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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

CYPRUS DISPUTE MAY RESULT IN LEFT-WING GREEK GOVERNMENT . . . . . Page 1

The growth of neutralist sentiment in Greece may be accelerated as the result of Greece's failure to inscribe the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Papagos government may fall if it is unable to control popular emotions on the Cyprus issue, and Papagos may be succeeded by a leftist.

[REDACTED]

FAURE GOVERNMENT MAY FALL OVER MOROCCAN PROGRAM . . . . . Page 2

Continued opposition from the right has prevented Premier Faure from carrying out his Moroccan program despite a series of cabinet decisions to support it. The delays have encouraged his opponents and may bring about his fall after the National Assembly convenes on 4 October.

[REDACTED]

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL . . . . . Page 3

The reported presence of an Egyptian military mission in Moscow to work out the details of an arms deal lends weight to earlier reports of the Soviet Union's willingness to make arms available to Egypt and other Near Eastern states. Moscow is probably trying: (1) to encourage Egypt to follow a foreign policy independent of the West; (2) to help the nationalists in French North Africa by making it possible for Egypt to supply them with additional light weapons.

[REDACTED]

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

French North Africa: Tension remains high in Morocco and Algeria, and the French minister of defense has notified General Gruenther of his intention to transfer six more battalions of NATO-committed troops to North Africa before 1 October. In Tunisia, an all-Tunisian cabinet was installed on 17 September.

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American-Chinese Negotiations: Peiping's determination to get into the second phase of the Geneva talks was indicated during the past week by Chinese threats that full implementation of the repatriation agreement was dependent on a prompt beginning of discussion on item two of the agenda, "other practical matters at issue." [redacted] Page 1 25X1

Implications of Soviet-Finnish Agreement: The USSR is exploiting its agreement to return the Porkkala naval base to Finland to support its campaign for the withdrawal of Western forces from foreign bases. By offering to return Porkkala, the USSR was able to obtain a 20-year extension of the friendship and mutual aid treaty with Finland without making any further concession. [redacted] Page 2 25X1

East Germany Granted Status Equal to Other Satellites: The agreements concluded between the USSR and East Germany in Moscow on 20 September grant East Germany a status comparable to that of the other European Satellites. East Germany can be expected to assert its prerogatives as a sovereign nation in an effort to gain recognition from West Germany and other Western powers. [redacted] Page 3. 25X1

The Soviet Amnesty: The 17 September amnesty of Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans during World War II sets the stage for the release of German prisoners of war who were convicted as war criminals. The amnesty may also be designed to aid the Soviet redefection campaign since in the Soviet view the bulk of anti-Communist emigrés in the West collaborated with the Germans. [redacted] Page 4 25X1

Adenauer's Impressions of Top Soviet Leaders: Chancellor Adenauer told Ambassador Bohlen after the second day of his negotiations with top Soviet leaders that although his first impression was that Khrushchev was the single most important leader, he was coming to the conclusion that Bulganin is at least equally important in the Soviet hierarchy. The German delegation was struck by the condescending and negligent manner of Bulganin and Khrushchev toward Molotov. [redacted] . . . . . Page 5 25X1

East-West Trade as a Soviet Propaganda Slogan: The Soviet Union probably will try to use the 26 September-14 October session of the Committee on the Development of Trade of the Economic Commission for Europe to promote Molotov's suggestion for a world economic conference leading to an expansion of East-West trade. Despite Soviet statements that trade could increase 150 to 200 percent over the next two or three years, Soviet capabilities are believed to be inadequate for such an expansion. [redacted] Page 6 25X1

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25X1 New East China Supply Route Under Construction: [redacted] 25X1  
 [redacted] considerable progress had been made in the construction of what will be the first highway between Foochow and Shanghai along the East China coast. It will greatly reduce logistic dependence on the exposed coastal shipping route from Shanghai, and be an important supplement to the 300-mile Shangjao-Foochow road, at present the only significant overland supply route into Foochow. [redacted] . . . . . Page 8 25X1

25X1 Dissidence in South China Confirmed: The recent arrival in Hong Kong of 142 junks from the Communist mainland constitutes the first mass flight of fishing vessels from Communist China since late 1952. [redacted] 25X1  
 [redacted] Page 9

25X1 Vietnam: The Viet Minh is maintaining constant pressure on both the domestic and international fronts to force the government in the south to adhere to the Geneva schedule for unification. Diem apparently intends to sit tight, thereby leaving the initiative with the Communists. [redacted] . . . . . Page 9

Indonesian Elections: Indonesia's first national elections will be held on 29 September to choose 260 members of parliament. Prospects continue favorable for a plurality of 30 to 40 percent for the anti-Communist Masjumi, which leads the present cabinet, with the Communist Party and the National Party vying for the second largest number of votes. [redacted] . . . . . Page 10 25X1

Situation in Argentina: The situation in Argentina will be unstable for some time to come. The new junta will be plagued by service rivalries for control of the government, by the possibility of serious strikes and sabotage on the part of the General Confederation of Labor and fanatic Peronistas, and by various economic problems inherited from the Peron regime as well as those caused by the fighting itself. [redacted] . . . . . Page 11 25X1

Soviet Interest in Antarctic: Soviet participation in plans for an extensive Antarctic research program during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58) is probably designed to secure the USSR a voice in any discussions on the future status of the continent. A Soviet expedition of two ships and several aircraft is scheduled to leave in November to establish research stations in Antarctica. The bases of the expedition will be the first the USSR is known to have had in the Antarctic. The scientific research of the expedition together with Soviet Arctic studies will give the USSR an extraordinary fund of information on both polar regions. [redacted] Page 12 25X1

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**PART III**

**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES**

**USSR FORMULATING NEW LINE ON EAST-WEST CULTURAL EXCHANGE . Page 1**

The Soviet Union is formulating a comprehensive propaganda line within the framework of Marxist-Leninist theory to rationalize the regime's current policy of promoting international friendship and cultural and technological exchange. The Soviet leaders seem to be acting on the belief that the advantages, both material and political, to be gained from such exchange are greater than the dangers arising therefrom to the regime. This constitutes a radical departure from the policies of the later years of Stalin's regime. [redacted]

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**STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM . Page 2**

In the past year and a half, North Korea has made considerable progress in achieving the basic aims of its Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) of economic rehabilitation. This success results principally from the continuous influx of material and technical assistance from the Sino-Soviet bloc, which has promised to send to North Korea between 1954 and 1964 approximately \$780,000,000 worth of heavy machinery, transportation equipment, construction materials, POL, coal, foodstuffs, textiles, fertilizer and technical assistance. [redacted]

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**POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE . . . . . Page 4**

General Charles de Gaulle retains considerable influence over France's domestic and foreign policy, despite his retirement from active political life in June. The temperate tone of his retirement announcement and of the first volume of his memoirs has helped rehabilitate him in the minds of many Frenchmen who had been alienated by his uncompromising attitude. The general apparently has no intentions, however, of attempting to gain political office. [redacted]

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**CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE . . . . . Page 6**

The Eastern European Satellites in the last several months have let up on their campaign of religious persecution of individual clerics and churchgoers, but have not ceased their efforts to subvert the churches and destroy the influence of religion. The Satellite regimes have made this change in tactics probably because they found that their earlier repressive measures merely helped to strengthen the unity of the churches. [redacted]

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**THE PUSHTOONISTAN PROBLEM . . . . . Page 9**

The Pushtoonistan problem arises from the campaign waged by Afghanistan for the creation of a new independent state to be made up of the areas of West Pakistan where Pushtu is spoken. The new state would inevitably be an Afghan satellite. The campaign is a constant source of friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as such poses a continuing threat to stability on the northwest frontier of South Asia. International interest in the dispute has increased over the past year. The recent diplomatic settlement between Kabul and Karachi left the basic Pushtoonistan dispute unresolved.

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**PART I****OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST****CYPRUS DISPUTE MAY RESULT  
IN LEFT-WING GREEK GOVERNMENT**

The growth of neutralist sentiment in Greece may be accelerated as the result of Greece's failure to inscribe the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Papagos government may fall if it is unable to control popular emotions on the Cyprus issue, and Papagos may be succeeded by a leftist.

As a result of these events, serious anti-American riots might break out in Greece and the Balkan alliance might collapse. Many Greek newspapers are already demanding that Greece withdraw from NATO, and even moderate members of the parliamentary opposition claim that the government's foreign policy is "no longer valid."

The president of parliament believes that "demineutralism" may be a major issue in the next elections and that the leftists could attract considerable support with an anti-NATO platform. Meanwhile, the Rally government, as long as it survives, intends to maintain Greece's present alliances within the limits imposed by public opinion. Although the government shares a general feeling that Greece is taken too much for granted by its allies, it would probably resign rather than change the bases of its foreign policy.

The Papagos government might be replaced by a leftist coalition headed by Sophocles Venizelos, leader of the Liberal Democratic Union who reportedly

has been negotiating for the support of the Communist-front United Democratic Left. None of the leaders of the Greek Rally would be in a position to head a new government. Minister of Public Works Constantine Karamanlis, the most popular politician in Greece and reputedly the king's choice to succeed Papagos, says it would be futile for a moderate to try to form a government with the crisis over Cyprus unresolved.

Ambassador Cannon notes that Greece is already the object of "a two-sided, though not necessarily co-ordinated," campaign from Belgrade and Moscow. Greek-Yugoslav relations have in fact become increasingly close as the Greek-Turkish split has widened.

Cannon suggests that as a possible result of a deterioration in Greek-American relations, Greece might "by a process of peaceful infiltration become either a people's democracy or a neutralist, fellow-traveling state." Before this happened, however, the secret right-wing military society IDEA might attempt a coup and plunge Greece further into political chaos.

Unless there is some early development favorable to Greece's position, American personnel and property are likely to be the object of anti-American riots in Greece and Cyprus. Outbreaks against the British and the Turks may also take place as the government loses control over popular passions.

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FAURE GOVERNMENT MAY FALL  
OVER MOROCCAN PROGRAM

Continued rightist opposition prevented Premier Faure from carrying out his Moroccan program despite a series of cabinet decisions to support it. Faure has no alternative but to replace Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa with a three-man Council of the Throne, but the delays have encouraged his opponents and may bring about his fall after the National Assembly convenes on 4 October.

Faure may still be able to get assembly approval for his Moroccan program, but he would probably have to rely on the Socialists to replace rightist defections. This would seriously weaken his chances of maintaining the present coalition.

Faure probably lost his chance to launch a successful program by failing to insist on the removal of Ben Arafa when Grandval was forced out as resident general at the end of August. Opposition to the program in France and Morocco has grown since then and is now well organized to undercut Faure's position.

The present stalemate resulted from a cabinet dispute

over the choice of a third man for the proposed Council of the Throne. Opponents of the Faure program, particularly Defense Minister Koenig, have encouraged Ben Arafa to cling to his throne. He cannot be removed now without renewed outbursts from rightists, who may be influential enough to force the resignation of Resident General Boyer de Latour.

Even if Faure does manage to remove Ben Arafa, he will have to plead with his parliamentary opponents to be patient until negotiations with a new Moroccan government result in agreement. His success will depend on more active support from Foreign Minister Pinay, now attending the UN General Assembly session in New York, who thus far has deserted the opposition but has refrained from active support of the premier.

The stability of Faure's government would be further jeopardized if Moroccan nationalists, convinced that the Faure program had become hopelessly bogged down, resorted again to widespread violence.

[Redacted]

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SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL

The reported presence of an Egyptian military mission in Moscow to work out the details of an arms deal lends weight to earlier reports of the Soviet Union's willingness to make arms available to Egypt and

other Near Eastern states.

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The USSR's reported willingness to supply arms to Egypt may have a twofold motivation:

(1) Moscow may desire to give Cairo an alternative to closer ties with the West and encourage it to follow an independent foreign policy that would include closer ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc; (2) Moscow may want to strengthen the nationalists in French North Africa by making it possible for the Egyptians to supply them with additional light weapons.

Egypt and the USSR have been especially sympathetic

with the nationalist movement in North Africa.

There are indications that the Egyptians have attempted to purchase arms for the insurgents and they may already have been instrumental in getting some arms into the area.

Moscow has supported the nationalist cause by propaganda transmitted to North Africa from Budapest and has sided with the nationalists on a number of occasions in the UN. Moscow would be eager to aid any movement that might exacerbate the difficulties for the Western powers in North Africa.

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## PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTSFrench North Africa

Tension remains high in Morocco and Algeria, and the French minister of defense has notified General Gruenther of his intention to transfer six more battalions of NATO-committed troops to North Africa before 1 October. In Tunisia, an all-Tunisian cabinet was installed on 17 September.

**Morocco:** The French government's procrastination on its announced plan for the removal of Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa has permitted the reactionary settler organization, the Presence Francaise, to mobilize to block the plan. The Presence Francaise now maintains a 24-hour watch at the palace and at the ports of Rabat and Casablanca and is expected to attempt by force to prevent Ben Arafa's departure.

Spanish objections to the removal of Ben Arafa to Tangier may become increasingly embarrassing to the French. Spanish consul general Castillo warned the president of the international Committee of Control in Tangier on 17 September that bringing Ben Arafa there under present circumstances might constitute a danger to public order. He suggested that French authorities make no decision until the governments represented on the Committee of Control

have time to consider the matter carefully.

**Algeria:** Armed resistance continues in eastern Algeria. A small area west of Philippeville was reported last week to be in the hands of the rebels, who were said to be trying to establish control over a region they could proclaim as "Free Algeria." Uneasiness among French settlers in eastern Algeria was reported increasing as the idea of a "holy war" appeared to be gaining ground.

Information released by the governor general following the outlawing of the Algerian Communist Party on 13 September indicates that evidence of Communist involvement in the rebel uprising is sketchy and inconclusive.

**Tunisia:** An all-Tunisian cabinet of generally moderate tendencies under the premiership of Tahar ben Ammar was installed in Tunis on 17 September. Initially this cabinet, the first since the French-Tunisian conventions granted limited autonomy, will oversee the reorganization of Tunisian governmental functions. It will have no responsibility for foreign affairs or defense, which remain the prerogative of the French high commissioner.

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American-Chinese Negotiations

Peiping's determination to get into the second phase of the Geneva talks was indicated during the past week by Chinese threats that full implementation of the repatriation agreement was dependent on a begin-

ing of discussion on item two of the agenda, "other practical matters at issue."

The Peiping press on 17 September denounced what it called a "deliberate attempt

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to stall the talks" and hinted that Ambassador Johnson's refusal to proceed immediately to phase two might hinder the speedy repatriation of American nationals. This line was substantially reiterated by Wang Ping-nan, the Chinese Communist negotiator in Geneva, two days later.

A Peiping People's Daily editorial of 19 September argued that some of the Americans being held in China were guilty of "criminal violations" and were subject to "the procedures of Chinese law." The editorial also said that "some" of the Chinese students in the United States might wish to continue their studies there for "one or two or several years." The Chinese apparently regard the Americans still remaining in China as a useful lever to accelerate the initiation of phase two at Geneva.

The Chinese may anticipate a further American demand concerning the 461 American servicemen missing from the Korean war and 11 navy and coast guard personnel lost in Chinese

#### Implications of Soviet-Finnish Agreement

The Soviet agreement to return to Finland the Porkkala naval base, the only Soviet base outside the Orbit, will play a major role in Moscow's campaign against foreign bases. Abandonment of all foreign bases is one feature of the Soviet disarmament plan proposed on 10 May and is closely linked to Soviet proposals for European security. Soviet delegate Sobolev has already cited the action on Porkkala in reiterating to the UN disarmament subcommittee Moscow's proposal

waters in 1953. Peiping rejected this in advance in an 11 September People's Daily editorial which called the question of the 400-odd American war prisoners "a pure fabrication."

Peiping also displayed sensitivity to the possible adverse effect of press reports from Hong Kong describing bad treatment the returning Americans had suffered while in Chinese hands. A Peiping broadcast of 19 September described an interview with a returned Chinese student and dwelt on his "relentless surveillance and interrogation" while in the United States.

Thus, while retaining the prisoner issue as a source for propaganda broadsides and diplomatic blackmail, the Chinese Communists will continue to try to exclude it from the arena of the Geneva talks. Wang can be expected to press along the main lines of Peiping's Geneva policy--toward raising issues that, by their nature, could only be settled on a higher level, and toward agreement for a higher-level conference.

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for relinquishing all foreign bases.

Marshal Zhukov urged the West immediately after the agreement was signed on 19 September to follow Moscow's example. Khrushchev, for his part, added that his country could make new proposals if the West "followed suit" on the USSR's abandonment of Porkkala and its announced 640,000 reduction in armed forces.

Although the USSR did not use the occasion of its

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negotiations with East German leaders to announce any reduction in its forces in East Germany, some Soviet troop withdrawals in Eastern Europe are likely in conjunction with the Geneva talks to dramatize Soviet security proposals and bring pressure to bear on the Western powers to cut their forces in Europe.

The agreement to return Porkkala not only served the USSR's propaganda campaign, but enabled it to get a 20-year extension of the treaty of

friendship and mutual aid without even discussing the treaty changes and boundary concessions the Finns had intended to seek.

The treaty will serve as a long-term guarantee against any Finnish alliance with the West as well as provide for collaboration with Finland in case of a threat of attack by Germany or an ally of Germany. The USSR was not seeking closer ties with Finland, such as its participation in the Warsaw pact, but was content with an assurance that Finland's neutral status would be continued.

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East Germany Granted Status  
Equal to Other Satellites

The agreements concluded between the USSR and East Germany in Moscow on 20 September grant East Germany a status comparable to that of the European Satellites and remove all overt Kremlin controls with the exception of the 400,000 Soviet troops stationed there.

A treaty signed by the two governments provides that Soviet troops shall remain in East Germany temporarily. Khrushchev stated in his speech of 19 September that these troops would be withdrawn whenever the Western powers were prepared to reciprocate. He counseled the East Germans to be understanding of the unpleasant necessity of keeping Soviet troops in their country.

The Soviet Union clearly intends to use the troop issue as a further bargaining point in efforts to persuade the West to withdraw forces from West Germany and dissolve NATO.

East Germany can be expected to assert its prerogatives as a sovereign nation in an effort to gain recognition

from West Germany and other Western powers.

One of these prerogatives concerns control of the East German borders, and communications between West Germany and West Berlin except in the case of persons and goods of the United States, French and British garrisons in West Berlin. This traffic will continue to be controlled by four-power agreements, "pending the conclusion of an appropriate treaty." Further efforts to hinder West German access to Berlin, however, are probable.

The boundary provisions state that East Germany will "exercise control and guard the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic...within Berlin," which implies that a formal absorption of East Berlin by the East German republic is contemplated. Such action would constitute a unilateral invalidation of the quadripartite status of the city and would raise the question of free Allied access to East Berlin.

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East Germany's authority has been extended to air transportation, but military aircraft of the three Western powers remain unaffected by this provision. East Germany, however, will probably seek direct negotiations with the United States, France, and Britain on these countries' commercial air service to West Berlin, which heretofore has been permitted under a four-power agreement. Such negotiations, which must be held on a government level, would tend to carry some degree of recognition.

East Germany will probably soon announce the establishment of its own armed forces and of a defense ministry. East German deputy premier Ulbricht, at a press conference on 20 September, said that "it is necessary for the German Democratic Republic to have armed forces to protect the homeland.... As the military laws have been pushed through in Bonn, this is a matter of course." Presumably East Germany's full adherence to the military provisions of

the Warsaw pact would soon follow.

Another agreement, which abolishes the Soviet high commission in East Germany, also invalidates Allied Control Council legislation in East Germany, but "does not touch the rights and obligations of the Soviet Union in relation to Germany as a whole, emanating from corresponding decisions of the four powers."

In a communiqué issued after the meetings, the Soviet Union stated it would consider favorably the question of German prisoners of war raised by the two Germanies. While the USSR has clearly maneuvered to give the East Germans maximum credit for the releases, it is noteworthy that the intervention of both Germanies on behalf of the prisoners is treated equally in the communiqué. In any case, the release of prisoners will probably be carried out in a fairly expeditious manner. A few are reported to have been released already and to have arrived in Germany.

The Soviet Amnesty

The 17 September amnesty of Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans during World War II sets the stage for the release of German prisoners of war who were convicted as war criminals. The amnesty may also be designed to aid the Soviet redefection campaign, since in the Soviet view the bulk of anti-Communist emigrés in the west collaborated with the Germans.

The amnesty itself, like all Soviet law, is couched in vague generalities which permit elastic application of all of its provisions. It apparently

applies only to those persons who through "lack of courage or ignorance became involved in co-operation with the occupiers," and not to the pre-war or postwar defectors or the nationality groups deported during the war.

Under the provisions of the amnesty, persons sentenced to confinement for ten years or less for aiding and collaborating with the enemy are to be released, and those who received longer terms are to have them reduced by half. Persons who served in the German army, police, and special formations are to be freed from exile, confinement,

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and banishment regardless of the length of their sentence.

It is specifically stated that the amnesty does not apply to persons convicted of murdering or torturing Soviet citizens. All cases and inquests pertaining to collaboration with the Germans not yet examined by the courts are to be removed from their jurisdiction and dropped. Soviet citizens now abroad who served in German units, including those who occupied leading positions, are to be freed from responsibility for their acts providing they have "atoned for their sins" by subsequent patriotic actions of by confessions.

The amnesty will undoubtedly have a serious effect on the Soviet emigré movements abroad and will greatly facilitate the current campaign to break the back of these movements.

Adenauer's Impressions  
Of Top Soviet Leaders

West German chancellor Adenauer told Ambassador Bohlen after the second day of his negotiations with top Soviet leaders that although his first impression was that Khrushchev was the single most important leader, he was coming to the conclusion that Bulganin is at least equally important, if not more so, in the Soviet hierarchy.

Adenauer is the first participant in international negotiations to attribute such an important role to Bulganin. In other recent conferences, such as the Yugoslav visit and the meeting at Geneva, Khrushchev gave most observers the impression that he was the dominant personality. The ceremonial dinner for the East German delegation in Moscow on 17 September, when Bulganin tried and failed to restrain Khrushchev's aggressive and vehement statement on

The condition that the emigrés may expiate their guilt through patriotic acts provides the USSR with a convenient lever by which it can turn them against the West by offering them eventual return to their motherland as a reward for services rendered.

If the provisions of the amnesty are fully carried out inside the Soviet Union, a considerable number of political prisoners will be released from forced labor camps. Implementation of the amnesty will intensify the shortage of forced labor in the USSR. It may result in a discontinuance of some of the activities now dependent on this labor or at least will necessitate a substitution of free labor. For this reason it is probable, that many prisoners will remain in the locality where they are released..

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Communism's goal of world domination, furthers the impression that within the equality of collective leadership Khrushchev is the "most equal."

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The West German delegation was struck by the condescending and negligent manner of Bulganin and Khrushchev toward Molotov. Molotov was the continual butt of sly digs to the effect that foreign ministers know a great deal, but that major decisions are made by more important people. The impression received by the delegation conforms to other reports that Molotov has lost considerable influence on top-level policy and that he follows orders rather than gives them.

Hans Globke, state secretary of the Federal Chancellery, who accompanied Adenauer in the

negotiations, reported that the delegation received the impression that the elder Soviet leaders were confirmed Marxist doctrinaires and talked according to the book, while younger Soviet negotiators, particularly First Deputy Premiers M. G. Perukhin and M. Z. Saburov, were more flexible in their attitudes.

Globke also reported that Adenauer, in a quizzical exchange with Bulganin concerning their successors, gained the impression that Saburov was definitely rising in Soviet inner circles. All previous indications, including the splitting into two bodies of Gosplan which Saburov originally headed, are that Saburov is a second-level figure among the ruling Party Presidium members.


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East-West Trade  
As a Soviet Propaganda Slogan

The Soviet Union probably will try to use the 26 September-14 October session of the Committee on the Development of Trade of the Economic Commission for Europe to promote Molotov's suggestion for a world economic conference and to build up the campaign for East-West trade. The USSR will have its eye on the coming four-power foreign ministers' conference, which is expected to discuss international economic problems, particularly the expansion of East-West trade.

Following Molotov's statement at the UN meeting in San Francisco on 22 June suggesting a UN-sponsored world

**SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE 1951-54**



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economic conference to consider the "removal of any discriminations hampering the development of...international trade," Moscow introduced propaganda lines designed primarily to promote a world economic conference and to abolish Western trade controls.

In contrast to the propaganda on the expansion of foreign trade generally and East-West trade in particular, the actual growth of total Soviet foreign trade is leveling off.


Soviet trade with the free world has declined since mid-1954 after a sharp rise in 1953 and early 1954. It reached its highest level since World War II in mid-1954 primarily as a result of the dramatic rise in imports following the announcement of the new course.

Difficulties in marketing exports in the West, however,

limited Moscow's ability to finance the expanded imports and resulted in a sharp decline in the second half of 1954 which continued at least through the first quarter of 1955. This decline in imports continued even after Soviet exports increased, suggesting a trend toward a lower level of Soviet-free world trade characterized by an excess of Soviet exports over imports.

For this reason, prospects for a broad expansion of East-West trade are dim, despite Soviet statements that East-West trade could increase 150 to 200 percent over the next two to three years. While the USSR could absorb large quantities of Western machinery and agricultural products, it is unlikely to find sufficient suitable exports. The most marketable Soviet exports, excluding gold and other precious metals, are petroleum, timber, grain, and manganese. Petroleum

**SOVIET-WEST TRADE, 1952-55**



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exports are expected to increase over 60 percent this year, to almost 9 percent of the total Sino-Soviet bloc production, but exports will probably increase only gradually over the next few years.

of expansion make it unlikely that the USSR can increase total net exports significantly above the 3,000,000-ton average of recent years. Furthermore, the corn expansion will contribute little if any to an export program.

Production of timber and grain is not likely to increase sufficiently to permit a significant increase in exports. In 1954, Soviet grain exports to the free world, 1,000,000 tons, represented a third of total Soviet net grain exports and about 20 percent of the value of all Soviet exports to non-Communist countries. Despite increases in wheat acreage, the uncertainties of weather in areas

Exports of manganese, mentioned by Khrushchev [redacted] could be increased by 1956 to as much as 1,000,000 tons--almost twice the level of 1954 exports. The USSR would have to make a very attractive offer, however, to tempt American buyers to give up the steady suppliers they developed when Soviet supplies were cut off in 1949. [redacted]

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New East China Supply Route Under Construction


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25X1 [redacted] considerable progress had been made in the construction of what will be the first highway between Foochow and Shanghai along the East China coast.

The new all weather road from Foochow and Loyuan to Ningteh on Santuao Bay has been completed,

[redacted] it is being extended northward toward Juian. Juian is connected by a first-class road with Wenchow, which is linked by all-weather highways to rail lines in the north.

This route will require considerable bridge construction over numerous estuaries of coastal



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streams. It opens up the previously inaccessible Chekiang-Fukien provincial border area to more effective political and military control and to mineral survey activities. The principal significance of the road, however, lies in the fact that it will greatly reduce logistic dependence on the exposed coastal shipping route from Shanghai, and be an important supplement to the 300-mile Shangjao-Foochow road, at present the only significant overland supply route into Foochow.

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Dissidence in South China  
Confirmed

The recent arrival in Hong Kong of 142 junks from the Communist mainland is the first mass flight of fishing vessels from Communist China since late 1952.

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On 14 September, 142 fishing junks fled to Hong Kong from the Chungshan area of the Communist mainland.


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Unrest in this same area was also reported in August

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Vietnam

The Viet Minh is maintaining constant pressure on both the domestic and international fronts to force the South Vietnam government to adhere to the Geneva schedule for unification.



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[redacted] an uprising late in 1954 of more than 1,000 peasants in the Chungshan area because of a cut in the food ration.

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[redacted] the majority of the 1,000 farmers arrested were eventually released, but their leaders were tried as Chiang agents or American spies and either executed or sent to forced labor camps.

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Peiping's voluminous propaganda concerning uprisings and counterrevolutionary activity is believed to contain some grains of truth. In the Chungshan area, at least, existence of widespread dissatisfaction has been substantiated.

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Premier Diem apparently intends to sit tight, thereby leaving the initiative with the Communists.

While continuing to demand that national elections

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be held in 1956, the Viet Minh has recently outlined new proposals designed to persuade the populace of the south that the rights and interests of non-Communists will be safeguarded after unification. In essence, the plan calls for establishment of a nationally elected parliament which would appoint a coalition government. However, the two zones would enjoy considerable autonomy under separate regional assemblies, and various groups, including landlords, are promised fair treatment.

Meanwhile, the Hanoi radio constantly denounces Diem for "sabotaging" the Geneva agreement at American instigation, and exhorts the people of both north and south to "struggle for peace, unification, independence and democracy." Viet Minh agents in the south are reported to be engaging in increasingly open activity. On at least three occasions this month, army troops in the provinces of South Vietnam have resorted to gunfire to disperse Communist-inspired demonstrations calling for elections.

The Viet Minh recently formally asked Britain and the USSR, cochairs of the 1954 Geneva conference, to request French and South Vietnamese

authorities to acknowledge their responsibilities for arranging a political settlement in Vietnam. This was followed by a letter from Viet Minh general Giap to the Indian chairman of the International Control Commission proposing that the commission take steps to ensure implementation of the Geneva agreement.

In the south, Premier Diem, apparently convinced that the Viet Minh will not resort to military means to enforce unification, is sitting tight on his refusal even to consult with the Viet Minh regarding elections.

Meanwhile, the program in South Vietnam to develop a broader popular base for the government is making little progress. Plans for the establishment of a popularly elected assembly, which it was once suggested might be in being as early as September, are apparently giving way to a plan for a referendum to depose Bao Dai, with this to be followed by a government reshuffle and the election or appointment of an assembly with limited powers. Land reforms and refugee resettlement programs are being impeded by lack of official enthusiasm for them and by ineffective administration. There are also indications of renewed factionalism in the army.

Indonesian Elections


The Indonesian electorate of some 43,000,000 is scheduled to go to the polls on 29 September to choose 260 members of parliament in the country's first national election. Local insecurity will prevent the holding of elections in several areas--North Sumatra, West Java, South Celebes, and Ceram--and physical difficulties may retard them elsewhere. Indonesian officials are hopeful, however, that the polls will be open to

90 percent of the electorate on election day.

Prospects continue favorable for a plurality of 30 to 40 percent for the Masjumi, the anti-Communist Moslem organization which leads the present cabinet. The Communist Party is expected to improve its parliamentary position and may outstrip the National Party, which led the former cabinet, for the second largest number of

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votes. The remaining votes will be contested by 80 independent candidates and some 40 organizations.

Apparently because of transportation and communication difficulties and the great care which they hope will be taken in counting and recounting the votes, Indonesian officials are predicting a considerable time lag--from one to three months--before election results are announced.

The long-delayed elections will replace a largely appointive parliament which had ceased to be representative and which had adopted obstructive tactics in order to ensure its own existence. The government is still operating under a provisional constitution, but further elections, scheduled for 15 December, will elect a constituent assembly of 520 members to draft the nation's permanent constitution.

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**Situation in Argentina**

The situation in Argentina will be unstable for some time to come. The new junta will be plagued by service rivalries for control of the government, by the possibility of serious strikes and sabotage on the part of the General Confederation of Labor and fanatic Peronistas, and by varied economic problems inherited from the Peron regime, as well as those caused by the fighting itself.

The revolt which broke out on 16 September was not a civilian uprising against the government. It sprang rather from a split in Argentina's armed forces, with the rebel group--initially smaller than the loyalist forces but reflecting the discontent of a considerable segment of the population--finally deciding to take action. The outcome was determined by the fact that various other military units, not originally

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associated with the rebels defected to them in the ensuing three days.

The new ruling junta established as a result of truce

negotiations between the victorious rebel forces and the military junta of the "loyalist forces" consists of professional military leaders, none of whom is known to be unfriendly to the United States. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Interest in Antarctic


The USSR has participated on a major scale in the July planning sessions in Paris and in current meetings in Brussels for an extensive Antarctic research program organized by a number of countries for the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year. Moscow radio previously announced plans for a Soviet expedition of two ships and several aircraft to leave in November to establish research stations in Antarctica.

These will be the first known Soviet bases in the Antarctic. Since 1946 there has been an annual Soviet whaling expedition which has included at least one ship for scientific research.

The Soviet Union has never put forward an official claim to any part of the Antarctic. It has frequently reiterated its claim that the continent was discovered by the Russian Bellingshausen expedition of 1819-1821, however, and in 1950 advised interested countries that it could not "recognize as legitimate any decision concerning the sovereignty of the Antarctic continent taken without its participation."

A series of articles in Soviet publications early this year attacked the "predatory tendencies of the imperialists of the United States in Antarctica." These articles charged that the United States wanted to use the region as a source of raw materials, as a location for air bases, and as a testing ground for military equipment and new weapons, particularly thermonuclear devices.

The Soviet delegates to the Antarctic Conference of the International Geophysical Year



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in July had shown some interest in the mapping of Antarctica. The Soviet expedition will probably establish some ground control points and also undertake some aerial photography for mapping that may ultimately be used to strengthen future Soviet territorial claims.

The USSR is not likely, however, to choose the present time to put forward any specific claims. Its active participation in plans for the forthcoming explorations appears, rather, to be a part of its current effort to take part in every kind of international undertaking. It may also be designed to assure a Soviet voice in any discussions on the future status of the continent.

The increased Soviet interest in the Antarctic region is also of major scientific importance. In addition to territorial and ice-sheet

exploration, Soviet scientists will make observations in the principal fields of research in the program of the International Geophysical Year: ionosphere physics, cosmic rays, meteorology, gravity measurement, oceanography, magnetism, glaciology, seismology, and aurora and airflow.

The results of such observations combined with data previously gathered by scientists attached to the Soviet Antarctic whaling expeditions and the extensive Soviet research in the Arctic will give the USSR an extraordinary fund of information on both polar regions. This information will be useful ultimately in the development of guidance techniques for some modern weapon systems, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles and earth satellites.



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## PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVESUSSR FORMULATING NEW LINE ON EAST-WEST CULTURAL RELATIONS

The Soviet Union is formulating a comprehensive propaganda line within the framework of Marxist-Leninist theory to rationalize the regime's current policy of promoting international friendship and cultural and technological exchange.

This receptiveness and respect for Western science, technology and, to a certain degree, culture has developed steadily over the last two years, affecting increasing areas of Soviet activity. These developments taken as a whole constitute a radical departure from the isolationist and chauvinistic policies of the later years of Stalin's regime when the USSR claimed Soviet priority in all fields and rejected everything of "bourgeois capitalist" origin.

The policy of the Stalin era, although aimed at building up the self-confidence of Soviet citizens and spurring them on to greater achievements, in effect hindered the long-range development of Soviet science and technology and seriously interfered with propaganda efforts to establish the USSR as the "champion of world peace and friendship."

Western Achievements Acknowledged

Acknowledgement of the merits of Western production and technological achievements began to creep into the speeches of top leaders soon after Stalin's death. By mid-1955, "Learn the Best from the West" had become one of the most heavily emphasized directives to industrial and agricultural workers. Soviet science, long hampered by the ban imposed on Western learning, benefited particularly from the regime's change in outlook.

Beginning in 1954, scientists were warned against "nihilist rejection of the achievements of science and technology in capitalist countries." The validity of Einstein's theory of relativity was for the first time acknowledged, and an Institute of Scientific Information was established to keep Soviet scientists in touch with scientific progress throughout the world.

An increasing number of cultural as well as technological delegations have moved in and out of the Soviet Union, and the ban on Western music and art has been somewhat relaxed.

New Policy Rationalized

Until recently there did not appear to be a particular effort, however, to relate these various developments and fuse them into a coherent statement of national policy regarding Soviet relations with the outside world. Now such a "line" appears to be in the process of formulation. Several articles have appeared in the Soviet press devoted exclusively to this subject in the form of a discussion of "Soviet internationalism."

Party members are being told that "propagation of ideas of friendship between nations, regardless of their social systems," is "one of the most important ideological tasks of party organizations" and that techniques and products of foreign countries must be studied whenever they are superior to their Soviet counterparts. A statement by Lenin to the effect that Communism should be built by using the entire store of man's accumulated knowledge is being used to sanctify their thesis.

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A particular effort is made to point out that Soviet internationalism is not incompatible with Soviet patriotism. In fact, internationalism in the form of a "respectful attitude toward all peoples" has now become an essential ingredient of true Soviet patriotism; patriots are warned against the deadly sin of "national narrow-mindedness" resulting from regarding Soviet achievements as superior in all fields.

The New "Internationalism"

These formulations appear to mark the first significant statements on this subject since the death of Stalin and in some respects stand in marked contrast to previous propaganda. In the past, while internationalism was always

stressed as an important aspect of Soviet policy, it was generally interpreted to mean only "proletarian internationalism," that is, the promotion of the solidarity of all workers of the world. This qualifier has now been dropped, at least temporarily, in favor of an interpretation that sanctions friendly relations with all people regardless of their social and economic systems.

Soviet leaders must now feel that the advantages, both material and political, to be gained from free intercourse are greater than the drawbacks arising from any unfavorable comparisons on the part of Westerners visiting the USSR or Soviet citizens going to the West.

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STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM

In the past year and a half, North Korea has made considerable progress in achieving the basic aims of its Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) of economic rehabilitation. This success results principally from the continuous influx of material and technical assistance from the Sino-Soviet bloc, which has promised to send to North Korea between 1954 and 1964 approximately \$780,000,000 worth of heavy machinery, transportation equipment, construction materials, POL, coal, foodstuffs, textiles, fertilizer and technical assistance.

Although significant progress has been made, the current plan calls merely for restoration of the economy to the 1949-1950 level. It is estimated that industrial output will not reach the 1944 peak level

under the Japanese until the ensuing Five-Year Plan (1957-1962) is well under way.

Ferrous Metals and Coke


The most noteworthy accomplishment has taken place in the ferrous metals industry. By June of 1955 the annual rate of pig iron and crude steel production had exceeded the 1949 peak output under the supervision of the Soviet Union. As a result of substantial assistance, from the Soviet Union in particular, it is estimated that current annual production of metallurgical coke is 200,000 metric tons; pig iron, 210,000 metric tons; crude steel, 190,000 metric tons; and finished steel, 94,200 metric tons.

Since the Korean truce, considerable effort has been

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made in the nonferrous metals industry to rehabilitate flooded mines and restore the major refining facilities at Chinampo and Munpyong. These plants are currently producing blister copper, lead bullion and electrolytic lead at an estimated annual rate of 3,600 metric tons of copper and 6,000 metric tons of lead, both being still below the 1947-1949 level of output.

#### Electric Power

Soviet and Czech aid is principally responsible for the relatively rapid rehabilitation of the electric power industry. The Three-Year Plan goal is to attain an electric power output capacity of 1.35 billion kilowatts, which is approximately equal to the 1949 capacity. The electric power output goal, however, is set at roughly less than one half of the 1949 power output. The excess of capacity over actual production is in part because the chemical industry, which was by far the

largest industrial consumer of electric power in North Korea, will only be partially restored to its 1949 level of operations by the end of the Three-Year Plan. Similarly, restoration of other industries by the end of the plan will be insufficient to require electric power consumption comparable to the 1949 level.

#### Coal and Cement

One of the major handicaps to over-all industrial recovery is the shortage of coking coal, which is needed principally by the metallurgical and chemical industries. Although Sino-Soviet bloc aid has resulted in the modernization and restoration of most of North Korea's 32 coal mines to a point where their output approximates that of 1949 (about 4,000,000 metric tons per year), lack of coking coal deposits has necessitated the annual import of between 600,000 and 750,000 tons of bituminous coal from Communist China.

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Another serious handicap has been the failure of the cement industry to keep pace with increasing industrial reconstruction requirements for cement, which are currently estimated at about 800,000 metric tons per year. Sino-Soviet bloc aid has made possible the rehabilitation and modernization of four of the six cement plants in North Korea, but estimated annual cement production by the end of 1955 will probably not exceed 650,000 metric tons. Imports of cement, from Communist China in particular, will probably continue to make up most of the deficit.

Chemical Industry

Rehabilitation of the war-devastated chemical industry is progressing slowly under the supervision of Soviet bloc chemical technicians. Main emphasis is on the reconstruction of the chemical fertilizer facilities of the Hungnam Chemical Works; ammonium sulphate

production capacity is planned to reach 90,000 metric tons per year by July 1956. A new nitro-lime fertilizer plant with 100,000 tons annual capacity is under construction at Hungnam. However, chemical output by the end of the Three-Year Plan may possibly be as much as 50 percent below the 1949 level.

Light Industry

Investment plans in light industry call for the repair and rehabilitation of 42 textile, paper and pulp, food-processing and other light industry plants, and the construction of 11 new plants. Current estimated production of cotton fabric is about 37,600,000 meters; and silk fabric about 4,580,000 meters. This low level of textile output provides less than six meters of cotton and silk fabrics per capita, thus necessitating large textile imports from the Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly Communist China.

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POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE

General Charles de Gaulle retains considerable influence over France's domestic and foreign policy, despite his retirement from active political life in June. The temperate tone of his retirement announcement and of the first volume of his memoirs published in 1954 has helped rehabilitate him in the minds of many Frenchmen who had been alienated by his uncompromising attitude. The general apparently has no intentions, however, of attempting to gain political office.

First Withdrew in 1951

De Gaulle's virtual withdrawal from active politics dates from 1951 when his Rally of the French People (RPF) failed to win control of the French National Assembly. The general's refusal to permit the RPF to participate in a coalition when the assembly convened dissipated both his party's parliamentary effectiveness and his own political following.

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Even at the height of the 1951 electoral campaign, most of De Gaulle's opponents conceded that he was not a potential dictator. Much apprehension was expressed, however, over the ambitions of many of his close associates, and as long as his return to political life remained a possibility, many national political figures hesitated to identify themselves too closely with his views.

Nevertheless, he continued to exert considerable influence on national issues. His forceful public condemnation of the European Defense Community treaty played a major role in blocking it, and the National Assembly's acceptance of the Paris agreements can probably be attributed to his statement in November 1954 that he would not oppose them.

In December 1954, De Gaulle severed his ties with the Gaullist deputies in the assembly. He called for the RPF to continue, however, as a nonpolitical body. This organization is believed to be strong in the Strasbourg area and in North Africa. While there is no indication that it is capable of or is planning any moves against the government, the June issue of its press organ restated the intention of pursuing its "mission" of political reform.

De Gaulle told an American official last April that the establishment of the RPF in 1947 had been his last effort to reform the regime. Ambassador

Dillon reported after talking with the general on 5 July that he seemed tired and discouraged and clearly no longer interested in taking part in political activities.

De Gaulle's retirement from the political field is confirmed by the RPF's recent statement emphasizing that its members who support the government are acting on their own responsibility. This is indicative of the general's personal isolation from electoral maneuverings.

Influence in  
1956 Elections

De Gaulle apparently desires that no candidate in the 1956 elections attempt to exploit his association with him. Nevertheless such prominent Gaullists as Gaston Palewski, who is Premier Faure's chief deputy, and Defense Minister Koenig will probably

try to do so. Much of the support of the two Gaullist parties in the assembly is expected to gravitate to various non-Communist candidates.

A recent example of his influence is seen in the more moderate attitude shown by rightist deputies on the question of concessions in Morocco. De Gaulle can probably be credited with moderating rightist extremists who were adamantly opposed to returning former Sultan ben Youssef to France.

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*General de Gaulle*

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Paradoxically, De Gaulle's announced intention to remain aloof from political squabbles will probably increase his influence on key issues. The elder statesman concept is strong in France, particularly in view of the lack of real national leaders following the defeat in 1940. The exaggerated deference paid to ex-premier Herriot exemplifies the need many Frenchmen feel for a symbol of the national spirit.

Role as Elder Statesman

De Gaulle's ability to express himself well can be expected to broaden his influence beyond the military and political elements to which he appealed earlier. The first volume of his memoirs received wide acclaim in French intellectual circles, and he is now at work on the second volume. French respect for literary skill can be counted on to sway many normally unsympathetic to his views. They may not agree with him, but they cannot rebut his insistence on the necessity of reforming France's political system and reviving the French economy.

It is unlikely that De Gaulle will attain or even seek the position of king-maker but it is conceivable that his influence might shorten or prolong the life of any French government. Ex-premier Mendes-France, during his tenure in office, actively sought the general's approbation. In October 1954 the two apparently resumed their friendship of early liberation days, but the general remained aloof from Mendes-France's bid for a left-center majority. He did look with favor, however, on the latter's attempt to bring a dynamic approach to the premiership.

De Gaulle attributes France's woes to the internal weaknesses of the institutions of the Fourth Republic, and in particular to the feebleness of the executive. He rejects violence, but he clearly indicated again on 30 June his belief that a shock will come in time to provide the necessary reforms. He does not, however, assign himself any role in provoking the change. Short of a Communist threat to seize power, it is unlikely he would attempt to assume leadership of the state.

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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The East European Satellites in the last several months have let up on their campaign of religious persecution of individual clerics and churchgoers, but have not ceased their efforts to subvert the churches and destroy the influence of religion. The Satellite regimes have made this change in tactics probably because they found that their earlier repressive

measures merely helped to strengthen the unity of the churches.

While some church leaders have been released from prison and there has been greater toleration of church attendance, the Communists are continuing to harass Catholic and Protestant clergy in an effort to enroll them in Communist-dominated national front organizations

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and weaken their ties with Western churches. They are simultaneously stepping up "scientific-atheistic" indoctrination of party members, youths and children, and with an eye to the general public, are sharpening press and radio ridicule of religious "superstitions."

Policies of Moderation


The nominal release of prominent clerical victims of Stalinist persecution is probably designed to impress the church membership and the outside world with Communist "reasonableness." Hungary has released Cardinal Mindszenty from detention and Poland has liberated Bishop Kaczmarek. Polish premier Cyrankiewicz has implied in a public statement that Cardinal Wyszynski will be

released soon. Czechoslovakia recently freed several Baptists and, according to unconfirmed reports, may liberate Archbishop Beran of Prague. None of these church leaders has been or is likely to be permitted to resume his ecclesiastical functions.

The Satellite regimes have also made a show of contributing to the rebuilding and maintenance of church structures and have permitted free attendance at religious services.

In contrast to these concessions, the Communists are intensifying their use of "scientific-atheistic" propaganda directed primarily at party members and youth and children. This policy has the sanction of the USSR. A 1954 Soviet decree declared that such teaching is a "component part of Soviet education."

EASTERN EUROPE  
ESTIMATED CHURCH STRENGTHS



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Efforts to Exercise Control

The regimes are also attempting to minimize the effectiveness of the churches as mobilizers of popular sentiment and to force them eventually into becoming instruments of state policy by associating them with national front organizations.

In Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, special attention is being given to gaining the support of the great mass of lower clergy, who are less able than the high ecclesiastics to resist continued pressure to collaborate with the regime. In these countries, it is becoming increasingly difficult for priests to remain aloof. Clergy who voice any sort of opposition to regime policies are generally subjected to sharp official rebukes.

Antichurch activity is strongest in Hungary. The press has attacked the "pernicious" influence of "clerical reaction," attempted to expose "religious superstitions" from the standpoint of Marxist dogma, and belabored priests for allegedly violating church-state agreements.

Here and in Poland, current campaigns against "superstition" apparently are aimed in part at forcing clergy into endorsing collectivized agriculture. The Hungarian regime appears to have had some success in this campaign, since on 20 August a pastoral letter signed by the major collaborating bishop called for the congregations to support "communal" farming.

In Poland, the party's chief theoretician has demanded intensified "class struggle" against "reactionary clergy" who allegedly dissuade peasants from entering collectives.

Approach to Youth

In Czechoslovakia, the party central committee has

directed that children shall be taught "the reactionary action of the church and the unscientific and harmful aspects of religion without offending the religious feelings of believers."

In East Germany, the regime apparently is having considerable difficulty in gaining greater control over the Evangelical church, which has been a major source of opposition. Party and government controls have been quietly expanded on national and local levels.

Various irritants have been introduced to hinder religious education, and efforts are being made to substitute Communist youth activities for those of the church. Party schools will reportedly emphasize atheistic teaching as a main target for the 1955-56 school year in an effort to eliminate surviving religious ties of Communists and make them more adept in spreading antireligious propaganda. The present official East German attitude toward the churches and their youth groups, however, is one of "benevolent toleration."

Outside Influences

West German influence, both Protestant and Catholic, has been a significant factor in strengthening East German church opposition to the Communists. The replacement with an anti-Communist of the neutralist West German president of the Evangelical church's general synod, which includes both East and West German churches, led East German authorities to predict a deterioration in "good relations between church and state." Although the implied threat has not materialized, the unusual encouragement given by East German authorities to East-West church contacts in 1954 is not being repeated this year.

In predominantly Orthodox Rumania and Bulgaria, the

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Communists have a firm grasp on the church organization. Because of the absence of close ties with Western churches, the whole problem is less acute than in the western Satellites and East Germany. Relative quiet also prevails in Albania, where the population is largely Moslem with a sizable Orthodox minority.

The East European regimes will continue to pursue their

long-range program of strengthening their controls over all areas of life. Key policies such as absorption of the churches into the national front organizations and detachment from their Western connections, notably the Vatican, remain unchanged. While making some gestures toward the churches, the regimes have not abandoned the basic Communist goal of destroying religion as a dangerous competitor of the Marxist-Leninist faith.

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**THE PUSHTOONISTAN PROBLEM**

The Pushtoonistan problem arises from the campaign waged by Afghanistan for the past eight years for the creation of a new independent state made up of the Pushtu-speaking areas of West Pakistan. The new state would inevitably be an Afghan satellite. The campaign is based in large part on Afghanistan's claim that British India in 1893 forced acceptance of what is now the Afghan-Pakistani border.

There is no political or economic basis for the state envisaged by Kabul's Pushtoonistan movement. The tribes in the area in dispute have virtually no economic assets, and many of them have never had a common ethnic allegiance.

Although most Pushtoons are satisfied with the role played by the Pakistani government in regard to them, the Pushtoonistan movement tends to intensify and perpetuate unsettled conditions on the border. It also is a constant source of friction between Kabul and Karachi, and as such poses a continuing threat to stability on the northwest frontier of South Asia.

**Land and People**

The area claimed for Pushtoonistan comprises more than half of the total territory of West Pakistan. All of it was under Afghan rule in the 18th and 19th centuries. Its population is about 7,000,000, of which about 5,000,000 are Pushtoons (also called Pathans). There are an additional 5,000,000 to 7,000,000 Pushtoons in Afghanistan, but these would not be included in the proposed state.

The political and cultural heartland of the Pushtoons is the Tribal Area, a narrow strip on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border. The 2,500,000 well-armed tribesmen who live here have always considered themselves exempt from Pakistani law. They have almost no economic resources, and the rulers of the more fertile plains have had to pay them subsidies to keep open the vital communication routes through the area, the most noted of which is the Khyber Pass.

The various Pushtoon clans on both sides of the border, the most important of which are the


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Mohmands, Afridis, Wazirs, and Mahsuds, constantly feud among themselves, and there is practically no support among them for Pushtoonistan as a political entity. Few feel national allegiance toward either Pakistan or Afghanistan.

As the British prepared to leave India in 1947, Kabul raised the question of disposition of the Pushtu-speaking areas. When Pakistan refused to consider any adjustment of the Durand boundary, Afghanistan launched its Pushtoonistan movement.

**THE PUSHTOONISTAN PROBLEM****The Pushtoonistan Movement**

The consistency of Afghanistan's ethno-linguistic arguments on behalf of the movement is compromised by the proposed exclusion from Pushtoonistan of those Pushtoons who are Afghan nationals. Moreover, Kabul's insistence on inclusion of the sparsely populated non-Pushtoon areas of southern Baluchistan suggests that its campaign is at least partly motivated by a desire for an outlet to the sea via the new satellite.

**Background of Dispute**

Under the Durand Agreement of 1893, Afghanistan and British India agreed on an international boundary which placed the Khyber and other strategic access routes to India in British territory. Afghanistan has always insisted the agreement was made under duress and continued to claim the right to interest itself in the affairs of the Pushtoon population beyond its boundary on the grounds of kinship and former suzerainty. There are also practical reasons for this interest. In 1929, these tribes were responsible for the overthrow of King Amanullah and the establishment of the present dynastic line in Kabul.

Within the Afghan government there is an extensive apparatus which carries on propaganda at home and abroad, pays subsidies to tribal leaders, maintains an excellent free school for several hundred Pushtoonistani youths, and produces maps, official documents, and other trappings of independence for the Pushtoonistan area. In addition to keeping Kabul's claims alive, these activities also help to keep the Pushtoon tribe from again menacing the Afghan capital.

The most extreme advocate of Pushtoonistan in Afghanistan is Prime Minister Daud, but almost all of the ruling group--who are themselves Pushtoons--are publicly committed to it.

Shooting incidents are a continuing occurrence on the

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border. They have not increased significantly in recent years and many routine disturbances are attributed by Kabul to a nonexistent agitation for independence.

A few influential tribal chiefs are in exile in Kabul, and one of them was able in December 1952 to raise 5,000 men who set out to plant the Pushtoonistan flag on the banks of the Indus River. This force was driven back by Royal Pakistan Air Force bombing. Several similar incidents on a smaller scale have taken place since.

The Latest Flare-up

In March 1955, the Pakistani government began to implement a plan to merge all the subunits of West Pakistan into a single province, thus eliminating all distinctive status for the Pushtoon areas. This occasioned a violent speech by Afghan prime minister Daud, which was followed on 30 March by mob attacks on Pakistani diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan.

The resulting quarrel between Kabul and Karachi dragged on for over five months, chiefly because both sides tried to use it to promote their views on Pushtoonistan. The settlement reached on 7 September left the basic Pushtoonistan issue unresolved.

The "one-unit" plan for West Pakistan also occasioned the revival of a quiescent movement within Pakistan for Pushtoon autonomy under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a former Congress Party leader.

International Interest

Since 1947, India has supported the Pushtoonistan movement for two basic reasons: (1) it has traditional economic and political interests

in Afghanistan, and (2) unrest on Pakistan's western border relieves pressure on the eastern border with India over quarrels which developed out of partition.

Britain has taken no active role in the controversy and has steadfastly refused to comply with Afghanistan's request for denunciation of the Durand Line as an international boundary.

The USSR carefully avoided involvement in the Pushtoonistan matter until the past year, when it began to manifest interest in the proposed state. Should Moscow decide to lend its support to Pushtoon autonomy, it probably would be directed at increasing difficulties for Pakistan. Soviet propaganda has claimed that Pakistan plans to use the Pushtoons as cannon fodder in Western-sponsored military arrangements.

Most of the Middle Eastern countries have deplored the "squabbling between Moslem brothers," and several have urged Afghanistan to abandon its position.

In 1950, the United States offered its good offices in an attempt to promote a settlement.

Prospects for Future

Since the Pushtoonistan movement serves both to express Kabul's irredentist feelings for the area and to divert the tribes from threatening the Afghan government, it is unlikely to be abandoned permanently. Afghanistan's promise in its recent settlement with Pakistan to moderate its propaganda probably means only a short lull in the Pushtoonistan dispute.

Pakistan is equally adamant. Karachi has given priority to economic and social development of the Pushtoon areas, which has to date more than offset Afghan efforts to promote agitation

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for independence. However, little success has been achieved in extending government control into the more remote areas.

Recent increases in American ties with Pakistan and Soviet contacts with Afghanistan tend to make the Pushtoon area of greater interest in world politics. The potential

key to control of eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan lies with the fierce and unreliable tribes. Consequently, the Pushtoonistan movement serves to perpetuate a volatile situation in an area which would be of major importance in any struggle for control of the frontier of South Asia.

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