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27 October 1960

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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T H E W E E K I N B R I E F

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS Page 1

While continuing to attack Western policies on disarmament, nuclear testing, and Berlin, Moscow has initiated moves designed to set the stage for a new effort at negotiations on these issues. Khrushchev repeated [redacted] his call for a summit meeting on Berlin by April at the latest. At the UN the bloc delegations are apparently preparing to walk out of the disarmament discussion in the Political Committee and launch an intensified campaign for a special General Assembly session in March or April to be attended by the heads of government. The bloc has also moved to establish a deadline on the nuclear test ban talks and to bring the issue before the UN General Assembly. [redacted]

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CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN Page 4

Che Guevara has departed for the Sino-Soviet bloc with an economic mission to arrange for next year's trade and further integrate Cuba economically with the bloc. Soviet bloc military specialists continue active in Cuba and many more will be required to train Cubans in the use of bloc military equipment. While most Latin American governments believe the new US restrictions on exports to Cuba were justified, there has been strong criticism by Chile and Mexico. The Castro regime, at least for the moment, has increased its popularity among the lower classes through the urban reform law. Scattered opposition groups, however, continue active inside Cuba despite the regime's denials. In the Dominican Republic, a further weakening of Trujillo's position is evidenced in the poor turnout for his birthday demonstration on 24 October and in the worsening economic situation. [redacted]

SITUATION IN LAOS Page 7

Fighting has resumed in southeastern Phong Saly Province, apparently as the result of Laotian Government efforts to retake two posts lost earlier to the Pathet Lao. Persistent but still unsubstantiated rumors are current that Captain Kong Le's paratroopers are preparing to resume attacking Phoumi's forces southeast of Pak Sane. [redacted]

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PART I (continued)

[redacted] Souvanna's recent movement toward a more openly anti-Communist position could conceivably incline Kong Le toward such action. [redacted]

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SITUATION IN THE CONGO Page 9

Events appear to be moving in Lumumba's favor. Colonel Mobutu is confronted with growing disorders in the armed forces and political opposition in at least two provinces. Mobutu's major difficulty, however, is with the UN Command in Leopoldville. For its part, the UN has been unable to discover a local government which would have significant Congolese support and satisfy the demands for "legitimacy" on the part of Ghana, Guinea, UAR, and Morocco. [redacted]

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE CONTINUES. Page 1

Preparatory committees are reported to have been working for some weeks in Moscow on a resolution to be presented to the meeting of world Communist parties--scheduled to be held around 7 November--which has been called to consider the Sino-Soviet dispute. Recent authoritative statements from both parties have reaffirmed their basic positions and add to indications that they will find it difficult to resolve their conflicting views. [redacted]

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USSR PURCHASING LARGE FREE-WORLD TANKERS Page 3

To ensure the long-term growth and stability of its petroleum exports, the Soviet Union is making a major effort to expand its relatively small and slow tanker fleet by purchasing large, modern tankers in the free world. Russian crews have taken possession of two such vessels recently constructed in Japan and the Netherlands, and the USSR is negotiating with Italy for six or seven large tankers. The expansion of the USSR's oil exports--dramatized this year by a commitment to supply all Cuban needs--has required substantial readjustments in Soviet tanker operations. [redacted]

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THE CASE OF COMRADE LARIONOV--A LESSON FOR SOVIET PACE SETTERS Page 4

The personal tragedy of central committee member Aleksey Nikolayevich Larionov has a distinctly Soviet

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PART II (continued)

twist and is symptomatic of the great pressures generated by this year's agricultural difficulties. Larionov, the party boss of Ryazan Oblast, had been singled out for praise by Khrushchev at the December 1959 party plenum for his accomplishments in agriculture. By the time of his death in late September, he was in official disfavor, apparently for failing to fulfill the extravagant pledges for his oblast to which Khrushchev had pointed as an example for all. [redacted]

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UNCERTAINTY IN PEIPING OVER FUTURE ECONOMIC MOVES Page 5

The Communist regime in Peiping appears worried over the state of the Chinese economy and uncertain over what to do about it. Peiping's comments on industrial achievements so far this year have been uncommonly vague, but the major troubles are clearly in agriculture, which Peiping admits is still progressing too slowly. For the second straight year the harvest in China will be poor, and this will have an adverse effect on food supplies and the level of exports. [redacted]

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GHANA Page 7

Frustrations experienced by Ghanaian President Nkrumah in his attempts to promote his pan-African ambitions appear to be influencing him to adopt an increasingly less friendly posture toward the West and to welcome wider contacts and tactical collaboration with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, new emphasis by Ghanaian leaders on the "transition to socialism" in Ghana seems likely to reduce established Western economic interests and to provide new opportunities for the bloc to exploit. [redacted]

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PART II (continued)

BRITISH EAST AFRICA Page 8

Political activity looking toward independence is increasing in the four British-controlled territories of East Africa. Elections in Zanzibar are scheduled for January and in Kenya and Uganda for February, but progress toward self-government continues to be hampered by racial tension, tribalism, and squabbles among African politicians. A constitutional convention for Tanganyika, the most advanced of the four, is set for March, and Julius Nyerere, the territory's newly appointed chief minister, is promoting the idea of an area-wide federation when all the territories become independent.

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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Page 9

UAR-Jordanian relations appear to be moving into a more critical phase and may involve a UAR-sponsored attempt to overthrow the Husayn regime.

[Redacted]

The Sudanese military government's handling of the problem of resettlement of some 50,000 inhabitants of the Wadi Halfa area who are to be displaced by construction of the Aswan High Dam has resulted in riots and has added to pressures for a return to civilian rule. Shifts in the government of the oil-producing Persian Gulf state of Qatar are only temporary adjustments in a factional struggle there.

[Redacted]

THE TURKISH POLITICAL TRIAL Page 12

Turkey's mass political trial has failed either to gain momentum or to capture popular enthusiasm. There has been general criticism of the relatively minor character of the charges, designed mostly to ridicule leaders of the former regime, which have been presented thus far, although 38 of the 500 prisoners face possible death sentences for other offenses. While the regime is becoming more sensitive to adverse domestic reaction and foreign criticism, it still seems determined to remove any possible threat to its existence from the leaders of the previous government.

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
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PART II (continued)

has warmly approved the prime minister's announcement that Canada intends to maintain amicable relations with Cuba. [redacted]

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ARGENTINA Page 15

President Frondizi's steps to meet some of the Argentine Army's demands for changes among his advisers and policies have greatly eased the political crisis, but some time will be required to resolve the various complaints ranging from inefficiency in the state oil company to pro-Peronista and Communist activities. Frondizi kept intact the economic team responsible for the US-backed stabilization program, but made some conciliatory changes in army appointments. His new committee to channel military complaints and a special commission to investigate Communist activities are already in operation. [redacted]

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ANTIGOVERNMENT VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA Page 16

As a result of antigovernment student disturbances in Venezuela between 19 and 26 October, the armed forces are on an alert status and President Betancourt's three-party coalition has come under severe strain. The leftist Democratic Republic Union party, long a dissatisfied component of the coalition, was partly involved in the violence, and its representatives in the cabinet have since resigned on party orders. The party may be considering withdrawing from the government at all levels, and aligning itself with the leftist-Communist opposition. [redacted]

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HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN FRICTIONS Page 17

There has been an intensification recently of the chronic Honduran-Nicaraguan squabbles over the use of bases in Honduras by Nicaraguan revolutionaries, some of

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whom are apparently aided by Cuba. These frictions have increased bitterness over the two countries' century-old border dispute, now before the International Court of Justice. The court's decision is expected before December and could well threaten the government in whichever country loses the dispute. [redacted]

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COUP IN EL SALVADOR Page 18

The six-man military-civilian junta that ousted President Lemus early on 26 October sought immediately to secure the backing of the leftist elements whose demonstrations last August and September critically weakened the Lemus administration. The coup was military-led, however, and [redacted]

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[redacted] the military will maintain control over the civilian component of the junta. Ex-President Oscar Osorio, a retired army officer who retains strong backing in the armed forces and is widely popular throughout the country, will probably emerge as the real leader of the new government. Strongly anti-Communist, he is known to favor thoroughgoing reforms to alleviate the country's deep-seated socio-economic problems. [redacted]

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

THE CULT OF MAO TSE-TUNG Page 1

The Chinese Communist cult of Mao Tse-tung, which has fluctuated with the exigencies of party policies, in the past year has approached idolatry. The cult has two aspects: the adulation of Mao Tse-tung as a father-figure of the Peiping regime who is "great, brilliant, wise, compassionate, tender, and trustworthy"; second, the claim that Mao is pre-eminent as a Marxist theoretician, "the most prominent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary, politician, and theorist among all living contemporaries." The present extravagant claims for Mao as the legitimate heir of Lenin are interwoven with Peiping's defense of its position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. [redacted]

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THE ALGERIAN SITUATION Page 6

As the UN General Assembly moves toward consideration of the Algerian situation, the contending forces remain stalemated, although pressures on them are apparently becoming more intense. The rebels continue under severe French military pressure, but have received additional

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PART III (continued)

backing in recent approaches to Moscow and Peiping, and are almost certain to have substantial Afro-Asian support in the General Assembly for their effort to "internationalize" the conflict. De Gaulle's 1959 offer of self-determination remains France's official position, but there appears to be a growing diversity of French views. Popular opinion now seems to be swinging in favor of political negotiations with the rebels and even toward eventual independence for Algeria; but army sentiment is still adamant against such negotiations, and rightist leaders have in the past few months become more inclined to challenge De Gaulle directly on this issue.

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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25X1 [redacted] his call for
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sion in March or April to be
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ment. The bloc has also moved
to establish a deadline on the
nuclear test ban talks and to
bring the issue before the UN
General Assembly.

Germany and Berlin

Khrushchev used his con-
versation with West German Am-
bassador Kroll on 18 October
to make clear his determination
to settle the Berlin problem in
1961. He indicated that Moscow
will press for an early summit
conference and mentioned Febru-
ary or March, or April at the
latest. He ruled out any long
delays, and, as in his 20 October
speech in Moscow, he indicated
that postponement of Berlin
negotiations until after the
West German elections in Sep-
tember 1961 would be unac-
ceptable.

Khrushchev also insisted
on the permanent nature of the
Oder-Neisse boundary and the
necessity of an early peace
treaty with "both German states,"
as well as a settlement of the
Berlin problem.

Khrushchev emphasized his
desire for not merely normal
but friendly relations with
Bonn, and reversed the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's position by
agreeing that if West Germans
in the Soviet Union wanted to
be repatriated, the procedures
which lapsed last December could
be continued. The Soviet pre-
mier also agreed to refrain from
public attacks on Adenauer,
and indicated he would exclude
some remarks from his 20 Octo-
ber speech, which did not con-
tain the lengthy diatribes a-
gainst Adenauer, as many Soviet
pronouncements in recent months
have.

Despite Khrushchev's re-
affirmation of the USSR's in-
tention not to undertake unilat-
eral steps in Berlin, the East
Germans are continuing to exert
pressures, although the pace has
slowed down.

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The East Germans made no attempt to carry out a threat to interfere with or prevent a visit of Eleanor Dulles and members of her "Crusade for Freedom" party to East Berlin on 21 October. The East Germans have not published their warning against this visit contained in a note to the US Mission in Berlin on 19 October.

The East Germans continue to press for a resumption of interzonal trade talks and have used the issue in a new effort to drive a wedge between West German and West Berlin authorities by calling for separate negotiations.

On 21 October, East German Foreign Trade Minister Rau addressed separate letters to Bonn and to West Berlin Mayor Brandt offering to negotiate and emphasizing the damaging economic effects of Bonn's denunciation of the 1961 trade pact. Rau used an interview with a West German paper to appeal to West German businessmen to bring pressure on Bonn for new talks. He also suggested that the West Berlin authorities offer new proposals concerning the city's communications with West Germany. East German concern over the future effects of the cancellation of the trade agreement may have prompted a special economic mission, including the head of the State Planning Commission, to go to Moscow last week.

Disarmament and the UN

Since Khrushchev's departure from New York on 13 October, Soviet delegates at the UN have vigorously pressed his demands on disarmament and reorganization of the UN executive. In his opening speech on 19 October before the UN Political Committee, Soviet delegate Zorin echoed Khrushchev's warning of a Soviet boycott of disarmament negotiations in the committee if Soviet disarmament principles were not accepted as the basis for discussions.

While calling for general and complete disarmament, Zorin pressed the Soviet drive to secure recognition of three coequal blocs by repeating Khrushchev's call for the addition of India, Indonesia, the UAR, Ghana, and Mexico to the Disarmament Committee, now composed of five Soviet bloc and five Western nations. On 25 October, Zorin again repeated his threat to walk out of the Political Committee and renewed Khrushchev's call for a special assembly session on disarmament next spring to be attended by the heads of government, who could give "clear directives" to a new negotiating committee replacing the ten-nation group.

The Soviet Union may feel that a walkout will create pressure on the West to attend a summit session on disarmament and to accept Moscow's concept of universal disarmament as the basis for negotiations. Bloc propaganda accompanying such a walkout

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would probably echo the earlier claim, made after the bloc withdrawal from the ten-nation disarmament conference in Geneva last June, that the USSR refuses to abuse world hopes for disarmament by engaging in fruitless discussions with those who seek only "control without disarmament."

The Soviet Union has indicated its determination to press for a reorganization of the UN executive by directly attacking Secretary General Hammarskjold in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee. During the past week, bloc delegates frequently charged Hammarskjold with "extravagant spending" to further US policies in Congo, Laos, and Guinea, and the Soviet delegate demanded a \$50,000,000 ceiling on the UN budget for 1961--for which the secretary general has asked \$67,500,000. It appears that the USSR may concentrate its attack on the UN Secretariat in the Budgetary Committee, which reviews the composition of the professional staff. At present the Soviet Union and its satellites, with only 84 representatives on the staff, are far below their assigned quota of 216.

Nuclear Test Ban Talks

For the first time since the nuclear test talks began in Geneva in 1958, the bloc has moved toward setting a deadline on the negotiations and bringing this issue before the UN General Assembly.

On 24 October Poland introduced a resolution in the Political Committee calling for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests by 1 April 1961. If this deadline is not met, the resolution calls for immediate submission of the problem to a special session of the General Assembly, which Khrushchev called for while in New York. In private conversations with Western delegates in Geneva during the past two weeks, Soviet delegates said they expected no major American moves at the nuclear test ban talks before the US election, and gave no indication that any new initiative was planned by Moscow.

Soviet chief delegate Tsarapkin told a UN official he believed it would be some time before US policy would be decided and real negotiations could be resumed. In a talk with an American official, Tsarapkin was "completely unyielding" on the principal issues under negotiation. He restated the USSR's position that if the US resumed testing, whether for research or weapons purposes, the USSR would break up the conference and consider itself free to resume tests. Soviet propaganda, citing recent statements by AEC Chairman McCone as evidence, has claimed that the United States intends to resume nuclear weapons tests in order to bury the Geneva talks and intensify the nuclear arms race.

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CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Che Guevara's ten-man economic mission to Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, and East Germany left Cuba on 21 October. On the eve of his departure, Guevara told a television audience that he was going primarily to negotiate Cuba's commercial exchange for the coming year under trade pacts with these countries. Guevara will probably seek expanded arrangements with the bloc to compensate for items that Cuba can no longer receive from the United States. However, because of the nature of Cuba's industrial plant, it may be forced to seek immediate alternative sources of supply in nonbloc countries, which are better equipped to supply Cuba's import needs.

His TV talk clearly implied efforts toward the further economic integration of Cuba with the bloc. He referred to foreign "comrades" in the Cuban Petroleum Institute "who are going to the USSR to get equipment" and implied that bloc technicians in other industries are also performing such services.

Cuba and Rumania signed a trade agreement and technical assistance protocol in Havana on 25 October, and a joint communiqué declared their intention to exchange ambassadors. The composition of the Rumanian delegation suggests that that country may provide Cuba with technical assistance for its petroleum industry.

Moscow has moved on several fronts this past week to foster

the impression that there is a real danger that the US will intervene militarily in Cuba and that, in that event, the USSR stands ready to lend every assistance to Cuba. The Soviet objectives are apparently to increase suspicion of US intentions and to stimulate some action by the neutralists in the United Nations which might put the United States in an embarrassing position.

Soviet propaganda coverage of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now includes daily warnings of alleged American plans for "counterrevolutionary invasions," along with denunciations of US trade restrictions and of Ambassador Bonsal's recall. At the United Nations, the Soviet delegation has come out strongly in support of the Cuban complaint, which includes the charge that the US is planning to begin a large-scale invasion of the country "in a few days."

Despite these efforts to arouse concern over the possibility of US intervention in Cuba, it seems unlikely that the USSR anticipates such action. Khrushchev's threat on 9 July to use rockets "if necessary" in defense of the Castro Government in the event of US aggression was so qualified as not actually to constitute a commitment to any specific course of action, and it has never been repeated. Furthermore, TASS quoted Khrushchev as saying in a press interview on 25 September, when asked about his rocket threat,

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"...you needn't worry.... Since America does not intend to attack Cuba, this means that there is no danger whatsoever."

Soviet bloc military shipments to Cuba thus far include small arms, machine guns, anti-aircraft artillery, and tanks. More shipments are expected. The quantity of this equipment is clearly excessive for Cuban internal needs and will permit release of Cuba's Western-manufactured weapons for clandestine military support elsewhere in the hemisphere, should this be the Cuban intention.

In view of the lack of qualified personnel in Cuba, the Castro regime will be required to rely heavily on the Soviet bloc for training the Cuban military in the use and maintenance of the new weapons and military-related items such as communications equipment and radar. Increasing numbers of Cubans will probably be sent to the bloc for training, particularly if the Castro regime follows through with its apparent decision to build up a qualified "defense force" based on Soviet bloc equipment.

The Cuban Government responded to the new US export restrictions by increasing its propaganda attacks on the United States for this "new act of aggression." On 25 October, most of the remaining American-owned businesses in Cuba were nationalized.

Most other Latin American governments appear to feel that the US action was justified. Official circles in Mexico and Chile, however, are critical and feel it will give Castro an important propaganda advantage in the hemisphere. Other governments, while sympathetic to the

US position, have expressed concern over what they expect will be a strong negative reaction among the Latin American public.

Some of these governments may also see the move as obviating the need for their own participation in any future multilateral sanctions against the Castro regime. Many Latin American leaders prefer to regard the Cuban issue as a bilateral problem between the United States and Cuba, and the Ecuadorean foreign minister frankly explained that a number of Latin American governments are too weak to run ahead of public opinion on this issue.

The Castro regime, which has been embarrassed by a number of defections this year among Cuban officials abroad, is apparently recalling diplomatic and consular officers to screen them. Officials in Brazil and Mexico are already returning home, and more will probably follow. A decree of 27 September removed job tenure rights from foreign service personnel. It is becoming apparent that those officials regarded as "reliable" for foreign assignment are those who unquestioningly accept and are willing to promote the Communist position on Cuban and international issues. The Cuban ambassador appointed to Paris on 20 October, for instance, has a long record of Communist associations.

Scattered opposition groups continue active inside Cuba despite elaborate government efforts to give the impression they have been wiped out. Widespread rumors in Oriente Province suggest that a new "invasion force" of about 80 persons landed on the north coast on or about 20 October, and increased government military

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activity noted in the province lends support to reports of continued guerrilla activity. There is still no indication, however, that the opposition has the unity and leadership necessary to become a genuine threat to the regime.

In the cities, tenants are reported to have reacted with enthusiasm to the 15 October urban reform law, which offers them the prospect of becoming homeowners. The government probably calculated that the solidification of its support among lower income groups would more than compensate for the further alienation of the landlords, many of whom will lose their sole source of income.

Dominican Republic

The Trujillo regime is giving signs of further weakening. One example was the apathetic showing during the 24 October rally honoring the dictator on his 69th birthday, which contrasted sharply with previous staged demonstrations of "loyalty." Trujillo's efforts to prove to the world that he is implementing a program of "democratization" have generally been recognized as a sham. After some months in which his controlled propaganda media followed a viciously anti-US and pro-Castro and pro-Soviet line, Trujillo's speech on 24 October promised "undeviating" friend-

ship for the United States in tacit admission of the failure of his previous tactics.

The economic situation is worsening. Trujillo's efforts to promote trade with Western Europe have not compensated for the financial losses resulting from the country's elimination from the benefits of the higher price for sugar in the US market and from continuing Venezuelan efforts to impose a petroleum boycott on the Dominican Republic. Unemployment continues to be a serious problem, and there are indications that present Dominican efforts to refinance loans granted in past years by Canadian banks may fail.

Dissidents inside the country are showing unexplained optimism, which could indicate that a new plan to oust the regime is in the final stages of preparation. There are growing rumors in dissident circles of an imminent invasion by exile groups from Venezuela. There are also indications, however, that those dissidents with moderate and pro-US views are losing ground to more radical elements in the underground movement. According to the American Consulate, these pro-US groups were enthusiastic over the role of the United States in the August OAS conference that condemned Trujillo, but the lack of further decisive action against Trujillo has demoralized them and reduced their influence.

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SITUATION IN LAOS

Premier Souvanna Phouma appears to have made some progress during the past week in strengthening the position of his regime. During a week-end trip to Luang Prabang, he apparently succeeded in delaying a previously contemplated breakaway by the First Military Region, a move which would have seriously jeopardized his position as premier. Souvanna also appears to have convinced leaders from northern Laos, including King Savang, that he is prepared to take a harder line against the Pathet Lao, both in the present negotiations in Vientiane and in the limitation of further Pathet military gains.

Pressures are mounting, however, for Souvanna to come to terms with General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. General Ouane, the armed forces commander, and Col. Houmpanh, the First Military Region Commander, both warned Souvanna that if he did not reach a settlement with Phoumi within a reasonably short time, they would lead the north into open opposition against his regime. The King also believes it urgent that Souvanna reach an early accord with Phoumi. The King is opposed, however, to dissolving the Revolutionary Committee be-

fore reaching a settlement between Vientiane and Savannakhet.

Ouane claims that the premier will send a committee to Savannakhet to negotiate, but it is uncertain as to whether a basis for compromise has as yet



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developed. Souvanna has so far seemed intent on excluding Phoumi from any important role in the government, although he has been willing to welcome Phoumi's followers back into the fold. Phoumi, on the other

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hand, may still harbor the hope that Souvanna's government will fall and that he will have a much more prominent role in a successor government.

Negotiations between the government and the Pathet Lao in Vientiane are proceeding at an exceedingly leisurely pace, possibly by design on the part of Souvanna. The negotiators now are feeling each other out on the question of how far Laos should go in establishing ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and are apparently trying to devise the mechanics for a supervised truce between their opposing military forces. The renewal of fighting in Phong Saly Province may have reversed any progress toward a firm cease-fire they might have made and could conceivably lead to a breakdown in the talks.

Only preliminary reports have been received regarding the new fighting in Phong Saly, but it presumably reflects implementation of the First Military Region's reported plans to retake two posts lost by the Pathet Lao earlier in the month. Col. Houmpanh has with Souvanna's approval reportedly been marshaling his forces for such an offensive for several days. He told the American army attaché on 25 October that he expected his forces to engage the Pathet Lao momentarily.

Col. Kouprasith, the nominal commander of the Fifth Military Region in Vientiane, has denied any build-up in the Pak Sane area, although he does credit the Pathet Lao with the capability to launch an independent attack on Phoumi's forces. In any event, Kouprasith's disapproval would probably prove no deterrent if Kong Le and his lieutenants chose to resume operations.

Kong Le has undertaken no new initiatives recently, but there are increasing indications that he is subject to strong Pathet influence. He is reported, for example, to have permitted Col. Singkapo, a ranking Pathet military leader, to address officers in Vientiane on the virtues of a neutral foreign policy. He is also alleged to engage in frequent consultations with the wife of Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong; she is reputed to be a doctrinaire Communist.

Faced with a rapidly worsening petroleum supply situation in Vientiane as the

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result of the unofficial Thai blockade, Souvanna has threatened to ask the newly accredited Soviet ambassador for aid in alleviating the oil shortage. He also told Ambassador Brown that if Thailand persisted in preventing the entry of goods into

Vientiane, he would take "this act of aggression" to the UN Security Council. The Soviet ambassador finally presented his credentials to King Savang on 26 October, after having been kept waiting in Vientiane for 13 days.

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SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Colonel Mobutu's control seems to be slipping, but this does not necessarily guarantee the early return of Patrice Lumumba to power, although events appear to be moving in his favor. Mobutu's decision not to leave the Congo at this time for a personal appeal to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has probably delayed a showdown and the army chief's eclipse.

Chaos within the armed forces appears to be widespread, with lines of authority unclear. Last week mutinies reportedly occurred in Leopoldville and in the provincial capitals of Stanleyville and Coquilhatville. Disorderly Congolese troops terrorized the African quarter of Leopoldville and routed the police patrols of provincial governor Cleophas Kamitatu. Mobutu flew to Coquilhatville in an effort to restore order there

Mobutu apparently is depending on the 5,000-man force based at Thysville--the army's principal garrison about 80 miles south of Leopoldville--to regain control of the capital city. However, his recent effort to bring an armored unit to Leopoldville was opposed by the UN Command, which ordered its forces to set up roadblocks to prevent the unit's advance. On 26 October, the UN Command ordered Mobutu to withdraw his troops from Leopoldville, and he acquiesced.

The Thysville garrison may assume increasing importance if its commander, Lt. Col. Louis Boboso, tries to become the new strong man of the Congo. Boboso, reportedly a stronger personality than Mobutu, is said to be under pressure from army elements to replace him. Boboso's political inclinations are not known.

UN spokesmen have charged that Belgian specialists are aiding Congolese troops to ready armored vehicles in Thysville, presumably for an attempt to

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
intimidate the UN into releasing Lumumba so that Mobutu could serve an arrest warrant on him.

Mobutu's political problems are increasing. Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's erstwhile vice premier, is reported to be active on Lumumba's behalf in Orientale Province. According to press reports, pro-Lumumba police in Stanleyville have arrested the local army commander on Gizenga's orders. Previously, the pro-Lumumba governor of Leopoldville Province began pressing Mobutu with the threat of secession, and provincial police now are reportedly planning joint patrols with UN forces in Leopoldville.

The army chief has not been able to gain the support of the local UN Command for action against Lumumba. His efforts to arrest the ousted premier have been repulsed, and his demands that Lumumba be removed from the official residence of the premier have been refused. At the same time, UN representative Dayal has been frustrated in his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the Congolese leaders. Nor has he been able to have the assembly reconvened to form a Congolese government with wide local support as several African nations have demanded.

At present, the UN seems to have lost much of its initiative, and may rely on a good-offices commission of several African states to try to resolve the Congo situation. In such a commission, Ghana or Guinea would probably play a major role.

The situation in both Kasai and Katanga is deteriorating. In southern Kasai, fighting has been resumed as Congolese troops from Luluabourg reportedly launched an attack on secessionist forces. Secessionist leader Ngalula blames the UN for failing to maintain a neutral, demilitarized zone be-



tween Congolese and Kasai forces.

In Katanga, President Tshombé's government, angered by the reported undisciplined activities of UN troops in northern Katanga, has demanded the recall of the UN's top representatives there, a challenge which the UN met by sending reinforcements to Elisabethville on 26 October. During the last seven weeks, Tshombé's government reportedly has taken several repressive measures, including curbing Baluba opposition party activities, widespread arrests and imprisonment of Katanga Balubas, and repatriation of tribesmen from Kasai Province to the war-torn area around Bakwanga.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE CONTINUES

Preparatory committees are reported to have been working for some weeks in Moscow on a resolution to be presented to the meeting of world Communist parties--scheduled to begin around 7 November--which has been called to consider the Sino-Soviet dispute. [redacted]

[redacted] non-bloc as well as bloc Communist party delegations have been taking part in at least some of the preparatory meetings. The Chinese Communists have apparently also been represented at these meetings, perhaps by politburo members Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, who apparently were absent from Peiping from mid-September to 25 October, when Peng Chen reappeared in Peiping.

Recent public statements from both Moscow and Peiping have given no indication that either intends to compromise significantly on the substantive issues in dispute. Khrushchev's 20 October speech in Moscow included a vigorous and complete defense of Soviet propositions, and Soviet publications continue indirectly to engage in condemnations of Chinese Communist theoretical positions. In addition to these efforts to indoctrinate the population on the incorrectness of leftism, dogmatism, and sectarianism, an attack on Chinese positions was probably the purpose of a series of three lectures on issues which have been in dispute. American Embassy personnel were refused admission to the lectures which began in Moscow on 12 October.

The USSR is apparently trying to foster the impression that the forthcoming meeting

will be the last chance for a resolution of the dispute. [redacted]

[redacted] According to a Moscow rumor, presidium member Suslov has also recently told a number of party meetings in Moscow that unless the Chinese admit their ideological errors, a breach in Sino-Soviet party relations should be expected.

[redacted] The Chinese are said to be "unable to understand" why the Russians are in such a hurry to settle the dispute, and to believe that Moscow and Peiping should emphasize their points of agreement while continuing to discuss their differences. The Chinese apparently favor discussions but "do not believe that the dispute can be settled at one sitting."

Several recent developments suggest a Chinese effort to present an appearance of reasonableness prior to the meeting. The official party newspaper People's Daily on 22 October printed the full text of Khrushchev's 20 October speech, and Peiping's message of thanks to the Soviet leaders for their 1 October National Day greetings

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emphasized solidarity with the USSR and gratitude for Soviet aid.

The mid-October issue of the Chinese theoretical journal, Red Flag, has been canceled, perhaps because it carried an article which the Chinese leaders decided at the last moment would exacerbate the situation. Peiping announced on 16 October, the day the magazine was scheduled to appear, that it would be combined with the next issue, to be published at a later, unspecified date.

At the same time, Peiping has not budged from any of its basic positions in the dispute, continuing to reiterate on suitable occasions its belief in the necessity of struggle against US imperialism. Furthermore, the Chinese are openly encouraging the Albanians and other Communists to support their stand. A telegram from Peiping, broadcast by Tirana on 24 October, stressed the theme of Albania's consistent struggle against "modern revisionism" and its great contribution to defending "the purity of Marxism-Leninism." Among other actions which Moscow may well regard as provocative, Peiping has sent a military delegation to Albania, and during the last two weeks has signed scientific, technical, and cultural exchange and cooperation agreements with Tirana.

Peiping is using the 10th anniversary of the entry of its forces into the Korean war to reaffirm strongly several of its basic positions along the lines of the Chinese party's endorsement in late September of Mao Tse-tung's handling of the Chinese civil war. The regime's propaganda is asserting that the Korean experience is applicable to today's world situation because the Korean con-

flict proved that the United States is a "paper tiger" and that peace cannot be begged for but can only be won through "resolute struggle."

By emphasizing Sino-Korean unity both during the Korean war and afterward, Peiping is attempting to give the impression that Pyongyang is a staunch supporter of Communist China's present policies which conflict with Moscow's. The North Koreans, in effect, have agreed with the Chinese on the practicality of a tougher bloc effort to drive the United States out of Asia, but are more circumspect about endorsing all aspects of Peiping's views.

European satellite leaders, with the exception of the Albanians, continue to restate their solid support for Khrushchev's personal leadership and conduct. Party leaders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have made this clear in public speeches, and top-level government meetings are expected to be held in the other satellites to endorse Khrushchev's policies before the November meeting in Moscow.

The Albanian regime, however, continues to be conspicuous by its endorsement of Mao's views. In a 25 October speech dealing with the UN General Assembly meeting, Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, who recently returned from New York, asserted that China was following a correct Marxist-Leninist line in its policies. He praised the "valiant" Mao Tse-tung, and spoke at length on China's role in world affairs. Shehu played down the value of Soviet peace proposals and mentioned present aspects of Soviet foreign policy only in passing, while criticizing Yugoslav "revisionism" and American "imperialism" extensively.

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While Albania remains the only Communist party which appears to be endorsing the Chinese party and all of its views, considerable uneasiness over the Sino-Soviet dispute and its implications continues to be evidenced in the other satellite parties and in Communist parties throughout the world. It seems likely that this uneasiness exists in the

Soviet and Chinese parties as well, and that they will both attempt to use the coming meeting to prevent a complete break in party relations. Nevertheless, developments of the past few weeks add to earlier indications that they will find it very difficult to resolve their conflicting views.

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USSR PURCHASING LARGE FREE-WORLD TANKERS

To ensure the long-term growth and stability of its petroleum exports, the Soviet Union is launching a major effort to procure large, modern tankers in the free world. Russian crews have taken over two such vessels recently constructed in Japan and the Netherlands. Both of the new tankers originally were contracted for by Greek owners and prior to delivery were sold to the USSR-- apparently for cash.

The Japanese-built vessel, of more than 39,000 tons, is a particularly significant addition, as most of the present Soviet tankers carrying petroleum exports are in the 11,000-ton class. The two largest vessels, Pekin and Varshava, are of 30,000 tons; another vessel of this class will soon be launched. The entire bloc tanker fleet, with some 136 ships and a total of about 1,200,000 dead-weight tons,

is still small and slow by world standards.

The American Embassy in Rome is reliably informed that Moscow is offering to purchase Italian merchant vessels totaling about 300,000 dead-weight tons in exchange for wheat. The USSR has expressed particular interest in acquiring two tankers of 47,700 tons each, which were launched earlier this year, and in four or five tankers of 35,000 tons each. This proposal is the largest single offer the USSR has made thus far in attempting to purchase more Western tankers.

Representatives of the Soviet ship procurement agency, Sudoimport, have also made inquiries recently in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and West Germany. By rejecting all but the newest ships and, at least for

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the moment, willing to pay cash, the USSR has aroused considerable interest among Western shipbuilders, several of whom already are supplying other types of vessels and smaller tankers to the Soviet Union.

If the present purchases are part of a long-range procurement program, it is likely that Moscow will eventually request deferred payment provisions, as it already receives in some capital equipment transactions with Western suppliers. COCOM restrictions on the sales of tankers to the bloc have been drastically eased since 1958; the only prohibition remaining is against supplying ships with speeds in excess of 18 knots.

The expansion of the USSR's oil exports--dramatized this year by a commitment to supply all Cuban needs--has required substantial readjustments in Soviet tanker operations. By chartering Western vessels, the Soviet Union has been able to

boost the amounts delivered to Cuba and to other distant destinations without affecting deliveries elsewhere. In 1959 more than 60 percent of the 17,400,000 tons of bloc oil moved from the Black Sea was carried on free-world vessels.

The low rates prevailing in the depressed tanker market and the large amount of idle free-world tonnage available for charter probably preclude any immediate transportation difficulties for the Soviet oil-export program. Soviet economic policy is opposed to unnecessary reliance on free-world resources of any kind, however, and the purchase of large, new Western tankers to supplement bloc building programs is the most rapid method to reduce this dependence. It may also be a less expensive way of maintaining the Soviet petroleum trade, since acquisition of its own vessels will spare the USSR mounting expenditures of foreign exchange for chartered tankers.

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THE CASE OF COMRADE LARIONOV--A LESSON FOR SOVIET PACE SETTERS

On 22 September, the Soviet press announced the death after a "serious illness" of central committee member Aleksey Nikolayevich Larionov, first secretary of Ryazan Oblast in the Russian Republic. The personal tragedy of Larionov, who at the December 1959 party plenum was probably the most highly praised man in agriculture, has a distinctly Soviet twist and is symptomatic of the great pressures generated by this year's agricultural difficulties.

Larionov, party boss of Ryazan since 1948, reached the height of his career in December 1959. He was awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labor,"

decorated with the Order of Lenin and the medal "Hammer and Sickle" for achievements in livestock production, and singled out by Khrushchev at the plenum for lengthy and extravagant praise. His past successes and his pledge to fulfill the Seven-Year Plan livestock goals in only three years were held up repeatedly by Khrushchev as examples to officials in all lagging agricultural areas.

Larionov could ill afford to fail. "I know Comrade Larionov," said Khrushchev at the plenum. "He would never consider taking an unrealistic pledge, to sprint, only to founder the next day; that, he

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would not agree to do." This, however, is exactly what Larionov did.

The quarterly bulletins of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on the results of the "socialist competition in the productivity and delivery of livestock products" tell the story. Ryazan, still the winner according to the October 1959 issue, had by the time of the next quarterly report in February 1960 dropped to fourth place. In the two subsequent reports, in April and July, Ryazan was not listed among the many oblasts cited for good performances. No figures were released on the agricultural situation in Ryazan, nor was the nature of Larionov's difficulties revealed.

On 25 June, a satirical poem appeared in the main agricultural newspaper clearly directed at Larionov. The poem twitted a certain "Hero Larion" for blaming insufficient fodder supplies on pilfering mice. The piece ended with the suggestion that getting rid of Larion rather than the mice was the better solution. The next ominous sign for Larionov was

the removal of two oblast party bosses in September, specifically for failing to fulfill their livestock pledges for 1960. They had made these pledges in response to the pressure to emulate Larionov.

Dissatisfaction with Larionov was demonstrated in the official treatment of his death and funeral. Only an obituary and a brief statement of condolences from the party central committee were published. Almost all other full members of the central committee who have died in the last five years have had a funeral commission appointed, a state funeral with honor guards, and been buried in the Kremlin wall; Larionov was accorded none of these honors.

The official cold shoulder given Larionov undoubtedly reflects Khrushchev's own attitude. Larionov's botching of his agricultural pledges must have been a source of considerable disappointment and embarrassment to Khrushchev, who had lavished so much praise on him

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UNCERTAINTY IN PEIPING OVER FUTURE ECONOMIC MOVES

The Communist regime in Peiping appears worried over the state of the Chinese economy and uncertain over what to do about it. The major trouble is clearly in agriculture, which Peiping admits is still progressing too slowly. The food situation has been bad all year.

Food shortages have persisted through the summer months, despite the summer grain and vegetable harvests, and the population can evidently look for-

ward to no improvement this winter. Drought, floods, and insects have inflicted "serious losses" on at least one sixth of the area sown to grain, and the outlook is for a crop about the same as last year's disappointing harvest. This year's crop will have to feed some 17,000,000 additional persons.

The regime's concern over the farm situation is betrayed by its continued efforts to keep a tight lid on food

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consumption, by its encouragement to urban and rural residents alike to grow more vegetables, by its exhortations to grow more catch crops and to go to the hills and gather wild plants, and by an admission that Chinese agriculture remains more at the mercy of weather than does the agriculture of more developed countries. In addition, authorities in Kwangtung have agreed to exempt peasants from state taxes and purchase quotas on some of next spring's harvest.

Industry's performance so far this year has been somewhat brighter than agriculture's, from the regime's point of view, but Peiping has been uncommonly vague about accomplishments. Shortages of raw materials have plagued various industries, and the press still expresses frequent concern over the quality of industrial products, especially those from the vaunted small-scale enterprises.

Shortages of petroleum products have apparently affected transport. Urban passenger transport schedules in Peiping and Shanghai have reportedly been sharply curtailed. Transport has been hard hit this summer, with unusually frequent traffic interruptions because of weather.

There is some evidence that China is having difficulties in fulfilling current

trade commitments. Trade difficulties have apparently not been confined to the bloc. Trade with the sterling area and with Western Europe has declined since early summer, and the level of China's total trade this year may fall below last year's high level.

Communist China, in spite of its rapid economic advance, remains dependent on the USSR for key items for its industrialization program and for technical assistance. Some Soviet technicians have already been withdrawn, and further withdrawals could be made.

In the past, China has been permitted to fall behind in its short-term obligations to the rest of the bloc, principally the USSR. It must face the possibility that the USSR, and the European satellites in particular, may not be willing to permit China to accumulate additional indebtedness in trade. Further, the USSR has not greeted with any warmth Mao Tse-tung's much-publicized sorties into the field of economic policy, particularly his "three magic keys" to economic growth--including the leap forward and the communes. Although the validity of these concepts continues to be reaffirmed, recent publicity has not been extensive, suggesting that Peiping may have growing doubts about their long-range efficacy in solving China's economic problems. (Prepared by ORR)

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GHANA

Frustrations experienced by Ghana's President Nkrumah in his attempts to promote his pan-African ambitions appear to be influencing him to adopt an increasingly less friendly posture toward the West and to welcome wider contacts and tactical collaboration with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, new emphasis by Ghanaian leaders on the "construction of a socialist economy" in Ghana seems likely to reduce established Western economic interests and to provide new opportunities for the bloc to exploit.

This trend toward greater involvement with the bloc would be accelerated should Western financing for Ghana's extensive Volta River hydroelectric-aluminum project not materialize, despite the apparent imminence of a final agreement between Nkrumah's regime and a Western consortium which is considering the scheme.

Ghana's drift from the West and toward a variety of "positive neutralism" showing greater parallelism with positions espoused by Moscow was pointed up dramatically by Nkrumah's performance at the United Nations last month. Displaying none of the appreciation for US attitudes he has shown in private meetings with American officials, his public statements were consistently critical of the West and made clear his basic agreement with the Soviet Union's attacks on Secretary General Hammarskjold and the UN Secretariat.

In a speech following his return to Accra, Nkrumah in effect accused the United States of failing "to take a positively decisive stand on the question of peace." At the same time, he

told his people that his talks in New York with Khrushchev had convinced him that "Russia wants peace more than anything else."

The chaotic situation in the Congo seems to have prompted Nkrumah's new course more than any other single factor. There are strong indications that he has been deeply embittered by what he apparently regards as the responsibility of Western "imperialists"--first for the "secession" of Katanga Province and then for the failure of the UN to act as an agent of the Lumumba government. Nkrumah has counted on Lumumba to align the Congo with a Ghana-led crusade for a political union of African states. Since the Soviet bloc's unilateral intervention seemed to serve the objective of keeping Lumumba in power, it did not draw Nkrumah's ire, but rather appears to have added to his growing disposition, encouraged by influential leftist advisers, to collaborate more closely with the Communist world.

In any event, the USSR succeeded in achieving its first major breakthrough in Ghana last August at a time when its involvement in the Congo was increasing rapidly. A technical assistance and other agreements were concluded providing for a \$40,000,000 credit to Ghana and for trade, cultural cooperation, and the purchase by Ghana of four to six Soviet IL-18 aircraft. As a result the number of Soviet technical personnel in Ghana appears to be increasing rapidly.

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Accra seems prepared to take greater advantage of educational and training scholarships offered by the bloc and also to encourage close ties between cooperative organizations in bloc countries and Ghana's government-controlled National Cooperative Council, which has been assigned a major role in the "transition to socialism." In these areas, a particularly prominent role

is being played by East Germany, whose leaders have made Ghana one of the principal targets in their campaign for recognition. So far Nkrumah's response to this effort has been wary, although he reportedly agreed last month, in a letter to Prime Minister Grotewohl, that diplomatic relations should be established between the two countries "in due time." [redacted]

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BRITISH EAST AFRICA


Political activity looking toward independence is increasing in the four British-controlled territories of East Africa--Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Tanganyika, the most advanced of the four, is scheduled to take a further step toward independence next

parts of the Central African Federation as well.

Nyerere hopes to sell British Colonial Secretary Macleod on the federation idea before the Tanganyika constitutional talks open. If he wins Macleod's support, he will ask for full internal autonomy for Tanganyika by January 1962 but delay his demands for independence until the other territories have reached a similar level and together with Tanganyika can attain independence as a unit. Otherwise, he plans to drive for full independence for Tanganyika "sometime in 1961."



MBOYA



NYERERE

March when a conference is to formulate a new constitution. Julius Nyerere, the territory's newly appointed African chief minister, is promoting the idea of federation of the four territories when they become independent which might include

view of the problems they face elsewhere in the area, they are unlikely to oppose him outright, both because they tend to favor federation as enhancing East Africa's economic viability and because they are unwilling to undermine Nyerere's position

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vis-a-vis Tanganyika's more extreme nationalists.

In the other East African territories, progress toward self-government continues to be hampered by racial tension, tribalism, quarrels among African politicians, and--in the case of Zanzibar--by growing Communist influence. Elections in both Kenya and Uganda are scheduled for next February. The political scene in Uganda is complicated by the unwillingness on the part of traditional tribal rulers to participate in the protectorate's activities without guarantees that their position will be safeguarded. As a protest, rulers in the most important province have not registered.

In Kenya, where Africans are certain to dominate the legislative council as a result of the election, the principal African party--the Kenya African National Union (KANU)--is beset by personal and tribal jealousies. The autocratic behavior of KANU Secretary General Tom Mboya, who is a member of the Luo tribe, reportedly is resented by the other leaders, many of whom are of the Kikuyu tribe, the backbone of KANU support. The KANU lead-

ers are likely to preserve a facade of unity, however, since the party is under attack from both the white settlers and from the Kenya African Democratic Union, a rival group of minority African tribes.

Zanzibar, whose elections are tentatively scheduled for January, is the scene of rising tensions between the more numerous Africans and the traditionally dominant Arab minority. In addition, Communist influence is increasing, particularly among



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the Arab leaders of the Zanzibar Nationalist party, which may win an important place in the next legislature as a result of a split among the Africans.

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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS**Jordan-UAR**

King Husayn has replied to Nasir's diatribes of last week in Syria by making his most violent personal attack on the UAR

President. In a speech on 21 October, the King referred to Nasir as "dictator," "blood-thirsty," and "clown," and as "the red agent (who) has ridden on the bandwagon of Communism."

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The virulence of Husayn's attack reflects not only his animosity toward Nasir but also the necessity for appeasing his Bedouin and Majalli tribal supporters in the Jordanian Army, who are still incensed over the assassination of Prime Minister Majalli and pressing for some retaliatory action against the UAR. The speech probably was also intended to placate the Bedouin-Majalli faction for the failure to obtain any redress for Majalli's assassination through UN mediation in New York.

Husayn's attempts to satisfy his army supporters in his speeches have thwarted UN mediatory efforts, however, according to UN representative Spinelli in Amman. Both Spinelli and Hammarskjold feel Nasir's moderate attitude toward Jordan in New York might well have led to a modus vivendi between the two countries. When Husayn arrived in New York, he too was prepared to make a moderate statement on his government's position, Spinelli said, but a last-minute plea from Amman for a more extreme statement in deference to the Bedouin-Majalli army faction resulted in the speech on 3 October which antagonized Nasir and probably provoked his propaganda blasts in Syria.

Spinelli stated Husayn had appeared contrite in talking to Hammarskjold the day after the General Assembly speech, and that Hammarskjold had told the King his speech had dissipated the initial atmosphere of conciliation. The UAR and Jordanian foreign ministers nevertheless are quietly consulting in New York to see if any progress can be made in resolving important points in the dispute, such

as the activities of Jordanian political exiles in Syria and the extradition by the UAR of the three alleged assassins of Majalli. Spinelli indicated he had reason to believe the UAR may be ready to moderate its propaganda if Jordan will do likewise. He intends to suggest this to Husayn, but admits there is "little room for optimism" in the present situation.

The continuation of Jordanian-sponsored acts of terrorism in Syria promises to push UAR-Jordanian relations into a new, more critical phase. The 25 October bombings in Damascus, apparently instigated by Jordanian agents, are likely to be followed by further such acts. The UAR has widely publicized the Damascus bombings, as well as earlier ones near the Jordanian border, in an apparent effort to stir up Syrian feeling against Husayn.

Having adopted this tactic, it seems certain the UAR will feel compelled to retaliate in Jordan or risk the appearance of impotence. UAR involvement in the overthrow or assassination of Husayn could bring direct Israeli military intervention in Jordan.

Iraq

Dissatisfaction with the Qasim regime continues to mount, and criticism is becoming more outspoken. Most Iraqi contacts of the American Embassy in Baghdad seem to feel that the regime is doomed; none, however, is willing to set a date for its demise.

Qasim has lost the confidence of "most government officials, army officers, and the civilian

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populace." Dissatisfaction largely arises from Qasim's constant vacillation, from deteriorating economic conditions, and from recent instances of patronage of the Communists.

Plans for a 21 October demonstration in Baghdad by anti-Communist religious leaders were thwarted when security forces arrested a number of members of the Islamic party, including one imam who had delivered a vicious personal attack on Qasim in a sermon.


Evidence of economic discontent lately has become apparent in the Iraqi press with numerous editorials discussing price increases and rising living costs. Demands voiced for an official investigation into the causes of this phenomenon apparently have forced the regime to seek refuge in the appointment of a committee to "investigate" the price situation. However, it is doubtful that this subterfuge will have much popular impact.

Sudan

Demonstrations and rioting took place on 23 October in Wadi Halfa, a Sudanese town on the Nile near the Egyptian border. This was in part a reaction of the local inhabitants to a visit by several members of the Sudanese cabinet. The high-level delegation came to present the government's decision to resettle the more than 50,000 residents of the town and the surrounding area because the territory will become a reservoir when the UAR's Aswan High Dam is completed several years hence.

The officials told them they are to be resettled at Khashm al-Girba, on the Atbara River in Kassala Province where a new dam and irrigation system is to be constructed. Most residents of Wadi Halfa have previously indicated their opposition to moving to this area, preferring either to resettle at Wadi al-Khowi on the Nile, some 200 miles south of their present location, or on the Northern Gezira plain.

The riots were serious enough to require the use of tear gas and police reinforcements. By 24 October, how-



ever, the situation in Wadi Halfa had been brought under control, and small sympathetic demonstrations by students in Khartoum had been quickly dissipated.

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The Abboud military government has, nevertheless, blundered in its handling of the problem. Even if it now reconsiders its decision, it has added one more element to the various political and religious groups which are exerting pressure for a return to civilian rule.

Qatar

The Ruler of the small, oil-producing Persian Gulf state of Qatar has abdicated as part of an attempt by key members of the ruling family to resolve a contest between Sheik Ahmad al-Thani, the Ruler's son, and Sheik Khalifa Ibn Hamid, the Ruler's young nephew. The Ruler, in his seventies, no longer takes much interest in the government. Sheik Ahmad now has been named Ruler and Sheik Khalifa, heir apparent.

This arrangement will probably not prove durable, especially if--

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Sheik Khalifa is to be given control over most of the government machinery. Concerned about growing unrest and popular resentment over the extent and flamboyance of expenditures by the more than 400 members of the ruling family, Khalifa hopes to undertake political reforms and a substantial economic development program. If opposition by Ahmad or other members of the ruling family blocks the institution of such measures, the British, who are the ultimate arbiters of Qatar politics, may be confronted with moves to overthrow the whole traditional order.

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THE TURKISH POLITICAL TRIAL

Turkey's mass political trial, which got off to a sluggish start on 14 October, has failed either to gain momentum or capture popular enthusiasm. The military regime faces the problem of removing a constant threat to itself without alienating the Turkish people or seriously damaging Turkish prestige abroad. Members of the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) appear to feel that Turkey as a nation and they as its leaders are as much on trial as the members of the regime they ousted on 27 May 1960.

The primary attention thus far in the trial has been focused on an Afghan hound sold by ex-President Bayar, an alleged illegitimate child of ex-Premier Menderes, and the destructive anti-Greek riots of 1955. The CNU appears to

have blundered in opening the long-heralded political trial with a charge of "dog thievery," with which it apparently intended to denigrate Bayar and Menderes personally.

At the present rate, the trial, which involves about 500 defendants and required months of investigation and preparation, will last so long that the key defendants are more likely to meet death from old age than from the hangman's noose. As the trial drags on, friction will probably increase between the procedurally correct judges and the impatient military. Unless publicity regarding the trial is handled more effectively, the entire venture may backfire on the present regime.

The CNU is showing sensitivity to foreign and domestic

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criticism. Farmers in the east-central province of Kutahya were reported to have set fire to the forests in the area to protest the possible execution of Menderes. Pro-Menderes elements in the tightly packed Istanbul slums are another potential danger. Elements of the Third Army apparently either have been or soon will be moved into the Istanbul area from eastern Turkey as a security precaution. The army may be expected to crush ruthlessly any group endangering domestic stability.

The government has canceled all leaves for the Turkish National Police for the duration of the trial. The police are reluctant to take forceful action against popular demonstrators because they bore the brunt of popular criticism growing out of the repression of demonstrations before the coup. None of the groups known to be critical of the trial appears to have the potential for mounting a successful counter-coup. Nonetheless, subversive activity, including distribu-

tion of leaflets, posters, and threatening letters, continues.

Opposition to death sentences for political prisoners is increasing in Turkish political circles. Many Turks fear that such action would pave the way for future retaliation against both the CNU and the Republican Peoples' party and would damage the further development of Turkish democracy. They are also concerned over the effect on Turkey's prestige abroad.

Meanwhile, economic stagnation which has plagued the country since the coup appears to be easing somewhat with a partial renewal of public confidence and the prospects of a record wheat crop. Although domestic economic prospects appear brighter, however, Turkey faces a significant cash deficit in its balance of payments, and Turkish officials are again suggesting the need for substantial foreign economic aid and a further rescheduling of foreign debt repayments.

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ARGENTINA

President Frondizi's steps to meet some of the Argentine Army's demands for changes among his advisers and policies have greatly eased the political crisis, but some time will be required to resolve the various

complaints ranging from inefficiency in the state oil company to pro-Peronista and Communist activities.

Frondizi kept intact the economic team responsible for

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the US-backed stabilization program--despite demands for the replacement of Economy Minister Alsogaray--but made some conciliatory changes in army appointments. War Secretary Larcher, special target of Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo Montero, was replaced by General Rosendo Fraga. A new chief of staff was also appointed.

Fronidizi established a high-level committee under the minister of defense to hear constructive suggestions from the military on government policy. Following several meetings with Fronidizi, this group announced that the armed forces support the economic stabilization program but are critical of its implementation. This was a diplomatically softened version of earlier army charges that the program was handicapped by inefficiency, graft, and the political maneuvers of some officials trying to woo Peronista electoral support for forthcoming elections.

These charges were partly responsible for the dismissal of Arturo Sabato, executive director of the state oil company (YPF). Sabato had clashed with retired General Pedro Charpy, unofficial army representative

on YPF's board of directors, over YPF's efficiency and policies. Charpy also objected to YPF's plans to solicit offers from foreign oil companies to operate on a production-type contract basis in the south flank of the Comodoro Rivadavia area, which he maintained should be exploited by YPF itself. While the majority of the armed forces do not object to Fronidizi's policy--begun in 1958--of permitting foreign companies to participate in oil development on a contract basis, Charpy's complaints over specific details helped spark the recent crisis.

To expedite action on another major military concern--Communist influence in labor, the universities, and in provincial governments--Fronidizi on 18 October established a special commission to investigate Communist activities.

Since then, the police reportedly have arrested more than 100 Communists in nationwide raids, and the government is unofficially reported to have asked the USSR to reduce its diplomatic staff from 15 to four, the number Argentina has in Moscow. Personnel in the six Soviet- 25X1 bloc missions in Argentina total an estimated 200, including some 50 with diplomatic status.

ANTIGOVERNMENT VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA

As a result of antigovernment student disturbances in Caracas and several provincial cities of Venezuela between 19 and 26 October, the armed forces are on an alert status and President Betancourt's three-party coalition has come under severe strains. The leftist Democratic Republican Union (URD), long a dissatisfied com-

ponent of the coalition, was partly involved in the outbreaks and has made no public condemnation of them. Its two remaining representatives in the cabinet have resigned on orders of the party "in order to leave the President free to reorganize the government."

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The student demonstrations were promoted by the Venezuelan Communists, the Marxist Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), and elements of the URD, all of which are pro-Castro and have reportedly received sizable subsidies from the Cuban regime and maintained close liaison with it. The meetings were called to protest the arrest of MIR leaders allegedly responsible for a press article inciting the "popular masses" to overthrow Betancourt.

These three factions have allied themselves closely in recent weeks, particularly in a sporadically violent struggle with Betancourt's Democratic Action party for control of organized labor, as well as in demonstrations of support for Castro, toward whom Betancourt is hostile. They will probably attempt to exploit the government's critical economic difficulties, which include a high level of unemployment and a continuing decline of foreign exchange reserves.

Early in September, pro-Castro URD Foreign Minister Arcaya resigned in protest against the government's policy toward Cuba, but top URD leaders have subsequently given at least lip service to the necessity of maintaining the coalition. The party's growing dissatisfaction is reflected, however, in the two further resignations of URD ministers and URD demands for a new government which will carry out a "nationalist" policy and find solutions to the nation's economic problems. These moves suggest the possibility that the URD may be considering withdrawing from the government at all levels and aligning with the leftist and Communist opposition.

The armed forces, which for the most part are believed loyal to Betancourt, apparently favor strong action against agitators, and responsible moderate groups are demanding similar measures. This backing will strengthen Betancourt's hand in dealing with any unrest from a possible breakup of the coalition. 25X1

HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN FRICTIONS

Recent intensification of chronic Nicaraguan-Honduran squabbles over Nicaraguan exile activities in Honduras has further increased bitterness over the century-old border dispute between those countries which now is before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court's decision in the case is expected before December and could well threaten the govern-

ment in whichever country loses the dispute.


Nicaraguan President Somoza, who has been a special target of Castro's hostility, has complained that Honduran President Villeda Morales is only paying lip service to the commitments he made under an OAS agreement in 1958 to control the activities of Nicaraguan revolutionary

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groups. Somoza charges that Honduran expulsion of exiles is meaningless, since they are allowed to return, some of them directly from Cuba. Active prosecution and neutralization of the rebel groups by the Villeda government is apparently deterred by two factors: financial inability to mount adequate army operations in the roadless border area and fear that strong action might bring into open conflict the already feuding left and right wings of the ruling party, thus jeopardizing the constitutional government.

Villeda evidently does not take seriously the Nicaraguan suggestion that Cuba might use the revolutionaries against his government, professing to believe that Honduras, as a friend of all progressive social movements, has nothing to fear from them. The embassy feels this attitude

is based at least partly on Villeda's awareness of the pro-Castro and anti-Somoza attitudes of his party's important left wing.

Somoza and Villeda both face considerable domestic opposition to their respective governments, and a clear-cut ICJ decision would pose a real threat to the administration of the losing country, although the disputed area is sparsely settled and largely undeveloped. Neither Nicaragua nor Honduras is politically mature enough to accept serenely any adverse results of a juridical process, and the government would be held responsible for a defeat. Honduras believes the Somoza government is already using alarms over exile activity to divert attention from what the Villeda government is sure will be Nicaragua's "abject defeat at The Hague."

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COUP IN EL SALVADOR

The six-man civilian-military junta that replaced President Jose Maria Lemus early on 26 October in a bloodless coup sought immediately to secure the backing of the leftist elements whose demonstrations last August and September critically weakened the Lemus administra-

tion.

the new government will be friendly to the United States and that the military elements in the junta will maintain control over the civilian member.

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One of these civilian junta members, Dr. Fortin Magana, is known to have extreme leftist tendencies and has reportedly announced that all existing recognized political parties, as well as the previously illegal Communist-front group, will be permitted to participate in elections due in 1962. Public reaction to the change of government has been generally apathetic, although there has been some rejoicing in the streets, apparently over the release of all political prisoners. Junta members told newsmen that exiles also would be permitted to return. Probably most of those being freed or allowed to return were pro-Castro or pro-Communist participants in the August and September disorders. Press reports that Lemus now is in Guatemala are unconfirmed.

The ouster of Lemus probably was engineered by followers of ex-President Oscar Osorio. Colonels Escamilla and Miguel Angel Castillo, a junta member, are reported to have held weekly meetings with Osorio for several weeks prior to the coup. Osorio, a retired army officer, appears

to have strong backing in the armed forces, which began to consider ousting Lemus after he showed himself as a weak and inept executive in dealing with pro-Communist and pro-Castro demonstrators who threatened the government during August and September. Osorio would almost certainly attempt to implement reforms to alleviate the country's deep-seated social and economic problems. While Osorio is known to be strongly anti-Communist, he might attempt to apply some radical reform measures. The US Embassy stated last month that as president he probably would not be as openly pro-US or as amenable to US suggestions as Lemus was.

The Soviet news agency TASS commented almost immediately that Lemus lost authority among the people because of "his complete submission to the interests of the United States." The New China News Agency attributed the coup to "seething discontent" with Lemus for "following the United States in its intervention in Cuba and suppression of democratic forces at home." 25X1

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"Chairman Mao's thinking is the only correct thinking guiding the party, and if one separates oneself from it under any circumstances...mistakes are apt to occur." This eulogy to Mao in 1960 contrasts with the position taken in 1956 that "our party has always held that no political parties or individuals are free from flaws... and our party abhors the deification of the individual." The 1956 statement was China's somewhat reluctant echo of the USSR's denigration of Stalin, but the gulf between the two pronouncements indicates the extent to which the cult of the individual has flourished of late in Communist China.

This cult is not limited to the often repeated boast that Mao Tse-tung is the "world's greatest contemporary theoretician of Marxism-Leninism," but extends into the personal sphere as well. "Great, brilliant, wise, compassionate, tender, and trustworthy" are a few of the adjectives used to describe him.

But during the 21 years since the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935, our party under the leadership of the central committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-Tung has not made any mistake in its line.
--Liu Shao-chi, September 1956

We definitely cannot take an attitude of compromise in dealing with the various thoughts, trends, and feelings which are opposed to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, no matter where such reactionary thoughts are found....
--Political Study, 12 October 1960

Failure to understand his thinking means failure to understand politics; to let politics take command actually means to let Mao Tse-tung assume command.
--Creation, 1 February 1960

Now with my own eyes I saw his forehead, as he put out his hand and personally invited us inside. I shook hands with Chairman Mao, whose hands were soft with a tenderness that seemed ready to embrace me entirely.
--Chinese Literature, September 1960

The physical prowess of the 67-year-old Mao is acclaimed in tales of how he swims the Yangtze River, and his personal magnetism is extolled by visitors "thrilled" to meet him. His frugality and disdain for personal comfort are popular legends, according to the Peiping press. In short,

*Come lets go together
To the golden bridge of happiness;...
Sing, let's sing together,
A poem of praise to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.*
--Tibetan song.

*We worship no god, nor temples build,
Chairman Mao's love is greater manifold.
Gods we destroy, and temples tear down,
Better than gods we worship the One Man.
Mountains may shake, earth may quake,
And we are not afraid,
But we dare not forget what the Chairman said.*
--Inner Mongolian song.

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the regime has portrayed Mao as an omniscient paragon of virtue--a perfect father-figure.

On the domestic front, this benevolent image of Mao has been intended in large part to encourage popular loyalty to the regime and to arouse enthusiasm for the tremendous efforts and sacrifices needed to carry out Communist programs in China.

Internationally, the Chinese Communists have attempted to use Mao's reputation to enhance their standing in the bloc. They have relied on his prestige as a Marxist theoretician to support their pretensions to ideological pre-eminence in the bloc and to buttress their arguments in the dispute

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with the Soviet Union. The Russians have taken obvious umbrage at this effort. Khrushchev felt it necessary to attack Mao personally at the Bucharest meeting last June, compared him to Stalin, and stated that Mao's theories are formulated without any contact with reality. The Chinese delegate angrily retorted that Khrushchev was the one out of touch with reality, and a revisionist as well.

Before De-Stalinization

Mao Tse-tung was one of the original founding members of the Chinese Communist party in 1921 and has been its undisputed leader for the past 25 years. Nonetheless, his rise to power within the party entailed many setbacks and disappointments, including expulsion from the party central committee at one time. When Mao won control in 1935 during the "Long March," the Communists were on the run and at a low ebb in their power. Many of the claims now advanced for Mao rest simply on the fact that he built the party and its military machine into a force that eventually defeated the Nationalists. Since Mao was successful, he was "correct."

Although Mao formally assumed the party chairmanship in 1938, the leadership cult did not develop until the early 1940s. In discussing the education of party members in 1939, for example, party theoretician Liu Shao-chi wrote: "The term collective leadership and democratic centralism means that leadership is not an individual matter; on the contrary, the leaders are bound by policies that have been derived by democratic methods." Liu did not extol Mao's virtues at all in that article.

At the seventh party congress in 1945, however, Liu--

influenced in part by the Soviet glorification of Stalin--set forth the authoritative view of Mao as China's counterpart of the great Stalin: "Our party, and this is very important, is one that now has its own great leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung.... He has pointed out to the Chinese people, sunk in deep misery, the only clear, sure road to complete and thoroughgoing liberation, the Mao Tse-tung road."

The revised party statutes which Liu presented to the congress paid tribute to Mao's alleged contribution to Marxist theory: "The Chinese Communist party takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the combined principles derived from the practical experiences of the Communist revolution--the thought of Mao Tse-tung--as the guiding principles of all its work...."

If Mao was thus elevated to the Marxist pantheon, the Chinese were still careful to keep him on a level subordinate to Stalin. Until the Soviet dictator's death in 1953, the claims pressed for Mao were carefully hedged and for the most part unpublicized beyond the domestic scene. A People's Daily editorial of 7 March 1953 eulogizing Stalin put Mao in the role of the Soviet dictator's disciple: "The Chinese revolution achieved victory under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, following the guidance of Comrade Stalin."

After Stalin's death, the new leaders in the Kremlin, perhaps still unsure themselves or hoping to cement the Sino-Soviet alliance, apparently thought it expedient to make some gestures to flatter the Chinese ego. Between May and December 1953, several reviews of Mao's works appearing in Pravda and Izvestia asserted that Mao had made "a valuable contribution to the

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treasure chest of Marxism-Leninism." The reviewers pointed out, however, that the value of Mao's contributions on Marxism lies in their application to the Chinese scene, and that it would be profitable for revolutionaries in colonial and semi-colonial countries to study his work; they did not concede that his work had universal significance.

De-Stalinization

The cult of Mao in China flourished after Stalin's death. Thus Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the "cult of personality" at the Soviet 20th party congress in February 1956 came as a bombshell to the Chinese Communists.

Peiping's response was carefully thought out. A People's Daily editorial of 4 April 1956, entitled "On the Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," did not echo the emotional tone of Khrushchev's denunciation. Instead, it essayed a dispassionate discussion of Stalin's errors and concluded that, his mistakes notwithstanding, Stalin had made a great contribution to Marxism-Leninism and that his writings would continue to be studied in China.

The Chinese were evidently embarrassed by the parallels many would have drawn between Stalin and Mao; it was deemed necessary to congratulate the Soviet party for correcting its mistakes but to imply that Peiping had not fallen into similar errors, inasmuch as the Chinese Communist party relied "on the wisdom of the masses of the people."

Peiping did little that really detracted from Mao Tse-tung's stature in the subsequent period, although it made some show of stress on "collective leadership." At the eighth

party congress, which met in September 1956, the allusion to "the thought of Mao Tse-tung" was removed from the party statutes. Nonetheless, speeches at the congress were filled with laudatory references to the party chairman, and Teng Hsiao-ping, who presented the new party statutes, stated, "Marxism has never denied the role of outstanding individuals or the role of leaders within the party."

In at least one respect, de-Stalinization was apparently responsible for a significant modification in Mao's own concept of his role as a leader; he appeared to think it more necessary than ever to project the image of a leader whose ear was always attuned to "the wisdom of the masses." From his assumption of power in 1949 through 1956, Mao apparently had made only ten trips outside Peiping, but in 1957 alone he made 13 trips to the hinterland, and from 1958 to date he has made even more inspection tours away from the capital. So far this year, Mao has spent less than half his time in Peiping.

Between 1956 and early 1958, Peiping's propaganda organs continued to treat Mao deferentially, although in a more muted tone than before de-Stalinization. The propaganda was not entirely successful in creating the intended public image of Mao. The party leaders were clearly shocked by the anti-Mao sentiments voiced by a few foolhardy intellectuals during the "hundred flowers" campaign in 1957. According to the Communist press, criticisms of the Chinese leader included such statements as "Chairman Mao loves to be great and meritorious," "meets only those who seek to please him," is "hot-tempered," "impetuous," and "reckless," and "assumes the air of a benevolent god."

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There is probably some truth in these charges; however, the infrequency of purges among senior Chinese Communist leaders over the past 25 years suggests that Mao does not suffer from the paranoia which plagued Stalin.

Great Leap Forward

In 1958, Communist China inaugurated sweeping economic and social changes which were hailed as harbingers of a utopia: the "great leap forward" was begun, and most of the rural Chinese were reorganized into communes. Peiping's aggressive, brash efforts were probably predicated on the leaders' grim realization of the tremendous problems which China faced in attempting to transform itself quickly into a modern, industrialized nation. Desperate measures seemed called for, and, in an effort to obtain a maximum effort from the people, the regime began to rely heavily on "Maoism"--the term used by Peiping to designate the theoretical writings of Mao as well as his personal qualities as a leader.

An example of the treatment accorded the party chairman in this period is the speech Liu Shao-chi made in May 1958 before the second session of the eighth party congress. Liu credited Mao personally with the speed-up of the First Five-Year Plan, the proposals in the draft program for agricultural development, and for progress in general. As Liu saw it, Maoism was basic to future economic development; achievements would come more easily because of "the practical experience gained in the people's struggle and of the development of Mao Tse-tung's thinking in the past few years."

In June 1958 the regime launched a major program to promote the study of Mao's works.

Millions of persons spent several hours a week attempting to understand Maoism. The party apparently had two objectives: to rebuild confidence among those whose faith was shaken during the antirightist campaign of 1957-58 and to inculcate enthusiasm for the new leap-forward program.

An attempt to personalize the lofty figure of Mao was also made. A spate of articles on the theme "I knew Chairman Mao when..." appeared in the press. Most of these reminiscences, written by soldiers who had accompanied the party chairman on the Long March or before, were filled with tales of his kindness and consideration. They all included such statements as, "I felt in him the love of a father."

Peiping's drive in 1958 for unparalleled progress fell short of its objectives. Although much economic headway had been made, there was considerable popular discontent with the communes, which had been organized too hastily. Furthermore, the regime's grandiose scheme to double its iron and steel output by establishing "backyard" furnaces in the communes failed miserably.

In December 1958 Mao Tse-tung announced his decision to retire as chief of state and indicated that he wished to devote his time to writing and study and to his duties as party chairman. Tempting though it may be to link Mao's resignation from the government to the failure of programs closely associated with his name, there is no evidence that his authority had been challenged or that his control over the party had slipped.

It is true, on the other hand, that the emphasis on both Maoism and the adulation of Mao

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as an individual slackened during the period of consolidation and review in early 1959. Premier Chou En-lai made a major address before the National People's Congress in April, for example, in which he mentioned Mao only three times. In a similar speech in May 1958, Liu Shao-chi had invoked the leader's name 21 times. Feature articles in People's Daily appeared without any reference to the party chairman.

During the first half of 1959, statistical teams attempted to verify the inflated production claims for the previous year. The survey of the statistical teams showed that these claims had been grossly overstated. It became obvious to all that the 1959 economic goals were completely unrealistic, and the regime had to determine whether it would continue to operate on the basis of false claims or confess its errors. To do the first would have entailed maintaining an almost impossible fiction and made further planning extremely difficult.

The decision to admit the exaggeration of production figures and targets was made in early August 1959. The central committee did not concede that Mao had made errors in principle, and fiercely castigated those who had been "viciously slandering and attacking...our great leap forward and people's commune movement.... They have suffered ignominious defeat." In this defensive tone the central committee went on to affirm: "The wisdom and the might of the masses is unlimited. Enlightened and led by the party and Mao Tse-tung, this wisdom and might have become irresistible...."

The thesis that the party and Mao had been right all the time was necessary unless there was to be a major purge among

the leaders. Presumably Mao was too strong to challenge, or at least too many of the other top leaders had jointly authored the extremist policies. The image of Mao the omniscient was again invoked to inspire the doubters and the shaken.

Shortly afterward, at the tenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime on 1 October 1959, extravagant claims were put forward of Peiping's achievements. It was in this period that the first sweeping assertion was made of Mao's universal significance, when central committee member Liu Lan-tao termed him "the most prominent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary, politician, and theorist among all living contemporaries."

Of greater importance, by autumn of 1959 several disputes had developed with Moscow over Chinese domestic programs and bloc strategy. The controversy gave added impetus to the Chinese effort to portray Mao as the legitimate heir to Lenin. It was deemed essential to show that the Chinese, not the Russians, were the orthodox Marxists: Peiping counted heavily on Mao's prestige as a theoretician to lend authority to its arguments.

Present Image

A mass movement to study theory, launched by the party in December 1959, has continued to the present. Mao's thought is portrayed as a development and perfection of Marxism, and the people are told how fortunate they are to live in the "era of Mao Tse-tung." Maoism seems almost to have replaced Marxism in emphasis. Ideological articles always give a nod to Marx and Lenin, but they make it clear that Mao's interpretations are what count, because he deals with practicalities and the present: "Maoism is the key to Marxism."

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Claims for Mao as a Marxist theorist are closely interwoven with assertions concerning his ability as a military strategist. The latter claims were spotlighted in August 1960 when the Revolutionary Military Museum was formally opened in Peiping. According to an article in the regime's English-language edition of Peking Review, the museum epitomized "the correct political and military thinking of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, our great, respected, and beloved leader." Appropriately enough, the motto over the entrance, in eight-foot gold letters, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" is in Mao's calligraphy and is the title of one of his books.

Additional emphasis was placed on the military aspects of Mao's thought with the October 1960 publication of the fourth volume of his Selected Works, which deals with the Chinese civil war and revolution. The commentary and reviews of the book use Mao's analysis of the civil war to defend Peiping's position in the present Sino-Soviet dispute.

To do this, they first endeavor to demonstrate that Mao's writings have the stature of the other Marxist scriptures. This demonstration is accomplished mainly by fiat: "The Mao Tse-tung ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developed form in the era of the socialist revolution by the proletariat"; i.e., Mao is the greatest theorist since Lenin. Such assertions do not sit well with the Soviet Union.

Maoism has reached such heights in Communist China that it seems a permanent part of the political landscape--to remain as long as Mao does, and perhaps longer. After the party chairman's death or political demise, especially if his successor wants to improve relations with the USSR, it is possible that a re-evaluation will take place, as in the case of Stalin. If the successor wishes to maintain present Chinese positions against Moscow, however, he will have no choice but to retain "Maoism." Peiping's pretensions to ideological leadership will depend heavily on the acceptance of Mao in the Communist pantheon.

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THE ALGERIAN SITUATION


As the UN General Assembly moves toward consideration of the Algerian issue, the contending forces remain stalemated, although the pressures on them are apparently becoming more intense. The rebels continue under severe French military pressure, but have received additional backing in recent approaches to Moscow and Peiping, and are almost certain to have substantial Afro-Asian support in the General Assembly for their effort "to internationalize" the conflict.

De Gaulle's 1959 offer of self-determination remains

France's official position, but there appears to be a growing diversity of French views. Popular opinion now seems to be swinging in favor of political negotiations with the rebels and even toward eventual independence for Algeria, but army sentiment is still adamant against such negotiations, and rightist leaders have in the past few months become more inclined to challenge De Gaulle directly on this issue.

Despite the apparently hopeful evolution of negotiating positions on each side since De Gaulle came to power,

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both French and rebel positions have hardened since the failure of preliminary talks at Melun in June. The rebel leaders have steadfastly rejected a cease-fire without prior political guarantees for the future of their movement, and De Gaulle has held to his stand that fighting must cease before political terms can be discussed.

Military Situation

The approximately 440,000 French military forces in Algeria--of which about one quarter are Moslems--confront approximately 15,000 rebels dispersed in small units. An estimated 10,000 other rebel soldiers are in Tunisia and 6,000 in Morocco, but the electrified barriers which the French constructed along both borders have made it increasingly difficult for rebel reinforcements and supplies to enter Algeria.

Recent military action has been mostly limited to

minor local operations. The French claim the level of terrorist acts in Algeria has dropped one third in the past year, but the rebels will probably continue ambushes, assassinations, and grenade attacks to discourage the emergence of a Moslem "third force" willing to cooperate with France. Victims are far more frequently Moslems than Europeans. The rebel underground terrorist organization in France on 23 October renewed its attacks on the French police, apparently as a demonstration of its ability to "carry the war into France itself."

Rebel Position

The Melun negotiations were broken off primarily because of rebel demands to be treated as representatives of a government, and the Provisional Algerian Government (PGAR) has not modified its conditions since then. It has, however, intensified its efforts to internationalize the

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conflict. Premier Ferhat Abbas' recent trip to Peiping's National Day celebrations and two stopovers in Moscow on his first visit to the Communist bloc were designed to show the West that the rebels are in earnest when they say they will accept Communist aid if necessary in their fight for independence. Abbas and his group, like a previous rebel delegation to Peiping last spring, were accorded an enthusiastic reception and had several conferences with top Chinese officials. A joint communiqué of 5 October affirmed Peiping's intention to give "total assistance and its support to the Algerian people in pursuit and intensification of its armed struggle."

The USSR, which previously maintained a "neutral" stand so as not to alienate De Gaulle, has dropped its cautious attitude toward the PGAR. Abbas held talks with high Soviet officials in Moscow both en route to and returning from his visit to Peiping. Khrushchev, at his own initiative, met with members of the Algerian rebel "delegation" while in New York, and on 7 October extended de facto recognition to the PGAR.

Tunisia and Morocco are supporting the rebels' attempts "to internationalize" the war, partly through efforts to get the UN more directly involved. Leaders of both countries see in the UN's Congo operations a precedent they feel could be useful in solving the Algerian problem. Tunisian President Bourguiba's vague proposal of "union" between his government and

the rebels' regime was apparently offered as a means either of jarring De Gaulle into some further proposals or of provoking French incursions into Tunisian territory which would permit a new appeal to the UN for protection.

In addition, Bourguiba has recently said that he would facilitate the passage of arms and volunteers from any source to help in the liberation of Algeria. Morocco, anxious not to seem less pro-PGAR than Tunisia, has magnified several recent violations of its territory by French troops in Algeria and has publicly considered various means of retaliation.

French Position

While no change has been made in the official French policy favoring self-determination for Algeria, there has been a considerable modification of French opinions on the subject of Algeria. De Gaulle's constant repetition of the self-determination and "Algerian Algeria" themes--sometimes on occasions which seemed

STATEMENTS ON ALGERIA BY DE GAULLE

The future of Algeria rests with the Algerians, not as thrust upon them by machine gun and knife, but according to the wishes which they will freely express through universal suffrage.... The three arrangements which it is possible to conceive of will be the object of the consultation. One of these would be secession, where some believe independence would reside; France would then leave the Algerians, who would have expressed their wish to become separated from her. They would organize, without her, the territory in which they live, the resources which they have at their call, the government which they desire.... Or else, out-and-out identification with France, such as is implied in the equality of rights.... Or else, the government of Algeria by Algerians, backed up by French help and in narrow relationship with her, for economy, teaching, defense, and foreign relations.

--Television address, 16 Sept 1959

We wanted to solve the Algerian problem in a manner now well known in every household in the world. First of all, we wanted the fighting and assassinations to come to an end. We want the cooling-off period to follow. We want everyone to return home. We want the people to renew contacts with one another. We want them to look the situation in the face, which is to say, to see the necessity of developing Algeria. Later, when this necessity is understood, the Algerians will decide their own destiny. I am sure that they will decide in favor of an Algerian Algeria in close union with France. That makes good sense both for them and for us.

--Speech in Normandy, 7 July 1960

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propitious for spelling out further steps--has disappointed many who had pinned their hopes on a bold new move to settle the question. The mounting frustration in France over the Algerian issue has combined with discontent on economic and other issues to bring De Gaulle under the heaviest political attack since he came to power.

The spectacular trial in September of the "Jeanson network" of French supporters of the Algerian rebels has been seized on by leftist, liberal, and clerical groups to express opposition to the army's methods of conducting the war. Calls for peace negotiations--in some cases even on the rebels' terms--have been issued by the principal labor unions and the formerly pro - De Gaulle Socialist party. Teachers' associations and the Catholic hierarchy have expressed concern for the youths compelled to participate in the war, and a "manifesto" by a group of leading intellectuals goes so far as to proclaim the right of soldiers to desert a wrong cause.

Rightist leaders have countered with appeals for the maintenance of French Algeria and to patriotism--as in the case of the manifesto of 200 writers, teachers, and French Academy members, including Marshal Juin.

On balance, De Gaulle's campaign has succeeded in winning broad popular support for

his self-determination policy. Most Frenchmen would probably accept a carefully handled French initiative leading to political negotiations with the rebels or even to Algerian independence.

Such a move, however, would depend on the army, which has probably been the principal single force limiting De Gaulle's freedom to solve the Algerian problem. The majority of the officer corps appears to be coming around to the idea that Algerian independence is inevitable. These officers would not acquiesce in any negotiated settlement requiring the army's withdrawal from Algeria, however, until they were certain that European settlers and pro-French Moslems were in no danger from rebel elements.

The army is further concerned to have at least the appearance of a victory over the rebels. Although a number of "activists" wish to overturn De Gaulle, they could not drag the remainder into an overt move against him unless he afforded a clear-cut pretext which could be interpreted by them as a "sellout" to the rebels.

Progress in Algeria

Paris can point to some progress within Algeria itself, where official French policy insists that the solution of the problem requires the Moslem and European communities to work together to build a modern economy and political structure. Two thirds of all elective offices have been reserved for Moslems in parliamentary and local elections held since 1958. The rebels failed to intimidate Moslem candidates, but many of these candidates were not representative of Moslem opinion.

In September, Paris convened meetings of commissions appointed from among Algerian elected officials to study

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various aspects of the Algerian administration. Their effectiveness is doubtful thus far, but they at least constitute a precedent for French consultations with a cross-section of Algerian Moslems on nonpolitical issues.

Meanwhile, a gradual upward trend is apparent in the Algerian economy. Although the five-year \$4.3 billion Constantine Plan for Algerian economic development announced by De Gaulle in October 1958 has not yet been formalized, some new industrial investment has been attracted. Production and exports of Saharan petroleum have been stepped up with the completion of two 24-inch pipelines between the oil fields and the Mediterranean, and petroleum exports now are approaching an annual rate of 6,000,000 tons. Major progress has also been made on construction of the pipeline from the Hassi R'mel natural gas fields which will ultimately supply Algiers and Oran with cheap power for industrial development.

UN General Assembly

The focus of attention on the Algerian problem in the next few weeks will be in the UN General Assembly, where the Political Committee is expected to begin debate on the Algerian item about mid-November. The increase in UN members with an anticolonial bias, plus the USSR's injection of an appeal for the end of all colonial regimes, makes it almost certain that this session will pass a resolution on Algeria that goes far beyond the 1956 and 1957 expressions of hope that a solution might be found through negotiations.

The French delegation will take no part in the proceedings at the UN on Algeria, and De Gaulle's slighting references to the UN in his speeches this fall were probably designed to condition the French public to a setback on the Algerian issue in that body. Paris can be expected to refuse to take cognizance of any UN resolution, and will probably issue strong protests to all allies of France which fail to vote against "outside interference" in the Algerian problem.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION ON ALGERIA

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| 1955 | 10th session inscribed question of Algeria on its agenda. France walked out of Assembly. Assembly later decided not to consider the question further. |
| 1956 | 11th session adopted unanimously conciliatory resolution expressing hope that a "peaceful, democratic, and just solution will be found." |
| 1957 | 12th session adopted moderate resolution taking note of the offer of good offices by Morocco and Tunisia and expressing wish for a solution through "pourparlers." |
| 1958 | 13th session failed by one vote to adopt resolution which recognized "right of Algerian people to independence" and urged negotiations between the parties. |
| 1959 | 14th session failed by one vote to adopt resolution urging "pourparlers" take place looking toward a peaceful solution based on the right of self-determination. |

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With the support of the African states belonging to the French Community, a resolution calling for a UN-conducted referendum in Algeria might receive the necessary two-thirds majority. An active campaign by other members of the Afro-Asian bloc--such as Tunisia, the UAR, India, and Ghana--has already begun to influence some of these French Community states, although counterpressures may be exerted as a result of the meeting of the French-speaking African states at Abidjan called by Ivory Coast Premier Houphouet-Boigny on 24 October.

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The special weakness of France's position in the UN this year is that, unless pro-French Houphouet-Boigny can devise some suitable plan at the Abidjan meeting, there will probably be no moderating influence on the Algerian issue from Asian or African UN members. Unless such a moderating influence soon develops, it is doubtful that a resolution mild enough to be acceptable to France's allies will be proposed.

Outlook

There is a possibility that an anti-French UN vote, particularly if a resolution calls for the UN's physical presence in Algeria in any form, might produce a new solidarity in France behind another government attempt to solve the Alge-

rian problem as an "internal" question. French press speculation is running to predictions of a move to resume negotiations with the rebels--possibly even before the UN debate--or, if such negotiations fail to materialize, of new steps by the French to create institutions for self-government along "Algerian Algeria" lines.

In line with the latter possibility, Premier Debré has hinted that if the military situation is basically unchanged by spring, the government may take the initiative to assure greater local representation in administration. In either of these cases, one motive would be to build up a responsible Moslem group which might ultimately be able to treat with the rebels.

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