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Intelligence tackles an old problem in a new form.

"ROLLING THUNDER" AND BOMB DAMAGE TO BRIDGES

Kenneth C. Fuller, Bruce Smith, and Merle Atkins

The program known as Rolling Thunder, a systematic but restrained air offensive against selected economic and military targets in North Vietnam, began on 2 March 1965. The basic objectives of Rolling Thunder were to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; to increase progressively the pressure on North Vietnam to the point where the regime would decide it was too costly to continue directing and supporting the insurgency in the south; and to bolster the confidence and morale of the South Vietnamese. As the days of the air campaign over North Vietnam stretched into months, the requirement developed in Washington and particularly in the White House for independent assessments of the results. As a consequence, CIA was asked to make its own assessment of the bombing campaign as well as to join the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the preparation of an analysis for the Secretary of Defense. The work on bomb damage to bridges, which is discussed in this paper, is one example of the reporting on the Rolling Thunder program. Although the extent of damage and the cost of repair are the principal topics discussed here, the White House was equally concerned to find out how much time would be needed to restore lines of communication (LOCs).

Background

North Vietnam's major contributions to the war in the south have been its military manpower, its function as the control center for the insurgency, and its function as the logistics funnel through which materiel, mostly from the USSR and Communist China, has moved into South Vietnam. Consequently the attainment of the first objective of Rolling Thunder hinged almost entirely on the ability to impede or stop the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Although a number of different target systems were taken under attack, the Rolling Thunder campaign was essentially and at

times almost exclusively an interdiction program. A standard bombing strategy to achieve such a goal was to stop or slow military traffic in rear areas by interdicting critical choke points along heavily used LOC's. Bridges of course qualify as such, and during Rolling Thunder more attack sorties were flown against bridge targets than against any other fixed target system.

As the bombing campaign progressed, policy-makers and high-level Presidential advisors started asking the intelligence community to assess the effectiveness of the effort. Among the questions posed were those on the status of damaged bridges and North Vietnamese countermeasures to bypass the bridges. The Secretary of Defense specifically wanted to know the number of bridges damaged, the estimated cost of repairing the damage, whether or not the flow of traffic south was being effectively impeded, how quickly the bridges could be restored, and the net impact on logistics capabilities. Answering these questions proved to be a knotty problem.

Number of Damaged Bridges

In one of his columns in 1966, Art Buchwald pointed out that available statistics suggested that the US apparently had destroyed all of the bridges in North Vietnam many times over. He concluded that we must be "dropping our own bridges on North Vietnam and then bombing them." Buchwald's quips contained much truth. During the early months of the bombing campaign, depending on the sources being used and the degree of discrimination exercised, one could get an extraordinary variety of estimates of the total number of destroyed bridges in North Vietnam, ranging from as low as 657 to as high as 7,000. When total "bridge-kills" began approaching these incredible numbers, it became apparent that a new basis of intelligence assessment was in order. Before we could get at the matter of the true extent and nature of the damage and the impact of the program on the enemy's logistic activities, however, there were fundamental problems to be resolved including such basic questions as when is a bridge a bridge. Within CIA the job was given to the Construction Branch of the Office of Economic Research (OER).

Analysts from OER, in consultation with DIA, discovered that early estimates of destroyed bridges were compiled almost exclusively from pilot reports. Now it is very difficult for a pilot to assess accurately the results of a strike while traveling at high speed and when the

target area is obscured by smoke and dust. To narrow the credibility gap concerning the number of bridges damaged, OER analysts decided that the only reliable method was to use "hard" evidence provided through the eye of a camera rather than the fleeting evidence provided through the eye of a pilot. Starting in September 1965, therefore, a special task force consisting of personnel from OER and DIA and the Imagery Analysis Service (IAS) spent many man-hours reviewing all reconnaissance missions flown over North Vietnam searching for damaged bridges. This intensive search, completed in March 1966, revealed that 216 bridges actually had been destroyed during the first year of the interdiction campaign, compared with 657 in what were at that time the currently most conserative assessments. The figure rose to a high of 541 destroyed bridges by the end of the bombing program in October 1968.

Once the principle of using aerial photography was adopted as the sole source of information from which to make hard estimates, a group of CIA/IAS photo interpreters was assigned the tedious but important task of scanning all photographic missions looking for damaged bridges. Each bridge crossing was measured and cataloged, and a photograph of each was prepared for later analysis by OER. During the three years of bombing, personnel in the Construction Branch analyzed and filed over 2,500 prints covering some 600 bridges. These photographs provided the basic input for answering many questions posed by the Department of Defense and the White House on the effectiveness of the interdiction campaign.

Conceptual Problems

Before an accurate bridge count could be attempted, a number of conceptual problems had to be solved. One such problem was how to define precisely what constituted a bridge. It appeared somewhat irrational to place a 10 or 20 foot water crossing in the same category as the 1,000 foot bridge at Viet Tri or the mile-long Paul Doumer bridge crossing the Red River near Hanoi. Many of the smaller crossings could more accurately be described as culverts, causeways, or simply improved fords, and thus were excluded from the bridge count. Another problem that arose concerned the definition of a "destroyed" or "damaged" bridge. Mere cratering of bridge approaches or "near misses" in adjacent rice paddies could not be counted as damage serious enough to interdict a water crossing. The concept of Severe

Damage Occurrence (SDO) was developed, therefore, to assess bomb damage. An SDO was defined as damage sufficiently severe to deny a crossing to users until a significant amount of repairs had been performed, requiring considerable time, materials, and labor. For example, serious damage would include a dropped span, a destroyed pier, or a destroyed abutment. Holes in a deck, cratered approaches, twisted superstructure, or a slight shifting of spans was not considered serious damage.

In 1967 a study of the effectiveness of bombing bridges in North Vietnam was made by OER analysts. A sample of 46 Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS) target bridges which had severe damage was used. The study covered the period from the start of bombing through January 1967. Photography provided most of the information for the assessment of the extent of damage to the bridges, and bomb damage assessment reports provided data on the volume and types of ordnance used. The study revealed that there were 249 hits out of 11,744 bombs dropped, for an average of one hit for every 47 bombs dropped. In other words, slightly over 2 percent of all bombs dropped succeeded in damaging a bridge to such an extent that it needed extensive repairs.

Cost of Repair

In addition to an accurate count of interdicted bridges, policymakers wanted to know what it would cost to rebuild destroyed bridges to their original state. The best method to arrive at an aggregate cost figure would to be use North Vietnamese costs for bridge construction in terms of dongs and then convert the dong figure into US dollars according to an appropriate dong-dollar construction ratio. This ideal approach could not be followed because of our complete lack of statistical data on North Vietnamese construction costs. The procedure finally adopted was therefore a compromise, but it did enable the calculation of relative values.

The costing methodology involved selecting a number of US bridges for which construction costs were available and which were similar in design to many bridges in North Vietnam. Unit costs for labor, materials, and equipment were calculated and then adjusted to reflect construction inputs available to the North Vietnamese. The result of these calculations indicated that $700 per lineal foot would provide an order of magnitude for the cost of building permanent

highway bridges in North Vietnam.[1] This figure was tested by referring to reports from a prominent US engineering firm that had estimated the construction cost of building 205 highway bridges in Southeast Asia. These estimates averaged $740 per lineal foot, which was within about six percent of the figure obtained by the OER method.

In estimating the cost of repairing damage to a bridge, the structure was broken down into its component parts: abutments, piers, and superstructure. Relative costs for each of these components were then derived for each damaged bridge, and only the destroyed components were considered in estimating the cost of both temporary and permanent repair or replacement. The estimated total cost figure for rebuilding all bridges to their original state rose from about $10 million after the first year of bombing to over $30 million by the end of the Rolling Thunder campaign.

A similar approach was used in estimating the cost of construction and repair of temporary wooden bridges. These crude, relatively cheap structures of simple design were easy to build. It was calculated that the cost of construction averaged $50 per lineal foot and required 30 men for each 20 feet of bridge under construction. During the entire campaign, 292 temporary wooden bypass bridges were built at an estimated cost of $10,000,000.

In addition to bridges, over 500 bypasses of other types were constructed. These consisted of pontoon bridges, causeways, ferry slips and fords, at a cost of approximately $3,000,000. In this instance, the real burden was the requirement for large numbers of personnel to construct, maintain, and repair these crossings. Manpower requirements were far more burdensome than material costs, especially during 1966 and early 1967. In these years it is estimated that 72,000 full time and nearly 200,000 part time workers were required to keep the LOC's open. At the same time there were several Chinese engineer battalions totalling more than 20,000 troops working on the roads and railroads north of Hanoi.

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[1] Highway bridges were used as the basis for all estimates. The cost of reconstructing railroad and combination (rail/highway) bridges was obtained, generally speaking, by doubling highway bridge costs. Railroad bridges are designed to carry much heaver loads than highway bridges, which means a significant increase in the volume of materials used and much heavier foundations.

Countermeasures

One of Newton's laws states that "for every action there is a reaction that is equal in magnitude but opposite in direction to the action." Three years of examining photographs of destroyed bridges indicated that this dictum also applied to the North Vietnamese program to counter the effects of the bombing. During the early months of the Rolling Thunder program, the North Vietnamese were unable to repair LOC's as fast as they were damaged. It took them several months to organize their labor force and pre-position materials near anticipated areas of attack. After two years of bombing, however, they had so organized their construction effort that they built and repaired bridges and other bypasses faster than the crossings could be interdicted. Their *modus operandi* was to rely on labor intensive repair techniques and local building materials. They stockpiled stone, bamboo, and timber near expected targets and assigned construction personnel to nearby semipermanent work camps to maintain and repair allotted segments of the LOC's. As the campaign neared its end the North Vietnamese countermeasures had been perfected to a point that many of the serious damage occurrences could be repaired in hours rather than days. The main emphasis in the North Vietnamese countermeasures program, and the main reason for its ultimate success, however, was the strategy of building multiple bypasses for all important crossing points.

Types of Bypasses

The type of bypass chosen for construction was generally determined by the nature of the terrain, and the number of bypasses constructed at a crossing point depended on the importance of the route. Fords were common in the mountainous regions where streams are shallow and narrow. Cable bridges with removable decking were usually constructed where the stream banks were high, and where the streams were fairly narrow but deep. Temporary wooden bridges, pontoon bridges, and ferries were predominent in the lowlands where the rivers were too wide and deep to ford. Constructed fords were the most common means to bypass damaged highway bridges, especially in the early months of the bombing campaign. They could be quickly built and repaired with local materials. They could, of course, only be employed at shallow crossings where banks were low. The construction of alternate bridges was also an effective countermeasure. The virtue of these bridges was their simplicity.

They were built from salvaged components and locally procured timber, lumber and rock. Because of their short span design they were easy and quick to build and repair, but difficult to destroy. One innovative variety which appeared, unique to North Vietnam, was the cable bridge, which proved to be a very effective method for repairing or bypassing highway bridges. Parallel steel cables drawn taut between anchorages on each bank were covered by prefabricated wood sections which provided a removable deck. The only method of interdiction was to bomb the cable anchorages buried in the river banks, which proved to be a most difficult assignment. Ferries and pontoon bridges were used at the largest water crossing. Ferries are a relatively inefficient means of rapidly moving a large volume of goods and were used mainly to carry rail traffic over major river crossings. Pontoon or float bridges proved to be effective bypasses for truck traffic. They were difficult to interdict because they could be divided into sections and hidden along river banks.

Number of Bypasses

The trend of the North Vietnamese countermeasures effort can be illustrated by the change in the average number of bypasses built for important JCS-targeted bridges. Repeated aerial photography indicated that the numbers steadily increased, as shown in the following tabulation:

Type of Bypass	Through May 67	Through Sept. 67	Through Dec. 67	Through Sept. 68
Total number of damaged JCS-targeted bridges [2]	46	52	54	54
Total number of bypasses	99	157	175	200
Of which:				
Fords (including causeways and culverts)	18	22	22	22
Alternate bridges	26	36	38	49
Cable bridges	9	14	15	16
Ferries and pontoon bridges	46	85	100	113
Average no. of bypasses per bridge	2.2	3.0	3.2	3.7

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) targets were those designated under ground rules established by the White House in an effort to avoid possibilities of escalating the war, and those considered most crucial to its successful termination.

Why Bypasses?

The North Vietnamese preoccupation with the construction of bypasses was a well-conceived response to the bombing campaign. In effect, they dispersed their LOC chokepoints just as they had dispersed their POL storage facilities and other targets which gave their system a built-in redundancy that greatly lessened its vulnerability to effective air attack. Multiple bypasses at a single crossing generally were placed so far apart that the dispersion pattern of a bomb stick would bracket only one bypass at a time. (See Figure 1.) Therefore, where it may have taken one raid to interdict a crossing during the early days of the bombing program, in later periods it took two or three raids to interdict the same crossing. The most important rail/highway crossing in North Vietnam is the Paul Doumer Bridge over the Red River at Hanoi; at one time it was supported by 20 bypasses. Multiple bypasses thus increased the probability that at least one crossing at a site would always remain serviceable. In addition, because it normally took as much ordnance to interdict a bypass as to interdict the original bridge, the cost of bombing a water crossing in North Vietnam increased much faster than the cost of repairing it with cheap local materials. At the same time, US aircraft were subjected to the same risks when attacking bypasses as when attacking the original bridge.

After the Bombing Halt

The story of estimating bomb damage and analyzing North Vietnamese countermeasures abruptly ended on 31 October 1968 when the bombing program was stopped. However, the expertise and voluminous files that were built up over three years of work are still useful. These assets now provide the basis for estimating the extent and speed of reconstruction rather than the cost and effect of destruction. Also, they will provide a valuable data base for the historian or anyone doing a post-mortem on the Rolling Thunder program.



FIGURE 1. Bypasses at Phuong Dinh, North Vietnam.

Current intelligence delivers a maximum effort.

CLOUD NINE: A PROBLEM IN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

James W. Featherstone

On the 24th of January, 1969, there descended upon the Directorate for Intelligence at CIA a document that for a brief but frantic period was to try the resources of the Directorate in some ways more severely than they had ever before been tested. This document was a National Security Council directive, later dubbed by those who became affected by it, with appropriate irony, "Cloud Nine." This directive called for an inventory of the international situation as of 20 January 1969, in the form of a "current assessment of the political, economic, and security situation and of the major problems relevant to US security interests and US bilateral and multilateral relations" world-wide. It demanded, in addition, "a discussion, where appropriate, of the data upon which judgments are based, uncertainties regarding the data, and alternative possible interpretations of the data." To make certain that the response was properly pointed, the directive posed, in 52 pages, a total of 893 probing questions touching almost every country on the globe. The answers were to be in the President's hands by the 20th of February, a matter of 26 days, including weekends.

Obviously this was a task of formidable magnitude, one that at first glance appeared almost impossible of fulfilment in the time span allotted. Of course, certain short cuts could be taken. It is always tempting, for example, when confronted with a requirement of large dimensions, to look on the shelf for already canned material that could be dusted off, updated if necessary, and ladled out lukewarm to the consumer. Another timesaving device is to by-pass the usual processes of editing and review, sending forward immediately from the typewriter the analyst's sweaty draft. Unfortunately, although in many instances, at least, the analyst views the draft as perfect, the editor thinks it is merely perfectible, and his ministrations toward that laudable end take time.

In this case, it was decided that there would be no short cuts. A really fresh look at the situation would be taken, candid judgments

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would be rendered, and the answers would be made as incisive and unequivocal as it lay in our power to make them. Each answer would be responsibly edited, and the entire lot would be reviewed by two senior officers—one of them the chairman of the task force established to complete the project—who would ensure that, stylistically and substantively, the whole massive response met the high standards set by the DDI. In appearance the response was to be neat and attractive, if not as psychedelically colorful as a Madison Avenue product, and it was to be carefully packaged. And finally, in the words of the Director, as far as CIA was concerned, at least, the deadline would be met. His determination in this respect may have been influenced somewhat by knowledge that the directive had been levied also on the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, putting the Agency, in a sense, in competition with them for timely production of a quality product.

The manner in which inter-Office and inter-Directorate teams were manned and organized to prepare the answers and get them edited and coordinated is a complex story in itself. Here, however, we propose to deal with a different aspect of the Cloud Nine problem, one with which we are well acquainted especially in current intelligence production, but which is not generally thought of until it becomes potentially a major obstacle, as it did in the case of Cloud Nine. This aspect embraces the mechanics of reproduction, the process of getting a clean draft typed, a final draft printed, and a finished product ready for distribution to meet a deadline.

Anyone with any experience in the management of current intelligence is likely to be more familiar than he likes with the sentence, "It's in the typewriter." This sentence, usually uttered in a tone of bored indifference by a writer who has been asked what has happened to an item that has a rapidly approaching deadline, typifies an all too common feeling among professionals that once the draft is written, the work is done and the project completed. Would that it were so; our task would be much easier. Few, of course, would buy the proposition that the clerical process is as difficult or complex or even as valuable as the analytical/writing process. But the fact remains that in many instances, unless the analyst's work is typed and reproduced and distributed at the right time, the analyst might just as well not have done it at all, for all the effect it will have. So from this point of view, the clerical process, whatever else its level in the scale of values in

the profession of intelligence, is just as essential as the analytical one. And it is played down or disregarded only at the peril of derailing the entire train of intelligence production.

In the case of Cloud Nine, it was clear from the outset that the production process, unless carefully managed, would unquestionably defeat us. This was partly the result of the sheer bulk of the project. It stemmed also from the decision to start from scratch and to apply the full editorial review machinery to the final product. It was closely related, obviously, to the shortness of the deadline: less than three weeks remained after the writing teams had been organized in which to finish and deliver the product. And, of course, the fact that all of the production personnel involved in Cloud Nine had other duties that normally occupied them full time, duties that still had to be carried on simultaneously, compounded an already difficult situation. Given all of these factors, it was legitimate to question whether the deadline would, in fact, be met as we plunged into work.

It was estimated originally that CIA's response to the NSC directive would require about 1,000 pages, and in actuality this estimate was only slightly below the mark. Each original contribution would be subjected to at least two levels of editing. No one, least of all the analyst, was hopeful that minimum alterations in the first or any subsequent drafts would suffice. The average editor is said to live by the principle that the pen is mightier than the sword, and it is commonly held that he forgets that both can be equally lethal against their natural targets. So it was conceivable that every contribution to the aggregate response would have to be typed a minimum of three times and quite possibly, when finally reviewed, for a fourth. The massive size of this typing load made it potentially a serious obstacle to our meeting the deadline, a built-in impediment at every stage of production between the writer, the reviewer, and finally the print shop. A backlog of any consequence at any stage of the process could cause us to miss the target date by a wide margin.

In fact, the key to the success of any large operation of this sort is to establish and adhere to a realistically phased writing-typing-correction schedule that will ensure a smooth, steady, and controlled flow of material from the writers through the editors to the printers. This began, in the case of Cloud Nine, with scheduling the actual

writing so that the answers to the easier questions would be prepared and edited first and the more difficult ones deferred until close to the deadline. It was hoped, and indeed it turned out to be the case, that the senior reviewers would be confronted on any given day with no less and if possible very little more than they could plow through in around ten hours. Since these two gentlemen constituted a marked constriction in the pipeline, having to read everything, it was mandatory that their part of the operation proceed smoothly.

To ensure the essential control of the flow of material, a control center was established in OCI's Publications Support group. Here a number was assigned to each question in the NSC directive (they were unnumbered in the document itself) and notation made of the team and office responsible for producing the answer and of the scheduled date of delivery to the senior reviewers. As the various answers were written, edited, and typed in second draft, they were sent to the control center. The center, in turn, passed them to the senior reviewers. When the latter had finished massaging them, they were returned to the control center, which then had them put on mats in final form and sent them to the print shop for reproduction. The control center could tell at any time, and kept the Task Force Chief informed, whether the production schedule was being maintained, where any particular answer was at any time, etc. The system made it possible also to have the individual answers printed as they were completed, regardless of sequence, and to ensure that assembly and pagination of the entire response could be done in orderly fashion at the very end of the process. Obviously it would have been fatal to hold the drafts until all parts of the response were in and had been put in the sequence required by the NSC directive before beginning to print them.

The production schedule was extremely tight, and there was little latitude for slippage. We were fighting the clock to such an extent that, rather than hand carry, we used the pneumatic tube system to get papers from one part of the building to another without delay, and to keep everyone busy. At one point, the tube system broke down, causing a certain amount of panic until the missing papers were located and extracted, and business could go ahead again.

Despite this and a few other lapses, our attack on the Cloud Nine problem was well-organized, and it proved to be effective. The

flow of manuscripts actually began earlier than expected, and no large backlog developed at any time. But even with the best organized and most rational schedule, we would still have failed to deliver on time if we had not had the MTST—Magnetic Tape Selectric Typewriter. We had eleven, and sometimes twelve, of these machines at our disposal, five of them in OCI's Publication Support group and the remainder elsewhere in the Intelligence Directorate. We could have used more, since not all of the substantive teams had one available to them. The answers to the vast majority of the questions, however, were put on magnetic tape after initial editing and review had been completed by the substantive teams. The tapes and the corresponding typed drafts were then delivered to the Control Center in OCI, where the tapes were retained while the senior reviewers were working independently on their copies of the drafts. The revisions made at this level were then, with the aid of the MTST, incorporated in a finished, corrected tape and a final draft typed simultaneously.

The advantage that the MTST has over the ordinary manual or electric typewriter, and its unique contribution to Cloud Nine, may not be apparent from this generalized description of procedures. So to be a little more specific: At a reasonable estimate, probably less than five percent of all the pages in the analysts' original typescripts were completely untouched in both levels of review. Retyping all of these pages by hand would have been enormously time-consuming, not to mention the strain it would have imposed on the typists themselves. But when a draft on tape is run through the machine, the MTST retypes automatically at a very high rate of speed. The trained operator stops the machine wherever a correction is necessary, enters the change on the new typed draft and the corrected tape, simultaneously, and directs the machine to proceed until the next change is encountered. By this means a clean, corrected draft, together with a new tape, is rapidly produced with a minimum of effort compared with what would be required without the MTST. Depending upon which stage of production we are talking about, this new draft is either a typescript designed for further review or a mat for printing, if final review has been completed. We believe that without the MTST, it would have taken about twice the number of typists twice the time to do the same job.

A final factor bearing on our success with Cloud Nine—intangible but nonetheless critical—was the morale of the machine operators.

Theirs was an exacting task, and, despite the magic of the MTST, a nerve-racking one because of the constant pressure on them to get the thing done, and done accurately. Their performance was splendid, their pride in their work obvious and justified. At one point when the Task Force Chief inadvertently referred to them as typists, he was politely but firmly told that they were machine operators. The distinction is a valid one. The girls do have to be trained to operate the MTST, and certain stages of their work are somewhat akin to computer programming.

Between February 3, when Cloud Nine drafts began to pile into Publication Support's office, and February 16, when the mats were finished, the machine operators worked every day. The five in the Publication Support group, alone, together with three proofreaders, racked up a total of 378 hours of overtime. Their supervisor had to watch them closely—a pleasurable occupation in any event—for signs of exhaustion and falling efficiency. Occasionally he had to tell one to pack up and go home. But he was most impressed by their energy and drive and their devotion to duty, which clearly went beyond any desire for overtime compensation.

Once the mats were done, the only remaining hurdles to be surmounted were printing and assembling the answers. These tasks were performed in Printing Services Division's plant on the seventh floor of Headquarters Building, operating around the clock. Considering that the various parts of the project were delivered to the plant piece-meal and were printed on arrival, without regard for final order of the answers, the job of collation alone was staggering. Small changes in the texts, moreover, were being introduced up to the very last moment. Printing Services Division designated a Control Officer for Cloud Nine who, in close coordination with the Control Center in OCI, monitored the flow of mats into the seventh floor plant and ensured that the printing schedule was maintained. High standards of appearance were demanded and met. And, of course, in this as in other Agency components engaged in Cloud Nine, regular routine work requirements had to be carried on at the same time.

When Cloud Nine was finished and put together, it filled 7 volumes and 1030 pages, counting inserts. The product was the result of a team effort probably unparalleled in the Agency's history, involving cooperation—smooth at all times—between elements of the DDP,

ONE, DDI, DDS&T, and DDS. The Director called it the most extensive compilation of intelligence data and judgements ever assembled in such a brief time span. It was delivered to the White House a day before the deadline, and could actually have been sent over two days early. But that would have been ostentatious and might, besides, have promoted the dangerous view that Agency deadlines can be clipped back more severely than they already are.

Tracking down Soviet underground nuclear explosions.

WINNOWING WHEAT FROM CHAFF

James R. Shea

Every year hundreds of seismic events occur in the Soviet Union and are detected by sensors of the US Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS). Finding out which of these disturbances are earthquakes and which are the dozen or so underground nuclear events conducted each year by the Soviets is a major task for the intelligence community. This has been of particular importance since the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which required the Soviets to conduct all their nuclear tests underground.

Prior to the signing of the Treaty the Soviets were known to have conducted only two underground nuclear tests, one in 1961 and one in 1962, although they may well have conducted some additional underground nuclear events at yields below the detection threshold. The Soviets probably did not, however, make major use of underground testing from 1949 to 1963; after all they had well-established atmospheric proving grounds at Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya and conducting weapon development tests in the atmosphere was both easier, faster, and cheaper than to do them underground. This all changed in 1963, and our interest in underground test detection increased as a consequense.

A major factor spurring on improvements in seismic detection and identification techniques was the possibility that a treaty banning all nuclear testing, including that conducted underground, might be signed between the US and the USSR. Such a treaty has been discussed, off and on, for a number of years. An alternate proposal, to ban all underground testing above a certain size or magnitude, has also been discussed extensively, but no agreement has yet emerged. Both of these approaches keep raising the question—how can you tell if a distant seismic rumble from behind the borders of the USSR is a natural event or a nuclear explosion, and can you be confident enough in your identification to rely on national means of verification rather than on-site inspection of suspect nuclear tests?

When a seismic event is picked up on USAEDS sensors, it is recorded ultimately in Washington as a seismic wiggle which is then decoded by experts who decide, first, whether a seismic event has in fact occurred, and second, whether receipt of the signals by several separated seismographs enables an approximate location of the event to be determined, much in the same fashion that direction-finding is done to determine the source location for electromagnetic signals.

Once an event is established as Soviet in origin, various methods are employed to determine whether it was an earthquake or an explosion. For many events the "depth of focus" can be found (the depth beneath the earth's surface at which the disturbance occurred), and often this turns out to be so great that there is no question that the event was natural, simply because no one can drill shot emplacement holes to, e.g., depths of tens of kilometers. Other seismic analysis tools such as "complexity" (earthquakes normally produce more complicated seismic records than do nuclear tests) and "first motion" (shock direction at the focal point is normally outward, or compressive or an explosion and is compressive and rarefactive in opposing quadrants for an earthquake) also help identify some events. Shallow earthquakes put more energy into surface wave motion than do explosions. Although deep earthquakes have about the same surface wave motion as explosions they can be identified by their depth as earthquakes. This method of discrimination becomes ineffective for events of low magnitude because the seismic signal becomes too small.

The Soviets conduct a number of tests each year at known proving grounds, and these are the easiest of all to identify. The first Soviet underground test was detected in 1961 in an area some 40 nautical miles south of the normal atmospheric test area at Semipalatinsk. Prior to this event the area in question had not been recognized as a test site. After consideration of all the evidence, however, including the fact that the area in which the event occurred was not a seismic zone, was located close to a known test area, and contained sizable mountains suitable for underground testing (the Degelen chain), the community concluded that this was indeed a probable underground test site. Since then, of course, the Soviets have conducted many underground tests. The total detected from 1961 to 4 July 1969 now stands at 76. Most of these have been in the Degelen Mountains, but a number have been at other areas within the Semipalatinsk

Test Site. In general, a seismic event anywhere in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk is presumed to be a nuclear test unless shown otherwise. The same is also true of Novaya Zemlya, where the Soviets are known to have conducted five underground nuclear tests, the first in 1964. Although the Soviets used Novaya Zemlya for atmospheric testing up to 1962, there was by no means unanimous agreement that they had opened an underground test site when the first two seismic events were detected there in the fall of 1964. The events were, of course, brought under intensive intelligence scrutiny because of the past history of Novaya Zemlya in atmospheric testing, the relative lack of seismic activity in the area, and the presence of sizable mountain peaks suitable for underground testing. The Soviets confirmed for us that this was a test area by detonating there in the fall of 1966 their largest nuclear test—about 1 megaton. A clandestine report was also received describing rock slides from this event and providing evidence of tunnelling by the Soviets for emplacing their nuclear devices.

Probably the most interesting of the Soviet seismic events are the so-called "out-of-area" tests they have conducted in the past few years primarily for peaceful purposes. Here the assets of intelligence were brought fully to bear on identifying what were presumed from the start to have been probable explosions because of their occurrence in non-seismic areas of the Soviet Union distant from the normal test sites. All told there have been six such events since 1965, one each near the towns of Ufa and Tyumen (slightly west and east of the Urals, respectively), two near Karshi (just north of the Afghanistan border), and two near Azgir at a site north of the Caspian Sea. In some cases it took months of analysis to establish that the events actually were nuclear explosions. Although they were for peaceful purposes, the Soviets maintained press silence about the events, making the job of tracking them down much more difficult. We were aided in the case of the first Karshi event in 1966 by Soviet articles about the great difficulties they had had in shutting off a wild gas well in the Urtabulak deposit, which was quite close to the location of this event. They had tried a number of different techniques to seal off the well, but all had failed, and it was at least conceivable that they might resort to a nuclear explosion to stop the runaway well. The matter was thrown into doubt when the Soviets listed this seismic event on their published earthquake list, contrary to their previous practice. We finally

received good information indicating that this was indeed a Soviet nuclear explosion to put out a runaway gas well. Because of its proximity to this event, a seismic disturbance near Karshi in 1968 was also considered to be probably an explosion to seal off a wild well. Other out-of-area events have generally been harder to pin down as to identity and purpose, but information from intelligence sources has provided a valuable supplement to that provided by the USAEDS seismic net.

There remains the problem of the "unidentifieds," the much larger number of events that are detected, but for which there is no ready or probable explanation. Seismic means alone are unable to distinguish, for example, between chemical and nuclear explosions. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regularly examines small seismic events that often later turn out to be Soviet high explosive detonations (sometimes with yields as high as several kilotons) for canal and dam construction. If the yields are large enough, tens of kilotons or more, there is no question of their nuclear nature, but at low or modest yields collateral evidence has to be brought to bear to sort out the wheat from the chaff.

When all the foregoing techniques have been applied, the usual result is that there are perhaps 20-30 seismic events per month of magnitude 3.8 (equivalent to a nuclear explosion yield of about 1 kiloton if fully coupled in hard rock) or greater that are not identified. We usually can in time identify the largest events. Those that remain unidentified are for the most part rather small events. As a result of progressive improvements in seismic detection method, events of smaller and smaller magnitude are being detected.

This raises another question: at what point on the scale do these small events become insignificant to us? If the Soviets are conducting a few tests annually in the fractional to low kiloton range without detection, is our knowledge of their nuclear progress, which has already been severely hampered by lack of debris from their underground tests, seriously reduced? The answer to this question is of utmost importance in defining the seismic level below which underground nuclear tests would not be allowed under a threshold test ban treaty. A decision about such a definition would also be affected by the possibility that underground shots could be "decoupled," that is, conducted in an underground cavity in such a way that the seismic signals from the explosion would be weakened by the time

they reach the cavity wall. This would result in distant readings of seismic signals suggesting a substantially smaller shot than was actually fired. Indeed, such a decoupled shot might not be detected at all. Such a technique could permit the Soviets to experiment with larger yields, and therefore possibly make more progress in the development of nuclear weapons, than they would legitimately be entitled to under a threshold test ban treaty.

As matters stand at present, most of the unidentified events have occurred in seismically active areas of the USSR, i.e., areas in which earthquakes are relatively frequent. These events in seismic areas are therefore presumed to have been earthquakes. An attempt is made to develop collateral evidence that would indicate whether any of these were nuclear tests, but because of limitations on intelligence capabilities and resources, normally no firm conclusions about them are possible. As a result, it is possible that the Soviets have "gotten away with" some nuclear tests in seismic areas in recent years without our knowing about it.

It is, however, fair to conclude that a combination of seismic record analysis and intelligence analysis has been reasonably successful in identifying seismic events occuring in the USSR, particularly those in seismic areas. For events in seismic areas our capabilities are less good when the yields are small, but fortunately, our concern about missing a limited number of small yield tests is least in this area. Any improvements in present intelligence capabilities to identify small events in seismic areas probably will be limited and costly to achieve.

More on the theory and practice of estimating.

ON THE ACCURACY OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Abbot E. Smith

Whenever I talk about National Intelligence Estimates to an intelligence training course, or to any other group, someone always asks: How accurate have these estimates been; what is your score? The question is perfectly legitimate but my answer is usually vague and unconvincing. The purpose of this article is to try to explain why the answer is so unsatisfactory, and then to explore the problem further.

It would seem reasonable to suppose that one could get a truly objective, statistical verdict on the accuracy of estimates. Go through the papers, tick off the right judgments and the wrong ones, and figure the batting average. I once thought that this could be done, and I tried it, and it proved to be impossible. The reasons are various.

The Number of Estimates

Since National Intelligence Estimates began to be produced by their present methods in late 1950, there have been some twelve or fifteen hundred of them. Each of these papers, however, contains a multitude of "estimates," that is, of statements setting forth an explicit or clearly implied judgment. Many of them also include one or more footnotes of dissent, conveying an opinion in conflict with the judgment in the text. I am sure that if one were to try and work out an accuracy score covering the product of nearly twenty years he would have to scan not less than 25,000 judgments, and probably far more. Even if one tested no more than ten or a dozen NIE's he would find several hundred statements to be checked.

Most of these are restricted judgments, frequently appearing in subordinate clauses, and usually introduced because they contribute background to a more contentious or consequential estimate. Most of them were probably not questioned or discussed. I would guess that the vast preponderance of them were quite correct. And if we assume for the moment that they could all be checked, and that 95 percent of them did in fact turn out to be right, I still doubt

that we would be justified in swelling with pride. Most of them were simply too easy. Although indubitably matters of judgment, they were not matters of difficult judgment. In short the batting average, if it were arrived at, would be worth about as much as the batting average of a major league team playing against a scrub outfit in a sandlot. This is why a complete, objective, and statistical tally would not be worth doing.

To be sure, we must not presume that because an estimative judgment appears in a subordinate clause it is necessarily inconsequential. Consider a sentence beginning: "Since the Soviet leaders will not in the near future cease to distrust the United States . . ." If this clause should prove wrong, not only would the rest of the sentence be unsound but the foundations of most estimates about Soviet policy would be undermined. Nevertheless, this is not a judgment which anyone would score high on a list of estimative triumphs. But suppose again (as might well have happened) that sometime in 1958 or so a sentence had begun: "Since no change is to be expected in the Sino-Soviet relationship . . ." Such a clause would certainly in hindsight rank high on a list of egregious errors, yet it is not likely that in 1958 it would have been seriously questioned.

Common sense tells us that a box score of estimates must be selective if it is to mean much; it must take account only of the *important* judgments. In saying this, however, we have left behind the wholly objective approach. Doubtless there are many estimates which everyone would agree to be important, but there are many others on which opinions would differ. The hard fact of life is that the high-level consumer of NIE's—the only person whose opinion really matters—is apt to judge the whole output on the basis of two or three estimates which strike home to him. If they prove correct, NIE's are good; if incorrect, they are bad.[1]

[1] Incidentally, from a strictly professional point of view the intelligence estimator would often rank his successes and failures differently from the way the consumer would. For example, I know of several difficult estimates which proved wrong, and wrong because they showed a failure to grasp the nature of forces at work in a situation; these grieve me greatly, though so far as I am aware no high-level consumer ever noticed them. And there have been some which received high praise, but gave me little satisfaction; they were too easy, or they were merely lucky.

The Difficulty of Checking

A great number of the judgments rendered in NIE's cannot be checked at all as to validity; the facts are not available. This is bound to be so; it is no reproach to intelligence collection or research. We estimate, for example, that political leader X is in serious trouble, but then it turns out that nothing much comes of it, and we may never know whether he really was in trouble, or, if he was, whether it was serious. Or we estimate that if the United States undertakes a given course of action the response of other countries will be such and such; but the United States never undertakes that action, and we never know whether we were right or wrong. There are of course a great number of "contingency" estimates, in sentences beginning: "If such and such happens, then so and so will probably follow." But the contingency never occurs, and the estimate can never be objectively checked.

Often those judgments which can be checked have to be scored as partly right and partly wrong; we would view them as "right on the whole," or as "wrong by and large." Or again, suppose we have made an imprudently precise estimate, as that the Soviets will at a given time have 500 missiles of type X, and then they turn out to have 510. Conceivably this might be an important error; more likely it would be considered negligible. But how many more than 500 would they have to have before the estimate should forthrightly be deemed wrong?

Estimative Formulations

The drafters of estimates are deeply conscious of two obligations: to distinguish between statements of estimate and statements of fact, and to convey as clearly as possible the degree of confidence with which an estimate is delivered. On the second point Sherman Kent has written in this periodical. His injunctions may be simplified as follows: since the degree of confidence must usually be conveyed in words, these words should as far as possible be uniformly used and with full understanding of their meaning; for example:

> a. Something "is possible" or "may be" true. This constitutes no judgment of probability; it is in effect a statement merely that the thing under consideration is not out of the question. But the fact that it is mentioned at all constitutes a judgment that it is something worth bearing in mind.
>
> b. Something is "probable" or "likely"; this means that there is about a 60 or 65 percent probability of it's occurring or being true.

Let us see how this affects the matter of scoring.

First, suppose that an NIE says that "it is possible" that such and such may occur, and then it occurs. We could score this as a correct estimate, which it was. But since a very large number of things are "possible," was it really the kind of judgment that deserves to register a plus for the perspicacity of the estimators? Perhaps it was, and perhaps it wasn't; that will depend on what we were talking about.

Now suppose that the NIE says that something will "probably" occur, and it does not. The estimate was strictly not 100 percent wrong, for it only gave the event about a 60 percent chance of occurring; perhaps it should be scored as 60 percent wrong. But pause a moment, and suppose that somehow we come to realize that there never had been any appreciable chance of the event occurring; then the estimate was really about 100 percent wrong. Or suppose that we come to know that there was indeed a 60 percent chance of its occurring but that something happened—perhaps even an act of US policy taken as a consequence of the NIE—which prevented it from occurring; then the estimate was 100 percent right—or was it?

It ought to be observed that while the subtleties of the preceding paragraph complicate the problem of making an objective and statistical study of the validity of NIE's they are of no consequence in real life. The high-level consumer pays little heed to qualifications. If he is interested in a judgment that something "probably" will happen, and if it turns out not to happen, he denounces the estimate as 100 percent wrong, period. The saddest example of this was seen in the ill-starred estimate of 19 September 1962, issued as the Cuban missile crisis approached. That paper discussed at some length the possibility that the Soviets would put "offensive" surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. Nowhere does the estimate declare even that the Soviets would "probably" not do so; the presentation was obviously labored, difficult, and inconclusive. Yet the late Senator Robert Kennedy, after the dust had cleared away, wrote as follows in his book, *Thirteen Days:*

> "No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in Cuba.
>
> "No official within the government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian build-up in Cuba would include strategic missiles. . .
>
> "The last estimate before our meeting of the 16th of October was dated the 19th of September, and it advised the President that without reservation the U.S. Intelligence Board, after consideration and examination, had concluded that the Soviet Union would not make Cuba a strategic base. . ."

This brings me to the next point.

The Discrete Statement and the Context

Neither Senator Kennedy nor the many others who condemned that NIE on Soviet missiles in Cuba were altogether wrong in doing so. The text of that paper was labored and inexplicit. I think that a reader might well have understood that it showed the intelligence community to be beset by the gravest doubts and concerns. Nevertheless it conveyed an unmistakeable impression that the Soviets would probably not do what they did. One may well say that in drafting those passages we ought to have followed Sherman Kent's edicts and come out with a clear-cut statement that the act was improbable; as it turned out we might as well have been killed for a sheep as a lamb. But it was the weight and impact of the context that carried the judgment, rather than any explicit statement. What the estimators probably wanted to convey was something like this: "We really think it unlikely that the Soviets will do this thing, because it would be out of accord with their conduct of affairs in the past, and probably turn out to be disastrous for them; nevertheless, with the evidence as it is, and bearing in mind the gravity of the matter, we think that the risk of their doing it is so great that the US Government should provide for the contingency that it may happen." My concern at the moment is with the question: Supposing that the estimate had in fact said these words or their equivalent, how would its validity have been objectively scored? Still, I suppose, as wrong.

Most NIE's are not so dramatic in their implications, yet a great many convey their message by the context, or rather by the total text. They are something more than collections of discrete statements. Many address questions such as these: what is the situation and what the prospects in country X; what is the trend of Soviet military policy; what is the nature and dimension of revolutionary potential in Latin America; and so on. The validity of such papers depends only partly upon the accuracy of each particular statement in them. It must also be judged by the impact and tone of the document as a whole—the choice of facts which are cited, the distribution of emphasis, the cogency of argument, even the literary quality. I think that such a paper could be basically correct even though it had a great many statements which proved incorrect, and basically wrong even though many statements were accurate.

Sophisticated estimating indeed ought almost always to be something more than bald prediction. The course of events is seldom

inevitable or foreordained, even though hindsight often makes it look that way. A good paper on a complicated subject should describe the trends and forces at work, identify the contingent factors or variables which might affect developments, and present a few alternative possibilities for the future, usually with some judgment as to the relative likelihood of one or another outcome. Occasionally such a paper can afterwards be deemed precisely "accurate"; more often it will be difficult to arrive at a verdict in any fashion which can in the strictest sense be called objective. It may be a very long time indeed before we "know" the causes and background of great events. We still get a new analysis, every year or so, of the forces that led to the American Revolution; how soon shall we arrive at objective truth about the forces currently at work in Southeast Asia?

What it comes to is this: a complete, objective, statistical audit of the validity of NIE's is impossible, and even if it were possible it would provide no just verdict on how "good" these papers have been. Like the Bible, the *corpus* of estimates is voluminous and uneven in quality, and almost any proposition can be defended by citations from it. Obviously, if we are to make estimates at all we shall sometimes make wrong ones. An assiduous and hostile critic could certainly make up an extensive list of errors, some of which would be grievous. And a friendly compiler could counter with a massive collection of correct judgments. I usually say to the training course that, being knowledgeable about the contents of NIE's, I believe that on the whole they have been "good." But it may well be thought that mine is a biased verdict, and moreover that since I am a maker and not a consumer of estimates my opinion does not matter anyway.

Seldom if ever does a consumer of consequence pronounce on the virtue of NIE's as a whole, though comments on particular papers or particular judgments have been frequent. The more emphatic of these comments are almost always adverse, since attention seems more likely to be gripped by an important estimate that has gone sour than by one that has turned out right. This is natural enough; it distresses but does not astonish the estimator. Once in a while, however, the temptation to some sort of rejoinder is almost irresistible, and in the following section I indulge myself.

On 1 August 1969, Senator Thomas J. Dodd delivered a speech in the Senate during the debate on the Safeguard program. A part of this

speech was devoted to the achievements, or non-achievements, of US intelligence, and the theme was essentially in the following sentence:

> The American intelligence community, although it has performed well in certain situations, has not been impressive when estimating the intentions and plans of our adversaries.

The Senator went on to support this contention by a list of specifics, beginning with the failure to warn of the North Korean Communist attack on South Korea, the subsequent intervention of the Chinese Communists, and the earlier Soviet initial explosion of the A-bomb. Leaving these aside (because they occurred prior to the existence of the present machinery for coordinating National Intelligence Estimates) let us examine some of the others.

a. The intelligence community "failed to predict . . . accurately the Soviet H-bomb."

Our performance in this respect represents in fact one of those many instances where we were either good or bad, depending on the way one looks at it. We did fail to predict it "accurately." Yet an estimate in March 1953 said that field testing of a thermonuclear device was possible by mid-1955, and further that it would be unsafe to assume that the Soviets would not have a workable thermonuclear weapon by mid-1955. On 18 August 1953, another NIE said that field testing might occur at any time. Soon afterward it was confirmed by analysis that the first test had in fact taken place on 12 August.

b. "In 1956 [the intelligence community] failed to alert us to the Soviet invasion of Hungary . . . And, despite warning signs which many of our lay experts took seriously [it] was also disposed to discount the possibility that the Red Army would invade Czechoslovakia to depose the Dubcek regime."

It is true that neither the invasion of Hungary in 1956 nor that of Czechoslovakia in 1968 were forecast in National Intelligence Estimates, which represent the consensus of the intelligence community; in fact no such coordinated papers were prepared on these situations in the months immediately preceding the invasions. In both cases, however, and especially that of Czechoslovakia, various estimative memoranda and current intelligence publications reported the state of high tension and the Soviet military build-up. Without saying that invasions were likely, these papers emphasized that they were

possible, and were surely under consideration by the Soviet leadership. The US Government was made aware that the invasions might occur, though it was not assured that they would occur.

c. "In the period immediately before the Cuban missile crisis, the advance consensus of the intelligence professionals was that the Soviets would not tempt the fates by deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba."

I have discussed this above, concluding that despite various qualifications that might be made, the Senator's verdict is essentially correct. With respect to the performance of the intelligence community, however, an additional quotation from Senator Kennedy's book is appropriate: "The important fact, of course, is that the missiles were uncovered and the information was made available to the government and the people before missiles became operative and in time for the US to act."

d. "In 1957, the intelligence community was completely without advance information on the Soviet Sputnik."

Strictly construed, the Senator's words seem to condemn the results of collection rather than of estimates, and in this sense they may be correct. Nevertheless, in December 1955 an NIE said that the Soviets could put an earth satellite into orbit by 1958, and in March 1957 another NIE estimated that they could do so by the end of the year. They did, in October. We have always considered this a praise-worthy example of good estimating on the basis of very scanty informatoin.

e. "[After 1957] our intelligence community lapsed into one of its very rare periods of overstatement when it advised the Eisenhower administration that there was a massive missile gap between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Today it has been documented that the so-called missile gap was a Soviet-engineered hoax, and that our intelligence community fell for phony information put out by Khrushchev for the purpose of intimidating us."

We certainly overestimated the number of Soviet ICBM's which would be operational around 1961. But we certainly did not fall for a phony plant by Khrushchev. There was virtually no hard information available, beyond the fact that the Soviets

had successfully tested an ICBM in 1957. The principal basis for the overestimate was probably the opinion of the best US missile experts in those early days as to the number of ICBM's that *could* be manufactured in a given period of time, granting a previous successful test. Nevertheless, the estimates were wrong.

f. "In more recent years, conversely, . . . estimates of Soviet intentions regarding the size of Soviet ICBM forces have turned out to be woefully conservative."

A just criticism, despite a few defenses that could be put up.

These exhaust the Senator's list of specifics. Consider now some further general observations which he made: the following quotation combines three passages which were separate in his speech:

> "When it comes to estimates of Soviet intentions, however, there is admittedly a lot of guesswork involved. . . I think it pertinent to point out in this connection that our intelligence community has erred far more frequently on the conservative side than otherwise in their estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions. . . over and over again, the Soviet performance in the field of armaments has either surprised us completely or substantially surpassed our estimates."

As I have tried to show in preceding parts of this article, it would be idle to attempt to prove or disprove these statements by objective and statistical analysis. With respect to numbers of Soviet weapons, one could easily make up a list of projections which were too low, another of those which were too high, another of those which were substantially correct, and a final one—very short—of those which, thanks more to luck than wisdom, were precisely correct. The projection of numbers, however, is the most precarious of all estimative exercises; there is indeed "a lot of guesswork involved," especially as one looks beyond the two or three years subsequent to the date when the estimate is written.

Suppose we try one test, however, using the somewhat non-objective criterion of "importance." Probably all would agree that it is important to forecast with reasonable accuracy the appearance of new Soviet weapons systems, and to do so well ahead of their initial operational dates. Probably most would agree further that the weapons systems mentioned in the following list were the most important to

forecast, though others might certainly be added. Here is the record of NIE's in this matter:

a. In 1950 (the first year of National Intelligence Estimates in present form), jet medium bombers were forecast for the Soviet forces in 1952; they appeared in 1954.

b. In 1951, thanks to the appearance of a single aircraft identified as a heavy bomber (the so-called Type 31, never thereafter seen) heavy bombers were thenceforth estimated to be brought into Soviet forces; they were in 1954.

c. In October 1953, an NIE said that a Soviet surface-to-air missile of native design could be developed by 1955; the first SA-1 missiles (based on a German design) became operational around Moscow in 1953; all sites were operational by 1956. The first SA-2 battalion became operational in 1958 or early 1959.

d. In October 1954, an NIE said that the Soviets could have an ICBM ready for series production about 1963, or at the earliest possible date in 1960; the SS-6 became operational in 1960.

e. In 1957, an NIE said that the Soviets could not have an ABM by 1962. In 1959 the estimate was that the Soviets were pushing hard on the problem and could have a first operational capability with an ABM in the period 1963-1966; the Moscow ABM system began to be operational in 1968.

f. In 1965, an NIE said that the Soviets would probably produce a new class of ballistic missile submarine, that it would almost certainly be nuclear powered, and that it would carry perhaps 6-12 missiles of an improved type. That NIE also judged that a new missile with about 1,000 n.m. range would come into service in 1967-1968. These estimates were made purely on the basis of Soviet requirements; there was no hard evidence of such developments at the time. In 1966 we saw the first unit of the new Y-class submarine having 16 launch tubes, and the Soviets began testing a new missile with an estimated range of 1,300 n.m.; this system—submarine and missile—became operational in 1968.

g. In 1965, an NIE said that the Soviets could probably attain an operational capability with a multiple independently guided re-entry vehicle (MIRV) in the period 1970-1975.

I think it true to say that in the past fifteen or twenty years no important new Soviet weapons system has appeared which had not been heralded in advance in National Intelligence Estimates. The initial operational dates have often been wrong, but as the above citations indicate they have usually been wrong because they have set the date too early; they have not "erred far more frequently on the conservative side than otherwise."

To attack Senator Dodd's contentions is not to prove anything conclusively about the validity of National Intelligence Estimates as a whole. There are a good many people within the intelligence community (and probably outside as well) who feel that the net impact of NIE's over the years has been to over- rather than under-estimate Soviet military capabilities and intentions. If one of these persons were to draw up a documented indictment, it could probably be countered in the same fashion that I have tried to counter Senator Dodd's charges; and still nothing would be finally demonstrated. The estimator himself finds it useful to look into his record, not merely for the satisfaction or chagrin he may derive from the exercise, but because it may help him improve his performance in time to come. But the man whose opinion counts most—the "high-level policy-maker"—will never get his evaluation of NIE's from an exhaustive study of them. He will have no more than a vague impression—an impression, however, which will suddenly and emphatically crystallize whenever an estimate crucial to his immediate concern proves wrong. Once his view is thus formed it may take a long time to change.

The rudiments of an ancient craft ever new.

NON-ELECTRONIC AGENT COMMUNICATIONS

Gabriel M. D'Echauffour

Consider the following situations, all of which are possible. As a matter of fact, all of them have actually occurred in the not too distant past, and all may occur again at rather surprising places and times:

Situation: Outbreak of hostilities, closing of stations, evacuation of station personnel, loss of contact with station assets.

Situation: Defector walks into station and requests asylum. Defector agrees to return home for a specified sum of money. He appears legitimate and valuable, but his value would be greater if he were in place.

Situation: Agent is recruited in country X, is transiting country Y on the way home to the denied area. Station Y directed to meet agent, provide certain clandestine training, and send agent on his way.

Situation: Agent working for us in friendly area, in rather relaxed environment which permits face-to-face meetings with the case officer. One day the agent finds that he is being transferred to a hostile area where face-to-face meetings will no longer be possible.

Situation: Station recruits agent who is member of the local Communist party. Agent's position precludes contact locally without jeopardizing agent's position.

Situation: Local asset has friend or relative in denied area who he feels is amenable to recruitment. Asset sent as legal traveler into area to attempt recruitment.

Situation: Agent traveling for short vacation trip into a denied target area.

Situation: Station asset, member of local Communist labor union, going to Bloc country to attend Communist-sponsored labor conference.

The above situations all have one thing in common: a means of agent communications is needed. Secure communication is a vital factor in any clandestine operation, whether it be face-to-face or otherwise.

In the above situations, one solution is to have recourse to non-electronic agent communications techniques, also called chemical communications, or in the slang of technical tradecraft, secret writing (SW).

The purpose of this article is to describe briefly the various methods available and to outline considerations affecting their application. Our object is to provide some guidance to those who may at some time be confronted with the subject of SW, whether it be from a positive collection viewpoint, counterintelligence, or in some other connection.

Note-Taking Devices

The first type of SW device we will consider—note-taking employing direct writing implements—has restricted, but very useful application. Such implements consist generally of a chemical substance in the form of a piece of ordinary pencil lead, or other various camouflaged hardware items containing secret ink, which may be used to apply secret writing directly to paper materials. Since the devices are used to write directly on paper, there is inevitably some disturbance of the fibers of the paper. In some countries methods are known for detecting such disturbances, and therefore direct writing is normally not employed for correspondence transiting international borders through mail channels in which effective chemical censorship may be encountered.

Even with this restriction, however, the direct writing technique has many uses. It may be used for dead-dropped notes, or for notes to be carried by case officers traveling internationally or in a difficult operational area. This method has been used very successfully by agents and cut-outs, who may carry the writing on newspapers, magazines, and the like through border points, thus avoiding routine chemical censorship, for passage to the case officer in the form of a direct report, or in the form of debriefing notes containing data which one would not trust to memory. The devices have been used successfully by ships' crewmen, train conductors, aircrew members, and legal travelers. Use of these devices might be considered in preparing correspondence to be left in dead-drops as a precaution against accidental discovery, perhaps by a child at play, or by the

passer-by who kicks over a can and finds the drop. The technique may perhaps also be considered for use by agents or case officers carrying written material to forestall the possibility that severe illness, accidental death, or some other untoward event might bring incriminating written materials in their possession to the attention of local authorities. In rare cases, the devices have been used within internal mail channels where the chemical censorship is generally less effective than in international mail channels, but in general this is not advisable. The time required for training in the use of these devices usually is from one to two hours, but as with other techniques the time varies in direct proportion to the abilities of the agent.

Microdots

A more intricate method of SW, and one of the most fascinating to amateurs as well as to students of tradecraft, is the microdot, a photographic reproduction of textual material reduced to one by two millimeters or less. This method is well-known to most of the sophisticated intelligence services and continues to be widely and securely used. Although microdots can be used both as an agent sending and a receiving technique, they are primarily used in the latter application due to the complexity of preparation.

In general, it takes almost the same time to train an agent to receive microdots as it does to instruct him in the use of direct writing devices, but about two to four hours should be allowed. In addition, the media selected for carrying dots should be appropriate, such as an envelope, a postcard, or some other plausible object. Most important, however, the agent needs either natural access to a microscope of approximately 100 power magnification or must be furnished a microscope or other readout device. Scientists and doctors can easily receive mocrodots since they usually have a microscrope and are well versed in its use. Possession of such equipment is not so unusual, however, that other individuals cannot plausibly have it.

The security of microdots obviously lies in the difficulty of detecting them. (Try spreading an ounce of black pepper on the floor and finding a dot mixed into it.) This is not to imply, however, that a microdot in a postcard or letter could not be found if the censors were sufficiently interested in the particular item suspected of containing one. This consideration is discussed at greater length below.

It is also practical to have agents "send" microdots. The difficulties involved, however, are somewhat greater than in receiving, as the agent must have some photographic dexterity, photographic equipment, either normal or specially provided equipment, and some degree of privacy. In addition, considerably more training time is required. The Soviets frequently train their staff agents to send as well as receive microdots, but after they are in place they usually only receive. In the nature of the technique, microdots are not generally appropriate for mass transmission of intelligence information. Individual burying of each dot is required, and their use in quantity would tax the agent's eyes as well as his nerves.

For ease of readout, a dot usually contains several hundred words or less. Usually only one or two dots are sent at a time. As indicated above, they are not pasted on the surface of the carrier but imbedded within it to reduce the possibility of detection and avoid risk of detachment in the course of normal handling.

Examination for the presence of microdots generally consists of holding the suspect item in front of a strong light to look for small dark objects buried within it. Since well-hidden dots cannot be detected in this way, other tests may often be necessary.

Latent Image

Another photographic technique employed in clandestine communications uses a latent (invisible) photographic image, e.g., of a secret message or picture, which is processed into a photographic print such as a snapshot and rendered insensitive to light, but remains recoverable by the agent by means of a photographic chemical process. The process is well known to photographers and has been described in open literature. Its security lies in careful calculation of where and how it is to be used. It may be employed in agent sending or receiving channels, but like the microdot, is more readily used for the latter. Any agent who can normally receive photographs in mail could be considered for this technique.

Liquid Ink Secret Writing

Historically, invisible inks have been used in secret writing since antiquity. References to this can be found in ancient Greek and Roman literature as far back as 230 B.C. The principle is relatively simple: a chemical is dissolved into a quantity of solvent, usually water, to

provide a colorless, or nearly colorless, liquid ink which is used to write invisible messages with a stick or quill pen. Development is usually by application of a different chemical which reacts with the dried ink to produce a visible color which may then be read. There are, of course, many different chemical combinations which behave in this manner. Liquid secret writing is primarily restricted to agent receiving, and the preparation of messages is by the technical staff. One consideration in the choice of which of the many liquid SW systems to use is the relative ease of recovery of the message by the agent. The ease of recovery of the systems that may be selected will vary considerably, and the choice will depend in part upon how much privacy the agent has.

Carbon Writing

Although liquid inks still find operational application, they have in recent years given way to carbon writing techniques. Apart from the gains in chemical security which many, but not all, carbon systems offer over liquid inks, there is a substantial gain in simplicity since it is inherently easier for an agent to use a carbon. Liquid writing is much more time-consuming in all respects, particularly in training time and in the preparation of messages. With liquid secret inks, it becomes difficult to maintain continuity in writing the message as the ink dries, and what has previously been written disappears.

An SW carbon is essentially a piece of paper of normal appearance which has been impregnated with small quantities of secret writing chemical. When used in a manner similar to a black office carbon, small quantities of the SW chemical transfer to another sheet, forming a secret message. The many carbon systems differ chemically. Messages prepared from some are easily developed, while others require complicated and time-consuming treatment. For some, indeed, a laboratory is needed. Each SW carbon may normally be used for as many as fifty messages, and may be mounted in a pad of ordinary writing paper for concealment. Training time required for carbon writing is normally four to six hours.

The carbon technique is normally used by the agent to write to his case officer, and most of the sophisticated intelligence services have a good many systems of the kind. In this field, as in others in the SW business, there is stiff competition to produce ever new systems defying detection by hostile services. This involves a con-

tinuing quest for new and more secure chemical combinations as older methods become compromised. The object, of course, is to stay ahead of the research of the opposition, and to outwit its chemical censors.

Agent Training

As we have noted, the training time required for introduction of SW techniques varies, depending on the aptitude of the agent, and the nature of the techniques he is being taught. In many operations, the time available for training is limited. It will be evident, however, that training should not be slighted. Obviously, SW ought to be taught to an agent in advance of his actual need to use it in an operational situation. Time should be allowed not only for practice, but for corrective re-training or instruction in an entirely new technique. Most SW methods appear relatively simple, but lacking adequate training, the agent may make mistakes resulting in illegible development of the SW, or at worst jeopardizing his personal security, that of the SW system, and of the operation as a whole.

Since agent communications are a critical link in most operations, pre-planning and introduction of techniques—including training and establishing of practice channels—are certainly in order. It is recommended that an SW specialist be consulted at an early stage in the planning and that the training be conducted by the specialist. Prior planning in most cases will offer the opportunity for tailoring the SW techniques to the case situation. Adequate training can help avoid events such as the recent one in which the agent mistook blank paper for his carbons and wrote twelve blank SW "messages" over a year's time. Needless to say, this proceeding generated much concern among his correspondents not to speak of the paper work.

Censorship and Operational Security

No discussion of SW would be complete without a consideration of the security environment in which it is to be employed. In the most general sense, this involves the matter of censorship. By definition, censorship means to withhold information or materials, which are judged to be morally, politically, or otherwise inappropriate or undesirable. With respect to programs designed to uncover secret writing channels, one should use the term technical (or chemical) censorship, or even more appropriately "interception for technical

examination," since the process usually involves extraction of the suspect item for physical examination, and its re-introduction into the normal channel.

A large number of countries exercise censorship in varying degrees in an effort to control the flow of written information, to provide intelligence leads, or in some areas, to control anti-regime activities and the criminal element. To these ends some of these countries, but not all, have developed technical facilities of varying effectiveness for searching out and resolving secret writing. Most technically advanced countries have some capability in these respects.

Thus, the use of SW in an operation is predicated on one or all of the following: a) to make the transmittal of information secure against accidental discovery because of misrouting or accidental loss by the carrier of the message; b) to protect intelligence against discovery during mass, random, or selective opening of mail by authorities or others who are only concerned with reading the visible text; or c) to maintain security against efforts directed at uncovering secret writing.

The security of an SW operation depends upon a number of factors: a) the proper use of the SW materials which is related to training time and quality; b) the technical (or chemical) security of the secret writing method employed; which is in turn related to c) the technical capability of the opposition in the areas where the SW is being employed. A method providing total security in Borneo may not be secure in Russia. Equally important for security are the non-technical operational circumstances, such as the agent's physical security, how he posts his SW, and the consistency with which all other non-SW security practices are observed to avoid attracting attention to the operation, and to avoid stimulating a specific examination of the agent's mail, even though such examination should prove fruitless.

In planning an SW operation, all these angles must be considered. Generally, under-developed countries do not have a capability for detecting SW, although they may be opening mail. Also, a liaison service from a technically sophisticated country will not generally provide a "friendly" country with its most effective methods for detecting secret writing, because defensive chemical techniques are inherently related directly to knowledge of offensive techniques. Thus,

the service that detects and analyzes a system will logically incorporate it into its battery of counterintelligence techniques.

Upon occasion, when routine mass opening of mail is taking place, the examiners may be told to look for evidence of SW, such as writing impressions, or for letters which make no sense or appear otherwise suspicious. Letters selected may then be passed to a technical laboratory for chemical examination. Success will then depend upon the relative security of the SW method employed and the capabilities of the laboratory. Some countries, such as China, for example, with its large manpower reserve, can afford to open and scan large quantities of mail. None, however, can afford the manpower to look for technically sophisticated secret writing on more than a fraction of a percent of the total volume.

The risks in using SW can thus be minimized if the choice of technique is properly made. The selection of a secret writing system for a particular case depends upon the reliability of the agent, his area of operation, the training time available, the privacy of the agent, and the channels involved.

As noted above, the chemical security of SW systems and techniques varies. Obviously the most secure and complicated system cannot be given to every case, nor is it needed in every case. To do so would insure that it would be quickly picked up in any double-agent operations, or by other means, and would become known to the opposition. The loss of a particular SW system in one application, however, does not necessarily mean that it cannot continue to be used in some other area. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, it may even continue to be used in the same area.

Operational Considerations

SW should not normally be used except when an agent must have clandestine means to communicate or when caution dictates provision for contingencies. On the other hand, there have been instances where SW was introduced to an agent merely to improve his reporting by forcing him to be more concise. There have also been instances in which SW was introduced to impress the agent with the professionalism of the organization. The writer handled a case in which the agent was introduced to SW purely as a means of shocking him into the realization that he was indeed involved in clandestine activities. This helped induce him to take more seriously other opera-

tional matters, such as surveillance and solicitation of information. The Soviets apparently prepare their staff agents in SW communications as a matter of routine. SW does make demands on the time of the case officer and agent and in some instances, introduces some added risks to the operation. These can and should be minimized, however, by careful training, planning, and selection of techniques to be used.

The main questions to be answered when planning and selecting SW systems can now be summarized. What countries of operation are involved, that is, what are the SW channels? What is known about the censorship and SW capabilities of the countries involved? What is known about the importance of the agent in terms of access? How reliable is the agent? Where will the SW message from and to the agent be processed, and by whom? How much privacy will the agent have? What is his profession? Who will train him? What can he legitimately or plausibly have in his possession? What can he carry across the border? In his position, would it appear logical for him to send and receive mail? Is an accommodation address available for the agent to write to? What languages will be used?

Normally the agent who writes SW messages should not reveal his true identity in the visible part of the letter. In some cases where the text of the secret writing may pinpoint the agent and where it is feared local censorship can detect and develop SW, it may be desirable to encypher the SW text. Generally, however, the large volumes of mail being sent offers such a formidable task to censors that only select suspect letters can be given thorough examination. Thus, the sheer volume of mail provides a great deal of safety, and if proper attention is given to other security considerations the agent's mail normally will never be suspected of carrying secret messages. In areas where more stringent technical censorship is expected, more secure techniques would need to be considered.

Accommodation addresses, which serve as the receiving point for the agent's SW to his case officer, must be carefully chosen and should as far as possible appear to be legitimate normal mail channels. Generally, a letter to a country considered neutral or friendly from the viewpoint of the country of origin is less suspect than one to an unfriendly area. SW *to* the agent may directly identify him if intercepted and developed or otherwise detected. Therefore, it is advisable to minimize the volume of SW messages sent

to the agent, and desirable when possible to mail SW to the agent internally in the country, thus circumventing international censorship. It may be desirable where possible to have the agent write with SW, but receive by encyphered radio broadcasts, with SW receiving only as an emergency back-up technique.

Contingency Planning

Past experience has proven the value of establishing SW "stay behind" capabilities in areas where direct contact with the agent may be lost. This situation has arisen many times in the past. Equally important is provision for the possibility that an agent may suddenly be transferred to an area where personal contact is precluded. This also happens frequently. In many such instances, adequate preparation for the use of SW may not be possible, especially preparation through practice. Therefore, whenever SW may be a possibility, steps should be taken to have the agent trained at the earliest opportunity.

The writer has encountered a number of cases where SW was not given to an agent because it was thought that the agent would continue to be able to "travel out" frequently for personal meetings, or that the agent was only going away for a "short period of time" or that the agent's "present access doesn't warrant SW reporting." Subsequently it developed that the agent could no longer travel out, or found himself cut off for several years from personal contact, or his access suddenly became valuable. Sometimes the consequences of such changes may subsequently be corrected by training the agent through a third party or by having written instructions dead-dropped to him. These are inevitably poor substitutes for preplanning. Case officers often tend to regard techniques such as carbon writing as too simple to warrant the expenditure of time for training and practice sessions. There are, however, many case officers who have lived to rue this oversight, having experienced the frustration of agents who cleverly have made technical innovations on their own or, more commonly, have failed to remember technique, such as the agent who wrote his message with his carbon and mailed the carbon to his case officer. There have been successful SW cases after an absolute minimum of training, or even training by written instruction, but these are exceptional. In SW it is best to play it safe.

In the dynamic scene of clandestine operations, technical tradecraft in general will continue to expand and develop. Certainly secret writing continues to evolve and to play its role in operational activities, growing ever more complex, or as simple, as the situation demands. The purpose of this article has been to enlighten and to establish guidelines and a philosophy for non-technical personnel who may be confronted at some time with situations—such as were sketched at the outset of this paper—in which SW is the best available solution.

Some guidelines for secret agents.

DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST INTERROGATION ORGANIZATIONS

Michael L. Mineur

The suggestions offered herein for practical defense against Communist interrogation organizations are designed to be used *very selectively* and with caution in the briefing of anti-Communist secret agents running the danger of Communist imprisonment.[1] Because some of the tactics outlined could be of use to other categories of persons, such as prisoners of war, political prisoners, and noncombatants, this study is offered with the reservation that it is not to be construed either as a modification of official US Government doctrine or an exhaustive treatment of the Communist system of prisoner management and exploitation.

The Importance and Techniques of Preparation

Most of the available guidance on this subject is too much concerned with the tactics of the conflict between the prisoner and his interrogator after arrest, and not enough with the *preparations* that the endangered agent can and should make in advance. His preparations are very often decisive in determining the outcome of his resistance effort. The agent must be prepared physically, organizationally, and mentally.

Among the most important physical preparations is to separate oneself as far as possible from incriminating materials such as commo plans, one-time pads, radios, secret inks, weapons, special cameras, documents, and money in bulk. Linkage to incriminating persons must be adequately covered, and all the standard procedures of operational security and conspiratorial discipline must be understood and maintained. Plans for emergencies must be worked out in advance and *rehearsed.* These plans should be set up for use under unfavorable conditions, when one is under surveillance or suspicion.

Organizationally speaking, the agent should have made all possible arrangements for the support and safety, rescue or warning of his

[1] Briefers should bear in mind that some agents, getting the full briefing, might decamp rather than take the risks.

family and others dependent upon him. He should have set up some system whereby his sponsors will learn of his arrest—if it occurs—at an early date, so that they can begin to help him. He should have arranged a simple code for concealing information in any letters or messages he might be able to send to his family, if the family is witting of his secret activities or affiliations.

This is a grim subject, and part of the mental preparation—a most important part—consists in accepting and living with these possibilities. An agent conditioned to face them honestly is likely to be far more capable and careful than the chance-taker who hopes somehow to get by without self-discipline and without the intensive preparation that is the only way to success in any clandestine operation. The agent should have studied the security service and interrogation systems operating in his area and should have prepared himself against surprise. The agent must prepare and thoroughly rehearse his cover story and his fall-back cover story for his status, action, and associations, and backstop them as far as possible. He will usually be able to get help with this work from his sponsors. There is an inward, or psychological aspect of imprisonment for which the prisoner must be fortified. Prisoners with a high ideological motivation are able to defend themselves and to continue to struggle against the opposition longer than others, even under conditions of extreme hardship. Persons who have strong religious beliefs are able to resist much more effectively than those with a weak faith or none. A person undertaking the dangerous work of the secret agent should in any case develop an ideological basis. If not religiously inclined, he should review in his mind the great cause of human freedom and the price that others have willingly paid to defend and advance it. Patriotism, the welfare of families and friends, and concern for his own future self-respect, all help to reinforce the will to resist. Very few persons are aware of how much hidden strength they actually have. The medical profession, which has the opportunity to observe persons fighting for their lives—often against incurable ailments—can testify to the fact that, when a person makes up his mind to resist, he can accomplish miracles.

The Arrest

It is, of course, essential that the agent, as a standard procedure, maintain a level of preparation for arrest. However, since he has to take chances in order to accomplish anything, it becomes important

to know something of the signs of impending arrest. History is replete with accounts of agents arrested with incriminating evidence in their possession *long after they themselves had good reason to expect arrest.*

Any change, however subtle, in the attitude of persons with whom one is in everyday contact must be fully reviewed as to possible causes. From the point of view of preparation, the agent should carefully study people with whom he has casual contact, such as an apartment house janitor, a storekeeper, a barber, for example. In a totalitarian country, people of this sort are keenly alert. If they have been approached under some cover by a local security officer to provide information about the agent, they will have received a tremendous shock and their attitude toward the agent is bound to change. He may observe signs of fear, sudden prying curiosity, avoidance, or even unusual pleasantness, on the part of such persons. He may have nothing but a feeling that their attitude has changed. Such warning signs should never be ignored.

If the agent is carrying out proper countersurveillance procedures he may detect signs that he is under observation. Although one would think that an agent detecting such signs would take strict measures to remove evidence, in many cases he has simply continued on his way—often with unfortunate results.

From time to time the agent may detect that his quarters, or his place of work, have been tampered with. He may discover articles out of place or missing, or signs of the rumpling of clothing in drawers, and the like. There are simple methods of so arranging various objects that their movement can be detected. Very frequently, the secret search of one's premises is an important warning that one is suspected. However, inquisitive persons and thieves also engage in this kind of activity.

The arrest or disappearance of confederates or accomplices is, of course, a warning that no one could misunderstand.

It is often possible for the sponsor of a secret agent to warn him through some prearranged system of communication that he should suspend operations, flee immediately, or the like. *The most careful preparation and planning is essential to assure that the agent will be able to verify the authenticity of a warning, as well as to understand it correctly.* From time to time persons have been trapped by "warnings" fabricated by the local security service and intended to stampede

them into some unwise action. Persons who should have known better have fallen for such simple tracks as an anonymous telephone call from "a friend," an anonymous letter dropped into the mailbox or shoved under the door, even a visit by an unknown well-wisher. Of course, in the areas where resistance to Communism is high there will be a person here and there who, out of the goodness of his heart will assist an enemy agent. But in the vast majority of cases, in a totalitarian country, fear of the consequences and general suspicions of everybody effectively prevent people from helping each other secretly—which is one of the main reasons why totalitarian governments survive.

Arrest occurs in two basic forms: overt and secret. In overt arrest actions, the Communist services tend to use a good deal of manpower to bar escape and to crash into the rooms of the suspect with the minimum loss of time. Occasionally they will have access to the keys to the suspect's lodging and use them for even swifter invasion of the premises. Sometimes these services deliberately create a great fuss during the arrest action, presumably in order to intimidate and impress the population. Arrest in this form indicates the intent of the authorities to liquidate the operation and formally charge and sentence the persons apprehended. The agent is advised to plan his resistance toward minimizing the offense, trying to get the charges changed to criminal charges and in general to aim at leading the arresting authorities to conclude that common crime is in fact the principal activity of the arrested persons.

In case of overt arrest, the prisoner in Communist hands in a civilized area can expect standard criminal processing, including photographing and fingerprinting, body search, replacement of belongings with a prison uniform, medical check, a hot shower bath, and assignment to a cell under close guard. In case of espionage suspects, these procedures will be very thoroughly carried out. The arrestee can expect to confront one or more interrogators for a long time to come.

In the case of secret arrest, quite a few of these procedures may be omitted. The prisoner may find himself in a safehouse, and the physical search may concentrate on depriving him of the means of suicide. The search for evidence may thus be a good deal less thorough than it might otherwise be. There may be evidence of concern for his state of mind in many cases; but in others the sternest and most thorough processing will occur. The prisoner should keep

alert to every nuance of the processing, as he can often gain clues as to how much is known and what is intended. He should be particularly alert if he is left in the company of talkative guards or "fellow prisoners" for long periods of time, as these persons will in all probability be plants trying to elicit information from him, and influence his attitudes.

In secret arrest operations, the person detained is usually accosted on the street by a number of men who "escort" him to prison or a safehouse as inconspicuously as possible. *Secret arrest as a rule means that the arresting service has plans which require that the fact of the suspect's arrest be concealed as long as possible.* This does not necessarily mean he is to be turned loose to be used as an informer, for the intent may only be to gain time and avoid scaring others before arrests can be made. It may mean that the arrestee is expected to provide evidence leading to the identification and arrest of persons not yet known to the security service. Occasionally a person is arrested on trumped up charges in the hope of getting him to provide evidence against himself by surprise and under high pressure. The possibility also exists that the arrest has been undertaken secretly in order to avoid embarrassment if the prisoner has to be released for lack of evidence later—that is to say, the arrest is a bluff. But in a good percentage of the cases there is a substantial prospect that the person detained may be let loose to function as a doubled agent, and the arrested person should take comfort from this circumstance and plan his defense accordingly.

Interrogation

While the prisoner is being processed into his cell, last minute preparations for his interrogation will be under way. The interrogators who are to deal with the prisoner will be putting the finishing touches on their interrogation plan and examining the materials recovered during arrest and body search. Frequently, the prisoner will not be interrogated for some time after entering his cell. During the interval the prisoner should review the main points of his cover story and of his fall-back story and decide what his attitude toward the interrogators will be. He may be fed, briefed on the rules, and allowed to go to sleep, only to be suddenly awakened and hurried off to an interrogation cell.

If the prisoner has been *secretly* arrested, his handling can vary widely. He may not be searched. He may be brought to a safehouse. He may be given a very friendly reception. On the other hand, he may be subjected to very harsh and violent treatment, in an effort to force or frighten a confession out of him. Harsh or violent treatment and hasty interrogation are indications that the arresting authorities are on a "fishing expedition" and do not really have sufficient information and evidence in hand.

In the initial stages of any interrogation it is best for the prisoner to play the role of a well-intentioned, but confused and innocent victim. The jails are full of prisoners who made the mistake of being clear and precise in their replies to seemingly harmless questions. The first thing every interrogator has to determine is whether his prisoner can tell a straight story about anything, or whether he is in a state of confusion. Prisoners are under no obligation to collaborate with their captors by exhibiting good memories and making coherent statements. This is the time to forget as much as possible.

In *all* interrogation sessions, the prisoner should try to discover the following:

a. What is known about him; more specifically, what evidence does the interrogator have? Even Communist interrogators have to have evidence to convict suspects, and they seldom have as much as they pretend to have. Nothing should ever be admitted unless the evidence that the interrogator exhibits is overwhelming. In such cases the admission should be framed in such a way as to mislead the interrogator as to the true nature of the evidence. *One should never assume that the case is hopeless and that one might as well tell all.*

b. Where did the interrogator get his information? The prisoner often overlooks the fact that the interrogator may let slip information which will indicate who betrayed the operation. By feigning stupidity and confusion and pretending not to understand questions, the prisoner may maneuver the interrogator into making further disclosures which may indicate the source of the betrayal.

c. What are the intentions of the authorities? By the time the prisoner is in his cell, he will have many clues to analyze: The arrest procedure, the search procedure, the remarks which the

arresting authorities may have made within his hearing, and other circumstances preceding the arrest which he may call to mind. Thinking these things over as calmly and as thoroughly as possible can help the prisoner to plan his defense.

d. How much importance do the authorities attach to the prisoner? When the prisoner faces his interrogators, he can gain valuable clues as to how much effort the opponent intends to make in his case. He may find himself confronted with an expert interrogator who knows the prisoner's language and background very thoroughly, or he may find a relatively inexperienced and ignorant interrogator working against him. The type of custodial handling, such things as the number of persons making the arrest, the speed and efficiency of his handling, the level of rank of officers dealing with him, all provide clues in this direction.

In the period before arrest—and certainly before interrogation—the prisoner should have made up his mind as to what facts he must conceal at all costs. Such facts would include: the identity or hiding places of other agents, the hiding places of items of evidence, the true objectives of the operation, and important information concerning his superior officers and his sponsoring organization.

Some General Rules

The rules which will help a prisoner to deal with his persecutors fall into two general categories: rules concerning attitudes and psychological defenses, and rules covering practical actions and defenses.

The first psychological rule is never to give up hope, no matter how desperate the situation appears to be. One must always bear in mind that the opponent is not only human but in all likelihood under heavy pressures of doubt and handicapped by fragmentary information. In espionage matters so much is cloudy and confused in even the clearest cases, that prisoners who know the game can frustrate their opponents—if they persist.

The second psychological rule is to view oneself in custody *as continuing the fight with other weapons and on another basis.*

The third rule is to view oneself as a patriotic hero fighting to free his people. After all, the soldier fights in groups, from which he draws courage. The secret agent generally spends most of his time

fighting singlehanded without this type of strong support. His fight is waged against great odds; hence he deserves extra credit for heroism—not condemnation as a "cowardly spy." One's own evaluation of oneself tends to get across to associates—and guards and interrogators are *de facto* associates of a sort, who may come to respect the prisoner who respects himself in spite of themselves. The safest pose is the pose of calm equality: "We are both doing our duty according to our principles."

Rule four is in many ways the most important: Care must be taken not to slip insensibly into the attitude that there is no world except the prison, no future, and that the time scale of the prison is all that counts. It must consciously be remembered that there is another world and that one day the prisoner will have to face that world and its rewards or punishment. Liberation may be very sudden and soon—then what?

Rule five is to remember one's own importance. The agent, confronted with the vastness of the prison and the clandestine activity, tends in any case to come to consider himself and what he does as unimportant. This is both a harmful attitude and an error: the agent is often very important and never unimportant. He can within limits continue to have an effect upon the world even while tied hand and foot, possibly even a greater effect than when he was at large. He cannot know what is going on behind the scenes of the opponent's organization. His case may be a *cause célèbre,* or even the subject of international negotiations. The prison administration, however, will make every effort to make him appear to himself as the forgotten man.

Combatting Environmental Influences

The tactics of most Communist services are designed to weaken the prisoner through relatively simple but highly effective methods. "Brainwashing" as commonly understood is an inexact notion. The prisoner can expect to be confined in a bleak and uncomfortable cell illuminated with a very bright light 24 hours a day. He will be under constant observation but unable to communicate with anyone. He will be required to obey minute, irritating, and senseless restrictions. His food supply will be inadequate and particularly deficient in vitamins. He will be deprived of sleep, required to sleep in a certain position when he does get a chance to lie down, and may have to stand for many hours on end. Interrogators and others will suggest that he

is guilty of all sorts of things and may alternate their treatment with sudden, unexpected interludes of kindness and even friendliness. The alternation of this treatment, especially when one is not prepared for it, can induce a state of mind gravely weakening the power to resist. Many former prisoners have stated that they were most weakened by friendly approaches after a long period of hardship. They found themselves forgetting that the interrogator was their enemy. They found themselves accepting the idea that they had to exonerate themselves and rehabilitate themselves, succumbing to intense feelings of guilt.

The interrogators, while they have a great deal of latitude and authority over the prisoner's situation, nevertheless would get into trouble, possibly quite serious, if the prisoner died or became demented or crippled as a result of the treatment he had been subjected to. The interrogator is not all-powerful. Prisoners should eat whatever food is placed before them to sustain their strength. With a little practice, however, some persons can vomit at will, and it could be effective if the prisoner suddenly did so upon the interrogator or in his presence. No interrogator enjoys close and continued contact with a prisoner who has lost control of his bowel movements. Fainting is sometimes an effective gambit. This interrupts the interrogation and creates time-wasting interludes while the prisoner is revived. The prison administration takes care to forestall attempts by prisoners to commit suicide. However, people have committed suicide in prison through dashing their heads against the walls, through biting their wrist arteries open, through inhaling items of food causing strangulation, and through other ingenious methods. There is nothing to prevent the prisoner from experimenting with suicide attempts in such fashion as to alarm the interrogator, and it takes a pretty determined interrogator to avoid making the prisoner's lot easier when this threat becomes evident.

Immediately upon imprisonment the prisoner should devise some method of keeping track of time. This is most difficult if there is no daylight in the prison cell. The prison schedules and routines are often deliberately varied in order to distort the prisoner's sense of time. The prisoner can pass the time he records very profitably by engraving upon his memory, through the process of repeated recall, important details about his opponents which will be valuable later on. Unless the prisoner makes a conscious effort to memorize these details, when

he gets out of prison he will usually be unable to recall important facts, dates, and the like. The prisoner should memorize the features and mannerisms of the interrogators, particularly unusual items such as an accent, a deformity, or some striking habit. He should attempt to find out as much as he can about the building in which he is housed, particularly its location. He should attempt to become familiar with the guards, who in a sense are also prisoners. The "friendly" guard, of course, is usually a provocateur, so he should be told nothing of significance except what the prisoner wants to reach the ears of his interrogators. However, cultivation of the guard can be used to elicit interesting details from him and may enable the prisoner to ease his own lot a little. Now and then the guard will be found who is in fact sympathetic to the prisoner. The prisoner should attempt to identify the vulnerabilities of interrogators and, of course, always look for clues as to their identity. The intelligence services of the free world are very well informed as to the identities of interrogators and can match the information the prisoner supplies with the information they already have to identify the interrogator fully later.

People captured by Chinese or other Asian Communists may find themselves imprisoned with a group of "reformed" prisoners, rather than isolated. The other prisoners are under heavy pressure to "reform" the victim. They will endlessly argue with him, plead with him, and abuse him, exerting moral pressure, and surrounding him with an ideological environment that will cause him to feel deserted, guilty, and hopeless. A person caught in such a situation can play for time, as this process takes days and often weeks to be effective. He can also use the situation to create confusion. For example, he can tell different individuals "in confidence" very different stories, and if he is good at dealing with people, he can create feuds amongst the people seeking to "reform" him, playing one off against another.

The effects of isolation and inactivity quickly weaken all—especially persons who are congenial and like human company. We all depend to a great extent on our associates for moral support and for a feeling of reality. When held in a dark cell, all alone, day after day, the desire for human contact, which can be satisfied only by the interrogator, grows very strong in many persons. Worry becomes an incessant companion. The tendency to see the interrogator more and more in a heroic light and as a friend also develops. Most prisoners

expect to find the enemy to be vile and revolting, and their resistance is greatly weakened when they discover that the interrogator can be a fine, clean-cut, idealistic, and quite charming person. The best defense against this approach is to keep telling oneself this is just another trick. If one can develop insight into one's own human weakness, much of the effect of this trick will be lost. The prisoner should realize that it is normal for a person in isolation to feel that he is losing his mind, to feel extremely guilty, to feel terribly lonely and anxious. The prisoner's fear that he is losing his mind is the best guarantee that he will not lose it.

The personal equation in the relationship with the interrogator must be borne in mind. Most people do not have dominant personalities or great powers of leadership and persuasion. Some interrogators have a great deal of such power. They are persons who exercise natural authority over others, and the prisoner will find himself emotionally affected by the demands of such commanding persons. Here again, insight into one's own weakness is the best defense.

It is also particularly hard to resist the blandishments of an interrogator who is obviously convinced of the justice of his own cause, and sincerely attempts to "reform" the prisoner. It is well to remember that some of the most sincere persons in history have been the most vicious, such as, for example, Adolf Hitler. Sincerity is no guarantee of the justice of a cause, but unless one is on one's guard against it, one can become persuaded.

As long as possible, and certainly until the pressure becomes intolerable, the prisoner should stick to his cover story. If he has worked up a plausible story, and has learned it reasonably well, and has lived his cover, he may be able to make the interrogator believe it. This happens more frequently than most people think. The interrogator is just another human being. In any case, as the interrogation proceeds, the prisoner can elaborate and develop the legend or cover story, especially if he has had the foresight to appear to be very confused and mixed up in the beginning. If gaps in the cover story become apparent, the prisoner can think up lies to insert. As the interrogation proceeds, he can rehearse these lies with the interrogator until the prisoner himself begins to believe the story. If, after a long time, the prisoner is forced to make a false confession he can use his fall-back cover story and go through the same routine as he did with the first story. Finally, if and when the prisoner is brought to admit that the fall-

back cover story was a lie, *he should go back to the original cover story,* telling the interrogator that he had told the truth the first time and then had been forced to lie and now can think of nothing but to tell the truth. It should be noted, and remembered, that the truth would quite possibly not be believed in any case. It has been the experience of many prisoners who, at an early stage, made a truthful confession, *that they received the same treatment as if they had lied.* The reason is that the opponent expects the prisoner to lie and very often has no way of telling how much of his story is true and how much is false, most cover stories being a mixture of truth and falsehood.

During interrogation it is well to try to distract the attention of the interrogator from sensitive items of information. This can be done by pretending to conceal information of secondary importance in such a way as to get the interrogator interested in prying it out of the suspect. For example, a prisoner who has no confederates can tell his story in such a way that the interrogator will conclude the prisoner must have had help. Eventually the prisoner can involve innocent persons—preferably persons loyal to the regime—thus causing the investigative apparatus to waste a great deal of energy and, quite possibly to arrest and interrogate persons who cannot possibly provide assistance.

Combatting Arguments

The prisoner can expect to be assailed with many arguments, all intended to persuade him to cooperate. One argument that is frequently effective is the statement: "We know all about your activities anyway. What I am doing is giving you a chance to explain and justify yourself." While this argument seems silly to a man who is not in prison, it has been extremely effective with many prisoners. Threats and promises are often made in a linked fashion. For example, the prisoner may be told he will be executed as a war criminal unless he cooperates, in which case he may be redeemed and even allowed to go free. Particularly effective is the trick of minimization. The interrogator takes the position that the prisoner was a dupe, really did not intend to commit a terrible crime, was victimized by his superiors, did not understand what he was doing, and so forth. The interrogator says that he fully understands the prisoner's activities and reasoning and might do the same if he were in the prisoner's shoes. This technique

is quite effective in inducing a prisoner to make small admissions. Once such small admissions have been made, they are used to pry more and more information out of the victim.

Another argument which is very effective when several persons in the same network have been arrested is based upon the natural distrust people have for each other. The interrogator will say or imply that the other persons arrested have long since confessed, putting the blame on the victim now being interrogated. The prisoner is then asked what he has to say in his defense, and if he believes he has been betrayed, he may easily fall into the trap of trying to put the blame on his accomplices. The only safe rule, no matter how overwhelming the evidence may be that others have confessed, is to stick to the story, and under no circumstances to attack one's associates.

Political arguments are often effective, especially against prisoners who do not know the inside story of Communist activities. People will be confused by long quotations from political authorities attacking their beliefs. It should be remembered that the devil himself can quote Scripture to his purpose. Often quotations from very great men, such as Abraham Lincoln, are twisted and edited to suit such purposes. Very effective is the "inevitable victory of Communism" approach. The prisoner is told that soon his homeland will be occupied by Communist forces and that he will be personally responsible for what happens to his family and friends if he does not cooperate. He will be told that Communist success is only a matter of time, and that he is wasting himself trying to prevent it. He will be told that he is pulling the chestnuts of other countries out of the fire, that he is a dupe of the capitalists, that his superiors are quislings and that the only way out is for him to help his enemies.

A particularly dangerous interrogator is a convert to Communism who was formerly on the prisoner's side of the fence. He can say, "I used to believe the same way that you do. I changed my mind for such and such reasons, and you can do the same." The convert can persuade the prisoner to hope that he too can be redeemed by conversion. After a long and miserable time in prison, this temptation becomes very strong. The best defense for the prisoner is to remember that conversion under duress is always suspect, and that, if the man interrogating him is a genuine convert, the circumstances of his conversion could not have involved duress.

A prisoner can sometimes waste a great deal of the interrogator's time by long and involved descriptions of trivial affairs and matters. This is particularly effective if, *from the beginning*, the prisoner has used complicated constructions and confusing *non sequitur* in his explanations. When stopped in a rambling discourse, the clever prisoner flounders and gets mixed up, loses the thread of what he was saying and then winds up starting at the beginning once more. Most interrogators tend to let the prisoner talk in the hope that he will say something of value. In most Communist prisons the interrogator is required to report the prisoner's statements in writing. The more confused and rambling the information is, the more time-consuming and repulsive the task of transcription becomes.

In some circumstances it may be profitable for the prisoner to tell the interrogator that the day may come when the interrogator—like a number of the Nazi Gestapo—may find himself on trial as a war criminal. Some interrogators fear this ultimate fate. A prisoner can sometimes profitably attempt to involve the interrogator in an ideological discussion. Most Communists render lip service to Marxist ideology, but know as little about Marx as the average religious person knows about the Bible, the Torah, or the Koran. It does no harm to ask for Marxist literature. Anything which will delay or sidetrack the interrogation can be useful. Sometimes such literature will be supplied on demand, and the ingenious prisoner can contrive to waste the interrogator's time and energy in fruitless ideological discussions. The prisoner who knows the laws pertinent to his case can often quote it to help himself. Communist law is usually a farce, but it is a farce that Communists are expected to maintain.

Warning

In all cases, whether or not the prisoner undertakes to arouse the curiosity or the fears of the interrogator, great care must be taken not to arouse personal hostility. One of the most foolish and dangerous things a prisoner can do is to incur the personal hatred of the guards or the interrogators.

It is customary in most Communist prisons for the prisoner to be required to sign the written protocol of each day's interrogation. If the prisoner has had the foresight not to carry specimens of his own handwriting with him, he can sign the protocol in a distorted handwriting (which he should have memorized). However he signs, he

should always first write, "I have read this document," and then cross his signature over this line of writing. This is legal in most Communist prisons and hinders the use of the signed protocol as if it were a signed confession. To the limits of his ability, the prisoner should refuse to countersign documents written in a language he does not understand.

Coping With Interrogator Tricks

In addition to environmental influences, direct accusation, and moral pressure, the prisoner will have to deal with a great many tricks of the interrogation trade. There are so many of these that a full catalogue is impossible. Most of the tricks, however, are relatively simple, and once one has studied the pattern of trickery and types of common tricks outlined below, one should readily be able to spot most of them. It should be noted that these tricks are not confined to Communist interrogators, but are used by police and other interrogators all over the world. The defense suggested will be discussed in connection with the individual approaches.

A most obvious trick which is still surprisingly effective is to ask the prisoner why he thinks he has been arrested. The trick is very simple and very often provokes the prisoner into making disclosures which the interrogator had never suspected. The best defense is some statement which fits into the cover arrangement. If, for example, the prisoner is posing as a national of some other country, he may infer that he has been arrested because it is the policy of the local government to persecute citizens of his country. Whatever explanation the prisoner volunteers should be along the line of imputing persecution, or error, or blackmail, or some other discreditable motive to the arresting authority. This is part of the basic posture of the prisoner of rejecting any implication that he could be guilty of an offense. As always, the reply should not be conspicuously clear. It is always safe to say one has no idea, but this reply is negative, and attacking is usually a better defense.

Sometimes the prisoner will find himself accused or suspected of activities in which he has never engaged. This can be a trap, for it is quite possible that the prisoner, in his haste to establish an alibi by proving where he really was at a given time, will provide the arresting authorities with information of great importance which they did not have and may not even have suspected to exist.

Sometimes elaborate scenarios are set up to induce the prisoner to believe that he is not, or not yet, under interrogation. For example, he may find himself awaiting processing in a cell with two or three other "prisoners," one or more of whom are actually informers. These persons will seek to involve him in a harmless conversation. The wise prisoner never forgets that *there is no harmless conversation in prisons.* The prisoner may be asked to fill out some simple form concerning his belongings, and involving notification of relatives, employer, or friends. By filling out such a form the prisoner may provide the interrogator with a specimen of his handwriting and often a great deal of useful information. If forced to fill out any forms, the prisoner is well advised to use a distorted handwriting and to put in false or misleading information. Occasionally an interrogator will pose as a technical specialist. That is to say, a "guest" of the interrogation staff will be left alone with the prisoner on the pretense that the interrogation has been interrupted to "talk shop." Depending on the cover story that the person under interrogation is supporting, he should or should not go along with this trick.

A particularly devastating trick is to compel the prisoner to tell his cover story or legend backwards. It is, therefore, a good idea, when memorizing a cover story, literally to learn it forwards and backwards.

When a question of alibi arises, that is to say, a determination of where the prisoner was at a certain time, the prisoner who has not lived his cover is especially vulnerable. For example, the prisoner may state that at a certain time he was at a certain hotel in a certain city. The interrogator makes a note of this and then, after some hours or days have passed, calls the prisoner in and says that he has investigated the alibi and asks the prisoner whether he noticed any unusual event during his alleged stay at the hotel. Conversely, the interrogator may tell the prisoner that at the time he was supposedly at the hotel, there was a hold-up or some other spectacular event. This he will do in the course of a "conversation" and the prisoner, in his effort to sustain his alibi may go along with the interrogator's fabrication and so trap himself. The interrogator, of course, may not let the prisoner know that he has been trapped. The best defense of a prisoner who has not been at the place he claims to have been is to plan in advance to claim a place where he could have been sleeping at the time something unusual occurred. He could, for example, in the hotel situation, easily have missed even a fire in some other part of the hotel through being asleep.

The interrogator may have an enormous file on his desk and look into it from time to time as if reading about the prisoner. He may speak as if he knows a great deal, dropping names, mentioning addresses, even telephone numbers. This type of technique can be exploited to the prisoner's advantage, for the interrogator, in his efforts to impress the prisoner, may let slip many valuable items of information, including the extent of his own ignorance.

Some interrogators have success with very simple tricks such as staring silently at the bridge of the suspects nose. This gives the suspect the feeling that the interrogator is looking through him. Most persons cannot stand a sustained silence. The wise prisoner will simply sit and stare back.

Sometimes interrogators resort to very persistent and detailed questioning about matters about which the prisoner has no knowledge, with the result that, when a question is slipped in to which the prisoner can provide a satisfactory answer, he will feel relieved and let fall information he should keep to himself.

Sometimes a prisoner is plied with questions which make no sense. Most persons worry about losing their minds or at least self-control in such situations and naturally assume that they themselves are slipping, when in fact the interrogators are deliberately talking nonsense. It is a good idea to play around with this trick to keep the interrogator talking nonsense as long as possible, as this gains one time.

On occasion prisoners are stripped naked and made to stand before one or more interrogators for long periods of time. Sensitive individuals find this extremely trying. We all rely upon our clothing to sustain our image and our status. One good defense against this kind of thing is to begin to cough and sneeze and tremble and to show preoccupation with the physical rather than the mental result of such indignity.

A common expedient is to upgrade the prisoner's living conditions as he becomes more cooperative. He may begin prison life in a dank or mosquito infested cell and advance to a cell which may even have a carpet and a private toilet. He may be confined with other prisoners who pretend to have a dreaded disease, such as tuberculosis, a venereal disease, or a skin disease, or even leprosy.[2]

[2] Persons who have visible leprosy are no longer infectious. Tuberculosis bacteria exist everywhere in prisons anyway. Venereal disease cannot generally be communicated without the cooperation of the victim.

A prisoner of importance may find himself in the hands of a "medical"specialist who gives him psychological examinations and may tell him he is on the verge of insanity and suggest that he take some injection. Everyone has heard rumors of the use of truth serums and other debilitating drugs, "brainwashing" drugs, and the like, and many persons are disposed to feel that no one could blame them for confessing when confronted with or injected with drugs.

As a matter of fact, a determined person can successfully resist truth serums and other chemical gadgets. It is obviously very frightening to be visited by a *soi disant* medical specialist suggesting shock treatments, nerve resection, frontal lobotomy, or castration as a means of "helping" the prisoner to become "normal." These expedients lose their effectiveness, however, if the prisoner realizes they are tricks, and that a prison administration will not usually countenance any such activities.

The Cuban interrogators have used a particularly devastating expedient to break the will of prisoners who resist: the false firing squad. A common variation of this trick is to have the prisoner brought out to witness the execution of some other prisoner. Sometimes the execution is real and sometimes it is staged. He then is told his turn is next, he is blindfolded and led to the stake, a volley of blank cartridges is fired. The effect of this is naturally overwhelming, and is heightened when the prisoner is told, after he discovers he is still alive, that the next time he may not be so lucky and then he is given one more chance to tell his story. One defense against this trick is the knowledge that *he will not be executed as long as he has not provided the information the regime seeks.* As a matter of fact, prisoners nowadays are seldom executed without some form of trial, even in Communist areas, because of the effect upon the prison administration of allowing too much arbitrary mistreatment of prisoners. As far as is known, Communist services make little use of electromechanical "lie detectors" or polygraphs, apparently because the general hypocrisy and paranoia of Communist societies make it impossible to get reliable results. On occasion some trickery employing a machine represented to be a "lie detector" may be employed. The person interrogated is best advised to deny any imputations by the machine that he is lying.

A variant of interrogation trickery that is as old as the hills but still traps many persons is the "good guy", "bad guy" trick. This

is worked as follows: One interrogator consistently harasses, insults and badgers the suspect, accusing him of lying, threatens him with violence, pushes him around and in general behaves very badly. The other interrogator is a friendly and rather well-intentioned man who plays the role of the friend of the prisoner, attempting to restrain the "bad guy" and protect the prisoner. Eventually the prisoner is left alone with the "good guy" who then attempts to win the prisoner's confidence by condemning his colleague. Strange as it seems, many a prisoner falls for this trick. Most persons are now aware of the existence of mirror windows or two-way mirrors and realize that someone may be watching them. Ordinary mirrors, however, are occasionally used so that the interrogator can watch the prisoner and his reactions while appearing to look elsewhere. The interrogator may go to some other part of the room to fumble with a drawer or some other object and casually make a remark to the prisoner which contains frightening implications, and observe how the prisoner reacts when he does not believe he is under observation.

Interrogators often seek to aggravate a prisoner by pointing out such signs of guilt as sweating, crossing and uncrossing of legs, nail biting, blushing, or aversion of the eyes. Persons not guilty of anything become exceedingly nervous and uncomfortable when under interrogation. In point of fact, only hardened criminals and aberrant personalities of certain types behave calmly in such a situation. The best defense is to say one is always nervous and ill-at-ease when interrogated or questioned or even in conversations. The display of horrible photographs of bombing victims, murder victims, or other atrocities occurs occasionally. The interrogator calls to the prisoner's attention that he is responsible for atrocities. This provocation has two objectives. It can make a person feel guilty, or it can provoke him into attempting to justify the acts of the power he supports. The best defense is to deplore these misfortunes and to take no stand whatsoever with regard to them.

The prisoner finds himself in a particularly hazardous situation when he makes some small admission and the interrogator tries to use this to pry more information out of him. Of course, "the longest journey begins with a single step," but there is no law that says that a person, having made one step, necessarily has to take further steps. An admission or a slip of the tongue can be used by the resolute prisoner to lure the interrogator up a false trail.

Some interrogators will provide the prisoner with pencil and paper and demand that he write his life history. This is a very tiring and time-consuming activity. If the prisoner has maintained his posture of confusion effectively, there is nothing to prevent him from preparing a most confused biography. A great deal of time can be gained in this way, as well as much peace and quiet for recovery of equilibrium and review of the situation.

The prisoner should conceal all knowledge of foreign languages, as far as possible. The interrogator will be very interested to identify the foreign languages spoken by the prisoner and may use a number of tricks, such as suddenly addressing the prisoner in a language he is suspected to know, or speaking to a third person in this language, while observing the prisoner. He may say something uncomplimentary or startling about the prisoner, seeking to cause a visible reaction. If a strange language is spoken in his presence, the prisoner should always make the appearance of trying to hear and understand what is said. Many prisoners who know a foreign language act ostentatiously uninterested in such a situation, but the normal behavior of a man who does not know a language is to listen attentively in the effort to catch a word here and there, finally to give up and lose interest.

Prison informers are not usually brought forward while there is intensive interrogation, but may be after the prisoner has been interrogated or if he is held indefinitely in detention pending investigation. The prison informer can be exceedingly dangerous or useful depending upon the skill of the intended victim. It is wise to regard all fellow prisoners as informers. Especially suspect, however, should be persons who warn the prisoner against other inmates of the jail, persons who are quite healthy in spite of the miserable prison conditions. The informer often has the task of discouraging a resistant prisoner. The prisoner should never lose sight of the fact that contact with an informer or other provocator gives him an opportunity to supply deception information to the interrogation staff, while pretending to be telling the truth in confidence.

The interrogator will tell the prisoner, "we are alone and can talk completely privately." A tape recorder may be ostentatiously displayed and turned off so the prisoner can talk "off the record." Many fall for this although common sense should tell them that no prisoner is ever alone with any interrogator. Even if several people are not listening in on concealed microphones and recording on

concealed machines, what the prisoner tells the interrogator will be told to everyone needing to know and often enough to the world-at-large. In fact, no prisoner can ever be sure he is truly alone anywhere. Not only are peepholes and audio devices easily employable, and closed circuit TV a possibility, but the prisoner may find himself quartered in a cell with a person he has every right to trust and who *is* in fact trustworthy, in order that concealed devices can pick up their conversation. Stool pigeons confined in a cell with a prisoner may point out a "hidden" microphone and involve him in a discussion outside its range, where another microphone is known to them to be hidden.

Propaganda Exploitation

One of the most painful ordeals the agent-prisoner has to undergo is the attempt of the apprehending service to exploit him for propaganda purposes. Efforts may be made to get him to denounce his sponsors and the regime he has been serving in favor of the Communist system, both on paper and in public before cameras. Depending on the intentions of the Communists, the prisoner may have to undergo a show trial or some other legal farce. Show trials usually require that the prisoner rehearse his part in the show until it is letter perfect. Commonly, he will be rehearsed in a story which displays him as pleading for mercy and as the victim and/or accomplice of a capitalist machination.

One gambit used with success in many cases is to invite or allow the prisoner to write one or more letters to his loved ones. These letters must conform in many parts to a prescribed text. If the agent has prepared for this contingency in advance by arranging a simple open code with his loved ones, he can use this opportunity to convey useful information. The code must be simple, and cannot convey complicated ideas. Provision in such a code should be made to send at least the following messages:

a. What is stated about my situation is (is not) true.

b. I am (am not) being severely maltreated.

c. I suspect (know) I was betrayed by _____.

d. The enemy knows (does not know) who my accomplices were.

e. The enemy has a source in _____.

In some show trials, prisoners have had the courage to denounce their rehearsed pleas. In the case of a prominent prisoner this action may have some value, as the foreign press may be represented or hear of it. However, in the average show trial no reporters other than Communist sympathizers will be in the courtroom. The most heroic conduct on the part of a prisoner ordinarily will not be mentioned by such persons. As a rule, therefore, the prisoner should aim to make himself as uninteresting and useless for propaganda purposes as possible. The propagandists do not like to put on a show with unreliable persons—or persons who show of symptoms of crippling mental or physical mistreatment which might arouse the sympathy of an audience. All trials end with a predetermined verdict on which courtroom conduct, unless it is bitterly hostile to the Communists, will have no effect.

The thing to bear in mind in refusing cooperation in propaganda exercises is that *in the long run* it will have no effect on the fate of the prisoner whether he complies or not. On balance he will probably be better off if he does not comply. For some reason, the Communists tend to inflict more suffering and demands on the weak than on the strong.

At times the prisoner may be trapped by technical devices used without his knowledge. He may be asked to review some progaganda statement out loud and then state what he thinks of it. A secret tape recorder will be set up to record his voice apparently saying what in fact is merely being read. It is, therefore, advisable for anyone given anything to read to read it in silence. Sometimes statements of the prisoner are taken out of context and merged with something he said elsewhere to make a damaging statement. There is little the prisoner can do to guard himself against an effort of this kind unless he says nothing at all, which is always a method to be tried but can seldom be sustained long if the interrogator chooses to employ drastic measures.

Penitentiary, Escape, Release

Once the prisoner has passed through the sentencing procedure, the interest of the authorities in his case declines very sharply, although attempts may later be made to recruit him as an informer. The prisoner should bear in mind that entry into a penitentiary with a long sentence does not necessarily mean that he will serve this sentence.

Important captured Communist agents are from time to time exchanged for agents of the West. From time to time there are diplomatic negotiations, as in the case of the Cuban and the East German prisoners, resulting in the release of thousands of individuals who had resigned themselves to many years in prison. There is the possibility of escape. There is the possibility of the overthrow of a Communist regime. This is a danger that the regime is constantly preoccupied with. In the recent case of Czechoslovakia, an explosion of the entire Communist system in Europe was thought to be imminent. This can and will happen again and again, possibly with increasing frequency. The prisoner should bear these consoling factors in mind.

In the penitentiary or concentration camp the prisoner will again find human association. Among the prisoners he meets there will be persons with whom he can cooperate, but there will also be secret informers against whom he must defend himself and whom he can also exploit by telling them whatever it is he wants the authorities to believe. The prisoner should always beware of special officers in the prison who have a stature higher than the guard personnel, especially "welfare officers" or "morale officers", or "political indoctrination officers". These are very often state security service men responsible not only for keeping an eye on the prisoners, but for watching the guards. Some of the guards will be extremely venal and others will hate the regime.

The prisoner should look upon himself in the penitentiary as continuing the fight in a special situation, not simply as a man who is out of action until release. His conspiratorial skills and training can be used to good advantage in the prison. He can learn a great deal more about conspiracy in the prison. This is, after all, the school of conspiracy in which the Communists learned their trade. A prison is, in a very real sense, a typical Communist country in miniature. Skillful and determined prisoners have effectively operated within such penitentiaries safely and for long periods of time to create great difficulties for the prison administration, organize escapes, subvert guard personnel, and sabotage the installation.

In considering escape plans and confederates, the prisoner must never forget that the prison administration from time to time may induce provocateurs to suggest escape, and thus dupe the prisoners, later visiting heavy additional punishment on them. A provocation of this kind generally destroys escape ideas for quite a long time.

A provocation which is elaborate, but sometimes is used, is to allow the prisoner to escape in company with another prisoner who is actually a member of the security service. Usually the escape is "miraculous" and the prime mover is the provocateur. The intent is to win the confidence of the prisoner. In a variant of this trick, the prisoners escape, and meet the confederates of the provocateur, who profess to distrust the prisoner, consider him a stool, become very angry, and threaten to kill him unless he can prove his loyalty by proving that he has been operating against the regime. The temptation to betray operations and contacts under such conditions is strong. The best defense is to say nothing on the grounds that one can never trust anyone and take one's chances, for it is after all by no means unusual for one prisoner to help another escape without ulterior motives.

The prospects and conditions governing physical escape and subsequent evasion of controls vary so widely that only very general rules can be given here:

a. Be careful whom you trust (see above on types of provocations).

b. Be realistic as to the prospects of success: it is one thing to get out of a prison; it is quite another to get out of the country, and it may be foolish to try physical escape if other factors are tending to promote the chances of early release. Prison guards may be lax because there are other obstacles to escape beyond the perimeter.

c. Do not aggravate your situation by committing serious crimes in the escape effort; for example, murdering a guard will usually result in a death sentence. Of course, there may be occasions of active warfare in which the prisoner in his escape action is in effect undertaking guerrilla warfare. This is not commonly the case, however, for a secret agent arrested in alien territory.

d. Beware of becoming involved in escape plots from which you may later want to withdraw. The others plotters may decide you know too much.

e. Above all, never become involved with persons who are sincere but indiscreet.

Release from prison can come about, as already mentioned, through a number of factors over which the prisoner has no control. One

of the ways to get out of enemy custody most easily is to get oneself recruited as a double agent, that is to say, to let oneself be "turned". The hostile service, of course, is aware of this, but sometimes has no choice but to try to recruit agents from among its captives. It is well for the agent to memorize the factors which can make him a desirable "turn around" for his captors:

a. Special access or other capability to accomplish something for them.

b. Lack of publicity in his case.

c. Fundamental "job loyalty." If a man conveys the impression that he has desperately and loyally defended the interests of his sponsor so long as he thought the sponsor was in the right, only turning his coat when he came to see how wrong his sponsor was, he will win a great deal more trust than if he gives the impression of merely yielding to pressure.

d. "Unpacking." In general, before a person will be considered really "doubled," he will have had to make a full confession of his activities. It is possible to display the appearance of this provided the planning has been thorough, even while concealing vital information. The agent can best plan his ultimate "confession" (really a third cover story) at his leisure in his cell after he has had many sessions with his interrogators and has discovered what they actually know. He can devise a story which explains the known factors and makes him look attractive from the point of view of *potential* to do things the opponent wants him to do. Woven into the story should be factors which induce the opponent to think he can *control* the potential "double agent" through blackmail. For example, the prisoner in the course of "unburdening his soul" can confess to serious but not easily checkable misdeeds, such as embezzlement or fraud. Confession to crimes such as murder is fine, provided investigation by the opponent will confirm that such a crime was in fact committed, the guilty person not apprehended, and the prisoner could have committed it. The prisoner may "betray" an ambition to become a figure of power in his homeland which can only be realized by collaboration with the enemy. The prisoner must be very careful in pretending to become "converted" to the opponent's faith. Protesting too much is usually suspect, but true believers seeking converts are often quite vulnerable to being de-

ceived by the pretence of belief on the part of others. Easy capitulation is, of course, fatal to any hopes of emerging as a double agent.

Most prisoners in jail for clandestine operations find themselves free as a result of one or another event unexpectedly and suddenly. A word of caution is in order: There is a tremendous temptation to share one's joy and information with all one encounters in the first wild elation of release. This should be rigorously suppressed, for only harm can come from spontaneous disclosures, even when fully true, to unauthorized persons before coordination with the original sponsor has been effected. Publicity may for example alert the person who betrayed the prisoner, so that he may escape or destroy evidence. Whatever is said will be twisted by certain publications to the detriment of sponsors, friends, and relatives and thus may endanger innocent persons. Public recriminations against the Communists for treatment received in prison can hinder the release of other prisoners, and possibly damage secret operations which are under way. For maximum effect, release stories have to be enriched with information not known to the released or escaped person, and publicized at the right time and place. It may be desirable to avoid any publicity, as this may be just what the opposition hoped to achieve.

Above all, the prisoner should never forget that one can turn almost any situation to one's advantage with a little luck and careful planning.

Distant events shape the craft of intelligence.

THE BOGOTAZO

Jack Davis

On the afternoon of 9 April 1948, angry mobs suddenly and swiftly reduced the main streets of Bogotá to a smoking ruin. Radio broadcasts, at times with unmistakable Communist content, called for the overthrow of the Colombian government and of "Yankee Imperialism." Many rioters wore red arm bands; some waved banners emblazoned with the hammer-and-sickle. A mob gutted the main floor of the *Capitolio Nacional,* disrupting the deliberations of the Ninth International Conference of American States and forcing Secretary of State Marshall and the other delegates to take cover. The army regained control of the city over the next day or two. But not before several thousand Colombians had been killed. It was the *bogotazo.*

The reaction in Washington was also dramatic and swift. Congressmen and commentators alike lamented that Communist Russia had scored a signal victory in the Cold War. The recently organized Central Intelligence Agency in particular was rebuked for having provided no warning of this "South American Pearl Harbor." And on 15 April the Director of Central Intelligence defended the Agency's performance, first before a congressional subcommittee investigating the failure of US intelligence, and then before the Washington press corps.

This article attempts to assess the impact of the *bogotazo* on the history both of Colombia and of the CIA. The passage of two decades is a mixed blessing in this undertaking by one who was not a participant. Some formerly disputed aspects of the affair seem clear in retrospect; other aspects remain or have become murky. Those among the readers who personally experienced this dramatic episode, either in Bogotá or in Washington, are urged to transmit comments to the editors of the *Studies,* so that a more definitive account can be written for the history of the Agency.

Bogotá: The Aborted Revolution

One thing now seems clear amidst the confusion that still surrounds the *bogotazo*: Colombia in 1948 was closer to social revolution than it has ever been before or since. The old order was under challenge from a forceful and extremely popular politician, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, and the poor in the cities, especially Bogotá, were in a rebellious mood. But it was the assassination of the one that turned on the dreadful violence of the other. No one else was able to harness the savage energy of the mob; certainly not the feckless Colombian Communists, though they tried. The government preferred to blame the riots on Communist agitation and foreign intrigue, rather than to address itself to the underlying causes of popular discontent. Today, some twenty years later, the same elite, somewhat expanded and more enlightened, still controls Colombia. Indeed the *bogotazo* has served as an antidote to revolution, because the ruling classes now tend to avoid the excessive partisanship and disdain for the welfare of the masses that helped set the stage for the rising of the poor on 9 April—"Black Friday"—1948.

Throughout nearly all its history, political and economic power in Colombia has been monopolized by a small elite which has ruled through either the Conservative or Liberal Party, or through some combination of the two. Leaders of national stature who attempted to organize the masses against the oligarchs were rare. Gaitán was one such. He was himself of humble origin and mixed blood. He was a staunch antagonist of oligarchical rule and a spellbinding orator. His keynote was "I am not a man, I am a people."

Yet by 1948 Gaitán had captured control of the Liberal Party, which was the majority party even without his broad personal following. Only a split of the Liberal vote between Gaitán and an oligarch nominated by the Party had enabled the Conservatives to capture the presidency in 1946. Gaitán was a strong favorite to win the presidency in the election scheduled for 1950. His role as Liberal Party leader, naturally enough, somewhat curbed his license to attack the oligarchs of both parties.

The *bogotaños*, usually resigned to their poverty, had turned bitter in the years immediately following World War II. Times were bad; the rich made their clever adjustments, but, the poor suffered simultaneously from soaring prices and declining job opportunities. Also, in the usual pattern of Colombian history, the return of the Conservative

Party to power in Bogotá in 1946 meant that its partisans in the hinterland, with the help of the army and police, were intimidating their Liberal counterparts. Early in 1948 Gaitán had addressed a rally of 100,000 in Bogotá and demanded an end to government persecution and violence.

The *gaitanistas* were angered still further by the fact that their hero had not been appointed to the Colombian delegation to the International Conference of American States which convened in Bogotá on 30 March. Moreover, Foreign Minister Laureano Gómez, to the Liberals the most feared and hated Conservative leader, had been selected to head the Colombian delegation and thus had been "elected" president of the Conference. There is evidence that some supporters of Gaitán, apparently with his knowledge and perhaps mild encouragement, were considering the possibility of a *coup d'etat* for 1948. This probably reflected their awareness of the growing popular discontent and their doubts that a fair election would be held in 1950. In any case Gaitán's murder on 9 April also put to death a potentially revolutionary moment and the *bogotazo* was no more than its wake.

The assassination took place on a downtown street as Gaitán was walking to lunch. The murderer was apparently one of those fanatics or psychopaths we say may never be excluded from calculations on the safety of dignitaries. His motives cannot be known for certain, for he was battered to death on the spot by frenzied bystanders. Inevitably, charges were raised of the complicity of the Conservative Party, of the Communists, and of the US. But no strong evidence of a political plot has ever been produced. [1]

Naturally enough the outraged populace of Bogotá was convinced that the Conservatives were the culprits, and its vengeance was directed primarily toward the Party's symbols, though also toward those of the oligarchy generally. Laureano Gómez's newspaper building and his suburban estate were destroyed. The mobs that attacked the *Capitolio* were looking for Laureano (though they were also

[1] The assassin was identified as Juan Roa Sierra. The Colombian police indicated that he was seeking revenge for a relative slain by an Army officer, who had been acquitted on 8 April on the strength of a legal defense by Gaitán. A subsequent government-sponsored study of the affair by Scotland Yard agents does not mention this story, but pictures Roa as a mystic with delusions of grandeur who had sought a political appointment from Gaitán and had been given a run-around.

shouting anti-US slogans). Cathedrals and priests as well as public buildings and commercial establishments were made targets, because the Church was associated with both the Conservative party and the old order.

What of leadership? Gaitán's stalwarts gave the mob some early political direction, hoping to topple the government. The red arm bands were the traditional symbol of the Liberal Party. The Communists had long planned to disrupt the Conference but before the assassination had attempted nothing risky or substantial. After the start they also did what they could to enlarge the disorders and to give them a political direction. From time to time they gained access to the microphones at radio stations captured by rebel forces. Through the Soviet Embassy they also had access to clandestine stations and to printing presses. But the Communists were neither strong enough nor popular enough to take command. Gaitán had stolen most of their thunder through his own populistic appeals. In terms of both radio time and street leadership the *bogotazo* was mostly a *gaitanista* affair. In any case, frenzy and drunkenness soon diverted the mob from its interest in political vengeance and revolution, to violence and looting as ends in themselves.

There were many foreign radicals in Bogotá at the time, to advertise their causes in the publicity extended to the Conference of American States. Fidel Castro, then 22 years old, happened to be one of them. Thorough investigations indicate that he played only a minor role. Castro subsequently reported that he tried to turn the mob into a revolutionary force, but was defeated by the onset of drunkenness and looting. The episode may have influenced his adoption in Cuba in the 1950s of a guerrilla strategy rather than one of revolution through urban disorders.

Most of the police in Bogotá were pro-Liberal and *gaitanista* in their political loyalties. Many joined the mob or handed over their arms soon after the rioting began. In contrast, the army, slowly augmented from provincial barracks, stood by the government. The soldiers followed the orders of their officers and shot volley after volley, point blank, into the crowds. This—together with the steadfastness of the Conservative president, the growing concern of many Liberal leaders about the anti-oligarchical nature of the affair, and the unwinding of the mob's fury—brought a sharp reduction in vio-

lence within a day or two. But continued sniping, dislocations brought on by a general strike, and a dispute over the burial site for Gaitán kept the capital city unsettled for another week.

Events in the outlying cities were much less significant, though not devoid of drama. Some Communists were able to raise the Soviet banner over the town hall of Barranquilla. Apparently it took but one army officer to tear it down. Liberal partisans gained control of Cali temporarily. A presumptuous group of local Communists then declared the establishment of the "Soviet Socialist Republic of Colombia." Here too the army swiftly reestablished government control. The officer in charge was the then obscure Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, whose effectiveness and devotion to duty were duly noted in Bogotá.

As it turned out the *bogotazo* probably had its most lasting impact on the countryside. Political violence involving feuding Liberal and Conservative bands, never completely absent in Colombia, had been increasing in tempo since the return to power of a Conservative government in 1946. (The Liberals previously had ruled since 1930.) In the period before April 1948, the Conservatives, with help as we have indicated from army and police, had been getting the best of it. With the news of the *bogotazo,* Liberal partisans struck everywhere with fury. But soon Conservative bands had better arms and were able to retaliate. Rural warfare reached a new high level known as *La Violencia,* which was to claim more than 200,000 lives in the following decade. This remarkable bloodletting, stimulated by the *bogotazo* and nourished by the deeply rooted feuds between Conservatives and Liberals, also reflected the hard times economically, the attractiveness of violence as a way of life for many peasants, the ineptness of the government, and the senseless factionalism of the country's more civilized politicians.

The inability of the civilian leaders to curb either the rural violence or their own bitter political disputes opened the way for Rojas Pinilla, now a general, to take control as military dictator in 1953. He made progress in reducing rural warfare; but by 1957 his regime had become so arbitrary and corrupt that he was put out of office by the oligarchy and the military establishment. The former in particular feared Rojas' efforts to organize a mass anti-oligarchical party. In 1958, to curb such tendencies and to preclude future *bogotazos,* the civilian leaders set up a remarkable coalition government called the

National Front that has prevented Liberals and Conservatives from competing for office directly.[2] They have over recent years considerably curbed their partisanship, and worked, with modest success, toward improved conditions for the poor. The National Front is scheduled to run to 1974. Another *bogotazo* is possible; but for the moment there is no revolutionary leader of stature, and the poor, while perhaps discontented, are not seething.

Washington: The Aborted Investigation

The Washington reaction to the Bogotá riots was heavily influenced by the initial responses in Colombia of the Conservative government and of Secretary of State Marshall. The Colombians charged that both the assassination and the riots were parts of a "premeditated movement inspired by Communists and undesirable foreign elements" to sabotage the conference. Marshall reported to the press that the riots had been Communist-inspired and as such were an extension to the Western Hemisphere of the tactics of subversion and violence that the Soviet Union was employing in Europe. He insisted that the conference continue in Bogotá (as it did), so that international communism would be denied a victory over the free countries of America.[3]

In 1948—the year of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, of concerted Communist drives to gain power in France and Italy, and of the beginning of the Berlin blockade—a deliberate Soviet extension of the cold war to the Western Hemisphere was indeed a credible phenomenon to many US observers. The following is from a *New York Times* editorial (April 14):

> "Backing up the findings of the Colombian Government, Secretary of State Marshall and other delegates to the Inter-American Conference have now likewise accused Soviet Russia, and its tool, international communism, of instigating the riots that wrecked Bogotá and cast a pall over the whole Western Hemisphere. Basing their judgment on first-hand information and personal observation on the spot, they see in the tragic events which interrupted their deliberations the same powers and patterns at work as in the attempted insurrections in France and Italy. And that makes Bogotá, as Mr. Marshall said, not merely a Colombian or Latin American incident but a world affair, and a particularly lurid illustration of the length to which Russia is willing to go in its no longer (cold war) against the democracies."

[2] Among other features, the office of president is rotated between the parties and the congress is divided equally between them.

[3] Within a few days after the riots the Colombian government began reporting that the assassination had been a non-political act. In time Marshall indicated that he believed that the Communists had taken advantage of the disorders but had probably not directly initiated them.

The US reaction to the *bogotazo*—in particular the talk of an intelligence failure and the search for a scapegoat—was conditioned not only by cold war jitters but also by election year politics. The Truman administration was already under attack from its Republican adversaries for, among other things, being inept and naive in the ways of combatting Communism. Governor Dewey, campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination, had been attacking Truman for the shortcomings of the recently-established Central Intelligence Agency even before the Bogotá riots. Then on 12 April he let loose the following blast:

> "If the United States had the adequate intelligence service it should, it would have known about Communist plans for the Bogotá uprising in advance. Knowing what goes on in the world is just as important as knowing how to handle it. The Panama Canal is vital to our security. Yet because of the dreadful incompetence of our present government, we apparently had no idea what was going on in a country just two hours bombing time from the Panama Canal.
>
> "During the war the United States had the finest intelligence service operating all over South America under J. Edgar Hoover. After the war Mr. Truman ordered the entire service discontinued. He cut off our ears and put out our eyes in our information service around the world." [4]

Dewey's attack in good measure reflected the prevailing attitude in this country toward the role of intelligence organizations. The shock of the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent wartime emphasis on prediction of enemy attack led many Washington observers to believe that all crises should be predicted in advance. Thus, only a grievous intelligence failure would have caused us not to have had prior warning of the Bogotá riots (especially insofar as they were part of a well-planned Communist conspiracy).

At least several congressmen thought so, including Rep. Clarence J. Brown (Republican, Ohio). On April 10, the day after the riots, Brown urged an investigation of the intelligence community by the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. This committee had sponsored through the House the National Security Act of 1947 under which CIA had been established. Brown let it be known that he intended to call first Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, and then representatives of the State Department and of the military intelligence services.

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[4] From a report on the speech in *The New York Times,* 13 April 1948.

At this point the motives, actions, and interactions of participants become private and complicated. Hillenkoetter made some abortive attempts to quash the investigation. He apparently also became convinced that the CIA record on the matter was a good one. He discussed strategy with President Truman who apparently encouraged him to confront the congressional critics with the CIA record. Truman and his political advisors, *qua* Democrats, may have decided that such a course might strip Governor Dewey of a political issue and redound to the credit of the Administration as well as of the Agency.

In any case Hillenkoetter did appear on 15 April before an executive session of a special subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures. Representative Brown, chairman of the subcommittee, opened by stating that it was authorized to investigate the CIA to "learn whether the Secretary of State and other high officials were promptly warned that a revolution was impending in Colombia, and that their attendance at the Bogotá Conference might endanger their lives and bring embarrassment to the United States."

From his hard charging testimony the Admiral appeared to be anything but a reluctant witness. He rebuked his critics by stating that CIA had known of "unrest in Colombia" and of the "possibility of violence and outbreak aimed primarily at embarrassing the American delegation and its leaders," and that this information had been transmitted to officials of the State Department.

He then read excerpts from classified CIA intelligence reports, based on information received from agents in Bogotá during January-March 1948. These talked of Communist plans to demonstrate against and block the progress of the conference. Some of the reports indicated that at least one advisor to Gaitán was an advocate of social revolution and was in contact with Colombian Communists and the Soviet Embassy.

Hillenkoetter in his testimony charged that Embassy officials in Bogotá had blocked the transmission to the Department in Washington of a key report. He said that this report, dated 23 March, indicated "confirmed information that Communist-inspired agitators will attempt to humiliate [the] Secretary of State and other members of [the] US delegation . . . by manifestation and possibly personal molestation," upon their arrival in Bogotá. (This would of course have taken place late in March.)

This was a period of endemic wrangling between State and CIA. Some Department officials believed that the Agency was trying to build an "empire" abroad; Agency officials for their part resented State's reluctance to provide cover for Station personnel and the interference of ambassadors with the transmission and dissemination of CIA reports. Thus, Hillenkoetter may have raised the issue of interference to spark congressional support for the Agency's position. Also, the Admiral apparently felt that he had erred in not disseminating this particular report (which had been transmitted to CIA Headquarters) on his personal authority as Director of Central Intelligence, and he may have wanted to present the facts of the case to the congressional investigators in the most favorable light.

In any case, his charges served to give the critics of the administration a new target for attack in the Bogotá affair—the State Department. Representative Brown made a big point of the intereference issue at the hearings (and subsequently before the House and at press conferences). He said that Congress in establishing CIA had not intended for State to have the power of veto over Agency reporting and that he would work to see that the will of Congress prevailed on the matter. State, moreover, was now subjected to criticism from Brown for not having called off the conference after being warned by CIA of pending disorders.

Then, after the executive session, someone called in the press, perhaps Representative John W. McCormack (Mass.), the only Democrat at the hearings. And Hillenkoetter at the subcommittee's direction read his testimony—complete with excerpts from top secret reports and charges against State—to reporters at dictation speed.

State reacted the same night with its own news briefing. The State spokesman cited classified reports from the Bogotá Embassy warning of possible disorders and molestations of delegates during the Conference. The State reports were more general than the CIA documents but covered similar ground. The Department said that Secretary Marshall had known of these warnings before his departure, and had brushed them aside with "salty remarks," stressing that it was "quite ridiculous to suppose that the twenty-one American republics should even consider being intimidated by the protestations of one kind or another from Communists, or anyone else." State made it clear it had received no warnings of assassinations or major rioting.

The story—of explanations, charges, and countercharges complete with release of classified information—became the lead item in major newspapers around the country on 16 April. That afternoon, for the benefit first of the House of Representatives and then of the Washington press corps, Representative Brown repeated his charges of an intelligence fiasco, now directing his fire mainly against the Administration and the State Department. The story thus again got prominent newspaper coverage on 17 April. Next came a period of weeks during which editorialists, political columnists, and radio commentators turned their attention to the story. Officials of CIA reported that the more perceptive journalists came around to supporting its role in the affair. Officials at State made the same claim.

When Secretary Marshall heard of the rousing events in Washington he ordered an end to the public dispute between State and CIA, and to the airing of classified documents. His authority was sufficient to have his will prevail, though he probably was aided by growing embarrassment among senior White House advisers and leaders of Congress. The Brown subcommitte never reconvened—despite the Chairman's public statements that he planned to call witnesses from State and the military intelligence organizations, and even Marshall himself when he returned to the country. Marshall's success in continuing the conference despite the devastation of Bogotá and in obtaining a resolution condemning international Communism soon produced news stories of US diplomatic successes and decreased attention to charges of intelligence failures.

Inside CIA

As dramatic an event as the *bogotazo* was in the first year of the Agency's history, it is difficult, twenty years later, to point with confidence to any specific impact on the course of affairs. Admiral Hillenkoetter was convinced that the Agency's record of warning was a good one, and a number of critics were disarmed by his testimony. Yet some within the Agency appear to have reacted as if the Bogotá affair had indeed been an intelligence failure, or at the least a warning of institutional vulnerability to charges of not having adequately forecast one or another crisis. The *bogotazo* thus appears to have been one event—perhaps a pivotal early event—that led to a strong emphasis in reporting upon "beating the newspapers" on any story

of crisis involving Communists. One veteran observer speaks of a "Bogotá syndrome," that is, an extraordinary concern with early warning of crises and emphasis on the Communist angle.

There apparently was soul searching on the intelligence side of the house as well. The Office of Reports and Estimates (so remembers one veteran) had discussed in staff meetings the possibility of disorders during the conference. The consensus was that the Colombian government would be able to control the disorders, and no warnings were published in the monthly *Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,* or in other serials or special reports. The *bogotazo* may have produced considerable pressure for greater attention to the publishing of warnings of possible crises, especially those with any Communist connection. Considering the Cold War atmosphere at the time and the mandate of the collectors to concentrate on Communist affairs, such developments on both sides of the Agency were probably inevitable, with or without the stimulus of the *bogotazo.*

The *bogotazo* may have been one factor (doubtless a minor one) leading to the establishment in 1950 of the Board and Office of National Estimates. Some observers and commentators during 1948 concluded that the Bogotá affair revealed weaknesses in the analysis and coordination of intelligence that exceeded in importance any weaknesses in collection. The Eberstadt Report to the Hoover Commission (i.e., the Report of the Committee on National Security Organization to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government), of November 1948, made this point without specific reference to Bogotá:

> "The greatest need in CIA is the establishment at a high level of a small group of highly capable people, freed from administrative detail, to concentrate upon intelligence evaluation. The Director and his assistants have had to devote so large a portion of their time to administration that they have been unable to give sufficient time to analysis and evaluation. A small group of mature men of the highest talents, having full access to all information, might well be released completely from routine and set to thinking about intelligence only. Many of the greatest failures in intelligence have not been failures in collection, but failures in analysing and evaluating correctly the information available."

The assassination of Gaitán was very probably a private and irrational act and, as such, an unpredictable event. To that extent, so

was the *bogotazo*.[5] Yet a closer understanding of Colombian politics at headquarters *might* have produced far greater concern about the attitudes of Gaitán and his devout followers, and less about the plans of the small and far from bold Communist forces. Secretary Marshall, however, would probably have dismissed warnings of political tensions as summarily as he did warnings of Communist disorders.

This is not to say that at the time all hands within CIA were attributing too much importance to the Communists as a factor in Latin American instability. The 12 May 1948 issue of the *Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States* presents an analysis which has withstood the test of history:

> "The disturbances which interrupted the Bogotá Conference are more properly attributable to the basic political and economic tensions prevalent in Latin America than to international Communist conspiracy. Without question the Communists were conspiring to embarrass and discredt the Conference, and they were quick to seize the opportunity afforded by the outbreak of violence. That outbreak, however, was clearly the spontaneous reaction of Liberal partisans, already on edge as a result of acute political tensions and party violence, to an assassination no doubt erroneously attributed to the Conservative government."

* * * * *

There are perhaps some lessons in the *bogotazo* for assessing contemporary crises in Latin America:

(1) When a critical situation is as fully developed as was the case in Colombia in 1948 (i.e., the presence of a rebellious popular mood, of a virile radical leader, and of reports of coup plotting), the intelligence community with its current resources on Latin America will almost certainly be tuned in generally. Complex problems of timing and interpretation, however, will probably still rise.

(2) The actual moment that gives birth to revolutionary violence or to violence without revolution will often depend on a chance combination of circumstances and will thus be largely unpredictable.

(3) Many potentially revolutionary situations will not produce social revolutions; strong leadership with broad popular appeal will almost always be an essential ingredient.

[5] Richard L. Stokes, in the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, 17 April 1948, attributes the following to a State Department official: "Only Superman and Steve Canyon combined could have learned that, at 1:15 p.m., on April 9, six blocks away from the meeting place of the conference, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán would be shot to death by a personal enemy named . . . Sierra. Such pinpoint predictions of acts virtually unpremeditated are beyond the power of any human intelligence service."

(4) Assessing the role of Communists in a revolutionary situation takes special care; their noise and dramatic presence may not be based on much actual strength and popular appeal.

(5) Finally, an outbreak of violence, even of dreadful violence, need not permanently weaken the reigning regime.

PLATT'S LAW

All old-time analysts in the profession have heard of Platt's Law; few are familiar with its exact terms. Like Darwin's theory of evolution, it has often been distorted or misrepresented, giving rise to grave errors. For the guidance of the young we publish herewith the original formulation of this seminal discovery, as recently exhumed from ancient files.

25 August 1951

Mr. Sherman Kent
Office of National Estimates, CIA

My dear Mr. Kent:

As one of the earliest purchasers and most constant readers of your classic on "Strategic Intelligence," I am writing to invite your attention to the omission from your (otherwise) excellent book of a fundamental principle in the production of intelligence.

Assume the following situation:

1. You have prepared after much thought and wide discussion the first draft of an Intelligence Estimate. This draft contains certain details and statements which your careful study of the problem leads you to believe should be included.

2. This first draft is reviewed by the first echelon above your own. Members of this echelon read your details. After thus getting the benefit of your explanations, they find these details self-evident and so eliminate them from the paper along with many of your other pet phrases. So the second draft is prepared stripped to the bare essentials.

3. The second higher echelon, on reviewing the second draft thus cut to the bone, finds many of the bare statements lacking in proper justification or background. This second echelon therefore insists on the inclusion of more explanation and details. So the third draft is prepared, restoring the details and pet explanatory phrases which echelon No. 1 cut out.

4. In turn, the next higher echelon reviewing this third draft and receiving the benefit of the explanations now once more included, finds these details unnecessary and cuts them out. . . .

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5. And so on, from echelon of review to echelon of review ad infinitum.

General Principle derived from the above universal experience:

Whether or not the necessary explanatory details and pet phrases of an intelligence paper appear in the paper as finally published, depends entirely upon whether the number of higher groups which successively review the paper *is even or odd* respectively.

I have, Sir, the honor to be your humble follower in the study of fundamental intelligence principles,

Washington PLATT
Brigadier General USAR-Hon.

one-time AC of S, G-2 Armored Force
" AC of S, G-2 XIX Corps in ETO
" Commanding General 98th Infantry Division
now Lower echelon Intelligence Officer, OSI-CIA

Intelligence during a Presidential transition.

DDI/NEW YORK

Paul Corscadden

Within hours after the polls had closed on 7 November 1968, President Lyndon Johnson invited President-elect Richard Nixon to the White House to plan for the smooth transition of power by Inauguration Day 1969. Summoned to attend the meeting of the two men on 11 November were a number of President Johnson's key policy advisers and administrators—including the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms.

Decision at the White House

President Johnson had determined at the outset of the 1968 campaign to provide intelligence briefings for the major candidates. After the nominating conventions, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Mr. Nixon, and the independent George Wallace had received briefings from Mr. Helms on Soviet strategic forces, the political situation in South Vietnam, and the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia. Now, prior to the inauguration, Mr. Johnson proposed to make available to his successor the same intelligence product shown to him. Consequently, he instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to arrange intelligence support of the President-elect and key members of his staff at their temporary headquarters in New York City.

Such arrangements had proved make-shift in the past. An improvised situation room at the Commodore Hotel in New York had been visited no more than a few times by Governor Sherman Adams prior to the inauguration of President Eisenhower in 1953; John F. Kennedy had been briefed two or three times by Allen Dulles before he took office on 20 January 1961. Mr. Helms determined, in keeping with President Johnson's wishes, that Mr. Nixon should benefit from a more sustained effort. The DCI assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence responsibility for providing support to the incoming administration. The Office of Current Intelligence would be the executive agent, collaborating with other Agency components as required.

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The DCI decided to send a three-man team to New York to confer immediately with the President-elect's chief aide, Robert Haldeman, at the Hotel Pierre at Fifth Avenue and 61st Street. The Deputy Director of Intelligence, the Director of Security, and the Deputy Chief of the Office of Current Intelligence left for New York the next day.

On the advice of the Secret Service, the President-elect had established offices on the 38th and 39th floors of the Pierre. Access was by way of an elevator that was monitored at lobby level by special agents with short-wave radios and a direct telephone line to a command post on the 39th floor. Security's New York office had arranged with the Secret Service for the Agency officers to be admitted and also for the installation in the suite occupied by the President-elect, himself, of a safe for storage of classified documents.

The Nixon staff agreed that CIA should establish at its own expense a secure area to house a combination Situation and Reading Room to which members of the staff could come to read classified documents after they had received their security indoctrination. Space was not readily available in the Pierre, which, in any event, the Secret Service had already discovered could not be rendered truly "secure"—so it was decided to locate the Agency's outpost, dubbed "DDI New York," in the basement of the Nixon Campaign Headquarters at 450 Park Avenue, at the southwest corner of Park Avenue and 57th Street. This site, which was formerly the world headquarters of the North American Missionary Alliance and was slated to be demolished, would attract far less attention than the Pierre. It also served as the office of Richard Allen, who then functioned as the President-elect's principal staff adviser on foreign policy.

The DCI, the Executive Director, and the DDI approved plans for the facility, and OCI assigned two officers to man it. The staff was completed by a secretary drawn from the New York Domestic Contacts field office plus two experienced communicators from Headquarters.

The area selected for the Agency's facility was adjacent to an elevator and not far from the building's boiler room and heating plant; it had served during the campaign as a mimeograph room and now was used as a catch-all for broken office machinery, discarded press releases, and a wide assortment of debris. The Office of Logistics was given 72 hours, a weekend, to transform the area into a habitable

office. Logistics personnel hauled furniture, safes, and office equipment by van from Washington, arriving on Park Avenue early on a Sunday morning—shortly after a special security team had "swept" the premises. They quickly emptied the area, painted walls and ceiling, sealed off air ducts leading to other floors of the building, installed window air-conditioners below sealed street-levels grills, and rewired all of the electric circuits to allow for the installation of communications equipment.

Such frantic activity had not gone unnoticed by other occupants of the building, who assumed that the "Secret Service," the "Federal Bureau of Investigation," or some sensitive military agency had moved in and would, inter alia, assume responsibility for the physical security of all the President-elect's staff offices and even for the protection of Mr. Nixon's family. The Office of Security had decided *not* to identify the operation as Agency-sponsored but, rather, to allow anyone who learned of its existence to draw whatever conclusions he chose. Before long, staff secretaries were calling to ask that someone "behind the Black Door" investigate the disappearance of office supplies and even find a purloined television set. The supervisor of the staff mailroom demanded one day that an Agency communicator "taste" canned hams sent as a Christmas gift to the President-elect.

Effective 19 November with an eye to production schedules in the Office of Current Intelligence, communications between New York and Headquarters were open from 0500 to 2100 each weekday, from 0500 to 1300 on Saturdays, and from 1700 to 2100 on Sundays. Except for a one-day interruption because of power failure, communications remained open until late on the morning of 17 January 1969.

The daily *Vietnam Situation Report* arrived the evening of its publication in Washington; the *Central Intelligence Bulletin* and *The President's Daily Brief* came soon after five o'clock each morning. Ad hoc, crisis reporting could be sent at any time, and the Agency Operations Center was able to alert staff officers in New York to critical developments during non-duty hours. Daily courier service, which had begun on 13 November, continued through 25 November as a stand-by measure.

Flexibility and availability were to be the keynotes of the operation. A complete set of publications in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only - the President-Elect" would be delivered daily to Rosemary

Woods, the President-elect's secretary, in Mr. Nixon's office. Nixon staff members who had access to the intelligence publications were to come to the facility whenever convenient. Current publications, along with appropriate National Intelligence Estimates, special memoranda, intelligence handbooks, and various graphic aids were prominently displayed.

For the first ten days, only "finished" intelligence was made available. It soon became apparent, however, that the needs of the new administration did not coincide in every detail with those of the Johnson administration. The foreign press had begun to speculate openly about the incoming administration, its personnel, and its policy options. This and other information was available to the White House; little of it would reach the Nixon staff unless some vehicle were designed to convey it.

The Director of the Office of Current Intelligence on 29 November compiled the first "Nixon Special," an "Eyes Only," all-source intelligence memorandum for the President-elect. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service transmitted directly to New York foreign press treatment of the new administration.

On 2 December, the "intelligence portfolio" was passed to Harvard's Professor Henry J. Kissinger, whose appointment as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was announced by the President-elect at a news conference at the Pierre. The same afternoon Kissinger came to the Agency facility on Park Avenue for a briefing. He was shown current issues of all of the intelligence publications available in the facility, told what had been delivered to the Presient-elect, and was pledged the utmost cooperation on the part of the DCI. He was also assured that the Agency was prepared to be as helpful as possible in shaping the types and subject matter of reports and publications and their format to meet the wishes of the new administration. Kissinger asked for time to become familiar with the demands that would be made on him by the incoming Chief Executive, but promised to arrange as part of his daily schedule a 15 minute intelligence briefing. He also accepted the offer of Agency officers to advise him immediately of any critical world development requiring the attention of the President-elect. Two days later, at a meeting at the Pierre, Kissinger requested a series of one-hour briefings on major problems confronting the new administration—briefings to be fitted into his schedule wherever possible.

At a meeting with DDI/New York officers on 14 December, Kissinger directed that Attorney General-designate Mitchell was to receive *The President's Daily Brief, The Central Intelligence Bulletin,* and all other reports in which he had expressed an interest. He had been one of the first for whom Haldeman had requested a security clearance on 12 November but subsequently was not available for indoctrination by Agency officers until after the President-elect unveiled his cabinet. Mitchell, a towering figure in the Nixon staff, was to become a major consumer of these publications. One of the Agency officers met almost daily with the Attorney General-designate until the last day the Nixon staff worked in New York.

The President's Daily Brief had been uniquely tailored to the needs of the outgoing administration—just as its predecessor had been shaped to the reading preferences of President John F. Kennedy. The authors of the PDB could assume that President Johnson and his principal advisers were familiar with the background of most of the subjects covered each day and were often able to employ a shorthand style without sacrificing clarity or breadth. The President-elect and Kissinger, however well read, lacked familiarity with many of the problems dealt with in the PDB.

This situation had not been unanticipated by the Agency. In fact, the Office of Current Intelligence already had begun to devise a new version of the PDB for Mr. Nixon and his aides. Considerably expanded in length, the new brief had been circulated for comment to the DCI, DDI, and other principal officers in the Agency. With their concurrence, it was decided to send a new PDB to New York.

Because of Kissinger's crowded schedule, his briefings were held on a somewhat ad hoc basis. The probing questions of the incoming Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, his insatiable demands for assessments of the significance of even isolated developments on a low order of probability, meant that far more speculative, estimative analysis than normally characterizes current intelligence reporting was required. It was therefore decided to supplement the topics covered each day in the PDB and the occasional briefings by the DDI/New York officers with more detailed backup pieces by DDI analysts. These reports were written as soon as the makeup of an issue of the PDB was known in Headquarters and were sent to New York at convenient hours during the day. On several occasions senior analysts with special competence in the areas dealt with in these annexes came to New York to meet with Kissinger. By the middle of

January *The President's Daily Brief* had been totally redesigned to meet Mr. Nixon's preferences. The new brief would consist of three sections—Major Developments, Other Important Developments, and occasional annexes—all double-spaced and printed on legal sized paper bound at the top.

The first section, Major Developments, was subdivided into sections on Vietnam, the Middle East, Soviet Affairs, and Europe. This was not a static listing. As developments warranted, some areas could be dropped, others added. The second section, Other Important Developments, was intended to highlight problems which—though not yet critical—could in time engage US policy interests. The annexes were to fulfill the same role as the "problem papers" that had been sent to New York.

Under the Johnson Administration, the PDB had been published at five o'clock in the morning, six days a week, and delivered to the White House an hour later. However, in order that he and his National Security Council staff would have time to mull over the intelligence reporting before meeting the Chief Executive, Kissinger proposed that the PDB be released at 5 or 6 in the afternoon, for delivery to him that same night and to the President the following morning. Changing the publication time meant an additional lag of 12 hours in the reporting time, but Kissinger pointed out that so-called "late starters" could be reported in *The Central Intelligence Bulletin* and specifically called to the President's attention. This arrangement, he believed would most satisfactorily meet the new President's plan to hold regular meetings with his key advisers at nine or nine-thirty each morning. Kissinger surmised that he would brief the President for 30 minutes each morning, immediately following these staff conferences.

By the middle of January, DDI/NY had served its purpose. The Offices of Security, Logistics, and Communications stood by to remove files and communications equipment and to transport them under guard to Washington over the weekend. At 0730 on 17 January, a two-man security team was already guarding a moving van that had been loaded with most of the furniture from the basement suite. Inside the building, packers were boxing the last of the files, and a communications technician stood by to dismantle the teletype equipment once Headquarters approved a request to do so. The last message, requesting this permission, was sent at 0840 EST. It was the 523rd message sent or received since the facility had opened and the 2,179th page of text.

Retrospective reflections inspired by recent research.

THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

John T. Pizzicaro

Early in 1969, the Special Research Staff of the Directorate of Intelligence published an extensive analysis of the Indonesian upheaval: Indonesia - 1965, The Coup that Backfired, by Helen Louise Hunter. It is classified SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM, and may be obtained from the Directorate of Intelligence with appropriate authorization. Mrs. Hunter's study is reviewed in the following pages by a senior officer of the Central Intelligence Agency who served in Indonesia throughout the coup period. His observations on the events described are subjective, and the conclusions summarized are his own.

The publication of *Indonesia - 1965, The Coup that Backfired* is an important event for serious students of the Asian scene. Before it became available to the intelligence community there existed no reliable analysis of an episode that not only defied full comprehension at the time it occurred, but has since retained an aura of mystery and, indeed, controversy among observers in and out of government. We are therefore grateful to Helen Louise Hunter for her impressive accomplishment in distilling out of masses of intelligence reporting an orderly, coherent and historically defensible treatise. Mrs. Hunter has gone well beyond the limitations of conventional research, and has produced a book—readable, intelligible, enormously interesting.

The question has been raised—and it remains valid—could not this analysis have been produced without heavy classification or, better, with none at all? The need for a definitive treatment of the subject has been acute, for reasons that will be indicated below. And certainly Mrs. Hunter's study could hold its own in the public domain with appropriate modification. The fact of the matter is that virtually all source material used in *The Coup that Backfired* was obtained originally via clandestine channels, and its release would have entailed serious complications. Hence, the decision to stand on Secret classification.

It must first be noted that almost no one these days is objective about Indonesia. People who have lived there either love it or hate it; many

of them leave bewitched. Scholars who have never set foot in the country adopt it sight unseen, and fight for eventual access. The exception to all this is Helen Louise Hunter. She speaks no Indonesian, has never been to the country, and has no axe to grind. But she has done her homework with painstaking thoroughness, and has developed cogent answers to all the important questions. Although Mrs. Hunter would be the last to claim final say on the complexities analyzed in *The Coup that Backfired,* it is hard to visualize a more definitive treatment of that historic event on the basis of information currently available. Her paper was submitted in draft to a cross-section of CIA and State Department officers who had served in Indonesia during the coup period, thus permitting minor changes in detail and atmospherics; as far as substance and the logical flow of the narrative are concerned, her account cannot be faulted.

The key questions, of course, are relatively few in number, and have been asked repeatedly by interested observers since 0730 hours on 1 October 1965. Who was Untung, and what was the 30 September Movement? Why were the generals murdered? Was the Indonesian Communist Party the prime mover, or was it an innocent bystander on the sidelines of an internal army upheaval? Was there a Generals' Council? What was President Sukarno's role? Answers to these basic questions emerged a very short while after the event, fragmentary at first, but gradually achieving perspective, and have generally withstood the scrutiny of time and the availability of new information. But the picture is not complete, and it may never be.

A curious feature of the upheaval was that while the march of events was fairly dramatic and at times noisy, most developments—especially in the early stages—were shielded from public scrutiny and made little sense to the unassisted observer. Overt sources were limited in access and utility. Even the redoubtable American press corps had a rough time of it during the early weeks, and was able to meet its reporting requirements effectively only by extensive piggybacking on US mission sources for both background and detail. In time the situation eased. The Indonesian press began to flex its muscles under Army supervision. People began to talk, and the rumor mills resumed operations. By and large, though, throughout the eight to ten months following the coup attempt, overt information remained inadequate and decidedly inferior to that available to the US Government from clandestine sources.

Inevitably, there were periods of uncertainty and speculation as to what was happening and why, and what would happen next. The most striking of these occurred during the first 24 hours. Contact with [redacted] sources had long before been placed on a maximum security basis, owing to the extreme tension and sustained threat to the American presence that characterized the months of mid-1965; prearranged schedules applied until such time as they could be adapted to meet the requirements of the new emergency. Should the latter have been foreseen? Ideally, yes. In practical terms, it would have been asking a great deal to predict an event that, for all its similarity to the traditional fire and brimstone drama of the *Ramayana,* defied both the logic of historical dialectic and the apparent drift of Indonesian politics. An interesting facet, however, is that for weeks in advance of the coup, [redacted] reporting on developments within the Indonesian Communist Party—the so-called PKI—gave a graphic and detailed picture of its activities which led directly and, as we see it with the advantage of hindsight, inexorably to the events of 1 October. These included the caching of arms and grain, military training of youth and women cadres at Halim Air Base, and—most important—the reorganization of party structure in the greater Djakarta area along military-tactical lines. The signs were clearly there, and a field appraisal of the situation was being coordinated in draft with the Embassy when the coup broke.

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In Java, where ironies compound themselves, the *wayang kulit*[1] is normally cited by foreigners to explain the inexplicable or to account for whatever in Indonesian behavior defies Western comprehension. Late in the evening of 30 September, this writer attended a *wayang* in the suburban district of Manggarai. It was held outdoors in the village market place under the auspices of the mayor, and attended by a throng of contented-looking Indonesians from the neighborhood. The handful of foreigners present sensed no hostility whatsoever. As the show went on, the seats grew harder, and by 0100 the period of enchantment had passed; the next day was a working day. The road home was along Djalan Krakatau, past the house of the Army commander, General Yani, and farther on past that of Brigadier General Sutojo, both scheduled for execution within a few hours. There was

[1] The shadow play, based on stories adapted from the Hindu epics, and traditional entertainment of Indonesian village life.

no hint of menace in the shadows of the darkened street. The flickering light and jingle of an occasional trishaw suggested a most ordinary night.

Morning came, bright and fresh, Djakarta's best time. But it was Friday, and one should remember that in Indonesia things always happen on Friday. The route from Kebajoran to the city seemed normal enough until reaching Djalan Thamrin and turning east on Merdeka Square. At that point the mood changed with the scenery. Strange troops guarded the intersections. Why strange? It is difficult to say, but they were not the usual custodians of local peace and order that Djakarta residents grew to recognize. They were infantry with serious faces and unfamiliar shoulder patches, armed and deployed tactically. The gates of the *Gedung Telekomunikasi* were closed and the area swarmed with troops. Further on, the American Embassy was similarly encompassed. Instead of the khaki-uniformed Mobile Brigade who customarily guarded the outer premises, infantry held the line, a heavy machine gun at the gate, although making no attempt to interfere with people arriving for work. It was a perplexing sight for seven-thirty in the morning. The next few minutes witnessed a rump staff meeting in the Embassy lobby, chewing over a story told by the Assistant Air Attaché about a firefight behind his house in Kebajoran shortly before dawn. His servants reported that a general had been killed. Which general, he did not know. It turned out later to have been Pandjaitan.

After comparing notes briefly with Embassy colleagues and officers reporting in, I felt that some personal reconnaissance was in order, particularly since the telephones were all dead. A meandering route by Volkswagen past the houses of key generals and other points of military interest proved revealing. General Yani's house was cordoned off at each end of the block by military police. General Nasution's house was likewise inaccessible. The residence of Major General Parman was apparently deserted, but not under guard. A short distance away, Brigidier General Sukendro's residence was closed up tight—not surprising since he was away on a visit to Peking—and that of Brigadier General Magenda showed no signs of life. The streets throughout that sector of the city were remarkably empty and quiet. Nearby commercial districts lacked their customary bustle, although they were by no means deserted. Approaching the Square again, green uniforms abounded. They swarmed about the Gambir railroad station on Merdeka Timur and on up toward Army Headquarters. Strategic

Command Headquarters (KOSTRAD) across the street had its share too, and although they looked like the others to the unpracticed eye, there was a difference. It was discernible, though hardly appreciated at the time, in the small patch of white cloth the former wore on their left shoulder bar. (By morning on 2 October Suharto's men were wearing a similar identification, but colored red.) Lastly, the Foreign Department, its attractive white facade and pillars gleaming in the morning sun, was observed under heavy guard. Exactly what all this unfamiliar military pomp added up to became a little clearer when the writer returned to the Embassy to hear that Radio Indonesia had come on the air, proclaiming the existence of the 30 September Movement. The name of Lt. Col. Untung was on the way to becoming a household word, and the activities of the so-called *Generals' Council* appeared to have some bearing on the events of that unusual Friday morning.

To fathom the sequence of events thereafter, there is no better way than to sit down with *The Coup that Backfired* and follow Mrs. Hunter's tracing of its labyrinthine path. She has much to offer, even to those of us who, having been there, profess to understand what happened and why. Her paper is organized rather uniquely and in a way that lends itself to the layman's comprehension. The first of its four main sections deals with the events of the coup itself. The second focuses the movements of all leading personalities from the time of the coup until the curtain rings down on their particular act of the melodrama. Next she examines the plot itself as it unfolded during the critical month of September, the period when plans were made and in a sense the outcome of the coup foreordained. The fourth section, and in Mrs. Hunter's opinion the most important, concentrates on the final sequence of events leading up to the coup, including the decision to carry it out. An extremely helpful summary and statement of her conclusions are provided at the end. There is also an evaluation of the primary source material on which the entire analysis is based, namely, the prisoner interrogation reports produced by the Indonesian Army. Mrs. Hunter is careful to distinguish between her categories of material—fact as established in the public domain, testimony of the coup participants, and conjecture, whether her own or that of others. The key, of course, to any serious interpretation of the kaleidoscopic and sometimes contradictory pattern underlying this episode devolves on the validity of the Army interrogation material. The author accepts it as

essentially valid, and her reasons for doing so are cogent. The reader's task is further facilitated by a first-rate graphics representation of the coup highlights, including the only effective map analysis this writer has seen, plus some helpful time-and-movement diagrams, and, last but not least, a host of excellent photographs.

With respect to the Communist Party, the author makes it crystal clear that PKI bore the major responsibility for planning and implementation of the entire operation. Other important Indonesians, not necessarily Communist, were also intimately involved. The ultimate question, and one which Mrs. Hunter scrutinizes with care, bears on the role of President Sukarno. She concludes that the evidence reflecting his full involvement is not conclusive, and from a legal standpoint she is probably correct. Yet as a practical matter the evidence Mrs. Hunter marshals so graphically in these pages can hardly be construed as signifying anything less than Sukarno's intimate involvement from the outset. The question is admittedly not open-and-shut, and from the Indonesian standpoint there have been valid grounds for abstention from full and public attribution of responsibility to the former president. Witness General Suharto's extremely careful handling of the issue.

As a problem of intelligence acquisition and analysis, it is interesting to note how Sukarno's role in the 30 September affair became at once the central and vital question for both the Indonesians and those of us foreigners who were engaged in looking over their shoulders. Initially it was approached rather cautiously in discussion, sometimes pointedly avoided. Before long, however, it was clear that the question was under discussion in high cabinet circles, civilian and military. As diffidence faded, similar reflections appeared at lower levels of government. It was soon apparent that in Army circles talk on the subject had taken on a brutal frankness. Well placed sources quoted Nasution and Suharto directly, notwithstanding the fact that those personages remained fairly circumspect in their public utterances. By late October there were indications that Sukarno's removal on grounds of his involvement in the coup was already under consideration. As attitudes of leading Army figures crystallized, with General Nasution figuring as the hard-liner, the pattern was reflected in extensive reporting from a wide variety of extremely well-placed sources. Throughout November the pressure intensified and talk of an Army move to eliminate Sukarno, by assassination if he would not acquiesce, echoed in both military and political circles.

This period, it will be recalled, coincided with the killing of vast numbers of Communists or presumed Communist sympathizers throughout the country. Although Djakarta was spared the horrors of that nightmare, the city was by no means exempt from the emotions that gave rise to it. Thanks to tight Army discipline and intensive security measures sustained over many months, an explosive situation was kept under control. On the other hand, bitterness against the President continued to mount. More and more people believed that he was just as guilty as PKI leader Aidit. And yet Sukarno, recovering from the state of shock that characterized his behavior in early October, had once again begun to play his cards skillfully. He refused to panic. He temporized on critical issues, minced his words on all possible occasions, and gave no sign of willingness to concede another inch to General Suharto. Many observers at the time believed he held the current edge in what was clearly a struggle for power. His days, however, were numbered. By mid-December [redacted] undertook a detailed analysis of the situation, and advised [redacted] that events were moving toward a showdown. Information then available [redacted] left most of us convinced that Sukarno was indeed a witting participant in the 30 September conspiracy. Whether the move against the Army leaders had been his original idea, or whether he merely responded to the advice of his henchmen, was considered essentially immaterial. The critical point was that Sukarno's endorsement of the coup plot made it feasible; his participation gave it an excellent assurance of success. Without him the plan would have been totally unrealistic. Headquarters was told that an appreciable number of highly placed Indonesian leaders had reached similar conclusions. Under the circumstances it was felt that the objective validity of their views was far less important than the fact that they entertained them. Grounds for direct action were thus available; the showdown was believed to be near at hand.

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Two courses of action appeared open to the Army, each predicated on the assumption that history could not be turned back and that Sukarno could never regain his former ascendancy. On the one hand, Suharto might opt for gradual assertion of authority over the operation of government; Sukarno could be neutralized slowly but steadily and relegated to figurehead status while the Army tightened its control. Or, Suharto could undertake more or less immediate action to strip Sukarno of his authority. His decision, [redacted] was being made for him—in part by the desperate economic situation of the

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country which cried out for ameliorative action, and even more so by the intensifying political pressures converging on him, both within the Army leadership and among the younger political elements beginning to emerge as factors to be reckoned with. The latter included organizations of university and high school students, already quite vocal in their attacks on the President.

25X1 The [redacted] analysis of the situation was discussed at some length within the Mission. Embassy opinion leaned toward the first of the two alternatives proposed. [redacted] the gradual approach would not suffice under the circumstances facing General Suharto. Thus, in concluding its rather lengthy commentary, [redacted] 25X1 25X1 25X1 on 23 December that the *next few weeks* would probably see a resolution of the impasse, with the Army taking direct steps to terminate President Sukarno's control over the government. Mid-January 1966 saw the crisis come almost to a head, precipitated by student demonstrations over the cost of living. But the Army failed to follow through, and Sukarno was given another month or so in which to attempt his final maneuvers. The redoubtable old tyrant did his utmost in the cabinet reorganization of 21 February; he fired General Nasution as Minister of Defense, and appointed more leftist sycophants to ministerial posts than anyone realized were still above ground. That was the beginning of the end. In a few days the student upheaval, under Army patronage but a remarkable phenomenon in its own right, engulfed Djakarta and paved the way for Suharto's move on 11 March when he forced the President to sign over to him authority for *all measures required for the safeguarding of security and government stability.*

Not all Indonesians today view Sukarno's elimination with equanimity. Pockets of support and even affection for him can still be found, particularly in the Nationalist Party strongholds of Central Java. By virtue of them Sukarno remains a factor in Indonesian politics. He is, of course, no more than a factor; he is certainly not a power.

An interesting sidelight on Sukarno's role in the 30 September Movement is the almost total lack of interest in it displayed by the American academic community. The latter, strongly influenced by George McT. Kahin and the Modern Indonesia Project of Cornell's Southeast Asia Program, have been much more attentive to the role of the Indonesian Communist Party in the coup and to the fate it has

suffered as a consequence. The fascinating thing about this rather unusual bias is that it developed in full bloom very shortly after the coup itself. It was couched then, and has been ever since, in language paralleling that used by the PKI when the latter on 2 October explained its relationship to the 30 September Movement: The Party merely endorsed the patriotic action of Lt. Col. Untung in forestalling the *expected counterrevolutionary coup* of the Generals' Council supported by CIA. What happened was an internal Army affair, but in the words of the leading Communist newspaper the support and sympathy of the people were on the side of the 30 September Movement.

Over the ensuing weeks this theme was developed in greater detail at Cornell, but except for an occasional article bearing on it, almost nothing reached print. There was method in Cornell's cautious approach to the matter, based on concern lest the Indonesian military learn of the latter's hostility and decide to curtail access to the country. To date the so-called Cornell "white paper" remains unpublished, though it is available in the form of an unsigned dissertation dated 1 January 1966, classified STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, entitled *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia.* The Indonesians are naturally aware of the Cornell position, and they resent it. The scholars predicate their position in large measure on a total rejection of the Army reports of prisoner interrogation, claiming that they are based on torture and fabrication, and they place little or no credence in the published confessions of the coup principals or testimony of other witnesses before the Military Tribunal. They argue that since the interrogation reports are not openly available, whoever gains access to them must be in league with the Army. In actuality, the trial evidence covers much of the same ground and offers ample food for thought to the interested reader. And there is the nub of the problem. Are the Cornell scholars really interested? Are they willing to consider any radical deviation from their own preconceptions? This is a harsh insinuation, but it must be weighed. Ruth McVey, who for many years has been a major luminary and authority on Indonesian Communism closely associated with the Cornell group, took the firm position in 1965 that the PKI would not move directly to seize power, being content to settle for the slow but steady progress it had registered in the preceding ten years.

This view has by no means been confined to the Cornell group. Donald Hindley of Brandeis and J. M. van der Kroef of Bridgeport took similar positions in their respective books published in 1965 be-

fore the coup. It has been the Cornell group, nonetheless, that has held most dogmatically to the idea that the PKI became the scapegoat in the Indonesian upheaval and was unjustly saddled with responsibility for it. In this writer's opinion there is a serious question of intellectual integrity involved in the issue. How better to defend the thesis that the PKI *would not* do what it did than to argue that it *did not* in fact do so?

A reflection of the amount of vitriol that can still pervade a gathering of intelligent men and women over an issue of this character was noted in last April's meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of the Conference on Asian Studies, in a confrontation between Guy Pauker of Rand Corporation and several proponents of the basic Cornell thesis. Pauker is an authority on the Indonesian Army and well read on the subject of the coup, his views on the latter being generally compatible with those depicted in Mrs. Hunter's analysis. After presenting his brief but cogent monograph, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia,* Pauker was attacked viciously for his reliance upon Army interrogation reports which according to one of his interlocutors (Roger Padgett, then of Cornell), Pauker *knew were doctored.* The attack was snide and *ad hominem,* a clear aspersion on his intellectual integrity. Donald Hindley arose subsequently and criticized Pauker's reliance upon the doctored reports, but conceded that he now agreed with Pauker's conclusions regarding PKI involvement. The charade was carried further when another participant needled Hindley for endorsing Pauker's conclusions while disparaging his sources.

To allay any reasonable doubts about the authenticity of the interrogation material, the Appendix to Mrs. Hunter's study should be ready with care. She treats the matter with detachment, concluding that there is no evidence whatsoever to support the charge of doctoring or fabrication on the part of the Army. Convictions die hard, though, and one may safely surmise that were *The Coup that Backfired* to be declassified and made public, it would be attacked by the academicians with a ferocity at least equal to that aimed at Pauker, and for the same reasons. Among the better known writers on Indonesian developments, Ruth McVey has had comparatively little to say in print since October of 1965. She is said to be working on the definitive book concerning the coup and its denouncement, hopefully to establish the PKI's innocence of responsibility for the 30 September affair. It will be welcomed by the many scholars who share her views and who look with disdain upon the opinions of Guy Pauker

and Arnold Brackman, both of whom are working on books of their own on the same issue, and who maybe presumed to reflect a pro-Army bias.

This academic skirmishing might perhaps be safely ignored were it not for the difficulty in which it leaves the informed reader who has no access to classified material, as well as the serious student of Asian history and politics who seeks to evaluate the Indonesian upheaval of 1965-66. Of the two, the man in the street who reads books is in the more advantageous position. He now has Robert Shaplen's *Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia* (Harper and Row, 1969), most of which also appeared in *The New Yorker* (Issues of November 23, 1968, May 24 and May 31, 1969). Shaplen does an excellent job of making a complex subject readable. It is clear that he has been briefed in great detail by Indonesian military sources and, not impossibly, by US officials conversant with the same material, covering events up to late 1968. The latter point is of particular interest because Shaplen is thus able to draw upon information of quite recent vintage, which he exploits to great effect in asserting the complicity and responsibility of former President Sukarno. He does this in sharper terms than Mrs. Hunter has seen fit to adopt, notwithstanding her vastly more detailed and incisive analysis of Sukarno's role. In both, the key element is the testimony of Brigadier General Sugandhi (Sukarno's Minister of Information), the details of which were not known until comparatively recently, and then only through clandestine channels. It is difficult to take the Sugandhi testimony at face value and sustain any doubt about Sukarno's intimate involvement.

One curious feature of Shaplen's otherwise extremely well-informed survey is his acceptance of the original story of the kidnapped generals' maltreatment at Lubang Buaya. Whether for purposes of dramatic heightening of his account or because he actually believes it, Shaplen holds to the tale of torture and multilation of the generals by frenzied Communist women. The story is untrue, although in the early days following the coup attempt it was bruited around widely and given general credence. Apart from this, Shaplen's observations are strikingly consistent with Mrs. Hunter's. The similarity is in fact so detailed that one is led to wonder whether or not Shaplen was given access to the classified account.

On balance, *The Coup that Backfired* constitutes a unique contribution to intelligence annals. It is regrettable that an analysis of com-

parable quality is not overtly available to serious students of Indonesian affairs. While Pauker and Brackman may in time produce books capable of dealing frontally with the proponents of the Cornell thesis, it is doubtful that either version will match *The Coup that Backfired* in depth or scope. At some future date it might therefore be well to reconsider the possibility of declassification. Until that occurs, Mrs. Hunter's study must remain the province of a somewhat limited professional audience, much of it already entertaining preconceived views of what the 30 September Movement was all about. As one of the worst offenders in the latter respect, this writer is now happy to claim a clearer perspective and even stronger convictions on the *how* and *why* of that event.

Let it first be noted that the year 1965 saw the Indonesian Communist Party embark on a collision course with the Army. The gauntlet was thrown down brazenly by Chairman Aidit in January when he began to press for NASAKOM-ization of the armed forces.[2] This was followed not long afterward by a proposal made to President Sukarno for arming the peasants and workers, the so-called Fifth Force. The initiative was Aidit's, and it contrasted sharply with the apparent passivity of the Army leadership. Sukarno's initial response was somewhat diffident. He purported to be unimpressed, made occasional ambivalent observations on the subject, but avoided commitment. As the weeks wore on, however, he displayed increasing signs of interest in the Aidit proposals, and the Army was not slow to take the hint. Major General Mokoginta, Panglima of the North Sumatra Regional Command and anything but pro-Communist, began training local militia—i.e., peasants and workers—in what he described as anticipation of President Sukarno's forthcoming instructions.

The point is that there was nothing in the posture or behavior of the Army leadership during those critical months to suggest concerted initiative, whether in the form of resistance to Sukarno's domination or in active response to the PKI challenge. The existence of the Generals' Council is said to date from that period, but the testimony of the coup principals and other Sukarno supporters is extremely vague as to where the idea originated. In any event, out of it came the story

[2] NASAKOM is the acronym representing Sukarno's basic concept of the State, predicated on representation and participation by the key elements of Indonesian society—the Nationalists, those of religious persuasion (i.e., Islamic), and the Communists. NASAKOM-ization of the Armed Forces would have entailed full Communist participation in command and administration.

of the generals' plot to take over the government, which subsequently served as the ostensible basis for planning and implementation of the 30 September Movement. While the charge of coup plotting can be dismissed as without foundation, the idea of a secret grouping of general officers had some basis in fact. In approximately January, 1965, a number of generals closely associated with Army Commander General Yani began to meet with some regularity to discuss a variety of problems facing the Army. [redacted] on the deliberations of this group, described colloquially by its members as the "brain trust," reflected an acute concern on their part with what all recognized as a determined PKI effort to force them to the wall. The group included Generals Suprapto, Harjono, Parman, Sukendro, and Sutojo, all of whom, with the exception of Sukendro, were killed on 1 October. Most of the officers were official members of the Army General Staff, and in that capacity they had every reason to meet regularly. None was a commander of troops, without which no coup attempt could be successful. Over and above these considerations, to argue that the brain trust was at least construable as a conspiratorial body, while it has a certain plausibility, is to ignore the basic fact of life prevailing in the first nine months of 1965, namely, that the morale and political outlook of the army leadership at that period were so bad, and its leadership so divided and at odds with other elements of the armed forces, as to render it incapable of pursuing an adventurous course of action. 25X1

A flurry of concern unquestionably developed in midsummer over Sukarno's health. But it cannot be shown for certain that it did anything more than stimulate the basic drift of events already under way, which, however one chooses to read the signs, represented a systematic effort on the part of President Sukarno and his principal constituents to neutralize any capacity for independent action that the army may have possessed. The role of President Sukarno during that phase of the development has been variously interpreted. In attempting to reconstruct it following the coup, [redacted] generally saw the President as a witting and willing participant, and to some extent swept along under pressure from the Aidit and probably the Subandrio forces. His role as we saw it was to provide authority and legality for the action undertaken and to provide insurance against failure. 25X1

Today Sukarno's role stands out in much bolder relief. The impressive testimony of key communist members of the conspiracy, plus

new reporting from Army sources showing extensive involvement in the 30 September Affair on the part of important military figures previously thought to be above suspicion, offer an image of Sukarno as a prime mover, a dominant force in the enterprise. In retrospect, there is no other satisfactory explanation for the dynamics of the year 1965. Without Sukarno as an active sponsor, the PKI would never have embarked on its collision course with the army. It is almost inconceivable that Subandrio, regardless of his dreams of ultimate succession to the presidency, would have moved ahead of his master. The same applies to Air Force Marshal Omar Dani. The cleavages within the armed forces were indeed real; but only under Sukarno's active instigation would senior non-Communist military leaders have dared to participate in a violent move against their colleagues in the top army command.

Why would Sukarno have seen fit to accelerate a process already going well under his full control? Perhaps he was simply in a hurry. The Indonesian revolution was no ball of fire. After twenty turbulent years its energies had flagged. Sukarno may have taken his cue from Mao Tse-tung. Certainly, had the coup succeeded, there would have been Red Guards aplenty to scour the archipelago in a massive purge of counterrevolutionaries.

Why did the coup fail? The answer is simple according to the basic *wayang* motif: The wicked giant, supported by witches from the forest, tried to seize the kingdom; but the good prince, in alliance with friendly gods, prevailed. The triumph of good over evil. Some say that the coup was poorly planned and badly executed. By Western standards, that may be so. Yet, notwithstanding its short and futile life, the coup failed by a hair's breadth. The pivotal factor was probably the killing of the generals. Had they not been killed, but merely sequestered, and thus in Indonesian style eliminated from public life, the coup would almost certainly have been carried off successfully. Conversely, if the Untung forces in accordance with the plan had succeeded in killing *all* the generals, the operation would probably have accomplished its objective. Nasution's survival not only frustrated the plotters and shattered their composure. More importantly, it provided a continuity of authority within the Army and lent moral assurance to Suharto in the critical early hours. Success might still have been achieved in the face of Nasution's survival had Sukarno himself not lost his nerve. Instead of holing up at Halim Air Base for twelve critical hours, the President's logical move would have been to return

at once to the palace, call in all military commanders and the cabinet, and assert his full authority in the crisis. At that stage Suharto lacked the momentum he later developed. He would not have dared to clash head-on with the President. The old magic would have prevailed, as it had done so many times in the years past. Instead, Sukarno sat and waited, but nothing happened. Suharto and a comparative handful of Army officers regained their composure, and took quick stock of the grim reality staring them in the face. Yani and his strongest officers were gone, presumably dead. Whatever the name of the game was, it was a question of survival. By the time Sukarno had pulled himself together it was too late. The Suharto/Nasution duumvirate was firmly established and the transition had begun.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

POWER IN THE KREMLIN. By *Michel Tatu.* (London: Collins, 1969. 570 pp.)

Looking back, one finds it a little hard to tell now whether the figure of Khrushchev looms so large in our memories because his successors somehow seem so small or because he was in fact a man of considerable political stature. Whatever the truth of the matter, the years from roughly 1957 to 1964 were certainly lively ones on the international scene, and we can thank Khrushchev for some of our most anxious and entertaining moments. But now along comes Michel Tatu, a Frenchman who spent most of these same years in Moscow watching the Kremlin at close range, and we can thank him (among others) for the news that while Khrushchev was so busy bedeviling his enemies abroad, his opponents at home were just about as busy bedeviling *him!*

Tatu's book, *Power in the Kremlin, From Khrushchev to Kosygin,* is an unabashed exercise in Kremlinology. As one reviewer has already observed, moreover, it is Kremlinology at its best. And it may be more than that: it may indeed be the best Kremlinology, i.e., one of the best single works ever written about domestic Soviet politics. This book does for the political scene in the USSR—in particular, the "Unmaking of a First Secretary"—approximately what the first of *The Making of the President* series does for the American, a feat all the more remarkable because Tatu, quite unlike White, had no real access to Soviet leaders and no entrée into the closed, murky world of Soviet politics.

I praise this work highly in full awareness that its author is a competitor of sorts, as well as a colleague. And I should mention that William Hyland, co-author of *The Fall of Khrushchev,* a shorter work which covers some of the same territory, and which, alas, was published at about the same time, perhaps would not agree with me. But I also praise it because I wish to make clear at the outset that Tatu's volume is an excellent study and—as we say in the trade—should be must-reading for all students of the Soviet scene. But this is a serious book and it deserves a serious critical review.

Power in the Kremlin (a crisp and apt title) surveys its subject under five major headings: The U-2 Affair and Its Consequences, The 22nd Party Congress, The Cuban Fiasco, The Fall, and The Collective

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Leadership on its Own. Emphasis in the first three of these sections is placed on the struggle of Khrushchev's opponents to resist his policies and to restrict his powers and, in the fourth section, on their ultimately successful efforts to remove him from office. Thus, for example, in the discussion of the U-2 incident, Tatu makes the point that it "played a decisive role in the reversal of Soviet policy," and in addition, helped to lead to the formation of an informal but effective anti-Khrushchev coalition (including Kozlov and Suslov) among Khrushchev's top colleagues. The fifth section concerns itself with the post-Khrushchev collection and is much less interesting than the others.

It does not really matter that most of Tatu's central theses are familiar and that a fair amount of what he has to say concerns previously explored territory. His notions about the domestic political impact of the U-2 affair, for example, coincide quite nicely with similar sentiments expressed earlier in Karl Linden's book, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964*, which deals essentially with the same period. But Tatu arrived at his conclusions independently of Linden, and indeed Linden's ideas were by no means unique when *they* first appeared. Moreover, it should be recalled that Tatu did not wait until the publication of *Power in the Kremlin* to reach judgment. He did so, in fact, as the events were actually taking place, both in *Le Monde* and in conversation with Western diplomats in Moscow (including US diplomats). He thus helped at the time to shape everyone's ideas about politics in the Kremlin, including those of intelligence analysts in Washington (this one included). In any case, the validity of Tatu's examination and the importance of his ideas does not rest on when they appeared or, for that matter, on their originality.

Tatu's theme is grand, but along the way he by no means neglects small but nonetheless illuminating episodes. He reminds us, or tells us for the first time, of some fascinating incidents. As late as 6 May 1960, for example, after the U-2 had been brought down, Khrushchev publicly reasserted his oft-repeated belief in the sincere desire of President Eisenhower for peace. But later in the same month, a spokesman for conservative interests in the CPSU had this to say:

> "Yes, we wanted to believe Eisenhower, we wanted to believe him for the sake of peace on earth . . . *But unlike certain simple-minded persons, we were not exactly moved to enthusiasm by the President's foggy, evasive statements.*" (reviewer's emphasis)

"In order to appreciate the outrageousness of such statements," comments Tatu, "it should be noted that the Chinese themselves went no further in their criticism of Khrushchev at the time, and occasionally used the same words."

Tatu also occasionally throws out an interesting and provocative question which he leaves the reader to answer for himself. Sometimes these questions are rather startling in their implications. He asks, for example, whether the Berlin crisis of 1961 brought about the subsequent increase in Soviet military expenditures, or whether, conversely, the need of the military to strengthen the armed forces brought about the crisis.

As is perhaps already evident, Tatu's work is not for those who like their political analysis in the manner of Mary Barelli Gallagher or who are seeking a light summer entertainment. It is overly long, and will surely tell most readers more than they want to know. And, almost as if he could not bear to discard notes he had made during the event, Tatu sometimes overburdens his account with detail which seems irrelevant and inconclusive.

A more serious charge is that, to paraphrase the cliché, Tatu neglects (although he does not completely ignore) the forest for the trees. As indicated, many of the trees which he studies with such enthusiasm are simply of little account as timber. The part of the forest most neglected is, not surprisingly in a book of this character and intent, foreign policy. But Tatu overdoes it; he tends to regard international problems almost wholly in a domestic light. The following sentence, for instance, strikes me at least as decidedly odd: "Nothing else of any significance was in fact touched on (at the Congress) apart from the Albanian and Chinese problem, *which was only a form of the struggle for power projected on to the international scene. . .*" (reviewer's emphasis.)

A part of the problem is that, as described by Tatu, there is a certain lack of connective tissue between events, especially international events. Links between domestic and foreign events are too often simply referred to in passing, if at all. Thus, for example, in the sections dealing with Khrushchev's difficulties during the winter of 1963, there are few references to Soviet foreign policy. This is important for several reasons, but notably because developments in this area clearly reinforce Tatu's thesis that Khrushchev's policies—e.g., de-Stalinization and economic reform—were in trouble. There was a close parallel be-

tween Khrushchev's internal setbacks and what was happening to his principal foreign policies. These too, were running into effective opposition. Clearly, the conservatives led by Kozlov wished to retrench abroad as well as at home. It will be recalled, for example, that Khrushchev's interest in a nuclear test ban treaty, strongly expressed in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, came to naught until he was able to pick up the thread again in June, after his defeat of the conservatives.

In a larger sense, a similar fault can be discovered in Tatu's treatment of the missile crisis itself. The period leading up to that crisis is covered in some detail on the home front (though perhaps inadequately explored on the international scene). But since he attributes almost everything to the lure of Berlin, Tatu tends to neglect the two principal Soviet motives in the affair: Khrushchev's desire to overcome US strategic superiority and to damage US prestige; and his more personal, though equally important wish to improve his own position. Tatu does not discuss in this context the whole discouraging pattern of events, domestic and foreign, in the two years preceding Cuba. He thus does not explore the notion that the Cuban gamble reflected Khrushchev's extreme frustration and even desperation, that in fact Khrushchev was impelled by his failures on both the internal and international fronts, and that he sought in this way to recover lost momentum abroad and to forestall his ouster at home.

It may be an occupational fault of Kremlinologists and Kremlinology to neglect, relatively speaking, the international scene and its impact on Soviet politics. This is perhaps not surprising, given the rigors and necessary emphases of the art. There is also the matter of time. Tatu admits that Kremlinology must grope, and that takes time, a lot of it. Precious little may be left for explorations of the foreign field, except insofar as it may seem to intrude on the convoluted world of internal Soviet politics. In any case, few practicioners seem very much concerned with the need for looking very far beyond the walls of the Kremlin itself.

The importance of this work does not lie, however, in the marginalia mentioned above. And it was admittedly not Tatu's purpose to provide us with a full account of Khrushchev's foreign policies. The significance of the book is twofold: it is the most thorough and persuasive account yet of the nature of Soviet politics during the Khrushchev era—an era described at the time by many Kremlinologists (includ-

ing many within the US Government) as politically placid and lacking in high-level contention; and it is as such the one account most likely to make an impression, even indirectly, on those in the West whose business it is to respond to and contend with the Soviet challenge. In Tatu's words: "No policy of relations with Moscow can be planned intelligently without regard to the capital question of how it affects the struggle for influence at the top level of the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the symptoms of that struggle which are visible to the outside world must be taken seriously however slight they may seem."

Richard W. Shryock

WESTERN ECONOMIC WARFARE, 1947-1967: By *Gunnar Adler-Karlsson.* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. 1968. 319 pp. 64 Sw.-kr.)

This book is an analysis of the postwar trade control programs of the US and its allies against the USSR and other Communist countries. The major portion of the book is devoted to the historical development of the trade control programs. The most interesting portion, however, is the evaluation of the impact of the controls and the judgment that these failed overwhelmingly to achieve their objectives. The author's argument is well documented, but his conclusions are overstated and need to be substantially qualified.

Controls on exports to the Communist world have been with us for two decades. The two chief systems of export controls applicable to the Communist countries are the unilateral controls based on the US Export Control Act of 1949, and the multilateral controls administered since 1949-50 in cooperation with our European allies and Japan under the aegis of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM). These two sets of controls, designed principally to delay and complicate the ability of the USSR (along with the Warsaw Pact countries and Communist China) to augument its military potential, were adopted during the height of the cold war.

The scope of both lists has been reduced and interpretation of controls has been liberalized over time; nevertheless, there has been considerable friction between the US and its allies over what should be exported to the Communist world. In the early postwar period when our allies were economically dependent on the US, when Stalin was molding his "closed" economic bloc, and during the Korean war, there

was closer official adherence by the allies to the stricter US interpretations. After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Korean armistice, and the growing economic recovery in Europe which produced competition for foreign markets, there was pressure in COCOM for a relaxation of trade controls.

All COCOM countries, including the US, are in general agreement concerning the embargo of items on the international Munitions and Atomic Energy lists, but broad disagreements exist on the COCOM International List I, where items have both civilian and military uses. The COCOM International List I is the lowest common denominator for export controls, and any participating country is free to apply a higher level of controls. US controls are wider in scope and more vigorously enforced than those of Western Europe and Japan, because the US is more inclined to look on the Communist countries as posing a strategic threat, while other Western countries tend to regard the Communist countries as a vast potential market which must be exploited before US competition makes it impossible to do so.

It is Mr. Karlsson's purpose, he says, to look at the history of this "embargo" policy "reluctantly adopted by the West European governments . . . to analyze both the political forces which created the policy, and the economic effects which it may have had on East-West trade and on the balance of power between the Communist bloc and its Western adversaries." The generous proportions of his book testify to the fact that he approached his task with a vengeance. The 8"x10½" volume has more than 200 double-columned pages liberally interlarded with diagrams and tables; there are more than 1,000 source references and footnotes (many rather long and fortunately relegated to the back of the book), and more than 50 pages of trade statistics in the appendix. Ostensibly the author also consulted numerous sources in his research, including more than 100 periodicals in a half-dozen languages. His bibliography includes about 200 authors—from the best known experts on the Soviet economy to numerous lesser luminaries.

The history of the controls programs, which takes up roughly half of the book (all or major portions of chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10), is the strongest part of the book. The obvious painstaking research using unclassified materials has resulted in a well-documented unclassified history of the trade controls program. Those of us who have access to classified sources and particularly those who at least are gen-

erally aware of the trade controls program and some of its history might question the utility of Mr. Karlsson's monumental effort. The book's chief distinction would appear to be its encyclopedic proportions rather than any new contributions or insights into the question of the merits or lack thereof of the trade controls program. Our colleagues in academia, however, who are not privy to classified materials, may well regard Karlsson's book as a major contribution to the literature on Western export controls, particularly its historical development. This is not to say, however, that some of the motives and reasoning for various trade controls actions that he attributes to policy makers are necessarily true. Thus, there is some reason to doubt that during the period 1947-53 American leaders "had no vision of peace beyond the collapse or defeat of Soviet power . . . and that the Americans hoped to achieve a collapse after which the Russians would come and beg for renewed trade relations, now on American conditions." (pp. 88-89).

The theme which runs throughout the book is that the embargo policy, which Karlsson says was instigated by the US and perpetrated on its allies over the last two decades, has been futile; that numerous diversions have undermined the controls; that the embargo has caused considerable ill feeling among our allies; that depriving the Communist countries of Western goods helped Stalin consolidate his Eastern European domain, promoted autarky, and affected development of East-West trade up to 1953; that the costs imposed on the USSR by the denial of certain goods were negligible; and finally that it failed to affect perceptibly the growth of the Soviet economy and Soviet military power. The book, in fact, is an almost unrelieved indictment of the Western trade controls programs allegedly nurtured by the United States and foisted on our hapless allies in the early postwar period.

It is certainly true that there have been many diversions. This fact has been well documented in classified and unclassified sources. It is also true that much ill will has been generated because of trade controls. However, it is highly debatable that Western trade controls were more than marginally influential in fostering the creation of Stalin's economic bloc in the East. As to the development of East-West trade up to 1953, we can only be sure that trade controls had a major impact on US trade with the Communist world. Commodity scarcities pursuant to the Korean conflict, inward direction of trade among the USSR and Eastern European countries, and the liberalization of trade

among Western European countries all played a role in the stagnation of trade between East and West at that time.

Karlsson's thesis that controls have had little impact on Soviet economic growth is based on a comparison of "non-realized imports" (the difference between actual imports from the West and the estimated value of imports in the absence of controls) with Soviet GNP. This, he says, would have affected only one-tenth to one-half of one percent of GNP during the height of the embargo period (pp. 189-90). He states that the bottleneck effects of the embargo restrictions may have affected a greater share of the economy and that an exaggerated estimate might be a slowdown in growth from the "potential 8 percent to the actual 7 percent" during the 1950's. Based on "these exaggerated assumptions" the effects of the embargo policy would have been to retard economic development during the decade of the 1950's by one year.

A study undertaken in the intelligence community several years ago confirmed the thesis that controls have had little impact on growth. It concluded that a complete embargo by NATO would have caused, under generous assumptions of impact, the equivalent to the loss of only a few months' increment to output in the USSR and Eastern Europe. It has not been possible, moreover, to identify any of the items imported from the COCOM countries by the USSR and Eastern Europe for which there would be no possible substitute.

The principal justification for export controls for many years has been their contribution to or maintenance of the technological lag in the USSR. It is in this area that Karlsson's arguments are weakest. The denial of some goods undoubtedly has had an impact on those economic capabilities that lie at the edge of advancing technology. In this sense, the quality of Soviet economic growth must be inferior to what it would be otherwise. The current pattern of trade controls is aimed primarily at those goods whose technology the USSR has had the most difficulty mastering.

The technological gap between the USSR and the developed West is large and is probably widening, as a recent classified study indicates. This statement is at odds with Karlsson's evaluation of Soviet technological prowess, which he attributes in part to the "efficient organization of R & D work" there (p. 124). On the contrary, he sees little point in controlling exports of technology to the USSR, other than those clearly possessing strategic significance. Karlsson's argu-

ments seem to be derived mainly from statements made in the Gaither report in 1958 regarding the rapid pace of Soviet military development (p. 123). Indeed, the USSR has achieved near-parity with the US in technology for producing many types of weapons and space equipment, and even superiority in a few areas. Soviet priorities, however, have favored the military sector. According to the above-mentioned report, second priority has been given to the basic industries whose output directly supports both military production and the investment programs essential to rapid growth—steel, fuels, electric power, producers' equipment, and more recently, chemicals. The bulk of the output of these industries is produced with technology obsolescent by a number of years relative to that predominantly in use in the West: e.g., technology for producing computers, peripheral equipment, and solid-state electronic components (a 5-year lag and widening); the Soviet technological composition of machine tools is inferior because of its poor quality and preponderance of general-purpose tools; production technology and product mix of the Soviet automotive and tractor industry are obsolescent; all aspects of Soviet petroleum technology lags well behind the US as does much of Soviet chemical technology.

Contrary to Karlsson's evaluation of the efficiency of Soviet R & D, the technological gap exists and is largely due to the Soviet system of planning and economic administration which retards innovation. The importation by the Soviets of Western technology and equipment valued in billions of dollars during the 1960's has been designed to help overcome this gap. The denial of key advanced Western technology and equipment via export controls, moreover, has contributed to the technological lag. The lag is in some degree attributable to the US unilateral trade program because a substantial amount of key advanced Western technology is covered by US patents and licenses.

The relaxation of Western controls undoubtedly would lead to changes in the composition of Communist imports from the West. Such imports would feature equipment and technology for priority sectors where the lag is greatest, e.g., computers, microelectronics, petroleum refining and exploration, metal finishing, thermal power, and certain chemicals. The contribution that such imports would make to Communist economic growth is, of course, unquantifiable. Indirectly, such imports would help to improve the general economic

performance of the USSR and Eastern Europe and, thus, would make it possible for them to allocate more resources to military production than otherwise would be the case. Some of these items, computers, for example, have military as well as civil uses and, thus, would direotly strengthen the Soviet strategic/military posture.

As noted above, denial of strategic goods for two decades did not prevent the USSR from building a formidable military establishment at home as well as in Eastern Europe. The military sector is the first claimant of goods and services in these countries. Denial of Western technology and equipment, therefore, has had minimal impact on the size of Soviet military programs. On the other hand, the denial of Western technology and equipment probably has increased the costs and reduced the effectiveness of Soviet military programs, and delayed development and deployment of some weapons systems. Technological lags appear to have been absorbed in Soviet military systems at a cost of reduced effectiveness, e.g., through weight penalties in aircraft; more cumbersome command, support, and communications systems; limited flexibility; and reduced reliability.

Controls in the past decade probably have retarded Soviet production technology in semiconductors and other electronic components by denying access to silicon and germanium metals, the processing machinery for these metals, and transistor and diode production lines. This delay, in turn, has probably contributed to present lags in digital computer production technology, which has remained embargoed.

The Soviet lag in production technology for large high-speed computers probably would be a constraining factor in the size and pace of deployment of a nation-wide ABM system. The US lead in developing a MIRV system may also be attributable in part to computer superiority. Optimal nuclear warhead design requires large computer capacity.

The current Soviet lag in the field of microelectronics contributes to computer deficiencies. The USSR does not yet produce integrated circuits on a commercial scale. Failure to acquire adequate supplies of integrated circuits may retard the deployment of on-board missile guidance packages and reduce the accuracy of missiles. In the general field of military applications, unrestricted access to Western microelectronic components and/or technology would enable the USSR to

replace existing Soviet-made components in a wide variety of military gear with smaller, lighter, and more reliable Western components.

The quantity, quality, and variety of Communist output of telecommunications equipment falls far short of meeting Communist requirements. As the USSR increases its investment in sophisticated weapons systems, such as ABM and offensive missile systems, increasing requirements will be generated for a wide variety of telecommunications systems for strategic application. Included among these systems are hardened communications facilities in target areas, under ground control links for hardened missile sites, automated nationwide command and control functions, and facilities for rapid and secure data and voice transmission. The USSR's capability in the telecommunications techniques needed to satisfy these requirements is deficient, and numerous attempts to acquire Western technology and equipment have been made in recent years. The lack of adequate high-rate data transmission equipment in particular is a serious hindrance to the deployment of an ABM system, which requires an intricate network of communications facilities, connecting radars, computers, command and control centers, and defensive missiles.

The impact of US and Western trade controls on the USSR and other Communist countries has been less than originally hoped for. However, they were never intended to bring the USSR to its knees, as implied by Karlsson. They have not slowed Soviet economic growth noticeably in the past but they have contributed to the technological lag which is the major factor in the current economic slowdown. The have not prevented the USSR from becoming a formidable military power, but they have denied it equipment and technology which would have upgraded some weapons systems, and in any case probably have helped delay the deployment of certain weapons systems. What this has meant in terms of costs to the Communist world cannot be quantified. The costs to the Western alliance, particularly with respect to the loss of political capital by the US, should be weighed in the balance, of course. The viewpoints of our Western allies in assessing the strategic significance of exports relative to commercial gains are different from that of the US. Protected by the US nuclear umbrella, the options are easier for our Western European allies.

Robert S. Kovach

ASSASSINATION BUREAU, INC. By *L. Natarajanan.* (New Delhi: Perspective Publications, 1967.)

This book is a lurid account of five political assassinations in Asia during the past twenty years. It is a reprint of articles previously serialized in the nominally independent Indian leftist weekly, *Mainstream* (circulation, 4,000). It cannot be treated as a serious work. What we can discern of the motives behind such a publication may, however, be of some interest.

L. Natarajanan is a pen name of Nikil Chakravarty, an Indian Communist Party member for more than 30 years. An Oxford University student in the 30's, when he joined the British Communist Party, he had personal acquaintances among India League and Congress Party leaders that have stood him in good stead over the years. The first fifteen years of his party work were devoted to "combining legal and illegal activity"; he was a party journalist and, when occasion demanded, a wartime member and later (1948-50) a leader of the clandestine technical apparatus of the CPI, under various aliases.

From 1952, when he wrote *American Shadow over India* for the party press, his career followed a different course. Aligned with Ajoy Ghosh, the new Secretary-General of the party, he was used in party contacts with Soviet Bloc embassies, and eventually became head of the India Press Agency, a Communist Party "news" outlet created with Soviet financial backing. After Ghosh's death he moved away from open association with the party but strengthened his relations with the Soviets, who also financed the establishment of *Mainstream.* At one point in 1959-60, it was reported that he was taking on "counterintelligence duties" with Americans as his target, when the party took new steps to create a secret mechanism. What is known is that he has for several years published numerous articles on CIA in Asia in various outlets, virtually all of them elaborate fabrications.

The first case treated is the assassination in 1947 of General Aung San, the leader of the nationalist Executive Council that governed Burma in the first post-World War II period, and the subsequent execution of the organizer of his assassination, U Saw. The second is the murder in 1949 in South Korea of Kim Koo, a leading political opponent of then President Syngman Rhee, and the third the shooting in 1951 of Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. The last two cases are those of Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike who met

violent death at the hands of two Buddhist monks in September 1959, and of the Japanese Socialist Party leader Asanuma, stabbed at a pre-electoral meeting in September 1960.

Soviet apologists and agents of influence have special problems in dealing with the question of political assassination. One difficulty is, as Khoklov and other Soviet defectors have stated, that the USSR has resorted to assassination for many years, although mainly of political oppositionists who fled from Soviet territory. In this book the author addresses another problem, the fact that not all victims of political assassination operations attributed to the imperialists can be identified as simonpure fighters against capitalism and imperialism.

The central idea appears to be that the British and the Americans use political assassination against erstwhile puppets, a theme which is consistent with Soviet efforts in the CENTO, SEATO, and OAS treaty areas to drive wedges between the US and cooperating political leaders. In the Burmese case, it is U Saw, the organizer of the assassination of Aung San, who is betrayed by his masters. An interesting sidelight in this case is the fact that the Soviet Union, in its attack in early 1969 on the Chinese and their Southeast Asian puppets, claimed Aung San as the leader of the "good" Burmese Communists at the end of World War II, whose death made it possible for Maoist sectarians to break up the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, thus playing into the hands of the imperialist enemy.

In the Korean case, the Americans are cast as the villains behind both the elimination of Syngman Rhee and the death of his opponent, Kim Koo. The idea that no Korean should trust the US is reiterated. The stream-of-consciousness account of Syngman Rhee's thoughts suggests that the author of the piece—Indian or Soviet—has found a way of communicating with the spirit world.

The Pakistani case is built around a supplementary theme used in Soviet wedge-driving—that the British and Americans will use any means necessary against each other in their struggle for colonialist hegemony, and that their failures to expose each other's crimes arise in the last analysis from the fact that they are tied together by their crimes. Apparently the person who inspired this piece believes in the validity of the old Nechayev principle of conspiracy, that the best way of making a fellow conspirator reliable is to lead him to commit a crime and to hold the knowledge of his guilt over his head.

The case of "Sword" (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike, again suggests the theme that a collaborator will be liquidated if he begins to see the error of his ways and to move away from his subordination to the imperialists. Again Anglo-American mutual jealousy and mistrust is woven into the story along with the idea that an agent shared between the two may be the local villain of the piece.

In the Japanese case, which in one or two places also suggests either spirit-world sources or a penetration in the US Embassy in Tokyo, the book again plays on the theme of an assassination as a sequel to an unsuccessful American effort to influence a political group, in this instance, the Socialist Party of Japan.

Neither the "facts" presented, the professional ability of the writer, nor the interpretive analysis of why these assassinations were necessary to the US and Britian are likely to have impact even in India. They are, however, useful for Indian Communists who need a rationalization that can be acceptable from a Marxist-Leninist point of view for the fact that the opponent they condemned yesterday as an imperialist puppet may be today's forgotten man, as far as the "imperialist beast" is concerned. Some erstwhile friends of the West in South Asia who turn against the US or Great Britian also may find the stories handy polemic aids when they cannot frankly explain to their associates why they have turned toward the USSR.



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