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COPY NO. 56  
OCI NO. 1013/60  
24 March 1960

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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26-228578

DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S © 25X1  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: [REDACTED] 1990  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 12/5/80 REVIEWER: [REDACTED]

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**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**24 March 1960**

**T H E   W E E K   I N   B R I E F**

**PART I**

**OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST**

**EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . Page 1**

The Soviet proposal of 19 March for a permanent ban on all nuclear tests except small underground explosions, which would be covered by a moratorium pending the results of joint research to improve detection techniques, climaxes Soviet maneuvers to draw the Western powers into a comprehensive ban on all testing. The USSR is seeking to force the United States either to accept what is in effect a comprehensive ban on all tests, or to risk an open break with London by rejecting the small-tests moratorium. In the disarmament conference, the bloc delegations have refrained from their customary procedural disputes, and have sought to demonstrate a desire for serious negotiations. In his first days in Paris, Khrushchev lost no time in developing the main themes of his visit--the need for Soviet-French cooperation on the German problem, disarmament, and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

[Redacted]

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**MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . Page 4**

The Qasim government, apparently fearing further clashes between Iraqi Communists and anti-Communists, has tightened security precautions. King Husayn of Jordan has reiterated his determination to proceed with plans for a plebiscite among the large Palestinian population of West Jordan. President Nasir included several supporters of Syrian security chief Sarraj in his appointments on 18 March to fill vacancies in the Syrian cabinet.

[Redacted]

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**VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA . . . . . Page 6**

The riots on 21 and 22 March in Transvaal and Cape provinces of South Africa resulted from the first well-organized African nationalist protest action since 1957. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which arranged the demonstrations, is a relatively new, militantly antiwhite political group

[Redacted]

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The South African Government can be expected to restrict the activities of the PAC's leaders and to attempt to suppress the organization.

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**24 March 1960**

**PART I (continued)**

**THE CUBAN SITUATION . . . . . Page 7**

The Castro regime is tightening its control over communications media and extending its radical socio-economic programs. Opponents of Castro's policies are becoming more outspoken, however, particularly on the Communist issue. Meanwhile, the extent of Chinese Communist interest in Cuba is emphasized by the appearance of Chou En-lai at a rally of the newly formed China - Latin American Friendship Association in Peiping. [redacted]

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**PART II**

**NOTES AND COMMENTS**

**PEIPING ELABORATES DOCTRINAL CLAIM FOR MAO . . . . . Page 1**

The Chinese Communists have substantially expanded their claim for Mao Tse-tung as a theorist, crediting him with a whole series of "discoveries" and formulations in political economy. A recent article in People's Daily for the first time attributes to Mao the "discovery" that political indoctrination is more important than material incentives in increasing worker productivity. It also credits Mao with solving the economic problems connected with China's own "road" to industrialization. Thus the Chinese, in claiming "doctrinal originality" for Mao, continue to raise a challenge to Moscow. [redacted]

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**SINO-INDONESIAN RELATIONS . . . . . Page 2**

Peiping, apparently fearing a burdensome increase in the number of Overseas Chinese desiring repatriation from Indonesia, has called on Djakarta to relax the pressures forcing their departure. Djakarta may reduce harassment of Chinese, but it is unlikely to accede to Peiping's request for a formal agreement on repatriation or to other of its demands. [redacted]

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**TAIWAN AND PEIPING COMPETE FOR AFRICAN RECOGNITION . . . . . Page 3**

Communist China's recent threat to break diplomatic ties with Guinea if Conakry received another Chinese Nationalist delegation reflects Peiping's concern that the "two Chinas" concept may be gaining acceptance in Africa. Competition between Taipei and Peiping for recognition by emergent African republics was sharpened by

**SECRET**

**THE WEEK IN BRIEF**

**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**24 March 1960**

**PART II (continued)**

the recent success of Nationalist China in establishing relations with Cameroun and the favorable impression made by Nationalist delegations on several African nations which will become independent this year. 25X1

**SOVIET REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES . . . . . Page 5**

Information coming out of the recently concluded Communist party congresses in various Soviet republics reveals that the shake-up last year in the top leadership of several republics was part of a more extensive turnover in important party and government officials than that following Stalin's death. The underlying aim seems to have been to bring new blood to the leadership of party and government at all levels to carry out Khrushchev's dynamic new programs.

**THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY IN 1959 . . . . . Page 6**

The economic gains achieved in Yugoslavia in 1959 indicate a sound basis for continued rapid economic expansion. Significant increases in agricultural and industrial production have reduced Yugoslavia's chronic foreign exchange deficit and will enable Yugoslavia to expand its export trade, especially with underdeveloped countries. Belgrade continues to need foreign economic investment, however, to ensure present rates of growth. 25X1

**RUMANIA PLANS INCREASED EMIGRATION OF JEWS . . . . . Page 7**

Bucharest has apparently decided to permit a sizable increase in the number of Jews emigrating to Israel. Arab pressure led to a suspension of such emigration in February 1959 after 16,000 Jews had left Rumania in the preceding six months. To date, there has been only limited Arab reaction to the small number permitted to leave Rumania during the past four months. The Rumanians are seeking to avoid publicity by increasing the number of exit routes but have had difficulty in securing cooperation from Greece. 25X1

**POLITICAL SITUATION IN KENYA . . . . . Page 9**

Although the London constitutional conference on Kenya last February pointed toward eventual independence, those Africans demanding immediate freedom have not been satisfied by concessions such as London's agreement to an African-dominated Kenya legislature. European settlers, concerned over isolated instances of Mau Mau - type terrorism, are deserting the moderate New Kenya party in favor of the right-wing United party, which is pledged to support white rule in Kenya. 25X1

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

**PART II (continued)**

**MOROCCAN LABOR CONFLICT SEEMS IMMINENT . . . . . Page 9**

A prolonged struggle for dominance over organized labor seems imminent in Morocco. A recently launched right-wing labor federation, expected to be legalized by royal decree, seeks to win over 650,000 workers affiliated with the leftist Moroccan Union of Labor. While police repression of leftist activities may have deterred an attempt to disrupt the right-wing organizing meeting, clashes between rival labor factions seem almost certain when leftist labor leader Ben Seddik returns to Morocco.

[Redacted]

**MODERATE GOVERNMENT FORMED IN CEYLON . . . . . Page 10**

Moderate elements scored a substantial victory over the leftists in Ceylon's parliamentary elections on 19 March, but political instability is likely to continue. The conservative United National party (UNP) has only 50 seats, 29 short of a majority. Prime Minister Senanayake intends to rule with a minority government, and may stay in power temporarily by virtue of the opposition's disunity, but new elections could become necessary in the relatively near future.

[Redacted]

**SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . Page 11**

The Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) has belatedly entered 9 candidates for the 59 National Assembly seats at stake in Laos' 24 April elections. Hanoi radio has broadcast a purported NLHS appeal to the Laotian people to vote for NLHS and other "peace-loving" candidates. These developments suggest that the Pathet Lao insurgents will not make a widespread effort to disrupt the elections; however, they may try to influence the vote in rural areas. Of the non-Communist candidates, who make up most of the total of 158, some 60 are on the government's "unified slate," and the rest are unaffiliated candidates, many of whom may be induced to withdraw.

[Redacted]

**DETERIORATING POLITICAL SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA . . . . . Page 13**

The widespread resentment aroused by the Rhee government's repressive and fraudulent election tactics marks an increasing tendency by the regime over the past year to rely on force and repression.

[Redacted]

**SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN AGREE ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE . . . . . Page 14**

South Korea's agreement to exchange 167 captured Japanese fishermen for about 1,000 illegal Korean entrants detained in Japan will relax the domestic pressures on Tokyo for strong countermeasures against Seoul's "hostage

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**


**24 March 1960**

**PART II (continued)**

diplomacy." South Korea, however, has not committed itself to refrain from future seizures nor to release an additional 47 fishermen when they complete their sentences. A broad settlement of the many differences between the countries remains remote. 25X1

**PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO DE GAULLE REGIME RISING . . . Page 15**

De Gaulle's refusal to call a special parliamentary session on agricultural policy has evoked widespread criticism from the press and from parliamentary spokesmen. While he has muzzled parliamentary opposition during Khrushchev's visit, he will shortly face further demonstrations by farmers in addition to efforts to topple the Debré government. 25X6  
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**NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING . . . . . Page 17**

The special meeting of NATO defense ministers in Paris planned for 31 March and 1 April has been called to follow up proposals made at the December 1959 ministerial meeting on means of improving the Western defense effort in the face of chronic deficiencies. While wide-ranging discussions may be expected, significant decisions must await the results of other studies not due for completion until May, when the foreign ministers hold their regular spring meeting. 25X1

**THE OUTLOOK IN COLOMBIA . . . . . Page 18**

Preliminary returns from the 20 March elections in Colombia for the lower house of the national Congress indicate that the National Front government headed by President Alberto Lleras can no longer count on the two-thirds congressional majority required to pass virtually all legislation. Lleras will arrive in the United States on 4 April for an official visit, and he will probably seek to determine the availability of credits to promote his comprehensive economic development plan, which was not an issue in the recent elections. 25X1

**SECRET**

v

**THE WEEK IN BRIEF**

**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**24 March 1960**

**PART II (continued)**

**THE BOLIVIAN REVOLT . . . . . Page 19**

The brief threat posed by the rebellion of a police regiment in La Paz on 19 March temporarily allayed feuding within Bolivia's governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. Further disorders are likely in the next two months as the government prepares for the country's second presidential election with universal suffrage. The quick suppression of the police revolt suggests that President Siles is likely to be the first Bolivian president in 30 years to serve for a full term. [redacted]

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**VIOLENCE IN THE ECUADOREAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN . . . . . Page 20**

Recent politically motivated violence in Ecuador reflects the explosive and acrimonious nature of the campaign for the June presidential elections and indicates that the incumbent Conservative government will be hard-pressed to maintain order both during and after the voting. The Communist-backed coalition [redacted]

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[redacted] will probably attempt to intensify the interparty animosity to exploit unrest. An organized revolutionary move is more likely after the elections than before. [redacted]

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**PART III**

**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES**

**KREMLIN POLITICS AND THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION . . . . . Page 1**

The Soviet system has no mechanism for the orderly transfer of the great power which in the USSR inevitably becomes concentrated in the hands of one man. Many of the dismissals of important central and regional officials since late 1958 are probably attributable to failure to get things done to Khrushchev's satisfaction, but some of the principal changes seem to arise from rivalry for the succession. The sharp decline of Aleksey Kirichenko, contrasted with the growing prestige and authority of Frol Kozlov, presents the clearest recent evidence of this rivalry. Kozlov seems at the moment to be in front. [redacted]

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**SATELLITE ATTITUDES TOWARD EAST-WEST DETENTE . . . . . Page 5**

The East European satellites' attitudes toward improvement of East-West relations have ranged from full support of Khrushchev's position to echoes of Peiping's divergent opinion. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Albania particularly are at some variance with Moscow.

**SECRET**

vi

**THE WEEK IN BRIEF**



**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**24 March 1960**

**PART III (continued)**

Soviet pressure has been increasing for a greater degree of conformity on central issues in the pre-summit period. Many satellite leaders continue to fear that a rapprochement with the West may make their maintenance of internal controls more difficult; expression of their reservations as to the wisdom of Soviet policy probably have not been completely silenced. [redacted]

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**WHITE COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA . . . . . Page 8**

Successes of the African nationalist drive for self-government emphasize the problem posed by the entrenched European communities. A policy of hard opposition to local nationalist movements is dominant among the 5,000,000 Europeans in Algeria, Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa. This attitude tends to negate the efforts of London, Brussels, and Paris to develop good will by yielding control elsewhere in Africa to nationalist movements. [redacted]


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**ISSUES BETWEEN COMMON MARKET AND EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION . . . . . Page 13**

Prospects are poor for compromising the key differences between Western Europe's increasingly competitive trade groupings--the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA or Outer Seven). While a showdown may be avoided at a 29 March meeting of all countries directly concerned, EEC efforts to accelerate its tariff reductions are viewed by members of the EFTA as a new threat to the major purpose of their organization--the establishment of a preferential Europe-wide free trade area. [redacted]

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**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

**PART I****OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST****EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS****Nuclear Test Talks**

The Soviet proposal of 19 March for a permanent ban on all tests except small underground explosions--the latter would be covered by a moratorium pending the results of joint research to improve detection techniques--climaxes a long series of Soviet maneuvers to draw the Western powers into a comprehensive ban on all testing. This is the second time that the USSR, at a critical point in the long negotiations, has adopted a proposal favored by Britain as a means of compromising differences between the Soviet and American positions.

The moratorium proposal, based on a concept first advanced last October by Britain, is designed to force the United States either to accept what is in effect a comprehensive ban on all tests, or to risk an open break with London by rejecting the moratorium on small tests.

Moscow is also seeking by this move to strengthen Khrushchev's advocacy at the summit conference of a compromise treaty incorporating the Soviet proposal for an annual quota of on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions--a concept first advanced by Prime Minister Macmillan. 25X1

Before introducing the proposal, Tsarapkin listed "numerous Soviet concessions" which have preceded this move: the quota concept for on-site in-

spections; the package proposal of 14 December for the composition and voting procedures of the control system; the "temporary criteria" proposal introduced on 16 February, in effect accepting American criteria for dispatching inspection teams during the period required for installing the control system; and the agreement to begin joint research for improving the control system immediately upon signing the treaty.

Each of these proposals was intended to press for a total ban without requiring Moscow to yield to any great extent in its insistence on maintaining control over the day-to-day operation on Soviet territory of the proposed inspection system.

Tsarapkin's public and private interpretations of the moratorium proposal suggest a desire to blur the line between tests prohibited by the treaty and those banned by the temporary moratorium. On 21 March he asserted that the inspection quota should apply to all underground events regardless of yield, therefore making the question of magnitude "irrelevant." 25X1

In agreeing to a joint research program, the Soviet proposal moves beyond the 16 February proposal to adopt "temporary

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

criteria" for determining when to send out on-site inspection teams. While part of any research program would be devoted to refining these criteria, the principal effort of the experts under the latest proposal would be devoted to studies and experiments for developing adequate techniques for detecting and identifying possible underground explosions. The joint research would include underground explosions intended to improve available data on seismic disturbances.

On 21 March, however, Tsarapkin repeated the assertion he made earlier to the press that the joint program should be limited to non-nuclear chemical explosions, thereby supporting the longstanding criticism of Western efforts to include nuclear explosions in any technical program.

Since introducing its 19 March proposal, the Soviet delegation has sought to create the impression of flexibility in working out a satisfactory compromise. Tsarapkin asserted on 21 March that the moratorium should remain in force for four or five years, although he implied that this would be subject to negotiation. He suggested that during this time the joint research program should stress the specific problem of detection and identification of underground tremors, with a view toward extending the limited treaty to include all testing.

Tsarapkin stated that if the experts were unable to solve the problem within the time limit, the three powers would have to work out a new

arrangement for the future. He had told the press earlier that in this case he presumed the moratorium would be extended.

Disarmament Conference

Although the Soviet bloc delegates at the general disarmament conference continued their efforts to secure priority consideration for Khrushchev's proposals by establishing that "general and complete disarmament" is the principal task of the conference, they have refrained from resorting to certain tactics employed in previous negotiations, such as refusing to proceed to serious discussions until the Western powers agree to Soviet demands on the agenda. The Communist delegates also avoided raising obstacles to a quick agreement on procedural arrangements.

The European satellite delegates apparently have been assigned the task of prolonging the exchange over complete and general disarmament as the main objective of the negotiations.

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The Communists lost no time in seeking explanations of particular aspects of the

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Western plan as a means of demonstrating their desire for serious negotiations. Zorin's remarks in particular were intended to convey an impression of reasonableness and flexibility. He offered to change the timetable of the Soviet plan, moving a prohibition of nuclear weapons from the last stage to the first, and stated it did not matter at what stage the liquidation of foreign bases would come about.

The bloc delegates have also attempted to emphasize the first stage of the Soviet plan --reduction of forces--by describing it as a response to previous Western proposals. In presenting a detailed comparison between the Western and Soviet plans for conventional disarmament in the first stage, Zorin recalled force levels set out in the Western plan of August 1957.

He countered British criticism of lack of precision in the Soviet plan by requesting specific force levels for British and French forces in the first phase of the reductions under the Western proposal. The bloc has reinforced these moves by strongly criticizing or ignoring the other features, such as preparatory studies and arms storage, which are proposed in the first stage of the Western plan.

**Khrushchev in France**

In his public statements during the first two days of the visit, Khrushchev departed from the usual generalities and emphasized the main theme of his visit--Soviet-French cooperation against Germany. He began this campaign in his ar-

rival speech by recalling De Gaulle's wartime role and, referring obliquely to the problem of Germany and Berlin, he indicated the possibility of a concerted French-Soviet position. In the formal toast at a banquet on 23 March, Khrushchev again stressed the possibility of "working out a common approach to the solution" of the problem of restraining German "revanchism."

The Soviet leader also began his effort to play on the historic ties between the two countries and on France's great-power status. Foreshadowing a possible proposal, similar to the one offered Macmillan last February, for renewing the wartime treaty of friendship and alliance, Khrushchev interspersed his remarks with frequent references to "joint efforts," and "concerted positions on basic questions." He asserted that the situation in Europe depends to a great extent on relations between the two largest countries--the USSR and France.

Khrushchev placed his visit in the context of the forthcoming summit, and repeated his forecast that his talks with De Gaulle would be "good preparation" for the summit. As he did in Asia last month, the Soviet premier expressed hope that the May summit meeting would lead to "a series of important negotiations between leaders of the great powers." In addition to the German problem, Khrushchev listed disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons as subjects which would be taken up during his visit. He attempted to demonstrate Moscow's serious interest in reaching settlements on these

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

issues by stating that the USSR had not carried out an underground nuclear test and was not "preparing to do so."

He portrayed the negotiations for a nuclear test ban as on the verge of agreement in claiming that, if the Soviet 19 March proposal is adopted, "all issues will be

settled, and a protocol can be signed." He also sought to further the impression of Soviet interest in a disarmament agreement by hinting that the USSR would be willing to proceed with additional unilateral reductions of its armed forces.

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**MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS**Iraq

The Qasim regime has tightened its security precautions during the past week, apparently fearing major clashes between Communists and anti-Communists. A serious incident between these groups took place in Basra on 19 March and was followed by many arrests.

A rash of Communist-inspired strikes in Baghdad and labor difficulties in Basra have accompanied an intensification in antiregime propaganda by the pro-Communist press. The campaign, which began in mid-February, has been particularly aimed at municipal and provincial authorities, who have for various reasons arrested Communists and their supporters, and at provincial governors, who have been accused of discriminating against Communist-dominated peasant organizations.

At first this criticism was aimed at individuals and anti-Communist elements; it now is aimed at the government itself, which is charged with "intellectual bankruptcy." The propaganda does not, however, attack Qasim personally. The non-Communist press has re-

sponded in kind and is defending the regime, while accusing the Communists of masterminding the labor troubles.

Jordan-UAR-Iraq

King Husayn has reiterated his determination to proceed with plans for a plebiscite among the large Palestinian population of West Jordan. He appears convinced that this is his best tactic for undercutting strong pressures from the UAR and Iraq for creation of a separate Palestine entity. Husayn believes his announcement of the plebiscite idea caught Nasir, his principal antagonist in this triangular dispute, off balance, and he wants to exploit his presumed advantage.

Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli has indicated the government would welcome "neutral" --i.e., not UAR, Iraqi, or Saudi Arabian--members of the Arab League to determine whether Jordanian Palestinians want such a plebiscite. At a banquet held in Husayn's honor in Jerusalem on 19 March, the mayors of 11 West Bank towns reportedly told the King that a "plebiscite was unnecessary, since the country is firmly

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

united under his leadership." Husayn could cite this and other manifestations of Palestinian support he has received as reason for not holding a plebiscite if he should change his mind.

Opinion in Jordan varies as to what might be the result of a free plebiscite. The American Consulate General in Jerusalem reports that private reactions there to the King's offer have ranged from cynical apathy to heated questioning. Some Western diplomats in Amman believe UAR propaganda might swing a vote in favor of West Jordanian independence.

Husayn professes confidence that UAR propaganda would not affect the outcome, since he believes the experience of Syria, as a member of the UAR, has "opened the eyes" of Palestinians to what he implied were unhappy consequences of accepting Nasir's leadership.

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 [redacted] Meanwhile, broadcasts from both Cairo and Baghdad have alluded to the possible assassination of Husayn.

**UAR--Syrian Region**

Nasir's new appointments to the Syrian cabinet on 18 March appear to reflect the continuing influence of Syrian security chief Abd al-Hamid Sarraj. Four of the seven new

appointees have been closely associated with Sarraj, who, [redacted] had been losing favor with the UAR President. Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Akram Dayri, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Jadu Izz al-Din, and Minister of Agrarian Reform Ahmad Hunaydi are all former military men and were members of Sarraj's "Little Revolutionary Command Council" prior to formation of the UAR in 1958. Sarraj's secretary general in the Interior Ministry, Yusuf Muzahim, now has been appointed minister of religious endowments.

The selection of Husni al-Sawwaf as the new minister of economy was probably based on his excellent qualifications for the position. The new minister of culture and guidance, Thabit al-Aris, is a Christian and long-time member of the Syrian foreign service and, like Al-Sawwaf, appears to have a pro-Western outlook. Jamal al-Sufi, appointed to the newly created Ministry of Supply, is a former naval officer and, in common with Dayri, Izz al-Din, and Hunaydi, has had no political experience.

While the evidence of Sarraj's hand in some of the appointments seems clear, it is not conclusive. Such young, aggressive military types would appeal to Nasir in any case and need not have been recommended by Sarraj. Nasir obviously did not wish to select new cabinet members from the crowded Syrian stable of old political work horses, and the relatively untainted ranks of the military furnished an acceptable alternative source.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**


24 March 1960

**VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

The riots on 21 and 22 March in Transvaal and Cape provinces, in which at least 87 Africans were killed, were the bloodiest in South Africa since 1949. At Vereeniging, 30 miles south of Johannesburg, police fired into a demonstrating crowd estimated variously between 12,000 and 20,000,

ing away from work in some areas.

Racial tension has increased in South Africa in recent months, and outbreaks have been frequent. Previous disturbances--such as the riots at Durban in June 1959 and January 1960, the Windhoek riots of December 1959,



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killing more than 80. The police were reinforced by army units, citizen militia, and air force jets; the government also alerted the national guard. A similar disturbance, with seven Africans known dead, took place near Cape Town. Large peaceful demonstrations have occurred elsewhere in the country, and Africans are stay-

and smaller outbreaks elsewhere in February, August, and November 1959--were spontaneous expressions of local grievances. The most recent demonstrations, on the other hand, were the result of an organized African nationalist campaign--the first to have significant impact since 1957.

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

The demonstrations were organized by the anti-Communist Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which broke with the older, Communist-influenced African National Congress (ANC) in early 1959. While the ANC is willing to grant rights to non-African minorities, the PAC's program is militantly antiwhite; both organizations, however, deny at present that they plan to attain African domination through violence.

The South African Government can be expected to restrict the activities of the PAC's leaders and to attempt to suppress the organization. President Robert Sobukwe, a former instructor at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, has been arrested and charged with incitement and sedition, along with 12 other PAC leaders. Prime Minister Verwoerd has stated that they will be charged with sedition.

Racial tension in South Africa will probably increase further. The 10,000 white police--an estimated one third of them under 21--have shown a growing tendency to fire at demonstrating crowds. Africans, on the other hand, are increasingly effective in organizing their protests, and the widespread response to the PAC's call for demonstrations indicates a new willingness to suffer the consequences of militant organized protests. Disturbances will probably occur with increasing frequency in the future.

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[redacted] As a result of a dynamic organizational campaign, this group has apparently supplanted the ANC as the nationalist spokesman for important areas of Transvaal and Cape provinces. The recent demonstrations were part of a PAC campaign, in which the ANC did not participate, against the South African system of identity cards for nonwhites. Taking advantage of the present state of tension, the ANC has called for a work stoppage and day of mourning on 28 March.

**THE CUBAN SITUATION**

The Castro regime is tightening its control over communications media and extending its radical socio-economic programs. Over 80 radio and television stations have been formed into the "Independent Front of Free Transmitters" (FIEL) with the avowed purpose of "consolidating the revolution and orienting the people." Many of the announcers are pro-Communists, and the output often follows the Communist line. One FIEL announcer has said

that an inter-American network is planned, with branches in Mexico, Venezuela, and possibly Panama.

According to Peiping's New China News Agency, which has been timely and accurate on recent internal Cuban developments, the "people's stores," organized by the regime's Agrarian Reform Institute to "eliminate exploitation by the middleman" in retail sales, are being extended to the cities.

**SECRET**



**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Five such markets are said to be operating in Havana, in addition to more than 1,300 already established in rural areas. Working on a 10-percent margin, they may drive independent grocers out of business.

The recent defections of Cuban service attachés in the United States and Venezuela and the resignation of the moderate finance minister, Lopez Fresquet, coincide with increasingly outspoken attacks on Communism by Cuban groups alarmed at recent Communist gains. The Autentico organization of former President Prio issued a sharply worded attack on Communism on 14 March and called for a "unity congress" of groups supporting the Cuban revolution. It warned these groups against abdicating their responsibilities, as such a course would leave the field open to the Communists.

Unrest is also reported among Cuban students worried by Castro's stated intention of "reforming" the university, eliminating its jealously guarded autonomy.

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The "Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of the Latin American People," declared by the Communist-infiltrated Cuban Labor Confederation for 20-26 March and warmly endorsed by the Cuban Communist party, resulted in several public manifestations and much propaganda against the "dictatorial" regimes in Latin America and in support of the Puerto Rican people's "struggle against colonial rule."

The Chinese Communists gave strong support to the Cuban manifestations with a mass rally in Peiping on 19 March, the first of the "China - Latin America Friendship Association" which was formed in China on 16 March. Radio Peiping reported that the rally, "in support of the Latin American people's national and democratic movement and the Cuban people's struggle against US imperialist aggression," was addressed by Premier Chou En-lai and a number of Latin American delegates.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

**PART II****NOTES AND COMMENTS****PEIPING ELABORATES DOCTRINAL CLAIM FOR MAO**

The Chinese Communists have considerably expanded their claim for Mao Tse-tung as a theorist, crediting him with a whole series of "discoveries" and formulations in political economy. An article in People's Daily on 25 February claimed that Mao "creatively" explained the proper relationships in a developing Communist economy and "discovered" the underlying principle of "high-speed expansion of socialist construction."

For at least 16 years, the Chinese have been adding new components to what they term the "ideology of Mao Tse-tung"; by 1957 the elements of philosophical, military, literary, and governmental theory were discernible. The People's Daily article, which contains the most precise elaboration of Mao's thinking on economic problems thus far published, appears designed to add a political-economy component to the "ideology of Mao Tse-tung."

The article for the first time attributes to Mao the "discovery" that political indoctrination is more important than material incentives in increasing worker productivity--a view previously expressed by lesser Chinese spokesmen. "The ideology of economism, superficially emphasizing material incentives and... 'pay according to work'... corrupts the revolutionary will of the working class," People's Daily states.

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung," the article continues, "formulated the concept that 'politics takes command' and, in a basic

manner, solved the relationship between economics and politics under socialism.... He discovered the definite principle for the encouragement of positiveness among workers: politics taking command is first, while material incentives can only occupy the second position."

This line appears to be intended as theoretical justification for China's departure from certain Soviet practices. It is an explicit contradiction of Soviet doctrine and an implicit rebuke to Khrushchev, who had criticized the Chinese for neglecting material incentives in their commune program. Another indication of Chinese divergence is the article's claim that Mao "solved" problems concerning the proper proportion to be given to agriculture and industry and "discovered the completely correct road" for China's industrialization.

The article suggests that Mao's desire to remain foremost among the world's Marxist thinkers is as intense as Stalin's had been and that he apparently has not been deterred by Soviet criticism of the personality cult. The difficulty raised for him in Moscow's appeal to Lenin against Stalin on 30 June 1956 was temporary. Moscow had stated, "The wisdom of tens of millions of creators," V.I. Lenin used to say, 'creates something immeasurably higher than the greatest foresight of genius.'" Chinese writers began to insist that Mao's genius lies in his ability to "generalize" the ideas and experiences of China's masses.

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

The study of Mao's works has again become a major campaign in China, and the Chinese may be preparing to publish another major doctrinal thesis by him. Such a development would be taken as another challenge to the leadership of Moscow, which praised Mao's works in 1954 but now is reluctant to reduce Khrushchev's authority among Soviet and non-Soviet Communists by conceding doctrinal.

originalty to the Chinese leader. The extravagance of the Chinese claims was indicated on 21 March by the first secretary of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, who stated that Mao's ideology is not only a "guarantee" of the victory of socialism in China "but also has a great influence on the socialist and Communist movements in the world,"

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**SINO-INDONESIAN RELATIONS**

Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi has called on Djakarta to negotiate promptly a formal agreement on Chinese repatriation. Chen's request was made on 15 March in reply to Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio's letter of 23 January denying that Indonesia had violated the lawful rights and interests of Overseas Chinese and stating that consequently there was nothing to negotiate.

Chen reiterated Peiping's demands that Djakarta refrain from "forcible" evacuation of Chinese under its ban on alien retailers in rural areas, compensate those already evacuated, and give those faced with removal more time to decide between being relocated and returning to China. Chen also asked that dispossessed Chinese who elect repatriation be permitted to sell their property and take the proceeds out of the country, and that Djakarta transport repatriates to ports of embarkation, assume responsibility for their accommodation while awaiting ships, and provide "shipping facilities" for their return to the mainland.

Peiping apparently is motivated by fear that the continu-

ing hardships suffered by Chinese may greatly increase the number desiring repatriation. There are growing indications that Chinese in Indonesia believe they will remain "second-class" nationals even if they adopt Indonesian citizenship, and that consequently they have no real future in Indonesia.

Communist China has scored an initial propaganda gain among overseas "compatriots" by its quick action in repatriating some 7,500 Chinese, but the regime has been indirectly encouraging others to remain abroad. A mass influx of Indonesian Chinese to the mainland, together with the cost of transportation and resettlement, would place a heavy burden on the regime. The majority of these already repatriated are indigent women, children, and aged, according to Peiping.

Probably the primary Chinese Communist concern at this point was expressed in a People's Daily editorial of 18 March which stated that Peiping would welcome "appropriate measures" by Djakarta to encourage more Chinese to choose Indonesian citizenship, and that it was ready to cooperate with Djakarta in persuading Chinese to make such a choice.

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Despite Indonesia's resistance to formal negotiations, informal talks between Subandrio and the Chinese ambassador have been in progress since early January, chiefly on the subject of repatriation. No specific results of the discussions have been announced,

However, a Djakarta daily which frequently reflects government policy vehemently attacked Peiping radio on 24 March for criticizing Indonesia's handling of the Overseas Chinese and threatened further delay and obstruction.

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**TAIWAN AND PEIPING COMPETE FOR AFRICAN RECOGNITION**

Communist China recently threatened to break diplomatic relations with Guinea if Conakry again officially received a visiting Chinese Nationalist delegation as it did last January. The harshly worded note, delivered by a chargé only a few weeks after the Chinese Communist Embassy was opened in Conakry, shows Peiping's apprehension that the concept of "two Chinas" may be gaining acceptance among emerging African republics.

Communist China is spending a good deal of time, money, and effort bidding for recognition in Africa. Peiping solicits governmental contacts with those nations which have achieved independence and, as the "true friend of national liberation," is actively supporting those Africans still engaged in the "anticolonial struggle." The Communists view this support as an investment in future recognition. Despite the appeal Peiping holds for many Africans, however, the competition with Taipei has become keener, and the Chinese Communists have real cause for concern.

Last year Libya recognized Taipei. In January 1960 the new Cameroun Republic did likewise, and last month the Chinese Nationalist Legation in Liberia was raised to em-

bassy status. Ethiopia reportedly has put off a Chinese Communist bid for recognition on the grounds the moment is not opportune. Reluctance of these countries to accept Peiping or their preference for Taipei may stem in part from Communist China's bellicosity in Asia, but political considerations for relations with the West and renewed efforts by Nationalist China in the area seem largely responsible.

The Chinese Nationalists, just as bitter opponents of the "two Chinas" concept as the Communists, realize the potential value of recognition by new African republics--each of which will eventually vote on the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations. Taipei has sent two official delegations to Africa in recent months in an effort to promote recognition and expand contacts.

Nationalist Minister of Economic Affairs Yang Chi-tseng established the diplomatic relations with Cameroun, received an invitation to Togo's independence ceremonies on 27 April, and was surprised at the friendly reception given him in Guinea and in Dakar, where the Nationalists hope to open a consulate general before the Mali Federation becomes independent late this spring. Only in Ghana, which maintains it inherited

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
**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

recognition of Peiping from the UK, but has not yet established formal ties, did the Yang mission receive really unfriendly treatment, although officials in Nigeria and Tunisia were cool.

A mission headed by Minister Yang Hsi-kun, director of African Affairs in the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was warmly received in Somalia

and assured of an invitation to the independence celebration there on 1 July. The mission also was favorably received in Ethiopia, where the Chinese Communist ambassador to the Sudan was soliciting recognition. The Nationalists are planning to follow up these visits by sending agricultural advisers to various African states and have hopes of promoting trade.



**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Peiping's note to Guinea indicates the seriousness with which the Chinese Communists view the Nationalist challenge, but Peiping is not likely to jeopardize its African program by severing relations with Guinea or any other nation which briefly entertains visiting Nationalists. Instead,

Peiping is likely to increase its own political and economic effort to broaden contacts at all levels, calling on Africans to "resist the trap set by the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek clique to undermine friendship between the peoples of China and Africa."

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**SOVIET REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES**

Information coming out of the recently concluded Communist party congresses in various Soviet republics reveals that the shake-up last year in the top leadership of several republics was part of a more extensive turnover in important party and government officials than that following Stalin's death. The congresses were the required periodic meetings of republic party organizations to review the work of the leading party bodies (central committee and auditing commission) in the republic and elect new members to them. Four of the republics --Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine--hold congresses every four years; ten meet every two years; there is no republic party organization in the Russian republic.

The report of the central committee, normally given by the first secretary, covers major topics of domestic concern to the republic--industry, agriculture, science, culture, and party work; foreign affairs are not discussed. All reports this year followed closely the basic themes expounded at the special 21st national party congress last year, with emphasis on fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) as a major step toward the establishment of a Communist society.

Underlying nearly all the criticism voiced at the con-

gresses was deep concern for the human factor in increasing economic productivity. In discussing deficiencies in the program for developing the "new Communist man," for example, speakers emphasized the practical need for inculcating in Soviet citizens a more selfless attitude toward work.

**TURNOVER IN MEMBERSHIP OF  
CENTRAL COMMITTEES AND AUDITING  
COMMISSIONS IN SOVIET REPUBLICS**

(IN PERCENT)

	1952-56	1956-60	DIFFERENCE
BELORUSSIA	33	62	+29
TURKMENIA	40	53	+13
TADZHIKISTAN	37	47	+10
MOLDAVIA	50	58	+8
UZBEKISTAN	30	46	+16
KIRGIZIA	50	56	+6
KAZAKHSTAN	53	56	+3
LATVIA	51	53	+2
ALL REPUBLICS	48	49	+1
LITHUANIA	47	46	-1
UKRAINE	45	41	-4
ESTONIA	50	40	-10
AZERBAIDZHAN	66	54	-12
ARMENIA	55	33	-22
GEORGIA	71	38	-33

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The criticisms and elaboration of defects, however, gave few clues to the reasons for the shake-ups last year. The nationalist tendencies mentioned so prominently in connection with some of the ousters last year were not stressed at the congresses. No new charges were made, although the admission by the

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

present Kazakh party boss, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, that work stoppages had occurred last year at a construction site in central Kazakhstan suggests that the strike may have been an added factor in the ouster of former Kazakh party boss Nikolay Belyayev.

Membership on the leading bodies elected by party congresses is given on the basis of the individual's political standing and position as an important leader at some level in the republic hierarchy. Changes in these bodies, therefore, provide a good measure of the turnover in officials at all levels in periods between party congresses.

The composition of the central committees and auditing commissions elected this year shows that in eight of the fourteen republics holding congresses, the turnover in the period 1956-60 was greater even than in the period 1952-56, during which the Beria purge and the Khrushchev-Malenkov struggle for power ravaged party organizations throughout the Soviet Union.

Considerations of political loyalty to Khrushchev, however,

appear to play only a minor role in the 1956-60 turnover, as most of the changes occurred in late 1958 and 1959 after the repercussions of the ouster of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich had largely died away. The republics most affected are, for the most part, those least affected by the events of the post-Stalin struggle. In all republics, moreover, carry-overs from the Stalin era constituted a relatively large proportion of those dropped, suggesting that the aim was to bring new blood to the leadership of party and government in order to cope with the demands of Khrushchev's dynamic new programs.

An editorial in one republic newspaper expressed the problem this way: "In his time he was not a bad leader. However, the new tasks and accelerated pulse of our entire life after the 21st party congress demanded better qualified party leadership over the economy, but Comrade X, having attained his goal, approached everything with an old measuring tape." 25X1

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**THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY IN 1959**

The favorable economic gains achieved by Yugoslavia in 1959 indicate a sound basis for continued rapid economic expansion. Economic successes were highlighted by the largest agricultural harvest in Yugoslav history and by the regime's announcement in November that the goals of the 1957-

61 plan should be essentially achieved by the end of 1960.

In 1959, Yugoslavia increased industrial production 13 percent and maintained a high investment rate. An increase of 17 percent in per capita income, coupled with a price index rise of only 2

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

percent, contributed to improved living standards. In January 1960, however, rent increases went into effect which caused an 8- or 9 percent increase in living costs. Achievement of the planned 8-percent rise in national income for 1960 would mean an increase of 58.4 percent for the 1956-60 period.

Personal consumption increased sharply, largely as a result of a 36-percent increase in national income originating in private enterprise. Successes on privately owned farms were largely responsible for this increase. Moreover, the combined national wheat crop was so great that Belgrade announced in June the termination of all wheat imports after 1959. Winter crop reports indicate that the 1960 harvest will be smaller than last year, but sufficient for all internal needs without the necessity of imports.

There were, however, some soft spots in the over-all economic outlook. Investments in industry and mining were delayed by difficulties in the utilization of funds allocated for underdeveloped regions--Macedonia, Montenegro, and the Kosmet.

The delays, resulting from shortages of local facilities, equipment, and capable planners, are made more acute by the fact that these are the areas of the greatest population increase. Housing construction did not generally

keep up with family growth in the large industrial areas, even though housing authorities reported for the first time since World War II that total new housing construction had kept pace with new families entering the housing market.

The Yugoslav economy will continue to need foreign investment to ensure present rates of industrial growth, but 1959 production made possible a 17-percent reduction, as compared with 1958, of Yugoslavia's chronic foreign exchange deficit; total imports for the first time in several years showed no increase. The Yugoslav current account showed a deficit of \$124,100,000 in 1959, compared with a deficit of \$132,000,000 in 1958. The regime hopes to reduce this deficit further by expanding its export trade, especially with the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, with which it can extend developmental credits under favorable conditions.

These moves are designed to create new export markets and to protect Yugoslavia from unfavorable trade-community actions in Western Europe, where 50 percent of Belgrade's foreign trade is now conducted. Trade with the Soviet bloc was maintained at the 1958 level--25 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade; exports were increased and imports declined.

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**RUMANIA PLANS INCREASED EMIGRATION OF JEWS**

Rumania has apparently decided to permit a sizable increase in the

number of Jews emigrating to Israel. In an attempt to implement such a program,

**SECRET**



**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Bucharest is making every effort to avoid any publicity over the renewal of emigration. In February 1959 strong Arab pressures on Rumania and the USSR forced the suspension of Jewish emigration after 16,000 Jews had left Rumania in the previous six months.

Bucharest has granted between 3,000 and 4,000 exit permits since November 1959. Since 1 January between 700 and 800 Jewish emigrants have arrived in Greece, nearly all of them on special chartered Rumanian civil airline (Tarom) flights from Bucharest.

The Rumanian decision to extend Jewish emigration appears to have been motivated by internal considerations. The political unstable Jewish element, which numbers about 225,000 persons, has refused to be assimilated into the "socialist" society. In addition, Bucharest stands to gain considerable economic benefits as a result of the exodus and concomitant appropriation of properties. Nevertheless, the regime is fully aware that it can proceed only gradually and cautiously if it is to keep the magnitude of the movement as secret as possible.

The Rumanians have sought to diversify the exit routes

for the emigrés. Future sizable emigration to Israel may be imperiled, however, as Greece--one of the main exit routes for the Jews--has not been particularly cooperative because of pressure from the UAR and concern for the safety of large Greek colonies in Arab countries.

In a further complication, France has suspended the issuance of all East European visas from 1 March until the end of Khrushchev's visit. Limited emigration continues via Hungary, Austria, and Italy, and there is speculation that a route through Yugoslavia may be revived.

In an effort to reduce Arab criticism of Rumania's actions, tacit agreements have been reached among Israel, Rumania, and some West European countries--particularly France and Italy--to provide "sojourn visas" which do not state the ultimate destination as Israel.

There is as yet no evidence of Arab complaints to West European nations concerning this procedure. Other than the pressure brought on Greece, there has been no known adverse Arab reaction to the renewed emigration. Last month Radio Cairo took cognizance of the renewal, but played down the development by saying that it was restricted to the sick and the aged.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

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25X1

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**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

this 66-member group, Senanayake apparently hopes to retain power because of the opposition disunity and defections. He may succeed temporarily. The SLFP apparently does not yet intend



SENANAYAKE

to ally with the leftists in Parliament, and UNP elements are trying, reportedly with some success, to attract SLFP members. The small size of Senanayake's cabinet suggests that he has reserved a few ministries to offer likely defectors. However, opposition elements can topple his government at any time they decide to unite in a no-confidence vote. Opposition pressure alone might cause him to resign voluntarily, as he lacks the political nimbleness and tenacity of his predecessors.

New elections would be the most likely consequence. Gov-

ernor General Goonetilleke would prefer to have the SLFP in power and might maneuver toward this end. The SLFP, however, probably could do no better than the UNP. The principal leftist parties are not in a position to form a government, either singly or in coalition. The Trotskyite party, which won second place in the 1956 elections, has suffered considerable losses, and former Agriculture Minister Philip Gunawardena's Marxist party made a poor showing despite its appeal to the majority Sinhalese-Buddhist community. The Communist party ranks lowest of the main parties, with only three seats.

New elections could result in a large plurality or possibly a majority for one party. A substantial number of minor party candidates who lost presumably would not care to incur the cost of another contest, and most of the votes they divided on 19 March probably would go to the UNP and the SLFP. The leftists would not make significant gains.

UNP leaders reportedly fear that new elections would result in a majority for the SLFP. This seems unlikely, provided elections are not held immediately, for the wave of emotional sympathy which the SLFP aroused by evoking the image of the late Prime Minister Bandaranaike probably cannot be sustained indefinitely.

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**SITUATION IN LAOS**


The Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) has belatedly presented nine candidates to contest the 24 April elections

for the 59-member Laotian National Assembly. Almost simultaneously with the NLHS entry into the race, Hanoi radio

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960



These developments suggest that the Pathet Lao insurgents will make no generalized effort to disrupt the elections. They may, however, exercise their probably substantial capability for influencing the rural vote, endeavoring to swing it in favor of leftist candidates in districts where there are such candidates, and to limit it in districts where there are not. The NLHS could still withdraw from the race if it considered the odds too heavily against it, but present indications are that it seriously intends to participate. While the NLHS and allied elements could not win control of the assembly, the Communists may hope to elect a small leftist bloc which can use the assembly as a propaganda forum and can maneuver to split the non-Communist majority likely to emerge from the elections.

broadcast a purported NLHS appeal to the Laotian people to support NLHS, Santiphab, and other "patriotic and peace-loving candidates" in the elections. The Santiphab is a small left-wing neutralist party which generally voted with the NLHS in the previous assembly. It has openly presented only five candidates, but a few of the unaffiliated candidates are believed to be associated with it. The NLHS is also probably hoping that other unaffiliated candidates, if elected, will support the leftist bloc in the next assembly.

Of the nonleftist candidates, who make up most of the list of 158 candidates, some 60 are on the "unified slate" agreed to by the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) and former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People (RLP). This group presumably will receive most of the funds and other forms of assistance the government will probably commit to the campaign.

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Many of the unaffiliated candidates may be induced by the government to withdraw, particularly in districts having NLHS, Santiphab, or other known leftist candidates. The American Embassy in Vientiane suspects that many entered the race in order later to be "bought off" by the government, or in the hope that wide-open competition would be allowed in districts having no leftist candidates.

Meanwhile, a major Laotian Army operation involving 5,000 men is apparently progressing on schedule in the three southernmost provinces of Laos. The most ambitious of a series of

such security sweeps undertaken in various parts of the country since January, the operation is designed to improve security conditions in preparation for the elections and to provide more effective government control in the countryside after the elections by establishing small military units in many areas in which the Communist insurgents hitherto have had an open field.

The results of the operation are unlikely to come up to government expectations, but security conditions in the towns and larger villages may be improved, and there may be a slight change for the better in the countryside.

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**DETERIORATING POLITICAL SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA**

The widespread resentment aroused by the Rhee government's repressive and fraudulent election tactics--which resulted in serious election-day disturbances--could lead to estrangement between the government and a majority of the Korean people. There has been an increasing tendency by the regime during the past year to rely on force and repression.

Those newspapers not controlled by the government have been outspoken in their criticism of the administration's election tactics, which produced an overwhelming victory for President Rhee and his running mate, Yi Ki-pung. Large numbers of students have participated in widely scattered demonstrations. Korean youths, already disenchanted with the Rhee government, now have a group of martyrs--the students killed by police during the bloody election-day riots at the southern port city of Masan.

The Democratic leadership has called the election "null and void," and the party's representatives have walked out of the National Assembly.

There are indications that the government is concerned and would like to bring about a relaxation of tensions. The home minister has publicly accepted responsibility for the Masan riots, and Rhee has accepted his resignation. The administration might use the traditional resignation of top ministers following a presidential election to drop or reassign

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25X1

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

those most closely associated with the election. An extensive police shake-up also appears likely.

There is no indication, however, that dominant ele-

ments in Rhee's Liberal party have revised their intentions of monopolizing political power after Rhee's death. Such a policy could force the legitimate opposition into subversive channels.

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**SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN AGREE ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE**


South Korea's reluctant agreement to exchange detainees with Japan will relax temporarily pressures within Japan for stern action against South Korea's "hostage diplomacy." The exchange, which Seoul postponed repeatedly since last August in order to extract further concessions, is scheduled to begin on 28 March and to be completed in early April. It will be smaller in scope than the first such program in 1958.

Seoul, apprehensive about the growing Japanese enmity, has agreed to release 167 captured Japanese fishermen who have completed lengthy sentences--in many instances more than three years--for fishing within the "Rhee line." Ac-

cording to Tokyo's figures, South Korea has seized 170 Japanese fishing vessels--149 of which have been confiscated--and has imprisoned 2,209 Japanese fishermen since it established the fishing boundary in 1952.

As its part of the agreement, Tokyo will return about 1,000 Koreans who have been detained at Omura prison for illegal entry. Japan has also agreed to buy 30,000 tons of Korean rice, despite some strong official opposition on the grounds that the rice is surplus to the country's needs and is tantamount to paying ransom.

Unresolved problems connected with the detainee exchange may not block the exchange itself, but they are likely to cause subsequent difficulties. The disposition of 47 Japanese fishermen who have not yet completed their sentences in South Korea has not been decided. Tokyo is seeking a South Korean commitment to release them automatically when their terms expire, but South Korean Ambassador Yu in Tokyo has stated that further consultations are necessary on this point. In addition, 176 Korean detainees, not

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

now scheduled for repatriation, have expressed a desire to go to North Korea. Ambassador Yu has insisted that they "quietly" be sent to South Korea, but Japan is unlikely to agree.

Immediately prior to South Korea's agreement to the exchange, Tokyo was considering a stronger policy toward Seoul. This included referring the Rhee line and the detainee disputes to the UN, expelling the South Korean diplomatic mission in Japan, and taking additional measures to protect Japanese fishing vessels from seizure.

Inasmuch as there are many differences remaining between the countries--including the continued existence of the Rhee line, the threat of future seizures, and vast unsettled property claims--an over-all solution appears remote. Tokyo already has announced that after 1 April its patrol boats in the Rhee line area will mount three-inch guns as well as machine guns, although orders lifting firing restrictions have not been issued. Other countermeasures will probably be considered if Seoul returns to an intransigent position.

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**PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO DE GAULLE REGIME RISING**

De Gaulle's refusal to call a special parliamentary session on agricultural policy has evoked widespread criticism from the press and from parliamentary spokesmen. While he has muzzled parliamentary opposition during the 23 March - 3 April visit of Khrushchev, he will shortly face further demonstrations by farmers in addition to efforts to topple the Debré government.

The farm bloc includes enough deputies in the major assembly groups to put considerable pressure on the government when parliament reconvenes on 26 April. The agricultural lobby can count on other interests, too, because several groups opposed to De Gaulle's tactics and policies are using the farm issue as a vehicle for their own ends.

The rightist Independents, with few exceptions, are against De Gaulle's self-determination policy in Algeria, and they

have been moving into overt opposition to the government since the dismissal of Finance Minister Pinay. The Independent right wing, convinced De Gaulle will be unable to solve the Algerian problem, is maneuvering with an eye to the period after De Gaulle. The Union for a New Republic (UNR), the other principal member of the Debré coalition, although under control of "loyal" Gaullists, is split on De Gaulle's Algerian policy. Dismissed UNR leader Jacques Soustelle may lead as many as 40 UNR deputies into a new formation advocating a "French Algeria."

Left and center parties--including the Popular Republicans, the third member of the coalition--appear to believe they can no longer afford to de-emphasize their opposition to various government domestic and foreign policy issues in order to give De Gaulle a freer hand in Algeria. Dismayed by the implication in De Gaulle's recent statements on Algeria that

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

he is dismissing the possibility of a negotiated cessation of hostilities, they feel that if they are to keep their own influence, they must press the government on social and economic issues and on foreign policy. The left and center, moreover, are increasingly unhappy with De Gaulle's tendency toward "one-man" government.

The political climate in France is rapidly changing, and the "honeymoon" with De Gaulle is probably over. Nevertheless, the lack of a ready alternative to De Gaulle will remain the fundamental deterrent to an all-out campaign against him. The Socialists, although publicly joining in the criticism, have

already indicated privately they must continue to support De Gaulle as the only French leader capable of solving the Algerian problem. De Gaulle will almost certainly have increasing difficulty in implementing his policies, although Premier Debré will bear the brunt of the attack, as there is no easy constitutional mechanism to curb the President. De Gaulle will not compromise where he feels a matter of principle is involved, and the Fifth Republic constitution makes it possible for him to pick as the best solution further moves toward one-man rule.

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**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

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**NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING**

NATO defense ministers, who meet in Paris on 31 March and 1 April, will follow up proposals made at the December 1959 ministerial meeting, and developed in subsequent studies, on means of improving the Western defense effort in the face of chronic deficiencies in manpower, training, equipment, and installations. Other studies on ways of overcoming the deficiencies in the individual country programs, which were authorized at the December 1958 ministerial meeting, are not due until May, however, and important decisions are unlikely without them. The agenda includes logistics in peace and war; cooperation in armaments research, development, and production; NATO defense planning; and meeting the defense burden.

The scheduled report on the air defense integration question was deleted for fear of jeopardizing "the very delicate discussions now in progress" between the French and NATO military authorities. In view of urgent requests for substantive information on this matter, especially on the part of Belgium and the Netherlands, Secretary General Spaak has called for a report to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as soon as possible, but in any event

shortly after the spring ministerial meeting in May.

A German paper proposing to keep the German build-up coordinated with NATO by establishing substantial integration in logistics poses the alternative of erosion of the system, established by the 1954 agreements, of checks and balances on the development of an independent German military force. This item is likely to be referred to General Norstad for study and recommendation.

German and British proposals designed to give impetus to cooperation in armaments production will be discussed. Defense Minister Strauss may also raise a German suggestion for NATO-wide cooperation and coordination in the field of psychological warfare. A British paper on defense planning proposes greater emphasis on NATO preparedness for the first phase of a nuclear war at the expense of the second.

The lack of response to the American plea for European members to undertake an increased share of the common defense effort has prompted Spaak to call for specific proposals by member governments to be discussed at this meeting. None

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

is known to have advanced any such proposal so far.

Recommendations by a special steering group on the reform of the Annual Review exercise, including the addition of a triennial review, have

been approved in principle by NAC and referred to the Annual Review Committee for detailed study. This matter was considered to be too complex for useful discussions by the defense ministers.

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**THE OUTLOOK IN COLOMBIA**

Preliminary returns from the elections on 29 March in Colombia for the lower house of the national Congress indicate that the National Front government headed by President Alberto Lleras can no longer count on the required two-thirds congressional majority required to pass virtually all legislation.

Colombia's National Front is a parity system under which elective and appointive positions at all levels are divided equally between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Each party must contend with dissident factions, which reportedly gained enough congressional seats in the elections to be able to disrupt the government's two-thirds majority. Although the dissident elements are unlikely to cooperate to obstruct the administration, a long-standing struggle between the two principal Conservative factions for control of the party may flare up again and create new strains for the National Front.

Lleras, a Liberal with considerable popularity in his country and prestige in Latin America, has restored democratic government to Colombia since he took office in August 1958 with an overwhelming popular mandate. Prior to his accession to power, an interim military junta had ruled for more than a year after the ouster of former military dictator Rojas Pinilla in May 1957.

In the economic sphere, the government has practiced import austerity, rebuilt foreign exchanges reserves, and refunded the backlog of commercial debts accumulated during the dictatorship. Its recently issued development plan envisages the need of about \$185,000,000 annually in public credits from abroad and private foreign investment. This basic



LLERAS

program emphasizes increased agricultural production and crop diversification.

Lleras will arrive in the United States on 4 April for an official visit, and he will probably seek to determine the availability of credits to promote his comprehensive economic development plan, which was not an issue in the recent elections. Lleras is expected to press for credits for agrarian

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

reform, which he considers essential to end prolonged and widespread rural violence and to undercut the Communist potential for subverting the rural population.

Lleras' ability to demonstrate progress in socio-

economic improvement during his last two years in office could bear heavily on the survival of the National Front, which may face a critical test in 1962 when a Conservative candidate is scheduled to fill the presidency.

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**THE BOLIVIAN REVOLT**

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The brief threat posed by the rebellion of a police regiment in La Paz on 19 March temporarily allayed feuding within Bolivia's governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), although the rebels apparently favored the party's right-wing faction. Both the party majority leader, Victor Paz Estenssoro, and his bitter opponent, Walter Guevara, rallied to President Siles' support while the fighting was in progress. Despite recent serious dissension within the army, air force, and civilian militia over the approaching presidential and congressional elections, none of these forces joined the rebels.

Two days later, however, an armed band fired on Guevara, who was unharmed. The attack was evidently designed to deter him from resuming active leadership of a right-wing splinter group of the government party. This attack and the resignation of two cabinet ministers in apparent protest against President Siles' tolerant attitude toward the splinter group suggest the likelihood of further disorders prior to the presidential elections on 22 May.

The revolt was led by Guevara supporters, although Guevara seems to have been unaware of the plot.

The willingness of key followers of Guevara to attempt a revolt reflects their pessimism about the 22 May elections. Guevara's supporters among the delegates of the 15-21 February convention of the MNR--which polled 80 percent of the vote in 1958 and 1956--were so few that they boycotted the meeting. Paz was nominated unanimously for the presidency, and Juan Lechin, intensely disliked by Guevara's followers, won the vice-presidential nomination by a large margin. The MNR nominees for six vacancies in the Senate and 34 in the Chamber of Deputies will be selected by a newly chosen group which is almost unanimously anti-Guevara.

Further disorders are likely in the next two months as the government prepares for Bolivia's second presidential election with universal suffrage. Quick suppression of the 19 March revolt suggests, however, that President Siles is likely to be the first Bolivian president in 30 years to serve a full term: his four-year administration ends in August.

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**SECRET**

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

24 March 1960

VIOLENCE IN THE ECUADOREAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

Recent politically motivated violence in Ecuador reflects the explosive and acrimonious nature of the campaign for the June presidential elections and indicates that the incumbent Conservative government will be hard pressed to maintain order both during and after the voting. The Communist-backed anti-Conservative coalition (UDNA)

will probably attempt to intensify the animosity among the parties and to exploit unrest. Although the possibility of widespread disorder will continue, an organized revolutionary movement is more likely after the elections than before.

Political violence erupted in two provincial capitals in early March, and campaign tension was heightened by the deaths of five persons in rioting on 19 March in Quito, when former President Velasco--a slight favorite in the presidential race--arrived for a political rally. The clashes were primarily between Velasquistas and members of the National Democratic Front, a coalition of Liberals and moderate Socialists which supports former President Galo Plaza. The Conservatives, whose candidate is former cabinet minister Gonzalo Cordero, were involved to a lesser degree.

Communists were also charged by a high government official with some responsibility for the riot;



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The Communist coalition, which includes leftist Socialists and the demagogic Concentration of Popular Forces, will probably attempt to provoke disturbances in order to take advantage of a favorable moment for a revolutionary attempt--particularly if its candidate, Antonio Parra, is defeated. Parra's chances are not considered so favorable as those of Velasco or Plaza, but his backers have an excuse for an extralegal move in the public statement of the top Velasquista leader that his party will not permit the election to be stolen from it, and that it will take the presidency by "assault" if necessary. Conservative President Ponce is a bitter antagonist of Velasco, and if the Velasquistas are defeated in June, they will probably charge that the President conducted a dishonest election.

Government concern over the political climate is reflected in the decree issued after the riots on 19 March banning outdoor political rallies through the electoral period. The possibilities of widespread disorders during the campaign may also be reduced by the increased capability of the army and police, which recently received training and equipment from the United States for controlling riots.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

**PART III****PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES****KREMLIN POLITICS AND THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION**

After more than 40 years, the Soviet system still has no mechanism for the smooth transfer of the enormous power which in the USSR inevitably becomes concentrated in the hands of one man. Heretofore there has been a period of transitional committee rule overlying an intense dogfight from which has emerged the new "sole leader," the man who best combines a determination to lead with two other staples of political strength: first, a program which most nearly fits the temper of the handful of oligarchs who command decisive voices, and second, organizational support, which rests on a consensus--primarily among top party professionals--that the dominance of one or another of the contenders is the best safeguard of their own future.

**The Question of Succession**

Khrushchev, now approaching his 66th birthday, may remain on the scene for many years. His concern about his durability is shown, however, by his frequent allusions to the subject and his lengthening vacation periods. There is no doubt that Khrushchev would like to handpick his successor. Much as he might want to guarantee an orderly transition, however, it is in the very nature of his position, as well as of his personality, that he can delegate or bequeath only a limited amount, if any, of his authority.

Thus, despite the more "civilized" aspect of the post-Stalin regime, Kremlin politics remain an intricate, brutal, bitter, "dog-eat-dog" business. Anyone who has his sights on Khrushchev's powers

must combine the qualities of discretion, a keen sense of political timing, and strong nerves.

A potential successor must also reckon now with Khrushchev's image of himself. Ever since 1957, when he finally eliminated the remaining obstacles to total power--Malenkov, Molotov, and Zhukov--Khrushchev's view of himself has come increasingly to center on two symbols of accomplishment: domestically, on an economic program which promises to provide greater material comfort as well as more personal security; internationally, on the establishment of the USSR as a great-power equal of the United States.

**Party "Reorganization"**

For the men closest to Khrushchev, his present sense of destiny presents both the hazard of failing to meet new criteria and the opportunity of influencing significant new appointments. In Khrushchev's eyes, political loyalty is no longer a sufficient test for important office in a man whom he otherwise rates as inept or clumsy. As he told the party central committee last December, "Friendship is friendship, but work is work." It is probably this thought which largely accounts for the changes made, beginning in late 1958, in most of the USSR's 15 republics and many key sectors of the central party and government machine.

Altogether, this "reorganization" has cut more deeply into the ranks of the higher party and government hierarchy than any of the earlier, more dramatic post-Stalin "purges,"

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

**RECENTLY TRANSFERRED "KHRUSHCHEV MEN"**

	PRESENT POST	PREVIOUS POST
KIRICHENKO, A. I.	First Secretary, Rostov Oblast Party Committee	Second (?) Secretary, Central Committee (CC) Soviet Communist Party (CPSU)
BELYAYEV, N. I.	First Secretary, Stavropol Kray Party Committee	First Secretary, C. Kazakh Communist Party
SEROV, I. A.	Chief, Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) (?)	Chief, Committee of State Security (KGB), USSR
KUZMIN, I. I.	Chairman, State Scientific Economic Council	Chief, State Planning Committee (Gospplan)
CHURAYEV, V. M.	Chief, Party Organs Department for Union Republics, CC, CPSU	Chief, Party Organs Department for RSFSR, CC, CPSU
SEMICHASTNY, V. Ye.	Second Secretary, CC Azerbaydhan Communist Party	Chief, Party Organs Department for Union Republics, CC, CPSU
LUNEV, K. F.	Recently Replaced as Chief, KGB, Kazakhstan, because of illness	First Deputy Chairman KGB, USSR
MYLARSHCHIKOV, V. P.	Director, State Farm Trust, Moscow Oblast	Chief, Agriculture Department for RSFSR, CC, CPSU
DOROSHENKO, P. Ye.	First Secretary, Chernigov Oblast Party Committee	Chief, Agriculture Department for Union Republics, CC, CPSU
KAPITONOV, I. V.	First Secretary, Ivanovo Oblast Party Committee	First Secretary, Moscow Oblast Party Committee

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24 MARCH 1960

beginning with Beria and ending with the Malenkov-Molotov debacle. Many of the men affected are graduates of organizations headed by Khrushchev in the Stalin era, either in the Ukraine or in Moscow Oblast.

Some of these men have been given responsible but lesser new jobs. In other cases, demotion is more clearly involved. Presidium members Nikolay Belyayev and Aleksey Kirichenko, once rated among Khrushchev's closest political allies, have tumbled far from the summit of power.

Some of the changes will have only an indirect bearing on high-level political rivalries. The disgrace of Kirichenko, especially, is bound to have its effect on the alignment of power at the top today and on the prospects for the succession in the future. His transfer from Moscow to Rostov opens up to others the substantial authority in party affairs he once exercised. The so-called cadres function--overseeing key party appointments--assumes particular significance. It is most likely

to be handed over to party secretaries Averky Aristov, Leonid Brezhnev, and Nikolay Ignatov. Khrushchev's preoccupation with high-level affairs of state probably means that he has come to rely increasingly on the advice of his lieutenants in making key appointments.

**Kozlov--A Beneficiary**

The major beneficiary of Kirichenko's decline may well be Frol Kozlov--Kirichenko's contemporary and most obvious rival for the position of heir apparent. The earnestness of Khrushchev's declaration to Governor Harriman last June now becomes more believable: Kozlov would succeed him, Khrushchev asserted, adding that Harriman would be backing the wrong horse if he picked Kirichenko. Since then the grooming of Kozlov has apparently continued: his visits to the United States in June and July 1959 and to India in January and February 1960 signify a widened scope of interest and experience;

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KOZLOV

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****24 March 1960**

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Kozlov's lack of a position in the party secretariat and, therefore, presumably of direct influence on party operations and appointments has been considered his most serious handicap in the succession sweepstakes. Kozlov himself may no longer be a member of the central committee's Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Republic), the dominant party organization in the USSR's largest and most important republic, but two men who are considered close to him politically are--Dimitry Polyansky, premier of the Russian republic, and Ivan Spiridonov, Kozlov's successor as chief of the Leningrad party organization.

The Leningrad Network

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There are signs of the emergence of a kind of Leningrad network in the upper echelons of the Soviet party. In view of Kozlov's long connection with Leningrad, covering the better part of 30 years, the staffing of pivotal posts with alumni of the Leningrad

organization is a potential gauge--although one which has its limitations--of Kozlov's strength.

Among such appointments, the most recent was the transfer in January of Nikolay Rodionov from second secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party to the party's second-in-command in the troubled Kazakh Republic. In discussing the appointment before the Kazakh party central committee, the first secretary, himself newly named, described Rodionov as "a pupil of the Leningrad party organization, which is strong in its revolutionary tradition."

The past year has also brought the appointment of several Leningraders to posts in the party's central headquarters, a string-pulling center through which party functionaries, although not of the first rank themselves, can exert considerable influence on the course of party politics. Former Leningraders are now head and deputy head of the central committee's Department of Agriculture for the Russian Republic and the chief of the Department of Administrative Organs, charged with party supervision of secret police and judiciary organs in the union republics.

They join other department heads appointed in recent years--those of the Department of Science, Schools, and Culture for the Russian Republic, of the Construction Department for the union republic, and of the General Department--to give Leningrad strong, probably disproportionate, representation in the headquarters staff.

**LENINGRADERS IN KEY PARTY POSTS**

	PRESENT POST	FORMER LENINGRAD POST
KOZLOV, F. R.	Member, Presidium Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU); First Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers, USSR	First Secretary, Leningrad Oblast Party Committee
RODIONOV, N. N.	Second Secretary, Central Committee, Kazakh Communist Party	First Secretary, Leningrad City Party Committee
GRISHMANOV, I. A.	Chief, Construction Department for Union Republics, CC, CPSU	First Deputy Chairman, Leningrad City Executive Committee
KAZMIN, N. D.	Chief, Science, Schools and Culture Department for RSFSR, CC, CPSU	Secretary, Leningrad Oblast Party Committee
MALIN, V. N.	Chief, General Department, CC, CPSU	Secretary, Leningrad City Party Committee
MIRONOV, N. R.	Chief, Administrative Organs Department for Union Republics, CC, CPSU	Chief, Administration of Committee of State Security (KGB) for Leningrad Oblast
VOROBYEV, G. I.	Chief, Agriculture Department for RSFSR, CC, CPSU	Chairman, Leningrad Oblast Executive Committee
SEMYENOV, P. S.	Deputy Chief, Agriculture Department for RSFSR, CC, CPSU	Member, Leningrad Oblast Soviet

00322 38

24 MARCH 1960

**SECRET**



**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960



ARISTOV



BREZHNEV



IGNATOV

Aristov-Brezhnev-Ignatov

Besides Khrushchev's patronage, Kozlov would do well to have the support or at least the benevolent neutrality of men like Aristov, Brezhnev, and Ignatov. These three --all experienced veterans of the party machine--are members of both the party presidium and the secretariat. Their roles are played mostly behind the scenes, but they are highly skilled in high party politics.

Aristov, formally second-in-command to Khrushchev on the Bureau for the RSFSR, actually exercises day-to-day control of operations and appointments in the Russian Republic.

Brezhnev, who has had a role in the party supervision of the armed forces and possibly the security organs, may have taken on some of the responsibilities for personnel appointments in the wake of Kirichenko's removal. For example, he presided over the recent change of command in Kazakhstan and was treated to the kind of elaborate flattery which would

benefit a man of growing consequence.

The third member of this trio, Ignatov, has made a comeback after a brief period of apparent eclipse, and he may be entrusted once again with top-level party supervision of agricultural policy. For a period of several months in 1953 he was Kozlov's superior in the Leningrad party, but whether this ephemeral relationship produced political friendship or enmity is not clear. There is a hint of the latter in the fact that the appointment of the Leningrader Vorobyev to his central committee agricultural post in April 1959 coincided with Ignatov's presumed removal, temporary though it may have been, from authority in the agricultural sphere.

The more Kozlov appears the heir apparent, the more likely he is to become the target of other ambitious men and the more he may be inclined to overreach himself. For now, however, he seems to have some formidable assets: Khrushchev's personal backing, a rapidly broadening experience

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

in both domestic and international affairs, and at least the nucleus of a personal machine. He probably needs time to build on these beginnings. If Khrushchev were to leave

the scene soon, for example, Mikoyan might become a sort of interim chairman of the board. Over the longer run, however, Kozlov now looks like the man to beat. 25X1

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**SATELLITE ATTITUDES TOWARD EAST-WEST DETENTE**

East European attitudes toward improved East-West relations range from support of Khrushchev's position favoring "peaceful coexistence" to an echo of Peiping's avowed distrust of the detente and interest in maintaining world tensions. The Stalinist regimes of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Albania have adopted propaganda positions in sharpest variance with Moscow, while Rumania and Poland have been most responsive to Khrushchev's example on this issue. The responses of the satellite leaderships reflect, to varying degrees, their basic political orientations, the degree of their servility to Moscow, the geographic situations of their countries, or their involvement in a specific foreign policy situation.

All the satellite regimes are mindful of events in 1955 and 1956, when the "Geneva spirit" contributed to dangerous internal relaxations. Concern over the effects of detente at home have been expressed publicly and privately, particularly last fall in all the satellites. Soviet efforts--most recently at the bloc meetings in Moscow in February--to interpret and explain Khrushchev's detente policy have evidently silenced some of the fear. Initial reactions coupled with some later expressions of concern, however, indicate con-

tinuing apprehension among a number of the satellite leaders.

Rumania and Poland

The Rumanian and Polish regimes have come closest to echoing Khrushchev's policies of internal relaxation. Bucharest, although hard-line in orientation, has followed the line primarily because of its fidelity to Moscow. Early fears of the effect of such a program on internal Rumanian developments were admitted by Rumanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej at a diplomatic gathering on 7 November: "My people," he said, "had some doubts at first about the benefits that could result from Khrushchev's American visit."

This fear evidently has been relegated to the background, for Bucharest has pressed for claims settlements and greater cultural and economic exchanges with the West, and it has been the loudest advocate of Khrushchev's calls for a Balkan "zone of peace." It has also used detente for its own specific ends, and began even before Khrushchev's US trip to make friendly gestures in the economic and cultural fields.

The more liberally inclined Polish regime has also been a strong advocate of rapprochement, but for different reasons. Warsaw has consistently followed

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

Soviet foreign policy since 1957, partly to lessen pressures for conformity in internal policies, and it has been a leader in Central European disarmament schemes since Foreign Minister Rapacki presented his plan to the United Nations in October 1957. Poland may also be motivated by a belief that a detente would lead to a settlement of the German problem and Western recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, and that a lessening of world tensions would reduce Soviet pressures on Warsaw. Most recently, Poland has reached agreement with the United States over outstanding American claims for nationalized properties.

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian leadership, one of the most rigidly orthodox in East Europe, has reverted to total support of Moscow's internal and foreign policies after having strayed beyond Soviet examples in evolving a "great leap forward" in late 1958 and early 1959. In recent months Sofia has publicly echoed Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" theme, cooperating with Rumania, Albania, and the USSR in supporting Soviet plans for a Balkan nuclear-free area.

Further evidence of a warmer attitude toward the West is the cooperation the American advance party, and now the legation, has obtained from Bulgarian officials since last fall.

Despite these public examples of support for "peaceful coexistence," however, some

party members appear very concerned about the desirability of a rapprochement with the West. A high-ranking Bulgarian official, for example, noted at the time of Khrushchev's visit to the United States that international relaxation could lead to a weakening of internal control in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Karlo Lukanov warned the National Assembly on 3 November of the possible harmful effect of a detente on the "national liberation movement."

Czechoslovakia

The Czech leadership has also expressed considerable skepticism concerning a detente. Czech propagandists have emphasized anti-American themes and seized every opportunity to charge that the West is working against coexistence and is interested in rapprochement only in the hope of stimulating revisionism from within through increased contacts.

Certain Czech actions have reflected this attitude. While there have been isolated tactical moves to conform with Moscow's line, these are more than counterbalanced by such actions as the virtual suspension of the four-year-old negotiations with the United States on an economic settlement, the rejection of the US efforts to expand cultural exchanges, and the defaulting on British and French loan payments, which had been serviced without interruption since before World War II.

Party leader Novotny, long an advocate of tough policies, clearly views Khrushchev's more moderate policies with misgiving. Czech party leaders were

upset by Khrushchev's article "On Peaceful Coexistence" in the October issue of Foreign Affairs, fearing that it indicated a disposition

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**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

to compromise with the West. Novotny, who demonstrated his understanding of Chinese reluctance to a detente during anniversary celebrations in Peiping in October, has insisted on tight control and isolation from the West, believing this to be the only means of communizing a nation with advanced West European democratic traditions and orientation. He apparently believes coexistence would erode the internal progress toward the Soviet model which the Czech party has achieved.

Czech leaders--and Novotny in particular--may still have reservations about the thesis and may have expressed them at the recent Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact. Such an action could, in part, explain why Novotny was the only party first secretary who did not have a private audience with Khrushchev while in Moscow.

East Germany, Albania, Hungary

The attitude toward a detente exhibited by East Germany, Albania, and Hungary is heavily influenced by fear that it would permit external forces to affect their stability. The East German leadership fears that East-West negotiations might lead to a settlement detrimental to East Germany. It has followed a policy of maintaining tension and challenging the integrity of any Western proposals designed to ease the cold war. Last September, Ulbricht [redacted] feared that Khrushchev, in his eagerness to secure agreement with the United States, might make concessions at East Germany's expense. There is, however, agreement on the basic goals of Moscow's German policy, and Khrushchev has sought to allay Ulbricht's fears of any adverse settlement of the German issue.

Recent East German propaganda--perhaps reflecting Ul-

bricht's satisfaction with Khrushchev's tactical planning for the summit--has conformed with the Kremlin line on Soviet policy toward Germany. Nevertheless, some East German apprehension over the tactical treatment of the German problem will remain as long as East Germany's international status remains unsettled. [redacted]

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Albania has given lip service to detente but has adopted a hostile and militant propaganda position. Tirana's reservations, which parallel Peiping's position, are based largely on a fear of the alleged threat Yugoslavia poses for Albanian security in the event of international relaxation. Party leader Hoxha underlined this fear on 21 September when he warned, "Vigilance is essential, because the imperialists and their servants the revisionists are waiting to pounce on any bloc weakness to stab us in the back."

Hungary has, in the main, supported a rapprochement, but it has taken a more hostile attitude than Moscow toward the United States because of a continued American challenge to the legitimacy of the present Budapest regime. Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar, a loyal supporter of Khrushchev, gave evidence of concern over the possible internal effects of international relaxation in a speech in November to the party congress.

Warsaw Pact Meeting

The Warsaw Pact meeting was probably designed, at least in part, to clarify Khrushchev's policies for other bloc members

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

and to establish a unified bloc position for the summit. The final communiqué indicated that a surface unity had been achieved. Peiping's publication of the speech by Chinese delegate Kang Sheng itemizing Peiping's objections to a detente, however, raises considerable doubt over the extent to which agreement was achieved during the closed sessions.

Chinese opposition may have fallen on sympathetic ears among the East European leaders, particularly those from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. While there is no firm evidence that satellite leaders supported the Chinese positions or that Peiping sought to enlist such support, the similarity of Chinese objections with those of certain satellite party leaders can hardly pass unnoticed in the bloc.

Prospects

Variations in the treatment of and response to the detente theme have been possible because of the increased maneuverability accorded individual

satellite regimes by Khrushchev. These variations tend to reflect the political character of the satellite leaderships. Some of the more orthodox leaders have been troubled by Khrushchev's pragmatism--a pragmatism which they feel weakens the capabilities of the regimes to maintain internal controls. To assuage such fears, Khrushchev has repeatedly declared that there can be no ideological relaxation with the West; in turn, some satellites continue to tighten internal discipline.

During the past few weeks, there has been a greater degree of satellite conformity over the central question of East-West rapprochement. Such unity--as expressed in the Warsaw Pact communiqué in February--is likely to be increasingly manifest in the pre-summit period. The fears of the satellite leaders, however, have not been permanently put to rest and are liable to find expression when the overriding need for outward expressions of bloc unity on the detente theme lessens after the summit meeting.

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**WHITE COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA**

The success of the African nationalist drive for self-government has tended to obscure the problem posed by the entrenched European communities. The 5,700,000 whites of Algeria, Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa may wipe out the good will the Western colonial powers have earned in yielding control to the indigenous Africans. Settler opposition to local national-

ist movements may eventually provoke considerable bloodshed.

Among Africa's total population of 236,000,000, the small European minority has made the major contributions to the economic and political development of the continent, but the influence of individual European groups varies considerably as a result of the geographic, historic, and economic

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

factors in different areas. In West Africa, the few small European settlements pose no great problem. In the higher altitudes of East and South Africa, whites are more numerous and in several areas show a determination to retain their influence regardless of the consequences.

Areas With Little Tension

In West Africa, European merchants and slave traders began to exercise growing military and political power along the coast more than 250 years ago. Adverse climate limited the European element to traders, missionaries, and a few administrators until late in the last century, when extensive penetration of the hinterland began.

Today, in the vast region stretching from the Sahara to the Congo River, there are over 74,000,000 Negroes and only about 165,000 whites. Of these Europeans, at least a third are located at Dakar, which has played an important role as the French administrative capital, defense post, and economic center. In this area, where there are few white settlers, racialism is relatively unimportant, and the white minority enjoys no special privileges which would delay the achievement of independence by African states.

In the East African territories of Ethiopia, Uganda, Ruanda-Urundi, and the Somalilands, there are about 30,000,000 indigenous people and only 45,000 Europeans. Here, too, the influence of the white man in commercial and administrative capacities is decreasing and the African exercises increasing political power.

**AFRICA: ESTIMATED POPULATION IN 1960**  
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)

COUNTRY	EUROPEAN	INDIGENOUS (AFRICAN)
<b>NO RACIAL PROBLEM</b>		
Cameroun	16,000	3,350,000
Ethiopia	23,000	16,100,000**
French Community Republics (exc. Mali, Malagasy)	49,000	16,200,000
Ghana	15,000	5,000,000
Guinea	8,700	2,800,000
Liberia	300	1,250,000
Malagasy Republic (Madagascar)	74,000	5,100,000
Mali Federation	57,500	6,250,000
Nigeria	16,000	35,000,000
Ruanda-Urundi	5,000	4,900,000
Somalilands	8,300	2,000,000**
Uganda	9,000	5,950,000
Other West African	3,000	4,500,000
<b>NATIVE PREDOMINANCE WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY</b>		
Belgian Congo	115,000	13,500,000
Kenya	65,000	6,560,000***
Morocco	270,000	9,600,000*
Tanganyika	22,000	9,150,000
Tunisia	130,000	3,800,000*
<b>EUROPEAN STRONGHOLDS</b>		
Algeria	1,200,000	9,850,000*
Fed. Rhodesia and Nyasaland	300,000	7,600,000
Portuguese (Angola, Mozambique)	178,000	9,900,000
Un. South Africa and SW Af.	3,150,000	12,400,000***

\* Arabs

\*\* Hamites, Semites

\*\*\* Also includes Asians; in S. Africa, also Cape Coloreds (Mixed Bloods) Independent Nations

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24 MARCH 1960

Europeans Under Native Rule

In the North African states of Morocco and Tunisia, about 400,000 French, Italian, and Spanish settlers play a significant economic role. In both nations the size of the foreign community has declined in the four years of independence--in Tunisia from about 255,000 to 130,000. This reflects both the withdrawal of French administrative personnel as well as apprehension among European businessmen and farmers regarding the policies of the new states. President Bourguiba's policy of gradually buying all

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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**


24 March 1960

European agricultural holdings for distribution to Tunisians is likely to bring a further decline.

In Tanganyika, Belgian Congo, and Kenya--which are expected to obtain independence as predominantly African nations--the settler communities face a drastic loss of economic and political influence. In Tanganyika the 20,000 whites, who have a strong economic position in the sisal industry, have never considered themselves strong enough to dominate the

9,000,000 Africans and 100,000 Asians, as do the whites in Kenya. They have not opposed African nationalism and probably can continue to play an important role in an independent Tanganyika.

In neighboring Belgian Congo, where the Africans' political advance has been spectacular in recent months and the Europeans' position has changed rapidly, 115,000 Europeans view with alarm the prospects of rule by 13,500,000 Congolese. Administrative officials, who



**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

total about 25 percent of the employed Europeans, are centered at the capital in Leopoldville and have no strong ties to hinder their return to Belgium. However, the future holds greater concern for the rest of the community, including the 50 percent concerned with manufacturing and industry and the 20 percent engaged in independent commerce.

Many of these persons, particularly those in the eastern Congo and in mineral-rich Katanga Province, fear heavy economic losses whether they sell out and return to Belgium or remain under an inexperienced African regime. Some settlers in Katanga may emigrate to neighboring Rhodesia. Others are apparently already supporting schemes for Katanga's secession from a Congo state. The large foreign companies--particularly the copper-processing Union Miniere--apparently expect to weather the transition period and do business with the new Congolese government. They may, however, face early nationalization.

The recent constitutional conference in London clearly indicated that the British colony of Kenya would be developed as a predominantly African state. This served notice on the 65,000-member European community that most of its economic, political, and social privileges would soon end.

To date, a small minority of the whites--primarily the families on the 4,000 European farms--have spoken for the entire white community. Their conservative policies frequently have not been genuinely representative. This group also has had a disproportionate influence--as have its counterparts in Rhodesia--on the formulation of British policy.

The Europeans, however, have recently lost their exclusive right to inhabit the re-

served highlands in Kenya. They will probably soon lose their advantage in the civil service pay scale, in educational facilities, in credit arrangements, and in agricultural regulations.

The prospect of rule by Africans in the next few years probably will decrease the size of the European community in Kenya. Hard-core rightist settlers are likely to instigate incidents during this period. Of the 4,000 landowners, 40 percent are reportedly considering emigration to South Africa, 40 percent to the Rhodesian Federation and Commonwealth countries, and 10 percent to Britain. Only 10 percent desire to remain in Kenya under an African government.

European Strongholds

Algeria is one of the four areas in which an entrenched European minority appears determined to resist an indigenous take-over of power. Here 1,200,000 French, Spanish, and Corsican settlers are resisting the growing political demands of almost 10,000,000 Moslems.

In Algeria, as elsewhere, out of the 330,000 gainfully employed Europeans, a small landed minority of about 40,000 has exercised influence out of proportion to its numbers. The groups engaged in manufacturing, construction, the professions, and administration are three times as numerous as the landed class, but they seldom speak with a united voice. Under French President de Gaulle the settlers have suffered a rebuff, but their determination remains unshaken. They might even consider secession from France rather than face the prospect of Moslem domination.

In Portugal's African possessions, particularly Angola and Mozambique, Lisbon's determination to resist African

**SECRET**



**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

nationalism is likely to lead to bloodshed eventually. In these areas where the only officially promoted European colonization plan in Africa operates, about 180,000 Portuguese settlers confront 10,000,000 Africans. However, no radical change in the racial proportions is likely because of Portugal's limited population and economic strength.

Another crucial area is the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where 300,000 whites face almost 3,000,000 Africans. In the 60 years of European settlement, the whites have maintained virtually complete domination, although African economic strength and political awareness are rapidly increasing. There is a slow trend toward some official amelioration in the natives' status, but advocates of white supremacy are supported by newly arrived settlers, and they may expect more backing from future immigrants from Kenya and the Congo.

At a conference in London next October, a decision probably will be reached concerning the federation's readiness for independence. Britain faces a dilemma because of the increasing racial antagonism in the federation. Pronounced support for the Africans could lead the 220,000 whites of Southern Rhodesia--and perhaps the 80,000 in Northern Rhodesia's copper-producing region--to declare for separate independence. On the other hand, British support for the white minority would provoke African nationalist disorders and might imperil the federation's continued existence in view of the growing native opposition to the white-dominated federal government.

Southern Rhodesia, which has considerable secondary in-

dustry, mineral wealth, and agricultural riches, could be viable as an independent state. Moreover, most Europeans there believe that if they are pushed too far by pro-African interests, Southern Rhodesia can probably associate itself with the Union of South Africa, even though they openly criticize the extremism of Pretoria's racial policies.

The strongest white citadel is the Union of South Africa, whose 3,000,000 Europeans constitute over half of all the whites in Africa. There, both tradition and a government dedicated to a vigorous espousal of white privileges minimize any immediate threat to white supremacy. Nevertheless, the influence of the 12,000,000 natives, those of mixed blood, and Asians is growing in the economic field. They are increasingly doing semiskilled and even skilled labor, even though it is illegal. However, their political strength has shown no significant gain in recent years because of government repression and a lack of unity.

None of the solutions for racial relations advanced so far in South Africa--e.g., development of separate, self-contained native areas--is either economically or politically feasible. Because of the unwillingness of the Europeans in South Africa to compromise, the non-Europeans probably will ultimately seek a revolutionary solution. The English-speaking minority--largely engaged in commerce and mining--may be willing under heavy native pressure to give up and emigrate elsewhere. However, the more numerous Afrikaners, descended from 17th century Dutch settlers, have no ties outside of South Africa and are likely to resist any African domination by all means available. 25X1

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

24 March 1960

**ISSUES BETWEEN COMMON MARKET AND EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION**

Prospects are poor for compromising the key differences between Western Europe's increasingly competitive trade groupings--the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). While a showdown may be avoided at a 29 March meeting of all countries directly concerned, EEC efforts to accelerate its tariff reductions are viewed by members of the EFTA as a new threat to the major purpose of their organization--the establishment of a preferential Europe-wide free trade area.


**Underlying Issues**

A major objective of the proponents of the EEC is eventual political union. As a first step toward this goal, the six members--France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries--are making important sacrifices of sovereignty and national economic freedom, including adoption of a single common tariff against all other countries. The seven members of the EFTA--Britain, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries--are unwilling to accept the restrictions inherent in membership in a similar system, but they want free commercial access to the EEC, the largest and fastest growing trading area in the world.

The EFTA countries are urging the EEC to link up with them in an association without tariffs among

member states but leaving the original EFTA countries free to fix national tariffs against the rest of the world. The EFTA maintains that the linkage it proposes is necessary to prevent political friction between two trade blocs and to discourage discriminatory EEC policies that would damage the trade of outsiders.

In the EEC view, such an arrangement would serve the commercial interests of the EFTA while undermining the



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