

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE




VOL. 18 No. 3

FALL 1974

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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
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


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MORI



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*When the questions provided
the answer*

HOW WE IDENTIFIED THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF EARLY RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Henry S. Lowenhaupt

*We dance around in a ring and suppose,
But the Secret sits in the middle and knows.*

—Robert Frost

But suppose Secret has to ask questions to solve his own problems?

The occasion was the first visit of the Soviet Electric Power Delegation to the United States in October 1959, with its nuclear overtones, followed immediately by the prestigious Soviet Nuclear Delegation in November. These complex visits occurred on the heels of the initial visits of their U.S. counterpart delegations to the USSR, which in turn had followed Vice President Nixon's trip to Russia in July when he engaged in the famous "kitchen debate" with Nikita Khrushchev.

The Soviet Electric Power team was scheduled to tour three nuclear power plants and the Westinghouse turbine manufacturing facility in addition to a dozen other plants related to electric power. The Nuclear Delegation intended to visit three nuclear power plants and 17 other facilities, including ones such as Oak Ridge and Los Alamos where no Russians, and few other foreigners, had ever been allowed.

The Resources

CIA's Contact Division of the Office of Operations (now the Domestic Collection Division of the Directorate of Operations) had several sources in proper positions to report on these projected visits, but by and large there was no time to identify and brief the large number of reporting sources really needed for comprehensive reporting on such complex activities. Similarly, the State Department had translators who were accustomed to working with various international delegations, but these persons did not have the technical language competence necessary for these highly technical fields. Chairman John McCone of the AEC, the man primarily responsible for the setting up of this exchange of nuclear delegates, wanted to keep close control of the situation, yet give the Russians the feeling of being in a relaxed, friendly atmosphere throughout their trip. He most definitely wanted to find out any and all additional information on Soviet nuclear activities, but he also insisted that the Russian delegates not be badgered.

The Plan

The plan to elicit information, as it finally evolved, was kept simple. Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Chief of AEC's then Division of Intelligence, was to instruct the managers and scientific personnel at U.S. nuclear facilities about the limits of cooperation with the Russians and obtain their aid in gathering information from the Russians. CIA's Contact Division was given the task of identifying cooperative sources in those facilities run by private industry. In addition, the Contact Division was to interview all the selected plant and laboratory contacts within both AEC and private industrial facilities, and to publish reports obtained from these and any other sources. CIA was to detach several technical interpreters to the State Department for use with the Russian delegations. For instance, Mr. Charles V. Reeves, who had been for a number of years the expert in OSI's Nuclear Energy Division (NED) on electric power usage at Russian nuclear facilities,* became the technical translator for the Electric Power Delegation. Additionally the technical translators were to provide assessments of the members of each delegation from the point of view of covert operations.

CIA analysts were to put together written status briefs on each major subject to be covered in the Delegation visits, along with short lists of those subjects where additional information was needed. These were to be served to appropriate AEC plant and laboratory personnel through Dr. Reichardt, and through the Contact Division to reporting persons in those privately owned industrial facilities being visited by the Russians. Mr. Jackson R. Horton,** the Contact Division's case officer for scientific matters, was to follow the activities of the Russian Nuclear Delegation, while Mrs. Mary Elizabeth Warner of Contact Division's Eastern European/USSR Branch was assigned the Russian Electric Power Delegation as her field of activity. Mr. John A. Lundin of NED, for instance, wrote up the brief on Russian power reactors and went with a Contact Division man to brief the management of one U.S. power reactor facility. Mr. Robert Weaver, also of NED, travelled with Dr. Reichardt to both the Livermore and Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories and then on to Oak Ridge to brief on controlled thermonuclear research in the USSR.

The key decision, however, was the one to circulate to a large number of people general requirements that were passive in nature, ones designed to determine what questions the Russians asked, what they were interested in, and whom they sought out for technical conversations.

The Background

To put these Delegation visits in their proper perspective, the Cold War was easing a bit in 1959. The USSR had started to publish scientific articles on nuclear matters in 1955—the first since 1940—and Scientific Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy had been held in Geneva in 1956 and 1958. Except for the highly touted "First in the World" research-sized, graphite-mod-

*See *Studies*, XI/3: "The Decryption of a Picture."

**Now Chief of the Domestic Collection Division, DDO.

erated,* pressure-tubed power reactor at Obninsk south of Moscow, which had been placed on view in 1954, Americans got their first view of Russian nuclear laboratories in 1958 following the Second Geneva Conference.

This view had been something of a shocker, for the Russians, putting their best foot forward as was indeed to be expected, turned out to have research efforts to produce energy from thermonuclear reactions at several of their laboratories every bit as good as we had at Oak Ridge and Princeton University. Several research reactors were also shown, and these, while pedestrian, seemed to be quite adequate.

A movie clip had been shown of a power reactor "somewhere in Siberia" that had just started up. The Russians indicated that this reactor produced 100 MW electrical, and that its electric power generating efficiency was 20 to 25 percent. Intelligence analysis of the released photographs** had revealed that the reactor must have been a graphite-moderated, pressure-tube plutonium reactor, modified to operate at elevated temperature to produce steam. Details, however, indicated that both fuel element and turbogenerator construction limited the electric generating cycle to a miserable 14 percent. (This was by no means the first time the Russians had used the fact that the present and the immediately expected future in Russian use the same verb form.)

The Russians in 1958 also indicated they were building two nuclear power stations—one type at Beloyarsk in the Urals with graphite-moderated, pressure-tube reactors, the other at Novo Voronezh in the Volga region with water-moderated, pressure-vessel reactors. Their papers included quite detailed construction plans. In addition they discussed their first experiments with fast breeder reactors, which had little moderation, used plutonium for fuel and liquid sodium (instead of water) for cooling. They presented a fine paper on the *Lenin* icebreaker with its three pressure-vessel power reactors—and not one word about the nuclear submarines that for technical reasons, mainly physical size, should be using reactors quite similar to those being installed on the *Lenin*.

There had been, incidentally, clandestine reporting to the effect that nuclear submarines were being built in the far north at the shipyard in Severodvinsk on the White Sea not far from Archangelsk. Estimates had suggested the first units might well be launched in 1958, but there had been no sightings well into the fall of 1959. Clearly, the important intelligence goal was the status of the Soviet nuclear submarine program. And the way led through acquiring a detailed understanding of the Soviet nuclear power program: the technology had to be much the same, whether the power reactor made electricity for Voronezh, or turned the propellers of a nuclear submarine out of Murmansk.

Admiral Rickover Takes the Lead

The game had opened wide in early July of 1959 when Frol Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministries and Premier Nikita

*The moderator is placed between the uranium tubes or rods in a reactor to moderate or slow down the neutrons so that they may have the correct speed (energy) for maximum reaction when they collide with the next rod.

**See *Studies*, XV/1: "Somewhere in Siberia."

Khrushchev's representative, had visited the Westinghouse-designed water-moderated, pressure-vessel-type power reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. Here, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover of American Nuclear Navy fame showed Kozlov—to everyone's horror—the details of the Shippingport reactor. Kozlov must have reported that there was something to be learned from the Americans, and indeed that they were willing to open up a bit, for in late July Vice President Richard Nixon, along with Admiral Rickover, visited first the icebreaker *Lenin* in the Admiralty Shipyard in Leningrad and later the nuclear power plant under construction at Beloyarsk in the Urals.

Admiral Rickover, incidentally, tried his best to learn as much about the Lenin reactor system as he possibly could. Being quite dissatisfied with the expected 20-minute tour prepared for Vice President Nixon and himself, he had before leaving Moscow requested and received permission from Professor V. Yemelyanov, Chairman of the Chief Administration for the Utilization of Atomic Energy for the USSR, for a special tour. After Vice President Nixon left, Admiral Rickover asked for his special tour, and was told that Mr. Mikolayev, Yemelyanov's representative, was not there and that everyone had gone home. According to Raymond L. Garthoff, the translator who accompanied him, Admiral Rickover took this news like a vice admiral in the Russian navy denied permission to inspect one of his boats. He reminded the Captain, P. A. Ponomarev, the Chief Engineer and two of the ship's officers that the Americans had shown the Kozlov party everything on the *Savannah* and at Shippingport, and that he, Vice Admiral Rickover, had not embarrassed them by forcing them to ask questions. He repeated his request to Mr. B. S. Klopotov, Director of the Shipyard. He reminded Mr. Klopotov that on the morrow he was going to be talking with Khrushchev: Did Mr. Klopotov want him, Vice Admiral Rickover, to tell Khrushchev that Mr. Klopotov would not let him tour the *Lenin* after receiving permission from Professor V. Yemelyanov? Besides, the idea that the man with the key to the reactor compartment had gone home with it was pure nonsense. No one would dare leave something like a reactor compartment without a key immediately at hand. He continued to fire broadsides for effect intermittently for some two hours until permission was received from higher authority. Then he rudely poked his nose into every conceivable corner of the ship for three hours—and memorized everything in minute detail.

Early Soviet Problems

The Admiral concluded that the three pressurized 90-MW (thermal) light water cooled and moderated reactors were each physically too large for submarines. However, by increasing the U-235 content of the uranium in the uranium oxide, zirconium-clad fuel elements from five percent to, say, ten percent and changing the piping so as to shorten the overall height, the reactors could be made to fit submarine hulls yet operate satisfactorily under stop-and-go conditions. He also learned that the Russians intended to use boron as a "burnable poison,"*

*When a reactor is first started up, it has excess U-235 giving off more neutrons and more reactivity in the center of the core than at the edges, causing uneven and undesired overheating. The first solution was to space control rods so as to restrain the overheating in the middle. This is sometimes reinforced by adding a "burnable poison" such as boron to the uranium, concentrated in the center to absorb and burn off the excess neutrons. Over a period of a year or more of run-in, the boron and the excess U-235 are both consumed, and the problem of overheating in the middle is dissipated.

thus permitting the reactor to be loaded to attain high endurance. However, he felt the Russians, once the system became operational, were going to encounter three problem areas:

First, the high pressure used in the primary loop (about 3000 psi) would enhance chloride stress corrosion of the stainless steel piping, and eventually lead to leaks.

Secondly, the plant layout was formulated without proper consideration of maintenance. The three reactors are all located in the same compartment, so that one cannot be isolated for repairs while the others continue operation, and indeed radioactive contamination of one would make the others inaccessible as well. The heat exchangers would require considerable time for repair of a leak because of the way they were built, and also because their location was such as to be affected by radioactivity from adjacent equipment. Much of the piping was located close to bilges and bulkheads, crisscrossed in many places, and generally was difficult to get at. Repairs at sea would be wellnigh impossible for any except the simplest malfunction. The doors through the 14-inch steel shielding to the reactor compartment were tapered, but not stepped, which could permit some radiation to escape.

Finally, the Russians were depending too much on automatic equipment which might scram (stop) the reactor just at the crucially wrong time.

Following the Nixon visit, agreements were made and implemented to have a U.S. Power Delegation visit the USSR in early September, succeeded in turn by a U.S. Nuclear Delegation in October. CIA's briefing of the members of these U.S. Delegations were exhaustive. The one to the U.S. Electric Power Delegation, for instance, ran 30 pages of detailed discussion of the status of our knowledge and of important gaps in that knowledge. These delegations brought back a thorough understanding of Russian laboratory work in the research reactor and thermonuclear energy fields. They learned that Russian research at Obninsk on breeder reactors was still in its early stages. They thoroughly toured Russian high energy physics establishments. Detail on turbine manufacture bearing on the turbines used in nuclear power plants were obtained. They visited the two large nuclear power plants then under construction, but not the one "somewhere in Siberia." The mid-stage of construction of the big nuclear power plants prevented a detailed assessment of much of the nuclear power equipment, although of course a lot was learned. The Nuclear Delegation was taken for a three-hour cruise on the *Lenin* (which had been commissioned since Rickover's visit), but the vital equipment was buttoned up in the now radioactive reactor compartment and could not be viewed. One really new fact learned was that there had been no land-based prototype for the *Lenin* (and presumably the submarine) reactors.

This, then, was the state of our knowledge when the Russian delegations arrived in New York.

The Electric Power Delegation

The Russian Electric Power Delegation numbered twelve bright and forceful personalities. Their leader, Konstantin Lavrenenko, was the First Deputy Minister of Electric Power Station Construction. George Ermakov was his Chief Engineer. Sergei Berezin was the Chief Engineer of the Kharkov Turbine Plant

(Raymond Garthoff had noted that the turbogenerators on the *Lenin* had been made by the Kharkov Turbine Factory); Dimitri Kotelevsky was Chief Engineer of the USSR Planning Commission (Gosplan). And so on.

The main emphasis of this delegation was, of course, normal electric power production, though often these interests had possible nuclear power plant overtones. A few short quotes from a dozen or more much longer Contact Division reports will illustrate:

OO-B-3,144,103: “. . . the overall technical interest of the group was in power production. Specific interests showed up in terms of techniques used in welding stainless steel; the dispatch center of the company; our long distance coal pipeline (the only one of its kind); and the new 250,000-KW generating unit at Avon Lake, a supercritical plant. The construction engineers N. V. Shchukin and G. V. Ermakov stated that they are still having trouble in trying to weld stainless steel piping. This . . . surprises me after the technological capability they have shown in other fields. . . .”

OO-B-3,144,522: “. . . Berezin . . . of the Kharkov Turbine Works, presented me with many detailed questions regarding our turbines. He could not understand the efficiencies of our output”

OO-B-3,144,896: “. . . Shchukin told us that 300 percent of the welds they have made in austenitic steel have cracked. In the discussion they wanted to know all details of the welding techniques used on the austenitic main steam leads of this unit. Only general answers were given”

OO-B-3,143,972: “. . . They first asked for information on how turbines were built to withstand the high moisture content in the steam from nuclear reactors. I tried to help them without disclosing too much know-how (stating) the present preferred plan is to employ reheat between the high-pressure and low-pressure turbines. I told them that this reheating can be accomplished by separating moisture and employing live steam reheating”

OO-B-3,141,735: “. . . They inquired as to what arrangements there were in the U.S. for handling radioactive waste materials. We told them that these products were buried but that efforts were being made to find uses . . . for such wastes. . . .”

Because he was constantly with them, Charlie Reeves, the MIT-trained electrical engineer from CIA's NED attached to the delegation as technical translator, was in perhaps the best position to assess their questions in the nuclear area. Charlie got along quite well with Ermakov, in fact almost too well. Charlie later told me that he had been hard put on several occasions to keep from revealing that he had, in the course of his everyday work, read several times over every paper that Ermakov had ever published.

Conclusions on Soviet Reactors

Ermakov left Charlie with the definite impression that the Soviet atomic reactor program was struggling with a number of specific difficulties, including:

- a. Poor gasket seals which fail to stand up under the severe operating conditions.

b. Inadequate technology for bonding dissimilar metals, such as the stainless steel lining to the body of the reactor and the securing of steam generator tubes to the tube sheets.

c. Lack of uniformity of the neutron flux in the vertical and horizontal axes (of a reactor).

Charlie added that Ermakov was keenly interested in the design of heat transfer equipment and demineralizing filters for the primary reactor water circuit. He wanted to know what was being done to bring the cost of atomic power down to a competitive level. He showed interest in the temperature and pressure values in existing and projected reactors. Finally, he wanted to know how we use the "spent" uranium from power reactor operations.

The Soviet Nuclear Delegation

The visit of the Electric Power Delegation was followed by the arrival of the nine-man USSR Nuclear Delegation, composed of even more outstanding individuals than those who had represented the USSR in the electric power field. It was headed by Academician Vasili Yemelyanov, graduate of Goettingen in metallurgy and Chief of the Main Administration for the Utilization of Atomic Energy attached to the Council of Ministers (Yemelyanov is believed also to have represented his superior, Yefim Slavskiy, the Minister of Medium Machine Building and thus the man in charge of all military-related nuclear activities in the USSR. The Russians have never publicly admitted the role of either Slavskiy or the Ministry of Medium Machine Building). Academician Anatoliy P. Aleksandrov, chief of reactor physics at the Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, and Academician Aleksandr I. Leipunskiy, head of the Nuclear Research Institute at Obninsk, were primarily concerned with power and propulsion reactors. Academician Vladimir Veksler, the man of cosmic ray fame, was mostly interested in high energy physics. Academician Igor Golovin and Yevgeni Piskarev were experts on controlled thermonuclear research. Andrey Bocharov was their expert on uranium and plutonium metallurgy.

As mentioned previously, the Russian delegation visited some 20 facilities in as many days. The Contact Division of the Office of Operation eventually published at least 25 reports on these visits, each from one to six legal pages long. Then there were oral personal reminiscences.

Actually, the reports concerning uranium mining and ore concentration, research reactors, high energy physics, the machines producing high energy particles, and controlled thermonuclear energy research can be summarized rather quickly. In all five fields the Russians were doing about as well as the Americans, although they clearly lagged in advanced research along fast reactor and pulsed reactor lines. Often the ways of achieving similar ends were different, and these differences were of enormous interest to those technically involved on each side. Thus discussions following the initial briefings at each facility tended to devolve on minute details, or on discussions of which way to proceed was the better one.

The more serious Russian problems, causing many questions, seemed to have resulted from a lack of engineering skill on the part of Russian scientists, and a serious lack of communication between Russian scientists and engineers.

Thus the Russians found out the answer to several pieces of pure silliness on their part. For instance, they had ordered all the steel for their newest accelerator, as a good Communist should, from a particular plant—and indeed a particular rolling mill. As any engineer who has been concerned with steel for ships knows, the earth's magnetic field imprints a permanent magnetic field into the steel during the rolling operation. The way to randomize the orientation of these residual fields in one of the large accelerators is to order steel from several plants and carefully mix the steel from these different plants before pieces are selected for machining. To make it work properly, the Russians had the choice of tearing down their accelerator and replacing the steel.

The Search for a Key

The reporting on nuclear reactors was the difficult part to assess. Generally the Americans had not been able to place useful questions at the right time, or the Russians had answered with so little detail that the answers were not useful. What was available were long reports on what the Russians said and did, page after page of summary reporting. From the intelligence analysis viewpoint, we were overwhelmed with words and paper. It was easy to summarize that technically the Russians had learned more than the U.S. It was easy to conclude that they would attempt to implement over the years this new knowledge in their nuclear power program. Much of it seemed relevant to the never-mentioned Russian nuclear submarine program. How to point this up was the analysis problem.

Then one day Jack Lundin in desperation listed for several reports those subjects the Russians were particularly interested in and asked questions about. I happened to be looking over his shoulder as he put some five lists on the desk side by side for comparison. The results were striking. Many points of interest showed only once. But some themes ran through all five lists, the more remarkable because a couple of the lists were made from reporting on the Russian Electric Power Delegation and the others from reporting on the Russian Nuclear Delegation. Surely those questions asked again and again by more than one person were important questions. Jack had found the key.

When the various Contact Division reports were broken out by those subjects that appeared on two or more lists—really a cut-and-paste job—Jack's first impressions were clothed out. The Russians really must have been having a horrible time with welding—and the welding of critical items like steam generators, at that. They were finding their pressure vessels, steam generators and heat exchangers were corroding, and they clearly did not know why. These subjects all applied to nuclear power plants, such as the one at Novo Voronezh, but surely the last thing one wanted on a nuclear submarine was a steam generator to spring a leak, or the weld on a reactor vessel to fail when full of radioactive steam at 16 atmospheres pressure.

The Ultimate Conclusions

In February 1960 Jack was able to write confidently in both the Scientific Intelligence Digest and the Current Intelligence Weekly that the Russians were having trouble with "the design of protective containment vessels and of fuel

elements for their power reactors." They were most concerned with "finding methods for achieving a uniform production of heat within a reactor, and methods for coping with radioactivity and moisture in steam to minimize adverse effects on pipes and turbine blades." They wanted information to help them with "corrosion problems, engineering problems connected with pumps, large valves, and pipes, and the metallurgy of stainless steel." Indeed, stress corrosion of stainless steel was so important that "the Soviet scientists indicated, for example, that the steam generator tubes in the icebreaker *Lenin* were expected to last only a few years, and so were made easy to replace." Jack was sure these problem areas would also affect the operation of the nascent Soviet submarine fleet.

Thus when sightings of Russian submarines started in late 1959—early 1960, and reports of remarks by Russian seamen on these submarines began to flow, the reports of failures at sea and of radioactivity, often in the body of the submarines, were believed. While the American submarine fleet was roaming the seven seas, and indeed sailing completely across the Arctic submerged and under ice, the Soviet submarine fleet stayed within reach of home port. By 1963 there were five confirmed reports of nuclear submarines being towed into Murmansk. And Jack Lundin was confident that he had correctly uncovered the sources of these problems by studying the questions the Russian delegation members had asked.

*The problem of making
classified information public*

DECLASSIFICATION IN AN OPEN SOCIETY*

Gail F. Donnalley

People are creatures of habit and have an innate resistance to change. The dilemma created for intelligence agencies in June 1972 by the implementation of Executive Order 11652—the Executive Order dealing with classification and declassification of national security information—bears out this theory. The concept that “the interests of the United States and its citizens are best served by making information regarding the affairs of Government readily available to the public,” is reflected in that Executive Order and in the Freedom of Information Act. The Order acknowledges that information bearing directly on the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct of our foreign relations “must be subject to some constraints for the security of our nation and the safety of our people and our allies.” It identifies the information to be protected, prescribes classification, downgrading, declassification and safeguarding procedures to be followed, and establishes a monitoring system to ensure its effectiveness.

The Contradiction of Security and Openness

The application of Executive Order 11652 and the Freedom of Information Act to the Central Intelligence Agency postulates a real contradiction in definitions and philosophies. The CIA reflects the society of which it is a part; and to that extent, it is the most open intelligence agency in the world. But there remains the inherent conflict between an open society, which wants all official information made available to members of that society, and the aims of an intelligence organization engaged in the collection and production of intelligence derived from sources which cannot be identified. For this reason, our application of the Executive Order takes place in a dichotomy and involves a considerable amount of trauma as a result of our previous history.

The Director is charged by the National Security Act of 1947 with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This legal requirement is consciously and unconsciously instilled in each employee of the Central Intelligence Agency every day of his employment. For those of us who have been with the Agency for some time, protection of sources and methods has thus become instinctive. We have been trained to err on the side of caution, because a mistake the other way could have dire effects. Perhaps the most recognizable effect that could immediately result is the loss of a source; someone will no longer provide us with information. This loss could go even further. The individual, rather than just deciding he would no longer provide us with information, could be incarcerated or even lose his life.

*From a speech to the National Classification Management Society in San Diego, Calif., in July 1974.

The loss of the primary source is not the most important consideration; having lost a source of intelligence through an error in judgment in terms of protecting that source, we then run the risk that we no longer will be able to attract additional sources. In a sense, in the intelligence world, we lose our credibility; and, having lost our credibility, we lose our capability to attract. So it is quite fair to say that the application of Executive Order 11652 gives us psychological problems. We have to re-think; we now have to make better decisions as to what is important in source protection and what isn't. All this is salutary and I think necessary and perhaps overdue. The general philosophy which we are now trying to instill in our employees is that we can better protect those things which need protection if we limit our protective measures to those things which truly require protection and do not apply the same measures willy-nilly across the board. Other national intelligence services do not operate in the same atmosphere as we do and hence have difficulty understanding this Government's approach to the protection of classified matters. We can already sense an erosion of confidence on the part of some of our friends.

As to what is going on, a little history might be useful to set the stage for you. As you can appreciate, the traditional view has seen our intelligence services cloaked in extreme secrecy taken to the limits of not revealing names of employees or informants for ever and ever; indeed, if you lived in a pure world which was dominated only by the influences affecting intelligence, the ideal situation would be this: a complete and final removal of intelligence-related matters in terms of informants, agents, and employees from any aspect of public knowledge. But we don't live in that kind of a world. We do, however, concern ourselves with protecting the sources after they have stopped being sources. We are concerned that it may be necessary to protect information relative to a source for a period of time in excess of the 30 years specified in the Executive Order. The question might well be, "Why more than 30 years?" The answer is that frequently the activities of the first generation informant could carry over to a second generation; and, if we don't protect that first generation, we may not be able to attract the services of a second generation.

Early Classification Procedures

Of course, classification and security protection had not really been a major problem to the government until World War II, and I would say that even in the second World War, though we did need to protect war plans, operational plans and so forth, we still had not developed a very coherent philosophy of classification. The system then was modeled after the English system. The most important judgment exercised seemed to be what color ink to use in the stamp pad. Certainly in the predecessor organization to CIA, the Office of Strategic Services, this was true. We have found, for example, in reviewing OSS documents for declassification, that in many cases the stamp put on the document when it was received in the OSS mail room classified the document Confidential when it previously had been unclassified. That is to say, the act of receipt itself had a classification built right into it.

This type of generic overclassification is one of the reasons for the genesis of the Executive Order on classification and a valid reason for attempting to improve access to documents. I think that this overclassification, this classifi-

cation without thought, probably has contributed in its own way to the deplorable habit of certain individuals who decide on political grounds that a particular piece of classified information no longer merits classification, because its release can produce a given effect that they wish—so it appears in the press or is leaked some other way. It is true that occasionally such leaks have been for personal gain, or simply because somebody wants to capitalize on his own personal experiences and become the first to declassify or publish something previously classified.

In the past 50 years there has been an increasing amount of quite accurate intelligence tradecraft and methodology revealed in fictional and non-fictional works, usually by authors who had had experience in either wartime or peacetime intelligence work. This trend was started after World War I with Somerset Maugham's *Ashenden*, based on Maugham's personal experience as an intelligence officer. It describes the frustrations and failures encountered in such work; if something can go wrong, whether from human weakness or stroke of fate, it usually does. In a much different tone, Ian Fleming's James Bond tends to glamorize intelligence work in the post-World War II era, though his exploits do contain a leaven of tradecraft in realistic detail. John LeCarre's *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold* is a fine example of the grubby life of an intelligence agent, played like a puppet by those who hired him. In the non-fiction field, I should mention Allen Dulles' *The Craft of Intelligence* which purveys a fine flavor for intelligence as a profession. There are also good books on cryptography and code-breaking. Obviously, these deal extensively with the past, inasmuch as it is in our national interest to keep current techniques and methodologies closely controlled.

What We Are Trying to Protect

I have covered this background material, which I'm sure is familiar to most of you, in order to lead up to the question of what we in the CIA are trying to protect. It includes: (a) the names of *some* of our employees—those working overseas (even if disclosed to host governments) and those in line for such assignments in the future; (b) the names of *all* our agents—for obvious reasons. Incidentally, much confusion seems to exist in the public mind over the term "agent of the CIA." All too frequently, the media use "CIA agent" to mean *anyone* working for the CIA—directly and full-time or only on an *ad hoc* basis, openly labelled as CIA or identified otherwise. This is improper and needs clarification. The confusion probably arises out of the practice of our FBI colleagues who perform their investigative and security functions under the professional title of agents.

CIA uses the term "agent" in its dictionary sense of "a person empowered to act for another." Thus all our so-called agent operations engage individuals, usually foreign nationals, in the conduct of intelligence work as guided and directed by CIA officers. The agent is the doer, the CIA officer is the representative of the U.S. Government, and the Agency is charged with insuring that the agent does what is required in the manner chosen within the time allowed. Thus, it is improper to refer to E. Howard Hunt as a CIA agent; Hunt was a CIA officer charged with the direction of agents, as in his role leading up to the Bay of Pigs.

Resuming the list of the types of information we are trying to protect, next is (c) the current methods we are using to obtain intelligence—maybe you've read about them in James Bond, but perhaps they aren't in anything you could have read; (d) all information dealing with cryptography and cryptanalysis; (e) the details of the processing and analysis of intelligence information—the Soviets would like this; and (f) the finished intelligence publications—because they reveal what has been provided to the decision makers in our government. This list is by no means complete, but it does include those of most significance.

Bundy's List of 'Real Secrets'

Perhaps you have not had the opportunity to read some of the recent testimony given before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Operations. McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to President Kennedy, testified on May 22, 1974 to the Subcommittee, which was inquiring into classification practices in the government. Bundy identified what he called "real secrets" and divided these into six classes: (1) defense information, such as the details of military contingency planning and the design of nuclear weapons systems; (2) current diplomatic negotiations; (3) covert activity abroad (incidentally, he suggests that, since some of such activity is out of tune with national sentiment, it should not exist, and other types of such activity should be governed by the Congress through its share of the war power); (4) the covert collection of intelligence—including secret agents, interception of electronic transmissions, or any other where revelations could enable the enemy to take countermeasures; (5) material whose capacity for *international* embarrassment outweighs its values for enlightenment of the public—he cites confidential assessments of foreign leaders coming to meet the President; and (6) legitimate secrets relating to the process by which a President makes a decision.

Statutory Authority for Protection

As I mentioned, when the CIA was established under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director was given statutory authority to protect intelligence methods and sources. This Act, and the successive Executive Orders on classification, have been the foundation for our policies in protecting national security information, whether originated by us or received from other government components of foreign sources. Additional authority to protect certain information, particularly that relating to names and numbers of employees, was included in the CIA Act of 1949. These acts have in no way been superseded by the Freedom of Information Act of 1966. You should be aware, however, that there is a very strong possibility that this Act will be amended significantly in the near future,* and both versions passed by the House (in March) and the Senate (in May) contain sections which appear in potential conflict with the Agency's statutory authorities mentioned a moment ago. The most important change lies in the provision for *in camera* review by a court in cases where the reasonableness of the classification of a document or material is challenged. Leaving aside the question of how to protect sensitive intelligence information while it is in the possession of a court, the basic problem is whether a court

*These amendments have since been enacted over Presidential veto—Ed.

could overrule the Director's decision, taken under his statutory responsibility, that certain information requires protection because it involves intelligence sources and methods.

The Declassification Machinery

Let me now return to 1 June 1972, when Executive Order 11652 became effective. The Central Intelligence Agency integrated the implementation of classification practices into its Records Management Program. Other agencies selected different options; some included it in public relations programs, others in security programs. To date, our experience is that it operates quite effectively in the Records Management Program, but could operate equally effectively in any of the other programs.

The Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff, is charged with the responsibility for ensuring compliance with Executive Order 11652 and the Freedom of Information Act within the Agency. In August 1973, a Classification Programs Branch was established within this Staff with a basic mission of carrying out the program, emphasizing coordination rather than centralized declassification activity. The major task in terms of manpower requirements is the primary responsibility of the originating components or their successor organizations.

As you realize, the Order required an update of our procedures in several areas. It called for: (a) a sharp restriction in the number of authorized classifiers; (b) the refining of the criteria for materials to be classified, and accountability of classifiers for their actions; (c) the identification of classifiers on any materials classified; (d) the implementation of the General Declassification Schedule (GDS), which permitted much too brief periods of protection for most intelligence materials; (e) the exemption of material, if necessary, from the provisions of the GDS (but there is a question as to whether all the Agency's activities can be considered as falling under one or more of the four exemptions); (f) the development of procedures to implement the provisions for mandatory review of classified material, leaving the Agency with the question of what manpower would be needed; (g) the automatic review of classified material 30 years old, with declassification of all such material except that continued under classification by decision of the Director; (h) the systematic review of classified material with the view of downgrading or declassifying it as soon as possible (and again there was the problem of manpower); (i) the potential problem posed by the apparent authority of the Interagency Classification Review Committee to overrule the Director in appeals from the denials of mandatory review requests; (j) access to classified documents by approved historical researchers (non-government); and (k) the requirement to provide quarterly lists of authorized classifiers to the ICRC.

Perhaps I should reemphasize here how these requirements conflicted with the training and practices acquired over the years by our professional intelligence case officers and analysts. In the intelligence field there are two aspects of information, the information itself, and the means by which it is obtained. It is obvious that if the leaders of a less than friendly foreign country know we have learned of their defense mechanisms, they will modify or completely change

them. If they know we have been able to intercept and read their communications, they will no longer use those channels to transmit information helpful to us, or they may attempt to mislead us with misinformation.

But, more important, disclosure of the fact that we have certain pieces of information could seriously endanger the agent or agents who made them available to us, resulting in the termination of any more information from that channel, whether because of the removal of the agent or because the agent fears the consequences of his passing further intelligence material to us.

The intelligence case officer realizes that a particular piece of information may not require protection, but he is concerned with the likelihood that an accumulation of separate bits of intelligence will lead back to the source. Hence, his training conditions him to think of a continuing need to protect information not only from disclosure to the public, but even from his colleagues who do not need to know.

You can perhaps appreciate, then, the traumatic effect of the disclosure provisions of the Executive Order on such professional intelligence officers. Not only were they asked to review intelligence documents for possible disclosure in response to mandatory requests; but, on the basic question of what level of classification, if any, a document needed, they were required, when in doubt, to use the *less* restrictive treatment

We have now lived with the Order for more than two years, however, without things going to pot. This is in part because of the helpful and cooperative attitude taken by the ICRC on several procedural matters. It is due much more to most Agency people having learned to follow the spirit of the new system, though sometimes reluctantly; having learned the refined basis for classification; and now *thinking* before routinely stamping a classification on a document.

Experience to Date

In monitoring our progress in complying with the Order, we find we have accomplished several things, such as: (a) greatly reducing the number of classifiers (and this is still an on-going process); (b) significantly reducing the current amount of classified materials being produced, particularly as classifiers increasingly realize that little administrative or support material needs protection; (c) beginning the review of 30-year-old material (as you know, we are the successors to the OSS and CIG); and (d) keeping abreast of the requests for mandatory review.

I will expand a bit on this matter of handling mandatory review requests, for there are points here which will likely be of interest to you. We were initially apprehensive that we would be swamped by requests from the news media and private individuals, especially historical researchers. Yet two years after the Executive Order went into effect, we have received only 240 requests.

Among the first of these was the request from one of the major news services for records related to the Guatemalan Revolution of 1954, in which the Agency is alleged to have played a significant role. It was quite a task to identify and retrieve the relevant documents; and, after a careful review, it was determined

that most of them could not be declassified because sources of information were identified. However, it was possible to sanitize many of these papers and thus meet the larger part of the requester's needs.

We have had an oft-repeated request from a well-known historian and academician, mainly for documents relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This request was made initially under the FOIA, but since classified documents were involved, it has been processed under the provisions of the Executive Order. It was pointed out to the Professor that he appeared to be eligible for approval as a historical researcher, but he declined to take this route, preferring to use only declassified source materials. It has been possible to declassify some of the documents he wants, but others can be released only in sanitized versions, if at all, and historians understandably don't like sanitized documents.

Occasionally, we have had requests for declassification from former employees (including those of the OSS). We have declassified a considerable number of documents dealing with OSS operations in Vietnam (then French Indochina) for a former OSS officer who served there in the latter part of 1945 and who knew Ho Chi Minh. And we have been able to declassify documents on OSS operations in Yugoslavia for a former OSS man who served there and is writing a book.

There are still several challenges for the Agency to meet in implementing various facets of the classification policies mandated by the Executive Order, and some of these may well be the same as you are facing. For example, you probably see occasional documents which are obviously overclassified or are exempted for no apparent reason. It's clear that someone hasn't gotten the word—or has unthinkingly used former procedures—or signed what his secretary prepared without reviewing it for the appropriateness of the classification. There is a continuing need for both indoctrination of newly authorized classifiers and re-indoctrination periodically of the "old hands." We are still working to develop effective means to accomplish this.

A different problem we face is in getting together the necessary resources to get current on the review of classified material which is 30 years old or older. With rare exceptions, all OSS documents still on file are classified, and the review of these has been a challenge in terms of making qualified personnel available to do the job. In fact, as a practical matter, we re-hired three retirees to work on the OSS records previously held by the Department of State and turned over to the National Archives some time back, but this is only a part of the problem. From 1977 on, when we pass the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Agency, we will have increasing numbers of documents eligible for review and we will have to gear up to handle that workload.

We have taken steps to reduce the average time of responding to mandatory review requests. Your problems in this area may be somewhat different from ours, for we must first search out the documents and then find busy operations people to review them in terms of current classification criteria. Because of our many internal reorganizations over the years, it is often not too clear which component should make the review, and perhaps two or three different offices should look at it. All this takes time; but, needless to say, we are doing our best to be responsive to the anticipated new requirements, both for requests and appeals of denials.

In closing, I would say that if our problems, as I have tried to point out, have been psychological and have been brought about by the requirement to re-think old habitual practices, I think it's been healthy for us and it's certainly an interesting challenge to an intelligence agency steeped in the tradition of silence to comply with the current demands of our society for more freedom of information.

The Office of Training on 22 July 1974 established the Center for the Study of Intelligence, a framework within which discussion groups and researchers can pursue investigation of the theory and practice of the profession of intelligence. Fellows in Intelligence, appointed by the Director of Training for terms of various lengths depending on the scope of specific research projects, will deal with a broad range of issues having to do with the ways in which intelligence is gathered, processed, and used. Discussion groups sponsored by the Center, involving both Agency and non-Agency participation, will meet to discuss questions of long-range importance to the Agency, both substantive and procedural. The research product and reports on the work of the discussion groups will be given appropriate distribution to inform and to stimulate further thought about the problems.

The aim, as with Studies in Intelligence, is to develop a professional literature of our discipline which will contribute to the growth of a systematic body of knowledge about intelligence. The accompanying article, examining the rationale underlying the establishment of the Center, echoes an article by Sherman Kent in the initial September 1955 issue of this publication entitled "The Need for an Intelligence Literature."

The Editor

PREFACE TO A THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE

Lawrence T. Mitelman

It is an obvious but essential point that the question of *why* we collect and produce intelligence precedes the question of *how*. In a world of increasingly constrained resources, the clear answer to the question of *why* must be that the intelligence is in the most serious national interests. Those interests, as defined and made explicit by the political leadership of this country, are the only justification for the collection and further processing of information. We no longer live in an age tolerant of the "nice-to-know"—need-to-know has assumed an additional meaning for us. But the effort to develop standards to guide intelligence with reference to both the *why* and *how* is conceptual as well as practical. Theory, however assimilated and unexamined its assumptions may be, precedes practice. A theory, as I shall use the term rather broadly, is a well-coordinated conceptual system which requires a rigorous statement of premises, assumptions, and relationships to give order to a body of observed data or empirical situations. Clearly a theory has other characteristics as well, but at this early stage I would much prefer to emphasize the process, not the product; to stress the effort to make general statements about relations rather than the statements themselves.

Why a "theory of intelligence?" Or rather, several or even many theories of intelligence? Why the effort to be explicit about assumptions, variables, and relationships when ambiguity, particularly in a bureaucratic context, may be more acceptable and less conflict-producing? There is, after all, a well-researched and persuasive literature arguing the many values of ambiguity and ignorance. There

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is recent evidence from the world of international diplomacy that ambiguity, even in the most intricate of negotiations with seemingly unambiguous outcomes, has proved useful. Not to erect too many straw men, one must distinguish between conscious or intentional ambiguity and lack of clarity in one's own mind. The decision to be vague for a purpose differs fundamentally from vagueness that proceeds from uncertainty about purpose. Again, *why* precedes *how*, and theory—whether identified as such or not—precedes practice. One justification, then, for theorizing about intelligence is to encourage clarity of thought about assumptions and explicitness about purposes. The effort is far from frivolous. Consider, for example, the following passage from *The Real CIA* by Lyman Kirkpatrick:

“The role of the intelligence services in the future is, and should be, that of keeping the policy makers fully informed of anything happening (or about to happen) in the world that might affect the United States politically, economically, or militarily, either directly or indirectly. . . . What our intelligence services must learn is what weapon any power on earth is planning to build. . . . Until there are guarantees of a safe disarmament, the only margin of safety in national defense is 100 percent accuracy in our knowledge of other countries' weaponry.” (p. 282f)

This passage, from a book which has been described as constituting “a resounding defense of CIA's role in our society,” could probably command the assent of many at work in intelligence today. Examine for just a moment some of the crucial assumptions which underlie this view of the proper role and scope of intelligence activity. One need only ask what kinds of events abroad in the world do not affect the United States politically, economically, or militarily, either directly or indirectly, to know that this is an impossibly broad charge. The response will come: “we all know what he means.” Perhaps. It may be that he means just what he has written—what then? The object is not to belittle a point of view, it is to highlight the assumptions implicit in that view. Is 100 percent accuracy in our knowledge of other countries' weaponry really necessary, or desirable, or attainable? Is, in fact, such accuracy “the only margin of safety” in national defense?

It is not necessary to belabor the issue, but to emphasize once again, the effort to theorize encourages explicitness about assumptions and relationships. There is a further point to be made. Without some theoretical apparatus, it is immensely difficult to establish standards of relevance or levels of priority. What among a flood of impressions and data is pertinent to an inquiry, and investigation? Why? What collection systems are preferred to what others and why? How have the increasing sophistication and reliability of technical collection affected the need for non-technical collection? Much is made of the distinction between capabilities and intentions. Is there a threshold of capability below which intentions do not matter? To address such questions successfully requires that one have at least some theoretical context at hand. Lacking it, one is consigned to almost random observation and decision. Observation and experience are far more productive when guided by intelligent hypothesis.

To argue the need for theorizing and eventually some theories about intelligence is not to urge the need for dogma or binding doctrine. It is to urge, and very strongly, the need for a dialogue on doctrine, for the venting of comple-

mentary or even competing theoretical constructs. There has been too little of that, and we are the poorer for it. The literature on intelligence is, for the most part, anecdotal or case-oriented and little given to theorizing about the nature of the processes involved in intelligence work. What we lack, even given the serious and sustained work of the editors and many contributors to *Studies in Intelligence*, is a cumulative, critical literature, a literature from which people may learn and against which they can react. It was just a very few years before the founding of OSS that John Maynard Keynes wrote his epochal *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*. In the years since, economic theory has burgeoned, spawning in the process a welter of derivative and counter theories and, also in the process, sharpening, honing, growing in policy usefulness. By contrast, since the publication of Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* there has been almost nothing of comparable intellectual merit or persuasiveness written about intelligence. Admittedly, intelligence officers have had much to do since OSS days, while the generally overt character of data for economists has permitted many to work in that field. But is there no one among the many gifted people who have worked at and thought about intelligence over the last three decades who is inclined to advance some general propositions about the processes and purposes of intelligence? With a flippancy I think he might enjoy, I could have called this paper, "Is Sherman Kent Enough?"

The theoretical explorations I suggest could take many forms, depending upon the disciplinary interests of the researcher. Two brief examples, from economic theory and decision analysis, hopefully, will give some sense of how one might proceed and what the policy relevant results might be.

In the economic example, consider the intelligence community (or, more modestly, the CIA) as a firm engaged in producing a product. By definition, production is held to be the transformation of one commodity into another. There is no requirement that the commodities be tangible. Orchestras as well as factories produce. The question arises, then, "What does CIA produce?" Surely not paper, or reports, or even advice. It can be argued that what CIA and other intelligence organizations produce is certainty. That is, it is the task of intelligence to reduce the uncertainty attending situations and options of interest to policy makers. Assume that the product is produced by some combination of two factors, capital and labor, one or the other of which may be fixed. Capital includes the cost of technical collection systems as well as the equipment needed to interpret and process data. Labor includes not only the labor of human collection but also the labor required to process information gathered by technical means. Assume further that capital is fixed—given anticipated budgetary constraints, this may not be too pessimistic an assumption. What would happen then if labor were increased in production? According to economic theory, the relative contribution of labor in the production process declines as more labor is used. This is no more than a statement of the "Law of Diminishing Returns." What relevance does this analysis have for the management and allocation of resources for intelligence gathering and production? At best, given this grossly oversimplified statement, the analysis points to the possibility that greater infusions of labor into the process will not necessarily result in proportionate increases in production. There may be some more optimal mix of the two factors. Too, diminishing returns and the corollary, increasing

marginal costs, suggest that we will be paying ever more for a product constantly decreasing in cost effectiveness. One policy prescription which might emerge is that collection and production must become vastly more selective. Returning to Mr. Kirkpatrick's assertion that "the only margin of safety is 100 percent accuracy in our knowledge of other countries' weaponry," it can be argued that given the above, the cost of even approaching 100 percent accuracy may become prohibitive. At what level less than 100 percent do we establish the "margin of safety" and why? These are issues and questions the theorist about intelligence could profitably address from one disciplinary perspective.

The above illustration is drawn from a field, economics, which falls within what has recently been labeled the "analytic paradigm" of decision theory. According to this paradigm a decision maker knows his goals, the constraints he is subject to, the resources at his disposal, and has some ranking of available options which will yield maximum positive results. Given this formal design, the problems of aggregating individual choices and preferences become enormously complex. The analyst of foreign affairs who is necessarily concerned with explaining and predicting the behavior of foreign states when working, consciously or not, within the rules established by the analytic paradigm is impelled toward a view of affairs which is frequently misleadingly rational and coherent.

Increasingly in the literature of the social sciences there are alternatives to the analytic paradigm being discussed, a new set of conceptual lenses which, proceeding from different assumptions, yield fruitful new insights into problems of decision making. This developing new paradigm stresses procedures, not outcomes. It asserts that the decision maker, in the words of a recent paper on the subject, "strains to avoid direct outcome calculations and thus to eliminate the impact of uncertainty" and "is sensitive only to a limited range of highly pertinent information." Interpreting the behavior of foreign states through this model, particularly during times of crises, could produce starkly different results from the analytic paradigm and different missions for intelligence in the process.

It would be pointless to ask which of these two ways of inquiring into decision making is correct. Rather we should ask how might they complement each other in intelligence work to convey a richer understanding of foreign state behavior so that intelligence may better serve the needs of policy.

These two examples are merely that. The would-be theorist about intelligence is by no means limited to the world of the economist or decision analyst. It is far more likely that other disciplines, more abundantly represented in the Agency's ranks, will contribute to this effort. There will be, in the parlance of the political scientist, islands of theory awaiting some grand concept to connect them. But without the islands, it is unlikely that the concept will have the power to explain and predict that may one day be possible. What is essential is that the experience in the workings of intelligence gained in the last three decades not be permitted to persist only as an undifferentiated mass of data and impressions. If we are to learn, if we are to grow professionally from one generation to the next, then we must begin now to look for the patterns and general lessons of our profession.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

OPERATION SPLINTER FACTOR, by *Stewart Steven*. (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, New York, 1974)

Operation Splinter Factor by Stewart Steven, a naturalized Englishman, formerly *Daily Express* and now *Daily Herald* international affairs correspondent, is distinguished by the fact—and this is quite possibly the only fact connected with the book—that it contains not one single redeeming element of truth.

Steven has added another monument to Cold War revisionism, but in so doing, he serves directly the current interests of the Soviets, the Bloc, and their security services. In effect, he relieves them of the moral consequences of having systematically killed off the top Communist leadership on trumped-up charges after the expulsion of Tito from the Bloc. He shifts the moral stigma for these criminal acts from Stalin, the KGB, and the various Bloc security services to Allen Dulles and the CIA. Steven is able to accomplish this bit of legerdemain by simply inventing a series of flat lies.

There never was an operation conducted by Mr. Dulles or by CIA that bore the name "Operation Splinter Factor." We have checked this out. Steven asserts that Dulles personally wrote the operational name on the dossier and that he boasted about it to the end of his days. This is simply not so. Nowhere in the book does Steven show the slightest awareness of CIA operational methodology or case practice. He obviously does not know, for example, that CIA does not and never has used a binomial project nomenclature.* But even setting aside the question of the operation's name, research from the time we received the first word of the Steven enterprise in 1972 has unearthed nobody who has any memory of an operation along the lines put forward by Steven, conducted by Dulles or by the Agency.

Joseph Swiatlo, an officer of the Polish Security Service (UB), defected in Berlin in December 1953 because he felt he was in imminent peril of his life from what he saw developing in the Polish service following the death of Stalin. It had become clear to him that he was going to be made the scapegoat for criminal activities by his own boss in the UB against innocent individuals. Swiatlo had never known nor seen an American intelligence officer, nor as far as we know any other Western intelligence service representative, including MI-6, before he volunteered his own presence in Berlin. The key structural elements of Steven's presentation are:

- the assertion that Swiatlo was worked in-place in Warsaw from 1948 to 1953;
- that he had walked in first to MI-6 in Warsaw; and
- that the walk-in operation had been taken over from the British by Allen Dulles (who at that time was in New York City in private life, not working for the government). Steven would have it believed that MI-6 checked out Swiatlo's offer with Dulles, and then turned him over for handling.

*Interestingly enough, NATO operations, which in many cases are openly publicized, employ just such a system.

All of these assertions as given by Steven are unequivocal . . . and erroneous. Swiatlo was not worked in-place. He appeared for the first time in Berlin when he himself made contact with U.S. military authorities in Berlin in late 1953. As far as we know from the Swiatlo record, he never contacted MI-6 in 1948 nor at any other time, anywhere. Dulles was not queried by MI-6 in any manner, shape, or form about a proposal from Swiatlo at any time. Such a thing would have been anomalous, indeed, because it would have occurred during the administration of another DCI, Admiral Hillenkoetter. No one with any perception of what goes on among Western services would fail to recognize that what Steven says regarding Swiatlo is totally incongruous with the day-to-day operational facts of life.

The case of Noel and Harry Field and the Field family is another important element in Steven's fictional sequence. Allen Dulles was in touch with one of the Field brothers during his World War II Swiss activity in Switzerland. This fact is in the public domain and is well-known. Steven converts it into a post-war relationship manipulated by Allen Dulles and CIA to deepen and develop mistrust among the Soviet and satellite services who, it is documented fact, regarded the Fields of that time as intelligence service collaborators. There is no evidence whatsoever that Dulles or CIA at any time utilized the Fields as a deception channel or deceptively induced them to disappear behind the Iron Curtain in 1949. The Fields were totally immersed ideologically and personally with the Soviets and the Bloc. Whatever happened in their cases occurred in response to stimuli originating within the Communist services themselves, and their story is still not known to us in detail. The State Department sent a sequence of notes to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union inquiring about the missing Fields. The matter became an open *cause célèbre*. Not a detail was forthcoming officially until long after the death of Stalin. Actually, it was Swiatlo *after* his defection in December 1953 who gave us the first significant details about them.

To sustain his whole invented construct, Steven adds what is probably the ultimate lie—ultimate in its utter remoteness from reality and in its credible simplicity to an unwary reader. He asserts the existence of a still-unidentified, CIA-controlled State Department Double Agent (“Mr. X”) who worked to the Soviets and to the Bloc as a deception channel. He asserts this “source” was used by Dulles to complete setting the hook of deception in the outthrust soft jaws of the KGB and its Bloc fry. The fact is obvious that no such source or deception channel existed, and therefore it could not have been used by Dulles, CIA, or anybody else for any purpose.

The narrative, unfortunately, is credible to the non-expert.* It is reasonably well-written and self-sustaining, and the story hangs together, but this is because the matter of evidence or proof is never allowed to interrupt the flow. A guileless reader, uninitiated in the ways of *disinformatsia*, could read it and accept it, if only as a basis for discussion. There is, however, no single worthwhile feature in the entire book.

A. V. Knobelspiess

*For an example, see the review by Harold F. Alderfer, *The Annals of the American Academy* (1974), pp. 219-221. Against this exercise in gullibility one would set most of the reviews that have appeared in English, except for those of open Communist Party affiliation. For a typical skeptic's evisceration of Steven's book, see Neal Ascherson, “Somebody Blundered,” *New Statesman* (16 August 1974), pp. 226-227.

KGB: THE SECRET WORK OF SOVIET SECRET AGENTS. By *John Barron*.
(Reader's Digest Press—E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1974.)

This is a compendium of information on the State Security service of the Soviet Union, exceeding any of its predecessors by the range, depth and accuracy of its treatment of the subject. No one who pretends to expertise on Soviet security and intelligence matters will be able to do his work without reference to this book. This book for the present moment is *the* authoritative word on the subject. Specific accounts of particular experiences, events, and operations such as *The Secret World* by Peter Deryabin and *Inside a Soviet Embassy* by Alexander Kaznacheyev are still important but of a different genre from any of the attempts to describe the service as a whole. It is in this last category that Barron is clearly without a peer. *KGB* not only commands its subject matter, it also recounts a series of Soviet clandestine operations in a fast-paced, exciting style that would attract most readers with the magnetic force of a spy thriller.

As appendices, *KGB* contains the translation of a Soviet training manual on the recruitment of Americans and two historical notes, one on the KGB and the other—clearly inferior qualitatively—on the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU. There is also a thirty-five-page list of Soviet citizens engaged in clandestine operations abroad. Mr. Barron is a skilled journalist who appears to believe that, when dedicating a book to the *what, when* and *why* of the KGB, one should not overlook the *who*. Barron names some 1559 Soviet operatives abroad in his compilation. About one-third of the names are “guilt-edged”; they are drawn from the published PNG actions taken by governments against KGB personnel under official cover all over the world since 1946. These solid data are easily derivable from the *New York Times* and *London Times* indices by anybody. What is new is that someone like Barron has amassed and published the results. The remaining two-thirds were gleaned from a spread of resources that would exhaust a bird dog. In a book that attempts to blend this popular appeal and the monograph, *any* error in a list of this kind is too many. A very small number of them would appear to require further checking.

KGB details and updates the organization of the Soviet service with far greater precision than any other book on the subject. It covers the First and Second Chief Directorates, which are respectively responsible for the bulk of the foreign and domestic operations, on what approaches a branch-by-branch basis. This, in particular the information on the Second Chief Directorate, is something new and important for scholars and intelligence specialists and interested laymen as well. There are classified studies that go farther, more accurately and more currently, but none in the overt literature. Barron's exposition should answer the needs of almost anyone who is not directly concerned with counterintelligence analysis of the KGB and should be carefully read by those who are. The author's insight and understanding of the relations among the major subdivisions and of the overall role of the KGB within the Soviet political system put his book a giant step ahead of earlier accounts.

Without question more space could have been devoted to the internal operations of the KGB; nevertheless, Barron explains well the link between the foreign and domestic functions of the service and its synergetic effects. The complaint that Barron should have given more or most of his attentions to the KGB's operations inside the USSR is voiced in an acidulous review of the book

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which appeared in *The Economist*, 29 June 1974, p. 129, but in fact the fundamental purpose of the KGB to serve as the "Sword and Shield of the Party leadership" against all enemies, foreign and domestic, real and imagined, gets a separate, concise chapter to itself.

Barron's information on the organization of the KGB, as well as on other topics, is based on lengthy interviews with former Soviet and East European citizens who served or suffered from the KGB and also some of its Western victims and dupes. Aid from unnamed Western security services is acknowledged and assistance from the FBI and DIA specifically mentioned. CIA, Barron writes, helped him make connections with some of his defector sources who were not otherwise approachable. In addition, Barron and his assistant, Katharine Clark, assembled what must be the largest collection of information on the KGB in the open literature. Judging by the range of the bibliographic notes—which merit notations and study—Barron's files of clippings and articles may well exceed holdings of some intelligence services. More to the point—he uses his sources well. Getting the information is one thing; getting it straight and getting it down on paper in well-organized and well-written prose is something else again. Barron has done both. In a book as large as this, there must certainly be errors that disturb some experts. The academies will never pardon him for not footnoting every sentence, however impressive the bibliography. There are indubitably matters of emphasis and interpretation that some will dispute—the dismissal of the significance of the GRU, for example—but given the complexity of the subject and the difficulty of finding good information about it, Barron not only has put together an impressive collection of facts, but shows an impressive command of his subject as well.

Among the stories in the book, one has special significance for U.S. Government officials. Never to my knowledge have the consequences of run-of-the-mill security violations and the failure to observe standard procedures and precautions been more appallingly depicted than in the account of the Johnson-Mintkenbaugh case. Anyone who feels irked at niggling security regulations should know that one scrap of paper carelessly tossed into a waste basket provided the KGB with access to one of the most sensitive repositories of classified documents in the U.S. military establishment. "Treasures of the Vault," as this chapter is called, also proves that at least one other author can write an Eric Ambler spy story. In contrast to Ambler's novels, however, this story just happens to be true, pornographic movies and all. Even with today's cult of the absurd in literature, no work of fiction could end the way the saga of Sergeant Johnson does. If you doubt that assertion, read it and see for yourself.*

The most extraordinary revelation in the book is, somewhat surprisingly, not about a KGB agent, but rather the precise opposite, a Soviet citizen who served the CIA. Vladimir Sakharov was a young KGB co-optee and Soviet

*See pp. 199-229. An abridged version of the chapter appeared in the January 1974 *Reader's Digest* under the title "The Sergeant Who Opened the Door." It is available from the magazine in reprint form and makes about the best security indoctrination pamphlet one can find. The training manual on recruiting Americans (Appendix A) is also effective in this regard. Those in the government or its contracting firms who wish to sensitize employees to the problems of security at a time when such matters are often viewed with skepticism or boredom should find these materials useful supplements to standard fare.

diplomat who defected in Kuwait in the summer of 1971 after working in place for a period of time (unspecified) for the CIA. As the book's foreword explains, Sakharov got in touch with Barron after some of the chapters of the book had been published in *Reader's Digest* as separate articles. By that time Sakharov was already living in the West. The chapter on Sakharov combines two themes in counterpoint: the personal story of a young Muscovite, raised in top circles of Soviet society, who came to detest those circles and the regime they ruled and—intertwined with that story—the covert history of Soviet intrigue in the Near East in the late 1960's and early 1970's. I know of no reason to question the veracity of Sakharov's relation of his own life, though much of his story cannot be confirmed by independent sources. About what he says concerning Soviet machinations in the Near East, there is confirmation from one of the best conceivable sources, the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram*. *Al Ahram* on 15 March 1974 hailed Barron's book as an accurate source on a story that even in today's circumstances must be embarrassing to the Egyptians. Reading it, one realizes that an understanding of the history of the Near East during the past ten years must include a full appreciation of the role of Soviet penetrations in Nasser's Egypt.

Al Ahram's comments are typical of the almost uniform praise that *KGB* has received from reviewers the world around. It is to Barron's credit that his book is so persuasive and so carefully documented that strident attacks on it are hard to mount. The aforementioned review in the *Economist* and another in the *Manchester Guardian* are practically the only adverse comments available in major media.

KGB, by definition, fits everybody's category of Class A Anti-Soviet Literature. There was a time, and not long ago, when a book in that category that began to become popular (*KGB* has been on most of the best seller lists) had to be shot down, or at least sneered at by somebody. But here we are in a world dedicated to détente, and from Australia to San Francisco the long way 'round everybody jumps on the band wagon and says this is a bully book, very important for our times. Of course it is, but that has never inhibited reviewers with a "point of view" before. At the risk of sounding like a reviewer myself, I suggest that this phenomenon may have significance as a sign of the times.

Détente these days does not mean the recognition of Soviet virtue; it means the recognition of Soviet power. Although American political scientists, historians, and others appear to ignore it, by anybody's logic the Committee on State Security is an inescapable aspect of that power.* Therefore, to understand Soviet

*Robert M. Slusser notes in the *Slavic Review*, December 1973, pp. 825-826: "Despite its fundamental and universally recognized importance, the secret police continues to be the neglected stepchild of Soviet studies. . . . As far as the scholarly community in this country is concerned, the study of the secret police still seems to be regarded as somehow discreditable, marginal, or unfeasible. . . . Granted that there are formidable obstacles to studying the history and operations of the secret police; granted too that the politics of U.S.-Soviet scholarly exchange militate strongly against a choice of a dissertation topic in this area, since the Soviet authorities would be certain to reject any application for actual research on a topic bearing even indirectly on the Soviet policy; the fact remains that a major institution in the Soviet political system is receiving grossly inadequate attention from the U.S. academic community." Slusser has a balanced review of the Barron book's strengths and weaknesses in the *Russian Review* (October 1974), pp. 437-438.

power, one must understand the KGB. Soviet officialdom in its dealings with the outside world cannot avoid an unctuous hypocrisy in averring the benignity of its intentions coupled with what the Secretary of State once identified as a tendency to try to pick up all the loose change. Détente and trade increase the exposure of more people to more Soviet officials, and those who have encountered this irritating manifestation of the dialectic—whatever their views on other subjects—can scarcely help but rejoice to see such an utterly frank book as *KGB*. It highlights the contrast between the minuscule staffs of foreign embassies in Moscow and the horde of Soviet officials, sometimes ten times as numerous, that man Soviet embassies in the non-Communist world. It describes all those goings-on that diplomats and journalists in Moscow know about, but seldom mention out loud. It even snatches the wreath from the balding head of Mikhail Sholokhov, the one Russian Nobel laureate (out of four) Moscow considers loyal. To all those on the front lines of détente, these stories must come as a welcome astringent.

It may be that *KGB*, coupled with that unanswerable chronicle of Soviet history, *The GULAG Archipelago*, may make a notable contribution to international relations. Under the influence of these books, the West may begin to deal with the Soviet Union in openness and realism. That does not necessarily imply hostility, but it does mean freedom from the game of pretending that the KGB and the camps and all the rest don't matter. Effective dealing with the Soviet Union begins with the recognition that indeed they do.

Wayne Lambridge

THE ARAB MIND. By *Raphael Patai*. (Charles Scribners and Sons, New York, 1973.)

The major objectives of social science research involving the topics of "national character" or "personality and culture" are: (1) the prediction of the type of character that a given society is likely to produce, based upon the sum total of its culture and social structure and (2) the demonstration of how character or personality, in turn, impacts upon the very culture and social structure which has shaped it.

Raphael Patai's recent book, *The Arab Mind*, is a significant scholarly contribution to the field of national character research in general and, more specifically, to the understanding of Arab culture and national character. Further, the book implicitly suggests the relevance of national character research to intelligence analysis. It seems, therefore, both appropriate and useful to assess Patai's book in the following contexts: (1) its contribution to the literature on the Arabs, (2) its status in terms of the evolutionary development of national character research as a field, and (3) both its relevance and that of national character research in general to intelligence analysis.

Patai's book is clearly the product of a profound knowledge of Arab civilization. The book is well organized and, for a scholarly study, especially interestingly and elegantly written. The author does a masterful job of integrating his knowledge of the many facets of the culture, such as the language, the arts and literature, and child-rearing practices, and then delineating the ways that these cultural variables influence personality development. In this respect, it is appropriate to compare Patai's book with Sania Hamady's *The Temperament and Character of the Arabs*, published in 1960, since the objective of both authors was the same—the delineation of Arab national character. While Hamady and Patai reach many of the same conclusions about the Arabs, Patai's analysis and explanation of the "why" of their behavior places his study on a considerably higher analytical plane than that of Hamady. The specialist on the Arabs may not discover anything startlingly new about Arab character or world view in Patai's book, but he will probably acquire a better appreciation of the cultural and psychological wellsprings of Arab behavior. It is in this latter respect that *The Arab Mind* is an important contribution to the scholarly literature on the Arabs.

Where does Patai's book stand in the evolution of national character research to date? To make such an assessment, it is necessary to review briefly the development of this genre of research.

The intellectual roots of national character research can be traced to cultural anthropology as early as the 1920's. During World War II, those methods employed earlier in the academic community in this field of research were brought to bear upon a variety of problems connected with the war effort.

It was precisely the inaccessibility of the target country and the availability of only fragmentary information about it that made national character research relevant to intelligence analysis during the war. The cultural anthropologists had long been developing models of former and disappearing cultures from fragmentary materials. The anthropologists, joined by the psychiatrists, combined the use

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of psychoanalytic theory, interaction theory, child development theory, and learning theory with standard anthropological research methods to construct models of the contemporary cultures of wartime enemy countries, Japan and Germany. Indeed, Ruth Benedict's classic study *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* is an example of this multidisciplinary approach to national character research which evolved in the World War II period.

Since the appearance of Ruth Benedict's book in 1946, national character studies have fallen into two broad categories despite some differences in terms of approach, focus, and explicitness of conceptual framework. Until the late 1950's, national character studies tended to be focused on the modal personality (i.e., the statistically most significant personality construct in the group studied, and not necessarily that of the majority) of a group or a nation. The research findings derived from the application of psychological, sociological, and psychoanalytical theories were combined with other materials, such as autobiographical literature and folklore, to produce a general description of the modal personality. The studies of this period tended to be more descriptive than analytical, and the modal personality construct tended to be related to the total culture, or at least, its salient features.

In the late 1950's, a new line of research emerged alongside the earlier type of national character study. The later studies tended to be narrower in focus than their predecessors, in that they concentrated on the relationship of personality traits to subsets of a given society or a given category of roles of that society, rather than on the identification of relationships between personality and the social structure as a whole. In addition, a number of comparative studies appeared such as Francis L. K. Hsu's *Americans and Chinese* and Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. A greater effort was also made to use more precise measurement techniques. Large samples of given populations, the projective psychological test, and public opinion polling techniques were increasingly employed. Richard Solomon's *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* is a good example of a recent attempt to integrate the use of a number of these techniques.

Viewed against these two general categories of national character research, *The Arab Mind* belongs more to the earlier than the later tradition of research in this field. Patai's approach is very similar to that employed, for example, in the Benedict and Hamady studies already cited, and by Dinko Tomasic in *Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics*. In these studies the authors used information derived from formal and informal interviews, personal observations, and a knowledge of the history, arts, and religion of the society. These types of data were all integrated by means of concepts in linguistics, psychoanalytical theory, and child-learning theory to produce the national character construct. While Patai used three surveys carried out by others, there is no evidence that he employed polling techniques, large population samples, or psychological projective tests in his research. He cannot be criticized for not having used the psychological projection tests because, despite the fact that such tests have been used in a number of national character research works, their validity in such research remains controversial.

In one respect, however, Patai's work is an improvement over that of Benedict, Tomasic, and Hamady in that he has made the theoretical underpinnings of his research more explicit than they have. In his chapter, "The Group Aspects of the Mind," his discussion of the relationship of the concepts of national character and modal personality and their utility in the study of highly homogeneous societies as compared to heterogeneous industrialized societies clearly demonstrates his concern with the theoretical framework of his research—a concern which has not received adequate emphasis in this field. Moreover, his adherence to this framework throughout his book is, indeed, impressive.

What, if any, utility does the field of national character research have for intelligence? It appears that the intelligence officer often implicitly incorporates into intelligence assessments certain national character considerations in an unsystematic and, perhaps, unconscious way.* The question is whether or not the collection, organization, and systematic analysis of the types of data that are used in national character studies within a more structured analytical framework would make a significant contribution to a number of fields of intelligence activity.

Despite the relatively primitive level of methodological and conceptual rigor that obtain in the national character research field, it has utility now and considerable potential for intelligence analysis in the future. National character analyses can provide a useful, albeit broad, gauge against which the behavior of elites, governments, and electorates can be assessed in particular situations. Once a national character construct, such as that of the Arabs, has been developed, the next and most difficult task is to attempt to establish linkages between it and a propensity for action. An important intermediate step in this process for intelligence purposes is to focus upon the extent and ways in which elites or other subgroups of a given society vary from the modal personality or national character. In Chapter XII of *The Arab Mind*, Patai has made an interesting beginning in this direction in his discussion of the cultural dichotomy of the elites and the masses. He stops, however, short of any attempt to establish the linkages referred to above.

The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that national character analyses per se will enable the analyst to predict the specific acts or decisions of a government, or any other group. But the well-researched national character dimension combined with other relevant variables appears to hold considerable potential for improving the assessment of the propensity of a government, elite, or electorate to act in certain directions.

Much work, of course, remains to be done to improve the scientific basis of national character research. It is important for intelligence purposes, for example, to attempt to improve the techniques for the measurement of the variance of subgroups of the population from the national character construct. Continued experimentation is needed with measurement techniques, such as the Thematic Aperception Test (TAT), in-depth interviews, questionnaires, and other means that hold promise for enhancing the empirical verification of national character research results in general. Computer technology offers considerable promise for easing the analytical burdens involved in the coding and manipulation of data acquired from very large population samples by means of the techniques men-

*See Lewis, A. M.: "Re-examining Our Perceptions on Vietnam," *Studies*, XVII/4.

tioned above. Integration of national character research into various aspects of intelligence activity in a productive way requires a systematic and sustained data collection program and an integrated multidisciplinary staff to analyze the data.

In summation, the work of Patai and others in the national character research field merits serious examination for the contribution it can make to intelligence analysis and possibly other areas of intelligence activity.

Lloyd F. Jordan

FRÅN BÖRJAN TIL SLUTET: EN SPIONS MEMOARER. By *Stig Wennerström*. (Bonniers, Stockholm, 1972.)

Stig Wennerström notes in his memoirs (*From Beginning to End*) that as a boy he aspired to be a dentist. However, he relates, his fingers were too short and his hands too clumsy; family tradition prevailed and like his father, an uncle, and a grandfather, he became a military officer. In mid-career his fingers became among the stickiest in the annals of espionage; his hands smoothly passed many a roll of film in supposedly innocuous handshakes.

When arrested in Stockholm in June 1963, Wennerström, then 57, had been an agent of the GRU for almost fifteen years. Successive assignments in Moscow and Washington as Swedish air attaché, and in Stockholm as a staff officer at Defense Headquarters and as disarmament consultant to the Swedish Foreign Ministry gave him broad access to sensitive information. Energetically and imaginatively, he used that access to conduct military, scientific, and technical espionage against the United States, and to betray to the Soviets details of the Swedish air and other defense systems which had just been upgraded at high cost.

Charged with "gross espionage," Colonel Wennerström was sentenced in June 1964 to life imprisonment and a heavy fine. During his pre-trial interrogations he became voluble and cooperative intermittently before ceasing to talk (too soon to permit a separation of all fact from fancy or to get all the facts). As the story unfolded, supplemented by investigations on both sides of the Atlantic, the quantity and quality of the intelligence he had acquired for the Soviets, especially on advanced weapons systems and military research and development, became evident. Equally apparent was the professional skill of the GRU in assessing, recruiting, manipulating, and handling Wennerström.

Wennerström was a somewhat stiff, gentlemanly individual, a devoted family man without apparent vices, correct in behavior, conscious of rank and status, who had studied Russian in Riga in 1933 as a young officer and had served in 1940-41 as air attaché in Moscow. The accreditation lasted long enough thereafter to place him in official and social contact with the Soviet representation in Stockholm, so that the Soviets had had a good look at him by the time he arrived in Moscow in 1949 for his second posting there. What they had found was a man deficient in loyalties, whose pride and vanity had been wounded when he was informed in 1948 that his performance as a pilot and in command had not been sufficiently promising to warrant future promotion to higher command. Moreover, he liked and excelled in languages, clearly savored the taste he had had of international and diplomatic life, considered Sweden and the Swedish defense and intelligence establishment to be small potatoes, and had had sufficient brushes with the intelligence business to develop an overweening fascination with it. He arrived in Moscow having already accepted from the Soviet attaché in Stockholm a contact plan and 5,000 crowns for having placed a pencilled dot on a map to denote the location of a Swedish military airfield. The full recruitment which followed shortly after his arrival on post was neither surprising nor difficult. Wennerström initially rationalized his ready agreement to cooperate with the Soviets as a clever move to penetrate Soviet intelligence; the only trouble was that he never told anyone on the Swedish side about it.

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Through flattering use of rank (his recruiter was a general and his primary handler throughout the years was always "the General"; Wennerström himself was "promoted" to major general in the GRU), decorations, judicious praise (title of "top agent", codename EAGLE), authority to draw funds on his own judgment as wanted and needed without receipt, the conveyance to him of the belief that he was playing a key role in restoring a balance of power on the world scene, the GRU kept Wennerström hard at work for them with his loyalty developed and focused on the GRU. His admiration for the organization and "the General" at the "Center" who guided him knew no bounds and survived his arrest. Through sound tradecraft, use of natural cover, and Wennerström's own sage, successful resistance to a brief GRU effort to convert him from a singleton "agent in place" to a recruiter and principal agent, he worked undetected for the Soviets and was esteemed by his Swedish superiors for his reporting activities on their behalf. As the representative of a friendly neutral and armed with the additional title of chief of "The Purchasing Commission of the Swedish Air Force in the United States", Wennerström found American military-industrial security to resemble a sieve. Eager, if unwitting, American help abounded in supplying him with information.

Wennerström's mistake, he claims, lay in returning to Stockholm in 1957 after five years in Washington. He wished to provide some Swedish education for his two daughters and prepare for his retirement years. He refused the offer of the post of air attaché in London in favor of a staff position at Defense Headquarters in Stockholm. Back in Sweden, an uncharacteristic outburst by Wennerström against a colleague concerning arrangements for the visit of a Soviet delegation resurrected a long-dormant suspicion in the mind of Otto Danielsson, a veteran counter-intelligence officer in the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO). Danielsson recalled a report Wennerström had prepared about 1948 on Soviet intelligence. It had struck him at the time as being a bit too well informed. In 1959 Danielsson began to look anew at Wennerström. Intuition, perception and, especially, patience and persistence for four years in the face of much doubt, albeit a fair degree of cooperation, by key Swedish officials finally struck real paydirt when Wennerström's maid was approached and was found to have solidly-based suspicions. The arrest followed quickly, just as Wennerström, disturbed by an apparent change in attitude toward him by a Swedish general and by the loss of two rolls of exposed film he had hidden (they had been taken by the maid to SÄPO), had started thinking of a rapid getaway. If returning to Sweden had been a mistake, the tendency, through arrogance, carelessness, or class prejudice to view the household help as little more than part of the furniture had certainly been a costly error.

The Wennerström case is instructive, warranting study by operations officers and counter-intelligence specialists alike. The memoirs are disappointing, however. Published in Swedish and German (*Mein Verrat: Erinnerungen eines Spions*. F. A. Herbig, Munich, 1973), they add very little to the accounts, based largely on the police interrogations of Wennerström in 1963 and 1964, by the Swedish journalist Hans K. Rönblom (*The Spy Without a Country*. New York, Coward-McCann, New York, 1965) and by Thomas Whiteside (*An Agent in Place*. Viking Press, New York, 1966). Of these two, the Whiteside book, originally serialized in *The New Yorker*, is the best. Wennerström's memoirs are especially repetitive of the detailed, lengthy excerpts from the Swedish police interrogations published in

1964 as a document of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate.* The recruitment story and the tradecraft practices are all there. The memoirs include a few anecdotes of little consequence as entertainment or instruction. In them Wennerström remains the uncritical admirer of the GRU and "the General" whose identification by "the Americans" as Pyotr Pavlovich Melkishev he contests vigorously on the basis of description of the man. (Wennerström claims to have known his case officer throughout all the years only as Pyotr Pavlovich, in keeping with normal GRU security practice as it had been explained to him.)

The main claim to distinction of the memoirs was a publisher's ploy. In a pre-publication scheme to insure wide sale of the book, Wennerström and his Swedish publisher decided to attach the manuscript as a supporting document to Wennerström's legal brief filed in 1972 requesting commutation of sentence, knowing that this would result in its automatic classification. The publisher then planned to sue for declassification arguing abridgement of press freedom and gaining considerable favorable publicity for the work. The Swedish government, however, quickly declassified the entire brief. As public property, it was cited freely by the newspapers. Sales of the book were not impressive; the scheme gone awry took the headlines.

Wennerström's prison regimen had been progressively relaxed from the early years of his incarceration, and in 1972 his sentence was reduced to 20 years. In September 1974 he applied for further commutation of sentence. The Swedish government reduced it to the ten years already served, thus freeing him. The chances that Wennerström will shed more light on the case than he already has done appear slight. Those with professional interest in the case and its lessons must hope that an account written by Otto Danielsson, long since retired from SÄPO, now will be cleared by the Swedish authorities for publication.

Frederick K. Schilling

**The Wennerstroem Case: How it touched the United States and NATO; excerpts from the testimony of Stig Eric Constans Wennerstroem, a noted Soviet agent.* Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

