bolivia from the help which the US extends indirectly to the Bolivian Mining Corporation through budgetary support. The finance minister recently said that the United States would be to blame if the Bolivian Government did not have funds to pay its November wages.

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**MALI**

During the Mali Republic's first month as a separate state, its Marxist-influenced leaders have been concerned chiefly with demonstrating their independence from Western--especially French

--domination. This has provided Sino-Soviet bloc countries with new opportunities, which they are moving rapidly to exploit, to extend their presence in Black Africa.

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
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Already Mali has established, or clearly indicated its readiness to establish, diplomatic relations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, and North Vietnam. In addition, the Mali Government is actively engaged in working out barter-trade and other economic and technical assistance arrangements with at least some of the seven Communist countries...including East Germany, Hungary, and Yugoslavia --which sent special missions to Bamako last month.

While no commitments have yet been announced, the Czechs reportedly have agreed to construct certain industrial enterprises, to supply 350 trucks, and to send several geologists to conduct mineral surveys. Prague is also said to have offered a long-term,

low-interest credit. An initial group of eight Soviet technicians already has arrived in Mali, presumably to survey possible aid projects.



MODIBO KEITA



MADEIRA KEITA

A number of the projects being presented by Mali for the consideration of the bloc delegations are designed to improve transport routes between landlocked Mali and Conakry, Guinea's capital and port. This presumably reflects a belief that the bloc will show particular interest in schemes that would foster ties between Mali and Guinea--a belief which appears

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well founded in view of the increased emphasis apparently being placed by the USSR and Guinea on the early reconstruction of the Conakry-Kankan rail line in Guinea.

Since August, when Senegal dissolved its federation with Mali, the Malians have adamantly refused to use the direct rail link with Dakar. Instead, they have arranged to ship the bulk of Mali's commercial traffic via the more costly, road and rail route through Abidjan, capital of the Western-oriented Ivory Coast.

While Mali's leaders have not yet demanded the evacuation of the four French military and air bases, which constitute France's most important single interest in Mali, steps have been taken in the domestic field to undercut the position of private French economic interests. Moreover, many of the statements and actions of Mali officials since late September have reflected the generally held conviction that France was responsible for the breakup of the federation and have indi-

cated a desire for complete dissociation from the French Community. This impression has been created particularly by Mali's representatives at the UN, who have denounced France at every opportunity while voting with the bloc on nearly all East-West issues.

Mali's drift away from the West and toward the bloc--similar in many ways to the course adopted by Guinea when it became independent in 1958--may well be accelerated in the near future.

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Should the extremists, who previously had been held in check by relatively moderate President Modibo Keita, succeed in gaining predominant influence, Mali would probably move rapidly toward a close alignment with Guinea and, like that state, welcome bloc assistance on a large scale.

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**PART III****PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES****NONBLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE**

The conclave of world Communist leaders scheduled to be held in Moscow in conjunction with the 7 November celebration of the Bolshevik revolution bids fair to be the most important meeting of its type ever held. The "strains" in the Sino-Soviet alliance, increasingly apparent since 1956, became a "rift" by April 1960, and now threaten to develop into a permanent schism. Throughout the evolution of the dispute on world Communist tactics, and particularly in its later stages, both the Soviet and Chinese parties have lobbied energetically for support from other Communist parties.

Since the failure of the Bucharest meeting in June 1960 to bring even a temporary easing of the situation, the Soviet Union has stepped up its drive to get the Communist parties of the world to commit themselves to Moscow's side. In large measure it has succeeded. The European satellites, with the exception of Albania, are firmly on record with the Soviet party; the major European Communist parties are also behind Moscow. Even the Dutch Communist leader, Paul De Groot, who is notorious for his preference for Chinese views, pressed his central committee for a resolution supporting the Soviet Union after a recent visit to Moscow.

Of the Asian satellites, North Vietnam and North Korea have shown a reluctance to become embroiled in the argument. Among the important nonbloc Asian parties, most of the Indian and Indonesian leaders have voted for Moscow's views,

although the Japanese party seems to prefer to remain neutral. On the American continents, no party has shown enough sympathy for the Chinese positions to argue for them, and most of the major parties are aligned with the Soviet Union.

On the surface, then, Moscow will enter the discussions in November with impressive world-wide support. Beneath this encouraging surface, however, pockets of dissent remain, uneasiness over Moscow's course survives, and dedicated revolutionists are still in fundamental agreement with Peiping's fiery slogans. Thus support for Moscow even in those

**POSITIONS OF NONBLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES  
IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE**Parties unequivocally supporting Soviet position:

US  
Canadian  
British  
West German  
French  
Italian  
Swiss  
Finnish (People's Democratic League)  
Lebanese  
Chilean

Parties whose leaders, at least, favor Soviet position:

Austrian  
Costa Rican (Popular Vanguard party)  
Ecuadorean  
Peruvian

Parties declaring support of Soviet position  
but with significant dissenting minorities:

Dutch  
Belgian  
Indian  
Indonesian

Parties which are neutral or equivocal toward dispute:

Iraqi  
Japanese  
Cuban (Popular Socialist party)  
Panamanian (People's party)  
Brazilian  
Argentine

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parties which have declared themselves does not appear complete, and this must be a cause of considerable disquietude in Moscow.

Western Europe

Although Peiping has tried to swing at least some of the older, more mature parties of West Europe to its side, it has had little success. In countries where parliamentary democracy is strong, economies are healthy, and the people fervently desire peace and disarmament, Chinese programs hold little appeal. In addition, leaders of the major parties have loyally followed the lead of the Soviet Union through many sharp twists and turns of policy, even when this has meant increasing unpopularity for the parties involved and heavy losses in party membership.

Since its 30 June - 1 July central committee meeting, the French Communist party, lacking a "Chinese faction," has been unequivocally aligned with Moscow against "dogmatists and left-wing deviationists." The Italian party is so firmly committed to the Soviet view that the Chinese reportedly told its leaders that the usual Italian delegation to the celebrations of China's National Day would not be welcome in Peiping this year.

The Swiss Communist party, solidly behind the Soviet Union, has refused to distribute literature received from the Chinese party in support of Chinese views. While the British Communist party has made no formal statement on the dispute,

*What appears most serious, at least to me, is the fact that the number of those who think that banging on tables is not an adequate substitute for dropping A-bombs is steadily increasing...these forces are certainly making headway, since it is very difficult to find the proper counterarguments to what they are saying.*

*--Otto Horn, Austrian Communist leader.*

*While we respect the opinions of our Chinese comrades, the Chinese have forgotten one important thing: we, not they, will be the victims of an atomic war.*

*--Paul DeGroot, secretary general, Dutch Communist party.*

*The Communist who thinks that a war must be unleashed to reach socialist objectives cannot be regarded as a normal human being.... Those who are dreaming of war...have not the fate of the peoples at heart, but are merely basing themselves on fantastic and philosophic ideologies.*

*--Dominique Urbany, secretary general, Luxembourg Communist party.*

*The unjust criticism of the Soviet Communist party cannot but be harmful and is not in the interest of the workers' movement.... The interventions and certain of the writings of the Chinese are dangerous, and cannot but cause certain parties to deviate....*

*--Georges Glineur, Belgian Communist party representative at Bucharest Conference.*

the material which has been appearing in the Daily Worker indicates that it favors Moscow's views. Leaders of the Austrian Communist party agree that the conflict has reached a stage which must be described as dangerous, but apparently have decided that it should not be discussed within the party, since this could only lead to discord.

The situation in the Dutch Communist party illustrates how the realities of the European scene, combined with pressures from Moscow, overcome the sympathy which life-long revolutionists feel for Chinese views.

De Groot, who had been regarded as a consistent Stalinist and was believed to favor Peiping's positions, stated that the Dutch party must support Moscow on peaceful coexistence whether sympathetic with its

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views or not. In a revealing statement, De Groot told his central committee that "while we respect the opinions of our Chinese comrades, the Chinese have forgotten one important thing: We, not they, will be the victims of an atomic war."

The Belgian Communist party appears to find itself in somewhat the same situation as the Dutch. While generally supporting Moscow, it still eyes the Chinese line with some favor, and many militants in the party appear to hope that this line will triumph. On the question of the "national liberation movements," the Belgians appear to prefer the more aggressive, revolutionary views which Peiping advocates. The party recently advised Congolese correspondents to collaborate with China as "a country capable of providing important aid."

Far East and Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia and the Far East show the obverse side of the coin. Here, close to the Chinese colossus, in countries where parliamentary democracy is not deeply rooted, economies are weak, and extreme solutions to problems seem to offer promise, Soviet success in enlisting support is tinged with some failure.

*I'm not quite sure whether talking like this with you will be correct according to the party. But I think I am right as far as I have gone because you have read it all in the newspapers. What bad luck for the party! I wish you hadn't known it!*

—S. A. Dange, Indian Communist party leader, talking to provincial party members.

*Khrushchev is doing harm to the international Communist movement, as he did when he attacked Stalin.*

—P. Sundaraya, Indian Communist party leader.

*The Chinese are wrong and Moscow right and, according to Lenin, who improved on and perfected Marx, each country must follow those tactics suitable to the situation of that country.*

—D. N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian Communist party.

Indian Communist party leaders on 7 September formally reaffirmed their policy of achieving power through "peaceful" means, thus in effect backing Moscow's views. The resolution passed by the Indian party's central executive committee temporarily ended a bitter debate that had raged for some time between pro-Moscow moderates and an extremist "left-sectarian" group which had supported Peiping's views on various questions.

The Indian Communist leaders remain deeply divided, but the position of the moderate faction has reportedly been bolstered by indications that even some "left sectarians" now deem it expedient to show some support for the Moscow line. Other of these leftist leaders, however, continue to support the concepts advanced by the Chinese, and the potential of a shift within the party remains.

In Indonesia, like India, dissension and uneasiness remain a problem. Although Chairman D. N. Aidit of the Indonesian Communist party, long the dominant figure in the party, is reported to have declared Moscow "right" and Peiping "wrong" and to have gained acceptance of this position, support for Moscow from this party must be considered fragile. Four of the seven politburo members have recently been reported leaning

toward Peiping, and there was considerable argument before Aidit's views were accepted.

Aidit's support for Moscow continues the ambiguous policies of all previous leaders of the party in Indonesia--they have looked to Moscow for guidance, but have tended to view the Chinese Communist revolutionary tactics as

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better suited to Indonesian conditions.

The Japanese party has not gone on record in support of either side in the dispute. Prior to the Bucharest meeting in June, the Japanese Communist newspaper had urged its readers to study the text of three statements of Chinese views which had been reprinted on 5 June in the party's semimonthly journal. Since the meeting, the Japanese Communist press has been publishing only those Chinese statements that support the Bucharest communiqué.

ly to support the USSR. The leaders and the rank and file of the Communist party in the United States are united in their view that Chinese concepts can only do harm to the international Communist movement and the US party. The leader of the Canadian Communist party, Tim Buck, has not condemned Chinese views to the evident satisfaction of his followers, but has refused an invitation from the Chinese to visit Communist China. Buck also wrote an article which appeared in the Marxist Review, September-October 1960, which was highly critical of Chinese positions, and the Canadian party drafted a letter of criticism which was sent to the Chinese party.

In Latin America, the Com-

*Any ideological differences will be settled shortly, and a definitive Sino-Soviet break is a capitalist daydream.*

*--Rafael Echeverria, an Ecuadorean Communist party leader.*

*The imperialists have speculated much about a division between China and the Soviet Union. They have not hidden their joy and their criminal hopes of such a possibility. But their joy is in vain. Their criminal hopes will be disappointed. The Soviet Union, China, and all the socialist countries will not be divided by any cause; on the contrary, they will become more united and better coordinated every day.*

*--Editorial of 1 October in Hoy, newspaper of the People's Socialist (Communist) party of Cuba.*

American officials in Tokyo believe the party is reluctant to become publicly involved in the dispute because of close ties with both Peiping and Moscow. If forced to choose now, the Japanese party would probably declare in favor of Moscow's present interpretation of Communist theory and doctrine. Over the longer range, however, the orientation of the Japanese Communists will be influenced by their party's long and sympathetic association with the Chinese party and the special attraction which the mainland exerts on Japanese society.

North and Latin America

The Canadian and American Communist parties appear firm-

unist parties are somewhat isolated from the rest of the movement and ordinarily must contend with a time lag in receiving ideological and policy guidance from the bloc on changes in Communist international doctrine and issues affecting bloc solidarity.

A degree of hesitancy and confusion, partially due to a desire by the leaders to keep the problem from being widely considered, has characterized the apparently limited discussions on the Sino-Soviet rift within these parties. They are, however, traditionally accustomed to looking to Moscow for guidance on international Communist policies and

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to blindly carrying out Soviet directives. Although China has considerably augmented its influence among Latin American Communists since 1956, there is little indication that these parties will deviate from the pro-Soviet pattern.

Most of the key parties in the area--those in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba--have not taken an official position on the dispute. In Brazil, the party secretary general has effectively gagged discussion of the question, apparently believing that it would aggravate his troubles with the small, but vocal, extreme left party faction. The Chilean party, the fourth largest in Latin America, has clearly expressed its support of the Soviet line, and the Peruvian party has indirectly expressed its support. Some leaders of the Panamanian and Mexican parties have taken note of the dispute without adopting a position, while the top leader of the small Ecuadorean party, which has a dissident faction favoring revolutionary tactics, reportedly backs the Soviet theses.

The revolutionary tactics and policies of the Castro regime in Cuba, which is supported by both the USSR and China and all Latin American Communists, seem on the surface to lend support to Chinese theories. There are rumors of a split in the Cuban Communist party between the younger, more radical members who increasingly turn to Peiping for guidance and a somewhat more moderate group which continues to follow party guide lines originating in Moscow.

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for the present the Cuban Communist apparatus is oriented more toward Moscow than toward Peiping. The progress and fate of the Castro dictatorship and its experiment

with socialism could become a test of the validity of the opposing Sino-Soviet theories and hence a battleground for the loyalties of the parties in the hemisphere.

Middle East and Africa

The Communists of the Middle East and Africa, in those countries in which they are organized in formal groups, have generally been too involved with problems affecting their own survival in the face of governmental pressures to have been seriously affected by the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

An important exception is the Iraqi Communist party, which rapidly expanded its influence following the 1958 coup and pushed ahead in a bid for power under the leadership of a faction which apparently was influenced by Chinese views on the need for immediate armed struggle. Following a series of setbacks, however, the Iraqi Communists adopted a more moderate line involving at least nominal support for Prime Minister Qasim and conforming with the views expressed by the Soviet Union. The party, however, has never clarified its position on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Another exception is the Lebanese Communist party, which is clearly lined up with the Soviet Union. During the difficulties in Iraq, after heated discussions among Lebanese Communists, the party overwhelmingly sided with the Soviet-backed faction in Iraq, with only an extremely small dissenting minority. Since then, the local Communist press has taken its cue from Moscow, including the reprinting of Khrushchev's speech to the Bucharest congress and an article from Pravda deploring the "misinterpretation, ideological fossilization, and isolationism" of those who

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maintain that "since the question of war and peace depends on the wishes of the imperialists, the struggle for peace becomes worthless and without purpose."

Most of the other Communist parties of the Arab countries, as well as in Israel, have in the past been closely identified with Soviet views. They have also, however, been subject to intense factional differences, and there is not enough information available to assess their stands on the dispute.

In the newly independent countries of Africa, Communist elements have not developed to the point of establishing formal party organizations. Individual Communists in most of these

poses. Coming after the de-Stalinization campaign of 1953 and the events in Eastern Europe of 1956 which set comrade against comrade all over the world, the effects of further factional strife will be multiplied.

That the Soviet Union realizes and fears this development is shown by the vehemence of its reaction to the Chinese efforts in international Communist front movements, and in letters and documents sent to other parties to gather support for its views. While the dispute was still in a bilateral stage, while it remained on the level of argumentation in party journals, the Soviet party tried hard to keep it under wraps. When it moved into the arena of the world Communist movement, the USSR struck back hard.

*If we were to release to our press the material received daily from the Chinese Embassy, unaltered and in its entirety, it would cause serious ideological confusion.*

*--Istvan Szirmai, secretary, Hungarian Communist party.*

*Neither Khrushchev nor Mao seems to realize the damage their dispute is causing.*

*--Ho Chi Minh, first secretary of Lao Dong party.*

It seems clear that the dispute now has reached the stage where the present leaders of the Soviet Union and China cannot arrive at a real resolution of the dispute. If the party meeting is held in

countries are instead concentrating on establishing influence with nationalist leaders and within the dominant nationalist political movements, as well as in other key groups, such as trade union movements.

Effects of Dispute

As the men in the Kremlin survey the present situation in the world Communist movement, they can find little to give them joy and comfort. To be sure, the Soviet positions are being echoed all over the world. But the history of the Communist movement is full of the debilitating effects of ideological squabbles, and today's Soviet leaders are well aware of the dangers of polycentrism which the Chinese deviation

Moscow as scheduled and results in a nominal reconciliation, leaving both parties free to carry on as they have, the traditional factional struggles in all Communist parties will be intensified. If the meeting results in some form of Sino-Soviet break or a vote of censure against the Chinese, it will be necessary to follow through within each party with a purge of those elements which do not support the stand of their leaders. In either case, the eruption of the Sino-Soviet controversy into open struggle has affected, and will continue to seriously undermine, the unity of the Communist world.

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**THE KHRUSHCHEV LEADERSHIP**

Stalin, shortly after World War II and at about the age of 67, began to divest himself of many of the day-to-day problems attending the administration of the Soviet state. Khrushchev, at the same age, is apparently doing the same, and his rest and vacation periods are growing longer and more numerous. As a result, new methods of operation are being developed in order to allow Khrushchev to devote himself to matters of high policy, particularly external affairs. Nonetheless, Khrushchev retains his hold over the initiation of all major policies, and the cult of the leader continues.

strengthen his position among the leaders; and second, to reorganize and revitalize the domestic economy. By early 1958 he had put his agricultural program into effect, the industrial reorganization and the machine-tractor reform had been adopted, the antiparty people had been dealt with, Zhukov had been sacked, and Bulganin had been put in his place. It seems unlikely that the present change in emphasis toward foreign affairs would be possible if Khrushchev were under fire as he was in 1957.

**1958-1959**

During 1958 and 1959 the composition of the party presidium remained practically intact, although Bulganin was removed in September 1958 for his complicity with Malenkov and company. By December 1959, however, it was apparent that Belyayev, probably in some disfavor since 1957, would be purged for his poor performance as party chief in Kazakhstan and that Kirichenko was also on his way out.

In discussions with Governor Harriman in the spring of 1959, Khrushchev made it clear that Kirichenko was no longer a favorite, and during the second half of the year Kirichenko's activities became increasingly circumscribed and his position in the hierarchy apparently was slipping. Several reports indicate that Kirichenko had crossed the "old man." By January both Belyayev and Kirichenko were headed for oblivion; the pattern of their demotions was almost identical with that given Bulganin.

The central committee is known to have met eight times in 1958 and 1959. Although speculation is intriguing, evidence is lacking to indicate that

**KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIPS ABROAD AND VACATIONS**  
(SINCE MID 1959)

1959		
14 July	- 23 July	Polish trip
6 August	- 1 September	Black Sea
5 September	- 11 September	Dacha near Moscow
15 September	- 28 September	US trip
30 September	- 4 October	Chinese trip
19 October	- 25 October	Rumania
16 November	- 27 November	Black Sea
29 November	- 7 December	Hungarian trip
1960		
19 January	- 28 January	Place unknown
10 February	- 5 March	Southeast Asian trip
12 March	- 18 March	Ill with the flu
23 March	- 3 April	French visit
8 April	- 23 April	Black Sea
14 May	- 21 May	Paris Summit
4 June	- 18 June	Black Sea
18 June	- 27 June	Rumanian trip
30 June	- 8 July	Austrian trip
30 July	- 28 August	Black Sea
1 September	- 5 September	Finnish trip
9 September	- 14 October	UN General Assembly
26 October	-	Black Sea

OFFICIAL TRIP

VACATION OR REST

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A major shift in Khrushchev's activities occurred in the spring of 1958 when he assumed the premiership from Bulganin. From March of that year he began to move gradually away from the internal scene; during recent months he has displayed almost complete preoccupation with foreign affairs.

In the first years of his ascendancy, Khrushchev was deeply involved in two great problems: first, to retain and

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the committee was called on to intercede in disagreements involving the leaders. If anything, the role of the central committee became more routine. With only one exception since December 1958, central committee sessions, their agenda, and even the main speakers were announced well in advance. Large numbers of nonmember specialists were "co-opted" to attend these meetings, and the publication of stenographic reports became customary procedure.

Indeed, the years 1958 and 1959 brought the flowering of the Khrushchev cult--exemplified by his all-pervasive authority at the 21st party congress in January 1959 and illustrated by the great propaganda barrage surrounding his trip to the United States during the early fall. In addition to Khrushchev's mounting concern with foreign affairs and the increasing amount of time spent outside the country, beginning in 1959 it became noticeable that Khrushchev was away from Moscow much more frequently for vacations and rest; there were strong signs that he was not well. Khrushchev appeared to be slowing up.

December Plenum, 1959

In one respect, at least, the December 1959 party plenum represented a break with the past. It apparently was the first occasion since the 1920s that individual members of the central committee had attempted to win approval for a policy before the presidium had made its own decision. The particular question concerned changes in the organization of agriculture, including the establishment of collective farm unions--organizations which administer several collective farms.

The December plenum, following the pattern of the two

preceding plenums, was called well in advance. The agenda--a progress report on agriculture--and the main speakers were announced beforehand. There was speculation prior to the meeting that in addition to the announced agenda, the committee would take some action on organizational questions, including the collective farm unions.

Two candidate members of the presidium, Polyansky and Podgorny, were the chief spokesmen at the plenum for a hierarchical system of farm unions; the minister of agriculture advocated no expansion beyond the local level. Khrushchev was

*Every time you [Khrushchev] go abroad, you take with you a part of each one of us.... Every time [you] return from abroad having successfully fulfilled a mission of peace and friendship, [you] not only return to us "a part of each of us"--[you] enrich for all of us our understanding of the supreme tasks which are presented before the peoples in the struggle for peace and progress.*

*--Pravda, 21 October 1960*

aware of the differences beforehand but is not known to have committed himself to the proposal. In his speech, the closing speech to the plenum, Khrushchev declared only that the proposals for expansion deserved attention, and the resolution adopted by the plenum mentioned in passing that the question would be turned over to the presidium for decision.

The lack of a decision at the plenum is probably attributable to Khrushchev's own reservations at that time. Agricultural results were disappointing in 1959, and new organizational schemes which might adversely affect results for 1960 were unlikely to be considered premature.

Further, Khrushchev had been away from Moscow a total of 99 out of 174 days since 1 July. During intervals at home he was undoubtedly preoccupied with such problems as his proposed armed forces reduction, which had met with strong military opposition.

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Some observers have interpreted the December plenum as a defeat for Khrushchev. They argue that Khrushchev was very much in favor of the collective farm unions but could not obtain agreement from the party presidium. As a result, he utilized the services of two deputies in order to try to push the measure through the central committee, but other forces in the presidium took a negative stand. As a result of his "failure," Khrushchev was then forced to sack Kirichenko.

However, the use of deputies to champion his own proposal is in marked contrast to Khrushchev's usual procedures. He neither spoke out for the collective farm unions himself nor submitted draft proposals "for discussion"; indeed, his advocacy of the plan is difficult to establish. His chief spokesmen for the lost cause, Polyansky and Podgorny, were promoted to full members in the

presidium a few months later. Furthermore, some collective farm unions above the local level have recently been created --probably as an experiment to test their effectiveness.

Finally, there is no indication from Soviet propaganda, [redacted] or Khrushchev's behavior following the plenum that he suffered any kind of defeat. If Kirichenko had still been a Khrushchev favorite at the time he was ousted, and if a major program had been defeated in the central committee during a time when the military leaders were opposing another major program, it is difficult to believe that signs of shakiness in Khrushchev's position would not have appeared.

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The major trends noted earlier--preoccupation with foreign affairs and less time in Moscow--continue in 1960. As a result of foreign excursions and increasingly frequent vacations, Khrushchev has been outside Moscow 192 days or almost two thirds of the time so far this year. Nonetheless, every prominent development in Soviet policy during this time has been associated with him personally: the armed forces reduction, the U-2 and summit affair, the Burcharest conference, and the UN General Assembly session.

Personal publicity and accolade for the man have never been higher. References to Khrushchev as "head of the central committee" are commonplace, and as "head of the presidium" not unusual. Widely publicized



Painting of Khrushchev published in Ogonyok.

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poetry extols his leadership--and a new honor, the first oil painting of Khrushchev as leader and teacher, in precisely the same style in which Lenin and Stalin were deified--has been unveiled and reproduced in Ogonyok, the Soviet counterpart of Life.

May Plenum - 1960

As the central committee met in May, Khrushchev appeared to be approaching the summit period at the height of his prestige and power. As party first secretary, premier, head of the party bureau for the Russian Republic (RSFSR), and recognized "leader of the central committee," Khrushchev of course has assembled a considerable array of power and prestige. Because of his absences, however, he needs to be well assured that the machine continues to run smoothly as it does when he is there to regulate the throttle.

The May session had been summoned quickly--it was a one-day affair whose chief purpose was to brief the central committee members on the U-2 incident and the stand Khrushchev would take the next day at the Supreme Soviet session. Important personnel changes were also announced, but the plenum clearly was not conceived of as a battleground in a contest over the positions of the leaders. Rumors in Moscow as early as a month before the session accurately described some of the details of the personnel shifts which were to take place. At a reception on the eve of the meeting, Khrushchev outlined roughly what would happen the next day.

The main effect of the personnel shifts was to move some presidium members out of the secretariat and into jobs either on the Council of Ministers or to full-time work in the party

bureau for the RSFSR. Kozlov was brought into the secretariat, Kosygin promoted in the Council of Ministers, and Brezhnev moved over to take Voroshilov's job in the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. If we assume that Khrushchev had every intention of retaining control of the main positions of power--he said to Harriman, "As long as I live, I'll run the party"--and at the same time had been advised to slow up, then the changes can be readily understood.

In accord with the Harriman conversations, Khrushchev brought his number-one choice as successor, Kozlov, into the secretariat--a move which certainly had to be made if Kozlov is to have a head start in a succession race.

Kosygin's promotion to a first deputy premiership, as with Kozlov's shift, put a trusted man in a top supervisory position, Kosygin, for instance, was now on a par with Mikoyan.

With the reduction of the secretariat from ten members to five, the responsibilities of the incumbents--particularly Suslov and Kozlov--were undoubtedly increased. At the same time, the RSFSR Bureau (especially Aristov) may have been given some independence from the secretariat in order to provide better balance and help ensure that Khrushchev remains the final arbiter of major decisions.

There has been some speculation that Khrushchev's colleagues in the presidium forced a reduction in the size of the secretariat in order to break its majority in the presidium. Yet it is difficult to imagine Khrushchev not carrying the fight forward; it is equally difficult to imagine some of the members of the secretariat voting to relinquish their seats in the secretariat in order to break Khrushchev's hold.

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Mikoyan's Decline

The effect of the U-2 incident on the leadership in the period immediately following the May plenum cannot now be fully measured. The decline of Mikoyan, however, may well be related. Mikoyan's influence first appeared to be dropping when he was absent during most of May and early June, including the week preceding the opening of the summit conference--certainly a critical period in the formulation of Soviet policy on the U-2 incident for the Paris meeting.

Subsequently, evidence appeared to suggest that Mikoyan was in some trouble even before May. Khrushchev told [redacted]

[redacted] that Mikoyan was an opportunist who would not hesitate to "turn coat" to keep his position. Shortly before May Day, status symbols were adjusted to indicate a decline, and subsequent reports and rumors also alleged that he was in difficulty. Mikoyan has not since regained his old prominence; he was "on vacation" from the time Khrushchev left Moscow for the UN until the end of October, and there are recent signs that the status symbols are again being revised at his expense.

It is still not clear at what point Mikoyan began to slip; there may be some correlation between his decline and the tougher Soviet line since May. In any case, Soviet tactics seem to lack the sophistication they had when Mikoyan was Khrushchev's chief counselor on foreign affairs.

Other Developments

There have been other occurrences which were open to interpretation as trouble for Khrushchev. He did not give a major speech at the party plenum in July, and his speech to mem-

bers of the intelligentsia that same month was not published, although one by Suslov on the same occasion was. Speculation has thus arisen that Khrushchev can no longer speak out at will.

Such developments as the December and May plenums, which have been advanced as evidence of a decline in Khrushchev's power, would in fact reflect a major political crisis in Moscow. Accordingly, if these were the correct indications of the situation, they would point to factionalism, which is considered "antiparty" activity. Once the lines were drawn, there could be no accommodations. If one faction gained the advantage, it would have to go all the way lest the other eventually win and order a purge.

This does not appear to fit the present picture. The press lauds Khrushchev; his associates in the presidium unhesitatingly extol him as leader; and he in turn gives every impression during his long absences that the "farm" is left in good hands.

Propaganda Treatment

An increase in press references to collective leadership this year has also been interpreted by some as symbolic of Khrushchev's reduced authority. However, if such references were in fact meant to convey a reduction in Khrushchev's authority, they would be inserted in those publications which carry the greatest weight, they would follow some pattern, and there would be some geographic consistency. Thus, if newspapers in Tadzhikistan mentioned collective leadership to reflect the situation in Moscow, then so would newspapers in Kirghizia or Uzbekistan.

Despite some increase in references to collective leadership, there has been no

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authoritative editorial comment on the subject. Pravda and Izvestia have, for all meaningful purposes, been silent; party theoretical journals have made sporadic references--the greatest number in connection with Lenin's 90th birthday anniversary in April and the others mostly referring to elements in the lower echelons of the party. Any particular reference to collective leadership is invariably accompanied by others which underline Khrushchev's special place among the leaders; finally, geographic consistency in references to collective leadership has not been established.

Indeed, there need be no contradiction in Soviet theory between the principle of collective leadership and stress on the role of an individual. The politburo and the central committee even under Stalin were described as collective organs, and their decisions were also said to have been collective.

Current Methods of Operation

It is not clear whether Khrushchev's recent preoccupation with general problems and his comparative inattention to day-to-day affairs are dictated by age and health, or because he now sees himself primarily as a world statesman; most likely it is a combination of both. Probably it also derives from a feeling that he no longer needs to demonstrate his authority in public at every turn. Khrushchev may consider it unnecessary to attend each and every agricultural conference or even address every party plenum; organizational changes can be made without his personal public endorsement beforehand.

This would mean, however, greater dependence on subordinate specialists for advice

and consultation. It has already been noted that in some internal programs, such as the educational reform, Khrushchev has concentrated more on the over-all course of development and less on ensuring that each particular aspect is put into effect exactly as proposed.

Effective delegation of authority takes on greater significance as Khrushchev gets older and less active, and political maneuvering in anticipation of the succession becomes more intense. It has already been noted that Kozlov has moved some of his old Leningrad associates into better positions. Aristov and perhaps Kosygin may try the same thing. Polyansky, the RSFSR premier, is being mentioned more frequently in the press. At the same time, the public activities of Kozlov and Suslov appear carefully balanced to give the impression that neither is receiving favored treatment at the other's expense.

In terms of historical precedent, the members of the party secretariat have enjoyed a strategic advantage in preparing for the succession. Kozlov at this point seems to be the man most active in utilizing this advantage, and other leaders are probably pressing to limit his power if not to get him shunted aside completely.

As maneuvering intensifies, it may complicate the political chain of command. The various contenders for the succession will try to build effective bases of power, and lesser figures will find it necessary not only to maintain their loyalty to the number-one man but also to preserve the good will of their respective patrons. In a crisis, this question of dual allegiance might weaken Khrushchev's direct control.

Present Issues

There are, however, more immediate problems. There are

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probably more critical issues testing Khrushchev's leadership today than at any time since 1957. He faces his greatest test in regard to China; he must muster all his forces for the bloc meeting in November, and this means localizing and curing the Chinese disease. There is even the possibility that Moscow has already made a major effort but failed to put Albania back into line. If so, his job is even more complicated.

Outside the bloc, Khrushchev's campaign to negotiate personally with the Western leaders in 1960 failed. His blustering over Berlin has not yet achieved results, and his intervention in Africa has not so far furthered Soviet interests significantly.

In addition, Khrushchev may be vulnerable to criticism for letting internal matters slide--particularly agriculture. There is probably considerable disgruntlement over his reluctance to delegate authority still further; at least publicly, official life in Moscow

appears to grind to a halt during his absences.

The possibility that Khrushchev has suffered a loss of power during the past year should not be dismissed out of hand, however. The developments which apply to the leadership situation--such as the Kirichenko ouster, the May plenum decisions, or collective leadership propaganda--appear to have had Khrushchev's stamp of approval. There are, of course, some loose ends; the failure to publish Khrushchev's speech to the intelligentsia last July is a case in point.

It is difficult, however, to visualize Khrushchev acquiescing in a situation where the presidium attempts to limit his right to be heard. In 1957 he fought his minority in the presidium into a majority in the central committee, and there is no reason to assume he would not fight again if he felt his position being jeopardized. There is a dearth of evidence that he has been fighting for his political life during the past year.

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