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
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
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
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
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
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



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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Lt. Col. James Murphy and Dr. K. Wayne Smith were both members of the National Security Council Staff at the time the speech was delivered.



 a veteran Agency word-watcher, autopsied some of the more elegant examples in our first issue of 1972. The flow has apparently not slackened in the meantime.

 who delves into U.S. intelligence history, is in the Office of Training.



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*A request from
the consumer*

MAKING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS RESPONSIVE TO POLICY CONCERNS

Lt. Colonel James Murphy and Dr. K. Wayne Smith

Should the intelligence analyst stay aloof from issues that seize the policy makers he supports? Here are two users of finished intelligence, both former members of the National Security Council staff, who say "no." They collaborated to write a speech on this theme which Col. Murphy delivered before a gathering of intelligence officers (the Intelligence Forum) in May 1971. An abridged text of the speech follows.

Let me begin with some observations about intelligence support for the preparation of National Security Study Memoranda—NSSMs for short. This process is a systematized procedure by which the President directs the attention of the bureaucracy to national security issues in which *he* has an interest or needs to make a decision. It is a means of mobilizing the intellect and energy of the government and focusing them on major foreign policy issues.

The personnel and informational resources needed to address these issues are abundantly available within the government, but they tend to be fragmented among the various agencies including the intelligence community. The information and expertise required for rational decision making are interagency in nature. No single department or agency has a corner on the foreign policy market, and that goes for the intelligence input as well.

Moreover, the NSSM process gives those who have the responsibility for implementing and supervising the execution of foreign policy an opportunity to participate in the formulation of those policies. And I need not remind you that good intelligence information is essential, not only for making sound policy decisions, but also as an essential ingredient for judging the performance of policy.

The NSSM process is founded upon several principles which have a direct bearing on the intelligence response. *The first is creativity.* In a world of on-rushing and complex change, we cannot be content with familiar ideas, or assume that the future will be merely a projection of the present and the past.

In March 1971, when the President wanted an analysis of the impact of LAMSON 719 on the North Vietnamese logistic capability to support various types and levels of warfare against South Vietnam in the future, we found that the currently available intelligence data on supply flows was simply inappropriate to measure the capabilities of the enemy. The data had been structured to portray the magnitude of the enemy effort in terms of tonnage, and the results of our interdiction operations in terms of truck kills, but without relation to the effects on future levels of enemy activity.

Within the NSC Staff, a new analytical format was created by which the existing data could be structured to indicate the implications for North Vietnamese military capabilities. The CIA took this new analytical format and pro-

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duced an outstanding study that was of direct use to the President in assessing the significance of LAMSON 719 and assisted him in making policy decisions concerning our future role and presence in Vietnam.

We have found in the NSC system that the initial focus on the broader questions of national objectives and purposes stimulates discovery of new perspectives, and produces innovative approaches to the specific issues involved. I urge you to resist the strong temptation to fulfill the immediate demands of the moment with familiar standard operating procedures. Rather, *reflect upon the issues in their policy context* to determine the logical relationships between the informational requirements and the issues, and then decide what information needs to be presented and how.

The second principle of the NSSM process is the quest for accurate, complete, and relevant factual information. Too often the process of policy making has been impaired or distorted by incomplete information and by disputes within the government which resulted from a lack of common appreciation of the relevant facts. It is an essential function of the NSSM process to bring together all of the agencies of government concerned with foreign affairs to elicit, assess, and present to the President and the Council all the *pertinent* knowledge available and necessary to make policy that is thoroughly grounded in, and relevant to, the facts. It is on this rock that the intelligence community sometimes founders.

Information is your stock and trade, and the inventory is jealously guarded and highly regarded by several proprietors. Sometimes, the search for facts degenerates into a squabble about *who* is right, rather than *what* is right. I see enough documents from various intelligence agencies to know that rarely does any one agency possess all the relevant facts. Indeed, it would seem to me that the structure of the intelligence community is such that no one agency could possibly have all the facts. However, even with this conceded, I still hear disputes about who has the better information, and invariably each proponent claims that his data are best. The assessment of LAMSON 719 turned at one point into just such a hassle. The President, for whom we all work, couldn't care less about whether one agency's or another agency's sources are better truck counters. The agencies involved could have served the requirements of policy making better if they had analyzed their own information for trends and sought to establish meaningful correlations and ranges of estimates encompassing both types of data.

It took some methodological head knocking, but we were finally able to focus on *what* was right rather than *who* was right, and this was done by combining intelligence resources into meaningful patterns and relationships conducive to policy making. I realize that intelligence producers suffer peptic ulcers whenever they're asked for "the facts." It is in these moments that they have to be honest with themselves about the reliability of their sources, and the accuracy and completeness of their information. Usually, the pieces of information far outnumber the assured facts.

The phrase "true facts" is neither a linguistic nor logical redundancy to intelligence officers. Certainly policy makers, however, cannot "wait until all the facts are in." That is the job for the historians among your grandchildren. The challenge to intelligence is to be able to see through the glass darkly, here and now.

The intelligence community has a natural and understandable inherent conservatism, sometimes bordering on reluctance to commit itself to declara-

tions of fact. Indeed, a private jargon, little understood by the consumer, hedges such statements. *Estimated, believed, probably, possibly, may, and might* are examples of this special vocabulary. In fact, it reminds me of one of the first meetings I attended in the Pentagon where I heard a distinguished Assistant Secretary of Defense stand up and pound the table to insist that *might* was too *strong* a word to use in a particular sentence under discussion! I don't know what is weaker than *might*. But the policy maker must make decisions in a context of nebulous visibility. The intelligence community must do all it can, even at the occasional risk to its own credibility, to give the decision maker as much clear insight as possible into the facts, and to make clear the hedges, risks, and consequences of error. Too often, the hedging seems self-protective, rather than informative. And it is just as important for the intelligence community to be forthright in identifying what we do *not* know, and to assess the consequences for policy of this ignorance. Risk and uncertainty are the environment of policy making, and the intelligence community must share and seek to relieve some of this burden. The "true facts" are that impossible dream. But relevant information and a rational, objective assessment of it remain the most essential intelligence responses to the NSSM decision-making process.

A *third principle of the NSSM process* is the provision of a *full range of feasible options*. The President's leadership cannot consist merely in being confronted with a bureaucratic consensus that leaves him no option but acceptance or rejection of a single proposal, without any way of knowing what alternatives exist. The NSSM system is designed to ensure that clear policy choices reach the top so that various positions and alternatives can be debated fully. The NSSM system ensures that all agencies involved receive a fair hearing before decisions are made. Interagency participation begins with the working groups that draft the papers and continues right up through the review process, all the way to the National Security Council itself. Legitimate alternative positions reach the President without dilution. Differences are clearly identified and defended, rather than being muted or buried in bureaucratic waffle and log rolling.

These features give the President confidence that his choices are genuine, and enable him to put his own stamp on policy by the act of decision. I commend to you this principle of a full range of options in the intelligence response to the NSSM process. Much of the intelligence we all deal with is subject to varying interpretations. It is not sufficient simply to forward information. The information must be assessed and interpreted. We're all seasoned bureaucrats and well aware of the pitfalls of bargaining for consensus. But differences of view are legitimate, and the President should be aware of them and the impact on his options for choice. Certainly where agreement is possible, it should be so stated. But the ambiguity of many of the so-called facts leaves large openings for varying but reasonable interpretations.

The significance of data to the policy maker must be made clear. The NSC should be able to rely upon the intelligence community for these interpretations. Moreover, the NSC should be made aware of differences and the reasons for them. It is not enough simply to point out that disagreements exist. They must be explained, not only in terms of the substance, but also in terms of the implications for policy choices. If the intelligence community avoids this responsibility, then others will move in to fill the vacuum.

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For years, the National Intelligence Estimates had epitomized this problem. They hid as much as they revealed, if not more. In 1971, with some gentle but persistent prompting by the NSC staff, some of the NIE's were truly outstanding, particularly with regard to strategic forces. One reason is that these alternative assessments and the areas of controversy were explicitly stated with accompanying rationale. This new feature has resulted in a quantum jump in the value and utility of the NIE's for the policy maker. Reasoned alternatives give the President a basis for rational choice, rather than intuitive chance, in his policy decisions.

Crisis anticipation is the fourth principle of the NSSM system. The better prepared we are in terms of foreknowledge and options, the more we can be the master rather than the slave of events once a crisis breaks. Certainly, we cannot anticipate fully the timing and course of a possible crisis. But we *can* take actions to help ensure that we have asked the right questions in advance, that we have developed and explored our options, and have thought through the implications of alternative responses. The intelligence community is often the first to receive the tentative signals of impending crisis. While one flower does not make a spring, its appearance should not simply be marked by a footnote. The intelligence community should develop a discriminating instinct for crisis. I should add that this instinct should not be reined in by institutional biases and values which dull the senses and force-fit data into preconceived patterns.

I remind you of the Czechoslovak crisis and how stunned many were when it turned out to be something more than just another round of summer maneuvers. This delicate instinct for crisis requires that the intelligence producer have a reporter's nose for the news. He must be policy-oriented, be free to state his opinions with their rationale, and not be constrained simply to writing copy to fill out a daily bulletin. The intelligence producer must be more than a middleman between the collector and the consumer. He must evaluate his raw material, assess the significance, and relate it to policy.

A fifth principle of the NSSM process is systematic analysis. Policy cannot be allowed to be merely the result of *ad hoc* piecemeal tactical decisions forced as kneejerk reactions to the immediate pressures of events. A policy must be considered in the whole context of the situation and our national interest. The interagency nature of the NSC system assures that all relevant aspects of a problem are considered in formulating policy choices.

Now, analysis is a systematic way of thinking, a manner of approaching problems in an innovative, thorough and objective way. It requires the orderly juxtaposition of facts and values in order to make reasoned judgments in decision making. Analysis is not an occult science that produces immutable truth. It is more of an intellectual art that seeks to illuminate problems and sharpen judgment. I will be the first to concede, on the basis of several years of painful experience, that even good analysis does not necessarily bring on right decisions. But I'm willing to take my chances that a decision rationally arrived at is more likely to be right than an irrational one. Let me hasten to add that analysis does not solve problems itself. It is not a substitute for imagination, leadership, or wisdom. It brings out the bad news as well as the good. It does not make decisions for you. But it does serve to discriminate between choices, separating the knowable from the unknowable, the better from the worse, the patently

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wrong from the approximately right. The decision maker is thereby able to focus his attention on the issues requiring the application of his experience and values and the exercise of his judgment.

I sometimes fear that the intelligence community shortchanges its own analytical efforts and shuns participation in such efforts on an interagency basis. Too often the so-called intelligence input is simply a dry catalog of information lacking focus on the policy matters at issue. While the intelligence community is not charged with *making* policy, it does have the responsibility to *participate* in policy making. This responsibility does not stop with the mere reportage of the estimated facts. The intelligence input should include an analysis of the data in relation to policy options. That the intelligence community is capable of providing these analyses oriented to policy making has been amply demonstrated in its contribution of the NSC Verification Panel's work in preparing the SALT negotiating options.

The most crucial area for intelligence analysis is in the muddy field of enemy intentions. The usual response is to sidestep the issue, with the claim that the intelligence analyst can only provide assessments of capabilities. Capability analysis is essential to policy making, but someone has to make an educated guess as to intentions. It is not enough to know what the enemy *could* think. What he is *more likely* to think is even more important to the policy maker. Analysis offers a systematic and rational method for seeing through that glass darkly—even if only with one eye in a fog.

Finally, the NSSM system provides a means by which policy implementation can be reviewed, coordinated, and supervised. Once more, the intelligence community can provide some of the eyes and ears to detect the progress of policy implementation and the pitfalls and dangers that loom up along the way. It is false to claim that these are the tasks of the so-called "operators"—that the intelligence job is done when the policy decisions are made. The intelligence function carries through the entire policy process from inception to conclusion, which includes monitoring implementation.

Once again, too, this monitorship needs to be conducted with at least one eye on the effect for policy. You must be not over-fascinated with information for its own sake. To be useful, information must be related to policy—past, present, and future.

In summary, the intelligence response to the NSSM process has been a reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence community itself. In general, responsiveness in providing needed information has been good, though prodding has sometimes been required to elicit that information in a form more meaningful to the decision maker. I would say that the greatest improvement needed in the intelligence community is for it to begin anticipating the needs of the policy makers, and to take the initiative in providing information structured to these needs.

Let me illustrate!

The other day I sat in an intelligence briefing on the results of some recently acquired information. A fellow NSC policy analyst in the audience told the briefers that over the past six months the intelligence community had been reporting a great number of discrete bits of information regarding the quantitative increase of the Soviet presence in Egypt. He reminded the briefers that the Arab-Israeli confrontation was still a matter of national security interest,

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that there was at least continuing talk of possible agreements, and that U.S. interests were involved. He suggested that, in light of the disconnected information flow, it was about time we had an analytical summary that would bring us up to date on the situation and reveal the implications for our policy. The intelligence officer's supervisor was there and he agreed that this was "a good idea" and that he would "see about doing it." Ladies and gentlemen, *that "good idea" should have come from the intelligence community itself!*

You read the newspapers. You know the issues. But do you see your opportunity? Expand your vision. Relate intelligence information and requirements to the needs of the policy makers. Don't ask me what is my need-to-know. Ask yourselves instead what needs to be known. Analyze the issues! Analyze your information! And analyze the meaning of the information in terms of policy implications.

In conclusion, the principles of the NSSM process—creativity, factual information, a full range of options, crisis anticipation, systematic analysis, and policy implementation—are good principles for gauging the intelligence response. I was asked to say what was "wrong" with that response. I have given you my views on how you can strengthen that response and magnify the value of your essential contribution to the decision-making process. I want to finish by saying that I already see many indications that the intelligence community is aware of these problems, and that the kinds of actions I have recommended are being taken.

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*Military secrets in
an open society*

THE YALE REPORT

Sherman Kent

Known to the intelligence community simply as the "Yale Report" is a document of 627 pages whose proper title is *Estimates of Capabilities of the United States Combat Forces in Being* [as of] 1 September 1951. In a way, it was a special sort of National Intelligence Survey of gross order of battle of the U.S. military services in the early days of the Korean war. But to be more explicit without some necessary background is likely only to add confusion to that which these two lead sentences have initiated. Let me begin at the beginning.

There were many trials in the early days of the National Intelligence Estimate—none much stickier than a reluctance on the part of our colleagues from the service intelligence organizations to deal in what they called the "intentions of the enemy." The most senior and often most articulate of the military representatives who came to coordinate the NIE's had absorbed the old service doctrine which held that a G-2 did not handle the matter of intentions—that this was the Commander's job. I'm sure readers of this publication are familiar with the doctrine and its rationale; in any case this is no place to rehearse it. Be it said that our Director, General Walter Bedell Smith, whether or not he knew of the doctrine, did not want it applied in the NIE's and indicated to us of the Office of National Estimates that an NIE on the military stance of the USSR would not be complete until we had given the reader our best thoughts on how it was likely to use its vast military apparatus.

NIE 3, published 15 November 1950, is entitled *Soviet Capabilities and Intentions*, and the appearance of that word in the title was in itself no small tribute to General Smith's powers of persuasion. The text of the paper skirted the subject with a permissible discussion of "courses [of action] open to the Soviet government," which on balance was about as far as a prudent man would wish to probe into probable intentions.

Less than a year later (2 August 1951) the second NIE on the Soviet Union went to press under the title *Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid-1952*. Here again there was among our military colleagues a desire to fight the problem, and one suspects that had the estimate not been laid on by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the precursor of the USIB), its completion might have surpassed our powers. As things stood, the compliance which was accorded IAC requests was not of the sort which made for an imaginative appraisal of possible or probable strategic thinking in the Kremlin.

Matters became really difficult when the estimating machinery was asked for an NIE on the "Likelihood of a Soviet Attack upon Japan." If one were to play this out according to the letter of old military intelligence doctrine, one would reply with a dead-pan listing of Soviet military strengths-in-being in the Far East and some paragraphs on the logistic problems of their reinforcement from garrisons in the West. That such a paper would be wholly nonrespon-

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sive to the request apparently seemed to some of our colleagues a far less heinous offense than getting into the business of Soviet intentions. Furthermore, to write of these intentions as affected by Soviet knowledge of U.S. forces then deployed in the Far East was to compound the heresy. To them, the entire matter of "own forces" was not any part of the business of intelligence, and even though "own forces" stationed in occupied Japan obviously constituted a major item in any Soviet calculations of the attackability of Japan, we were supposed to shut our eyes to the fact. Any reluctance on our part so to do merely underscored the impropriety of undertaking the NIE.

As the reader will have perceived, these were the hard days in the life of the national estimators.

What's the Soviet Estimate of the United States?

There were those on our side at our coordination sessions who in oral argument would try to make points by imagining out loud how the Soviet leaders were estimating probable future developments in the policies and defense attitudes of the United States government. Their plan and hope was that in trying to depict the U.S. as they thought the Soviets would see it, they would stimulate their inhibited colleagues into thinking and talking and ultimately writing what they thought to be the likeliest lines of Soviet policy. If they could not be stimulated into positive action, at least they might be edged away from simple obstructionism.

To the end of getting a discussion started, William Langer, the first director of the Office of National Estimates, took an oblique but nevertheless praiseworthy approach. On 5 June 1951, he wrote a memorandum to CIA's Projects Review Committee (the institution which, among other things, passed on applications for funds for tasks to be done outside the Agency on a contractual basis). Mr. Langer's statement of the problem read as follows:

Many National Intelligence Estimates deal with the probable intentions of the Kremlin. It may be assumed that in deciding upon a course of action, the Kremlin is influenced by its estimate of the U.S. power available to counter that course of action and by its estimate of how U.S. policy makers are likely to use that power. An NIE on the intentions of the Kremlin cannot be written without ONE's having an estimate of the Kremlin's estimate of U.S. capabilities and intentions. To procure such an estimate is the problem.

In the next paragraph Mr. Langer indicated his requirement for an imaginary Soviet estimate of U.S. military forces in being as of 1 September 1951, and another such estimate regarding probable U.S. intentions with respect to the world situation. He stressed the desirability of having the work done outside the Agency and noted that informal enquiries had already indicated that a group at Yale and perhaps another at Columbia could do the work during the summer vacation. What they would turn up without access to classified materials would have the virtue of showing what the Soviets could learn about the U.S. with minimal intelligence effort.

The project received the committee's blessing, and with the end of the academic year a group was organized in New Haven under the supervision of a senior member of Yale's department of history, William H. Dunham. He recruited 15 people from six departments of the university in addition to history: biology, chemistry, classics, English, mathematics, and physics. All were trained

researchers who already knew how to use a great library and who were quick to adapt their general professional competence to the new and strange requirement. A few of them, notably Basil Henning and Archibald Foord, had had intelligence experience with the Navy during the war, and had a feel for the subject matter and the need for spare factual prose. They and the rest of the team got to the task in late June, and with a total outlay of 99 man-weeks of labor wound it up as of 1 September 1951.

The U.S.: an Open Book

Confining themselves to unclassified printed materials fully within the public domain, they uncovered what to us of the intelligence calling was a bewildering array of factual information about the size and composition of the U.S. military establishment, about major military units, their organization, training, state of readiness, and their weaponry and its performance characteristics. In short, what they found out and wrote down in 10 weeks' time was a good deal more than a very promising start on the military chapter of a National Intelligence Survey on the United States.

The section devoted to the army, for example, totaling some 120 pages with its appendix, begins with paragraphs on the state of mobilization, the army field forces, continental commands, overseas commands, tactical organization of the regimental combat team (the smallest unit under scrutiny), the division, corps, field army, and army group. The bulk of the material presented is devoted to the order of battle of army units of the Zone of the Interior, Far Eastern Command, ground forces in Europe, and other overseas commands. In the appendix, the structure of divisions and RCT's in combat in Korea is cited down to the level of specialized companies, along with their tables of organization and equipment. The final pages are devoted to the geographical whereabouts of a strange mix of some 251 army units ranging from the First Infantry Division in Darmstadt and the Seventh Infantry Division in Korea to the 8111 AU signal service in Okinawa and the 764 AAA gun battalion in the Canal Zone. For all of them there is an APO number.

The dozen and a half pages devoted to army weapons hit the high spots of the new automatic small arms and machineguns, mortars, recoilless rifles, artillery, tanks, liaison aircraft, and helicopters.

In the pages on the Navy (about 80), there is a listing of the civilians and admirals in charge of the Navy Department in Washington, in the Naval Districts, of the Atlantic Fleet, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the Pacific Fleet; there is a summary paragraph on overall manning strength; and a section on ships in commission which includes, in addition to the larger ships, destroyers, submarines, and destroyer escorts. (There was no effort to enumerate minesweepers, patrol vessels, and so on.) After one section devoted to ship modifications (notably of carriers to handle heavier aircraft) and another to construction of new ships, there comes a long treatment of the naval air arm. Here are discussed the then nine classes of combatant air units, with notations about the types and numbers of aircraft in each, along with a good deal of information about their deployment on carriers and shore stations.

Among the units one finds a note about Heavy Attack Wing 1 which the report correctly assessed as the Navy's first component capable of delivering the atomic weapon. (This was a datum to which the Navy had assigned a

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The Yale Report

justifiable secret classification.) Then comes a round-up of Marine Corps aviation. There are appendixes devoted to the performance characteristics of the planes being operated by both Navy and Marine Corps. The paragraphs devoted to deployment of major ships, by class and name, to the Atlantic, "Mediterranean," and Pacific Fleets are followed by a discussion of principal naval bases and naval air stations and facilities, a discussion of new weapons, and development in undersea warfare. The launching of the first nuclear-powered submarine (well-publicized, to be sure) is noted.

Air Force Section Bulkiest

The section on the Air Force is the bulkiest (222 pages). As with the passages on the Army and the Navy, this one begins with the table of organization, both civilian and military, at the headquarters in Washington and at the principal air commands within the continental U.S. and overseas. Then comes a discussion of the 95-wing Air Force which, at that time, was the strength toward which the service was endeavoring to build, a discussion of numbers and types of aircraft, the brief pages on personnel, a rather full treatment of the 13 commands in the Zone of the Interior—notably the Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and the Air Defense Command—and the five overseas commands. Then comes 100 pages about the aircraft: the operational inventory, production and production schedules, and performance characteristics of bombers, fighters, transports, helicopters, trainers, liaison, and experimental models.

The report's final 150 pages come in five sections, one each devoted to weapons (26 pages), electronics (31 pages), Atomic Warfare (12 pages), Biological Warfare (39 pages), and Chemical Warfare (42 pages). Of these the one dealing with atomic weapons, in which the authors attempted to penetrate the country's first-ranking secret—the size of the nuclear stockpile—and those dealing with CW and BW seemed offhand the most dramatic.

The Atomic Warfare section takes off from the official report of Henry D. Smyth and estimates the U.S. stockpile of atomic bombs to lie between 600 and 2400, with the favored number about 1500 bombs of the Hiroshima yield (20,000 tons TNT equivalent).

In the CW pages, due consideration is given the U.S. government's activities in "producing and perfecting" the new nerve gases as well as continuing to carry in inventory mustard, lewisite, phosgene, and others of World War I fame.

The extensive section on BW lists seven laboratories (under government supervision) which were engaged in BW research and seven others (all associated with private or state universities) which were doing BW-related research under government contract. Next comes a table occupying three pages which lists the bacteria, viruses, and other pathogens in the arsenal or under consideration, along with their targets (man, domestic animals, plants) and favored methods of delivery. This is followed by long discussion of individual pathogens: botulinus, tetanus, the organisms producing pneumonic plague, glanders, tularemia, brucellosis, anthrax, and a group of specific viruses and rickettsiae. Throughout, the need to know about such things for defensive purposes is recognized, but the main thrust of the report is the U.S. concern with these biological weapons as an offensive weapon. One cannot escape a feeling that the U.S. had developed and was retaining a very considerable capability in this field.

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To come back to the origin of the whole project: one would be justified in assuming that the Soviet leaders had very precise notions as to the inventory of U.S. forces in being at the end of 1951, and were in a position to make confident estimates as to the capabilities of those forces in any of several possible war situations. How the Soviet leaders estimated U.S. intentions—which was part two of the project—became a doubly stubborn exercise.

As matters turned out, it was much more difficult to obtain the services of outside Sovietologists who would play at writing the Soviet estimate of probable U.S. courses of action than of lining up a group like that at Yale. We did enter arrangements for the "Intentions" study and furnished the authors with a copy of the capabilities study just discussed, but the result was a disappointment. It may have been that we had set our sights a bit too high. In the end, it did not make all that amount of difference.

In the first place General Smith's concern to have National Intelligence Estimates wrestle with the imponderables of an adversary's probable intentions, which was forcefully communicated to his colleagues on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, began to filter down to the troops, and the resistance we had met in the early days began to melt. To our considerable surprise we were able for example to finish the estimate of the likelihood of a Soviet attack upon Japan with no more than the normal pains of doing coordinated speculative intelligence. So by the time the Yale Report was in, reproduced in suitable quantity, and ready for distribution, with the "Intentions" paper close behind it, the main reason for the exercise had largely disappeared.

But this was by no means the end of the matter, and the use to which the Yale Report was soon put was one which, to say the least, we had not anticipated.

This all began when General Smith received a very cursory and preliminary briefing. The occasion was social—our director was having a small gathering to honor some foreign colleagues. Over in a private corner of the room he asked me of the progress of the work at Yale. I told him that the report was already in, that I had rapidly gone over the conclusions with Mr. Henning on the basis of which I would hazard two guesses: (a) that there was in the public domain enough information to piece together an all-but-complete gross order of battle of U.S. forces-in-being, and (b) that the voluminous study which the Yale group had written was probably about 90 percent correct. I can only guess that it was General Smith who conveyed the gist of my remarks to President Truman, but of one thing we may be sure and that was that Mr. Truman had got the word.

President Truman Reacts

He got it just about the time he was working on a new Executive Order aimed at giving greater protection to certain categories of classified information. At the top of his list of secrets to be safeguarded were those concerning the U.S. military, but he also recognized that the State Department, the FBI, and the CIA also produced and disseminated material of similar sensitivity. On 24 September 1951 he issued an Executive Order (Number 10290) which set the new pattern for safeguarding of these materials, a class of stuff which was to

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be known as "security information." Paragraph 4 of the order undertakes a short (and not wholly satisfactory) definition of the material at issue:

(Classified security information. The term—as used herein—means official information, the safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security and which is classified for such purpose by appropriate classifying authority.

What the order was trying to get at was a separation of all classified government utterances into two categories: those which directly affected the national security—such things as intelligence, sensitive areas of international relations, but especially military matters of an operational nature—and those which dealt with other things. It was the President's intention to give the first broad category the benefit of special protection. Needless to say the American press was fearful of the consequences of the order and let its fears be known. Mr. Truman went out to meet it in his press conference of 10 days later.*

He started by reading a statement which began: "There has been considerable misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the Executive Order issued on September 24, 1951, relating to the handling of information which has been classified in order to protect the national security." At this point he interrupted himself with an *ad lib*. He said: "And right here I want to stop and tell you that Central Intelligence had Yale University make a survey, and that survey found—and they had no connection with the Government—that 95 percent of all of our information was public property."

He then continued with a close but not verbatim rendering of the document before him until he got to its end when he added: ". . . and remember that 95 percent of our secret information has been revealed by newspapers and slick magazines, and that is what I am trying to stop." **

The newsmen had awaited the question period with breath abated. When the time came (and it came immediately after the sentence quoted above) the first request was "Can you give us some examples of what caused this order?" Mr. Truman's answer began with reference to an article in *Fortune* magazine which had published a diagrammatic map showing seventy-odd places in the U.S. where one or another phase of the atomic energy program was going forward;*** he then took up some aerial photographs of principal American cities "with arrows pointing to the key points. . . ." Naturally the newsmen were soon politely asking about the impropriety of publishing information which had been released by the Department of Defense or cleared by the Atomic Energy Commission, or, as in the case of the air map of Washington, by the "Civil Defense Administration." After an unremunerative exchange, the conference came back to the Yale Report and once again the President reiterated his sentence with the "95 percent" in it. In answer to the question "How far did this Yale Survey figure

*Mr. Truman came to the conference of 4 October 1951 with a mimeographed hand-out. In his presentation he not only made some verbal departures from its text, but also interpolated some trenchant *ad libs*. The result is that comparative rarity, two slightly different official texts. One is what Mr. Truman actually spoke, to be found in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman*, vol. for 1 Jan. to 31 Dec. 1951 (GPO, Washington, D.C. 1695) pp 554-560. The other is the unmodified text of the official handout, but with Mr. Truman's *ad libs*. This is in the *New York times*, 5 October 1951.

**This final clause may be a distorted echo of what I believe I had told General Smith about the Yale Report. On the other hand it may be something wholly Mr. Truman's own.

***The Atom and the Business Man," *Fortune*, XXXIX, No. 1 (Jan. 1949) pp 53 and ff.

in the decision to put out this order?" the President replied, "I didn't sign the order until I got it."

The Aftermath

By all odds the most remarkable thing about this press conference was Mr. Truman's unawareness of just how open the open society of America was. Like a good number of other innocents (a lot of them in the intelligence community) who gasped at the large amount of apparently classified information in the Yale Report, he did not fully understand that practically all of it had been formally or informally declassified at one time or another by the action of the Secretary of Defense, or by one of the service secretaries, or by an official empowered to speak for one of them. As Arthur Krock wrote in a column in the *New York Times* (7 Oct. 1951) someone "in a position to know the background of the President's lecture" suggested that the "boss had just got a bum steer." It was up to the White House Press Secretary, Joseph Short, to issue with stunning promptness a statement of clarification. It ran in part:

The President has directed me to clarify his views on security information as follows:

1. Every citizen—including officials and publishers—has a duty to protect our country.
2. Citizens who receive military information for publication from responsible officials qualified to judge the relationship of such information to the national security may rightfully assume that it is safe to publish the information.
3. [Citizens who receive this sort of information from improperly qualified sources should be most guarded in passing it along.]
4. The recent executive order does not alter the right of any citizen to publish anything.

The statement did much to allay the fears of the press but not its curiosity about the Yale Report and the CIA's interest. The university answered all queries with "the project was completed for the Division of External Research of the government. All details are confidential—so we cannot say who participated [in it]";* the Agency answered with no comment whatever. In a short time overt press and public concern about the Yale Report declined to zero.

Meanwhile, back in the South Building at the 25th and E Street campus, we sat on a large quantity of the 627-page document. In a few days, however, General Smith authorized the circulation of one copy to each of the IAC principals. Some of their top staffers read the document, and one of the purposes behind the undertaking began to be realized, though perhaps not as fully as we had desired. What filtered down to the intelligence officers who represented their organizations at the meetings devoted to the coordination of the National Intelligence Estimates was that a far less expert intelligence service than the Soviet could know a very great deal about the inventory of American military strengths. This was, after all, one of our principal objectives and to this extent the enterprise had achieved a modest success.

As I have remarked earlier, the doctrinal objection to venture estimates into the realm of the other man's probable intentions had begun to soften, even before the Report and its counterpart dealing with the Soviet estimate of

**New York Times*, 5 Oct. 1951.

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probable U.S. intentions were completed.* Thus we were not obliged to pursue the somewhat devious attack which had prompted the study in the first place. We had, of course, plenty of troubles trying to agree about how the Soviet leaders saw the world scene and what they probably planned to do about it, but the difficulties were the normal ones relating to substance, not those proceeding from a reluctance to violate what had once been basic doctrine. (And so it has been ever since.)

But the Yale Report did cause a considerable stir in a direction we had not anticipated. General Smith and Mr. Truman were not the only ones to take cognizance of what anyone could learn about our armed services without half trying. A lot of us whose experience in our government's service had been confined to intelligence were not aware that our field was one of the few relatively protected ones in the area of national security. I, for one, assumed that since our ill-wishers were so successful in masking the details of their armed establishments, the U.S. too made similar but less successful efforts. Indeed, as I look back on the scores of non-intelligence military briefings I received in Washington and in the field, I cannot recall a single one designated as "unclassified," though I will warrant that much of what was conveyed under high security classifications had been or soon would be public property.

This essay is not the place to undertake a full discussion of what here is an important though peripheral issue: the issue of "secrecy in government" or—and more especially—that phase of it which bears upon the security classification of information regarding our military establishment. On the other hand it is hard to avoid it altogether.

Classification and Declassification

Three aspects can be ticked off briefly: *First*, almost everything regarding the U.S. military—whether or not committed to paper—gets classified at some point in its life. Often this occurs for the best reason in the world, more often for reasons not good at all. *Second*, the recent rule which establishes a system of automatic step-by-step downgrading to one side, there is and has been a tendency for the higher classifications to absorb the lower. *Third*, except for the automatic downgrading matter noted above (which by the way came long after 1951) there has been little—if any—formal rational across-the-board effort to downgrade or declassify. This is readily explained in terms of the staggering magnitude of the task. Thus there has been in years past the inevitable tendency for *formal* classifications, once given, to stick. This was obviously the case at the time of the Yale Report.

I use the modifier "formal" advisedly, for there are those who observe the classification because that's what the book says to do, and those who don't. In fact, there are and long have been two pretty well defined separate universes within the security apparatus of our military.

There is the one universe inhabited by the normal run of people (military and civilian) who know their service's regulations with respect to the formal classification of a vast encyclopedia of information regarding military matters. For those under Army discipline in 1951, the publication *Army Regulations No.*

*This, the "Intentions" half of the exercise, came to us a month or so after the completion of what I have been calling the Yale Report. As noted earlier, it fell a good distance short of our hopes, and we decided to file it without reproducing and circulating it.

380-5 was the ruling text. In a good number of pages it endeavors to define, in the abstract, the categories of military information deemed Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential, and to give substance to the abstract definitions with a wealth of specific illustrations. For those under the Navy and Air Force there were, of course, similar publications.

By far the greater part of the people in the first universe made no effort whatever to keep book on what formally classified matters—over-classified or misclassified to begin with—had been down-graded or declassified as a result of compromises, leaks, the simple passage of time, or conscious decision at the upper echelons. As already noted, no one made nor does anyone now make a systematic effort to keep this kind of book. In consequence there is an understandable tendency among these people to go on treating documents (and their content) which were initially slugged, say Secret, as Secret irrespective of what their classification has become in real life. This is the course of conscientiousness, if not simple prudence. Those low on the totem pole who cavalierly take the law in their own hands do so at the risk of crossing their security offices and getting bad marks in their personnel jackets or worse.

When we in intelligence had good reason to seek information which lay nominally within these operational security frontiers, we more frequently made contact with these cautious and conservative interpreters of the rules than with the others. Often our questions received diffident answers; sometimes we were urged to take the matter up to higher echelons: well up, say, into that other universe.

Who May Override Classifications?

This second universe is the one of the high civilian officials in the defense establishment, and sometimes the high military themselves. We may assume that these people too know all about the formalities which are owed classified information, how it is to be issued, transmitted, and stored. With equal confidence we may assume that of the many regulations regarding this sort of material, the one they know the best is the one at the beginning of the publication which tells them that virtually none of the preceding need apply to them.* To be sure, common sense—if no higher law—indicates that things having to do with communications systems, intelligence sources and methods, movements of forces and diplomatic negotiations in train, sensitive military R and D, plans, and a

*Department of the Army, *Army Regulations No. 380-5*. Section I,3. Application.-b.

In the application of policies for the safeguarding of Classified Security Information, consideration must be given to the fact that practical limitations will often hamper the attainment and maintenance of absolute protection. Consideration also must be given to the need for the dissemination of information to Congress, the public, or other Government activities, other agencies of the Department of Defense, and Navy contractors as well as to the Army Establishment. Likewise, progress in material development, commercial experience, and industrial capacity may be of greater value to national defense than the absolute safety of a specific item of Classified Security Information.

(This text is quoted from the issue of *Regulations* of 6 June 1952. I have been unable to locate a copy of those in force for the year in which the Yale Report was written, but I am assured that the message of this paragraph appeared in earlier versions. The message, furthermore, is in force today. See, for example Department of Defense *Information Security Program Regulation*, July 1973 (DOD 5200 1-R), para. I-604.)

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few other topics ought not to be made public. But to the people of this second universe goes the right to disregard classifications when they conclude that the national interest is better served by doing so. They have been known to project this right beyond their departmental jurisdictions over into other territory, including that of intelligence and diplomacy.

We must understand, however, that a Secretary of Defense (or a service secretary) will be under a number of pressures to talk freely. Some of these come from the public, the news media, or the political realities of democratic government; some, and often the most insistent, from a legitimate inner urge to tell fellow citizens and especially their representatives in Congress that he is performing the vital defense functions with which he has been entrusted. Indeed the commonest channel of declassification is probably through the Department of Defense and the military services themselves, and its principal tributary is the stream that runs between the Pentagon and the Hill. The civilian authorities testify fully and frankly on the record, reserving for themselves the right to review the transcript for security before it goes to the GPO and out to the world. Their underlying philosophy is to delete a little rather than a lot.

Should one of these officials display an understandable reluctance to give equal time to his nonsuccesses, he may be sure that congressional spokesmen in the opposing party will not. Nor will these spokesmen confine their remarks to off-the-record proceedings in committee. If they feel that they have a well-documented case, they may make it on the floor for the benefit of the readers of the *Congressional Record*. In the ensuing debate much more will be aired than the simple non-success which the initiating official wished to play down.

In addition to this volume of nominally classified information issued through one channel or another directly to the American public, there will be genuine secrets which are released with a different audience in mind. This will be the sort of information which the U.S. government may choose to convey to our allies for one set of reasons, or to our ill-wishers for another. Such, for example, would be one Cabinet officer's divulging to a meeting of allies the intelligence sources behind some critically important U.S. estimates, or another's using an open forum of foreign statesmen as the place to articulate the secret U.S. estimate of the numerical strength of the Soviet operational ICBM force. In this case his real desire was to have the message reach Moscow.

In the Name of Public Relations

But revelation of the nominal secrets of the first universe do not stop here. There is yet to be contemplated those which pour forth through the military's own public relations bureaux whose functions are among the most vital. After all, the armed services are *in loco parentis* for millions of the nation's sons and daughters; they must try to induce them to enlist and—once enlisted or drafted—they must do everything possible to lighten the burdens of service. They must reassure families and the public at large that the troops are being properly cared for, properly trained for a multitude of duties besides combat, and provided with equipment which will assure their optimum performance with a maximum chance of returning to civilian life in better shape than they left it. Rivalry between the services results *inter alia* in each one's touting in public its new weapons and new methods of bringing them to bear. The kind of reluctance one would normally associate with the publicizing of new military technology

yields to the demands of a good public image, or morale within a given service, and even to the demands of the contractors who have developed the new machines of war.

The public relations divisions of the services are very large enterprises, and their task is just what it sounds like. They are in continuous contact with the news media—their news- and feature-people—with the magazines, and technical journals; they are in close association with the host of privately-sponsored periodicals devoted to a score of military specializations—the infantry, the surface fleet, long-range aviation, and so on. These journals in turn carry the advertisements of the contractors wherein are related in as full detail as is permissible—and beyond—technological triumphs which lie behind the accuracy, reliability, simplicity, ruggedness, power, and so on of the military device at issue.

Publications like the *Army, Navy, Air Force Register*; the *Army, Navy, Air Force Almanac*; and the *Stars and Stripes* (several editions in different parts of the world) which in the course of their business print a voluminous literature of service order of battle could not be in business at all without an unofficial but nevertheless full service support.

With these volumes of material relating to the military being given to the media, the opportunities to guess at what is being withheld on security grounds are manifold and inviting. Furthermore the odds are not exactly stacked against a correct guess: if you tell a man that $2+1+X=5$, he needs something less than a graduate degree to divine that $X=2$. If he wishes to confirm his solution, access to knowledgeable sources and the wiles of the practiced newsman or secret intelligence agent can usually do the trick.

More Releases than Leaks

The bulk of the materials which the Yale group had exploited belonged to the general category of official and semiofficial releases from various components of the defense establishment; what the group drew from the “news-papers and slick magazines” was significant, but of far less importance. That the group amassed this welter of data probably caused little surprise among the relatively small number of witting officials in the Defense Department. A one-time highly placed official of one of the services said to me that the only part of the project that surprised him was that anyone should be surprised at its findings. Offhand, he thought that there was virtually nothing regarding the American military which was properly secret. He did except the areas which I have noted earlier. That was about it; he seemed wholly relaxed that all the rest was out in the open for all to see. Had he seen the Yale Report it would have been old hat to him.

Maybe that reaction would have been the correct one, for in comparison to what the Yale Report could have been, it was no great shakes. Some of its shortcomings derived from the limitations built in to its terms of reference which—it will be recalled—stipulated a tally of gross order of battle of U.S. forces-in-being as of 1 September 1951. Others derived from the scant amount of time allowed for the completion of the study, which in turn obliged the project supervisor to recruit staff where he could find it within the Yale community, and largely without reference to any specialized talent it might possess in

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U.S. military matters. But suppose it had been otherwise: suppose that the terms of reference had had no well-defined outer limit, and that the group pushed on until it ran out of valid and relevant material; suppose that the ceiling on available time and funds had been very considerably raised and that the staff comprised two or three score top-drawer professional specialists. Could any one, no matter how long a resident of that second universe, be wholly unshaken as he contemplated the new study? I somehow doubt it, especially if the study had been artfully packaged in two parts.

The first of these parts would be the bulk of the report, say a few thousand pages which would deal with the unspectacular matters of the Yale Report, but do it more thoroughly and accurately. The second would be a systematic arrangement of what the project supervisor would consider as unpleasant surprises. It would show that as a result of the general relaxation of security on matters which no one in the second universe cared about, a large number of the true secrets of state which they did care about lay about in the open, all but uncloned.

Nuclear Stockpile

A case in point: Among 1951's secrets of state, few ranked in importance with the size of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons. There were no more than a handful of Americans who knew how many A-bombs, as they were then called, had been assembled and were ready to go. The section of the Yale Report called "Atomic Warfare" nevertheless essayed an estimate. The man who composed it was a physicist whose principal focus of interest was not the viscera of the atom nor the nature of nuclear explosions. Needless to say, his wartime experience was remote from the Manhattan District. With these limitations he embarked upon a search of the open literature. Drawing principally upon the well-known Smyth report,* an article by Sir John Cockcroft,** and a few other articles in popular scientific journals and the *New York Times*, he made a calculation regarding the probable rate of the production of plutonium and uranium-235 between 1945 and 1951, and another as to the probable number of bombs on the shelf. Those of us who read these conclusions in 1951 were consumed with curiosity to know how well he had done. Of course, the few government officers who were in a position to say could not give us a grain of satisfaction. Now, twenty-odd years later, one such officer has received authorization to give a long-after-the-fact evaluation and to give it under the security classification of this article. Interesting indeed are his comments.

In the first place he finds that the Yale professor's estimates were wrong and wrong on the high side. He goes on to say that the error was wholly unnecessary. He points out that the Yale professor missed two bits of highly significant public information: the first had to do with the power levels at which the Hanford reactors were working. This had been picked up by a Soviet secret agent working for the KGB control in Ottawa and was published in the *Report*

*Henry D. Smyth, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes* (Princeton 1945). This report first appeared as a U.S. Government publication.

**See *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Nov 1950) p. 329.

of the [Canadian] Royal Commission* which investigated the espionage ring. The other appeared in none other than the AEC's semi-annual reports to Congress of 1949 and 1950. With these data and a higher degree of expertise in isotope separation and bomb design, the high-ranking secret of the stockpile could have been penetrated to a nicety. The odds are heavily in favor of the Soviets having done just that.

This case is a classic in its way. Once the atomic weapon was tested, then—shortly after—used in anger, the single most important secret surrounding the whole vast nuclear weapons enterprise was gone. Now everybody knew that controlled large-scale nuclear explosions were possible. Professor Smyth was an official spokesman for the U.S. government, and his report was a piece of deliberate disclosure. If the U.S. government had tried to continue into peacetime the security wraps which it had thrown around the Manhattan District during the war, it would have found the costs prohibitive. It would have had to cope with numerous powerful and angry groups (led by the nuclear scientists and the media) who were claiming an unlawful abridgement of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment. The Smyth report is a classic example of a libertarian government retreating to a prepared position and endeavoring to hold the security line at that point. The government correctly reasoned that in the absence of such a maneuver, uncontrolled leaks would be more hurtful to national interests. From there on, a minor slip over at the AEC, a snippet of significant information picked up by a Soviet secret operative, and the Russians had the essences of the secret of the stockpile. With the publication of the snippet in the unclassified *Canadian Report* it was almost anyone's in exchange for some legwork and thought.

Biological and Chemical Warfare

How many other of the true military secrets of 1951 would have fallen in such a constellation of circumstances? It is a guess, and not too risky a one at that, that the U.S. stockpiles of biological and chemical warfare weapons could have been known, although this was far from the intent of the Defense Department. The Yale group had no trouble in finding a rich unclassified literature. Oddly, it missed one of the documents in the BW area which was a rough BW counterpart to the Smyth Report. This was the memorandum which George W. Merck, a war department special consultant for biological warfare, wrote for the Secretary of War, and which the War Department released to the press on 3 January 1946.**

The Merck report tells of the history of the BW program, which began in anticipation of a need for defense against biological weapons the enemy might employ. It tells of the establishment of the early civilian agency under Mr. Merck; of how intelligence regarding German BW capabilities which arrived in December 1943 made necessary a change in the purely defensive posture of the program, and a change in the first administrative arrangements. The program was broadened and put under the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army. The

*Ottawa [27 June] 1946.

**War Department; Bureau of Public Relations; Press Branch. "Biological Warfare"; 8 mimeographed pages.

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report goes on to explain that while the main objective in the U.S. BW program was still

to develop methods for defending ourselves against possible enemy use of biological warfare agents, it was necessary to investigate offensive possibilities in order to learn what measures could be used for defense. It was equally clear that the possibility of retaliation in kind could not be disregarded in the event such agents were used against us. . . .

The report tells in general terms of the activities of the program and lists some of its "more important accomplishments." Needless to say, the most of those mentioned were the spin-offs with a definite bonus in such agreeable areas as pure science, public health, and plant pathology. Toward the end comes the pregnant paragraph whose topic sentence is:

Steps are being taken to permit the release of such technical papers and reports by those who have been engaged in this field as may be published without endangering the national security.

If one may be permitted to do a bit of reading between the lines of the Merck report, using something a good bit more substantial than pure intuition, one perceives in a flash that the document was largely designed to forestall future embarrassments. None knew better than the Army of the hundreds of civilian scientists once in the program who were returning to their peacetime pursuits and who in the uncensored atmosphere of their laboratories would be relatively free to talk of their hitherto highly classified research. Biological warfare was a nasty expression, and clearly the Army was eager first to acknowledge of its own free accord that it had indeed engaged in BW work, and second to stress that its primary concern had been "defensive" and "retaliatory," not "offensive."

How the Merck report affected the substance of articles on BW that soon began to be published one cannot say; it is difficult to believe that it did not have an effect on the quantity of books and articles devoted to the subject. By 1951 any foreign intelligence service with a respectable publications procurement enterprise could have had a highly enlightening little library on the BW capabilities of the United States. As in the case of the A-bomb, even had it so desired our government could not have stifled these voices in peacetime without risking a minor upheaval. Accordingly it did the only thing it could to mitigate the worst of the bad effects which it perceived on the horizon. In all likelihood it issued the Merck report with this aim in view. That it also gave the intelligence services of our ill-wishers a long and exhilarating free ride was merely one item in the cost-sheet of our blessings.

It is of more than passing interest that in an exercise of 1948 the combined intelligence resources of the United States and the United Kingdom produced relative to the Soviet BW and CW capabilities only the sentence that virtually nothing was known. If there had been a requirement on the subject in 1951, our intelligence community could have done only a mite better.

Conclusions

And for us who serve in the intelligence profession of our country this is the nut of the matter. I am happy to report that I know no one among us who would amend the Bill of Rights just to make things difficult for our opposite

numbers in unfriendly lands, but some way or another no one should blame us for the youthful pique we feel when we compare our lot to theirs. But pique and our lament on the injustices of life to one side, it still seems objectively improper that American intelligence endeavoring to construct, say a Soviet order of battle or the probable performance of a Soviet weapons system still under R and D should have to pick around in informational garbage pails for unmatched molecules, while our Soviet counterparts endeavoring to do the same for the U.S. parallels can get it by a letter to the GPO or a subscription to *Aviation Week and Space Technology*.

Something exactly akin to this sentiment was what moved Mr. Allen Dulles to say out loud, "Sometimes I think we go too far in what our Government gives out officially and what is published in the scientific and technical field. We tell Russia too much. Under our system it is hard to control it." * Something akin moved Mr. Truman to sign and defend Executive Order Number 10290 whose main point was to assure

that military secrets in the hands of these other [civilian] agencies should be protected just as much as when they are in the hands of the military departments. . . . It would not make any sense to have a paper containing military secrets carefully locked up in a safe in the Pentagon, with a copy of the same paper left lying around on the desk of a lawyer in the Justice Department.**

This simple and commonsense thought was unfortunately obscured at the press conference and in subsequent press coverage as a result of someone's having "given the boss a bum steer."

The order, however, was in effect and stayed in effect for two years*** and, of course, had little visible effect. It did not affect what high officers of the defense and service departments (both civilian and military) might wish to convey to the Congress, and on the record, and it seems to have done little to stem the tide of purposeful and inadvertent leaks.

The Yale Report could have just as well been written under its protective canopy in 1952 or 1953—or for that matter under subsequent executive orders in any of the 20 years which have followed. In fact if it were tried again and this time with greater expertise and a more relaxed deadline, the results would probably be far more of a shock to the intelligence calling, and of no more consequence to the course of national policy.

**US News and World Report*, 19 March 1954. p. 54.

***New York Times*, 5 October 1951, quoting President Truman.

***Superseded by Executive Order #10501 of 16 Dec. 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL
No Foreign Dissem

*Trials, tribulations, and
some lingering doubts*

LIAISON TRAINING

Warren R. Mulholland

The oldest and probably the most consistently productive liaison the CIA maintains with intelligence services of other nations is the relationship we and our parent organizations before us have enjoyed [redacted] Much of our original skill and capability we owe to the training and advice of the [redacted] and since that time we ourselves have had the experience of setting up liaison with the intelligence services of other friendly nations. We have thus learned to understand to some extent the concern expressed by some of the [redacted] veterans when they contemplated the connection between the older and more experienced [redacted] and the new one from across the sea.

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The underlying uneasiness was genuine, and must be common to all intelligence services when they consider establishing official connections with other smaller and less experienced services. Will the result be the creation of a Frankenstein's monster?

It may not be a monstrous moment, but surely it must be one of life's most embarrassing ones when a Chief of Station in a small friendly country is suddenly confronted with the fact that his Ambassador's office has been bugged with techniques and equipment his own station has provided to the host government's security service. At such moments does one rage, remonstrate, explain, excuse, laugh, or boast? If so, to whom?

More important, should such experiences make us hesitate or refuse to maintain liaison with other services? This question has been recurring regularly for many years, and the answer always seems to be that on balance we benefit from liaison with other services, and that although we use great caution in what we teach and give to them, we must face the fact that even the simplest and most basic of clandestine techniques can be used against us just as readily as against a common adversary.

Very well, we establish liaison, but must we *train* the younger or smaller services? If so, to what end do we train them? Is it simply to make them better services? Is it to make them more friendly to us? Is it to enable us to carry out joint operations with them, or to use their services against targets we otherwise might not be able to attack?

One of the area divisions of the Clandestine Service recently made a detailed survey of its liaison operations, and it is somewhat surprising to find that the survey was not very helpful in answering some of the more traditional and tiresome questions which bother us all. It did reveal some interesting facts about training, however. Perhaps one-fourth of the services we have trained, for instance, rank in the category of "above average—very good," or "near professional" category. All the rest rank as fair, inefficient, or below. One of these

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lower category services has received large sums of money and large amounts of training, but is nevertheless judged so low professionally that it is probably not penetrated by the opposition because "it would not be worthwhile for the opposition to do so." The dry comment which followed this observation was that "no lower classification seems possible."

Training *by itself* will not necessarily make a better service. It can help, but other factors weigh heavily, such as national pride, tenure, pay, recognition, and public respect. These things we cannot supply. When poor services are trained by us, they often remain poor services, and it therefore follows that when we do set about training such a service we must aim that training carefully, and plan it with great care and common sense.

The Agent and Liaison Training Branch (ALT) of the Office of Training should participate in such planning, although of course the decision *whether* to train is one which is the responsibility of the operating division. One of the first questions that arises after this decision has been made is, where should the training take place. Instructors from ALT, most of them operations officers on rotation, have some strong opinions here.

It is obviously cheaper to send one or two instructors and a few hundred pounds of training aids and material to the field than it is to bring a score or more students to the U.S. and feed and lodge them for a month while we train them. In fact, ALT is at present geared to handle groups of a maximum of four persons in the U.S., and larger contingents of trainees would require prohibitive extra expense and effort.

Moreover, the value of training students in the atmosphere and locale of their future operations can hardly be overstated. Street exercises are less artificial; the problems encountered are real, and solving them is more than a mere academic exercise. It is sometimes even possible for the instructor to train his charges by means of operations against real targets, thus not only providing the local service with well-trained young operations officers, but giving them a leg up on their own tasks as well.

The trainer must also teach with an eye to the local realities which will later confront his student. It does no good to train a man in the use of certain types of public facilities or professional equipment and support if such things are not within his reach at home. One of the first tasks of an ALT instructor when he is assigned a new program is to find out what the area is like and what equipment, money, and personnel are available to his trainees for their future operations. If he fails to find out these things and adapt his training to them, he may gravely mislead his students and waste a lot of their time.

Security is another factor. Training in the United States exposes safe sites, administrative personnel, and other training personnel who are used in role-playing or rabbit capacities in street exercises.

Finally, there is the problem of language. ALT can train in the major languages without the use of interpreters, but is often called upon to train in the less common languages. These instances may require the use of interpreters, translators, and equipment for reproducing training material in the language. Such services are often difficult to get at headquarters, but are more readily available in the field.

On the other hand, there are some valid reasons for wanting the training to be done in the U.S. The element of reward is one of the most important of these.

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A trip to the U.S., all expenses paid, is a coveted prize in most countries, and it is therefore not surprising that stations are often under great pressure to send liaison students to the U.S. for training. Ideally, training should never be used to camouflage a goodwill trip to this country. Purposeless training is at best a waste of time and money, and at worst can be downright harmful. In the real world, however, training is often the only way the travel can be rationalized to the satisfaction of all concerned, and so long as we are not deceiving ourselves, the device can be useful. The instructor should be told fully and frankly, however, if the training is a secondary reason for the travel, and the trainees themselves should also have at least a tacit understanding of the situation.

Training in the American environment may make it easier for the foreign visitor to convince himself of the communality of interests. The prestige of the student is also enhanced by training in the U.S. Although he might in reality get more useful training at home than he can in the U.S., the fact remains that the record of a course of instruction abroad weighs much more heavily in a man's personnel file than a notation that he completed a course given locally by an imported instructor. If our purpose in training is partly to assist certain specific individuals in their careers, we should give serious consideration to bringing them here for it.

Some other factors which tend to recommend training in the U.S. are the availability of supplementary instruction in specialized subjects from other components such as TSD, Commo, and Records Management, and the availability of other training personnel for role playing or for teaming up with students in practice operations. Such professional assistance is difficult to come by in the field.

Weighing the pros and cons usually leads to the decision to train abroad. More than two-thirds of all liaison training programs are done in the country of origin. When the number of *students* is calculated, rather than the number of programs, training abroad takes care of about 92% of all liaison trainees.

Training in the field is a demanding job. The instructor has many eyes watching him with intense and often critical interest—the eyes of the students whom he must impress with his professional qualifications; the eyes of station personnel, who quite properly expect that this training should render a net profit to the station and the agency; and the eyes of the hierarchy of the host service, who are watching closely to see how good the training is, how good the CIA is, and what the CIA thinks of the host country and its service. The instructor has no back-up staff to fill in for him, or provide him with emergency assistance. He often has been able to comprehend fully what the program ought to be only *after* he has arrived in the field, when it is too late to make adequate compensation for faulty planning at headquarters. The range of skills which the instructor is expected to be qualified to teach is frighteningly broad, and faltering in any one of these skills can undermine his presumptive authority in others. No individual can know everything there is to know about this profession, of course, and instructors soon learn that maintenance of authority sometimes requires them to gloss over the inevitable gaps in their professional qualifications. As Satchel Paige used to say about pitching baseball in his later years, "When you can't out-throw 'em, you gotta out-cute 'em."

If it were merely a question of teaching young rookies the mysteries of an unfamiliar art, the strain on the instructor would be minor, but in actual prac-

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tice he is often confronted by a class of students of quite disparate ages and backgrounds, and often of equally disparate assignments within their parent services. The same class may include near-illiterates and college graduates, assigned variously as records management officers, criminal investigators, or border patrol guards. The faces the instructor looks into may vary in expression from rapt attention to disdainful challenge.

The selection of students is obviously a key factor in training courses, and among the many difficulties we encounter in this process there is one hardy perennial for which we have never yet found a solution. Ideally, for our purposes, the station should make the choices, but for obvious reasons this prerogative is in practice nearly always reserved to the chief of the service. This in part explains (and often increases) the disparities of background and assignment just mentioned, since backscratching and politicking almost inevitably enter the picture. An instructor may note inwardly early in the course that Student X is a fathead, and upon discreet inquiry finds out that by wild coincidence Student X's uncle or cousin or brother-in-law happens to be Foreign Minister or President of the Republic. The instructor is stuck with him, however, and must resign himself to the braking effect which Student X's underendowed brain will have on the progress of the rest of the class. Not surprisingly, Student Xes crop up in their most extreme form in the least developed countries, where, moreover, the liaison relationship itself is in an early stage of development. It is even quite likely that one of the major justifications for the training in the first place has been the station's desire to accelerate the budding of this relationship.

The tensions of such heterogeneous classes are often exacerbated by a big cultural gap between instructor and students. How does the instructor from the pragmatic, factual and often impersonal western culture create an intelligence officer to satisfy his own standards out of the imprecise, abstract, emotional and family-oriented son of some far eastern nation? In these cases, the difference in language often signals a profound difference in thought patterns and psychological orientation. The instructor must be acutely aware of such differences, and of what he can accomplish in spite of them (or perhaps by means of them). He knows that there may be certain concepts he can never get across because the culture and language of his students cannot cope with them.*

Having made the decision to train, the operating division should immediately bring the Training authorities into the picture, because a great deal needs to be done, and the sooner an instructor can be assigned (probably two instructors if the class is to exceed ten persons), the better the preparations and the subsequent training can be. The instructor will need to consult at length

*The reverse is also true, of course. There are ideas and concepts in other cultures which we can comprehend only dimly or not at all, often to our own disadvantage. One thoughtful Vietnamese trainee who had just completed an exercise in agent acquisition commented to his instructor that he had done things by the book in the exercise, but without real conviction. "I do not believe," he said, "that a Vietnamese could ever successfully recruit a man with these personality characteristics, although he may be an excellent target for an American. The Vietnamese would be put off by the candidate's directness and his readiness to talk about things which a Vietnamese approaches carefully and indirectly, if at all. On the other hand, if you want to recruit a Vietnamese you will profit a great deal more by seeking ways to use family influence on him than by searching for chinks in his ideological armor."

with the country desk to find out precisely what training is desired, and how it is to be done. He will ask the desk bluntly whose idea the training is, because it may make a great difference to his program if it has been offered on the initiative of the case officer, the station, or even the headquarters desk, and has perhaps been accepted somewhat reluctantly, rather than being urgently requested by the liaison service because it discerns its own need and has confidence in our ability to help.

The instructor will want to make sure that the field station is prepared to furnish a site, blackboards, paper, pencils, duplicating facilities and other classroom supplies. He will pay special attention to the subject of film projectors. He will want to know if the station has one, and if it is in good shape. Visual aids to instruction are perhaps the most important auxiliary tool the instructor has, and of these aids, motion pictures have the greatest impact and utility.

If it were only a matter of getting good projection equipment, the instructor's lot would be a happy one, but, alas, when it comes time to go to the film library he flinches inwardly, because we are still training students with many of the same films which were in use when the instructor himself was a trainee. Most of these are excellent films, and of course the basic techniques of clandestine operations do not change radically with the passing years. As Allen Dulles pointed out in his *Craft of Intelligence*, Sun Tzu, in the year 400 B.C., wrote down the basics of espionage, much as it is practiced today. In addition to traditional techniques, however, one must consider the probable subconscious reaction of the 1973 student to a training film in which a surveillance team wears Dick Tracy hats and suits that are just a shade removed from the zoot variety, and where television is so new that it is exhibited as the latest scientific invention to be added to the arsenal of the clandestine operator. Will the student attribute the same kind of senility to the other elements of the agency which is training him?

It is easier to point out the problem than to solve it, for film production costs more than the uninitiated can imagine. When one contemplates a professionally produced film of about 20 minutes' duration, he may already be thinking in terms of \$100,000. In discussions of this situation, the suggestion is almost invariably proffered, "Why not produce films with our own people and technicians?" The answer is that our technicians, outstanding as they usually are, are not organized or equipped for this kind of job; and contrary to their own opinions, most of our intelligence personnel cannot act for sour apples. Attempts to use them in past productions would by comparison make Howdy Doody look like Sir John Gielgud—and we have seen from unpleasant experience that an amateurish training film is worse for our students than no training film at all.

As if the hoary age of most of our films were not handicap enough, more than half of our most useful films are restricted to showing for U.S. citizens, and the instructor must therefore arrange to have the same old reliables available at the station, among which are "Walk East on Beacon," "Ring of Treason," "The Thief," "PNG," and perhaps half a dozen short reels on specific subjects such as dead drops, surveillance and countersurveillance, and personal meetings. Unfortunately, the solution to our film problems is largely one of finances, and budgetary possibilities are not the same in 1973 as they were in 1953.

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Training programs are usually devised to give basic skills to new officers, and the curriculum usually includes instruction in basic operations, security, clandestine communications, agent acquisition and handling, observation and description, surveillance and countersurveillance, and reporting. Not the least important, and usually the most lacking, is knowledge of records management techniques and the importance of records to the intelligence organization.

The programs are usually scheduled by the stations to begin on a Monday, and the experienced training officer will try to arrive at the latest by the Thursday just preceding the start of the course, for he needs time to adjust his inner clock to the jet lag, and has a number of preliminary matters which must be taken care of. He will make a special point to let the field know of his exact arrival date, so that the case officer in charge of the liaison training will be sure to be on hand for Friday consultations.

He will first want to look over the training material which he has sent ahead by pouch, to see if it is all there and in good shape. He will need to verify that the station projector is of a vintage somewhat later than *The Birth of a Nation*, and that it is in working order, with extra projection and exciter lamps and drive belts. He will want to look over the training site, to make sure that it is capable of handling the class with a minimum of discomfort and distraction, and to arrange the furnishings to suit his needs as much as possible.*

He also must make sure that he has the means to travel between his hotel and the training site and the station without a great waste of time. He must either get the loan of a station car, rent a vehicle, or arrange to be driven from place to place as required. Taxis are usually undependable and unsatisfactory for this purpose. Field officers are so often overoptimistic about their capability to fill this need that experienced instructors usually insist upon having their travel orders include authorization to rent a car when needed.

Not the least important of the preliminary work is a call on the head of the service for which the training is being provided. It is not always possible to set up such a meeting, of course, although training officers usually urge the station in advance to do everything possible to arrange it. Failing the head of the service, some other high official connected with it can serve the purpose. There is a multiplicity of motives behind this desire for an interview with the mighty.

In the first place, the prestige and authority which is given to the instructor and his program by the appearance of, or at least strong endorsement by, the head of the service may mean the difference between a perfunctory attendance and performance and a lively and successful course of instruction. Most instructors quite unabashedly contrive at some time during the course to point out casually to their charges something to the effect that "General So-and-So was quite emphatic when he told me he wanted this particular thing stressed in this training." Of special benefit is the inauguration of the training course by the head of the service himself, by means of an introductory address on the first day.

*One instructor reported that a program he had recently completed in Indochina was probably his worst effort, because he had found out after classes began that the classroom was part of an ammunition storage warehouse. His lectures were regularly punctuated by the loud crack of cases of 105-mm. HE ammunition being dropped from a truck bed to the concrete floor. It was not the noise that disturbed him. He just refused to believe the ordnance officer's reassurance that the shells would not explode when unloaded in this fashion.

Another matter which the instructor will want to take up with the officialdom of the liaison service is the problem of attendance. He will plead with the service not to extract a student or students casually from the classes to attend to other official duties except in emergencies of the direst sort.

Then he will need to find out what ground rules this authority may want to establish for practical street exercises. Are there areas of the city which are to be considered off limits to training exercises? Can other local government or service personnel be made available as rabbits or drivers or in other support capacities? Do they have communications equipment for surveillance work? Are there live targets they would like or permit the class to work on?

The question of an assessment of the students often arises, also, but not because the instructor brings it up. He will avoid it if he can, because of all the tasks he may be confronted with, perhaps the most difficult is that of making a fair and honest assessment of 20 or more students after four weeks of instruction. If the subject arises, he will usually try to impress upon the requesting official that such assessments are subject to chance and personal bias, and can result in grave errors and injustice to individuals. If they must have some kind of judgment, it is much safer and more trustworthy for the instructor to cite any students who have stood out in the class as particularly apt, and to describe their accomplishments when appropriate, but without any stated or implied negative reports on the slower students. The Minister's nephew who becomes chief of service in 1975 is not likely to be cooperative if he knows that in 1973 we pointed out that he lacked the brains and the drive to be a good intelligence officer.

If, in spite of the instructor's demurrer, the service still insists on assessments of all students, it can be done, of course, but the instructor needs to know of the requirements at the outset so that he can gear his instruction and the exercises as much as possible to produce for him the elements he needs to make the judgments. It would seem gratuitous to point out that the instructor also ought to know their names, but in the case of one program in a Latin American country the instructor had to tell the head of the service that he could not give him an assessment on the students because he had never been given names, numbers or aliases for any of the students. The instructor surmised that a Student X from some previous course had managed to work his way into the upper administrative levels of that service.

This reluctance to assess students for their parent services does not imply any hesitancy about assessment for station purposes. Instructors, as a matter of fixed routine at the completion of training, give the station as complete an assessment as possible of all the students and of the course in general.

It may come as a surprise to some that not all the peoples of this world regard the eight-hour day as an establishment of the Almighty. In some of the more horrible of the earth's climates, an eight-hour day could probably accomplish no more than a six-hour day anyway. In any event, the instructor should be well aware of the work tolerance and attention span of his charges. As John Kenneth Galbraith said after visiting a particularly torrid town in India, "In India the difference between working and not working is not decisive." The same might be said for other countries, but our instructors must be ready to discern the difference, nevertheless, and respect it.

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Having made his preliminary arrangements, the instructor now has the weekend in which to review his material, his notes, his course schedule, and any data he may have been able to acquire on the individual students. He must plan how he intends to break the class down into groups or teams for the live exercises. He must study maps of the city, traffic patterns, rush hours, and other factors which may have a bearing on practical exercises.

He will never be totally ready, but finally the day of launch arrives and he is on the podium, with the head of the service to introduce him if he is lucky.

After he has been suitably inflated and introduced, has taken care of the administrative details of how the class is to be run and security attended to, and how the seating arrangement is to be maintained, he is ready to go. He now beetles his brow portentously, jabs a finger at his class and begins:

“Clandestine activity is a part of everyday living. We all act clandestinely for personal reasons from time to time, and if you don't believe it, consider the times that you, yourself”

In the coming weeks he will get to know this collection of faces very well indeed, for he is expected to insert behind each one, whether it is black, brown, swarthy, fair, oriental, or blue-eyed, the skills and attitudes of the professional intelligence officer. He will wave his arms and draw diagrams and tell war stories and regale the students with tales of intrigue and derring-do, usually of his own heroic exploits against an implacable and clever enemy. He will order them into the street to make a clandestine meeting with an unknown, to pass a supersensitive report, to prepare a casing report for a dead drop. He will rail at them for clumsy evasive techniques in surveillance problems, and will pray silently that they will outwit him and show that the instruction is sinking in. He will slap backs when back-slapping is likely to be appropriate and well received, and will compliment, kid, and criticize. He will be elated when he strikes that magic spark any teacher cherishes but sees so seldom. He will be disappointed but resigned when one of his favorite war stories falls flat. He will regularly be astonished at some of the things his students do or say.

Consider, for example, the instructor who was trying to teach a group of earnest young men from a new African nation which is struggling to adapt its rich tribal traditions to the needs of world affairs. The instructor had assigned the class the task of passing a message to a contact in the street without being detected. One of the students asked him if it was all right to use magic. The instructor, an old warhorse with great sympathy for his charges, replied without hesitation that if the student was in fact practiced in those arts, it was altogether acceptable to pass the message by magic.*

One of the most difficult tasks for an instructor is to teach an exotic skill while at the same time keeping his student imbued with the desire for simplicity of design and plan. One instructor, who had seen many an overelaborate meeting plan in his life, was still unprepared for the personal meeting exercise he monitored between two of his students in another small African capital. The “case officer” had selected a site in full view of the Communist Chinese Embassy, for reasons that were not clear to the instructor, and the “agent” was standing at the

*This same instructor had already had enough of a problem finding a way to teach carefully timed personal meetings to young men who not only did not own watches, but who would not have known how to tell time by them if they did.

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site, stiff as a ramrod, his back to the wall across the street from the embassy, his arms folded over his chest. When it was time for his prospective contact to arrive, he began to dance a sedate but energetic jig, his arms still folded, and he continued to do so until the "case officer" arrived and took up a position next to him, assuming the same arms-folded posture, and joined him in the dance. Having established something thereby, they then ceased dancing and walked together to another place to talk. The instructor observed later that this hardly seemed to be a satisfactory system of recognition and safety signals, but he had to admit that no passerby or occupant of the embassy across the street was likely to surmise that this tableau was in fact a clandestine meeting between two secret operatives.

Although the instructor covets the services of the head of the liaison organization at certain times, his presence is not uniformly useful, as one instructor of a recent class in a small Latin American republic will testify. His students had set up a stakeout against a real and important target, using support from their own agency to devise individual cover. The head of the service (a military intelligence service) decided to don civilian clothes and go by for a discreet personal inspection of the stakeout. Proud of his students, the instructor stayed at some distance from the scene and watched with a stinking heart as the officer strolled near a white-suited ice cream vendor, only to have the latter leap from his bicycle, snap to attention, and execute a smart military salute.

One instructor still recalls with some bemusement the student who went out on an exercise and was not seen again for three days. When he returned, he explained that when he went into the drug store to buy the bar of soap, according to the plan, he had been hit over the head with a bottle. He seemed to feel that the explanation was sufficient, for he volunteered no further details, and the instructor did not ask for any. One never knows.

Of such rugged and varied stuff are made the citizens of other countries whom we initiate into our clandestine society. On the final day of instruction, critiques, and wrapups, the euphoria of a mission completed sometimes almost overwhelms students and teachers alike. In these instances a party is likely to ensue, and in accordance with religious scruples and capaciousness of purse, people may get mildly drunk or ecstatic. Great oaths of fidelity and eternal friendship are sworn, and vows to reassemble at some future date to reaffirm the ties of clandestine brotherhood. You, sir, are the greatest instructor ever born! And you, my friend, are one of the best students I have ever had! To your health, sir! And to yours! Long live democracy! Long live friendship and decency! Down with bad people! To hell with Communism!

And so another liaison class has been taught, and the instructor, weary but reasonably pleased with himself, looks over his little chicks and wonders which of them is going to bug the American Ambassador next year.

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*The pen is sometimes
flightier than the words*

ELEGANT WRITING—REPORT NUMBER TWO

Richard T. Puderbaugh

If you missed my first report,* I should explain to you that I have been designated Chief Word Watcher, Western Hemisphere Division, and have been instructed to submit reports from time to time on outstanding examples of elegant writing in what is best known as the Clandestine Service. It has been some months since my first report, and I must say that I have been impressed by the response. Elegant writing has definitely begun to attract the attention of our officers.

There are some areas which still need improvement, nevertheless. Too many of our writers are still utilizing the word "use" where they could just as well use "utilize" and get the same meaning out of it. The mitigate/militate ratio is merely holding its own, when in fact we ought to be expanding our use of "mitigate against." As to the flout/flaunt ratio, we may even be losing ground, and I urge you all to be especially watchful for instances of contempt for the law so that we can be sure that it gets flaunted rather than flouted.

There is also one point which I failed to make in my first report, because quite frankly I didn't think we were having any trouble with it, but I now find that that is not the case. The problem is in the modern and forceful use of the words *target*, *aim*, *fault*, and *blame*. It is oldfashioned to aim at a target. One targets at an aim these days. The same can be said for blaming people for being at fault. Today we fault them for being to blame. This is a process of shaping meanings which delights us veteran word watchers, and I can even see possibilities in these words for an entire reversal of meaning, as happened with our old friend *sanction*. Think of the linguistic genius it required to give one word two diametrically opposed meanings! "The U.N. today sanctioned sanctions against Israel." It is an aim we should target at.

Here are a few samples of elegant writing, selected at random from my collection of the past six months:

"The actions must be completed in as quickly a time as possible."

"Transmitted hereto for your retention and information. . . ."

"We regret that reference cable was ambivalent and apparently misleading."

"They described him as a friendly type who loves entertaining people."

"He has been out visiting the grass roots."

As you read, it will become evident to you that our best work during this period has been in our descriptions of people and the things they do. One of the most impressive of these is the following: "Although sleeping at the time

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of the officer's contact, the American Consul talked to Mr. Doe on 25 September, and was lucid and alert." You can't tell whether that is a dangling participle or a *non sequitur*, and therein lies its charm.

"The reference, made in a letter, by Doe's wife to Doe having gotten himself involved in espionage, though, might be indicative of something, albeit enigmatic."

"He believes the risk will be minimal * if students and instructors utilize reasonable jurisprudence in the course of the exercise."

"He incurred the intense displeasure of the war ministry and general officers close to the president recently by publicly advocating abolition of the congressional authority."

I showed that last one to my friend, the Senior Officer, who pronounced it a typographical error and therefore not really deserving of high marks. I would agree if it were only the absence of the "l" between the "b" and the "i", but the addition of the "al" as the penultimate syllable can hardly be a typographical error, and the author of that sentence therefore gets top grades from me for his effort, especially since he had the great good sense to avoid any actual description of the gestures a man makes when he publicly advocates something.

"This announcement by the two officials should put an end to specific rumors of one firing the other, or vice versa."

"At that time they were in the first stages of a broken marriage."

"Even the carrot and stick approach of offering a higher income did not produce results."

"The old man, although infirm, obviously is not on his dying bed."

The following three quotations demonstrate what I have come to call the Puderbaugh Principle of Traumatic Terseness. We all know what a great impact one can achieve by making portentous statements in few words. "Lafayette, we are here." "I cannot spare this general. He fights." Now observe how much greater an impact can be achieved when the short statement describes the totally unexpected—not to say unbelievable:

"Doe and his wife had a daughter of four. When he last saw her she was pregnant."

"Fulano's wife is in her late twenties and their daughter, Mary, is aged about four. The latter is rather pale and sickly. She doesn't like Graustark very much. She smokes."

"Mengano was one of seven children, and was raised without a father who was killed by a log in a forest."

Given the rather consistent distortion of our work by the news media, the public might be pardoned for supposing that people in our profession live in a James Bond kind of world. If the truth were to be told (and it can certainly be deduced from the foregoing demonstrations of Puderbaugh's Principle) ours is much more of a Tolkien world than a Bond world. The people we deal with are surrounded by dangers Bond never dreamed of, and that may explain why they feel impelled to begin enjoying life, and reproducing it, at a very early age.

While we are on the subject of descriptions of persons and their doings, I must announce with some sadness that a writer from another agency has won

*"Minimal" is a very OK word this year.

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this year's Grand Prize for Baroque Bloviation. CIA has done some fine things, but nothing to compare with the following analysis which a Defense Department officer wrote about the wife of a government official in his country of assignment:

"She has a presentable personality with a modern posture, who is well versed in world affairs, where by modern standards she is considered to be a whole person."

Another non-CIA writer has been granted an honorable mention for excellence in Freudian Implications. He is a senior foreign service officer at one of our embassies, who informed his Washington office:

"The editor of a respected weekly called on me today to discuss the current political situation which he predicted would come to an end very soon."

It must be the golden dream, the cherished Nirvana, of our harried friends in the State Department—that moment when a political situation comes to an end.*

In no other instance did I find our writers to have been bested by those of other agencies, although I do have an item of special interest from USAID which I shall present to you later in this report. Our writers are especially good in those constructions which separate vital sentence parts from one another and place high-class words between them, selected and arranged so as to give the reader many minutes of enchantment as he searches for the meaning. The first of these sentences also evokes folk-feelings of the ancient past, echoing the syntax of the Germanic Mother Tongue.

"He helped his daughter, with whom he is quite close, out financially."

"We feel that the university, while still an important target, is less so than it once was. Even if it were, the situation on campus makes the operation impossible."

The beauty of that last quotation at first seemed to me to lie in its antecedent anarchy, but upon closer examination I discovered that the anarchy is much more pervasive than a mere indiscipline of pronouns and their antecedents. Here it is entire thoughts which are launched from their pads and enter orbit without ever achieving rendezvous with sister components.

Closely related to the foregoing examples of skillful disarticulation of sentence parts is the practice of redundancy. It is not difficult to be redundant, of course, and no special merit attaches to the mere repetition of a thought twice in several dozen words, but when you can express the same idea three times in five words you are in a class by yourself:

"That would make his *estimated ETA on or about* 5 July."

For technical excellence in tautology, that sentence is the best of the season, but for a symmetry which closely approaches poetry I think we would have to give the prize to this one:

"If Doe were arrested as soon as feasibly possible. . . ."

There are some sentences which mirror a truly and innately elegant soul—a writer who not only puts down elegant sentences, but whose thoughts are ele-

*The moment when a political situation reaches its zenith, on the other hand, has never been better described than by a State cable from North Africa in the mid-50's which may antedate Mr. Puderbaugh's research: "The seething cauldron is approaching the crossroad, and it is beyond the power of the French to get it back on the tracks." One sighs that these cables had no visual aids. [Editor.]

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Elegant Writing

gantly arranged. Here is a sentence which comes from the mind of just such an aristocrat, a writer who is modern enough to have no compunction about ending a sentence with a preposition, but who at the same time steadfastly avoids any ellipsis of relative pronouns:

"In order to return, he had to be guaranteed work and a house which to move into."

I shall now list a number of items which do not fall into any special Word-watcher classification, but which deserve our respectful attention all the same:

"The SDNT, the largest and only exile group in Graustark. . . ."

"He was determined not to defend red tape for its own sake."

"Misnaming of ammunition is illegal."

"We apologize for the readability of the copies." *

"Parallely, we plan to start work on another project."

"We opted not to reopen the question to avoid the risk of needlessly beating a dead horse." **

"That would be opening the magic Pandora's box."

"We would be foolhardy if we were to dismiss it lightly."

"They threw Molotov cocktails against five downtown stores during daylight hours in lightening demonstrations."

A word is in order here about *lightening demonstrations*. I have had many discussions about this with associates in headquarters who have never been to the field, and who think the reference is really to *lightning demonstrations*. It is surprising that this kind of objection can come from people who live in Washington, D. C., for they have witnessed the real thing right in their own city. Briefly, any demonstration which reduces a downtown store's inventory by several tons, or sets fire to its premises, can without hesitation be classed as a *lightening demonstration*. Demonstrations which include the use of Molotov cocktails are, by definition, *lightening* ones.

I was especially pleased during this period to see that one writer had extended the use of the word *majority* beyond anything our people had ever dared before. There had been a serious flood in his area of assignment, and in due course he reported that "the majority of the water had receded," and thereby implied that there was a minority of the water still around. From sad experience, however, I have learned not to trust such statements about the majority of, say, the money, or the weather, or the pollution, because I have found that many of our writers don't really know the definition of *majority*, and may in fact be talking about a plurality of these things. So I recommend great care with this usage.

In conclusion I want to report to you about a writer who works for USAID, who recently came to my attention. I know we must not proselyte, but if there

*An apology which might well be made for much of our official correspondence.

**Analogies have a way of losing their relevance as years pass. The writer of this sentence was wise enough to perceive that dead horses are not what they used to be. One must be careful to distinguish between those dead horses which it is bootless to beat, and those which can be turned into a profitable enterprise only by the application of the bastinado.

Elegant Writing

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is any way to get this man to transfer to our agency we should try our best to do it. He is clearly of managerial stature. He writes:

“We must steer a careful course between doing nothing about future plans and doing the irrelevant.”

That statement comes close to the beauty of Ring Lardner's masterpiece, “Although he was not a good outfielder, he was not a good hitter, either.” It is a question of keeping one part of a sentence from ever knowing what the other part is doing, and it is this kind of perfection toward which we must continue to strive. Few of us can hope to attain such high levels of elegance, but we must not let the seeming unattainability of the goal keep us from doing our best at all times. You can rest assured that any activity you engage in to equal or better the foregoing examples of elegant writing will be sanctioned by the highest authority.

How it all began:

DONOVAN'S ORIGINAL MARCHING ORDERS

Thomas F. Troy

Two quotations will set the stage for this inquiry into the orders under which Colonel William J. Donovan was set up in business by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as this nation's first chief of intelligence and special operations.

The first quotation comes from Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, 1939-1944, a man who figures no more in this paper but who was a close observer of much to be narrated here and who, moreover, kept an interesting diary. As one of three assistant secretaries working under Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Wells, "Breck" Long administered both the Department of State and the Foreign Service and, as he perhaps understandably complained in his diary, was responsible for 23 of the 42 divisions of the Department. This wide-spread coverage several times brought him in contact with the work of the new Coordinator of Information (COI)—the job FDR officially gave to Donovan on 11 July 1941; and Long was quick to arrive at the following characterization of this New York Irishman, military hero, and Wall Street lawyer:

"Bill Donovan—'Wild Bill' is head of the C.I.O. [sic]—Coordinator of Information. He has been a thorn in the side of a number of the regular agencies of the Government for some time—including the side of the Department of State—and more particularly recently in Welles'. He is into everybody's business—knows no bounds of jurisdiction—tries to fill the shoes of each agency charged with responsibility for a war activity. He has had almost unlimited money and has a regular army at work and agents all over the world. He does many things under the *nom de guerre* of 'Information'."¹

The second quotation gives the other side of the coin, and quite appropriately comes from Donovan himself. With reference to a different matter than the specific one which provoked Long's outburst, and writing not in a diary but to the President, the Colonel, "angry and indignant," denounced the circulation of "the well-worn lie" that he had 90 representatives working in Latin America. He attributed the repetition of this story to an effort to prove that he had "gone into a field which you had not allocated to me." Then Donovan laid it on the line: "You should know me well enough to know that I do adhere strictly to *my orders* and make no attempt to encroach upon the jurisdiction of anyone else." [Italics mine.]²

"My orders" . . . ah, there was the rub! Just what were those orders? That was, in effect, the question that many in Washington, throughout the summer

¹ Breckinridge Long, *The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections from the Years 1939-1944*, ed. Fred L. Israel (Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Neb., 1966) p. 257. This passage was written on 10 April 1942; on 20 December 1941 Long had noted (pp. 233-34) that Donovan was hard to "control," and that his organization was "composed largely of inexperienced people" who were also "inexperienced . . . in dealing . . . with . . . confidential information."

² Memorandum from William J. Donovan to President Roosevelt, No. 452, 27 April 1942, Donovan Papers, "Exhibits Illustrating the History of OSS," Vol. II, "The Office of the Coordinator of Information," Tab YY. Hereafter the short title is Donovan Papers, "Exhibits," and this will cover both Vols. I and II.

MORI/HRP
from pg.
39-69

and fall of 1941, wanted answered definitely. That was, in effect, the question—as will be seen—that prompted the Director of the Bureau of the Budget twice in the first seven months of Donovan's official existence to recommend to the President that COI's area of activity be newly defined. That question, indeed, also caused Donovan himself, three months after taking office, to tell the President that their original decision to put nothing in writing was wrong. That question, in fact, has never really been answered; and it is the purpose of this inquiry to make an attempt to do so.

The answer will be sought in reconstructing three episodes in roughly the first six months of COI's history: (1) Donovan's meeting with the President on 18 June 1941 when FDR gave the go-ahead sign on COI; (2) the drafting of the order which made COI official on 11 July; and (3) the next few months when that order was implemented.

The Roosevelt-Donovan Meeting, 18 June 1941

Contrary to a common misconception, Bill Donovan was not a close friend of the President. They had been at Columbia Law School at the same time but had not known one another. They were from opposite sides of the State of New York: Donovan from Buffalo, and FDR from the Hudson River Valley. They were also from opposite sides of the socio-economic tracks; Donovan was an Irish Catholic, the grandson of immigrants, the son of a railroad yards superintendent, while FDR, the squire of Hyde Park, was a WASP before the acronym was common coin. Also, and more importantly perhaps, they were from opposite sides of the political fence; Donovan was as much a life-long Republican as FDR was Mr. Democrat. Their paths had only occasionally crossed as when, for example, Donovan unsuccessfully ran for the governorship of New York when Roosevelt was elected President in 1932. It was not, then, until 1940 that Donovan, in his fifty-seventh year, and FDR, one year older, were brought together on the same side of the tracks.

What accomplished this was Adolf Hitler and the European War he launched in September 1939. There is no need here to do more than state the common revulsion and alarm felt by both men at the prospect of Nazi hegemony in Europe and abroad. Donovan, probably because he was a private citizen, was way out ahead of the President, however, in urging all-out aid to Britain as an essential element in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Because of this attitude, because of his prominence in Republican and national affairs, because of his recent travels in Germany, Ethiopia, and Spain, and probably on the recommendation of his good friend, the new Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, Colonel Donovan was sent by President Roosevelt to England in the summer of 1940 to report on Britain's chances against the expected Nazi assault. Six months later the President again sent him abroad, this time on a three-months tour of Britain, the Balkans, the Middle East, Spain, and Ireland.³

After both trips, Donovan, the President's representative who talked day after day with heads of state and their chief advisors, reported to the President—at least on 9 August 1940 and 19 March 1941. There are no good records of these conversations, but it is safe to say that Donovan, whose mind ranged over

³ See this writer's "COI and British Intelligence: An Essay on Origins," (CIA, 1970), esp. Chs. II and III. Hereafter referred to as "COI."

every aspect of the war in Europe, particularly singled out for the President's attention the whole range of unconventional warfare activities that had been brought to the fore by the Fifth Column and British counter-measures. He must have given Roosevelt some idea, however brief, of his thinking on a new agency to handle "white" and "black" propaganda, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, special intelligence, and strategic planning.⁴

Donovan Proposes "Service of Strategic Information"

Eventually, probably late in May of 1941, Donovan was asked by the President to put his proposal in writing, and this he did in a "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information," dated 10 June 1941. The document, which of course is fundamental in the long line of papers outlining the COI-OSS-CIA objectives and tasks, is as interesting for what it does not say as for what it does say. Since it was soon, on 18 June, to receive the Presidential stamp of approval, it is well here to take a close look at it.⁵ (Appendix A)

In a few words—934—Donovan laid out his argument, proceeding from general to particular, for a "Service of Strategic Information." The basic proposition was the interrelationship of strategy and information: without the latter, strategy was helpless; and unless directed to strategy, information was useless. The second proposition measured the information required in terms of total war—"the commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material"—and Donovan particularly stressed the dependence of modern war on "the economic base." The third proposition was the flat assertion that despite the activity of the Army and Navy intelligence units, the country did not have an "effective service" for developing that "accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the future." The conclusion was the essentiality of "a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect either directly or through existing departments of government, at home and abroad, pertinent information" on the total resources and intentions of the enemy.

As an example, he cited the economic field where there were many weapons that could be used against the enemy. These weapons were so scattered throughout the bureaucracy, however, that they could not be effectively utilized in the waging of economic warfare unless all departments of the government had the same information. This brief passage will appear more important, in this inquiry into Donovan's marching orders, when we touch upon the difficulty that Donovan was soon to have with the Economic Defense Board, which considered economic warfare its bailiwick.

Another brief—and apparently deliberately vague—passage is the one dealing with radio as "the most powerful weapon" in "the psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation." Certainly Donovan was one of the first fully to appreciate the significance of the Nazi use of the radio as an element of "modern warfare." In this memorandum, however, he contented himself with boldly stating that the perfection of radio as a weapon required planning, and planning required information, which could then lead to

⁴ *Ibid.*, Chs. IV and VIII.

⁵ Donovan Papers, "Exhibits," Vol. I, Tab B.

action by appropriate agencies. There was no felt need to spell out the role of radio in psychological warfare and clandestine communications.

In terms of secret activities, the most revealing part of this Memorandum is not the text but the organizational chart accompanying it. Where one would expect frankness, he gets obscurity, and vice versa. Hence, the coordination of information—the main subject of the paper—is entrusted to directors of “Collection and Distribution” and of “Classification and Interpretation”; and the radio weapon is the province of the “Director of Supplementary Activities”; whereas the chart shows what the text nowhere mentions, namely, the two directors of “Mail, Radio, Cable Interception (Censorship)” and of “Codes and Cyphers.” Only the “Director of Economic Warfare Material” accurately reflects its textual counterpart.

Presumably Donovan sent this Memorandum to the President on or shortly after 10 June. At least on the next day FDR told Grace Tully that he wanted to see Ben Cohen, old friend, adviser, and legal draftsman, before he returned to his London post and “also Bill Donovan.”⁶ Presumably again, at least in the light of subsequent events, the President wanted to see both men on the same matter. On 13 June, Donovan told Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who wanted Donovan to take the full-time job of running the Treasury’s Bond Drive in New York State, that he first wanted to tell the Secretary “something about the President.”⁷ Again, on the 17th Donovan told the importunate Secretary that he was in Washington “today because I’m supposed to have a date this morning . . .” to which the Secretary interjected the knowing “uh uh” and Donovan replied with “That’s the reason you haven’t heard from me.”⁸ Actually, it was not until 12:30 the next day that Donovan and Cohen, accompanied by Secretary of the Navy Knox, met with the President.⁹

What went on in that meeting? Unfortunately, there is no nice transcript of the proceedings; nor is there any indication as to how long or detailed and orderly the proceedings were. Indeed, given the reputation of meetings with the President, there could have been a good deal of what Robert Sherwood called “wildly irrelevant” talk.¹⁰ Still, there are four accounts within the first two days of the meeting, and these show that all went well for the Colonel’s plan and provide us with basic information on just what the President and Donovan agreed the latter was to do.

President Roosevelt Agrees

Surely the most important is the note which the President dashed off on the cover sheet of the Memorandum and addressed to “J. B. Jr.,” who was John Blandford, Jr., the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget: “Please set this up *confidentially* with Ben Cohen—military—not O.E.M.” It was initialed

⁶ Memorandum from Roberta Barrows to Gen. Watson, 11 June 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.) PPF 6558 (William J. Donovan).

⁷ Transcribed telephone conversation between Morgenthau and Graves, 13 June 1941, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., Diary (Roosevelt Library), Book 408, p. 4 (CLOSED).

⁸ Telcon between Morgenthau and Donovan, *ibid.*, Book 408, pp. 151-52.

⁹ *Composite Presidential Diary*, Roosevelt Papers.

¹⁰ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (Harper, New York, 1950, p. 265).

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"FDR."¹¹ (Fig. 1.) Thus, the President underwrote Donovan's 934 words and the chart; and then he added that the new Service was to have a military flavor and was not to be part of the Office of Emergency Management, which had been set up a year earlier as a framework for running the numerous new war agencies.

The next two accounts come from Donovan, the first directly, and the second indirectly. On the 20th, Donovan called Secretary Morgenthau in order to establish liaison with the Treasury's intelligence department and prefaced his request with this awkwardly worded explanation: "I just wanted to tell you myself that along the lines that you and I talked, the President accepted in totem (sic) . . ." ¹² We shall see as we go along that Donovan was firmly convinced that he and FDR had agreed on many things that were not explicitly put forth in the original Memorandum.

Even before this conversation with Morgenthau, indeed, some time on the 18th itself, Donovan had given a more substantive briefing on the day's proceedings to a very interested observer. This was William S. Stephenson, a Canadian who was serving in the United States as His Majesty's Director of British Security Coordination (BSC); actually he was the head of British intelligence in this country. Moreover, he had played a major role in persuading Donovan to recommend and take on the job of running America's first foreign intelligence establishment. Donovan, with a Presidential mandate in his pocket, so preoccupied as to forget to call the impatient Morgenthau, and hustling off to New York on a 3:30 flight, nevertheless found time to talk with Stephenson, who that night cabled London: "Donovan saw President today and after long discussion wherein all points were agreed, he accepted appointment. He will be coordinator of all forms [of] intelligence including offensive operations equivalent SO-2 [sabotage]. He will hold rank of Major General and will be responsible only to the President." Here at last is a direct statement of Donovan's function as an intelligence chief; what is meant by "all forms [of] intelligence" must be gathered from Stephenson's own organization, which he had in mind in his dealings with Donovan, and BSC was responsible for "secret" intelligence, counterintelligence, propaganda, and "special operations." Here also is the first reference to Donovan as Major General, a promotion which, as we shall see, the military managed to forestall.¹³

The last fresh account comes indirectly and largely from Ben Cohen, but it also reflects John Blandford's understanding of what the President wanted done. Cohen had been directed, on the 18th, to work with the acting director of the Bureau of the Budget, who, in turn, was personally directed on the morning of the 19th to work with Cohen. Consequently, later that morning Cohen met with Blandford and two of the latter's subordinates, Donald C. Stone and Bernard L. Gladioux. It was Gladioux who summarized the conference.¹⁴

Three paragraphs are particularly worth quoting, because they shed additional light on what the President had discussed with Donovan. The first raises

¹¹ Records of OSS, Bureau of the Budget, Box 23, Folder 211. These records referred to hereafter as BOB Records.

¹² Telcon between Morgenthau and Donovan, Morgenthau Diary, Book 411, pp. 67-71.

¹³ "COI," Ch. VIII.

¹⁴ Memorandum of "Conference with Ben Cohen on Strategic Information." BOB Records, Folder 210.

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Donovan

6/10/41

J. B. J.
I have set this
up confidentially
with Gen. Cohen -
Military - not
C. S. M.
JWA

Fig. 1 Roosevelt's Covering Note.

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a subject which may surprise the modern reader, who is accustomed to CIA's absorption in *foreign* activities:

"Cohen has tried to keep the [domestic] morale function separate from strategic information. However, the President has apparently been struck by the thought that Donovan might take the morale job on temporarily or at least for exploratory purposes. He will cooperate with La Guardia on the morale and propaganda aspects. At least we do not need to take La Guardia and his activities into account in setting up this service."

This, of course, is not the place to tell the story of the establishment of the Office of Civil Defense, and of the appointment and activity of New York's Mayor Fiorello La Guardia as that Office's first Director. Suffice it to say that "the morale function" and civilian defense had long been bruited about in the upper echelons of the government as needs that the President had been slow in satisfying. Donovan, along with others, had been considered for the job, although he may or may not have known it. Even so, Donovan apparently took quite readily to the idea of responsibility for domestic morale, inasmuch as his concept of what needed to be done was not, at least at this time, divided into the foreign and domestic fields. This was total war, and there had to be unity in the response. Hence, his memorandum of 10 June had spoken of his proposed "central enemy intelligence organization" collecting information directly or indirectly through other government departments "at home and abroad"; and, as will be seen, he had the same unified approach to the subject of economic defense information.

Conflict with New Economic Agency

This can be seen, albeit dimly, in the next two paragraphs from Gladioux; these raise the question of the relationship between COI and a new agency to handle economic defense, which, like civilian defense, had long been agitating some of the President's advisors. Wrote Gladioux:

We were particularly concerned about the relationship of this new agency to the Office of Economic Defense, since so much of the strategic information required will relate to economic defense problems . . . Cohen believes that there is nothing here to interfere with the setting up of the economic defense agency. He believes, however, that the Office of Economic Defense would get much of its information from this service.

Even so, Cohen was worried; in the next paragraph: "Cohen agrees that it would be unfortunate if this proposal were to preclude the establishment of the Office of Economic Defense, and thinks that the present Economic Defense Order should be approved." It was; six weeks later, on 30 July, the President signed the order establishing the Economic Defense Board (EDB); and what kind of functions were given this organization whose future was at one time put in doubt by the appearance of Donovan's COI? The list is impressive, if one thinks of them as somehow subsumed under the umbrella of the Coordinator of Information: advise the President on economic defense measures; coordinate the government's activities in this field; develop integrated plans and programs for coordinated action by the agencies of government; advise the President on the relationship of economic defense measures to *postwar economic reconstruction*; and review and recommend economic defense legislation! As late as the day FDR signed the EDB order, Gladioux was reporting that Vice President

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Wallace, who was to head the Board, wanted to know how Donovan's plans for "extensive economic defense activities" squared with EDB's charter.¹⁵

In conclusion, then, our earliest accounts of FDR's meeting with Donovan on 18 June show the President endorsing the appointment of a "Coordinator of Strategic Information" with a vaguely-worded mandate to coordinate information, do something with radio, carry on all forms of intelligence including sabotage, have something to do with domestic propaganda, and to be somehow involved in economic defense matters. This vagueness of function did not bedevil the drafters of the COI charter, simply because the President and Donovan had apparently agreed to put precious little in writing. How little was put in writing we will see when we review the drafting of the order.

The Drafting Stage: 19 June - 3 July 1941

The business was in the hands of Cohen and the men from the Budget Bureau—Blandford, Stone, and Gladieux—and was coordinated chiefly, if not solely, with the military, especially the Army, and of course with Donovan himself. The process of drafting lasted from 19 June to 3 July when the drafters' handiwork was forwarded to the President for approval and signature. It would be most useful if the surviving documents showed clearly all the changes that were made and by whom they were made; as it is, the record, while instructive, is incomplete.

The process began with a "Brief Outline of a Service of Strategic Information Based on Memorandum Submitted by Colonel Donovan."¹⁶ There is no need to recapitulate this, except for one point, because it is basically a re-organization of Donovan's paper in terms of an order to be signed by the President and also because all the items will show up more clearly as the drafting process is reviewed. The one exceptional point is the relatively lengthy gloss on the six units which, according to Donovan's chart, were to be set up in COI. This gloss adds a few words which must have emanated from the Roosevelt-Donovan meeting. Mail, radio, and cable interception required a special unit "because of the need of especially close and immediate cooperation with the radio and postal authorities"; and the "specialized character" of codes and cyphers also required a special unit. So also with "A Unit of Economic Warfare Materials" which was being set up to provide all agencies concerned with such warfare "the widest and most comprehensive range of informational materials"; it was pointed out that the Coordinator would not coordinate such activities, "but his work should greatly facilitate such coordination." The supplementary activities unit would handle activities "not now being covered by any service or department"; and these activities "would probably involve principally activities in foreign countries calculated to assist friendly elements and to retard and undermine hostile elements. Such activities necessarily would have to be conducted along unorthodox lines, but with the greatest possible circumspection."

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this review of the six units is that no mention of the business of intercepting communications, of codes and cyphers, of economic warfare, or of the delicate nature of special operations will appear

¹⁵ "Memorandum for the President," 30 July 1941. See Note 38, *infra*.

¹⁶ BOB Records, Folder 210. While undated and unsigned, the document clearly originated at the time mentioned.

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in the writing and re-writing of the Presidential order. We cannot go on to that work without first calling attention to the pious hope with which it ended: "The work of the Service should not require an unusually large staff. . ."

Actual drafting began with two drafts, testing whether the final order should be an Executive Order establishing the agency in the Executive Office of the President, or a Military Order designating Col. Donovan to perform certain functions. The former established a "Strategic Information Service" in the President's Office, based the order on the President's authority as derived from the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and did not specifically mention Donovan. According to the Military Order, "Colonel William J. Donovan" was "hereby designated as Coordinator of Strategic Information," and this was done by virtue of FDR's position as President and Commander-in-Chief. Under both orders, Donovan had the same three functions: (1) to collect, review, and analyze information bearing on "national defense strategy"; (2) to interpret and correlate such "strategic" data and to make it available to the President and other agencies of the government; and (3) to carry out, when requested by the President, "such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of strategic information not now available to the Government." Incidentally, these "supplementary activities," about which there was no argument, referred to the open collection or purchase through agents of information to be used in conducting a psychological counteroffensive, and to subversion and sabotage to be carried out in wartime against the Axis military, political, and industrial machine; the term did *not* refer to a worldwide secret intelligence service, which, as a matter of fact, Donovan did not undertake to establish until so requested by the Army and Navy in September 1941. Finally, both orders provided that other agencies would make available the data required by the Coordinator, and that the Coordinator could appoint such advisory committees as he thought necessary.

In following these preliminary drafts through to the final paper, it may help the reader to single out beforehand the recurring problems as well as the "nonproblems." In this last category, the provisions for ensuring access to data and the appointment of advisory committees caused no problems; this is also largely true of the three functions except as their description was tailored to ease a concern of the Army's. What did bother people were: the type of order, the name of the new service, the kind of reference to Donovan—his name, title, his status as civilian or military—and the relationship to the military services.

While it now is anybody's guess, it appears that Blandford and his associates made a choice as between the two orders and then submitted that choice, a Military Order, to Ben Cohen on the 23rd. (Fig. 2) On that day Blandford and Cohen revised the document, and on the 24th Blandford sent his co-worker several clean copies of the revision.¹⁷ The chief, and perhaps only substantive, revision may have appeared to them as half style and half the necessity of establishing the military character of Donovan's position. Instead of starting out with "Colonel William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator of Strategic Information," the revision began, after the preamble, with "There is hereby established the position of Coordinator. . .," and was then ended with this brand new line: "William J. Donovan, United States Army, is hereby designated as Coordinator of Strategic Information." The military, however, were soon to

¹⁷ Memorandum from Blandford to Cohen, 24 June 1941, *ibid.*

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Donovan

MILITARY ORDER

6-23-41
Master for General Donovan
6-24-41

DESIGNATING A COORDINATOR OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. ~~There is hereby established the position of~~

Coordinator of Strategic Information, with authority to collect and analyze information and ^{military or otherwise,} data which may bear upon national defense strategy; to interpret and correlate such strategic information and data, and to make it available to the President and to such other officials as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of strategic information not now available to the Government. The Coordinator of Strategic Information shall perform these duties and responsibilities, which ~~are~~ ^{include those}

#4
~~of a military character,~~ under the direction and supervision of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

2. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Coordinator of Strategic Information such information and data relating to national defense strategy as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.

3. The Coordinator of Strategic Information may appoint such committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.

→ 4.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June , 1941.

Fig. 2. Budget Bureau's Draft Order.

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knock out the "United States Army," as well as other military aspects of the Order. Indeed, the Army was to strip it of any military character.

To see how that happened, we must turn our attention away from the draftsmen to Colonel Donovan and some of the top people in the Army and Navy. On Friday, the 20th of June, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, that the President was "going to appoint Donovan as coordinator of all military, naval, and other intelligence," and that he, Knox, favored it. Stimson, an old friend of Donovan's, a person who enjoyed discussing the military strategy of the current war with him, noted in his diary that "I told him [Knox] that I was inclined to favor it because I trusted Donovan."¹⁸ Two days later, on a Sunday afternoon, Donovan talked with Stimson about what the latter described as Donovan's coming appointment as "Coordinator of Intelligence." They talked for two hours; Donovan explained his plan; Stimson read "his analysis of what he intended to do," and noted that "I think there is a good chance of very useful service." Stimson further observed that he was "particularly glad that the President has landed on a man for whom I have such respect and confidence as Donovan, and with whom I think we can work so satisfactorily in respect to our own intelligence branches in the Army and Navy."¹⁹ Trouble and doubt, however, lay just ahead—two days, in fact.

Marshall Objects

On 24 June, Stimson had an early conference with his Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, who then told him "about a subject which has evidently been worrying him very much and making him extremely angry." That, of course, was Donovan's appointment as "Coordinator for Intelligence." Here it must be interjected that for three months there had been considerable talk within the services, the FBI, State, and other agencies that Donovan was pushing such a project, and there was unanimity among the concerned agencies that such an eventuality ought to be sabotaged. It is, in fact, interesting to note that FDR, in making his decision to set up Donovan as COI, did not consult any of the interested parties, with the possible exception of Donovan's friend at court, Secretary of Navy Knox. Hence, when Marshall is described as having been "worrying very much," it is reasonably safe to assume that he had long been familiar with the rumors circulating in the corridors and that the announcement of the fact simply brought things to the proverbial head. Be that as it may, Stimson tried to re-assure Marshall that "the project did not seem to be so bad." He chewed the matter over in his diary:

But it has come to Marshall evidently in the wrong end to, and he saw behind it an effort to supplant his responsibilities and duties in direct connection with the Commander-in-Chief. There is certainly a danger in this proposition in case both men are not tactful and fair to each other but I think it probably can be avoided—those risks I mean—and certainly the proposition of checking up the Intelligence which we get from our military G-2 and Navy Information Service [sic] ought to be accomplished. I mean there are many economics and other bits of information through the world which would bear directly upon the military intelligence and its accuracy which comes to us. I afterwards had a talk with Knox about it. He of course is a

¹⁸ Henry L. Stimson Diary (Yale University, New Haven, Conn.), Vol. 34, entry for 20 June 1941.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 22 June 1941.

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close friend of Donovan and he is very hot for the project and thinks that it is all wrong to be suspicious of it.²⁰

Marshall must have gotten his point across, as is shown by the following quotation from Stimson's diary for 25 June; it is a long one, but the reader will surely find it interesting:

Either this morning or yesterday Marshall came in to voice his objections to the Donovan proposition and they were very vigorous—relating to the danger of giving to any other military man than the regular channels access to the President with military information. I had been thinking of the matter myself and had come to the conclusion that, although the purpose of getting a collection of economic, political, and other information available to check off against our present G-2 information was a very laudable and fruitful project, yet this plan of Donovan's may be not the right way to do it. So, when a little later Benjamin V. Cohen came in to see me at the suggestion of the President with a draft Executive Order for my examination and criticism, I looked at it with care and worked the thing out in my own mind, with the result that I finally told Cohen that I thought it was such bad planning from the standpoint of military administration that I should not favor it unless Donovan was kept in a purely civilian capacity; that I disapproved wholly of having him made a Major General simultaneously with this assumption of this position of Coordinator of Information. The proposed draft was full of language treating the function as if it were a military one. I told Cohen that this plainly resulted in giving the President two Chiefs of Staff: one, the regular one and one, an irregular one, because no military man could go to the President with military information without giving at the same time some views in the nature of advice based upon that information. I told Cohen that I thought the thing might be worked out if the Coordinator were kept purely as a civilian. I told him also that I was a friend of Donovan's and that I sympathized with his ultimate ambition to get into the fighting if fighting came and that I would have no objection to recommending him at that time as a Major General; but that I was wholly against combining in his person the function of being a Major General and being a Coordinator of Information.

Cohen seemed to realize the strength of my argument and said he would go over it and take the military phrases out. I suggested particularly that they should also add a phrase to the effect in substance that nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Information should in any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers to the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Later in the morning I called up Knox who had been very warmly seconding this project to put Donovan into this position and I told him of my views on the subject as thus expressed. Knox, who had been quite rampant on the subject in favor of immediate action on behalf of Donovan saw my point and cooled down.²¹

The Navy Secretary may have "cooled down," but he did not remain quiet. The same day that he talked with Stimson—whether before or after is not known—he asked the President to send a letter to Secretaries Hull, Morgenthau, and Stimson and to Attorney-General Jackson "outlining just what the Coordinator of Strategic Information will do." He explained that all those regular departments "have their hackles up over the danger that somebody is going to take something away from them." He also indicated that he had "already encountered some misunderstandings in the Navy Department over the premature publicity given out concerning Bill Donovan's new job." Nor was he "able to completely convince the Navy people that the major project" the President had in mind "was one of coordination, analysis and digestion of information

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 24 June 1941.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 25 June 1941.

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procured from various Departments.” Finally, he expressed the thought that the letter he proposed would “make it a good deal easier for Bill when he gets on the job.”²²

Three days later, FDR asked Harold D. Smith, the Director of the Budget, “to do the necessary for my signature.”²³ But before pursuing that matter let us return to Ben Cohen as he left Stimson and went back to his office and the Budget Bureau to revise the military order to make Marshall and Stimson less unhappy with its character and provisions. (Figs. 3A, 3B.)

Ben Cohen's Revisions

First of all, it remained a Military Order, but eleven times Cohen struck the word “strategic” from the document, and replaced it, depending on the context, by “defense” or “national security.” This changed Donovan’s title to “Coordinator of Defense Information” and related his activity to “national security” rather than the “hard” subject of military strategy. He did retain the line that the Coordinator “shall perform his duties and responsibilities, which include those of a military character, under the direction and supervision of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” but he added the sentence requested by Stimson, namely, that nothing in those duties would in any way interfere with “the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of the President as Commander in Chief. . .” As we shall see, only this last sentence actually survived.

The Budget Bureau cleaned up the paper, and on the 27th returned a copy to Cohen and sent other copies to both Stimson and Knox. In the letters to the Secretaries, Blandford said he understood that the drafts were to be used “as a basis of discussion with your associates . . . over the week end.” He hoped that the order could be put in final form for the President when he returned from Hyde Park early the next week. He was, however, to be disappointed.²⁴

For almost a week, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy continued to chew over the subject. On Monday, the 30th, when FDR returned to Washington, Stimson was noting in his diary that the Donovan business was “a troublesome matter even with the best of luck. I am afraid of it.” That evening he told the President on the telephone that he had decided “it would be a great mistake” to set up the COI with Donovan as a military man. As a civilian, yes, but Stimson asked the President to do nothing about it until they had a chance to discuss it.²⁵

The next morning Stimson had a long talk with Marshall again—at least the third, possibly the fourth—and his brief account leaves us with unsatisfied curiosity. He said he explained to the General “how important it was for his own—Marshall’s—sake that there should not be a sharp issue made on this.”²⁶ May one not conclude that Marshall continued to express Army opposition to the very existence of COI? Certainly he remained very hostile to the idea.

Stimson spent “a good deal of the morning and afternoon” of the next day, 2 July, talking over the matter with both the General and Assistant Secretary

²² Knox to Roosevelt, 25 June 1941, Roosevelt Papers, OF 4485(OSS) Box 1.

²³ Roosevelt to Smith, 28 June 1941, *ibid.*, PPF 6558 (William J. Donovan).

²⁴ Smith to Stimson, 27 June 1941, BOB Records, Folder 210.

²⁵ Stimson Diary, Vol. 34, 30 June 1941.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1 July 1941.

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6-24-41

President for 6/27/41

MILITARY ORDER

Defense

DESIGNATING A COORDINATOR OF ~~STRATEGIC~~ INFORMATION

Franklin D. Roosevelt

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator of ~~Strategic~~ *Defense* Information, with authority to collect and analyze information and data, military or otherwise, which may bear upon national ~~defense strategy~~ *Security*; to interpret and correlate such strategic information and data, and to make ~~it~~ *such information and data* available to the President and to such other officials as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of ~~strategic information~~ *important for national security* not now available to the Government.

2. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Coordinator of ~~Strategic~~ *Defense* Information such information and data relating to national ~~defense strategy~~ *Security* as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.

3. The Coordinator of ~~Strategic~~ *Defense* Information may appoint such committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.

Fig. 3A. Ben Cohen's Revisions.

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4. The Coordinator of ~~Strategic~~ Information shall perform ^{his} these duties and responsibilities, which include those of a military character, under the direction and supervision of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

5. Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Coordinator of ~~Strategic~~ ^{Defense} Information by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.

6. William J. Donovan, United States Army, is hereby designated as Coordinator of ~~Strategic~~ ^{Defense} Information.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June , 1941,

Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Defense Information shall in any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of the President as Commander-in-chief of the Army & Navy.

Fig. 3B.

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McCloy, and finally arranged to see Donovan the next morning at 8:30 in order to "settle the thing one way or another." It was surely bothering him: "It is a terrible nuisance to have this thrown on me at this time but it is so important that I have got to settle it in the right way."²⁷

For a change, that was not going to be difficult. When Stimson and McCloy, but not Marshall, met at 8:30 with Donovan, "everybody was fair-minded." They "very quickly" agreed on "the general principles and what should be done." Donovan said he had thought from the beginning that his position was essentially and entirely a civilian one; that he had taken up the "point of rank of Major General because the President had suggested it." Either then or later in the conversation, Stimson offered to recommend Donovan for Major General any time he "wanted to fight"; indeed, if Donovan wanted to do it now and give up COI, he could have "one of the most difficult positions" in the Army, specifically, command of the 44th Division. The Colonel admitted that he was interested in developing a theory of guerrilla warfare which he had but that he preferred now to stay with the information job, "make something real out of it," and then turn to fighting and a commission later.²⁸ A lesser man than Stimson might, at this time, have been suspected of attempted bribery!

But back to the meeting. Donovan also agreed to a "diagram" which Marshall had drawn up and given Stimson and which McCloy had now brought forth; this showed "the relation of the different positions to each other in the hierarchy of the War Department." Stimson's diary is unclear, but apparently this diagram showed that "the routine channels for the recommendations as to intelligence and information were to be coordinated by Donovan as they came" from the collectors—the Army, Navy, etc.—"and then should go up through the channels, through the Joint Board and then through the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Operations of the Navy, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, to the President." Even so, all agreed that Donovan had to have access to the President whenever he desired it, because it "was necessary to his position, and the President's temperament and characteristics" would make it inevitable.²⁹

Agreement at last. Later the same day Colonel Donovan met with Ben Cohen and the Budget Bureau's trio—Blandford, Stone, and Gladieux—to finish the paperwork. The "final revised draft," however, had not been returned by Assistant Secretary McCloy, who apparently was still discussing it with Stimson. The Bureau had hoped to receive the paper in the afternoon, clear it, and "send it immediately to Hyde Park."³⁰

Donovan Outlines his Plans

Pending the paper's return, Donovan elaborated on his needs and his plans, but only those remarks which bear on his orders will be noted here. The point has been made that, while the main thrust of Donovan's work was aimed at the foreign field, he did not think in terms of a clean distinction between foreign and domestic. Hence, his concept of a system for the coordination of informa-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2 July 1941.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3 July 1941.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Memorandum of "Conference with Colonel J. Donovan and Ben Cohen," 3 July 1941, BOB Records, Folder 212.

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tion envisaged “various operating sections,” apparently in Washington but also “apply[ing] in zones throughout the country,” feeding information into “a central clearing section.” Also in connection with this function, he planned to have the Librarian of Congress work in liaison with “all libraries and scholars of the country”; the University of Chicago was to be “the map-making unit of the Coordinator’s Office.”

On a second point, Donovan explained the offensive side of his work, broadcasting to Europe, in which incidentally Robert Sherwood and William Shirer were to be used because of—according to Gladieux’ account of Donovan’s remark—their knowledge of the grammar requirements! “Psychological warfare,” said Donovan, “will be started on all fronts”; did he mean the domestic front also?

On a third point, “The President expressed his desire to Donovan,” wrote Gladieux, “that he set up a Committee on ‘economics of the future.’” Donovan was not, however, to have easy sledding on this subject.

Some time later on the 3rd McCloy’s draft was returned to the drafting crew. Some significant changes had been made. The “Military Order” was now just an “Order.” So also, the “Coordinator of Defense Information” was now just the “Coordinator of Information.” The COI, instead of making his information available “to the President and to such other officials as the President may determine,” now sent his productions “to the Joint Planning Division of the Joint Army and Navy Board, and to such departments and officials of the Government and other officials as the President may determine.” Surely, Donovan must have hit the ceiling when he saw that insertion! Again, the COI was to carry out his supplementary activities “when requested by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy. . . .” The sentence about the COI performing his duties, “which include those of a military character,” under the President as Commander in Chief, was excised; and there was left standing in that paragraph only the guarantee that the COI would not interfere with the President’s regular military and naval advisors. In the last paragraph a subtle difference must have been intended when “William J. Donovan, United States Army,” was changed to “Colonel William J. Donovan” and “designated as Coordinator of Defense [*sic*] Information.”

Donovan and the others apparently quickly went to work on these changes. The “Order” was now eliminated, so now there was no indication what was being issued! They accepted elimination of “Defense” from the title of the new post. They excised the wholesale insertion of reporting to the Joint Planning Division and responding to the requests of the President and the Service Secretaries. They accepted McCloy’s Paragraph 4. (See Figure 3 above.) Finally, it was just “William J. Donovan” who was designated COI. The job was clearly not military.

The Final Version

The wrap-up must have gone quickly; for, still on the 3rd, Harold D. Smith, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, sent to the President the finished product and a proposed statement for the press.⁸¹ In his letter Smith observed that since the appointment rested on the President’s authority as Commander

⁸¹ Smith to Roosevelt, 3 July 1941, *Ibid.*, Folder 210.

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in Chief, "it should be issued as a Military Order." Be that as it may, it appeared officially, and so it appears today, simply as an undenominated Presidential act "Designating a Coordinator of Information." (Appendix B)

On the second point raised by Smith there is no ambiguity or room for argument:

While both the Army and Navy objected to our original title for Colonel Donovan of Coordinator of *Strategic* Information or Coordinator of *Defense* Information, I think either of these titles is preferable to the one used in this Order as now presented. "Coordinator of Information" is vague and is not descriptive of the work Colonel Donovan will perform.

The statement which Smith had readied for the press was a combination of three bland and one strong announcements. The first simply iterated the functions of COI as the collection, assembling, and collation of data bearing on national security and the fulfillment by Donovan of such extra activities as the President might from time to time request of him. The strong assertion was the assurance given the General Staff, the regular intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and all other government agencies that Donovan's work "is not intended to supersede or to duplicate, or to involve any direction of or interference with" their own activities. This was also intended to blunt the expected opposition of some Congressional critics of the Administration.

The line about the extra activities Donovan might be asked to render caught the attention of FDR's press secretary Steve Early before he passed it on, and so he wrote the President: "Is this sentence necessary? It won't be clear to many and will lead to much questioning." Harry Hopkins agreed "with Steve that [the sentence] should be eliminated from [the] release."³²

Smith's letter to the President also stated that his Bureau was preparing letters to the various departments requesting their cooperation with Donovan, as Secretary Knox had asked several days earlier. This letter, which was sent to 16 departments on 14 July—three days after COI was officially established—reiterated the points made in the press release, that he was going to coordinate data and not going to upset anybody else.³³

Although the work of drafting was completed on the 3rd, it was not until the 11th that the President actually signed the document. There is no indication of the reason for the delay, and it is assumed here that simply the press of the Presidential calendar accounted for it. There had of course already been some public expectation of a forthcoming announcement, and the coverage in the *New York Times* provides us with a contemporary view of what COI looked like. On 6 July the Associated Press reported that Colonel Donovan was "slated for a big post." The only clue to its character was "the reports for some time that . . . Donovan would head a new anti-spy agency." According to these reports, Donovan was to "coordinate a staff of investigators" in the Justice, Treasury, State, and military and naval departments. The rest of the article tied the expected job in with spies, the FBI case load, and Donovan's own investigations of the Fifth Column the year before.³⁴

³² Early's notation appears on the press release Smith sent the President, and Hopkins appended his note to Smith's letter.

³³ BOB Records, Folder 210.

³⁴ *New York Times*, 6 July 1941, p. 16, cols. 2-3.

On 9 July the *Times*' own staff had a better grasp on the shape of things to come. It had a name which had never been contemplated, however—"Coordinator of Intelligence Information." It did know that the new job was to be "without precedent in the government's operations," and was well-informed enough to know that his duties were "sufficiently elastic to take in such future possibilities as counterespionage operations and, perhaps, direction of some economic programs." His primary task, however, was to take other departments' reports and present them to the President in unified and manageable form.⁸⁵

Even on the 12th, the *Times* could not get the new post properly titled; now it was the rejected "Coordinator of Defense Information." Donovan's "relatively small staff" was to "supervise" and "digest" reports for the President. He had told associates that "the scattered reports which came to his desk often were hopelessly confusing."⁸⁶

In concluding this second portion of our inquiry, it must be clear that as far as clarifying the content of Donovan's original instructions from the President is concerned, the process of drafting the order of 11 July 1941 added nothing to the knowledge either of the drafters themselves or of us who now read the record. The decision to put nothing in writing meant, of course, that the resolution of many uncertainties and ambiguities would not take place in the drafting but would, in effect, simply be pushed under the rug to be turned up later as people went about the business of handling the many irons Donovan had in the fire: coordination of data, counterintelligence, subversive action, sabotage, all kinds of foreign and domestic propaganda, economic warfare, economics of the future, and a few sleepers which had not yet surfaced—planning military strategy, and "the writing of the peace!"

Organizing COI: July–September 1941

With the issuance of the 11 July order, Donovan could now intensify his organizational activity. He had, of course, already had numerous discussions with prospective colleagues on the job he was to do and the structure that would be needed. He was certainly in touch with the head of British Intelligence, William S. Stephenson, on organizing clandestine activities. He had already agreed with the dramatist, the presidential speechwriter, Robert Sherwood, on setting up what became the Foreign Information Service. He had met with officials of the Library of Congress on drawing on the resources of the American academic community for the research and analysis job.

It was not, however, until he and his associates had entered on a new phase of their negotiations with the Bureau of the Budget, that is, on setting up COI, that specific jurisdictional conflicts with other agencies began to take shape. This occurred on 16 July when Donovan and his colleagues—Sherwood, Atherton Richards, Thomas G. Early, and Ernest S. Griffith, the Director of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress—held three conferences with Budget officials to outline their plans and to obtain necessary guidance from the Bureau on organizational necessities.

These conferences began the laborious process of defining functions, drawing organizational charts, establishing budgets, fixing salaries, renting space, and

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 10 July p. 12, col. 3.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 12 July, p. 5, col. 1.

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purchasing equipment. Of course we are not going into these ramifications of the early history of COI; they would carry us well beyond our narrow concern with the content of the agreement reached on 18 June by Roosevelt and Donovan. This organizational development is but the context out of which we must pluck the indicators of Donovan's understanding of his assignment.

These indicators first show up in the reports of the 16 July conferences which were written by William O. Hall, the Budget officer who handled COI matters extensively and who will be quoted frequently in the next several pages.³⁷ We will single out from Hall's memoranda three topics which raise the question of Donovan's area of jurisdiction: "the morale function," postwar planning, and economic warfare.

The business of morale, as has been mentioned, had long been agitating many of Roosevelt's top advisors. For them some organization and activity were needed. La Guardia and the Office of Civilian Defense were finally settled upon, but the boundaries of activity were apparently clear in nobody's mind, least of all the President's. Hence it was that on the 16th the subject of morale came up in a discussion of COI's need for "country experts," and in that connection the name of Robert Lynd, the author of *Middletown* and *Middletown in Transition*, was mentioned. According to Hall, Griffith of the Legislative Reference Service then "stated that he (Lynd) was an authority on domestic sociological problems, but that he had no knowledge in the foreign field." Hall then adds:

Donovan stated that this would fit very well into the President's plans. The President has told Donovan that he is to investigate the state of domestic (U.S.) morale and formulate plans for the domestic morale program. These plans will then be forwarded to Mayor La Guardia (civil defense) for execution. Accordingly, Griffith should plan to set up a Domestic Morale Unit and Lynd would be a good man to head that unit, according to Donovan.

So much for the time being for COI's morale function; let us turn to the second topic singled out: postwar planning. This is another large topic that had been agitating people inside and outside of the government. The thinking ran roughly like this: in 1919 Versailles had not ushered in a new world; instead, the settlement simply generated and aggravated economic conditions which made another war inevitable; now, in 1941, history must not be allowed to repeat itself; therefore, a start must be made on planning the economic rehabilitation of the world once Nazism has been destroyed. The big question was who should do the planning, and how he should proceed. Donovan clearly had thoughts on the matter. Hence, on the 16th, Atherton Richards, who was then apparently slated to head COI's economic division, a major component, was asked by Donovan "to state the needs of his unit for postwar planning." Richards, an Hawaiian-born businessman admittedly without experience in government research, was not too clear on his requirements; he did know that the chief of the division would get \$9,000 per year, two assistants would each get \$7,500, and nine special assistants would be hired at \$6,500 each. What is most significant from our point of view is the fact, however awkwardly stated, that "these men would be assigned on the basis of general divisions of our economy to developments in the various departments and agencies in postwar planning and to coordinate the efforts of government, industry and labor."

³⁷ BOB Records, Folder 212. These reports are all dated 16 July 1941; it is possible, however, that one of the conferences occurred on 15 July.

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The third topic, economic defense and economic warfare, was just as large as the other two, and Richards was no clearer on this than on postwar planning. "After discussion with Colonel Donovan . . . concerning the possibilities of economic warfare organization," wrote Hall, "Richards stated that further amplification of his estimates for the Economics Division would be necessary." Hall himself did not appear to be too clear on just what "economic defense" and "economic warfare" actually were, but this is not surprising inasmuch as there was considerable confusion on just what the government should do at one and the same time to aid Britain economically, deny economic resources to the Axis, sustain the American economy, and still mobilize the economy for preparedness and, if necessary, war. Hall, after hearing Sherwood's explanation of his propaganda activities and needs, thought immediately in terms of economic warfare because "any activities in propaganda warfare must be directed at economic objectives." As will be seen, Donovan's interests in economics was considerably broader than propaganda. Anyhow, Hall concluded that "Sherwood's activities must be closely coordinated with the economic warfare agency, whether it be OED [Office of Economic Defense] or State-Treasury-Commerce-Export control, Federal Loan or Federal Reserve." Hall had another worry on his mind: except for Sherwood, Donovan's staff did not strike him as "particularly able;" and Donovan had "a tendency to commit himself too quickly on personnel and financial arrangements"; worse still, found Hall, a 27-year-old administrative officer, the 57-year-old Donovan "probably lacks the general background which should be present in the person directing the propaganda and economic warfare activities."

Budget Bureau Concerned Over Conflicts

Within two weeks, the Bureau of the Budget was sufficiently concerned by the tendency of COI to "impinge so directly upon a variety of activities of existing agencies," that a memorandum for the President was prepared for the signature of the Director, Harold D. Smith.³⁸ While the document was apparently not sent, it still succinctly summarizes some Budget worries that were to persist. First of all, Donovan's request for \$10,000,000 for the first year could not be reconciled with "the original proposal for establishing the office." Secondly, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who was about to be named chairman of the newly-established Economic Defense Board, wanted Smith of the Budget to take up with the President the extent to which he wanted Donovan to "enter the economic defense field;" it was clear to Wallace that Donovan was "planning to carry on extensive economic defense activities . . . with particular reference to the assembly and correlation of information and plans." Thirdly, what about morale? Donovan "is planning a Public Relations Division to deal with problems of domestic information and morale as related to the coordination of strategic information and foreign propaganda;" so how does this square with La Guardia's authorization "to conduct domestic morale programs?" Fourthly, Donovan "is organizing a staff to develop original data on strategic situations in foreign countries," and this "will in some measure duplicate" State, War, and Navy activities. Smith then asked a question which seems to echo the *Times'* expectation that

³⁸ Memorandum for the President, *ibid.* Gladieux prepared this for Smith's signature on 30 July 1941. An illegible note written by Hall and dated 31 July makes the writer uncertain that the memorandum was actually sent.

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Donovan was to "supervise" and "digest" other department's reports for the President: "To what extent should [Donovan] . . . develop such original research reports?"

Whatever the reason was for not forwarding this memorandum to the President, it certainly was not lack of concern on the part of the Budget Bureau. Before August was out, Hall wrote his boss, Bernard L. Gladieux, a memorandum on "Functional Confusion" in COI in which he outlined five areas of conflict with other agencies, cited the causes, and suggested some "correctives for the situation."³⁹ As might be expected, the domestic defense effort and postwar planning were two areas of conflict; here COI was seen to be running into the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the National Resources Planning Board, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, the Office of Production Management, and, of course, the Economic Defense Board. A third area, research on propaganda and undercover activities in South America, wrote Hall, had been "assigned to Nelson Rockefeller," the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. A fourth area was "the coordination of domestic counter-espionage and counter-subversive activities programs" which had been "assigned" to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the fifth area which may strike the reader as the most remarkable function which Donovan allegedly thought was his, namely, "the writing of the peace," which, wrote Hall, had been "assigned" to the Department of State and the EDB. On the margin of this memorandum Gladieux wrote and initialed this most interesting indirect quotation: "Milo Perkins [EDB's "most able, adroit, and energetic"⁴⁰ executive director] told me that Donovan claims the President told him to 'write the Peace' [*sic*], and he certainly is proceeding accordingly." We will see more of this function when we come to consider Hall's subsequent and much longer memorandum of 11 September on COI's conflicts with other agencies.

All this confusion was attributed by Hall to the "general character" of the 11 July order, to the "oral instructions to . . . Donovan from the President, with which we are not familiar," to the "conflicting newspaper reports and . . . rumors" about COI's functions, and to the use of the President's son James as the COI's Liaison Officer with the defense agencies. The 11 July order certainly was not helpful, and the "oral instructions" we do not know to this day. The President's son James was detailed by the Navy, run by Donovan's very good personal friend Frank Knox, to work with Donovan; just how this was accomplished we do not know, but Hall cannot be far wrong when he observed that the young Roosevelt made "it possible for Donovan's assistants to gain entre [*sic*] to any of the defense agencies." Certainly there was confusion both inside and outside the government; the press thought Donovan was going to "digest intelligence reports;" one Senator denounced COI as an Ogpu or Gestapo; Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle warned Under Secretary Welles against Donovan making foreign policy with his propaganda service; elsewhere in State, Secretary Hull was being warned that Donovan's activities in the field of postwar planning would result in "an intermingling of war and post-war problems;" and the Administrator of Export Control was telling his staff that "if rumors are true

³⁹ Memorandum from Hall to Gladieux on "Functional Confusion in the Office for Coordination of Information," 28 August 1941, *ibid*.

⁴⁰ Dean G. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (N.Y.: Norton, 1969), p. 41.

that he [Donovan] is going to take over the La Guardia office, he will be pretty busy.”⁴¹ This last comment reminds us that Donovan intended, indeed, to be “pretty busy,” and that the vigor with which this dedicated man, armed with a Presidential mandate, embarked on a varied program dear to his thinking and heart undoubtedly sowed both confusion and apprehension among settled bureaucrats and able newcomers in other agencies.

Hall’s “suggested correctives” for the situation were two: “a letter or confidential order from the President to Donovan setting forth in clear terms the area in which he is to function;” and “a competent administrative assistant” to end COI’s internal confusion which Hall also found troublesome but with which we have not been concerned in this paper. Gladieux made a second note on this memorandum, and it is another “corrective” for the situation: “Consolidate him [Donovan] with the Economic Defense Board.” This recommendation is, retrospectively, most significant as probably the first written suggestion that the newly-born COI be aborted; the suggestion was to recur, in one way or another, to such an extent that one can almost say that COI’s major success was to have survived.

It may be appropriate here to stress the fact that COI was an unwanted child. The Army, the Navy, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had made it quite plain to the President that they saw no need for such an organization.⁴² There was also no rush on their parts to channel their information, per the 11 July order, into COI in-boxes.⁴³ This uncooperative attitude makes quite plausible Stephenson’s claim that his organization provided COI, before Pearl Harbor and for several months after, with the “bulk” of its secret intelligence.⁴⁴ The other side of the coin of hostility to supplying Donovan with information was Donovan’s own strong determination to get control of that information. His memorandum of 10 June, and indeed the very vagueness of the 11 July order—with its sweeping authorization “to collect and analyze all information . . . which may bear upon national security”—show how much stress this omnivorous reader, this corporation lawyer, this military strategist

⁴¹ The reference to the unnamed Senator is in a memorandum from Early to Roosevelt, 1 August 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PSF (Donovan) (*Closed*). Berle’s warning is in his memorandum to Sumner Wells, 25 July 1941, in Records of the State Department, National Archives, RG 59, File 103.918/2541. The warning to Hull is in a Memorandum from Pasvolsky, “Proposal for the Organization of Work for the Formulation of Post-War Foreign Policies,” 12 September 1941; this can be found in U.S. Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, GPO, 1949), pp. 464-67. The remark by the Administrator is found in the Records of the Economic Defense Board, National Archives, RG 169, Misc. File, Box 6, Information Division Minutes.

⁴² “COI,” Chs. VII and VIII.

⁴³ Here is a sample of this attitude: On 26 December 1941, Captain T. S. Wilkinson, USN, asked Secretary of the Navy Knox, in a memorandum, if Colonel Donovan should be allowed to see the “Daily Bulletin” issued by the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Board.

Knox advised Wilkinson “to dig out the executive order” establishing COI and he would find therein “instructions for both Army and Navy to provide Colonel Donovan with all information in their possession. Under these conditions, it hardly seems necessary for me to instruct you to add his name to those who receive the bulletin. If you feel better about having such instructions, regard this as instructions to that effect.” Found in Navy Records, CNO Central Classified File, Folder A8-3EF13, *Secret*.

⁴⁴ H. Montgomery Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson* (London: Hamilton, 1962), p. 156.

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placed upon a mastery of data. What is probably more relevant to some of the opposition encountered by Donovan is the fact that he did think of information in terms of strategy and was, perhaps, even more interested in the use to which information was put than in the possession of it for its own sake. Moreover, if information was the basis of strategy, strategy had meaning only when it was put into action; and Donovan really wanted to lead troops into battle. Donovan was an activist, and it is, therefore, not surprising that his eagerness to take the mass of new and old information pouring into Washington and convert it into meaningful intelligence which could give direction and strength to military, political, economic, and psychological warfare against the Nazis should bring him smack up against all the monarchs who reigned over domains of knowledge.

This comes out clearly in the memorandum which Hall wrote on 11 September; it is his longest—five pages, single space—and details no less than eleven areas in which Donovan is allegedly exceeding his Presidential authorization, and only two in which he is doing what is his to do! Again, we cannot go into the merits or the details of these issues; we can only single out the indicators of the Donovan agreement with Roosevelt.⁴⁵

The first brings us back to the La Guardia situation; the Office of Civilian Defense was about to give birth to an off-shoot—the Office of Facts and Figures, which was soon to be headed by the poet and head of the Library of Congress, Archibald MacLeish. Until that situation became clear, however, Donovan, according to Hall, “proposes to report to the President and the public” on: production for military and civilian needs, American public opinion, the attitude of the American press toward the defense effort and the administration’s foreign policy, the attitude of U.S. foreign press, and foreign press opinion.

The second is “writing the peace.” Hall writes of Donovan “in his original plans stressing the preparation of ‘the blueprints for a new world order’”; where Donovan did this, however, this writer has not discovered. On the same point, Hall wrote that Donovan’s chief of research and analysis, James P. Baxter, III, “stated confidentially that Donovan would like to undertake another ‘peace inquiry’ like the one directed by Colonel Hause” [*sic*] at the end of the last war.

Next are four areas in which Donovan’s research and reporting activities cause trouble. On Latin America, Donovan’s plans caused Rockefeller’s people to fear not only that their area was being usurped, but also that they were expected henceforth to obtain all their information from COI rather than directly from State, War, Navy, Justice, and Commerce. On the domestic defense production effort, Donovan planned a unit so as to be able to report “to the public and the President.” On a related point, Donovan was described by Atherton Richards as feeling “that one of his responsibilities to the President is reporting on the status of organization for defense . . . on organizational and functional weaknesses;” Richards “anticipates that Donovan will at times recommend changes in the over-all defense organization.” Despite conferences with Milo Perkins, wherein he and Donovan presumably reached agreement on their functions, “Donovan still speaks of providing the Economic Defense Board and the President with economic information” relative to postwar planning.

Hall sketched three areas in which Donovan was moving into policy-making and strategic planning. Indeed, wrote Hall “there has been some indication that

⁴⁵Memorandum from Hall to Gladioux on “Scope and Function of the Office of the Coordinator of Information,” 11 September 1941, BOB Records, Folder 212.

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the Donovan group wishes to supplant the State Department in bringing together the military, naval, geographical, economic, and political information needed for the planning of basic foreign policy." Hall, echoing perhaps others' fears, saw this as Donovan insinuating himself between the President and the Department as did Colonel House in World War I. Next, Hall reported the belief on the part of members of COI's staff and of other agencies that "Donovan's hope is that he will be the planner of basic strategy." The mechanism for this leap to power was to be the coordination committees authorized by the 11 July order and calculated to operate at the highest level in the utilization of data in planning basic strategy. Hall threw in his, or others', estimate that Donovan's relationship with the President would tend to make him the "basic strategy advisor." Finally, Hall saw "some indications" that the Donovan organization hoped to develop as the "high strategy group," which many military and civilian people thought the defense program needed.

The last two of the eleven areas of conflict are relatively minor. Hall considered Donovan's tentative agreement with the military services to unify undercover activities abroad was "a primary accomplishment," but he feared this would interfere with Donovan's "informational strategy planning function." He also had fears about the COI section to produce propaganda motion pictures; "considerable question" could be raised, he said, about the usefulness of such films outside Latin America, and Rockefeller's organization found that such films were less appealing to Latins than commercial and informational films.

After detailing all these problems in four pages, two short paragraphs agreed that Donovan could make "definite contributions" in subversive activities and in psychological and propaganda warfare—radio broadcasting, underground messages, and leaflets—provided he stayed out of Rockefeller's Latin American preserve.

With these paragraphs we come to the end of this early organizational period in which there was so much discussion of and controversy about the legitimate functions of COI. Before trying to summarize these functions, however, it may be well to satisfy the reader's curiosity about how some of the controversies were resolved. First of all, it must be stated that the Bureau of the Budget continued for months to press for a Presidential re-statement of COI's functions. Hall's last memorandum was sent to Director Harold D. Smith, apparently with the recommendation to take it up in substance with FDR. On 14 October there was written, probably by Hall, a draft of a memorandum for the President in which "a number of basic questions" about COI's function were raised for the President's decision.⁴⁶ Then, on 5 November Harold Smith, writing about COI's 1942 budget, suggested to the President that he write a letter or order "precisely defining the Coordinator's assigned area of activity."⁴⁷ Finally, on 28 February 1942, Smith advised the President that such an order was "becoming increasingly necessary" and that he, Smith, was ready to draft it.⁴⁸ That drafting, however, was caught up in another series of events which saw COI shorn of its Foreign Information Service and re-constituted, on 13 June 1942, as the Office of Strategic Services.

⁴⁶ Memorandum to the President, "1942 Allotment Request of Coordinator of Information," 14 October 1941 (draft), BOB Records, Folder 247.

⁴⁷ Harold D. Smith, Memorandum for the President, "Budget Request for the Coordinator of Information," 5 November 1941, Roosevelt Papers, OF 4485.

⁴⁸ Smith to the President, 28 February 1942, Donovan Papers, "Exhibits," Vol. II, Tab UU.

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Roosevelt Intervenes

In the meantime, Roosevelt—when forced to it—had taken steps to settle arguments. On 4 September 1941 he directed Ben Cohen—"I am not 'asking' you to do this! I am 'telling' you!"—he good-naturedly wrote—to "see that inconsistencies and conflicts do not arise" between Bill Donovan's organization and the new Office of Facts and Figures; the latter's establishment on 24 October ended Donovan's "morale function."⁴⁹ On 15 October, Roosevelt had to step in between Donovan and Rockefeller, and he did so on the side of the latter, telling Donovan to keep out of Latin America.⁵⁰ In economic defense activities, the appearance on the scene of Milo Perkins as executive director of EDB effectively closed that area to COI. As for subsequent developments in regard to "writing the peace" and postwar planning, with which State, EDB, and other agencies continued to wrestle, we must leave some loose ends lying about. Jurisdictional conflicts—involving not only COI but so many other wartime agencies—persisted throughout the war, but they are not our main interest here.

In reviewing this early history of COI's development we have been searching for indications of functions which Donovan thought or knew were his by right of the President's authorization of the memorandum of 10 June, the meeting on 18 June, and the order of 11 July. Now is the time to state some conclusions and cite sample pieces of evidence, and we will do so under the following headings:

1. *Morale*: This is the least troublesome area. Morale was not a part of Donovan's original plan, but the President was "struck by the thought that Donovan might take on the morale job temporarily . . ." The New Yorker apparently fell in very quickly with the idea, especially with the idea of reporting on the state of mind of the American public.

2. *Economic defense*: There is nothing in the record to show that Roosevelt authorized Donovan to study and report to him and the American public on the state of the American defense effort, but Donovan certainly moved early in that direction. Atherton Richards was quoted by Hall to that effect; and on 5 August, in a COI memorandum to the staff, the "Economics Branch" was authorized to conduct research bearing on "the economic problems of the United States during and following the termination of the war emergency," which the President had proclaimed in May; and at the same time the Branch was divided into three divisions: the domestic, the foreign, and the "Industrial, labor and agricultural economics division."⁵¹

3. *Economic warfare*: Donovan and Richards clearly discussed "the possibilities of economic warfare organization." This must have had reference at least to that passage in his 10 June memorandum wherein he wrote that "All departments should have the same information upon which economic warfare could be determined." Donovan, according to Hall, reached an agreement with Perkins whereby COI would provide the EDB "with the basic information which would be needed for postwar planning and for economic warfare." While this agreement was by no means the last word on the subject, there is no reason to doubt but that Donovan did expect that the provision of such data was within

⁴⁹ Roosevelt to Cohen, 4 September 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 3509.

⁵⁰ Memorandum for the Coordinator of Information from F.D.R., 15 October 1941, BOB Records, Folder 239.

⁵¹ "AR," presumably Atherton Richards, appear as initials of the originating officer on this memorandum, which was prepared for Donovan's signature.

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his balliwick. At this stage of development, the subject of operations in this field was not discussed.

4. *Postwar planning*: As just mentioned, Donovan intended to provide EDB with data relating to the postwar situation, and Richards was asked at the 16 July conferences to state the need of his unit for postwar planning. Also, an undated statement of the functions of the "Economic Branch" shows that it was to "formulate plans for the coordination of post-war planning activities" of the various agencies, to collect and "popularize" information on such planning for the President and department heads, and also to encourage such planning by industry, labor, and agriculture.⁵²

5. *Writing the peace*: Milo Perkins is the indirect source of the Donovan claim that the President had told him to write the peace. According to Hall, writing on 8 September, Dr. Baxter was "disturbed by the rumors that Donovan has been commissioned to write the peace and believes that the State Department was also quite concerned." Baxter was further quoted as saying that some of his friends had been approached by Donovan, before the COI order came out, "asking them to serve with an organization similar to the House inquiry of the last war." Baxter was further quoted as saying that no such organization should be established and the function should be left with State, but that Donovan did not agree with him on this point.⁵³

6. *Basic Strategy Planning*: There is no reason to doubt that Donovan aimed to influence basic political and military strategy. Others may have thought "policy" was not the field of COI, but Donovan did not think that way, at least, in the period under consideration. He aimed to gather and interpret the data "bearing on national security," and working through the "coordination committees" to make recommendations to the President. Again, an early but undated statement of functions shows that the "Research and Plans Branch" was to assist in the development of strategic plans, advise the Coordinator on national policy, prepare "popular" reports on strategic subjects for the President, and maintain such liaison as would insure the "full utilization of the expert facilities in the various departments and agencies in the determination of national policy."⁵⁴ Just how far Donovan expected to go in this direction is arguable, but it is not surprising if Hall and others thought the "Donovan organization" hoped to develop as "the secretariat of [a] high strategy group" within the defense organization.

Conclusion

By now it must be clear that there was anything but clarity in the listing of the functions that COI was to perform. First of all, we know only that the President approved Donovan's memorandum of 10 June which called for the establishment of an organization to collect information on enemy countries and to use the radio as an instrument of modern warfare and that the President also underwrote Donovan's plans for secret and subversive activities. Secondly, the order of 11 July authorizes Donovan to collect, analyze, correlate, and dis-

⁵² This document appears in the BOB Records in company with Hall's reports of 16 July 1941, and there is no reason to doubt that it belongs there.

⁵³ Hall's Memorandum of Conference, 8 September 1941, on "Developments in the Office of the Coordinator of Information," BOB Records, Folder 212.

⁵⁴ Cf. Note 52 *supra*.

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seminate information bearing on national security and also to carry out "supplementary activities" as requested by the President. We know also, from the drafting of the order, that Ben Cohen thought the new COI would not interfere with the "morale function" of La Guardia's office or the need for the projected Economic Defense Board. Thirdly, as just reviewed, Donovan was quickly involved in a whole host of activities which could not possibly have been touched upon, spelled out, and agreed upon in the conference that Donovan had with the President on 18 June.

The conclusion here is that Donovan was given a charter marked by vagueness, contradiction, and open-endedness. The vagueness is clear on the face of the 11 July order, and Smith had pointed this out to the President a week before it was issued. It was so vague even on the basic function of the Coordination of Information that some people concluded, honestly presumably, that his job was simply to "digest" others' reports to the President. The most patent contradiction contained in the order, although not spelled out, was the authorization to conduct world-wide radio broadcasts even though Nelson Rockefeller clearly had a monopoly on such activity as far as South America was concerned. The open-endedness—the coordination of data bearing on national security—Donovan was clearly quite prepared to exploit to the full, and it is not surprising that people like Breckinridge Long were soon accusing him of poking his nose "into everybody's business."

This conclusion raises the question of President Roosevelt's understanding of what he was doing when he issued such a charter to the Colonel. For an answer, the writer can only fall back on others' analyses of FDR's administrative principles and procedures, and here there are at least two schools of thought. James MacGregor Burns has described the President as ". . . avoiding commitments to any one man or program, letting his subordinates feel less the sting of responsibility than the goad of competition, thwarting one man from getting too much control. . . ." and it was this approach that "prompted him to drive his jostling horses with a loose bit and a nervous but easy rein."⁵⁵ On the other hand, Dean Acheson has rejected as "nonsense" the idea that Roosevelt liked "organizational confusion which permitted him to keep power in his own hands by playing off his colleagues one against the other;" instead, says the former Secretary of State, under FDR, "civil governmental organization . . . was messed up . . . for the simplest of reasons: he did not know any better."⁵⁶

Let the last comment on the President's style go to William O. Hall, who, thirty years after the events narrated here, observed that "Donovan was a pusher, an empire-builder, a man with a sense of mission, whose activity had "the effect of stirring up the military and the State Department, and FDR was happy to see this."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1970), p. 53. More recently, John P. Roche noted in his King Features Syndicate column (*Washington Post*, 22 May 1973) that: "[Roosevelt's] technique, to simplify, was always to give subordinates overlapping jurisdictions. Thus Jesse Jones of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Harry Hopkins, and Secretary of the Interior Ickes (to take one hypothetical case) would each be given the impression by FDR that he was in charge of some major aspect of domestic policy. Invariably the three would get into a fight on any significant policy question and—since it was impossible to settle it among themselves—the President would wind up as the arbiter."

⁵⁶ Acheson, *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁵⁷ William O. Hall, private interview, Washington, D.C., 16 September 1970.

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Appendix A:

MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF
SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION

Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. Modern warfare depends upon the economic base—on the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and performance of the industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural production and upon the character and efficacy of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the strength of the attack and the resistance of the defense. Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do men and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied by the present day army exacts an equally wide and deep network of operative lines. The “depth of strategy” depends on the “depth of armament.”

The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitute what is called total war. To anticipate enemy intention as to the mobilization and employment of these forces is a difficult task. General von Vernhardi says, “We must try, by correctly foreseeing what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to gain an advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on the field of battle. That is what the future expects us to do.”

Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking in effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain, (or in some cases have obtained,) relative to the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the economic and military resources of those enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information is inadequate. It is true we have intelligence units in the Army and Navy. We can assume that through these units our fighting services can obtain technical information in time of peace, have available immediate operational information in time of war, and on certain occasions obtain “spot” news as to enemy movements. But these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the future. And we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans laid down for the spring of 1942.

We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our government, documents and memoranda concerning military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a knowledge both of the related languages and technique, would yield valuable and often decisive results.

Critical analysis of this information is as important presently for our supply program as if we were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is unimaginable that Germany would engage in a \$7 billion supply program without first studying in detail the productive capacity of her actual and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that she displays such a mastery in the secrecy, timing, and effectiveness of her attacks.

Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect either directly or through existing departments of government, at home and abroad, pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character and strength of their armed forces, their internal economic organization, their principal channels of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their neighbors or allies.

For example, in the economic field, there are many weapons that can be used against the enemy. But in our government these weapons are distributed through several different departments. How and when to use them is of vital interest not only to the Commander-in-Chief but to each of the departments concerned. All departments should have the same information upon which economic warfare could be determined.

To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized trained research officials in the relative scientific fields, (including technological, economic, financial and psychological scholars,) is of determining influence in modern warfare.

Such analysis and interpretation must be done with immediacy and speedily transmitted to the intelligence services of those departments which, in some cases, would have been supplying the essential raw materials of information.

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But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation. In this attack the most powerful weapon is radio. The use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent upon accurate information. From this information action could be carried out by appropriate agencies.

The mechanism of this service to the various departments should be under the direction of a Coordinator of Strategic Information who would be responsible directly to the President. This Coordinator could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director of FBI, the Directors of the Army and Navy Intelligence Service, with corresponding officials from other governmental departments principally concerned.

The attached chart shows the allocation of and the interrelation between the general duties to be discharged under the appropriate directors. Much of the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy and other departments of the government, and it will be seen from the chart that the proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department of the government.

The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is to constitute a means by which the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions could be based.

William J. Donovan

Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1941

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Appendix B:

DESIGNATING A COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator of Information, with authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.
2. The several departments and agencies of the government shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all and any such information and data relating to national security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.
3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.
4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Information shall in any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
5. Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Coordinator of Information by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.
6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator of Information.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE
July 11, 1941

* * * * *

(Federal Register, Tues., July 15, 1941. p. 3422-23.
F.R. Doc. 41-4969; Filed, July 12, 1941; 11:53 a.m.)

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

DORA REPORTING and UNDER THE PSEUDONYM DORA. By *Alexander Rado*. (*Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, 1971, and *Oktyabr*, Moscow, 1972.)

Alexander Rado, the Hungarian geographer-cartographer who headed a Soviet espionage net in Switzerland during World War II, has published two versions of his memoirs. In October 1971 the Budapest daily *Nepszabadsag* published excerpts from his memoirs,* and from February to June 1972 the arch-conservative Soviet journal *Oktyabr* did the same. Despite the differences in length (the Russian being approximately five times as long as the Hungarian) both versions are remarkably similar in tone and content. The Hungarian version appears to be a summary of the Russian rather than an independent work. There are, however, two noteworthy omissions in the Russian version.

Rado notes in the Hungarian version that he was awarded the Order of Lenin during the war for his intelligence activities (Hungarian version, p. 44). In addition, he states that he returned to Hungary in 1955 "after long and serious trials" (Hungarian version, p. 81). This remark is probably an oblique reference to his years of imprisonment in the USSR. The deletion of the date is probably an attempt to avoid recalling to the minds of Soviet readers the still sensitive issue of Stalinist excesses. *Oktyabr's* Stalinist editor, Vsevolod Kochetov, is particularly unlikely to want to raise the subject. The failure to mention Rado's Order of Lenin may be a careless error, but it is also possible that it reflects a Soviet desire not to over-emphasize Rado's contribution. The government has consistently maintained that the USSR won World War II practically single-handed, and that its great victories resulted not from the skills of its spies but from the valor of its warriors.

Another significant omission in both versions of the memoirs is the total absence of any reference to Rado's life as a spy prior to 1935. The omission is deliberate. Rado tells us that the Soviets gave him the source materials for his work, and there is plainly every reason to assume that the KGB edited both the Russian and Hungarian versions. The omission of Rado's life as an agent of Soviet military intelligence during the late 1920's and early 1930's reflects the typical Soviet sensitivity about this period. On 20 February 1968 *Komsomolskaya Pravda* printed an article by V. Chernyshev called "Code 'Dora.'" It included the following passage: "As a Hungarian emigré Rado went to study in Germany in the 20's. He worked tirelessly, graduated brilliantly from the university, and defended his dissertation. . . . After the Nazis came to power, the young anti-Fascist scholar lived in Paris, and on the eve of the Spanish Civil War, in 1936, crossed over into Switzerland." Not a word about when and where Rado was trained in espionage, or about his clandestine work and contacts in Germany. And very little about his Soviet case officers, who remain anonymous. This silence, which the Soviets are at pains to maintain for the entire Rote Kapelle during the 1920's and early 1930's, suggests that they still have assets meriting such protection.

Rado's memoirs inadvertently indict Moscow's intelligence services for inefficiency and poor planning. Moscow first instructed Rado to establish a cover operation in Belgium in 1935. The site was later changed to Switzerland (see below). One might assume that Moscow would already have worked out plans

**Dora jellentí* (Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, April 1971).

MORI/HRP
from pg.
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to support his intelligence activities. The evidence does not support this conclusion, however. The change of sites (Belgium to Switzerland) is not a valid excuse because Soviet agents in Belgium, France, and Germany experienced the same problems that Rado faced in Switzerland.

If it is assumed that Rado was ready to begin his real work after he opened Geopress in 1936, Moscow had almost five years before the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. to arrange to support him and his net. The memoirs, and even more so the traffic, reveal that the Center was unprepared. Rado was plagued by financial difficulties, and security had to be broken by using agents from outside his net to get funds to him. Even transmitters and operators were in critically short supply despite the time available to secure both. In 1942 and 1943 Rado was still recruiting operators, and on the eve of his arrest "Jim" was still struggling to get parts to assemble another transmitter. Even an inadvertent admission of the inefficiency of Soviet intelligence activities is noteworthy in a day when their prowess is sometimes exaggerated.

Falsifications and Contradictions in Rado's Narrative

There is an interesting conflict between the Russian and Hungarian versions of the memoirs about the decision on where to locate Rado's intelligence net. According to the Russian account, the authorities in Moscow originally instructed Rado to set up his cover operation in Belgium. Rado claims that he believed Belgium was best suited to his cover. The plan failed in December 1935 when Belgian officials refused to grant Rado a residency permit. Rado was then instructed to set up shop in Switzerland. It would appear from this account that the Swiss location was a second choice; but such an interpretation conflicts with the Hungarian account. Here Rado implies that he was originally instructed to set up his operation in Switzerland and suggests that he preferred this location. The Hungarian version contains only a passing reference to Belgium as a possible site for Rado's work and creates the impression that it was not seriously considered. (See Part I of the Russian version, p. 40; Hungarian version p. 8.)

The two versions are also contradictory about the date when he succeeded in establishing a W/T link with Moscow. In the Hungarian account Rado claims to have done so in January 1940, whereas in the Russian he implies that it happened in March 1940—after a visit from "Kent." The earliest message from "Albert" (that is, Rado) to the Director is dated 6 June 1940. The message appears only in the memoirs and may be a fabrication. Consequently, either date—January or March—could be correct; both can also be wrong.

Rado claims that Margherita Bolli ("Rose" or "Rosa") was largely responsible for the breakup of his net in 1943. He asserts that she violated security by having an affair with a young German, named Hans Peters, who turned out to be an Abwehr agent. Rado explains that "Rose" was seen with his wife (Lena Rado) and was thereafter targeted by the Germans. The explanation is plausible, but it conflicts with one offered by Alexander Foote, a member of Rado's net.

Foote claims that Rado was responsible for the identification of "Rose" as a member of the net. According to Foote, Rado was having an affair with "Rose." He was seen with her in a restaurant, and the result was the German decision to target her. Foote agrees with Rado that the German approach was made through Hans Peters. (Russian version Part III, p. 7; Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, p. 116.)

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The involvement of "Rose" with Peters is fact, and the variations offered by Rado and Foote are both plausible. But both men have adequate reasons to fabricate—Rado to furbish his own image and Foote to denigrate Rado's role while enhancing his own. Neither variant has been substantiated.

Rado repeats the well-worn allegation that "Werther," "Olga," "Anna," and "Teddie" were codenames for organizations, not individuals. This claim is not substantiated by the traffic, and Rado also contradicts himself on this point. These subsources were handled through "Sissy," and the traffic indicates that there was conflict between "Sissy" and Rado over releasing their identities. Moscow also tried unsuccessfully to force "Sissy" to identify them. If, as Rado claims, these names stood for organizations, there would have been no reason for Rado or Moscow to demand that "Sissy" identify them because there would have been no persons to identify. They were in fact individuals, however, and Rado's narrative inadvertently supports this conclusion.

Rado asserts, for example, that "one of 'Lucy's' sources, to whom I gave the name "Olga," served in the OKW communications headquarters." This passage is certainly a description of a person. Rado also slips when he refers to "Werther," "Anna," "Olga," and "Teddie" as "'Lucy's' agents." Deception is also betrayed by the Hungarian version. In this account "Olga" is allegedly the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, not the OKW of the Russian version. (Russian version, Part III, pp. 3, 13-14, 25; Part IV, pp. 14, 18; Hungarian version, pp. 40, 58-59.)

As noted above, Rado included "Teddie" among the cover names of organizations, not persons. Yet, in the Hungarian version (pp. 58-59), he also described "Teddie" as a person: "'Teddy' undertook to get the information [requested by Moscow]. In the middle of April, however, he sent word that for the time being he could not take out the secret documents to copy them for us. He promised to send detailed information, instead of the documents . . . the risk was very great, and 'Teddy' worked slowly out of caution." (Russian version, Part IV, p. 25; Hungarian version, pp. 58-59.)

Rado is obviously trying to follow the established Soviet position by obscuring the roles of these individuals. What is unclear, however, is why this bit of deception is carried out so poorly. One possible explanation is that the Soviets have created, through Rado, a book designed for a large lay audience. Like Soviet forgeries, the memoirs were fashioned for immediate impact. Rado says in the preface that the Soviet authorities provided the materials with which he worked, and the KGB has consistently shown a disregard for scholarly exegesis.

In the case of "Luise," Rado distorts the facts in the other direction—that is, "Luise" was the cover name for an organization, not an individual. Rado asserts that he "had given the cover name 'Luise' to the officer in the Swiss intelligence office from whom we had gotten this report. The Center had great respect for this source." The message referred to is dated by Rado as 6 April 1941. It is not in our holdings. The first reference to "Luise" that we have is dated 21 October 1941. It includes this statement: "In the future I shall call the intelligence section of the Swiss General Staff 'Luise.'" Thus, unlike 'Werther' *et al*, 'Luise' was not an individual. Rado's claim that the Director "had great respect for this source" is also false. The traffic from the Director to Rado clearly indicates that Moscow had serious doubts about the reliability of the information provided by 'Luise.' (Russian version, Part II, p. 13; Hungarian version, p. 28).

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Early in the summer of 1943, according to Rado, the Germans discovered 'Bill,' "a female secretary in the German Military Procurements Commission in Switzerland." She was fired for her intelligence activities. The last message in the memoirs citing 'Bill' as a source is dated 18 May 1943. Rado alleges that the deciphering of this message led to 'Bill's' discovery and his decision to order 'Sissy' to break contact with 'Bill.' This is fiction. Messages in our holdings dated 28 June 1943 and 1 September 1943 are sourced to 'Bill.' They contain the same type of information attributed to 'Bill' in the message Rado dates 18 May 1943. (The message in Rado's book may be invention; at least, it does not appear in our files.) 'Sissy' could not have broken contact with 'Bill' in early summer, nor could 'Bill' have been fired at that time, because she was still providing information in late summer 1943. (Russian version, Part III, pp. 27-28.)

In both versions of his memoirs Rado deliberately distorts the date of Otto Punter's involvement with the Rote Drei and the role of Rudolf Roessler ('Lucy'). The errors in this case as in all the others are not the result of an old man's failing memory, because Rado admits having had access to "original documents in the files of the Soviet Union." The purpose of these distortions seems to be to burnish the images of both men because of their pro-Communist leanings. He alleges, for example, that he met Punter in 1938 (Russian version, Part I, pp. 59-60; Hungarian, p. 15). It is more than likely that Rado is lying because a message from 'Dora' to the Director, dated 15 July 1942, identifies Punter as a new source. It is highly improbable that Punter would have been recruited two to four years before Moscow was informed.

Rado also claims that 'Lucy' and Christian Schneider ('Taylor') worked without pay, in return only for operating expenditures. Allegedly, they believed that the U.S.S.R. was the "most implacable enemy of Hitlerism, and on its struggle depended the outcome of the war." At least in the case of 'Lucy,' and probably also of 'Taylor,' this statement is a lie and Rado knows it. 'Lucy' was a well-paid mercenary. Rado's messages to the Director refer to 'Lucy's' demands for payment, and the Director had to keep sending reassuring messages about finances.

Two minor points merit mention. In the Russian version (Part II, p. 22) of the memoirs Rado describes 'Long,' whom he does not identify as Georges Blun, as a professional military intelligence officer. More correctly, 'Long' was a professional journalist with experience in intelligence work.

In the Hungarian version (p. 79) Rado erroneously calls 'Sissy' Esther Rosen-dorfer. He does not give a true name for her in the Russian version. Her real name is Rachel Duebendorfer. Again, there is clearly no possibility of error. Alexander Foote identifies her correctly as Duebendorfer in his *Handbook for Spies*. Rado read Foote and refers to Foote's book in his own memoirs. This distortion may be a minor attempt to muddy Western records.

Rote Drei traffic in Rado's memoirs

Although many or all of the messages not in our holdings but published in the memoirs may be inventions, analysis of all messages in the memoirs and, where possible, comparison with messages in our holdings revealed no pattern of deception. Most of the messages not in our holdings are described as sent from Switzerland and as providing intelligence on the plans and disposition of the German armed forces. Some few, sent by the Director, contained requests

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for additional information or comments on the operation of Rado's intelligence net.

Both the Hungarian and Russian versions of the memoirs contain messages—dated 1 January 1942 and 22 June 1943 respectively—which purport to relay Vatican efforts to negotiate a compromise peace settlement between the Western Powers and the Axis. The messages do not appear in our holdings, but they do have some basis in fact. The Vatican was hostile to Communism, and in late 1941 it was involved in negotiations aimed at a compromise peace settlement. Nevertheless, the information contained in the messages may be fabricated. They appear to represent an attempt by Rado and/or his advisors to link the Vatican with Fascism, presumably in an effort to discredit Catholicism. Despite the fact that the Vatican was interested in peace, there is no logical reason for this information to have reached Rado as he claims it did—through Swiss Jesuits who were not even involved in the alleged negotiations. This objection would be at least equally valid if the information were substantively accurate—which it is not.

One conjecture about the motive for this bit of deception has been noted—to discredit Catholicism by linking it with Fascism. In light of the difficulty the Soviets have had with Catholics in the U.S.S.R., particularly in Lithuania, this theme would have considerable appeal to the Soviets. Secondly, both messages give the British a major role in supporting the anti-Soviet peace settlement. Consequently, the messages would provide a historical basis for Soviet charges that Britain has shown consistent hostility toward the U.S.S.R. The Rote Drei messages from the center lumped the Americans and British together as the Anglo-Saxons, but in October 1971 and early 1972 the Soviets may have been soft-pedaling anti-Americanism for temporary, tactical reasons.

Rado describes one Suvich as a "highly placed official, State Secretary of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs," who helped arrange visas for Rado and his wife to travel to Belgrade in 1940. This Suvich may be a Fulvio Suvich who served as an undersecretary for the Italian Ministry of Finance and Foreign Affairs for an unspecified time in the 1930's. Fulvio Suvich has also been identified as an "old Fascist," a persuasion which would argue against his assisting Rado. The identification is at best tenuous.

Rado also implies (Russian version Part IV, p. 13) that a Gestapo agent, Ives Rameau (true name Ewald Zweig; codename 'Aspirant') was an agent of the U.S. The claim is spurious. Rameau-Zweig is a known information peddler. Although there is some indication that in early 1951 U.S. officials briefly considered using him, the plan was dropped because of his known unreliability. An earlier offer by Rameau-Zweig to work for U.S. intelligence was rejected in 1944 for the same reason.

Assessment

Despite the importance of Rado as an intelligence agent during World War II, his memoirs are neither very revealing nor very interesting. They do not appear to have any great significance for intelligence purposes, and there is no evidence that they represent a major disinformation effort. What, then, is the reason for their publication?

If Rado was the moving force behind their publication—not a strong possibility because of the sensitive subject and the Soviet role in providing the information in their files—the memoirs may be seen as an effort to ensure his place

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in history. A mercenary motive cannot be ruled out entirely. The content of the memoirs suggests, however, another, more plausible explanation. The Soviets have for some time been involved in an effort to reinterpret the history of World War II to stress the importance of the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Although there is some justification for such emphasis, the Soviets carry reinterpretation to an extreme. They denigrate the contribution of the West and continue to imply that the U.S. and Britain, in particular, hoped that Germany would sap the strength of the U.S.S.R., enabling the capitalist powers to turn on the Soviet Union. Rado's memoirs neatly fit into this campaign of slurs on the military efforts of the Western Allies.

Since the mid-1960's the Soviets have also tried to refurbish the image of their security and intelligence services. The aim is to obliterate the revelations of the Khrushchev years. The views of Soviet historians, like Nekrich and Medvedev, are no longer publishable in approved journals. Rado's memoirs highlight the role of the intelligence services without diminishing the Red Army's dominant role. They represent a careful balancing of these two themes.

Donald Suda

Books

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WATCHDOGS OF TERROR: RUSSIAN BODYGUARDS FROM THE TSARS TO THE COMMISSARS. By *Peter Deriabin* (Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1972, 448 pages).

The title of Deriabin's latest offering is something of a misnomer. *Watchdogs of Terror* does indeed chronicle the activities of the "bodyguards"—the special military units, the Oprichniki; the Okhrana, the Guards Directorate of the KGB. But more than that, the book is Deriabin's interpretation of Russian history, from Rurik and the Varangians right up to President Nixon's visit to Moscow last year.

At least for the general reader, his version of "the bloody history of bloody Russia" is probably much more valuable than the recounting of what the Kremlin guards did when and to whom. Deriabin's narrative reflects both the deep sense of history that is always unique to the native and the perspectives gained from a painful un-learning of the Communist interpretations to which he was subjected for most of his life. After twenty-odd years in the West, he still regards his motherland through the eyes of a Russian, but with new insights that could only be developed by leaving the USSR and its service.

He does not pretend to have produced a comprehensive survey—this was not his purpose—but only to have provided the historical background against which to detail the story of the bodyguards. This is somewhat regrettable. His observations are always interesting and sometimes even slightly jolting, but his obvious haste to get down to business often leaves the reader thirsty for more.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia, for example, has been dismissed with an almost casual wave of the hand. The bitter retreat from Moscow and the decimation of the Grand Army are attributed, in a minimum of sparse sentences, to a combination of scorched earth, Napoleon's overextended lines of communication, and winter. Even the epic battle of Borodino receives only passing mention as a Russian defeat, and surprisingly, Deriabin has managed to treat the whole war with no mention of Marshal Kutuzov at all.

Such impatience to get on with it diminishes as Deriabin begins to examine later 19th-century Russia. One suspects that he has grappled hard with this period, when revolution was a-borning, in order to clarify his own understanding of how it was possible for the Communists to come to power. It is here that he begins to hit his stride. The pace of the narrative quickens and is salted with reminders that from the Decembrists through the Bolsheviks, none of those plotting against the Tsar ever took the welfare of the Russian people into serious account. There are even flashes of wry humor—"The only reason that *Kapital* was not forbidden along with other Western books was probably because the censors couldn't understand it"—or an inside joke: the intelligentsia under Alexander II were "an all-union combination of noblemen, technicians, workers, ex-serfs and sons of serfs."

There is also some rather pointed social commentary for the members of today's establishment. The Soviet pantheon of pre-revolutionary heroes includes many whom Deriabin describes as forerunners of the hippies. They came replete with "long and freakish hair-dos, colored glasses, and blankets instead of capes." And when the regime cracked down on them, fads were converted into ideologies and youthfull enthusiasts into martyrs.

Deriabin's story becomes more detailed and considerably more critical as it moves into the Communist era. Probably because many of the events he de-

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scribes touched his own life, his judgments are expressed more frequently, and in harsher tones. Certainly they are anti-Communist. But it must be noted that Deriabin makes his criticisms without resorting to the strident anti-Communism that so many emigrés seem to regard as obligatory. His credentials, after all, are well established. His protests and his anger are directed less against Communism as such than at the brutality, the inefficiency, the indifference, the sheer stupidity of those who have tried to make it work.

First of all, he points out that the Great October Socialist Revolution wasn't really so great. And it wasn't much of a revolution, for that matter. Lenin and his henchmen found political power lying loose on the streets of St. Petersburg and simply picked it up. If they knew what to do with it, they were prevented from the outset by the need to get the Kaiser's army out of Russia, and then to fight a bloody civil war. It was won, according to Deriabin, by the *nationalist*—not Communist—Red Army Trotsky had formed.

Whatever the case, the war was won, the Allied intervention ended, and the Reds could at last concentrate on matters closer to home—liquidating real and imagined enemies in their own ranks, squabbling over the division of power, and trying to get the shattered country onto its new Soviet feet. Lenin may have taken a step forward, but he was forced to take two steps back. He instituted NEP, and the Russian economy began to show signs of healthy life.

Then came Stalin, and the march backward began in earnest. The enormity of his crimes is too well known to bear much repeating, and Deriabin limits himself to a comparatively dispassionate recital of the all-too-familiar story. The reader is saved from a sense of more-of-the-same by Deriabin's interpretations and by an occasional assertion that is not usually included in the standard catalog of Stalin's misdeeds. Noting, for example, that Soviet agriculture has never reached the level of production in 1916, he adds that it never will. This is true, he says, because Stalin was so determined to liquidate the kulaks and to collectivize that he killed off everybody in Russia who knew anything about farming. In the category of less familiar horrors, Deriabin describes the plight of the Russian slave laborers in Germany. Liberated by the Soviet army, they were herded into Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen where the ovens were still warm from the ashes of Hitler's victims, there to await transshipment to the labor camps of Siberia.

But these events affected large masses of people. When he speaks of the denizens who inhabit the Kremlin, Deriabin seems less sure of himself, and his writing becomes less assertive. He raises the rumors again: Stalin had the Cheka, ever so slowly, poison Lenin. Not so slowly, he had them do the same thing to Krupskaya as she was preparing to deliver an anti-Stalin speech. Stalin strangled his wife—Svetlana's mother—in a fit of rage when she criticized his methods.

Here again, the reader is left thirsty and somewhat annoyed. At least Deriabin might have given his flat opinion rather than to suggest, indirectly, that he believes the Cheka and Stalin committed the murders. Did they or didn't they?

Deriabin was already in the West when Khrushchev came to power. His treatment of the events since that time has been drawn from the works of others, and he seems generally to agree with Western analysis of what has transpired.

It is here, however, that perhaps the most serious criticism of the book must be made. Despite an excellent bibliography, there are no footnotes at all. This lack need not disturb the general reader, but those with a professional interest in the Soviet Union will be curious to know whose works have been most influential in shaping Deriabin's thinking on the post-Stalin years.

Then there are the bodyguards. The book was written about them. They are there throughout, almost an intrusion into the story Deriabin tells. Until very recently indeed they were not bodyguards in the strict sense of the word. Had they been, Alexander II may have lived to a ripe old age, and the Kaplan woman wouldn't have got her shot at Lenin. Rather they were the right hand, or more properly the mailed fist, of the Tsar and commissar alike.

Under whatever name, the guards were simply the instrument through which the rulers inflicted their terror on the ruled. Ivan the Terrible used them in his orgies of roasting victims alive or having them drawn and quartered. Their "monastery" headquarters was his refuge whenever he went off to sulk—and to wait for the little black people to summon the little black father back to the Kremlin to save them from themselves. Stalin's men were neater. They used the bullet at the base of the skull. But their *raison d'être* was exactly the same. "Protect" the ruler by physically eliminating any possible source of opposition, and keep the survivors in line in the process. Witness the purge of the Red Army—perhaps the only cohesive force in Soviet society—on the eve of World War II.

Guarding the ruler in the sense that the Secret Service protects the President was an art developed only under the Communists, and recently at that. It may well be that the Guards Directorate could not attain its extremely high proficiency until the age of mass terror was long past. The attitude of the ruler had first to change. Although Deriabin does not say so except by implication, this is what has happened. The Kremlin leaders have come to realize that they can trust most of the Russian people most of the time. Thus, mass terror has been replaced by selective terror.

The leaders do not seem terribly comfortable in their knowledge, however. Deriabin makes it clear that they still distrust each other and that they fear the chance of an assassination attempt by a disaffected citizen. As good as it is—Deriabin rates it well above the Secret Service—and as huge, the Guards Directorate was unable to prevent a would-be assassin from taking a pot-shot at Brezhnev in 1969. (He was apprehended and adjudged insane).

Deriabin's excellent appendices on the organization and functions of the Guards Directorate may tell a story of their own. The directorate is huge (3,000 sub-agents of one section in Moscow alone), tough, disciplined, dedicated, efficient. It has never shirked its duty to guard the top man, either through massive or through highly selective purge. In this day and time, it is somewhat surprising even to the student of Soviet affairs that such a massive elite is still considered necessary. Its continued existence argues that the Kremlin is hedging its bets. It is just barely possible that the leader may once more try to launch a mass purge à la Stalin? If so, which way would the Guards—and the rest of the police apparatus—go? Deriabin leaves these questions unanswered.

Neil Huntley

CONFIDENTIAL

Books

LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, AND PEACE-KEEPING. By *Frank Kitson*. (Faber and Faber, London, 1971. 208 pp.)

URBAN GUERRILLAS: THE NEW FACE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE. By *Robert Moss*. (Temple Smith, London, 1972. 288 pp.)

TERROR AND URBAN GUERRILLAS: A STUDY OF TACTICS AND DOCUMENTS. Edited by *Jay Mallin*. (University of Miami Press, Coral Gables, Fla., 1971. 176 pp.)

Low-Intensity Operations is a relatively thorough study, by an experienced British officer, of problems of policy and direction he expects the British Army to face in the decade of the 70's. Kitson, drawing on his own experiences in countering subversion in Kenya, Malaya, Muscat and Oman, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland, emphasizes that without solid intelligence, and maximum coordination between military and civil authorities at every echelon, any counter-subversion campaign is doomed to failure. He also calls for substantial change in British Army training in the future.

Kitson feels that the British Army, in addition to preparing for conventional warfare, must (1) provide units which are trained, organized, and equipped to carry out all types of operations assigned, and (2) produce properly trained commanders and staff officers capable of advising the government and its agencies at each level on how best to conduct an unconventional campaign.

His recommendations for future training divide the problem into four parts: (1) attuning men's minds to coping with this "different" form of warfare; (2) teaching officers to mount a cohesive campaign, closely combining civil and military measures to achieve a single government aim; (3) teaching officers to direct the activities of their own forces in the field—including police or local levies coming under their command; and (4) developing methods for teaching all personnel the actual techniques involved.

He adds two more factors he considers necessary for peace-keeping operations: (1) giving the officers—and through them their troops—a thorough understanding of the nature of the job; and (2) effective collection and use of overt information.

Kitson is obviously impressed by the U.S. approach of concentrating counter-subversion courses at one base, so that military advisors, psychological operations officers, civil affairs officers, special forces teams, and intelligence officers for such assignments can all be trained together by specialist instructors responsible to one command. He concludes that this achieves a high degree of cross-fertilization of ideas and makes the courses that much more effective.

Under certain circumstances, Kitson feels, an additional recommendation may be important in the future. If the trend is away from large-scale insurgency to civil disorder accompanied by sabotage and terrorism in urban areas, the operational objective will swing away from destruction of armed groups of insurgents to the isolation and separation of extremist elements from the population they are trying to subvert. At that point, persuasion will become more important than armed force, and psychological operations will be stressed in turn.

It is on this final recommendation of Kitson's that Robert Moss focuses in *Urban Guerrillas*. From an extensive background of conflict studies, Moss ex-

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amines the causes, nature, potential, and problems posed by the terrorists in city streets.

The primary cause of insurgency, Moss finds, is an imbalance between expectations and responses—that is, a *relative* sense of deprivation, whether expectations have outrun the responsive capabilities, or the latter suddenly drop out of balance. The common denominator of urban guerrilla warfare is the appeal to and use of violence as a cathartic force or a means to hasten social change. One of the attractions of terrorism is that it can be carried out by small clandestine groups regarding themselves as revolutionary elite. Over the long run, it has a corrosive effect on any government which proves itself incapable of maintaining law and order. Ironically, Moss concludes that the least vulnerable governments are those at the extremes—the most permissive and pluralistic because they are best able to remove the causes of insurgency, and the most repressive because they are most able to suppress the first stirrings of revolt.

Moss documents his statements with detailed case studies of the IRA in Northern Ireland, the FLQ in Quebec, the Weathermen in the United States, Brazilian guerrilla groups, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and several other Latin American guerrilla warfare situations.

Jay Mallin's book breaks little new ground on the subject, but affords a useful anthology, or case officer's reference book, of textbooks for terrorists and urban guerrillas since Lenin's 1906 essay on the part for terrorism in a general revolution. There is a Viet Cong 1965 directive on the use of terrorism and assassination of government authorities; excerpts from Yasir Arafat, commander of Al Fatah, and William Khoury, Syrian delegate to the "Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America"; the "mini-manual" for urban guerrillas by the late Carlos Marighella, Brazilian revolutionary leader; and the well-known "150 Questions for a Guerrilla," by Alberto Bayo Giroud who trained Fidel Castro's original forces.

A section by an American writing under the pen name of "George Prosser" which first appeared in *Black Politics*, a Berkeley, Cal., publication, discusses the possibilities for disrupting the military-industrial complex in the United States—and the Vietnam war effort—by guerrilla attacks against specific targets.

All the writers stress the need for ideological motivation and training, and for close party control of the guerrillas. "When terrorism is for the good of the revolution," one of them notes, "it is glorifying to the individual to participate in such terrorism. Terrorism is a crucial instrument of revolution and must be used widely and coldly to advance the success of the revolution."

Richard A. Spong

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Books

THE CONDUCT AND MISCONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By *Charles W. Yost*. (Random House, New York, 1973. 274 pp.)

Charles W. Yost, who retired from the Foreign Service two years ago with the rank of Career Ambassador after 41 years of service, has written a book which quite understandably urges the primacy of the Secretary of State and the Foreign Service in Foreign Affairs. Yost disapproves of the whole National Security Council mechanism and the role of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and is also basically opposed to the intelligence activities of CIA, DIA, and NSA.

A major theme of Yost's new book is that all foreign relations matters should be staffed and handled by the Department of State's professionals, who in his view are best equipped to handle such matters. He deplores the roles of the military, the intelligence community, and the White House Staff in foreign affairs, not only because of the numbers and funds devoted to such activities, but also because in his opinion those involved are inept in comparison to the professional officers of the Department of State. Nor do presidents of the United States escape Yost's criticism:

"I do not find the record of these three presidents [Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon] in the conduct of foreign affairs a brilliant one . . . [partly because of] their reluctance to heed advice from either experienced diplomats or more down-to-earth politicians . . ." (p. 140.)

Yost, who attended National Security Council meetings while he was U.S. Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, feels that the NSC is a poor mechanism, and that decision-making in foreign affairs "has become more and more entangled and distorted in the machinery of the Council." In his opinion, the growth of the power of the NSC and its staff has been a result in part of presidential distrust of the State Department. He has very little use for the NSC papers which present the President with a set of "options," because he feels they mislead the President. Yost also suspects (p. 144) that the option device was designed mainly to enable "the National Security Advisor, privately and without unseemly argument, to recommend to the President the option he prefers. This whole procedure, Yost says, undermines the prestige and effectiveness of the Secretary of State and the Foreign Service in the conduct of day-to-day relations. In essence, Yost's conclusions about the NSC mechanism are that:

"A President has no need to divide in order to rule. Overuse by the President of the Council and its staff reflects lack of confidence either in his principal minister or in himself." (p. 146.)

Ambassador Yost devotes a separate section (pp. 158-162) to his dislike of CIA and its activities. He admits that intelligence

"is extremely important, but except in regard to the technology and deployment of weapons, it can be acquired with modest diligence and without an elaborate covert apparatus." (p. 158.)

It is his view that most significant current intelligence is published in the press, and that the policy maker is exposed to too much of an information overload by the incoming traffic. He feels that policy makers in international affairs can be adequately informed by our embassies, properly staffed by experienced Foreign Service Officers; a smaller network of analytical and evaluating officers in Washington; and a network of private research institutes whose independent work is available to the government.

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Thus, to Yost, there is no need to add to the overseas establishment an intelligence apparatus with "transparent" cover, except in the weapons field. He admits that he himself, over the past quarter of a century, has been the recipient of "enormous help" from CIA, but feels that nine tenths of the information which CIA collected could have been handled as well by an embassy properly staffed with State Department political officers. Furthermore, this could be done without the "stigma" on the embassies of attached covert personnel. The remaining ten percent could be collected by a smaller covert apparatus or dispensed with "without great loss." (p. 159.)

Yost thinks that communications intelligence in peacetime does not justify the time, energy, and funds expended. While Yost acknowledges that it would be useful to read the minutes of the Politburo, and that this would be worth the cost, he feels that 99 per cent of the communications intelligence take could be known or deduced from more legitimate sources. In a throwback to the well-known remark attributed to Secretary of State Stimson, Yost adds, "I have never felt entirely comfortable reading other people's mail."

Turning to CIA's analysis and assessment work, Yost feels that a large part of "this soggy mass" could be better evaluated at the embassies without being sent to headquarters for evaluation at State and CIA. Moreover, he favors centralizing research and analysis on foreign affairs in State. In a curious bit of double-think, Yost comments that competing analyses from State and CIA place too much of a burden on a President when they reach him, as he is not equipped to judge, at least in minor cases. On the other hand, however, he believes that differences of opinion among analysts within the Department of State should be reported candidly to the Secretary *and* the President for their edification.

In Yost's opinion, "shrewder journalists were right about Vietnam more often than CIA, State, Defense and the White House" combined, despite the intelligence available, and that "The lesson may be that one man with an open mind is worth a thousand with an obsession or predisposition." (p. 161.)

Ambassador Yost feels that covert operations should be used sparingly, and that indigenous forces, rather than CIA, were the decisive element in the coups in Iran and Guatemala. He adds that:

"It is only fair to conclude these disparaging remarks by noting that most of the faults in covert operations and intelligence here attributed to the CIA and other U.S. agencies are conscious imitations—often pale in comparison—of Soviet behavior and practice." (pp. 161-162.)

In making his recommendations "to avoid mismanagement of foreign affairs," Ambassador Yost proposes vastly reducing the size and scope of the intelligence activities of CIA and the Defense Department, while placing the responsibility for analysis and evaluation of all intelligence in the State Department and Foreign Service. He favors about a one-third reduction in size of the State Department; a reduction of about three-quarters of those parts of CIA engaged in political and economic reporting and analysis and in covert operations; and a similar three-quarters reduction in the military attachés abroad. He concludes that the reductions in State should be almost wholly in the Washington staff,

"since Foreign Service field staffs of more or less present size may be required to take over the legitimate activities now being inappropriately performed by the CIA and other agencies." (p. 179.)

Walter Pforzheimer

UNCLASSIFIED

Books

THE OSS IN WORLD WAR II: THE COMPLETE STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST WARTIME ESPIONAGE SERVICE, THE FORERUNNER OF THE CIA. By *Edward Hymoff*. (Ballantine Books, New York, 1972. 405 pp.)

The reader with some familiarity with OSS may find the best way to read this book is to begin at the back—with the index. It is adequate and will lead one quickly to the man, the operation, or the area of the world that interests him. Otherwise, he is likely to get lost quickly in these patternless pages. The uninitiated will never know where he is, unless it is at the beginning and the end.

There is the conventional beginning, a sketch of the life of Maj. Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan and his appointment by President Roosevelt in July 1941 as the Coordinator of Information, the predecessor of OSS. There is also the conventional ending, the abrupt abolition of OSS by President Truman in October 1945. In between these terminals, however, are scores of personalities, episodes, and crises which have no chronological, topical, spatial, or other recognizable principle of order. It is worthy of note that the chapters are numbered but not titled. In this volume the reader will have trouble seeing OSS whole or seeing it steadily.

The parts are reasonably well done. There is OSS in North Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Burma, China, and Indochina. There are bits and snatches on personnel, training, assessment, money problems, logistical problems, and the political pitfalls of operating behind enemy lines. There is much on guerrillas, the resistance movements, airlifting personnel and supplies, and hiding and killing in remote areas. There is some effort to remind the reader of R & A. There is even the prosaic, the fellow "who held the distinction of having been one of the handful of employees who had come through the front door." The emphasis, however, is on the human element, the personal adventures, accomplishments, and heroics, but these are not overdone.

Hymoff is a journalist who has written books such as *The First Marine Division in Vietnam* and *The Fourth Infantry Division in Vietnam*. In World War II he served with the Corps of Engineers in Bari, Italy, on detached service with an OSS military mission to Yugoslavia; his job was coordinating the shipment of explosives. In writing this "popular history" of OSS he has relied on books, magazines (particularly *Bluebook*), some OSS R & A materials now in the public domain, and on some personal interviews with ex-OSS personnel. He has tried to relate OSS activity, successes and failures, to the wider aspects of the war, and has done so with a sense of proportion and with appreciation of and even affection for OSS.

He could not avoid the commonplace conclusion that OSS was "one hell of an organization staffed by geniuses, screwballs, misfits, and just plain people, who somehow managed a sense of cohesion and accomplishment."

A better organized book, written with more style and human interest, and featuring a liberal-conservative analysis of OSS, is R. Harris Smith's *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*.^{*} Neither book, however, is really what it purports to be. Smith's book, based mainly on published secondary sources and interviews, is hardly "secret," and, narrating selected

^{*}Reviewed in *Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 1.

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high points of OSS activity is not a history of the agency. Likewise with Hymoff's "complete story:" it is, rather a collection of incomplete stories of numerous OSS adventures. A different book, and one which the uninitiated might read before tackling either of these, is Corey Ford's biographical *Donovan of OSS*, an affectionate portrayal of the man to whom one subordinate gave the pseudonyms of "Stallion," "Charger," and "Seabiscuit," and whose drive and imagination made possible the events narrated by Smith and Hymoff.

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