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1 March 1956

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

THE SOVIET PARTY LEADERSHIP Page 1

The composition of the new central committee of the Soviet Communist Party and its presidium, secretariat and bureau for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) reflects the political relationships already established in the Soviet Union as a result of Khrushchev's rise to a predominant position. Collective rule at the top continues with Khrushchev clearly "first among equals." All of the full members of the presidium were re-elected, and there is unusual continuity in the secondary levels of leadership. [redacted]

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MAIN POLICY THEMES OF THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS Page 4

The 20th Party Congress, taking its cue from Khrushchev's authoritative political report, spelled out the main themes of Soviet policy--collective leadership, peaceful coexistence, rapid development of industrial strength, maintenance of military power at a high level, and promotion of popular fronts in non-Communist countries. One of the principal aims of speakers at the Congress was to strip the Soviet regime of the more repugnant aspects of Stalinism. [redacted]

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ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION Page 7

The possibility that Arab-Israeli border incidents could expand into major hostilities has been increased as a result of the concentration of Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese troops on Israel's borders. Firing on Israeli fishing boats on Lake Tiberias and new incidents on the Gaza front have also contributed to this situation. [redacted]

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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA Page 8

The crisis in Algeria is deepening as terrorist operations become bolder, better planned, and on a larger scale, with an uprising in the city of Algiers itself reported imminent. [redacted]

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[redacted] In Morocco, [redacted] the rebels have expanded their operations. [redacted]

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Yugoslavs Pleased With Soviet Party Developments: Yugoslav Communist leaders believe that the Soviet 20th Party Congress proves the present Soviet leaders are really trying to set the USSR on a new course. The way has therefore been made much easier for the resumption of relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties. [redacted]

Page 1

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Soviet Spokesmen Reaffirm Sino-Soviet Solidarity: The tribute accorded Communist China by speakers at the 20th Party Congress climaxes the slow development over the past several years of Soviet recognition of the Chinese road to socialism, and marks authoritative Soviet acceptance of established Chinese Communist thought on the subject. [redacted]

Page 2

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Chinese Communist Party Now World's Largest: The Chinese Communist Party membership of 9,000,000, as announced by politburo member Chu Teh in his speech to the Soviet 20th Party Congress, makes the Chinese party the largest Communist party in the world. The Soviet Communist Party has about 7,200,000 members. [redacted]

Page 3

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Soviet Technical Training for Asian-African Countries: New Soviet offers to provide technical training for Asian and African countries and the USSR's sponsorship of technical institutes in Bombay and Rangoon confirm that Moscow intends to make educational assistance one of the mainstays of its policy toward the economically less developed countries. This program will in the long run increase Soviet influence among the technical elite and may place the USSR in a position to compete with the West in the training of technical students from the underdeveloped areas. [redacted]

Page 3

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Afghanistan: Of the \$100,000,000 Soviet credit to Afghanistan, \$60,000,000 is reported to have already been committed to projects in all parts of the country. Arms from the USSR are apparently arriving in Kabul, and the long-delayed Afghan military mission to discuss Czech arms may soon depart for Prague. The USSR may also be preparing to launch a campaign designed to give its economic program maximum political impact. [redacted]

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
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Saar Settlement Prospects: French foreign minister Pineau is apparently ready to make extensive concessions on the Saar in his talks with Foreign Minister Brentano in Bonn on 3 March. In general, France seems willing to abandon all objections to the area's early political and economic reintegration with West Germany, provided the Germans in turn satisfy two economic demands aimed at strengthening France's over-all position in the Coal-Steel Community.



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Indonesia: The Masjumi-led cabinet, having won parliamentary approval on 28 February for abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, plans to resign shortly--perhaps before the new parliament is installed--and assume caretaker status. The first formal effort to create a new cabinet probably will be directed toward a coalition of the three major non-Communist parties. [redacted]

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Thai Government Reaffirms Anti-Communist Policies: The Thai government's crackdown last week on elements agitating for closer political and trade ties with Communist China appears to be the result of a decision not to alter its strongly anti-Communist policies at this time. [redacted]

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Chinese Communists Occupy Island in South China Sea: Chinese Communists have recently settled on one of the islands in the Paracel group, strategically situated midway between Vietnam and the Philippines. Ostensibly fishermen, the Communists may be reporting air-warning information and keeping watch on shipping in the area. [redacted]

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Inflation Again Threatens Aid Program in South Korea: A resurgence of inflation since the first of the year threatens further to dissipate the effectiveness of the \$700,000,000 American aid program in South Korea, and will probably lead to new disputes with President Rhee over the level and implementation of American aid. [redacted]

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Instability Continues in Peru: The ending of the Iquitos rebellion on 25 February leaves the Peruvian regime of General Odria still threatened by underlying disaffection. New disturbances can be expected if Odria fails to satisfy important elements in the country that the presidential and congressional elections scheduled for June will not be rigged. [redacted]

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

NEW CONSTITUTION NO CURE FOR PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Page 1

The perennial conflict between East and West Pakistan will probably continue despite approval of the new constitution by the Constituent Assembly, and the Pakistani government's stability is unlikely to be increased. [redacted]

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SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Page 4

President Rhee's re-election being virtually certain, political maneuvering in South Korea is centered on competition for the vice-presidential nomination of the dominant Liberal Party. A party convention to name the candidates is reported planned for 5-6 March and the elections for sometime in May. [redacted]

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THE DILEMMA OF SOVIET LITERARY POLICY

Page 5

Debate in Soviet publications on the problems of Soviet literature shows that official policy toward the arts remains unsettled and that the search for a more tolerable balance in official policy between ideological conformity and artistic creativeness continues. Differences of opinion as to the extent to which the party should regulate creative activity, evident within the literary fraternity for some time, may be reaching into the upper levels of the party as well. Khrushchev, in his speech to the 20th Party Congress, made it clear, however, that during a period when cultural interchange with the West has been allowed in the interest of propaganda and diplomatic objectives, the party must guard against a relaxation of ideological discipline and the infiltration of "alien" influence. Literature in the USSR always has been the servant of the state, and Soviet writers will be expected to stay within party-defined limits. [redacted]

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

THE SOVIET PARTY LEADERSHIP

The composition of the new central committee of the Soviet Communist Party and its presidium, secretariat and bureau for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic reflects the political relationships already established in the Soviet Union as a result of Khrushchev's rise to a predominant position. Collective rule at the top continues with Khrushchev clearly "first among equals." All of the full members of the presidium were re-elected and there is unusual continuity in the secondary levels of leadership.

The new central committee was elected on 24 February at the 20th Party Congress. On 27 February the 133 voting (full) members of the 255-man committee met in plenary session to elect the party's presidium and secretariat. This presidium, assisted in an executive capacity by the secretariat, constitutes the collective dictatorship of the Soviet Union. The central committee is actually chosen by the top leaders long before the formal election and includes their important political friends and protegés.

Khrushchev's predominant position was established beyond doubt by the election of a large number of his friends and protegés to the new central committee and as candidate members of the presidium and members of the secretariat. His power is further illustrated by his being appointed to head the central committee's important new "Bureau for the RSFSR" (Russian Republic). A liberal

sprinkling in the new central committee of probable supporters of the other top leaders (Mikoyan, Bulganin, and Kaganovich) attests, however, to the continuation of collective rule.

Central Committee

Since the election of the previous central committee in 1952, the top party hierarchy has changed considerably as a result of Stalin's death, Beria's execution, Malenkov's demotion and Molotov's humiliation. The secondary leadership, however, has remained remarkably stable. Almost 60 percent of the new central committee served on the old one. This percentage is larger than at any time since the 17th Party Congress in 1934, the last congress before the great purges.

The relative position in the central committee of the government administrator and the party official has not changed, but among the government representatives there has been a shift from the police and the military to other functionaries. The cut in police representation from nine to three is in line with the reduced political role of the police in the post-Stalin period. The effect of the cut in total military representation from 26 to 18 is somewhat offset by the military's net gain of one among the full members of the central committee and the election of Zhukov, a professional soldier, as a candidate member of the party presidium, where he may be able to exercise some personal influence on policy.

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
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The new central committee contains six more ambassadors than the one elected in 1952, but nearly all of these are former party careerists turned diplomat since Stalin's death and assigned to posts within the Sino-Soviet bloc.


Party theorists and purveyors of the ideological line appear to have been downgraded by the congress. A. A. Fadeyev, a secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, was demoted to candidate member of the central committee, and K. M. Simonov, another secretary of the writers'

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USSR

PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION



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*-New appointments

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guild, was removed from the committee. The Ukrainian playwright Aleksandr Korneichuk is the only writer to retain full membership on the committee. Neither the director nor deputy director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute, the party's top ideological research institution, was elected to the committee although both posts were represented on the last central committee.

The only appreciable change in geographical representation on the central committee was an increase in Ukrainian representation from 8 to 19. Nine other members of the committee had only recently transferred from the Ukraine to jobs elsewhere in the union. This increase is probably due to Khrushchev's influence, since he spent many years as party secretary in the Ukraine, and the persons gaining thereby can probably be counted his supporters.

Presidium and Secretariat

The eleven full members of the party presidium were re-elected at the central committee plenum following the

| CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE 1952-1956 BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| | 1952 | | 1956 | |
| PARTY OFFICIALS | 108 | 46% | 116 | 45% |
| GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | 114 | 48 | 124 | 49 |
| MILITARY | 26 | 11 | 18 | 7 |
| POLICE | 9 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| FOREIGN OFFICE | 6 | 3 | 12 | 5 |
| OTHER | 73 | 30 | 91 | 36 |
| MISCELLANEOUS | 14 | 6 | 15 | 6 |
| TOTAL | 236 | 100% | 255 | 100% |


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congress. Ambassador to Poland P. K. Ponomarenko, dropped as candidate member, was the only casualty. Ponomarenko may have fallen out of favor because of his association with Malenkov, or more likely because of the way in which he carried out Khrushchev's agricultural policy in Kazakhstan, where he was party secretary in 1954-55.

Five candidate members were added to the presidium. They are Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov, Kazakh party boss L. I. Brezhnev, Uzbek party boss N. A. Mukhitdinov, Pravda editor in chief D. T. Shēpilov, and Moscow City party boss E. A. Furtseva. Trade Unions head N. M. Shvernik was re-elected a candidate.

The six members of the old secretariat were re-elected and Brezhnev and Furtseva added. Since the position of all-Union party secretary may be incompatible with their Kazakh and Moscow City jobs, both Brezhnev and Furtseva may be replaced in those posts.

Furtseva is the first woman to achieve



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a position on either the presidium or the secretariat. Her promotion is probably due to the influence of Khrushchev, who had helped her become Moscow party secretary and who singled her out for honors at public fetes and receptions during the past year.

With five of the eight secretaries also on the presidium (two as full members and three as candidate members), closer co-ordination between policy-making and the party's day-to-day administration should result. Khrushchev's hand in top party councils will also probably be strengthened.

Bureau for the RSFSR

The central committee's "Bureau for the RSFSR," called for by Khrushchev in his speech to the congress, was presumably organized by the central committee plenum on 27 February. Khrushchev was named chairman, and party secretary N. I. Belyayev, deputy chairman. The

10-man bureau also includes RSFSR premier M. A. Yasnov, Moscow Oblast party boss I. V. Kapitonov, Leningrad Oblast party boss F. R. Kozlov, and A. P. Kirilenko, a Ukrainian recently transferred to head the Sverdlovsk (RSFSR) Oblast party organization.

The RSFSR bureau will probably act as a junior presidium, making republic-level policy decisions for the Soviet Union's largest republic. The creation of a special body to perform this function, formerly a responsibility of the all-Union presidium, followed apparently successful experimentation with departments in the all-Union party apparatus especially created to deal with RSFSR matters. While the new bureau is probably designed to relieve the presidium as a whole of administrative detail, the political importance of RSFSR affairs is so great that Khrushchev has chosen to keep them under his personal jurisdiction.

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MAIN POLICY THEMES OF THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS

The Soviet Party Congress has clearly spelled out main trends in Soviet policy, trends that had their origin in the period following Stalin's death and which became more clearly defined with the purge of Beria and the rise of Khrushchev.

Khrushchev dominated the congress. His eight-hour, 50,000-word political report was a demonstration of authority. His report as well as the other speeches at the congress, notably Mikoyan's, add up to the fact

that the present leadership has revised Soviet policy in order to strip the regime of the more repugnant aspects of Stalinism.

These aspects were:

An absolute dictatorship based on naked police power rather than on party authority.

A primary reliance on force and the threat of military power to achieve Communist ends, coupled with the grim thesis of the inevitability of war.

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A belief in the necessity of violent revolution in every nation.

These ideas have been formally repudiated, and have been replaced by:


Collective leadership. The veterans of Stalin's tyranny have now at least outwardly committed themselves to "collective leadership," with Khrushchev the dominant personality. This is not likely to work indefinitely, but while it does, it will probably give a flexibility to Soviet policy that will make it more dangerous to the non-Communist world than the "hardened arteries" period of Stalin's last years.

Peaceful coexistence and denial of the "fatal inevitability of war." These are policy-propaganda themes likely to last a good many years, because the Soviet leaders recognize that Stalin was making things easier for

the West by frightening small nations into co-operation with the United States from a dread of general war or direct Soviet military aggression.

Possibility of peaceful transition to socialism in some countries. The admission that the "transition to socialism" may be achieved in some countries by peaceful parliamentary means is a signal for full speed ahead with the "popular front" in unstable political arenas such as France, Italy, and Indonesia. It reflects a belief on the part of the Soviet leaders that, without war, they can push American influence off the Eurasian continent and perhaps all the way back home by political, economic and subversive pressures alone.

It is unlikely that the Soviet leaders would have undertaken the delicate and potentially dangerous task of revising



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Communist dogma if they were contemplating only some short-term, narrow tactical shift in line.

Authoritative pronouncement of this new policy line will have many reverberations in Communist circles throughout the world. (See article on Yugoslav reactions, Part II, p. 1) While some local Communist leaders have probably been shaken by Soviet repudiation of Stalinism, they now have a chance to revitalize their parties and win back respectable intellectual and working-class support, previously dwindling because of the unflinching subordination of local interests to Soviet policy.

The congress also reaffirmed that the regime is dedicating itself to maintaining a rapid pace of development of industrial strength. The economic goals cited permit the USSR simultaneously to keep the home base solid and secure in both economic and military contexts, even though at some cost in improvement of living standards; to export capital to the places where it will do the most political good--especially to the former colonial countries anxious to industrialize rapidly; and to distribute arms to countries abroad, wherever such action will cause the most trouble.

Mikoyan and Zhukov asserted that the USSR's military strength will be maintained at a high level, although they stated that Soviet military power would be employed defensively or as a deterrent to Western initiation of hostilities.

Soviet policy is also calculated to enhance Soviet

prestige in Asia and Africa. Khrushchev included "peace-loving" neutral states in both Asia and Europe, along with the Sino-Soviet bloc, in a vast "zone of peace" which now, and especially in the future, Soviet leaders expect to play a decisive role in world affairs. Soviet policy is designed to slow down the growth of Western strength and exploit weaknesses in the Western coalition. At the same time, it is intended to increase Soviet influence on the world's uncommitted and neutralist nations and to manipulate them in support of Communist foreign policy. The final congress resolution carefully grouped the main nations of the world in ways that reflected these policy aims.

All the speeches of the Soviet leaders make it clear that the capture of power, establishment of "dictatorships of the proletariat," and the revolutionary transformation of society will remain the ultimate aims of Communist parties. Khrushchev's revisions of Communist dogma constitute mainly an admission that long-term Communist objectives can be reached by means hitherto considered unrealistic and for that reason wrong.

Finally, all the speakers at the congress sounded a note of deep confidence in the strength of the Communist world and in the inevitability of its ultimate triumph over capitalism. In Khrushchev's words: "The Soviet State is growing and gathering strength. It towers like a powerful lighthouse showing all humanity the road to a new

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world....Our cause is invincible....The future is ours."

Or, as Mikoyan put it: "Not a single major international question can now be solved by the will of the Western powers alone without re-

gard for the views of the Soviet Union, China, and all the countries of socialism. In the minds of humanity, socialism is now incomparably stronger than capitalism. That is why it is not for us to fear a struggle between the ideas of socialism and capitalism." [REDACTED]

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
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

The possibility that Arab-Israeli border incidents could expand into major hostilities has been increased as a result of the concentration of Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese troops on Israel's borders. Firing on Israeli fishing boats on Lake Tiberias and new incidents on the Gaza front have also contributed to this situation.

Almost all major Syrian army units are now stationed at or near the Israeli frontier, and Egypt has 42,500 men, over half its army and about 80 percent of its actual combat strength, in the Sinai Peninsula near Israel's southwestern border. The Lebanese also have moved infantry and artillery closer to the border.

Syrian officers admit that the disposition of their forces makes them vulnerable to an Israeli breakthrough in the event of hostilities, but they

claim the recent move of their units is demanded by public opinion. Both the Syrian and the Egyptian reinforcements of frontier areas appear to stem from fear that Israel will take some action inside the



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demilitarized zone in the immediate future to divert the Jordan River. Fear of a crisis and possible domestic repercussions also appear to be behind Syrian president Quwatli's intention to take a "rest" in upper Egypt.

Despite the fact that UN truce supervisor General Burns has encountered an almost completely negative Israeli attitude toward proposals for easing tension along the border with Egypt, Israeli statements continue to imply that Israel is willing to wait at least a couple of months for some solution to the Jordan water problem.

The Israeli radio has publicized assertions by Syrian authorities that they would put a stop to the sporadic rifle fire directed against Israeli fishermen on Lake Tiberias. Moreover, Tel Aviv kept silent the fact that Egypt had held up a Greek ship carrying construction material for the Israeli port of Eilat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba until after Egypt had allowed the ship to proceed.

These actions suggest that Israel does not want to provoke a crisis at this time.

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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

The crisis in Algeria is deepening as terrorist operations there become bolder, better planned and concerted, and larger in scale.

French officials in Paris expect major rebel activity in March, and the cabinet has requested the National Assembly to approve emergency powers. Former premier Mendes-France told Ambassador Dillon on 27 February that the Algerian situation had deteriorated considerably during the past month and was beginning to show resemblances to the Indochina war.

The mayor of Algiers claims to have evidence that the nationalists plan to surround the city of Algiers and stage a simultaneous uprising within the city, possibly within the next two weeks. He does not believe the local police force is adequate to handle such a situation.

Algerian Moslem extremists are preparing for a showdown, while the "Group of the 61," hitherto attempting to exert a moderating influence, appears to be inactive. The extremists for several months have isolated the port of Collo in eastern Algeria, and in addition have now surrounded the important port of Nemours in western Algeria. Land communications are so disrupted that only air travel is reasonably safe.

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
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
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Fearful that France may be forced to abandon them, the European settlers in Algeria are organizing to take measures for their own defense, if necessary in defiance of French law. There is increasing advocacy of a coup to establish a European-supremacy regime patterned on the one in South Africa.




The French army in Algeria, variously estimated at between 166,000 and 220,000, is continuing to lose ground to the rebels, and the French Ministry of Defense is proposing a major reorganization and training program to combat their hit-and-run operations.



Morocco

Moroccan rebels, who recently have substantially enlarged their field of operations, on 26 February attacked a French military outpost in southwestern Morocco. Meanwhile, Moroccan dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the French-Moroccan negotiations in Paris is becoming apparent.



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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTSYugoslavs Pleased
With Soviet Party Developments

Yugoslav Communists believe that the Soviet 20th Party Congress proves the present Soviet leaders are really trying to set the USSR on a new course.

The Belgrade newspaper Politika, in an editorial typical of the Yugoslav press reaction, says that the speeches and resolutions at the congress, and particularly the condemnation of the "cult of personality," point to "a new page in Soviet history, a technical and modern, progressive and elastic, and also more humane stage than the previous one." The only point with which the Yugoslav press has expressed disagreement was the continued Soviet insistence that the world is divided into two camps, a position the Yugoslavs have consistently opposed as only sharpening tensions.

Ambassador Riddleberger reports that Yugoslav officials have concluded that the Soviet "threat" is no longer imminent, if in fact it exists at all. They based this conclusion mainly on Soviet references to peaceful intent and the statements that a socialist state can be achieved from capitalism through parliamentary procedures.

Prior to the Soviet party congress, the most important areas of ideological difference between Belgrade and Moscow were in concepts of how socialism can come to power, and how socialism can develop once in power. On the former question, the Yugoslavs claim that all countries will inevitably achieve socialism in their own way, and that already some

countries in Western Europe are developing socialism in an evolutionary fashion through legislation rather than revolutionary seizure of power.

Mikoyan's statement at the party congress clearly continued the historic Bolshevik objection to an evolutionary course, calling it mere revisionism or reformism, and "fruitless jibbing." Mikoyan and Khrushchev did, however, accept the idea of a "revolutionary" takeover by the "workers" (i.e., Communists) without actual resort to violence. In other words, they said, it is possible "to reach socialism by peaceful means... using existing parliamentary institutions." Mikoyan cited the Czechoslovak coup of 1948 as an example of successful parliamentary transition to socialism, and it was in this sense that Soviet leaders accepted the possibility of "peaceful revolution."

On the second point, the Soviet leaders made into official party doctrine what they had accepted on their Belgrade visit--that is, that there are many roads of socialist development once the "workers" are in power. This makes the Yugoslav and other possible "roads of socialist development" as respectable as the USSR's own road.

The ideological gap has thus been narrowed between Moscow and Belgrade, and the way made much easier for the establishment of new party-to-party relations. The Yugoslavs deny that any have been established yet.

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The message of greetings to the Soviet "comrades" sent by Tito on behalf of the Yugoslav party and Socialist Front in one sense constitutes a party contact. It may be a forerunner of more direct contacts, first at a relatively high level. Some move may be made in this direction during Tito's trip to Moscow this summer. The Yugoslavs have insisted that they are willing

to have relations with all "socialist" groups, provided a satisfactory basis can be established. They probably now believe this is possible with the USSR in light of statements at the congress. They will probably remain adamant against contacts with the Cominform, which Belgrade strongly criticizes as being dominated ideologically by one form of socialism.

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Soviet Spokesmen
Reaffirm Sino-Soviet Solidarity

The tribute accorded Communist China by speakers at the 20th Soviet Party Congress climaxes the slow development over the past several years of Soviet recognition of the Chinese road to socialism, and marks authoritative Soviet acceptance of established Chinese Communist thought on the subject. The Soviet leaders confirmed that the USSR and China are continuing to cooperate harmoniously.

The speakers discussed China separately from the other "people's democracies" and indicated its order of priority within the Sino-Soviet bloc by consistently placing it immediately after the USSR.

References to Communist China's world position strongly emphasized peaceful Chinese initiative. Communist China's claim to Taiwan was given secondary emphasis, although it figured prominently in speeches by Molotov and Zhukov. Khrushchev ignored the Taiwan issue and placed Chinese external policy entirely within the context of the bloc's general peace initiative.

He credited China with contributing to the termination

of the wars in Indochina and Korea and proposing a collective peace pact for Asia--a proposal for which Molotov again declared Soviet support. Both Khrushchev and Molotov endorsed the "five principles," originally co-authored by China and India, as the best formula for peaceful coexistence in the world.

Within the general framework of increasingly broad acceptance of past and future methods of arriving at socialism, the party congress speakers gave the fullest recognition thus far extended to the ideological correctness of the Chinese road to socialism. Several speakers, including Khrushchev, endorsed China's program of "peaceful" transformation from capitalist to socialist ownership.

D. T. Shepilov, one of the foremost of the Soviet ideologists, applauded the Chinese Communists for their "masterful application" of Marxist dialectics to local conditions in what constituted the most generous tribute to the special features of the Chinese transition yet made by a high Soviet official. Shepilov, probably echoing past dissension within

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the Soviet party on the problem of China's transition, criticized the "bookmen of Marxism" who regard the Chinese approach as "almost tantamount to trampling under foot the principles of Marxism-Leninism."

Shepilov did not go so far, however, as to cite

Chinese Communist claims for Mao Tse-tung as a formulator of doctrine. Without mentioning Mao, he attributed to the "Chinese Communist Party" the conclusion that "peaceful" methods would prevail in China's transition to socialism. [REDACTED]

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Chinese Communist Party
Now World's Largest

The Chinese Communist Party's membership of 9,000,000, as announced by politburo member Chu Teh in his speech to the Soviet 20th Party Congress, makes the Chinese party the largest Communist Party in the world. The Soviet party has an official membership of 7,215,505.

The last official Chinese enrollment figure announced was 6,500,000 as of the end of 1953. An increase of 2,500,000 in two years, though large, is not unprecedented. The Chinese Communist Party claimed to have enrolled 2,700,000 new members in 1949 and 1950.

Since 1953, the party has conducted an intensive drive for membership among the peasants, who make up the bulk of

the new members. More recently, emphasis has been placed on recruiting workers from industrial and commercial enterprises converted to joint state-private ownership.

Chinese Communist Party membership is likely to continue to grow. Party leaders in one Chinese province have announced a membership goal of about 3 percent of the population. This is about the present Soviet ratio, and if extended to China as a whole, would mean a membership of about 18,000,000.

An official announcement of Chinese Communist Party enrollment can be expected at the 8th congress of the Chinese party, which is scheduled for the latter half of 1956. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Technical Training
For Asian-African Countries

New Soviet offers to provide technical training for Asian and Far Eastern countries and the USSR's sponsorship of technical institutes in Bombay and Rangoon confirm that Moscow intends to make educational

assistance, especially in technical fields, one of the mainstays of its policy toward the less developed countries. This program will in the long run afford the USSR an opportunity to promote Soviet technical

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practices and influence a large segment of the technical elite in Asia and the Far East. The USSR may soon be in the position of training as many Indian and Burmese students as the West.

The USSR's technical training program may well fall under the jurisdiction of the new Chief Directorate for Economic Relations (GUES), which also controls Soviet foreign economic aid and enjoys a priority place directly under the Council of Ministers.

P. A. Maletin, a deputy chief of GUES, who headed the Soviet delegation to the conference of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which recently met in India, has said that the USSR is ready to receive specialists from the ECAFE countries and to share Soviet technical and economic experience with them. He also said the USSR would send experts to those countries either as a part of the Soviet contributions to the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program (UNETAP) or under bilateral agreements.

A Soviet spokesman reportedly told the conference that the Soviet government was ready to grant 200 scholarships to students from the ECAFE countries for study in Soviet institutions.

The USSR, through UNESCO, will provide technical assistance and equipment to the value of six million rubles (\$1,500,000 at the official rate) for the proposed Western Technological Institute at Bombay, which will be opened in mid-1957, according to the official Indian information service. The USSR

also will provide the institute with 15 Soviet professors for five-year terms, translators to prepare English versions of Soviet technical literature, and training facilities for 20 Indian teachers in the USSR.

The institute appears to have been worked out between India and the USSR early last year. The amount allocated for it is almost double the expenditure originally anticipated when the project was approved last November within the framework of the UNETAP for 1956. The deputy director general of UNESCO has stated, however, that if UNESCO is to be associated with the Bombay institute, the USSR will be informed that the project must be worked out on a multilateral basis.

The Soviet Union also plans to furnish similar facilities and, apparently, personnel for a technological institute it is to construct in Rangoon. The Burmese institute was promised by Bulganin and Khrushchev during their visit to Burma in December and has been planned outside United Nations channels. The institute, like the one the USSR is to construct for India, will accommodate about 1,000 students.

The Soviet Union probably will endeavor to make these institutes the most advanced in South and Southeast Asia. With the expanded educational exchange program, they will be effective means of promoting Soviet technical methods and Soviet-type planning for countries which desire speedy industrialization. Communist influence is already in ascendancy among Burmese university students, and a by-product of the institutions probably will

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be that some of the trainees will become Communist or pro-Soviet in their political convictions.

One of the most spectacular offers in the field of educational assistance has been the USSR's willingness to train personnel in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. On 10 February the USSR agreed to help Egypt set up and equip a nuclear physics laboratory in Cairo. Soviet scientists will be sent to Cairo, and Egyptian scientists and specialists will be trained in Soviet research institutes. The agreement was signed by a deputy chief of GUES.

A Soviet offer to help India develop its nuclear research was made last July. Premier Bulganin, in his reply to a Pakistani editor on 6 February, expressed a willingness to share the USSR's atomic knowledge of the peaceful application of atomic energy with Pakistan.

As a concomitant of the USSR's increased activity in the Afro-Asian countries, Soviet educational institutions have stepped up the teaching of the languages of the area. [REDACTED] (Concurred in by ORR and OSI)

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Afghanistan

Of the \$100,000,000 Soviet credit to Afghanistan, \$60,000,000 has reportedly already been committed to projects in all parts of the country. Arms from the USSR are apparently arriving in Kabul, and the long-delayed Afghan military mission to discuss Czech arms may soon depart for Prague. The USSR may also be preparing to launch a campaign designed to give its economic program maximum political impact.

The USSR and Afghanistan have agreed to more than a dozen development projects committing \$60,000,000 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Most significant of the reported projects from the standpoint of potential Soviet subversion of Afghanistan are motor vehicle repair shops at Kabul, Pulikumri, and Kandahar, and construction of a military airfield

30 miles north of Kabul.

Visits by Soviet missions to the Jalalabad area, which reportedly resulted in agreement for construction of a dam at Barikad 30 miles from the Khyber Pass, and to the Kandahar area, opposite Quetta in Pakistan, suggest that the USSR is eager to extend its influence into areas close to the Pakistani border. The Russians also inspected the Kandahar International Airport and the Khajakai dam in the Helmand River development project, both of which are being constructed by the American Morrison-Knudsen company.

The American embassy in Kabul reports that the Russians are to undertake construction of short-wave radio and long-distance telephone facilities for which the West Germans had already been given a contract.

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The second phase of the Sarobi hydroelectric project on which the Germans have been working is also reportedly to be taken over by the USSR under the credit agreement. If this happens, it would be the first occasion when Western interests were squeezed out by increased Soviet activity.

tained by the American army attaché in Kabul, may have carried equipment for a hospital, donation of which was announced by Bulganin and Khrushchev during their visit to Kabul last December. Unconfirmed reports of new Soviet-Afghan arms deals continue to circulate in Kabul.

Arrival in Kabul

PI two convoys of 25 to 50 trucks each from the Soviet border

contain rifles, light automatic weapons, and ammunition--indicates that the USSR is also supplying the Afghans with arms, which Kabul has long sought to obtain from any source. The second convoy, according to information ob-


The Afghan government is about to send a military mission to Czechoslovakia to purchase more arms. The decision to send the mission, which was publicized several months ago but never implemented, was reportedly made following prodding from Prague.

Although a demonstration against new Afghan-Soviet ties is supposed to have taken place

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Afghanistan



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among Hazara tribesmen in central Afghanistan early in January, prompt implementation of Soviet offers has apparently inspired a certain amount of public enthusiasm in Kabul. Recent informal protests by the Afghan Foreign Ministry to the American embassy against "encroachment upon Afghan sovereignty" by American balloons and USIS propaganda against a country "with whom Afghanistan has friendly relations" may also reflect Kabul's more favorable attitude toward the USSR.

On the other hand, unusual publicity has been given to the signing of a \$2,500,000 technical assistance agreement with the United States, and top Afghan officials have stressed their desire for more American assistance. This suggests Kabul is eager to keep its relations with the US and the USSR in some kind of balance.

Radio Kabul has announced the beginning of Russian language lessons in Kabul. There is also a report that Soviet cultural magazines in Russian and Persian are to be printed in Kabul and that Soviet agricultural magazines in Persian are to be distributed in the schools. This suggests that the Afghan government is not resisting Soviet efforts at cultural penetration as vigorously as it has in the past.

Two editors of Afghan government newspapers recently visited the USSR. Another press official is reportedly to go to Moscow and Stalingrad for two years' experience while a Russian press adviser is to come to Kabul in six months. In addition, Moscow is planning to construct a one-acre pavilion for the Afghan national festival scheduled for August.

[Redacted] (Concurred in 25X1
by ORR)

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
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Saar Settlement Prospects

French foreign minister Pineau is apparently ready to make extensive concessions on the Saar in his talks with Foreign Minister Brentano in Bonn on 3 March. In general, France seems willing to abandon

all objections to the area's early political and economic reintegration with West Germany, provided the Germans in turn satisfy two specific demands for economic advantages which would strengthen France's over-all

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
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position in the Coal-Steel Community.

At the beginning of the current negotiations in February, France demanded that political reintegration of the Saar with Germany be slowed to keep pace with economic integration which France had wanted to extend over a decade. There are indications, however, that the French may now be prepared to come close to a German counterproposal for a two-year political integration period, possibly with some arrangement permitting Saar participation in the 1957 Bundestag elections.

The Saar



electrifying the Moselle rail lines or even sooner by international agreement to lower existing rail rates.

The German negotiators, however, admit the "symbolic value" of the Moselle project for the French

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The Benelux countries--particularly Luxembourg--may, however, raise strenuous objections.

Continuation of the existing agreement on the Warndt coal field is seen by the French as essential for the future of the Lorraine metallurgical industry, but is strenuously objected to by the Saarlanders. Most of this coal field underlies Saar territory, but it is mined from pitheads in France. The Saarlanders accuse the French of mining only the veins closest to the surface, leaving the less profitable deeplying deposits for exploitation after the existing agreement has expired, 27 years hence.

Bonn is unlikely to allow the protests of the local

Remarks made by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Maurice Faure to American officials on 24 February suggest that Paris is now prepared to write off the whole territory as a French economic asset. Faure pointed to the "magnitude of France's sacrifice" of the Saar, its second most important foreign customer, and hitherto a key factor in the maintenance of the franc zone's favorable trade balance with West Germany. Faure considers German willingness to try to "maintain" French-Saar economic relations as mostly "theoretical."

Paris' two minimum demands in return are German acquiescence in canalization of the Moselle River and confirmation of the existing French-Saar agreement on exploitation of the rich Warndt coal field. The German negotiators' current position on Moselle canalization is confined to objections on purely economic grounds: that the French can attain their objective of making the Lorraine steel industry more competitive by

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extremists to deter it from making a reasonable deal with the French, since it recognizes that such elements will probably object to almost any attainable

French-German settlement. Bonn, moreover, has presumably noted the reports of the waning influence of Heinrich Schneider, most vocal of the Saar ultra-nationalists. [REDACTED]

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Indonesia

The Masjumi-led cabinet, having won parliamentary approval of the bill to abrogate the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, plans to resign shortly and assume caretaker status. It may resign before the elected parliament is installed between 10 and 20 March.

The three major non-Communist parties are engaged in informal discussions. The National Party (PNI), which heads the opposition, the Masjumi, and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) reportedly have agreed in principle to form a coalition government but they have not yet agreed on a program.

The Masjumi, which had been isolated from other non-Communist parties through the tactics of President Sukarno and the PNI, now appears to have increased its prestige by bringing about an end to the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. This achievement, combined with the Masjumi's reported endorsement of the more nationalistic policies of the party's Vice Chairman Sukiman as opposed to those of Chairman Natsir, may have reduced difficulties between the Masjumi and the other two parties.

Sukiman is a more skillful politician than Natsir and is more acceptable to President Sukarno, the PNI and the NU.

The first formal effort to create a new cabinet, therefore, will probably be directed toward a PNI-Masjumi-NU coalition. The large area of disagreement among the three parties, however, particularly in regard to personalities and the issues of foreign investment, foreign policy, and tolerance of Communist activity, foreshadows difficulties. Should this effort fail, the alternative of a PNI-NU-small party coalition probably will be accepted. This would be a return to the so-called "Ali formula" of 1953-55 whereby the government depended on Communist parliamentary support.

Meanwhile, Vice President Hatta--probably the best informed and most moderate individual in the Indonesian government and a strong anti-Communist--has definitely decided to resign. He hopes to combat Communism through the medium of the co-operative movement, which, under his guidance, is developing fairly rapidly among the villages. His departure will remove the most important restraining influence on President Sukarno, who appears to believe that he can use the Communists for his political advantage and eventually discard them.

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Thai Government Reaffirms
Anti-Communist Policies

The Thai government's crackdown last week on elements agitating for closer political and trade ties with Communist China appears to be a result of a decision not to alter its strongly anti-Communist policies at this time.

On 21 February, the police arrested parliamentary member Thep Chotinuchit and members of his party at the Bangkok airport on their return from a month's tour of Communist China. This action is in marked contrast to the government's equivocation prior to Thep's departure. Thep has warned that he will use public hearings on his case to compare favorably conditions in Communist China with those in Thailand.

The government, which reportedly intends to try Thep for "treason," can if it so chooses, however, prevent the press from publicizing Thep's statements. The police also arrested leaders of the weekly gatherings at Bangkok's "Hyde Park," which these elements have used as a forum for attacks against the government and noisy pleas for a Sino-Thai rapprochement. The government has since lifted its temporary

ban on further such meetings. Bangkok newspapers were warned that writers commenting favorably on China would be subject to prosecution under Thailand's stiff anti-Communist law.

These actions follow a six-month period in which there were strong indications that the government was re-examining its anti-Communist policies, possibly feeling its way toward a normalization of relations with Peiping. The reasons for the sudden about-face are obscure. Thai leaders may have concluded that the public agitation for a Sino-Thai rapprochement, which some of them seemed to have stimulated, was unduly embarrassing Thailand in its relations with the United States, especially in view of the approaching SEATO meeting at Karachi.

The arrest of Thep and related moves will be highly unpopular with many Thai intellectuals, whose neutralist and pro-Communist tendencies became apparent after the government relaxed its authoritarian controls last summer. The ruling clique's position is considered too strong, however, to be seriously threatened.

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Chinese Communists Occupy
Island in South China Sea

The Chinese Communists in the past six months have occupied at least one island in the Paracel group in the South China Sea, midway between Vietnam and the Philippines. The Paracels, claimed by several countries, are made up of a

number of small uninhabited coral atolls. Their value lies in their strategic location astride the main shipping lanes through the South China Sea. The islands' new occupiers, ostensibly fishermen, may be reporting air-warning


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information and keeping watch on ship movements. The islands are too small for airfields, but could be used as small naval bases.



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cial claims of sovereignty over the islands have been made by both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese, and by both North and South Vietnam.

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Inflation Again Threatens Aid Program in South Korea

A resurgence of inflation since the first of the year threatens further to dissipate the effectiveness of the American aid program in South Korea (amounting to \$700,000,000 in the current fiscal year), and will probably lead to new disputes with President Rhee over the level and implementation of American aid.

Rhee has taken cognizance of the latest inflationary surge

by publicly blaming the official exchange rate of 500 hwan to the dollar, which he says the US imposed on South Korea. The black-market exchange rate, which has been rising steadily since the first of the year, reached a level of 975 hwan to the dollar by early February.

Last August the United States agreed to maintain a fixed exchange rate for a year, Rhee having insisted that

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inflation was caused by fluctuations in the rate. The South Koreans initially created an illusion of partial success in combating inflation by the expedient of deferring government expenditures. However, following the receipt in January of an additional \$25,000,000 in American aid to encourage anti-inflation efforts, Korean counterinflation measures appear to have weakened considerably.

Certain recent developments--such as the action by the Bank of Korea raising the ceiling on commercial loans, the delay in the sale of government dollars to businessmen, and the failure to raise

fertilizer and monopolized commodity prices--promise to weaken the currency further.

The chronic inflation results largely from South Korea's attempts to live beyond its means. It maintains a 720,000-man military establishment and has an unrealistically ambitious investment program. The current year's budget is expected to show a deficit of about \$140,000,000. Among the effects of this inflation is the fact that it has discouraged the accumulation of capital essential to any private investment in Korean development and has priced Korean goods out of world markets.

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Instability Continues in Peru

The ending of the Iquitos rebellion on 25 February leaves the Peruvian regime of General Odria still threatened by underlying disaffection. New disturbances can be expected if Odria fails to satisfy important elements in the country that the presidential and congressional elections scheduled for June will not be rigged.

The Iquitos uprising, like the strikes and student demonstrations at Arequipa last December, reflected the growing popular concern that Odria intends to rig the elections in order to perpetuate himself in power, despite the constitutional ban on a president succeeding himself. Most top military leaders apparently desire free elections

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

NEW CONSTITUTION NO CURE FOR PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Pakistan's long-awaited constitution seems to be on the verge of approval by the Constituent Assembly. The perennial conflict between East and West Pakistan will probably continue, however, even after approval of the document. The struggle for personal power among individual politicians in both parts of the country will also continue. The result is bound to be a politically fragmented government whose policies will reflect its weakness and division.



Prime Minister
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali

Constitutional Progress

Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali's unrelenting pressure on the Constituent Assembly has resulted in approval of all but a few clauses of the draft constitution.

The most serious challenge of the constitution was the United Front's threat to withdraw from the government coalition and to join the opposition Awami League to form a united East Pakistani resistance to the passage of the

constitution. Governor General Iskander Mirza defeated this move by threatening to declare martial law in East Pakistan, home province of Fazlul Huq, leader of the United Front.

Price of Success

However, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and Mirza have had to accept dangerous modifications in the original draft to effect passage of the constitution.

The executive power on which the government has in the past relied to deal with parliamentary and provincial obstructionism has been greatly weakened. The wealthy West Pakistani landowners and industrialists on whom the ruling Moslem League must rely for support have succeeded in limiting the government's right of eminent domain. No determination has been made of the crucial issue as to whether Moslem and non-Moslems should vote in the same or separate electorates.



Governor General
Iskander Mirza

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Interior Minister & United Front Leader
Fazlul Huq

Designation of Pakistan as an "Islamic Republic" and denial of the presidency to anyone except a Moslem are important and potentially dangerous concessions to extremist religious groups. Mirza has steadfastly opposed these provisions and has managed to delay the crucial second reading of them in the assembly, but Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and other West Pakistani politicians who have been using the orthodox elements to increase their power have been afraid to insist on a secular constitution.

Inclusion of the Moslem provisions will continue to isolate the large Hindu minority in East Pakistan and has already resulted in the three Hindu minority parties instructing their ministers to resign from the central and East Pakistani governments.

Opposition in East Pakistan

This Hindu withdrawal, together with the defection of some key Moslem leaders of the United Front, leaves less than half of the East Pakistani members of the assembly in favor of the constitution and lends support to the charge that the

document is being imposed on East Pakistan. The opposition is carefully recording this fact by demanding roll-call votes on all important issues. Political posters to this effect are reportedly already appearing in East Pakistan. The intensity of this opposition makes the fall of the United Front provincial government in East Pakistan likely if the provincial assembly convenes as scheduled in mid-March.

The fall of the East Pakistani government may be prevented by the appointment of Fazlul Huq as governor and by dissolution of the provincial assembly, with the present ministry continuing as a caretaker government. This presumably would be less inflammatory than direct rule by the central government, which could also be undertaken. Nevertheless, the struggle between the eastern and western parts of the country will probably be renewed almost immediately after passage of the constitution on the issues of joint Hindu-Moslem or separate electorates and the selection of a provisional president of Pakistan.

Most West Pakistani leaders favor some kind of Moslem



Awami League Chief
Hussein Shahid Suhrawardy

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state and separate electorates. East Pakistan is eager for a joint electorate to erase Hindu-Moslem divisions and to enable formation of a united East Pakistani bloc.


Political Struggle

The challenge of discontent in East Pakistan will have to be met in the first national election under the constitution. This election, which is supposed to take place within a year after approval of the constitution, appears to be the opportunity that opposition leader Suhrawardy now hopes to seize to effect his

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali also has little popular support. Although he now seems to be in alliance with newly elected Moslem League president Nishtar and seasoned Punjabi leader Daultana, he may find himself discarded if the outcome of the election raises the possibility of his replacement as prime minister.

Prospects

Consequently, it seems unlikely that the Pakistani government's stability will be increased by adoption of a constitution. Development of the economy will still have to be



Moslem League President
Abdur Rab Nishtar



West Pakistan Finance Minister
Mian Mumtaz Daultana

return to national prominence. He alone has support in both parts of the country, and he alone has championed East Pakistan in the debate on the constitution.

The present leaders of the Karachi government have little reason to look forward to an election. Mirza has no political following, and although his selection as first provisional president is likely, he is apparently already being bypassed by politicians maneuvering for power in West Pakistan.

designed to meet the demands of various political groups rather than the needs of the nation, and neutralist sentiment is apt to increase in the absence of a broadly based government capable of committing the country to a strong and definite foreign policy. While Pakistan is unlikely to abrogate its already established ties with the West, it appears that the high point of political and military co-operation with the United States may have passed.

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SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Pre-election political maneuvering in South Korea is centered on competition for the vice-presidential nomination of the dominant Liberal Party. A party convention to name the candidates is reportedly planned for 5-6 March and the election for some time in May.

Rhee's Role

The assumption that 80-year-old President Rhee will be re-elected but will not live out his four-year term has made the vice presidency the immediate goal of South Korean politicians.


Split-ticket voting being permitted, it would theoretically be possible for President Rhee to be re-elected with a member of the opposition as vice president. However, although Liberal Party officials have reportedly expressed concern over popular gains by the opposition, the fact that the Liberal Party controls patronage and the instruments of coercion make its retention of both posts likely.

Any Liberal vice-presidential nominee will benefit from identification with Rhee, who, although the target of increasing criticism since the armistice, is still regarded as the embodiment of Korea's national aspirations. Nonetheless, should Rhee pass over party chairman Yi Ki-pung, regarded as the leading contender for the vice presidency, disappointment among Yi's followers could disrupt the party organization. In 1948 and 1952 Rhee chose weak running mates rather than risk any challenge to his authority.

Liberal Party Tactics

In 1952 Rhee received 75 percent of the popular vote in an election in which the free ballot was considerably neutralized by the intimidation of antiadministration groups. Such tactics may be kept to a minimum this year in view of the increased efficiency of the Liberal Party organization and the country's greater internal stability.

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Opposition Groups

The main opposition to the Liberal Party comes from the Democratic Party--whose considerable popular support is somewhat offset by rivalries --and from the incipient Republican Party, which may endorse Rhee but compete for the vice presidency. The Liberals are portraying Rhee as the person most qualified to deal with American officials; and Ambassador Yang in Washington has stated that American aid to South Korea would end if Rhee were not re-elected.

Meanwhile, the possibility that the recent assassination of South Korea's counterintelligence chief was politically motivated has brought into the open a power struggle between two factions: a moderate, pro-American group centering about Yi Ki-pung, Defense Minister Son and Army Chief of Staff Chong; and a group which includes

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Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Yi Hyong-kun and Republican Party leader Yi Pom-sok. The time remaining before the Liberal Party convention is likely

to see various opposition and Liberal Party factions in eleventh-hour attempts to block the vice-presidential aspirations of Yi Ki-pung.

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THE DILEMMA OF SOVIET LITERARY POLICY

Continuing debate in Soviet publications on the problems of Soviet literature shows that official policy toward the arts remains unsettled. Differences of opinion as to the extent to which the party should regulate creative activity, evident within the literary fraternity for some time, may be reaching into the upper levels of the party as well.

Propaganda Instruments

The regime has always recognized literature as a vital instrument of propaganda, and Soviet writers, whom Stalin called "engineers of the human soul," are considered employees of the state just as much as factory managers. In recent years, however, the popular appeal, and therefore the effectiveness, of the officially subsidized product has noticeably declined. Frequent signs of impatience among creative artists with the deadening restraints imposed by the party and of consumer resistance to a dull product have presented the regime with a dilemma--how to maintain ideological conformity without choking off all creative inventiveness.

The violent postwar literary purge directed by the late politburo member, Andrei Zhdanov, which attempted to place Soviet literature in a rigid party strait jacket, had run its

course before 1952. Delivering the central committee reports to the 19th Party Congress, in October 1952, Georgi Malenkov scored the prevalence of hack writing and called on Soviet writers to give their work more variety and interest. He suggested a revival of satire as a means of exposing the "negative" in Soviet life. While moving away from the extremes of the "Zhandovshchina," however, he emphasized that the basic standard of Soviet literature was "party-mindedness."

Appeals for Relaxation

Following Stalin's death, there were signs of a changed atmosphere. During the period of the so-called "thaw" in late 1953 and early 1954, there were several rather bold appeals for a relaxation of political controls over the arts. In the spring and summer of 1954 the regime answered with an emphatic "no." Total repression was not revived, however, and the Second Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers, which met in December 1954, heard a relatively uninhibited expression of divergent views.

Discussion at the congress steered clear of the basic issue of political control, but frequently called for greater aesthetic latitude and a more imaginative approach

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
within the orthodox political framework. The defenders of the status quo counterattacked, but in the absence of an authoritative pronouncement from the party, the congress ended on an inconclusive note.

During 1955, the debate between the "conformists" and the "reformists" continued at literary conferences and in the Soviet press. The argument ostensibly centered around questions of aesthetics, that is, how much latitude of style and method a writer may exercise in his portrayal of "socialist reality." However, behind the narrower issue of style, argued out in the technical jargon of Marxist literary criticism, a faction of Soviet writers who are chafing

at the bit of party control may be raising the question of substance.

Literary Gazette Editorial

A clear statement of the conformist position can be found in an editorial which appeared in Literary Gazette in April 1955. Socialist realism permits originality of form and style, the editorial contended, and no one seeks to impose a single, inflexible standard. "But," it continued, "diversity is not omnivorousness, diffuseness.... It is necessary that the diversity of means of which art disposes should serve one purpose--the affirmation of socialist life, of socialist ideology."



Author: "Tell me, when are you going to publish my novel?"

Publisher: "Soon...We are already writing up the last chapters..."

(From Krokodil)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

1 March 1956

Articles published in Pravda and Literary Gazette in November 1955, on the 50th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's work on Bolshevik literature, likewise strongly reaffirmed the propagandistic function of Soviet literature. They referred to the militant Zhdanov decrees on culture, asserting that they would remain the basis of party policy for a long time to come.

Kommunist Editorial

Ignoring these strictures, however, an editorial in the December issue of the party's theoretical journal, Kommunist, carried the claims for aesthetic flexibility further than anything that had appeared in the party press since the end of World War II. Without mentioning Malenkov, the editorial discussed and took issue with many of the views expressed by him at the 19th Party Congress.

While not denying its political function, the article argued that literature is a unique form of expression and is not bound by the rules of exposition applied in the social sciences. The creative writer should, in other words, have some freedom to decide how his message is to be presented. A strictly literal interpretation of official literary precepts can lead to schematization and oversimplification which, the author implied, are among the major defects of Soviet literature.

It is the writer's duty to portray what is typical in Soviet life, the article conceded, but it is not true, as Malenkov asserted in his party congress speech, that only that which corresponds to "the essence of a given social force" is typical. Literature should, instead, reflect actuality in a "concretely sensuous form, embodying the general in what is individual." Stripped of its

Marxian terminology, this amounted to a call for humanized characters living in a recognizable world instead of stereotyped party paragons acting out abstract Communist formulas.

Equally narrow and harmful is the approach which equates "typical" and "party-minded," Kommunist continued, again taking issue with Malenkov. It is not true, the article argued, that the merit of a creative work depends at all times and all places on the extent to which it applies a conventional party analysis to every political, social and economic problem. Some of the works of pre-revolutionary writers and of contemporary foreign writers, for example, can be called "progressive" even though they do not have a strictly Marxian point of view.

The argument was carried no further than this. It is not clear whether the author was suggesting indirectly that Soviet literature should be judged by the same standards. On this point nevertheless he had at least skirted a basic issue, for it is insistence on "party-mindedness" which lies at the core of party control of the arts.

Issue Remains Unsettled

Expression of these views in Kommunist, and subsequently in the regional press where the editorial was republished, suggest that they have some support within the party. The rejection of views expressed by Malenkov may be an attempt to saddle him with responsibility for the woes of Soviet literature. It seems more likely, however, that the attack was directed against the literary position represented by Stalin and Zhdanov, and may have been intended as a statement that the present leadership dissociates itself from the restrictive policies of the past.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

1 March 1956

The issue has not been settled in favor of a relaxation and liberalization of literary policy. The keynote speeches at the recent regional party congresses, for example, gave no hints of a softer line. A. I. Kirichenko, a member of the all-Union party presidium and first secretary of the Ukrainian party, speaking to the Ukrainian congress, on the contrary, asked the party to increase its influence on literature. He noted a slackening in "implementation of the historical decisions of the CPSU concerning literature and the arts--decisions which have formulated principles of party policy in ideological work," a reference to the Zhdanov decrees.

The Soviet press only recently attacked a prominent writer who, following the party's demand for exposure of "negative outlook" and "bourgeois survivals," had written a novel on life in the new agricultural lands which over-emphasized the "negative." Past experience should have taught Soviet writers to move carefully until a clear, unambiguous line has been laid down by the party.

State Continues Control

The regime, recognizing the value of literature as a medium of persuasion among a people which still has memories of a splendid literary tradition, may be tempted to make limited concessions in order to lift Soviet literature from its present depressed state and to prevent erosion of the allegiance of its intelligentsia. Literature in the USSR, however, always has been the servant of the state and Soviet writers will be expected to stay within party-defined limits.

Khrushchev, in his speech to the party congress, made it clear that, during a period when a limited extension of cultural interchange with the West has been allowed in the interest of propaganda and diplomatic objectives, the party must guard against a relaxation of ideological discipline and the infiltration of "alien" influences. The search for a more tolerable balance between ideological conformity and artistic creativity remains, therefore, a troublesome problem for the regime.

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