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OCI NO. 8261

23 July 1954

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY




DOCUMENT NO. 13  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. (L)  
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 1985  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:  
AUTH: HR70  
DATE 7-25-79 REVIEWER:

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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS **CONFIDENTIAL**

25X1

THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . Page 4



KIRCHENTAG STIRS WEST GERMAN INTEREST IN EAST GERMANS . Page 8

The Kirchentag, the annual meeting of the German Evangelical Church held in Leipzig from 8 to 12 July, was unprecedented both in size and in the degree of West German interest in Soviet zone Germans which it apparently stimulated. It may serve to bring increased pressure on the Adenauer government for more emphasis on German unity at the expense of co-operation with the West.

FRENCH MAY BACK SCHEME FOR NEW GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . Page 10

With the abandonment of Tonkin, the French may attempt to maintain a hold in the south by forming a new government in south Vietnam under Cochinchinese who in the past have worked closely with them.

REIMPOSITION OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTROLS ILLUSTRATES LIMITS OF SOVIET "LIBERALISM" . . . . . Page 12

The relaxation of strict control over cultural matters, one of a series of concessions made to the Soviet people in the immediate post-Stalin period, has abruptly ended. The fact that the Soviet leaders have been forced to reinstitute the dogma of complete ideological conformity suggests that the same fate may await other concessions.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

23 July 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

Page 2

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS . . . . Page 14

During the first six months of 1954, Indian-American relations have been marked by friction but have not deteriorated appreciably. Neither are they expected to improve materially in the near future.

CURRENT TRENDS IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY . . . . . Page 16

Constitutional change in the direction of increased local autonomy has been comparatively rapid in the majority of Britain's most important overseas dependencies during the past 18 months. These changes are appropriately symbolized in the formal announcement by the British government on 17 June that its century-old Colonial Service is being replaced with a new Oversea Civil Service.

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## THE SOVIET WORLD

There were growing indications last week that an Indochina settlement will be followed by a co-ordinated Communist campaign to defeat major American defense objectives in Western Europe and Southeast Asia. The central theme of this campaign is expected to stress that peace in Indochina has increased the prospects for further reducing international tensions and strengthening peace on the foundation of collective security systems, excluding effective American participation, in both Europe and Asia.

In Europe, a new Soviet move to deter French ratification of the EDC treaty is considered likely, probably in the form of renewed efforts to win support for Molotov's European security scheme.

In a move that may indicate other Soviet bids to gain support for Molotov's European security plan, the USSR attempted to win Finnish support for the scheme as a condition to signing a five-year trade agreement. The most that was obtained, however, was a vaguely worded joint communiqué stating that "only the collective forces of all states regardless of their social structure can ensure the security of peoples, since the struggle for peace and against the threat of a new world war is in the general interest of all states." A Soviet or Satellite call for a European conference to reconsider the Communist formula for security is anticipated.

On the Asian front, there were also indications that, following an Indochina settlement, the Communists will make proposals for an Asian security system designed to block American efforts to establish a Southeast Asian defense arrangement. As far back as 28 April, Chou En-lai, with Molotov's endorsement, stated that Asian states should work out their own security arrangements. Since Chou's visit in New Delhi and Rangoon, Peiping has suggested that his "five principles" for peaceful coexistence should be the guide for relations between Asian states.

Another aspect of the Communist drive to block the creation of a Southeast Asian defense arrangement was reflected in the special play made by the Soviet press and leaders for India's sympathy in connection with the Kremlin's opposition

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to American objectives in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. On 13 July, Malenkov received the chairman of the All-India Peace Council, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, and, on the following day, Indian major general Sokhey was awarded a Stalin Peace Prize. Pravda and Izvestia devoted half of their front pages to this presentation and Pravda published an article by Sokhey on the peace movement in India.

Moscow's purpose in extending these gestures to Indian sentiment was clearly indicated by an Izvestia comment that the Chou-Nehru talks were of special importance in view of American efforts "behind the back of leading Asian countries" to organize "an aggressive bloc to suppress the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and in particular to begin open armed intervention in Indochina." The Soviet press has also stressed the theme of Asian solidarity as a brake on America's aggressive ambitions in Asia and has hailed the "new relationship which is being formed between Asian powers." A Hungarian editorial at this same time stated that "it is no exaggeration to say that the outlines of a new Asian front are emerging."

Moscow's latest move to hamper Western military planning in the Middle East took the form of a statement by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo to Premier Nasr on 9 July that the USSR would consider it an unfriendly act if Egypt agreed to provisions whereby Western forces could re-enter the Suez base. The ambassador implied that this provision would be used by the West "for aggression against the peace of the world." Following this demarche, the Soviet ambassador reportedly called on the Egyptian minister of the interior with offers of Soviet arms and of assistance for the envisioned high-dam project on the Nile.

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## KIRCHENTAG STIRS STRONG WEST GERMAN INTEREST IN EAST GERMANS

The Kirchentag, or annual meeting of the German Evangelical Lutheran Church, held in Leipzig from 8 to 12 July may prove to have been a more effective stimulant for West German interest in Soviet zone Germans than all past Communist unity propaganda. Some 10,000 West German church and lay leaders met with up to 300,000 East Zone Christians, making this by far the largest all-German gathering since World War II.

West German comment has been surprisingly favorable and enthusiastic for a continuation of such East-West associations. A Bundestag deputy of the Social Democratic Party has stated that the personal contacts with leaders of the East German government may result in further alleviations in interzonal travel restrictions and a broader cultural exchange. A Christian Democratic deputy has suggested that contacts with East German leaders be maintained by correspondence.

Bundestag president Hermann Ehlers, who was a delegate to the Kirchentag, stated on his return that the meeting, while primarily religious, nevertheless had "great political significance." Never before, he noted, was the inner harmony of the nation so evident. The numerous press reports of political discussions between Ehlers and East German Volkskammer president Dieckmann, however, appear to have been unfounded.

West German press comment has centered largely on the surprising discussion between Kirchentag participants and East German culture minister Becher. The influential Frankfurter Allgemeine speaks of the "gratifyingly objective and aggressive" exchange, and a Munich paper is impressed with the "admirable candor" of the discussion. The powerful Sueddeutsche Zeitung, which termed the Becher meeting "unique in a Communist-governed country," reported that the Communist government in Leipzig "manifested a tolerance which would be unimaginable in West Germany if conditions were reversed."

West German public opinion, influenced by the enthusiasm of the press and of many of the 10,000 delegates in their home parishes, may tend to become more susceptible to future Communist approaches. The Communists can be expected to take advantage of the current West German sentiment to foster



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further discussions between East and West Germans and to encourage more interzonal trade and travel. In these efforts, the East German regime will attempt to stimulate West German sentiment favoring neutralism and unification.

While the increased contacts between the two peoples of Germany have been a specific part of recent Soviet strategy, they may also bring certain long-range gains for the West. Such contacts are one of the few ways by which Western ideas can be transmitted to and kept alive among the East German people; thus they can help assure the West of the continued moral support of the East German populace, regardless of any political changes affecting Germany as a whole.

It is likely that a more immediate result of the Leipzig Kirchentag will be increasing pressure on the Adenauer government to place more emphasis on German unity and less on cooperation with the West. Evangelical Church leaders had assured American officials prior to the Kirchentag of the decline of neutralist sentiment and of the definite wane of neutralist Martin Niemöller's influence within the church. The results of the meeting indicated, however, that the deep concern of church leaders with the future of the largely Protestant population of the Soviet zone remains a strong source of potential neutralism.

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## FRENCH MAY BACK SCHEME FOR NEW GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

With the abandonment of Tonkin, the French may press forward on a scheme to form a new government in south Vietnam under the Cochinchinese who have in the past worked closely with them. By such means they presumably would hope to continue the French "presence" in the south and avoid the embarrassment of dealing with an irredentist government under authentic Vietnamese nationalists.

Shortly after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, certain French officials and Cochinchinese politicians began to show interest in the revival of a separate Cochinchina government of the sort which the French authorities had sponsored in 1946. Former prime minister Tam appears to be the leading advocate and contender for leadership under this plan. On 12 May, four days after the decisive northern battle, Tam indicated to the American chargé in Saigon that he favored partition of Vietnam at the 16th parallel and the formation of a Cochinchina republic.

He said that he had been advised by "certain French sources" to overthrow Bao Dai and assume power, but was not certain whether "higher French authorities" would countenance such action. However, on 28 May, Commissioner General Dejean told the chargé that his idea of a good Vietnamese government would be one in which Bao Dai acted as his own prime minister assisted by three vice premiers: Tam, Tran Van Huu, and General Nguyen Van Xuan.

Dejean thus advocated a Cochinchina government in fact, if not in name. Each of the proposed vice premiers served in the Cochinchina government of 1946. All of them hold French citizenship and are regarded by most Vietnamese as willing instruments of French policy. Xuan holds the rank of general in the French army.

Marcel Mingant, a retired French officer and adviser to earlier Vietnamese governments, is apparently one of the principal promoters of such a scheme, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mingant's plan, which he recently outlined to Ambassador Heath, calls like Dejean's for a triumvirate consisting of Tam, Xuan, and Huu.

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Mingant, who was about to depart for France, said he thought Bao Dai had made a critical error in appointing Diem. He said that Bao Dai was "washed up," but that he intended to see him and Euu Loc, the ex-premier and present high commissioner, in France and that he hoped to return in a relatively short time "if conditions were favorable."

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Vietnamese nationalists are in general violently opposed to any dismemberment of Vietnam, and their knowledge, or suspicion, that a separatist plan is in the making has strained their already embittered relations with the French. The will to continue resistance to Communism on the part of the nationalists is certain to be gravely impaired by the abandonment of Tonkin; the further step of creating a new government in the south dominated by Cochinchinese who are naturalized French citizens would virtually destroy any prospect of effective local resistance to Communism.

French officials have expressed some apprehension regarding the apparent irreconcilability of Vietnamese, particularly Premier Diem and his associates, to the abandonment of Tonkin. The French fear that Diem's insistence that Hanoi is the "cradle of the race" and must be held or retaken at all costs may goad the Viet Minh into breaking a cease-fire agreement. The creation of a government with its roots in the south would, from the French standpoint, have the double advantage of removing excitable and impulsive nationalists from office, and of giving a new lease on life to the maintenance of the French "presence" in Cochinchina.

It is also evident that such a development would favor the long-term interests of the Viet Minh, since it would tend to shatter purely indigenous resistance to Communism and force many inflexible non-Communist opponents of French control into the Viet Minh camp.

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LIMITS OF SOVIET "LIBERALISM"

The relaxation of strict control over cultural matters, one of a series of concessions made to the Soviet people in the immediate post-Stalin period, has abruptly ended. It appears that the party, after offering Soviet writers and composers more creative freedom, realized that this would lead to works which would reflect adversely on the regime. The fact that the Soviet leaders have been forced to return to the dogma of complete ideological conformity, which Zhdanov instituted in 1946 in this field, suggests that the same fate may await other concessions.

Although efforts had been made since the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 to improve the quality of literary and artistic works, it was not until Stalin died that the party indicated the direction in which it was moving. Within six weeks after the dictator's death, articles by top-flight artists began calling for greater originality, fewer bureaucratic controls, and more freedom from restraints imposed by the ideological carping of semiofficial critics.

In the fall of 1953 the high point in the attack against stultifying controls was reached. Three well-known Soviet artists, Khachaturian, Shostakovich, and Ilya Ehrenburg, devoted long and bitter articles to the parlous state of the arts. In each case the target was the petty bureaucrat, the critic parroting a sterile "line," the institutional guardianship of the Union of Soviet Composers and the Union of Soviet Writers. "No tutelage," cried Khachaturian, "creative problems cannot be solved by bureaucratic methods!" Shostakovich heaped ridicule on those who would "'guard' composers from following independent, untrod paths of art. We should fear, not daring creative originality, but 'safe' superficiality, dullness, and stereotyped work." Even Ehrenburg, who has reached his present state of eminence through servile and abject adherence to the party line, attacked the Soviet practice of ordering writers to compose a novel or play, of supplying the subject matter and the tone to be used.

The appearance of such criticism seemed to indicate that the party leaders, who since the end of the war had kept a tight rein over cultural production, were experimenting with a new approach to the problem. They probably had two aims in mind: to make literature interesting enough so that it could once again

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be an effective tool to support the regime; and to counter disaffection among the intelligentsia. Since 1945 there had been only a few "safe" subjects--such as the restoration of a collective farm after Nazi devastation--and the same themes had been reworked time and again. Because the method of treating these subjects became stereotyped, every situation could be foretold and a deadly pallor of conformity settled over Soviet writing and composing. Under these conditions, no one would read or be influenced by what was written, and first-rate writers like Sholokhov and poets like Pasternak withdrew entirely from literary activities. The new "liberalism," it was hoped, would counteract both these tendencies while producing works which attacked officially approved topics but did not reflect on the regime.

Soviet writers, perhaps heartened by what appeared to be a clear removal of the heavy hand of Zhdanovism, hurried to carry out the party's latest dictum. But the results were apparently not what the regime had expected and the past few months have seen a demand for literature "dedicated to rearing the working class in the spirit of socialism." Thus, the keynote of Zhdanovism--Communist orthodoxy, fervor, and propaganda--is again required of the Soviet writer. The party wanted writers to attack the bureaucrat, the self-seeker, while at the same time eulogizing the brave new Soviet world, but in portraying the negative and bad part of Soviet life the writers apparently could not avoid casting reflections on the whole. As the criticism of Ehrenburg's latest book expresses it, the relaxation has brought forth "works caricaturing our life and libeling it wholesale."

Soviet leaders have thus been forced to realize that the realities of Soviet life are such that they preclude even the small measure of freedom of expression on the part of creative artists which was permitted in this period. They have therefore returned to the stringent controls of the Stalin era, and, while continuing to demand "searching criticism," have re-established so many qualifications as to make the demand meaningless. In the same way, the realities of Soviet life impose limits to the other political and economic concessions made in the first flush of enthusiasm after Stalin's death, and, if they prove too broad to be contained within these limits, they may well be discarded as those in cultural affairs have been.

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## CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

During the first six months of 1954, Indian-American relations have been marked by friction but have not deteriorated appreciably. Neither are they expected to improve materially in the near future.

India's objections to American policy have centered on military aid to Pakistan, the hydrogen bomb, and Indochina, demonstrating a continued obsession with the familiar themes of anti-Pakistanism, world peace, and colonialism.

Rumors in January of the subsequently announced Turkish-Pakistani friendship agreement and of American military aid to Pakistan aroused opposition from all quarters of Indian opinion. This has continued since February, but on a diminishing scale as more current problems have taken precedence. Reaction has been almost exclusively verbal. The sole results definitely attributable to this issue are the increased hesitancy of Indian officials to provide information to American diplomatic officers and the increased tendency of both officials and public to shun contact with Americans.

Possibly related anti-American measures taken during 1954 include notice on 14 January of intent to terminate the Indian-American civil air agreement in 1955, the request in March for the withdrawal from Kashmir of UN observers of American nationality, increased emphasis in propaganda during April and May on American "intelligence" activities in Nepal, and continued pressure to limit the operations of missionaries and American businesses. All these measures have their roots in earlier history, however, and are natural manifestations of Indian nationalism. None can be attributed solely to the antagonism generated by American aid to Pakistan.

In April the attention of the Indian government, press, and public centered on announcements of earlier American hydrogen bomb experiments in the Pacific Ocean and the harm accidentally caused to Japanese fishermen by radioactivity. The outcry was based on moral considerations, renewed impressions that American activities harm only Asians, and on general fear that such experiments can only lead to World War III. Indian efforts to limit further experiments continue in the United Nations.

Later in April and in May, Indian attention shifted to the issue of colonialism as exemplified in Indochina and discussed at the Colombo and Geneva conferences. New Delhi objected to

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Secretary Dulles' plea for a united stand in Southeast Asia against Chinese aggression. It opposed the concept of a South-east Asian treaty organization on the grounds that it would constitute a direct threat to China and that it would involve non-Asian powers. India also fought the Thai request for a peace observation committee, probably because it felt the request was an American-inspired maneuver.

Indian criticism has been that the United States' actions served only to disrupt the Geneva conference and delay a peaceful solution in Indochina. New Delhi still feels that the United States supports the colonial powers, and the Indian press paid little attention to Secretary Dulles' speech in Seattle on 10 June in which he said that his country would never fight for colonialism and that it would not intervene unilaterally in Indochina.

At the same time, India has displayed realism in certain facets of its relations with the United States. Despite periodic statements by persons as important as Prime Minister Nehru that dependence on foreign economic aid is undesirable, India continues to count on it in its annual budgets and its Five-Year Plan. New Delhi still makes military purchases in the United States of such heavy equipment as tanks, although it has been embarrassed by this in connection with its objections to American military aid to Pakistan.

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In addition, there seems to be a growing body of opinion that Nehru's neutralist foreign policy is not wise and that he handled the aid-to-Pakistan issue badly. Some of this opinion is found at the parliamentary and cabinet levels.

These situations indicate New Delhi's basic recognition that it needs the United States and cannot loosen important ties with it, especially since doing so would be detrimental to India's political and economic development. On the other hand, it seems obvious that issues such as anti-Pakistanism, world peace, and colonialism will not be solved in the near future and that the present points of friction between the United States and India will continue for some time.

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CURRENT TRENDS IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

25X1 Constitutional change in the direction of increased local autonomy has been comparatively rapid in the majority of Britain's most important overseas dependencies during the past 18 months [redacted] These changes are appropriately symbolized in the formal announcement by the British government on 17 June that its century-old Colonial Service is being replaced with a new Oversea Civil Service.

The evident aim of this change in title is to encourage the continued employment of British administrators by the newly autonomous governments of former colonies, and thereby retain for London at least an indirect tutorial influence.

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The overseas dependencies continue to have an important influence on Britain's global power position. Economically, they have since 1950 contributed sizable dollar earnings to the sterling area, but a continued decline in export earnings is expected, as are deficits rather than surpluses in many territories. In a military sense, the colonies presently represent a liability to Britain. At a time when there is not one complete division in the United Kingdom, British troops are dispersed around the world and tied down by the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya and the unrest in British Guiana.

Politically, Britain has long assumed public responsibility for encouraging colonial peoples to take over management of their own affairs in so far as they are capable. Since World War II, the attacks on colonialism in the UN, particularly by India, have given London an added reason for speeding the process. The aim of British colonial policy is to abolish the distinction between the colonies and the independent members of the Commonwealth. British officials have stated that Britain cannot accept any conception of "second-class Commonwealth membership" for former colonies. In addition to political maturity, the practical criteria for independence remain those of economic viability and the capacity to make a contribution to the defense of the Commonwealth.



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Important changes have occurred during the past year and a half in 11 of the 12 territories with populations exceeding one million. Of the total of 35 territories, 11 now have full adult suffrage. Fifteen have elective majorities in the legislature. In Nigeria--where about 45 percent of the total population of Britain's dependent empire lives--a federal constitution has been instituted providing for an elective native majority in the legislature based on wide suffrage adapted to local conditions. It is generally agreed that the recent constitutional innovations in the Gold Coast have brought it to the last stage preceding full Commonwealth membership. Despite the continuance of emergency conditions, changes have been instituted or planned in both Kenya and Malaya.

Britain's reluctance to proceed more rapidly with constitutional innovation where unstable conditions prevail, however, was demonstrated by the suspension of the liberal constitution of British Guiana last October because of the subversive tendencies of the Communist-dominated government chosen in the first elections a few months earlier. In British Honduras, promulgation of a new constitution this spring was accompanied by a clear warning that irresponsibility on the part of the anti-British People's United Party would not be tolerated.

A problem arising in other dependencies--in Malaya, for example, as well as in various African colonies--is disagreement among different racial groups as to their respective shares of the increased authority being granted by London. In turning over political control last year to white settler elements in the new Central African Federation, therefore, the British government tried to assuage the native Africans' fears by retaining final authority--probably until 1960--in matters affecting their interests in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In the less developed territories generally, the achievement of complete self-government will, as Colonial Secretary Lyttelton said last May, take much longer than "even the most patient" now believe. He held that immediate steps to institute "modern" suffrage and to end Colonial Office control would in several areas result in the "swamping" of European influence.

On balance, however, the colonial territories present a picture of steady political and constitutional development toward greater autonomy. Despite the heightened risks of instability accompanying the increased pace of change in the colonies, Britain remains generally committed to the policy of encouraging colonial peoples to learn the ways of parliamentary democracy.

23 July 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

Page 17

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