

This Notice Expires 1 July 1975

TRAINING

22 July 1974

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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

1. A Center for the Study of Intelligence has been established within the Intelligence Institute of the Office of Training.

2. The principal mission of the center will be to foster rigorous and systematic inquiry into the purposes and processes of intelligence. To achieve this goal the center will sponsor two programs. The first program will consist of a research and study on intelligence theory and doctrine, the place of intelligence in American society, methods and patterns of intelligence organization, and other such fundamental issues. The second program will consist of a series of discussion groups designed to explore selected issues, more process related than substantive, of importance to the Agency's current and future missions.

3. The permanent staff of the center will be provided by the Office of Training but there will be opportunities for other personnel to participate in the research and study program as fellows in intelligence according to procedures to be announced. Participation in the discussion group programs will be at the invitation of the Director of Training.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

HAROLD L. BROWMAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services

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10 June 1975

25 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Board of Advisors for the Center for the Study of Intelligence

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 2 Jun 75 to DD/A fr DTR, same subj

1. All precincts have been heard from, and the following have been nominated to the Board of Advisors:

25X1 DDO - Messrs [Redacted]

25X1 DD/I - Messrs. Lewis Lapham and [Redacted]

25X1 DD/S&T - Messrs. James Hirsch and [Redacted]

STATINTL O-DCI - Messrs [Redacted]

DD/A - Mr. John McMahon

2. Please undertake to draw up a charter for the Board and establish a date for our first meeting as soon as reasonable. Believe it would be most appropriate at the first meeting to brief the Board on the composition of the Center, how it proposes to address itself to topics, and identification of the subject matter presently under study or earmarked for consideration.

[Redacted]

JFB
John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

cc: [Redacted]
DDO
DD/I
DD/S&T
AO/DCI

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CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING

CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF
INTELLIGENCE, OTR

January 1976

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CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING

There is no phase of the intelligence business which is more important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, this relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automatically, does not do this. It is established as a result of a great deal of persistent, conscious effort and is likely to disappear when the effort is relaxed.

Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 1949.

INTRODUCTION

That an appropriate relationship between intelligence and policy making is neither spontaneous nor self-perpetuating has become increasingly evident over the years. Continuing efforts are needed to maintain and improve it. As a contribution to this process, the Center for the Study of Intelligence has undertaken to examine the current state of the intelligence-policy connection, focusing on CIA intelligence support. The Center's study team¹ perused relevant literature, interviewed a wide range of intelligence producers and policy makers,

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and looked into some recent and ongoing examples of the intelligence-policy relationship in operation (See Annex A).

This paper is a distillation of those efforts. It comments on the role of intelligence in policy making, analyzes and assesses the status of the Agency's intelligence support effort, and offers some suggestions for lessening gaps between aspiration and reality. Elements of the study will strike some readers as well-known and obvious; the Agency has, after all, been engaged in the policy support process for over 25 years. This does not, however, diminish the value of developing familiar aspects of the process and blending them with new insights to arrive at a total description and evaluation. The project focuses entirely on intelligence as an informational input. Covert action in support of policy is not considered. Certain other important aspects of the support process, such as community coordination of intelligence, receive only partial treatment; they appear to warrant separate study. It should be noted also that the project concentrates almost exclusively on policy making by the executive branch.²

The study team found policy makers quite willing to speak frankly and at length, apparently out of genuine interest in the project and concern that the quality of the Agency's products and services could be adversely affected

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by a continuation of less-than-responsible criticism. The battering the Agency recently has been taking at the hands of a number of Congressmen and in the news media stands in sharp contrast to the remarkably high respect policy makers still accord it for professionalism and substantive competence. The panoply of intelligence products and services the Agency provides is much appreciated, despite criticism of specific products and areas.

It is quite clear, however, that quality intelligence products cannot in themselves fulfill the Agency's policy support mission. Intelligence must be effectively communicated and assimilated if it is to provide an appropriate input to the policy making process, and the study reveals a need within the Agency to couple continued concern for quality production with greater and more systematic attention to dissemination, receptivity, and use.

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SYNOPSIS OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The dividing line that in traditional theory separates intelligence and policy has become obscure. CIA intelligence feeds into the policy making process in a wide variety of forms and at many different levels. A significant part of the intelligence message conveyed to top policy makers is unidentifiably imbedded in policy papers or inextricably interwoven in sets of options. The tendency of intelligence and policy to become intertwined early in the decision making process has intensified in recent years.

--The study suggests some measures to improve intelligence producers' understanding of the present complex linkages with the policy making process, and some steps designed to increase the impact of the Agency's products and services on the policy people who produce the papers and options upon which action often is based.

The widespread use of human filtering mechanisms on the consumer side results in the failure of much written intelligence meant for high-level policy makers to reach them in the original

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formats and contexts prepared by the Agency. CIA intelligence sometimes becomes just another anonymous bit of information, and even when particular intelligence documents are forwarded, principals often read only summaries written and attached by their aides. Policy makers, moreover, take aboard copious quantities of so-called unfinished intelligence. They prefer to get raw items of current import immediately, rather than to wait even a few hours for the raw factual report to be accompanied by interpretation.

--The study recommends closer alignment of written products to the realities of how information is received, screened, and processed by policy makers. It also suggests consideration of a new intelligence publication designed to help lessen problems that can be created by the injudicious use of uninterpreted raw information.

Some of the most important communication of intelligence is now done orally. Much oral dissemination takes the form of formal, prepared briefings, but informal exchanges are

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at least equally significant. Discussions that DDO Division Chiefs have with Assistant Secretaries of State and NSC Staff members should be widely recognized within the CIA as constituting important avenues for the passing of substantive intelligence. The strong natural linkages between the DDO and certain policy makers probably could be exploited in the overall intelligence support process more effectively than at present.

--The study suggests a thorough look at the prospects and problems of oral dissemination and at the establishment of mechanisms for insuring that feedback information and useful insights on the policy milieu obtained by DDO officers in contact with policy makers are regularly shared with their DDI colleagues.

Policy makers value and are receptive to the Agency's products and services, but they tend to like some kinds of intelligence more than others. They most appreciate receiving unique pieces of information of the kind only intelligence sources can provide. Analysis of unfamiliar or particularly

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complex material also is coveted; the Agency's work on technical/scientific and military/strategic subjects is highly regarded, and economic analysis is enthusiastically received by those consumers who specialize in the economic field. There is less admiration for the kind of intelligence that corresponds to most policy makers' own expertise, i.e., interpretive reporting on foreign political developments. Policy makers tend in this area to look to intelligence for the "facts," and they profess to regard much of the Agency's interpretive work as of marginal utility. They do, however, appreciate political analysis that answers specific questions or performs a special service by using new techniques, exploiting unfamiliar materials, adopting an imaginative approach, or developing an unusual insight.

--The study suggests several measures aimed at increasing policy maker receptivity to the Agency's political interpretation and analysis.

Policy makers genuinely desire probing, in-depth analysis in all fields, and there is recognition that CIA has been gaining ground on this front. There is, however, little confidence in most predictive intelligence--whether the Agency's own or the formal estimates of the Intelligence Community.

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--There is a need for improvement in predictive intelligence, and a hard look at the estimative process would be the logical first step.

The perennial--and probably interminable--problems of insufficient feedback and secretiveness concerning policy plans hinder intelligence responsiveness and adversely affect intelligence quality.

--The study suggests some measures to mitigate this situation, including the development of improved capabilities to independently assess within the CIA questions policy makers need answered now and to independently anticipate the problems they are likely to be faced with in the future.

Close intelligence producer-policy maker relationships are, nevertheless, important in assuring the relevance and impact of intelligence inputs. Most policy makers are reasonably enthusiastic about receiving intelligence, but are continually distracted from it by the pressures of day-to-day operational matters and the urgent demands that non-intelligence people, paper, and problems levy upon their

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time and energy. Initiatives for improved relationships must, therefore, come largely from the intelligence side. Agency people have managed to develop close, helpful relationships with a variety of policy people, and the intelligence transmitted in these circumstances has strong impact. There are, at the same time, cases where communication is sparse and the intelligence product sometimes has little to do with the focus of attention on the policy side. Developing and maintaining good intelligence producer-policy maker connections is, of course, particularly difficult in areas where policy makers tend to feel most competent doing their own analysis.

--The study suggests that political analysts take especially vigorous initiatives to expand and improve their contacts with policy people by utilizing the kinds of approaches that evoke positive responses.

There are clear advantages for the Agency in having multiple points of contact and communication with the policy side. These could be maximized by better coordination of policy support rendered by various Agency components.

--The study offers a suggestion for increasing organizational awareness of disparate policy support activities.

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POLICY MAKING AND POLICY MAKERS

Sherman Kent and other early commentators on the intelligence-policy connection³ posited policy makers who consciously and carefully assembled information relevant to their problems, weighed policy options and implications, and proceeded to select courses of action. Intelligence provided part of the factual and interpretative background for this process and aided in the projection of the consequences of alternative strategies. The role intelligence producers were supposed to play was seen as sizable, yet carefully delineated; they were admonished to guard against too intimate an involvement in the policy making process lest they compromise their impartiality and objectivity.

With the benefit of additional years of perspective on the policy making process, it now seems doubtful that such rational actor-based models ever adequately described it. They surely fail to do so today. Increasingly sophisticated analyses have revealed an intricate, often disorderly system of human and institutional interactions that is incompatible with traditional maxims about the role of intelligence. The Decision Making models that emerged in the early 1960s⁴ and more recent attempts to develop and apply sophisticated conceptual frameworks--notably the Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics models⁵--highlight the variety of

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forces at work in the policy making process. They provide valuable insights into the dynamics of individual actuation, organizational functioning, and bureaucratic maneuver. Although the models deal with informational inputs and communications channels in policy making, they unfortunately tend not to single out intelligence for separate special treatment.

The same is true of the intriguing work psychologists and organization theorists have done on perception, information processing, and decision making in individuals, small groups, and bureaucracies.⁶ There have been some attempts to apply the insights gained in these studies to foreign and national security policy making,⁷ but without any systematic effort to assess the impact of intelligence as distinct from that of information in general.⁸

This study recognizes the utility of theoretical work in a variety of fields, but is not cast in terms of a particular model or framework. It attempts a fresh, pragmatic examination of the working elements in the intelligence-policy relationship and a necessary starting point in this examination is an understanding of the policy making milieu into which intelligence support funnels.

Traditional thinking about this milieu tends to focus on policy makers at the top--the Presidents and their closest advisors. Unquestionably these figures play a key role,

especially in crisis situations, but there also is a great corpus of policy that is made or influenced by others--by the incremental day-to-day decisions of country desk and embassy officers, by the staff people who draft papers for their principals, and by the innovative suggestions of junior officers or aides.

Some policy decisions do rest on deliberations by a very few. But others stem from recommendations of a high-level body reviewing the work of a middle-level committee that was derived from a series of options formulated at a lower level on the basis of inputs from the next level down. Policy can also result from nothing more than unchecked momentum. Thus, policy makers must be thought of as many and varied. Whether a policy determination occurs high, low, or in-between, the set of people involved obviously will vary with the subject and geographical area, and the impact of intelligence will differ from case to case.⁹

Policy makers differ in interests, temperament, and working styles. These variations are not always apparent, however, and intelligence producers caught up in the effort to provide day-to-day support sometimes fail to fully appreciate resulting problems or opportunities.¹⁰ There is also a less than complete understanding of areas of congruence and divergence in attitude and approach between policy

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makers and different kinds of intelligence producers. This is especially so regarding the operational orientation and activist inclination that policy makers share with operations officers.¹¹

Policy people regard themselves as having certain expertise and ample sophistication. They are accustomed to interpreting, analyzing, and projecting, as well as planning, deciding and operating. They tend, therefore, to be most receptive to intelligence that provides new information, makes the esoteric comprehensible, or answers a particular question on their minds. Intelligence that attempts to do for them what they believe they can accomplish competently themselves generally is less well-received.

Intelligence, of course, often is only one among a number of information sources available to policy makers, and they are under no obligation to be guided solely by its light. Policy may, in fact, be shaped by personal, bureaucratic, political, or other factors having little or no relation to intelligence input.¹² Intelligence producers nevertheless are obliged to do their best to insure that policy makers are aware of relevant intelligence and take it into account.

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THE VARIETIES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

CIA intelligence feeds into the policy making milieu in a wide variety of forms. The Agency's products and services could be categorized in a number of different ways. One such arbitrary format is developed below as an aid to the analysis in subsequent sections of the paper. The categories are not meant to be rigid, and there actually is considerable overlap.

Current Intelligence, provided orally and by a varied array of written products including finished intelligence publications, FBIS output, and DDO disseminations, keeps a core of top policy officials and a corps of others apprised of a very wide range of developments. Current Intelligence includes reporting, interpretation, analysis, prediction, and even some customized service. Several different types of products and services are embodied in the category.

--Broad Spectrum Reporting from CIA is conveyed principally through the National Intelligence Daily and Bulletin and by the President's Daily Brief. White House Spot Reports, TDs and FBIS ticker help keep this coverage current, and some periodicals provide a reviewing service.

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--Focused Coverage, by area or function, is handled partly by directing to certain policy makers only those materials pertaining to their responsibilities, and partly through publications specially designed for this purpose. Among the latter are the informal staff notes sent to selected policy people by OCI divisions, the OER weekly on international petroleum developments, and DDS&T periodicals with current intelligence for policy people having scientific, technical, or strategic responsibilities.

--Crisis Response Intelligence is provided when a fast-breaking situation causes, among other things, a great surge of incoming traffic and acute need on the part of policy makers to know quickly what is happening and what may be about to take place. It is usually embodied in a series of up-to-date situation reports.

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Customized Service is directly keyed to specific concerns of policy makers. It may be supplied in response to requests by policy people, special needs ferreted out by NIOs or others in contact with consumers, or concerns that intelligence officers determine independently. Examples include support to the SALT and MBFR delegations, some NIEs, and other material produced by various Agency components, including the DDO.

In-Depth Analysis is the process of obtaining and evaluating all available pieces of evidence which seem reasonably to bear on an intelligence subject; seeking the counsel of other specialists; developing, testing, and refining hypotheses; and, finally, recording and issuing findings. The emphasis is on comprehensiveness rather than speed. Analysis of this kind for which the Agency has become respected is mostly in highly specialized fields--scientific/technical, military/strategic, or economic/financial. The Agency still is in the process of establishing a reputation for routinely high calibre in-depth political analysis or for compelling analysis on the sort of broad questions that require interdisciplinary attack--whether political/military, political/economic, or all three.

Predictive Intelligence involves a willingness to think the unthinkable and an ability to forecast discontinuities as well as to identify trends. It includes much more than

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formally issued National Intelligence Estimates. Much predictive intelligence work is done in Customized Service and in certain kinds of In-Depth Analysis. Some also appears in Current Intelligence. The National Intelligence Officers have a special responsibility regarding the most critical kind of predictive intelligence, the Alert Memoranda. These are the DCI's formal warnings to top-level policy makers of possible developments abroad of major concern to the United States.

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THE FLOW OF WORDS AND PAPER

The breadth and depth of the production described in the preceding section is impressive. Production of even the finest intelligence does not, however, guarantee that it will have an impact on the policy making process. The intelligence message must be effectively communicated to policy makers, and this means that it must be received as well as sent.¹³ There are clearly a variety of factors affecting delivery of the Agency's products and services. Many of them tend to blur the intelligence message, and it does not appear that the extent of their impact is fully understood by intelligence producers.

Changing Structural Arrangement

Formal institutional arrangements create some of the channels through which intelligence flows. Structural patterns tend to change with the varying concerns and attitudes of different sets of policy people, and the routes intelligence travels are shaped accordingly.

In the mid-1950s, when Robert Cutler was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Eisenhower Administration, the NSC Planning Board had an established system for intelligence tasking and for the consideration of formal intelligence Estimates as a regular part of the process of preparing policy recommendations for the NSC. The procedure

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was supposed to ensure that--as Cutler put it--"both the Planning Board and the members of the National Security Council would be inseminated (sic) with the Intelligence."¹⁴ Unfortunately, that was not the result; though there was regular intercourse, the coordinated intelligence input usually seemed to be sterile, and the unschooled policy position often turned out to be impregnable.

The NSC machinery was substantially altered and then used less and in looser fashion during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For CIA intelligence, this meant both an expansion of the policy audience and an increased receptivity to insightful intelligence not coordinated within the Intelligence Community. In 1966, midway in President Johnson's term, a new substructure was adopted under the authority of the Secretary of State for "the overall direction, coordination and supervision of inter-departmental activities of the US Government overseas."¹⁵ It provided for a Senior Interdepartmental Group--headed by the Under Secretary of State--and for a set of Interdepartmental Regional Groups subordinate to it. The President, at the same time, continued to take counsel from ad hoc groups and from advisors outside the government on a certain number of issues. Thus, the SIG/IRG never became the primary decision making machinery under Johnson and Walt Rostow.

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When President Nixon took office, he and Henry Kissinger replaced the system with the machinery still in nominal use today: the National Security Council Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda. The NSSM approach has had the advantage for CIA intelligence of opening up new opportunities for productive working relationships between intelligence and policy people. Partly as a result of Henry Kissinger's being for a time both Secretary of State and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, however, structured use of the NSSM-NSDM apparatus considerably declined.¹⁶ Even so, the NSSM-NSDM system has meant that the integration of intelligence and policy considerations frequently is undertaken at a relatively low level. This practice of mixing intelligence and policy early in the game is not unique to the NSSM-NSDM; it had become increasingly commonplace following the Eisenhower administration, and during the Nixon and Ford presidencies the tendency has simply intensified.

Getting Intelligence Through

The way in which the structural overlay has evolved has resulted in an increasingly significant part of the intelligence message being conveyed to top-level policy makers in other than intelligence formats. Intelligence may be the implicit stimulus for an action proposal, inextricably interwoven in

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a set of options, or unrecognizably re~~re~~incarnated in a policy paper. That a policy decision does not clearly reflect an identifiable intelligence input, therefore, does not conclusively demonstrate that intelligence played no role. The impact of intelligence often lies in a difficult-to-trace influence upon the people who drafted, reviewed, revised and forwarded options or recommendations. The importance of reaching these policy makers should not be underestimated.

Intelligence producers must nevertheless aim for and reach the top-ranking policy people. The path of written intelligence to policy making principals, however, almost always run through at least one set of their "gatekeepers," the staff assistants who screen, select, and summarize. The widespread use of such human filtering mechanisms means that much written intelligence produced by the CIA today does not reach high-level consumers intact in its original context. In fact, the identity of a particular item as a CIA-produced piece of intelligence may be lost once it is excerpted, digested, and imbedded amidst a collection of other equally anonymous bits of information. Even when a particular intelligence document actually does go through, the top-level policy maker will, like as not, read only a summary of its

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contents written and attached by an aide.¹⁷ Many policy makers, moreover, tend to be unable to recall exactly where in the voluminous daily flow of information they have picked up particular items they find interesting or useful.

Personal delivery and oral exchange appear to be the surest--sometimes the only--ways of guaranteeing that intelligence--as intelligence--reaches those at or near the apex of the policy making pyramid. The most notable recent instance of personal delivery paying off handsomely, of course, involved the President's Daily Brief and Mr. Ford's copy of the National Intelligence Daily. The President normally read them in the presence of the Agency officer who delivered them right to the oval office. This arrangement not only insured that these products got to and were read by the President, it afforded an opportunity for daily interchange between Mr. Ford and the Agency that proved valuable in providing intelligence producers with feedback on their efforts and insights into presidential concerns.¹⁸

Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships

There are several traditional forums in which intelligence is conveyed orally. DCI briefings of the NSC, WASAG, and SRG usually are the first order of business when these bodies meet, and regular substantive briefings of certain Congressional Committees have become standard. The DDS&T has

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since the late 1960s heavily utilized the oral delivery form. More recently, OER has been employing oral briefings on a regular basis. Its presentations to top-level Treasury Department officials and other ranking economic policy makers--and its support to the briefers on their own staffs--have been highly successful.¹⁹

A number of policy makers, busy as they are, seem willing, oddly enough, to take time to be briefed even when the process winds up consuming more time than it would have taken to read a piece of written intelligence. Policy people seem to like the idea of having someone at hand to answer questions and take requests for further or different information. Assured delivery and attention, instant feedback, and a chance to stay attuned to the policy makers' concerns are cited by those who have done extensive oral briefings as the key benefits to intelligence producers.²⁰

There are, of course, potential pitfalls in providing intelligence orally. It takes a certain kind of personality to do the job successfully. The wrong approach can turn a policy maker off to intelligence in any form. There also are problems regarding monitoring what is said, correcting mistaken impressions, and avoiding an inattention to caveats--on either end of the exchange--that can result in tentative conclusions being given more weight than they deserve.

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These problems do not appear to be unsolvable, they would seem, in fact, to be outweighed by the positive benefits that flow from oral delivery.

Informal personal contacts and conversations between intelligence producers and policy makers also are responsible for the delivery of a good deal of intelligence. It is abundantly clear that operations officers are particularly adept at developing and maintaining such contacts. They are geared toward dealing with people by temperament and experience, and high-level DDO officers often are long-time acquaintances of ranking State Department officers. Friendships and mutual respect born of service together overseas carry over to relationships in Washington. The need to regularly discuss operational matters, and the fact that DDO officers normally represent the Agency on many interdepartmental groups and committees, are important factors in sustaining these contacts.

There is, moreover, a quite understandable preference among many policy people to deal with intelligence people they know and have had productive relationships within the past. It also is evident that many policy makers have only a vague understanding of the organizational division within the Agency between intelligence collection and analysis.

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Even policy makers who are aware of how the Agency is structured and who maintain regular contact with an NIO or a finished intelligence producer will often turn to an operations officer for the answer to a substantive question.²¹ This may be because the policy maker finds it more convenient to do so, or because he has particular respect for the opinion of an individual he knows has served in the area in question and dealt first hand with the people concerned. It may also be because the operations officer not only can tell the policy maker what is happening or may be about to occur, he can discuss these matters in an operational context that parallels the way in which the policy maker approaches the problem. The operations officer, in other words, can speak to the question of what the Agency can and cannot do to help influence the course of events. This is a dimension that is simply beyond the scope of those who produce finished intelligence.²²

There have been instances in which finished intelligence producers have been very successful in developing productive interchanges with their customers. Force of personality and previous service on the policy side of things are two factors that seem to bear heavily on the success of such efforts.²³ Another factor is imagination and ingenuity in approaching

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policy makers with new ideas and specific suggestions about ways in which intelligence can help them, rather than empty handed, asking in vague fashion, "what can I do for you?"²⁴

Degrees of success in establishing good personal relationships with policy makers vary widely outside the Operations Directorate. Many finished intelligence producers lack the regular opportunity for contact with policy makers that operations officers have by virtue of their seats on policy-related, inter-agency committees, groups, or task forces and ad hoc discussions of "operational" matters. The pressure of day-to-day production for publications, moreover, tends to limit the amount of time finished intelligence producers--analysts and managers alike--can devote to developing and maintaining personal contacts with policy people.

The NIO system, established in 1973, was intended in part to alleviate this situation by creating high ranking and highly visible bridges between policy makers and finished intelligence producers. The results have been mixed. The NIOs vary in their conception of their roles and in the duties they choose to emphasize.²⁵ Some finished intelligence producers seem to believe that the system has relieved them of any responsibility for consumer relations; others profess

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a desire to better their relationships with policy people, but feel inhibited by the existence of an NIO--some complain of being specifically discouraged from dealing directly with consumers.²⁶

The lack of consensus among finished intelligence producers and between them and the NIOs on the allocation of responsibility for contacts with policy people appears to be causing some confusion and frustration. Clearer delineation of responsibilities would aid in efforts to improve policy makers' receptivity to intelligence through personal relationships.

The receptivity of policy makers to intelligence also hinges very heavily on the subject matter of the material offered, the policy makers' attitudes and preconceptions, and on certain other matters to which we now turn.

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RECEPTIVITY

Physical delivery of intelligence, written or oral, still does not insure that it will influence the policy making process. Receptivity on the part of policy makers is required. They must appreciate intelligence as worthwhile and worthy of being taken into account.

Generally speaking, policy makers value and are receptive to the Agency's support, but they like some kinds of intelligence more than others. They tend to prefer hard--or hard looking--facts to philosophical arguments, and they most appreciate receiving from intelligence that which they cannot--or cannot efficiently--provide for themselves. Especially coveted is the unique piece of information obtainable only from intelligence sources.

There is, thus, wide appreciation and brisk demand for material that some intelligence producers tend to regard as rather prosaic and routine--FBIS text, statistics, maps, charts, and biographies. It is clear that these products are more than raw inputs into the production of the finished texts of national intelligence; they are regularly received as independent products and used by policy makers who, right through the top levels, also take on sizeable quantities of so-called "raw" intelligence reports from the DDO.²⁷

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Attitudes toward finished intelligence products tend to vary with the subject matter. Receptivity is greatest in areas where it is recognized that manipulation of data and worthwhile analysis require special expertise or methodological know-how, as in the military, scientific, technical, and economic fields. Political intelligence that conveys a new piece of information or a fresh analytical approach is almost always welcomed, but there is less receptivity to the ordinary kinds of political interpretation and analysis, which policy people are prone to believe is surplus, if not inferior, to their own thought processes.

These distinctions are applicable to generalizations about policy makers' attitudes toward the various categories of CIA intelligence referred to earlier--especially so with regard to the variety of products and services that make up the Agency's Current Intelligence support. Feelings about the Broad Spectrum Reporting of the NID and NIB run the gamut of personal tastes. Critics make mention of blandness of style, of inadequacies in coverage, and of lack of absolute currentness.

Other policy makers find these publications useful--though in different ways and for different reasons. Some like the convenience of a quick means to inform themselves

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about events other than those in their own areas of specialization. Others read only the coverage of developments pertinent to their specialities--and for the purpose of assuring that they have not missed any important information in their broader flow of traffic. The attention paid to the more analytical articles in Broad Spectrum Reporting also varies widely among policy makers, depending upon the person's attitude, the subject matter involved, and the quality of presentation.

But some NID readers--including some of the most important readers--are not substantive experts on any particular area. The general educational service that the NID performs for these consumers appears to be of considerable importance. It seems clear that the Agency has to produce some kind of written daily intelligence product for a varied NID-level audience, and that no publication is likely to please all of these people all of the time.

It is at least arguable, however, whether the resources--especially analyst time--expended in producing the NID correspond to what it can reasonably be expected to accomplish. A good case can be made for the proposition that the NID's consumption of resources is out of proportion to this

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kind of publication's potential pay-off. Resource allocations necessarily involve trade-offs, and the Agency may be depriving activities that could have greater impact on the policy making process.

Focused Coverage finds a generally receptive audience. The economic, scientific, and technical publications are widely read and well-regarded. There is also much favorable opinion about OCI Staff Notes. Receptivity to these seems to be the greater because they have individualistic flavor--being the least edited and least coordinated of the many political intelligence products.

Crisis Response Intelligence is an Agency strong point. Policy people almost to a man prefer CIA Situation Reports to similar products produced by other agencies. Intelligence tends to be at a premium in crisis situations, but policy people want to know more than what is happening at the moment. They look to intelligence to anticipate and answer the next questions even as they are just beginning to arise.

Much of the Agency's most effective and influential work takes the form of Customized Service; providing answers to the questions posed by policy people, and focusing on the issues which especially concern them. Intelligence producers specializing in economic, scientific, and military matters,

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capitalizing on the strong interest in their material, have succeeded better in establishing the kind of intelligence-policy relationships needed for really productive interchange than have those concentrating on political subjects. Despite varying degrees of acceptance for specific categories of intelligence, however, there is a conviction widely held among policy makers that the Agency is a "can do" organization--that it is willing and able to respond quickly and helpfully on almost any kind of topic.

Many intelligence officers believe that customized service could be made even more relevant and useful if policy makers were persuaded to confide more about their plans and activities. To some extent and on some subjects this undoubtedly is so, and the quality as well as the responsiveness of the intelligence product suffers. In certain cases, policy makers realize that this is a price their confidentiality entails--and they are quite willing to pay it. They may, nonetheless, put a peculiar value on intelligence judgments they they know are made without the benefit of tightly held information available only to them. Their explanation for this seeming anomaly is that intelligence provides valuable checks on assumptions, and useful alternative points of view, even when intelligence producers are not privy to all that the policy maker knows. An argument

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can be made, moreover, for the proposition that a degree of standoffishness on the part of policy makers is sometimes beneficial in helping to diminish the danger of intelligence becoming engulfed by policy making through enthusiastic provision of customized service that causes important longer-range issues to be overlooked or ignored in the effort to tend to customers' immediate concerns. On balance, however, the danger of irrelevance would seem to outweigh that of overinvolvement, and there is ample justification for persistent efforts to persuade policy makers to be more forthcoming.

Policy people profess a high degree of receptivity to In-Depth Analysis, and many say they would like to see more of it. They tend, however, to have difficulty describing with specificity the kind of thing they have in mind--although they are on occasion able to point to examples.²³ This "I'll know it when I see it" attitude is paralleled by annoyance with intelligence producers who expect policy people to suggest what intelligence can do for them in the way of In-Depth Analysis. There is a far more positive attitude toward the intelligence producer who has thought out in advance what ought to be relevant and who arrives with a first draft, an outline, or even a set of ideas.

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Policy makers generally have little confidence in the Agency's ability to anticipate their concerns or in its Predictive Intelligence. This is particularly so with regard to formal National Intelligence Estimates, except for those that deal with military/strategic subjects. It is significant that NIEs are not usually accorded any special treatment by "gatekeepers;" the NIEs undergo the same screening process as do seemingly less prestigious intelligence products. Many policy makers, in fact, seem to prefer an incisive solo treatment by a good analyst to a "watered down" estimate. Some, on the other hand, believe intelligence producers benefit from the rigors of the formal estimative process, and express appreciation for clear delineation of dissenting views.

The generally negative attitude toward predictive intelligence is founded on the belief among policy makers that the Agency's estimative record over the years has not been very good. Policy makers, however, share with intelligence producers the realization that predictive intelligence is a difficult line of business. They understand that some things are by their nature unpredictable and that others are virtually impossible to predict accurately. What policy people seem to want from predictive intelligence is an identification of forces at work, an indication of which

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trends are lasting and which merely transitory, an exposition of probable turning points, and an idea of what kinds of signals will portend particular types of changes. Policy makers especially want a helpful predictive performance on matters of great import to the US. Failure to predict a coup that produces little real change in an area of marginal importance matters little to policy makers, if at all. Failure to provide advance warning of events such as a war in an area of major concern, however, is quite another matter.

Intelligence producers must be skilled in both short and long-range anticipation. Short-range anticipation is really an extension of independent determination by intelligence producers of the questions policy makers have, but fail to make explicit, and the questions that should be on their minds in a given situation whether they are there yet or not. It involves anticipating the problems policy makers will need to have addressed as the situation develops. At present, this is at best a haphazard process in intelligence production, with results depending largely on the time and attention analysts and managers choose to give it. No one in the Agency has continuing responsibility for doing the special kind of thinking required. An entity formally

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charged with such responsibility might significantly enhance the relevance of finished intelligence products to policy makers' concerns.

Long-range anticipation involves foreseeing and warning policy makers of broad or specific problems they are likely to be confronted with in the future. It should be accompanied by a readiness on the part of intelligence producers to redeploy resources in preparation for future demands. It must be noted, however, that policy makers are by their own admission much less receptive to intelligence that attempts to warn of a problem far down the road than to material that helps them to cope with the day-to-day problems they face in the here and now.

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Even delivery to policy makers who recognize its quality and relevance to the problem at hand does not mean that intelligence necessarily will be the determining factor in a particular decision.

The impact of intelligence often depends on factors far removed from its intrinsic quality. Among these factors-- which may operate singly or in combination--are: whether the intelligence message coincides with or runs counter to preconceptions on the policy side; on how intelligence fits in or conflicts with other counsels and pressures; the ostensible "hardness" of the intelligence and the extent of unanimity of CIA elements--and of the Intelligence Community-- in advancing it; the state of interpersonal intelligence-policy relationships; and whether different policy makers are undecided, of the same mind, or divided in their approach to the problem.

Thus, intelligence quality, the adequacy of communications, and the degree of policy receptivity all bear upon the impact of intelligence. As the ensuing illustrative examples indicate, optimum achievement in all three categories is difficult.

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Problem Cases

Policy makers are, from time to time, quite capable of deciding upon and becoming wedded to seemingly ill-conceived and uncompromising courses of action. Intelligence in such cases may ultimately help turn things around--but seldom quickly or easily.

CIA's conservative evaluation of the effectiveness of the various US bombing programs in North Vietnam was a consistent example of sound, careful analysis, clearly communicated. In contrast, the case originally made by military intelligence that the bombing effort was paying high dividends had an inherent weakness--the enemy resupply effort continued at a high level. Yet Secretary of Defense McNamara was not immediately persuadable that the CIA appraisal was the correct one, and President Johnson took years to convince. The policy makers' mind-sets and the mixed signals coming from the Intelligence Community both played a role.

During the period prior to and during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, CIA intelligence did much to explain the motivations that lay behind Indian policy and to describe the dire situation in East Pakistan. The analysis suggested that India was impelled to take action in

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East Pakistan because of the unstable refugee situation, and had at least some justification for assisting a Bengali population oppressed by the West Pakistan military occupation. The US, nevertheless, "tilted" its support to the Pakistani side. US leaders apparently chose to take a "big picture" view of the situation, possibly seeing support to West Pakistan as enhancing a developing Chinese connection (Peking was West Pakistan's other major ally and an instrument in getting US and Chinese officials together). A further consideration for US policy makers was a profound irritation with the government of India, which had shortly before signed a 20-year treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. Policy makers' attitudes were so firmly shaped by factors other than intelligence that they paid no great heed to it, except perhaps for such bits and pieces as served to reinforce their views.

Quite a different sort of problem can arise in those situations where a hot and seemingly hard piece of CIA intelligence conveys exactly--or almost exactly--what the policy makers are keen to believe. CIA's initial reporting on the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic seconded the worry that was already perturbing President Johnson and his aides, i.e., that the rebel movement in the D.R. was Communist-infested and that the US thus faced the danger of a "new

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Cuba in the Hemisphere." Subsequent CIA and INR intelligence inputs provided a more accurate and balanced picture, but they never quite caught up with the initial impression that had been conveyed.

Policy makers can develop another sort of predilection, becoming overly sure that intelligence will be able to provide them appropriate support. This attitude may lead to unfortunate results if the expected intelligence is not forthcoming or when it is impossible for the Intelligence Community to implement policy decisions. In 1970, the Israelis and Egyptians agreed to a limited cessation of hostilities along the Sinai front. The US agreed to assist in monitoring the agreement particularly in respect to the introduction of Egyptian air defense equipment into a denied area along the Suez Canal. The Intelligence Community, however, did not know the exact number of surface-to-air missiles in the prohibited zone. There was, therefore, a significant time lag before the US could confidently state that the Egyptians were in violation of the agreement. As a result, Egypt was able to ignore Israeli protests and build up its forces in the denied area.

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Mixed-But Better Results

Considering the variety of things that can go wrong on the intelligence side, the policy side, or in the relationship between them, it is worth noting that sometimes things go right. Unfortunately, it is far easier to document intelligence failures than to ascertain intelligence successes. Being accurate is adjudged normal and ordinarily is accepted without fanfare; errors or omissions, in contrast, are greeted with much dismay.

Intelligence judgments, moreover, may lead to action by policy makers that makes their accuracy impossible to determine. Early in 1975, for example, the Intelligence Community reported that the Turks might attempt to expand their hold on Cyprus. As a result of Community concern, high-level policy makers sent messages to Ankara noting US displeasure over any possibility of a renewal of warfare. It may have been that the Turks never intended to stage another military action and that the intelligence judgment was faulty; it is equally possible that the Turks were dissuaded from war by US actions. Thus, in the very area where intelligence may have its greatest utility, there is a considerable problem in measuring its true impact.

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A common occurrence is where intelligence is reasonably sound, where it persuades some policy makers readily, but where further data and argument are required by others. In the latter part of May 1967, when tensions between Egypt and Israel had risen abruptly, high-level policy makers levied a series of questions on the CIA--the two most important being, "Will there be war?" and "Which side, if the US stays out, will win?" The "yes" answer to the first was readily accepted, partly because Israeli officials were leaning on their US counterparts to take the threat seriously. But the Agency prediction that Israel would win--quickly and decisively--was received with greater doubt. Secretary of State Rusk and Ambassador to the U.N. Stevenson posed the most vehement questions; DCI Helms came back with a reiteration of the judgment and an amplification of the basis for it. Even then Rusk was reluctant to accept the appraisal. His comment was "Dick, there is only one thing I want to say--as LaGuardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut!"


Intelligence support that is quite difficult to appraise is the "mixed bag" where intelligence does well in some of its aspects, not so well in others. Those who conduct "post mortems" have to evaluate the positives and negatives and come out with an overall judgment. Often these conclusions

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turn out to be harsher in their appraisal of intelligence performance than are the statements of the top policy makers involved.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Intelligence Community underestimated the imperatives that drove the Soviet Union to place missiles in Cuba. Intelligence did provide the first indication that the missiles had arrived and enabled the US Government to verify missile deployments. Intelligence derived materials were used to brief friendly countries on the new development.



The more recent October War was another example of good and bad. Initially--and well ahead of time--the attention of high-level policy makers was focused on the Middle East by CIA intelligence reports that noted that possibility of military action. On the negative side, the analytical Community reinforced policy makers' beliefs that war was not in the offing. Once military action began, however, CIA provided excellent crisis support including the critical judgment that the Soviet Union would not place regular ground forces in Syria.

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CIA reporting on the Cyprus explosion also had its ups and downs. Analysts failed to predict the change in Greek leadership on Cyprus and never adequately described the motivations of the Greek "generals." CIA did provide advance warning of the Turkish invasion of the island and predicted the exact date. However, in attempting to ascertain the size of the Turkish invasion force, CIA analysts relied on the reporting from [redacted] who greatly over-estimated its strength. Dependence on this source occasioned a substantial error over how fast the battle would progress.

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Picture Book Examples

Sometimes, albeit not too frequently, we find that virtually everything went right. Three instances in the Far East area reflect the variety and range of importance of these "picture book" situations.

Henry Kissinger and associates have been recurringly concerned over the past half-dozen years about the degree of tension between China and the Soviet Union and about the danger of major hostilities between them. In response to his urging, CIA has repeatedly assessed the issue, studying the military and strategic posture on both sides and probing into other aspects. The findings--in contrast to dire predictions by other intelligence practitioners--have been

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consistently sound--and obviously helpful to the President and Kissinger during a delicate period when they have been nurturing new ties with China.

An instance of more measurable benefit had to do with a recent determination on military aid to South Korea. High-level policy people were concerned over the direction and levels of aid during the 1970s. They requested that DOD and CIA undertake a detailed examination of the North Korean "military threat"--i.e., of the forces of the North, their equipment holdings, their likely strategy. This intelligence study showed the need for a pronounced change in the mix of equipment provided to South Korea--more aircraft, fewer tanks, etc.--and also indicated the feasibility of a stretch-out in the planned delivery period. The study became the basis for developing a new, and far more realistic long-term military assistance program to South Korea.

An area in which the Washington-based Intelligence Community is not regularly involved is that of tactical intelligence support to the field. The use of unique Community resources, a correct appraisal of the situation, and a prompt warning to interested consumers provided a quick salutary result in November 1972. A CIA-chaired intelligence task force warned

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[] that a squadron of Komar guided missile boats would be moving from Chan-chiang in South China south toward a North Vietnamese port. US naval forces in the area were alerted, and the boats were intercepted and destroyed.²⁹

Other kinds of highly-specialized intelligence service which CIA is capable of providing should not be omitted from this "picture book" discussion. As Henry Kissinger has proceeded with his long and painstaking diplomatic efforts to bring about a tentative Egyptian-Israeli peace accord, Agency specialists have assisted with crucial support in a wide range of areas. Special note should be taken of the CIA geographers whose detailed maps and intimate knowledge of terrain have been particularly valuable, and of the technicians who were able to advise on feasibility and operation of an appropriate [] system.

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A final example which must be noted here--though with a reservation--is that of SALT support by the Intelligence Community and particularly by CIA. It is clear that the policy makers' confidence in intelligence-verification, in the Community appraisals of future missile force levels, and in the direct assistance provided to decision makers by CIA made the SALT agreements possible. It is equally clear that this is presently the most important of all the intelligence-support accounts. Whether the 10-year intelligence projections

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that underlie the treaty-negotiations will hold cannot be foreseen. Thus, prudence dictates that intelligence support for SALT not be evaluated as an absolute success until more time has elapsed.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The research team believes that a number of measures aimed at making the reality of the intelligence-policy relationship more closely approximate the ideal are worthy of consideration.

--An effort should be made to increase intelligence producers' specific understanding of the policy making process.

--Recent and ongoing theoretical work on decision making, organizational dynamics, and psychological factors should be selected, distilled, related to the intelligence-policy connection, and distributed to analysts and supervisors on a regular basis. A knowledgeable individual should be given full-time responsibility for the task.³⁰

--Discussion of policy making and the role of intelligence, including realistic specifics on how various policy makers take intelligence aboard, should become standard practice within the Agency.

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- The Office of Training should increase and sharpen the attention its courses and seminars give to policy making and the intelligence-policy relationship.
- Opportunities to place intelligence officers in rotational policy-related slots outside the Agency should be taken advantage of to the fullest possible extent. The experience gained by returnees from these assignments should be exploited by having them share their perspectives with other intelligence producers in appropriate forums.
- Written intelligence products should be closely aligned to the realities of how information is received, screened, and processed on the policy side.
- A very short executive summary containing the principal conclusions of the paper should precede all memoranda.

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- Papers aimed for the top policy levels especially must seize attention quickly and get to the point rapidly.
- A paper should immediately tell the reader why he should be reading it, i.e., the problem or issue and its implications for the US.
- Rationale for judgments, if too long or too involved to be included in the body of the paper, should be attached as annexes.
- Analytical differences should not be obscured in the name of Intelligence Community consensus. Policy people clearly prefer alternative interpretations to watered down consensus.
- Thoughtful, clearly labeled speculation regarding less likely eventualities or the implication of "irrational" actions by foreign leaders should be encouraged, especially in In-Depth Analysis.

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--A new intelligence product should be considered.

--There would be considerable receptivity to ultra-current "Morning Briefing Notes" on the part of the aides of high-level policy people. The purpose of such a publication would be to make the recipients' morning briefings and compilations sounder, fuller, more consistent in their use of intelligence information, and more reflective of the Agency's view of what should be brought to the attention of principal policy makers. The idea is similar to that of the once popular, internally distributed Night Journal. Distribution of the "Notes" could be made so as to reach the desks of aides as morning briefings were being prepared.

--The "Notes" would be informal, non-coordinated summaries and comments on significant overnight traffic-- e.g., important State and Defense

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cables, DDO reports,
and press--not accounted for in the
MID. The MID is more current than
the old CIB, but only the most
critical new items are usually added
in the wee hours, and they are often
only factual treatments. A widely
voiced criticism of the MID is its
failure to be consistently relevant
to the ultra-current morning concerns
of many policy makers.

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--The new product could be prepared
by night MID representatives and
electrically disseminated at the
last possible moment.

--There is a need for serious study of what a realistic
estimative mission ought to be for the CIA and of what
resources the Agency ought to devote to it. Policy makers
seem to be less interested in estimative judgments per se
than in the basis for them; i.e., the laying out of the
forces at work, the possible turning points, and the leverage--
if any--that the US has in determining the outcome.

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--A study of the estimative mission would aim basically at generating some suggested guidelines on the scope, format, and most useful organizational approaches for the production of estimates.

--It would need to be based principally on in-depth research with consumers and producers, and the use of case studies.

--Greater emphasis should be placed on reaching mid-level policy makers.

--Fuller advantage should be taken of publications aimed specifically at this audience; they should cease to be the step-children of top-of-the-line products. To the extent possible, content of such publications as the NIB should be especially tailored for the mid-level consumer. Analysts whose accounts are relatively inactive, for example, should prepare longer, more analytical items for the NIB.

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- Some predetermination should be made, where possible, of the intended audience for memoranda and other intelligence papers so that they can be tailored accordingly. If the audience is primarily mid-level, the paper might contain more detailed background, explanation, and argument than one designed especially for senior officials.
- Although admittedly difficult on a consistent basis, intelligence products should, to the extent feasible, be addressed to intended recipients by name.
- There should be increased organizational awareness and coordination of disparate policy support activities.

- Consideration should be given to the establishment of a centralized Agency mechanism--perhaps computer based--for improving intra-agency awareness of ongoing policy support projects, maximizing opportunities

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for contributory inputs, and helping to make policy makers more aware of the full range of potentially relevant intelligence products and services.

--A comprehensive study of the problems and prospects of oral dissemination should focus on the impact of oral delivery on efforts to better coordinate intelligence support.

--The Agency should try to increase policy maker receptivity to its political interpretation and analysis.

--The aim should be to convince policy makers that there is something about the Agency's work in this area that separates the CIA's finished political products from the kind of thing policy people believe they can do just as well or better themselves.

--Efforts along this line should include further attempts to impart a measure of uniqueness to finished political intelligence through

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sophisticated interweaving of political, economic, military and psychological analysis. In this regard, further study is needed of the efficacy of various methods-- e.g., team approaches, cross-disciplinary training, structural reorganizations--of fostering truly integrated inter-disciplinary analysis.³¹

--It should be clearly understood that the NIOs' important responsibility for developing personal relationships with consumers is not meant to preclude other intelligence producer-policy maker contacts at appropriate levels, and political analysts should be given the opportunity, encouragement, and incentive to take especially vigorous initiatives to develop and sustain these relationships. Individual analysts should be responsible for monitoring policy personnel changes and for

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making and keeping themselves known as specialists with something to contribute. They should be aware of and utilize the kinds of approaches that evoke positive responses on the policy side, and avoid the unproductive "what can I do for you" syndrome.

--The Agency should continue to impress upon policy people the fact that the relevance and utility of intelligence is directly related to their willingness to share their concerns and other information with intelligence producers.

--Intelligence officers in contact with policy makers at all levels should persist in efforts to make this point.

--Significant informational gaps that intelligence producers believe policy people might be able to fill if they were so inclined should be explicitly noted--both in formal publications and informal conversations--so as to encourage communication

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and avoid misunderstandings concerning the basis for intelligence judgments.

--Insufficient feedback and a degree of secretiveness concerning policy plans and developments will persist, however, and the Agency should also strive to improve its ability to independently determine the questions policy makers need answered.

--The DDO and DDI must work together in this endeavor, and the DDO's unique operational links to policy officials should play a key role. Regular meetings between DDO Division Chiefs, NIOs, and representatives from DDI production offices should include detailed discussion of policy makers' current and incipient concerns. Working arrangements between DDO Division Chiefs and the NIOs currently are positive and helpful, but they generally fail to achieve the mutually reinforcing relationship needed between the DDO and the producers of finished intelligence because there is no

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mechanism for insuring that insights into concerns on the policy side gained by the DDO are fully shared with the DDI.

--Concern for improving the immediate relevance of intelligence should not be allowed to obscure the equally important need for the Agency to improve its ability to independently determine the questions policy makers are presently faced with and to anticipate the problems that they will be confronted with in the future.

--Consideration should be given to the establishment of broadly-based mechanisms within the Agency charged with routine review of substantive areas with the mission of providing continuity, consistency, and direction for thinking ahead, challenging accepted hypotheses, and sensing changes in underlying trends. The NIO system and the KIQs are steps in this direction, but much remains to be accomplished.

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
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--A great anticipatory burden will, however, always rest on individual intelligence producers. They must avoid becoming so immersed in the problems of the moment that they fail to foresee those of the future.

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FOOTNOTES



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2. The extent to which the Agency will in the future be called upon to provide increased intelligence support to the legislative branch will depend in large part on the outcome of the ongoing investigative process and on how strongly Congress persists in asserting its prerogative in foreign affairs. The study team believes that the implications of the intelligence-congressional relationship deserve separate study when the still-evolving nature of that relationship becomes more evident. The study also does not concentrate on the role of the DCI, since this position transcends direction of the CIA and includes a great deal of Intelligence Community responsibility.
3. See, for example, George Pettee, The Future of American Secret Intelligence (1946); Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production (1957).
4. See Charles Lindbloom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" in Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (1959) and The Policy-Making Process (1968). See also, Synder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making (1962).
5. See, for example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (1971) and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1974). See also, Wilfrid Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations" in World Politics, October 1975.
6. See, for example, Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957); Robert Abelson, Theories of Cognitive Consistency (1963); Katz and Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (1966); March and Simon, Organizations (1958); Holsti and George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers" in Political Science Annual, Vol. 6 (1975).
7. See Joseph DeRivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (1968); and John Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974).

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8. Despite the lack of theoretical work specifically geared to the intelligence-policy connection, sophisticated and insightful studies that aid in understanding individual and organizational behavior should be of interest to intelligence producers. The Agency has tended to neglect these areas, and this probably has adversely affected efforts to make intelligence products more relevant and useful.
9. There are, of course, those who would challenge application of the term "policy maker" to anyone except the President, his inner circle of advisors, and perhaps some key Under Secretaries. Others would attempt to distinguish between policy makers, advisors, and drafters. This paper arbitrarily uses the phrases "policy makers" and "policy people" very broadly, to encompass a wide range of individuals who are involved in the policy making process regularly or on an ad hoc basis. References to "top" to "high-level" policy makers are to individuals at or above the Assistant Secretary level. The rest are those below that rank, i.e., mainly--but not exclusively--at the desk level.
10. Intelligence producers are unlikely to become aware of preferences and idiosyncrasies that affect policy makers' receptivity to intelligence unless they engage in "market research" through personal contacts with consumers. This subject is dealt with further in a subsequent section.
11. The strong natural linkages between DDO officers and certain policy makers are discussed more fully on pages 24-25.
12. An illustration of this kind of policy making appears in the section on USE.
13. Communications theorists contend that no communication takes place until there is a transference of meaning in the mind of the receiver--see, for example, Thayer, Communications and Communications Systems in Organization, Management, and Interpersonal Relations (1963). This distinction is dealt with in the sections on RECEPTIVITY and USE.
14. "Intelligence as Foundation for Policy," in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Fall 1959).

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15. NSAM 341, quoted in Clark and Legere, *The President and the Management of National Security* (1969).
16. Specialized entities such as the Verification Panel and its working group in which CIA intelligence participation is particularly strong and effective have, however, been increasing in importance.
17. At the State Department, for example, high-level officials get their intelligence from INR, which, in addition to producing its own analysis, selects, summarizes, and comments on material from other agencies. The fact that INR has coordinated an item for a national intelligence publication does not insure that it will endorse the item in its compilations and briefings. The National Security Council staff is another screening mechanism. Staff members will be the last readers of intelligence documents that they feel do not warrant higher-level attention. Products sent forward invariably are accompanied by a summary-extract-commentary which, unless coupled with a recommendation that the paper be read in full, is likely to be all that is read by key officials.
18. Every President since Harry Truman has received the Agency's current intelligence, but in varying ways. President Nixon, for example, received a package of material from the White House Situation Room that contained intelligence produced by several agencies including CIA. President Eisenhower got oral intelligence briefings from his staff. President Ford initiated, but later discontinued, regular exchanges with an Agency officer. Whether a new mechanism for personal delivery of Agency products will be established is presently unclear. The NSC system gives the Director of Central Intelligence certain opportunities for direct access to the highest-level policy makers, especially during crisis situations. Beyond these structured settings, however, the DCI's ability to personally deliver intelligence directly to the top may depend on his personal relationship with the President and other key policy officials. This element in the intelligence support process is critical in establishing the overall impact down the line of the Agency's product. It would appear that the support process can best function when the DCI has direct and routine access to the President.

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19. Much of the impetus for regular OER intelligence briefings of high-level economic officials came from former Treasury Secretary Schultz. When William Simon took over at Treasury he decided that the presentations were useful and should be continued. OER also polled officials outside of Treasury to see if they wanted their briefings to go on, and the answer was strongly affirmative.
20. Economic policy makers have, as noted above, recently become very receptive to orally-delivered intelligence. The Pentagon, traditionally a heavy user of oral briefings itself, is another receptive audience. The Agency provided regular briefings on military and technical subjects to Secretary of Defense Schlessinger. Oral presentations are often given to various senior Defense officials by CIA components.
21. One high-level State Department official, for example, indicated that the DDO Division Chief with whom he dealt on operational matters was also his major source of substantive information. He did know the name of the NIO responsible for the area, but noted that personal contact was infrequent. Another State Department official remarked that CIA analysis was first rate. The analysis he referred to turned out to be a situation report from a Chief of Station.
22. Within the context of this aspect of the relationship between the operational officers of the Agency and their policy making colleagues, resides one of the traditionally more troubling internal problems for the Agency in terms of policy support. Is intelligence colored in ways which tend consciously or unconsciously to favor an operational activity or course of action upon which the Agency is embarked or involved? This issue has troubled a number of outside commentators on the Agency, most notably in connection with the Bay of Pigs endeavor. The question is particularly difficult and sensitive as a research topic and was not pursued at length in this paper, although it warrants a hard look in an internal Agency study.
23. An outstanding example of force of personality at work is the case of OCI's Panama analyst several years ago. The analyst convinced policy people of the value of himself and his work to such an extent that he was considered to be practically a member of the policy team.

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23. (continued)

Intelligence producers who serve temporary stints on the policy side often are able to develop insights and cultivate personal relationships that can be extremely useful when they return to their parent organizations. The experience of one such individual during recent Middle East negotiations is a case in point. Even if a rotational assignment turns out to be permanent, the former intelligence producer will carry with him an understanding of intelligence that is likely to have a positive effect on the intelligence-policy connection.

24. A case in point was a scale model of the Sinai peninsula showing all terrain features that was given to policy makers for use in the Middle East negotiations. CIA provided the model on its own initiative, and it became an invaluable tool during the discussions.

25. Some NIOs appear to accord their responsibility for personal contact with policy makers first priority, and the bulk of their effort is in this area. Others, however, tend to concentrate more of their attention on the process of producing estimates and other--primarily interagency--intelligence products.

26. Attitudes on this issue vary among the NIOs. Some do appear to believe that they are supposed to be the exclusive point of contact between finished intelligence producers and policy makers, at least with respect to high-ranking policy makers. Others, however, seem quite content with the existence of parallel channels of communication.

27. The FBIS product in particular is widely distributed both electrically and in formal publications, and is viewed by many intelligence consumers as a key Agency product. FBIS field stations often provide the first indication of a coup or other important change within a country. Service personnel did a commendable job, for instance, in reporting on the invasion of Cyprus [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Occasionally, a foreign leadership will use the open radio to present new policies for the first time or will outline negotiating positions when speed is essential. The Mayaguez incident was a case in point. 25X1

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28. The following papers, produced over the last two years, have been specifically referred to by policy people as representing imaginative and helpful analytical work by the Agency. In the cases of the interagency papers, CIA was recognized as having played the leading role in production.

--India: Developing Power or Developing Power Vacuum (OPR)

--China in 1980-1985 and in the Year 2000 (OPR)

--The Mood in Egypt (OCI)

--Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate (OPR)

--Military Implications of Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union (Interagency)

--What's Wrong With Political Europe (Office of the NIO)

--Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe (OPR)

--The Communist Party of Italy (OPR)

--Soviet Commentary on the Capabilities of US General Purpose Forces (OSR)

--A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of Development and Considerations Affecting a Decision on Deployment (Interagency)

--Prospects for Determining the Accuracy of Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missiles (Interagency)

(See Annex B)

29. The Komars were the first of their type to be provided to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. They were shipped by freighter to Chan-chiang and off-loaded prior to their high-speed run to North Vietnam. Had the Komars reached their destination, they would have been a serious threat to US Naval vessels on patrol nearby.

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30. Intelligence producers are likely to find that this material will also provide highly illuminating insights into the process of intelligence analysis.
31. Greater interdisciplinary synthesis would have a number of beneficial effects. OER's success in building a receptive audience for its products has been significant, but this constituency consists primarily of a particular group of economically-oriented policy people. There remains a need for economic analysis to be truly integrated with insights from other disciplines and presented in a manner intelligible to the high-level policy maker unfamiliar with purely economic terms and concepts. Policy people value even speculative material that tells them something about what makes an individual tick, and

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ANNEX A

The data forming the research base for this study was developed in several ways. Some of it stemmed from a series of discussions with senior intelligence and policy officials; other conclusions came from the team's analysis of work done by several staffs and task forces that have looked at the intelligence-policy relationship over the years. These include background papers developed by the Murphy Commission, materials from the Intelligence Community Staff, and various CIA consumer surveys.

An original intention of the study was to do a number of detailed case histories of specific examples of the intelligence support process in search of common lessons and insights. It quickly became evident, however, that the difficulty of tracking the development of a particular episode in sufficient detail to warrant confidence in the analysis would make this an unproductive venture. There was, instead, a compromise in which individual cases were used to illustrate broad general propositions regarding intelligence support. A number of the cases were identified by interviewees as illustrative of certain themes. In some instances "post mortems" done by the Intelligence Community staff were utilized, but in all the illustrations, the interpretation is that of the study team.

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Specifically in terms of interviews, the team spoke to more than 20 senior officials within the Agency and to almost 40 middle-level officers and analysts. Twelve NIOs or their deputies also were interviewed, along with four members of the IC staff. Outside the Agency the team interviewed four NSC staff members, the two primary PFIAB staff members, and the Director of the White House Situation Room. At the State Department, two Assistant Secretaries, one Deputy Assistant Secretary, two members of Dr. Kissinger's immediate staff, and a member of the Policy Planning Staff were interviewed, along with a number of lesser policy officials. In addition, the team spoke with the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. At the Defense Department, the team saw three members of the Secretary's immediate staff, several other officials, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Two officials at the Treasury with intelligence-related responsibilities were also interviewed, and the team spoke to a member of the Council on International Economic Policy.

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ANNEX B

An Analysis of Outstanding Intelligence Products

While doing the research for this study, the team discovered several instances where consumers took the time to send positive written responses back to CIA on papers they deemed especially helpful. Other particularly useful examples were mentioned by consumers in the course of interviews. Eleven of these specific products are cited in Footnote 28.

At first glance, these reports seem very dissimilar in subject and approach. They deal across the board with political, military, economic and technological problems. They do not directly portray problems of immediate concern. They are not of much use in the "firefighting" type of policy making and they present more questions than answers.

What they do offer is an insightful look at areas where there is an important US interest and most specifically indicate why policy makers should be concerned or aware of the subject or issue. The papers provide a level of detail that policy makers would be hard put to package themselves--if they had the time or inclination to do so--and present it in a forthright and readable manner. The papers that deal with political subjects overcome problems of policy makers'

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failure to share details of their activities and their relatively low receptivity to CIA's political analysis by approaching the subjects in broad, imaginative ways.

Most of the reports have the common thread of dealing with an area of potential danger to US interests. The policy maker is aware of the problem, but being mortal, has only so much time in the day to turn away from fires that are already blazing. In these cases, he finds it rewarding and useful to rely on someone else to digest and evaluate the mountains of information on a subject and provide him with a cogent and thoughtful interpretation--not just of the surface or of the moment but of the underlying considerations as well. The papers on Southern Europe are notable examples.

We have mentioned in the body of the paper the special role of intelligence producers working on military and technical subjects. Policy makers generally claim little expertise in these areas, but most of the important decisions they must make presuppose a substantial understanding. The papers on military subjects noted as useful relate to the Soviet Union but are applicable as general examples. They provide considerable background knowledge but perhaps even more importantly, they illustrate uncertainties. They make complex material understandable and relevant to non-experts.

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One would be hard pressed to develop a single or simple preferred written structure from these papers that could be used to produce a consistently superior product. The approaches are as varied as the topics. If there is a commonality, it is that each of the authors went far beyond laying out the obvious facts and deeply probed the underlying concerns. There was no indication that the reports necessarily contained points of view that represented what the policy makers wanted to hear; i.e., that fitted previous consumer perceptions or prejudices. In fact, most of them were complimented for their boldness of conception and thought.

The papers all clearly reflect deep and careful concern with true analytical process and are sophisticated both in writing style and in presentation. Charts and graphs are used to make points more clear and to save words. Pictures are used to break the flow of words into manageable sections.

It seems reasonable to conclude from these particular reports that producers who make a concerted effort to carefully discern policy interests or who key into areas that will be important in the near future are more likely to increase the receptivity to their products. It seems equally clear that an author, no matter how profound, faces a major obstacle when writing on a topic that cannot be seen to directly concern US interests. He is unlikely to find much consumer interest.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIB	Central Intelligence Bulletin
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDA	Deputy Directorate for Administration
DDI	Deputy Directorate for Intelligence
DDO	Deputy Directorate for Operations
DDS&T	Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research - Department of State
MBFR	Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
NIB	National Intelligence Bulletin
NID	National Intelligence Daily
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OCI	Office of Current Intelligence - DDI
OER	Office of Economic Research - DDI
OGCR	Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research - DDI
OPR	Office of Political Reserach - DDI
OSR	Office of Strategic Research - DDI

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PDB President's Daily Brief
PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRG Senior Review Group
TDs DDO Field Reports
USIB United States Intelligence Board
WASAG Washington Area Special Action Group

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