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A new concept of soft sell and painstaking development in making an agent of the adversary.

THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

Andrew J. Twiddy

There is no dispute, in principle, about how important it is that we recruit Soviet officials as information agents. What we urgently need to know about Soviet strategic intentions, capabilities, and clandestine action to undermine other governments can in the last analysis be learned only from those who have access to the secret files of the USSR. No spy-in-the-sky can bring back this information. The highest aim of clandestine agent operations is to recruit and direct people who can.


This is a clear principle, but in practice U.S. operations against the all-important target tend to be neglected in favor of more easily successful work in response to the demands of the moment. The extreme difficulty of the task of inducing members of the privileged class of an inherently patriotic nation to betray their country, coupled with past failures at the task, has engendered a widespread skepticism about the very possibility of success—"Why go to all the trouble when we know it won't work anyway; we've got too many other things to do." Yet the job is anything but impossible, given the use of suitable methods and the widespread disaffection existing in the Soviet system.

The Vulnerable Target

The tensions and ills of that system bear down on most of its subjects in one degree or another, and its very extremism almost demands that disaffection be expressed in extreme terms. The regime invites treason by demanding absolute, narrow, rigid, and humorless conformity as the price of a decent existence. The road to the top in any profession, including intelligence, is climbed by Party work, toadying, and a stance of fanatic loyalty as much as by professional competence. Fear and suspicion poison relations between Soviet citizens, making genuine friendship impossible. The extreme, almost

THE 1963 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

The award of \$500 offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence was divided in 1963 between two quite different types of articles.



Both

articles appeared in the Fall 1963 issue.

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irrational care with which the Party screens candidates for work abroad is a symptom of the latent treason incubating in officialdom.

Abroad, in their ghetto-like communities, representatives of what they are told is the strongest power on earth are warned of the dangers of normal social contact with local citizens. Their children must return to the USSR after the fourth and last year at an embassy school because Soviet children are not allowed to study in Western schools. Their own conduct and movements are monitored by security personnel and informants. Because they are human and the system is not, they clandestinely break rules all the time and suffer the consequent tensions. They are bedeviled by denunciations, spying, gossip, jealousies, and sexual and other frustrations. Their zeal and originality are often rewarded with suspicion. Their security dossiers are gradually filled with evidences of imperfection inevitable under the arbitrary and often vindictive standards of discipline. An offense which in the West would bring only a reprimand, if anything, may be enough to send the Soviet back home in disgrace, to face punishment or even dismissal from the service and Party.

Aggravating their discomfort are the appeals of the foreign life they see around them. Although no people, by and large, is likely to prefer an alien to a familiar way and the Russians are particularly proud of their country and heritage, when they see this foreign life against the background of the evils in present-day Soviet reality they often find in it one or another compelling attraction, depending on their individual personalities—its easy personal freedom, the pleasure of relaxed trust between people, a career without toadying, or merely the lure of the exotic.

It is evident, to be sure, that many of our Soviet counterparts abroad are secure in their positions, happy in their work, and enjoying the best of both worlds. But even for these the possibilities of trouble and treason lurk not far beneath the surface in the strains of such an environment. This, then, is our target—a vulnerable thing festering with discontent and resentment, rendered brittle by narrow conformism and dogmatism, its vulnerability heightened by underlying cynicism or despair about the system as a whole and made more acute by exposure to another world and other ways of life.

Restraints

If this is a fair picture, why don't more Soviets come over to us? Those in trouble, reflecting on ways to get out of it, will somewhere along the line think of recourse to the West; "choosing freedom" is too common a phenomenon in the East ever to be entirely overlooked. Intelligence officers in particular are aware U.S. intelligence will help them financially if that is what they need. But even if a Soviet is practically in despair and has gone so far as to think about ways he could contact the Americans or the local security authorities, these plans will probably never take concrete shape but founder on an assortment of inhibitions and fears. In the end, more often than not, he will stolidly return home, rationalizing desperately that perhaps everything will be all right after all.

The inhibitions that hold him there to face the music rather than come to us are too many and too complicated for full discussion here, but some of them must be noted because they are pertinent to the argument to be developed in this paper:

Fear of the unknown, lack of understanding of the West. Stories of discrimination, race riots, warmongering, oppression of the proletariat, unemployment, etc., are believed in the East.

Distrust and fear of Western intelligence services. Many Soviets view Western intelligence as viciously anti-Soviet, the toughest anti-Soviet influence in Western life. Soviet intelligence officers, particularly of the KGB, assume that we share their own unquestioning aim of destroying or taking the enemy by whatever force or stratagem is available. Thus they believe Western intelligence is bent on destroying them, not helping them. They do not know how they will be received, and many even fear that they will be punished for their past work against the West.

Anxiety about making a place for themselves in Western life. Especially they fear being unable to earn a decent, honorable, and independent livelihood. Although Soviets abroad usually know of successful defections and rehabilitations in the West, they are

troubled by reports of at least as many failures, of former colleagues turning into friendless, drunken wrecks, abandoned in an alien environment. Certainly they do not believe that they will be permitted to work actively in their former profession, and many are not willing to be transformed from senior officers into mere information sources or "agents." Most of them fear that they will be "squeezed dry like a lemon" and then left to fend for themselves. All these fears are purposely nourished by Soviet propaganda.

Fear that Soviet penetration of Western intelligence services and governments means for them not only detection if they work for us in place but retribution if they defect. This fear is particularly acute on the part of intelligence officers, many of whom have personally known of such penetrations.

Unwillingness to leave relatives behind, or to burden relatives with the consequences of their treason.

The human tendency to follow the path of least resistance rather than take a bold and lonely step fraught with danger and the stigma of treason.

Ignorance of how to make contact safely with our people. We often assume wrongly that any Soviet knows enough to find an American or go to the embassy, but in fact they are afraid of finding the wrong American, or of being observed going into the embassy and so having burned their bridges. Talks with friends will not have suggested ways to get safely to a Western service; this subject is taboo and cannot be brought up even in jest.

In spite of all these restraining influences, many Soviets have come over to us of their own accord. The number of such volunteers contrasts so sharply with the failure of deliberate efforts to recruit them that one suspects there must be something radically wrong with the American approach. Let's examine the standard approach, then, in an effort to find the trouble.

The Conventional Wisdom

The process of recruiting Soviet officials stationed abroad, in the traditional and still prevailing conception, goes something like this.

A field station gets, from its own sources or from liaison with the host country's service, the identifying data on Soviets stationed in its area, including photos, dates of arrival and departure, official functions or title, sometimes their predecessors or successors, occasionally some personality information. This is supplemented by headquarters traces. The station tries to determine which ones are members of the Soviet intelligence services, the KGB and GRU, and acquires more data on them through double agents and various investigations. It identifies their local contacts by means of phone taps, informants, observation and surveillance, liaison sources, etc., and it establishes contact with these people in order to use them as sources of information or means of access to a target Soviet official.

The station collects and analyzes information on the target's points of possible vulnerability to recruitment or defection, judging them against Soviet realities and the experiences of the past, including the motivations of Soviet defectors. When it decides, with headquarters, that the vulnerability is great enough to give a reasonable chance of success, it plans a recruitment or defection pitch. The plan is often made and carried out quite hastily, for example when a new source who judges the target defectable is acquired and is available for use in the operation, when an agent of the target has been arrested or he has otherwise been compromised, or when he is about to be transferred back to the Soviet Union.

Finally, using one of its own officers or, more commonly, one brought in from the outside for better security or for his special qualifications, the station makes the "pitch." It must often be made in a public place, there usually being no secure or comfortable access to

the target. It is usually designed for maximum impact, revealing to the Soviet all the compromising information we have; it usually offers the inducement of a monetary reward; it carries explicit or implicit threats of exposure or other trouble if the offer is refused. It puts the Soviet officer in the position of having to answer yes or no on the spot.

Many of us have seen this system applied and have tried it out ourselves. The preparatory phases go nicely enough, but at the culmination we have seen it fail repeatedly, some think inevitably. Our offers evoke a violent reaction or a scornful or indifferent refusal or a public flap. These failures have often muddied local operational waters, have made other tasks more difficult, and have given American intelligence a reputation in Soviet eyes for clumsiness, naiveté, and callousness that certainly does not enhance our future prospects.

Why doesn't it work? A lot of professional thought has gone into this, usually after each failure. Time after time the reasons have been isolated and reviewed—in adequate assessment of the target, overestimation of his vulnerability, bad timing, or too cold an approach. But this analysis, made in the hope of doing better next time, has merely scratched the surface. Our work has not just suffered from flaws; it has been based on fundamental misconceptions. That is why we haven't done better next time, and won't do better as long as we continue in the same general framework.

Structural Weaknesses

The traditional method normally requires that the Soviet make up his mind right away, that on the spur of the moment he weigh our arguments against his own logic and inhibitions and take here and now an irrevocable step, betraying his colleagues and annihilating his whole past and his planned future. But no sensible person makes decisions this way, especially vital and unpleasant ones. The process of decision on critical personal matters is usually long and turbulent, full of starts and stops and reversals. While it can be influenced by advice and outside intervention, such as repetitive suggestion, it cannot be resolved sanely by a sudden forcing of the issue. To impose an ultimatum is almost to guarantee a de-

cision in favor of familiar fears and the normal course, against the drastic step we propose. The latter requires long self-persuasion.

The very act of the pitch, the shocking bald invitation itself, helps build barriers against success, almost regardless of the objective circumstances. Even one who has long contemplated defection is likely to be outraged and frightened when suddenly a practical stranger, representing what he views with distrust as a hostile force, asks him openly and callously to do here and now the difficult and repugnant deed he has been hiding in the recesses of his mind. This stranger has put him in an embarrassing and difficult position; he must now report the incident and suffer the consequences. His negative reaction is especially strong when the approach not only endangers him but includes a financial offer: however subtly presented, this tends to make the whole thing sordid.

Proper timing in a recruitment approach is not merely something we have somehow failed to achieve; it is a mirage. In every voluntary defection a complex array of personal and professional circumstances and pressures have conjoined to make the deed feasible at one precise point in time. We in the distance, with our inadequate sources and file data, would probably not even learn that a particular Soviet officer was disturbed or in trouble, much less precisely when the pressure became critical.

Successful recruitment requires that the target be not only vulnerable but psychologically capable of such a step. But can we ever know enough to pick the right candidate? Defectors have tried to make us understand that no Soviet ever confides to another, even his best friend, his true thoughts on these matters. They are all caught up in the desperate game, whose stakes are not only career but survival, of appearing holier than the Pope. A Russian saying holds that "the soul of another is darkness," and in Soviet Russia this is truer than ever. We will probably never get enough psychological insight into any Soviet to make a decent judgment about whether he would ever, under any circumstances, be capable of treason.

As we do not know enough to distinguish potential targets from the many who will never jump and the many others who don't need to, so also we will probably never be able to judge

just what sort of recruitment situation or recruiter would be most likely to entice a given target to a favorable decision rather than repel him: should it be a Slavic or American type, for example; should he speak Russian or English? And even if we could know all this in advance (and perhaps even the target himself wouldn't), our operational resources are seldom good enough to permit a careful and subtle development of the target by the right people in the right way and at the right time.

If we can agree that a person must have time to make an irrevocable and heartbreaking decision when and as he can and needs to, we arrive at the logical conclusion that the Soviet *must recruit himself*. We cannot and need not supply the essential pressures forcing him over to us; the Soviet system will do that, and we can only help the process along. The decision and the timing are the man's own. This important distinction was expressed not long ago by a Soviet intelligence officer who had come to us. In describing some Soviet operations, he told about an attempt of his own to recruit a foreign national, who had refused in spite of a real threat and intense pressure, and he expressed his personal respect and admiration for the man. Then, seeing the possible analogy with his own case, he said, "You see, you could never have recruited me. No offer or pressure could have brought me over." He was dead serious, and convincing. The fact that he had made his own decision and taken the step himself had put his act on an entirely different plane.

This does not mean that we should abandon recruitment operations, depending on walk-ins and devoting our case-officer time to easier and more pressing tasks. On the contrary, we should redouble our efforts. It is within our power to bring over Soviets who without our intervention would never take the step. But to do so we must revise our aims and methods. We must recognize our limitations and our real opportunities.

New Construction

What is proposed is to change essentially our conception of recruitment, to stop thinking of it as an event or incident, a one-shot deal, an offer or question followed by a few hours' decisive conversation. Instead, we should regard it as a series of varied operational steps carried out over weeks, months,

and years without a pre-set terminus. The process would be designed to reduce our target's ignorance of the West and distrust of us and make him know, by reminding him repeatedly, that he can defect, if he eventually must, with prospects for an honorable and active future, or he can safely cooperate with us in place. While taking action, without his knowledge, to increase wherever possible the pressures that might eventually force him to us, the program would show him how to come over safely and provide him the channel to do so. It would take for him the first difficult step towards eventual commitment by establishing meaningful contacts, personal and impersonal, and keeping these contacts alive as long as possible and necessary.

Each step in the long-term operation against each Soviet target personality should contribute in some way toward his eventual recruitment, giving him information and encouragement to help allay his fears and inhibitions, weakening his position or otherwise increasing the pressure on him, or opening for him a safe way to come over. Each step has to be tailored to the target and to local conditions and capabilities, as well as to what has gone before and what is planned for the future in each case. It is thus difficult to suggest concrete actions for general use, but a few examples will be given later for the sake of illustration. First it will be worth while to examine some characteristics of all such actions.

Each step should be carried out under conditions of maximum security. A clumsy or crude approach in public will only raise the target's ire and contempt and compel him to report it. Similarly we should avoid, in general, use of the open mail or telephone, and we should be careful how we use people who are known to local or Soviet counterintelligence. Our action should be designed to impress the Soviet with our competence, security, and genuine concern for his safety and personal interests, and at the same time to convince him that he might get away with it if he fails to report to his authorities.

Each action should seek to minimize the chances that the target will report it. By reporting it, he ratifies in his own mind the "no" he gave us, which he might otherwise secretly preserve as a "maybe" for the future. And his superiors will do what they can to guarantee his refusal. As a target of

We can encourage the omission by taking our steps securely, by avoiding ultimatums, and by maintaining a sympathetic and friendly or neutral and businesslike attitude, never a threatening one. (Even if we confront him with compromising information, we should try to convince him that *we* won't expose it but remind him that if his security people find out we may be able to help.) Moreover, the action can be made so ambiguous in content and purpose that he will not have anything to reject and may be unsure whether he really needs to report it or even what it was all about. We can make it progressively clearer in follow-up steps, but by that time, hopefully, he will have compromised himself by failures to report the early phases.

Each action, as part of a long-range plan, must be followed up by further steps, either direct contact or behind-the-scenes activity, in a constant effort to add to the cumulative effect, to keep up regular reminders, to provide deeper assessment of the man, and to establish a firm channel between us and him. Intervals between steps may vary from a few days to years, but we use the arrows in our quiver one by one rather than all in a single volley. We can hint in one meeting that we have other information which we will impart later; this might help keep his interest, increase the tension and fear, and encourage him not to report to his superiors right away.

Direct contacts with the target through our officers or agents or through letters may be supplemented by indirect actions designed to exacerbate his problems, weaken his position, heighten the tensions around him, and help the Soviet system vomit him out. We can use provocations, fabricated information, public exposure, manipulation of double agents, or other

actions to harm his position, with one proviso: we should not tell him, or allow him to know, that it was we who did it. We are trying to build up his confidence in our good faith toward him.

Some Don'ts

Under this concept we should drop some practices of the past. We need not entirely abandon direct offers of aid or suggestions of cooperation, even "cold" ones, but we should stop confronting Soviets with ultimatums or threats, even when the target takes violent offense at a friendly approach. After all, our very approach has beset him with new problems and dangers, and it may be normal to react with hatred or fear. We should always keep our real goal in mind—not to harm him, but eventually to recruit him. He may shy now, but he will remember us if he needs us later. Best leave this memory as palatable as possible.

Our work should be carried out less by American intelligence personnel directly and more by local citizens on our behalf. Soviets do not have their defenses up against the local community as much as they do against American officials; a proposal, suggestion, or hint given by an apparently innocent local citizen has a better chance to be entertained, and less chance to be reported, than a similar one made by an American official. The latter would automatically be viewed as a provocation, exciting fears and inhibitions the former would not.

We must not try to get final results here and now. Our first approach or contact should be regarded as only the beginning of a long series. Each step we take should be shaped according to this modest conception, and we should resign ourselves to the possibility that we may not be able to judge our progress or even the immediate effects of any given step. Although with luck we might be able to accelerate a man's decision, we must accept the fact that we may never get our man at all, and if we do it may take the five, ten, or more years that many past defectors had pondered their decision. We must reject the idea that a Soviet's transfer back to the USSR signals the end of the operation, demanding drastic action to justify the effort already put into it. We must be patient, reminding ourselves that he will probably come out again

before long, and content to have made a long-term operational investment.

When a Soviet begins to talk to us, when we begin to work our way into a relationship that suggests recruitment, we should not require black-and-white resolution of the situation but be satisfied with half-success and compromise. Half-recruitment or even less is better than nothing. Many who want, some of them desperately, to get away from the Soviet system or help destroy it are not ready to pay the price of telling all, especially at the very beginning of a relationship that requires trust on both sides. We should try to be more flexible, realizing that if a Soviet withholds some information and perhaps lies about other matters, this does not necessarily mean he is actively trying to damage us, and it certainly does not mean he was sent out against us, is in reality under Soviet control. That a Soviet being recruited does not immediately tell all does not mean that he never will. Patience and human understanding will take us a long way.

We should exercise discrimination in whether, when, and how to offer money as an inducement. Even if the Soviet's main motivation is materialistic, we must allow him to rationalize it on ideological or other grounds to maintain his own self-respect. If money is not a real factor with him, the mere mention of it may repel and alienate him. American intelligence already has a reputation, officially promoted by the Soviets, for buying people to do dirty deeds. It is usually quite different appeals which will bring about the drastic decision we want Soviet officials to make.

We should not entertain the idea that we can ever induce a defection. All we can do is help the Soviet system do that for us. That system, even without help, will create fears, doubts, and disillusionment, and it will get many Soviets into trouble sooner or later. Only let us try to insure that when the trouble comes to a head (we won't get advance notice) we will already have prepared and pointed out the way for the man concerned.

We should not consider our dossiers mere collections of data which, hopefully, might some day lead to a one-shot all-or-nothing D-day. Our file on any Soviet abroad should be a case file, a record of action taken and a source of inspiration for

future action—all part of one continuing operation to nudge him toward eventual cooperation.

Not knowing in advance who will come to us, or when, we should prepare the way for as many Soviets as possible. The limited actions proposed here should be incomparably more numerous than the recruitment pitches of the past. This does not mean that we should flail about hitting at every Soviet in sight, nor should we repeat the same techniques so often as to dull their point. But if we are to recruit Soviets, we have to act. We must make our Soviet targets know that we are here, active and competent, and what we want and what we have to offer. If we have usable data and access to our targets we should use them. And if we don't have them we should go out and get them.

Case Sketches

Here are a few examples, hypothetical and real, of tactics useful in such recruitment operations.

A young KGB officer under student cover, say, is approached at the end of his short tour abroad. Our veteran operator merely greets him in a fatherly way, exposes our knowledge of certain sensitive aspects of his life, says we have been watching him carefully, wishes him well in his KGB career, and promises to get back in touch when he is sent abroad again. By this step we put him in a ticklish position. Should he report our approach? We have not provoked or tried to recruit him; and we have shown him he is blown, a fact that could if reported hamper his future career and interfere with assignment abroad. At the same time we establish meaningful personal contact, a direct channel to us which he can use now if he is already looking for one but which in any case we can keep alive against a future need. Presumably he goes back to the USSR, on schedule, and we don't know whether he reports it. But when he comes out again the same officer will appear in his path from time to time. And we will work on him on the side, trying to uncover his operational activity and find compromising data which can be used against him.

Or we discover a KGB officer, Z, who had been known to us in the past and personally known to a defector, to be abroad again under a new identity with diplomatic cover. We prepare an

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anonymous letter to him containing friendly greetings and what looks like a status report on some private dealings—black market implied but not specified. The letter also reveals the writer's knowledge of personality information connected with Z's earlier identity. This letter is slipped under his door when he is known to be home. By this act we put him in a possibly embarrassing situation with his own authorities. His explanation, if he reports it, may be disbelieved, and he may be sent home. The letter prepares the way for follow-up contacts even less easy to explain to his superiors. And if he reports it and is believed, we bring about a KGB investigation that may cast suspicion on others. We may now take other steps, not only against Z but related ones against other KGB officers there and against Z's friends elsewhere.

Say we have long been troubled by a ubiquitous and effective KGB operative, A, working directly against us in a certain country, but we have been unable to identify his contacts. We know only—from phone taps—that his closest friend is B, a KGB officer under a different cover. Through audiosurveillance we learn something slightly compromising about A that B is likely to know. On the strength of this information we make a direct recruitment approach to A, suggesting that he had been singled out by an inside source and somewhere in the course of the discussion mentioning B by name. A rejects the appeal and reports it; he is recalled, and we have got rid of him. Moreover, B may now be under suspicion. As a second step an anonymous letter is sent to B, its contents implying the existence of a clandestine relationship. Then we put an indigenous agent of ours in touch with B to provide assessment and a means of future access. Thus we also dangle before B a potential agent, and if he recruits him we can manipulate the case to affect his position.

In an actual and still active case, a Soviet intelligence officer had shown that he liked Western life and social contact with Westerners and was occasionally indiscreet. Our case officer in contact with him under the same kind of cover one day referred quite offhand to the man's true status and half-jestingly suggested a clandestine relationship. The Soviet laughingly said no. Our man kept coming back and badgering the Soviet good-humoredly, trying to get him to meet us in a se-

cure place merely to discuss politics and otherwise talk shop. Finally, when approached once in an inconvenient situation, he agreed to meet securely. He has still not told us any damaging secrets, indeed refuses to, but each time we meet he tells more and the relationship comes closer to collaboration. We have told him certain things pertinent to his own safety and well-being. He has clearly not told his superiors; he could not have been authorized to meet us as he does. We have no intention of forcing him to a black-and-white decision but will content ourselves with a slow and gradual establishment of confidence, hoping for eventual cooperation. The information he gives us may be fragmentary, but it is becoming ever more sensitive and valuable.

Harassment Potential

Our subject here is recruitment, but we should note the important side effects that can be achieved by a broad recruitment campaign. Implicit in the actions described above is the parallel aim of harassing and disrupting the Soviet intelligence services, making their job more difficult. We cannot expect mass recruitments to crown our efforts; if they produced one extra Soviet agent they would be worth while. But many of our approaches and actions will be reported to the Soviet authorities, and it behooves us, therefore, to build into them provocative themes which when reported sow confusion, doubt, and suspicion, damage the position of other Soviet officers, and perhaps cause time-consuming investigations. By the mere act of provocative recruitment approaches we can bother and hamper the Soviet services and even get rid of troublesome opponents, because by doctrine those known to be compromised, and especially those who have become targets of Western recruitment efforts, are recalled. Thus recruitment failures can help build other operations and help create a more favorable climate for our activity.

The following article is adapted from one of several on Soviet intelligence doctrine written by high-ranking officers of the GRU (the Soviet defense intelligence agency). It was originally published in 1962. The articles apparently constituted part of an effort to improve the unsatisfactory performance of the GRU, a purpose which had reportedly motivated the installation of General of the Army Serov as its chief in 1958.

Although addressed particularly to GRU operations officers, the papers can be said to reflect Soviet operational doctrine generally. The civilian KGB, because of its security responsibilities, is counterintelligence-oriented, but the operational philosophies and practices of the two services are similar. The Serov lecture on walk-ins, in particular, which formalizes a revision of GRU operational principles in that field, is presumably based on his long experience in MVD/KGB operations.

Serov's treatment shows that Soviet problems in assessing and handling the walk-in are not unlike our own. Earlier, it seems, the hazards had been evaded by a brush-off policy: GRU officers avoided difficult decisions and the possibility of security flaps by simply refusing to receive walk-ins. Serov changed this policy. He makes it clear that walk-ins at GRU residences will now receive a hearing and be carefully assessed.

WORK WITH WALK-INS

Ivan A. Serov¹

The main task of intelligence is to give timely warning to our government and to the Command of the Armed Forces regarding imperialist preparations for surprise attack on the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp. Success in discharging the important responsibilities placed on intelligence depends to a great extent on proper planning and direction of the work and on the ability to make use of all possible means.

A significant role in intelligence activities is played by work with walk-ins,² i.e., persons who approach Soviet representatives of their own accord, wishing to help the Soviet Union and offering their services, in particular to obtain documents of value to us. In a number of countries (USA, France, Western Germany, Italy, and others) approaches by such walk-ins are not an infrequent occurrence. For this there is, in our view, a logical explanation.

Many people in capitalist countries are in serious financial straits, living in constant anxiety about the future. They consequently resort to any possible means of earning some money to put aside, and for the sake of this financial security they are ready to run the risks involved in offering to collaborate with

¹ Serov has had a long career in the Soviet security and intelligence services. Reportedly rising through the Central Committee apparatus that controlled the services, he entered State Security (then the NKVD) during the thirties. He first gained notoriety as organizer of deportations from the Baltic states after their annexation in 1940 and of the relocation of suspect nationalities in the USSR during the war. When Lavrentiy Beriya was overthrown in 1954, Serov became chief of the reorganized and carefully subordinated State Security service. His appointment as chief of the GRU at the end of 1958 was not made public, but it is said to have been made because of high-level disappointment with GRU performance. The discovery in 1963 that GRU officer Oleg Penkovskiy was a US-UK agent led to Serov's dismissal from this post.

² The Russian word is *dobrozhelatel*, "well-wisher," as used here virtually the equivalent of our "walk-in." Note the term's positive psychological value in contrast to the derogatory connotation of our "defector."

us. In these countries there also live many who came from countries of the socialist camp and have retained their love for the motherland, and others who have paid visits during the last few years to the Soviet Union, have come to know the Soviet people better, and are genuinely eager to do what they can to help us.

The majority, to be sure, of those who turn up regularly at our embassies declaring that they are in sympathy with the Soviet Union and want to help it in some way or other offer "inventions" or "important" documents which, when checked, prove to be of no value. Counterintelligence often makes use of such approaches in order to see which of our officers react to the "tempting" offers and so find out which ones are intelligence officers and what their methods are. These visitors bring drawings and various descriptions of their "inventions" and ask to see the military or naval attaché to show them to him. As a rule they are received by personnel of the attaché's office. They usually say that they are in sympathy with the USSR and for this reason are approaching the Soviet embassy; otherwise they would have offered their services to the Americans—naturally they would like to get some financial reward. Some declare that they are ready to go to the USSR in order to develop the invention. But in the course of detailed conversation with these "inventors" it emerges as a rule that they know little about their own inventions or about military equipment in the branches in which they have presented themselves as specialists. This probing of their story leads to the timely detection of counterintelligence agents.

One might think that work with walk-ins presents no special difficulties, if only for the reason that one does not have to seek them out, find ways of approaching them, etc. Such reasoning is misleading. Working with persons who offer their services is a very complicated business. First of all, it is difficult to make a quick assessment of the true motives of such a person, to discern the real reasons for the offer, and accordingly to make the right decision.

It will be seen in the case histories following that people walk into official Soviet establishments abroad with all kinds of motives. Some are ideologically close to us and genuinely and unselfishly anxious to help us; some are in sympathy with the

Soviet Union but want at the same time to supplement their income; and some, though not in accord with our ideas and views, are still ready to collaborate honestly with us for financial reasons. On the other hand, Soviet representatives often have to deal with unemployed persons who come to our establishments out of desperation as a last hope of getting some means of livelihood; needless to say these have as a rule no agent potential and cannot be of any use to us. Approaches are also made by various kinds of rogues, swindlers, and blackmailers, who in their search for easy money are ready to do anything and to whom nothing is sacred; today they will sell a state secret entrusted to them, and tomorrow they will betray the one to whom they sold it. Finally, counterintelligence often tries to plant agents under the guise of walk-ins, and here the slightest mistake can lead to very undesirable consequences.

Offers of service may be made by letter (through the mails or in some other way), by telephone, or in person at the Soviet establishment. The manner of approach can be very different. Persons wanting to make money usually produce a large quantity of documents and talk much and willingly about themselves, trying to make a favorable impression. Extortioners and blackmailers usually act impudent, making their offer in the form of an ultimatum and even resorting to open threats. It is essential that the staffs of the service attachés and other mission offices be able to assess correctly the persons who approach them, their motives, and the material they offer, so as to make the right decision regarding further action.

It must be said that until lately our officers, in the majority of cases, have acted without thinking things out properly; on the assumption that all offers are provocations they have as a rule turned them down and reported their decision to the Center³ afterwards, when it was too late to correct any mistake. It is only during the last two years, after intervention by the Center, that legal residencies⁴ and the military attachés' offices have started to show greater thoughtfulness in making decisions on such questions, and the results have not been slow in becoming apparent.

³ We would say "Headquarters."

⁴ Official-cover field stations.

Here are some concrete examples of correct and incorrect action by Soviet representatives with respect to persons offering their services, together with some conclusions and practical suggestions for improving work of this kind.

Potential Agents with Financial Motivation

Dangerous Contacts

In 1960 there was found in the mailbox of one of our embassies an anonymous letter asking that contact be established with the writer, who claimed he had something important that he could tell us and gave only his home telephone number. From this number the officers of the residency were able to determine the name of the correspondent, and with the help of local reference books they assembled all the essential details about him (where he worked, his job, his office and home addresses, etc.). It was evident that he occupied a position which gave him access to valuable information, and there was good reason, therefore, for arranging a meeting with him. We shall call him X.

The residency decided to telephone the number X had given and ask him to come to a meeting at a stipulated place, but to intercept him on his way there so that counterintelligence, if it listened in on the telephone call, would not be able to mount surveillance on the meeting. This plan was carried out.

During the meeting X gave some details about himself and said that he had access to important documentary information which he would pass to us if we would pay for it. His statements about himself agreed with the information that had been developed by the residency. At the end of the meeting it was agreed that X would come the following week with some of the material to one of the embassy's houses.

On the appointed day he arrived with the secret documents, and they proved to be valuable. A talk was held with him in which the possibilities of getting material of interest to us and the motives which had prompted him to offer his services were thoroughly explored. Then, as a further check on X's honesty, it was suggested to him that he bring another batch of suitable material to the same house. X refused to do this, saying that he could not run the risk again, and suggested that arrange-

ments be made for him to pass the material somewhere out of town.

In the two meetings it had thus been determined that X was being truthful, that his motives were financial, and that he was exercising caution, evidently appreciating the gravity of establishing this relationship and aware of its possible consequences. There was no doubt about the value of the material received from him. Taking all this into account, the residency decided to accept X's offer and in the future maintain contact with him by dead-drop.

This decision was correct. But the residency had made some mistakes. The first meeting should not have been arranged by telephoning the number given in the letter but in person, by meeting X "accidentally" on his way to work or home from work—his office and home address were known. Moreover, a second visit to the embassy's property should not have been suggested even as a test; it could not be excluded that the house was watched by counterintelligence, who might have apprehended X on the way in. If the residency's staff had given thorough and thoughtful consideration to all the circumstances involved they could have avoided these mistakes.

Amateur Lapse

Last year in a certain country a man who called himself A— telephoned our air attaché at home, saying he was a specialist in aviation and would like to have a talk. He was told that he could call at the air attaché's house any time he liked.

He turned up a few days later and offered to hand over, at a price, documentary information which was of interest to us. He gave quite a lot of details about himself and in general terms explained his access to the material. There seemed to be nothing suspicious about his behavior. The residency officer conducting the interview, however, evidently without adequate training, did not make definite arrangements for a subsequent meeting, and his arrangements for emergency contact were insecure.

The resident⁵ reported A—'s offer to the Center, which gave instructions to study his potential and if it seemed good to make use of his services. A— was summoned to a meeting

⁵ Chief of Station.

by telephone, as had been agreed. At this meeting a residency officer ascertained his potential for supplying information, gave him the task of producing a particular document, and agreed on the way it should be passed.

At the appointed time A— brought the document to the air attaché's office, and it proved to be of value. But before long the residency received a cable to the effect that further contact with him was risky, and it had to drop him.

On analysis it is easy to see that the residency made a number of serious errors from the very beginning of this case. First of all, an inadequately trained officer was allowed to interview A—. Moreover, this officer did not display any initiative and even failed to make arrangements for a subsequent meeting, so that the reestablishment of contact required use of the telephone. Repeated telephone conversations with A— and his visits to the air attaché's house and office evidently attracted the attention of counterintelligence; hence the warning cable. Thus a possibly valuable source was lost through carelessness.

Nursing a Gambler

In 1961 our embassy in one of the NATO countries was visited by a man we will call D. He gave an assumed name and said he was a citizen of the country, working in one of its important military establishments. He wanted to meet and have a talk with some military official of ours. His request was granted; he was introduced to a member of the military attaché's staff.

D declared that on certain conditions he could hand us secret information which passed through his office. He had not brought any material with him, but he had access to a number of important Secret and Top Secret documents which he could show us at any time. He asked a very large sum for delivering this material. He refused to give his real name. The interviewing intelligence officer expressed a desire to see the documents, and they agreed on a meeting in town for this purpose. If the rendezvous should fail, D could be reached on a public telephone the number of which he supplied.

The residency analyzed the circumstances under which D had presented himself, his behavior, and the operational situation

and decided to check up on him more thoroughly. In particular, it was decided not to go through with the meeting but to establish by means of secret observation whether D went to the prescribed place and whether signs of counterintelligence activity were in evidence in the area. At the appointed time D showed up at the meeting place with a bundle, and nothing suspicious was seen by the watchers stationed in the area.

With this reassurance, it was decided to ring D on the agreed public telephone and suggest that he bring the material to one of our official buildings. If D was a plant, this location for the delivery would reduce to a minimum the opportunity for counterintelligence to stage an incident. D agreed, and at the stipulated time he brought in two Top Secret documents. These proved to be genuine and valuable. D was paid a suitable amount for them and recruited as a regular agent.

Further meetings were held with D, both in the official building and in town. He handed over a number of valuable papers to us, signed the receipts for money paid him, and gave his hand-written agreement to collaborate with us on a regular basis. His personal papers were also photographed. The residency continued to study D in person at these meetings and through other channels.

In the course of this collaboration and study the following facts were established about D:

He was fond of gambling.

He had offered us his services for financial reasons, being in heavy debt because of gambling losses.

He did not sympathize with our ideas and did not disguise his dislike of us.

Being an ardent gambler, he was often in urgent need of money, and he not infrequently handed us ultimatums that large sums should be paid him or he would cease his collaboration with us.

He was not only not intelligent but a very flighty person: repeatedly he failed to keep agreed appointments; sometimes he turned up at meetings drunk; and on one occasion he broke off the meeting in the middle and rushed away in a rage.

Because of D's slow-wittedness, the instability of his character, his casual attitude, and his greed he was a very difficult agent to run, and the maintenance of contact with him presented serious dangers. Some risk was justified because the material he obtained was very valuable. But in working with such a personality the officers of the residency should have been especially circumspect and careful to avoid the slightest mistake. In particular, D should not have been asked to come to an official building for the first meeting and especially not for subsequent meetings: members of the staff of important military establishments who have weaknesses of character and are given to gambling are undoubtedly under the eye of counterintelligence.

American Peddler

A man walked into the official building of the military attaché in the USA. He gave his name, showed the cover of a Top Secret document to an intelligence officer, and asked whether it would be of interest to us. The officer answered that he might be interested in the text, not in the cover. The man fished the document out of the pocket of his overcoat and said that he could let us have it for fifty dollars. The officer examined the contents of the document and paid the money. It was agreed that the visitor would later furnish another such document, bringing it to the same building.

At the second meeting a thorough talk was held with the man, going into his particulars and possibilities as an agent, his job, and certain other questions concerning his history and personal qualities. The residency's officers got the impression that he was not playing a double game, had good potential, and was genuinely anxious to work with us. They therefore came to agreement with him on the terms under which he would regularly supply documentary material. Future meetings, however, would be held outside of Washington.

Later on, contact arrangements with this man grew gradually more complicated with the introduction of dead drops, emergency meetings, reserve meetings, etc. During his collaboration he furnished us a large quantity of valuable documents.

The material was paid for in accordance with its nature and value.⁶

It would appear that in this example everything went well. Here too, however, mistakes were made. Clearly, not enough thought had been given to the first steps. In the first place, arrangements should not have been made for a second meeting with the visitor in an official building. Even if it is assumed that his first visit to a Soviet establishment had not been noticed by counterintelligence, nothing can justify the risk which the residency officers took in setting the second meeting there.

Moreover, the residency officers did not carry out a thorough and all-around check when leaving for the first meeting with this man outside. They should have, because they had no guarantee whatever that the visitor was not a counterintelligence plant. Surely it cannot be excluded that counterintelligence might sacrifice several important documents in order to put through a planned scheme for compromising Soviet representatives. This example shows that even when everything goes as it should it is wrong not to have exercised the greatest vigilance, foresight, and care, thinking everything through to its logical end and committing oneself to action only when fully convinced of success.

From Peddler to Agent

In April of last year a visitor—let us call him M—came into our embassy in one of the European countries and asked to see the military attaché. He was interviewed first by the military attaché's interpreter and then by the attaché himself. Showing his personal papers, M explained that he was working at an important military target, was badly in need of money, and therefore was prepared, though not in sympathy with the Soviet

⁶This operation, while not fully identified, may have been reflected in several seemingly unrelated incidents that occurred in and around Washington in 1954. In August of that year a guard from a Norfolk shipyard where an aircraft carrier was under construction went into the Soviet military attaché's office. It was later ascertained that he held a Q clearance. Although identified by six witnesses, he denied even being in Washington on the date in question. On at least six occasions during 1954 personnel of the Soviet naval attaché's office visited a wooded area near Arlington, Virginia. These visits, possibly to service a dead drop, are believed to have some relationship to the guard's activity.

Union, to sell us documents of a military nature. As proof of his bona fides he produced an important and undoubtedly genuine NATO document which showed that he really had potential as an agent.

M's papers were photographed, and arrangements were made with him for a routine meeting in town. To this meeting he brought another document and received payment for it. It was agreed that in the future a purely commercial relationship would be maintained, with transactions to be consummated item by item on M's initiative.

During subsequent meetings the case officer, by displaying an interest in M's family and home life, managed to win his confidence and get on friendly terms with him. He succeeded in finding out M's exact job, addresses, and telephone numbers. Arrangements were made enabling either party to summon the other to urgent meetings, and a system of signals was set up in town. In this way M began to deliver a regular supply of the top secret material to which he had access. Gradually relations developed to the point that M became a real agent. This was achieved through clever handling in which the case officer had to overcome quite a number of difficulties; at the beginning, for instance, M wanted to get a large sum of money immediately for handing over one or two documents.

Attention is drawn to this case because some military intelligence officers have the wrong impression about the possibilities and the time needed to get on agent terms with a walk-in. Many act too hastily in this respect, evidently on the theory that when someone comes in with an offer, then is the time to act: recruit him and get a good mark. This is a harmful approach, fraught with unpleasant consequences. Here it is very relevant to quote the old proverb, "Seven times measure; cut once."

Peddlers Without Goods

The Gleaner

In 1957 an Austrian, one Sh—, approached the Soviet consulate in Vienna with an offer to obtain for us from the headquarters of American forces in West Germany several movies showing tests of new American weapons. The case officer examined Sh—'s papers and extracted the data for a name-

check. Upon receiving a go-ahead from the Center he advanced the man his expenses for a round trip to West Germany, with the understanding that he would be paid for the movies after they had been examined.

After some days Sh— returned and handed over a film, but examination revealed that it depicted American aircraft and other equipment of which photographs had appeared in open newspapers and magazines and was therefore of no interest whatever to us. A talk with Sh— brought out that he needed money and had grasped at a straw to get into our service, believing that he could be of use to us in some way.

Perennial Con-Man

In December 1959 a stranger called at the Soviet consulate in Copenhagen wanting to talk to someone in the military attaché's office. In the ensuing conversation the man gave his name as V— and said that in return for money he could give us information verbally or in writing (with photographs attached) on the Nike anti-aircraft missile sites in the Copenhagen area. He pointed out that he had previously sold military information to an officer on the staff of the Soviet military attaché in Paris. He displayed several photographs of anti-aircraft missile sites which seemed of doubtful value. He was asked to stand by for a few days and then telephone the interviewing officer at home.

A check was requested of the Center, and it was established that although V— really had been given money for passing military information to our officers in France, his reports had been of little value. The Center therefore instructed Copenhagen not to meet him or accept any material from him.

Nevertheless, when V— came again to the consulate a year and a half later, on 15 July 1961, an officer in the military attaché's office entered into conversation with him. After telling about his financial difficulties V— offered to write a report on the same old subject, the Nike missile sites around Copenhagen, for 600 Danish kroner. The military attaché, instead of turning down the offer, had V— write the report on the spot and paid him 300 kroner for it. The information was practically worthless, and the instruction to have no further contact with the man had to be repeated.

This shows how some people will try to take advantage of the inexperience and ignorance of our officers and how some officers are hasty in their decisions, spend money unjustifiably, and run unnecessary risks.

Traveler's Aid

In 1960 a certain B—, a displaced person of Ukrainian nationality, visited the official building of the military attaché in one of the European countries. He claimed to know that a group of Ukrainian nationalists was preparing a terrorist act against Soviet leaders and offered his services in ferreting out the details of this plot and the identity of those who would actually carry out the deed.

Instead of having a long talk with B— to find out more about him, his connections, and his sources of information, our officer accepted his story on faith and arranged to meet him the next day at a designated spot and give him the money he needed to travel to the city where the terrorists were. On instructions from the Center, however, B—'s character and his information were checked. It turned out that his story was false. He had evidently invented the whole thing to get money for moving from one country to another.

Et Dona Ferentes

In 1958 several approaches were made to the Soviet consulate in Vienna by Greeks, mostly small merchants or students. A Greek named Kh— was especially persistent in offering his services; he declared straight out that he wanted to help the Soviet Union for financial reasons. Asked why he was making this offer in Vienna rather than in Greece and how he thought he could help us, he replied that he was afraid of visiting the embassy in Athens but was often in Austria on business and that he himself had no special access but could get information through his brother, a sergeant at one of the American bases in Greece.

It was learned later that Greeks were making similar offers to embassies of other countries of the socialist camp, in fact to all establishments where in their opinion they might find a taker. This example shows, among other things, that walk-ins should be checked against information from the military attachés of other countries.

Blackmailers and Extortioners

A great danger is presented by persons who offer their services from dishonest, mercenary motives or with provocation in view—blackmailers, extortioners, swindlers, and persons acting under the control of counterintelligence. Special care has to be exercised in dealing with them.

Attractive Rogue

In 1959 a local national, U—, came to the official building of a military attaché. He had certification as test pilot for an aircraft firm, and he offered the design of an electromagnetic engine he had developed. A brief examination showed the design to be of no interest whatever, and it was turned down. Nevertheless, the man did not leave; he complained about being badly off, mentioned debts, said that he was poorly treated where he was working, and finally asked our officer for \$500 as a loan, promising that he would help us in any way he could.

In general, the residency's officers formed a favorable impression of U—. In reporting the incident to the Center they suggested that he be given a loan and that a receipt be obtained for it. The Center did not approve this proposal; it saw many suspicious features in U—'s approach and behavior, savoring of preparations for a provocation. It sent instructions to break off contact with him.

At the end of 1959 U— again approached our officer, requesting a meeting in town; and the resident, without the Center's permission, authorized the renewed contact. At this meeting U— handed our officer diagrams of some of the equipment on the antisubmarine aircraft Argus, the value of which was judged by intelligence to be moderate. He also reported that he had transferred to another aircraft company, complained about his financial position, and asked for help. At subsequent meetings he handed over two secret papers (one of which was valuable), boasted about his access to secret documents especially on the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile, asked that he be advanced ten thousand dollars to buy a house, and hinted that he had important connections in circles of interest to us.

The Center sent instructions to stop all contact with U—, who, however, continued to telephone and call in person at the official building and mail postcards there. The residency, for

its part, tried insistently to get the Center's permission to have meetings with the man and seemed to have no misgivings that he might be a counterintelligence plant and bent on provocation. Finally, when these efforts to reestablish contact proved of no avail, U— resorted to blackmail and intimidation. In several letters addressed to the military attaché at his office and offering more "important" documents, he demanded the payment of ten thousand dollars for the material already supplied and threatened to put the whole "transaction" into the hands of counterintelligence and the law.

In analyzing this case it is easy to see that in addition to the attempt at blackmail there cannot be excluded the possibility that counterintelligence had a finger in the pie: U— may have been given the task of arousing the interest of our officers in order to compromise them at some suitable moment. Among the weaknesses shown by the residency's officers was the fact that they failed to see through U— in the initial stages of their work with him, made an incorrect assessment of him, did not investigate his potential, did not learn his real intentions, did not study or check up on him properly, and did not attach sufficient importance to the suspicious features in his behavior.

American Imposters

In 1958 a stranger came to the Paris embassy, said that he was a lieutenant in the U.S. Army and badly in need of money, and offered some typewritten documents. Our officers, without studying the material properly, paid twenty thousand francs for it. Examined more closely, what had seemed reports on the disposition of individual U.S. units in West Germany turned out to be only an exercise for use in typist training.

The "lieutenant" was not seen again in Paris, but some time later he visited our embassy in Denmark, saying that he had collaborated with the military attaché's office in Paris and asking for money against a promise of some documents. He could have been just a swindler looking for some easy money, but he may have been a plant of NATO counterintelligence trying to identify our personnel.

In August 1960 a Second Lieutenant N— of the U.S. Army Reserve called at our embassy in Paris. He said that he was willing to help Soviet intelligence if we made it worth his

while. He himself had no access to information but he had a friend who did, a captain serving at an air base in Spain who wanted to earn some money and had asked to be put in touch with Soviet intelligence. N— asked for money for a trip to Spain and promised to bring back a copy of the U.S. field service regulations.

The conversation with N— was carried on through an interpreter, since he spoke only English; but he made a good impression on the officer who talked with him. On his personal signature he was given the money to go see his friend. When he got to Spain, however, he telephoned our officer demanding more money. The tone he used left no doubt that he was simply a rogue and an extortioner. Our officer hung up the receiver.

Later it was discovered that N— had gone from the meeting with our officer to French counterintelligence, where he told them that he was an agent of the Soviet intelligence service and was willing to help them. The French, however, although they verified that he had visited our military attaché, had refused his services, recognizing that he was simply a rogue. Two months later the man turned up at our embassy in Beirut and approached the ambassador and the military attaché with the same kind of offer. On instruction from the Center he was asked to leave the embassy.

This was an obvious example of carelessness and credulity on the part of our officer in Paris.

Checkroom Trap

In May 1958 the embassy in Sweden received a letter written in English which said:

"Do you know the method by which NATO intends to combat your submarines? Have you heard of the DAR equipment, which, in conjunction with new antisubmarine mines, can . . . [etc., etc.]? Do you know where the stations . . . [for submarine detection] will be situated? If you want answers [to these questions], I will be glad to let you have the main principles on which DAR equipment operates, and how this equipment will detect your submarines regardless of the temperature of the water. . . I can also explain to you how to save hundreds of your submarines from the new mines. I can

tell you approximately where the first two fields will be laid (to within two miles).

"The writer of these lines, who wishes to remain anonymous, has come to Stockholm only for a few days and will soon be returning to his station in Germany. For the information to be supplied, if it is acceptable, I am asking ten thousand American dollars. The information will be handed over to you in portions worth three thousand American dollars each, payment to be made later. This means that if the first lot of material is to your liking, you will pay for it and will receive another batch.

"The material can be handed over in Switzerland or in Sweden, whichever you prefer. I will have two weeks' leave in June or July. In order to convince me that you are interested, I would like you to pay my travel expenses in advance at the same time you inform me which country you would like to meet me in. Your answer, together with 1600 Swedish kroner in the currency of any West European country, can be left at the checkroom at Lidings up until 1630 hours on Saturday, 10 May. You can put your message in a pair of old shoes and tell the attendant at the checkroom that the parcel will be picked up by a messenger from Mr. Ekker."

The letter was clearly a provocation. The residency acted correctly in leaving it unanswered.

Cover Story

In August 1960 an approach to the military attaché's office in Vienna was made by a man who said he was a West German citizen, Konrad Loezel, born 1921, living at Nuernberg, Neuhausen 13. Interviewed by an assistant military attaché, Loezel declared that he was a genuine friend of the Soviet Union and for a long time had sought an opportunity to get into touch with us; he was in a position to pass us some very important information, in particular the formula of a new military material which had recently been developed in great secrecy. He had a confederate, a Major Bauer, serving in the NATO 3rd Fighter Squadron located at Fuerth; he himself was in charge of a travel bureau in Nuernberg (he produced a document to confirm this); he was a member of the Free Democratic Party of West Germany and a member of the Defense Committee of the Bavarian *Landtag*, where he had many friends

among the deputies; he was well informed about all military construction work in Bavaria.

In giving all these details he was obviously trying to arouse interest in his potential. But such a wealth of detail appeared suspicious to the residency's officers, and they pressed for more particulars on some of the points. Loezel grew confused in his replies, and what he represented became evident.

Counterintelligence Plants

Lures in Rome

Once an Italian telephoned the embassy and asked for a meeting in town with an officer of the military attaché's staff, specifying the time and place. The resident decided that no one should go to the meeting, but the area where it was to be held should be put under surveillance. It turned out that counterintelligence officers were stationed all around.

Another Italian took advantage of receptions and other official functions to make approaches to first one and then other Soviet representatives with offers of his services, attempting to arrange meetings in other, less official surroundings. This person's conduct appeared suspicious to the residency's officers, and they politely but firmly turned down all his advances. Then he switched his attentions to the Czech military attaché, and not without success. But during one of their meetings at a restaurant, when the Italian had got up and gone to the men's room, a waiter informed the Czech that his friend was a provocateur employed by the police.

Although in these examples our officers displayed due caution and did not take the bait, it is unfortunately the case that not all of them so conduct themselves always. Some still show weaknesses in grasping a situation, do not analyze events sufficiently deeply and thoroughly, and tolerate lapses in security.

On Target

In the summer of 1958, on a Sunday, a certain P— telephoned to the building housing our mission and asked insistently for a meeting with a member of the staff. The person on duty that day, an intelligence officer of the residency whose cover job was technical, not diplomatic, and in whom counter-

intelligence had recently shown a particular interest, answered that on a holiday there were no senior members of the staff in the office. P— replied that since he could not stay over until Monday he would come along and have a talk with the duty officer. The latter, explaining that he was busy at the moment, asked P— to call back a little later, and he immediately reported the matter to the resident. Because of his current attraction for counterintelligence, he had been instructed to drop all work with agents for the present.

Now the resident gave him strict orders that if P— turned up at the building he should listen to what he had to say but not accept any material from him or commit himself in any way by any arrangements or promises. The decision of the resident was undoubtedly the correct one, especially since one or two things P— said had been suspicious; he was clearly trying to interest the duty officer in his potential. Despite the resident's instruction, however, the officer fell for the temptingly easy dangled recruitment and when P— telephoned again agreed to meet him a long way out of town and under the detailed arrangements he suggested.

The resident gave categorical orders that the meeting was not to take place; he assumed that P— was probably a counterintelligence agent. The counterintelligence service was of course aware that the officer in whom it was interested was on duty that day. Having some knowledge of his character, it reckoned on his not being able to resist P—'s offer to hand over information "of a kind not previously received by anyone." When it had aroused his interest and induced him to come to a meeting outside of town, it would then try to compromise him.

This conclusion was strengthened by a further incident. Some weeks later, when the same officer was on duty, a certain Mr. Kh— telephoned for an appointment, came to the building, and told this officer that he could pass us information on military electronics. In confirmation of his access he produced a film showing the buildings of the school of military electronics. Again the officer displayed quite unjustified trustfulness. He accepted the film, which was of no value whatever, and arranged to meet Kh— later in town to return it. This was evidently just what counterintelligence

was trying to achieve—to catch our man at the meeting place with the film on him, as tangible grounds for compromising him. This meeting was likewise forbidden.

This example illustrates that the reception of walk-ins should be reserved to experienced case officers who can handle the interview expertly and avoid hasty decisions.

Miscellaneous Walk-Ins

Brush-Off Approved

At the end of 1959 one of the staff of a military attaché's office, Nikolay, noticed on his way home from work that he was being followed by a counterintelligence car in which, strangely, there was only the driver; usually at least two counterintelligence agents rode together. He had been about to stop at a large self-service store to get some groceries. While he was in a section of the store where there were no other customers at the time, the counterintelligence man came up and said that for a large sum of money he would reveal the whereabouts of two former citizens of countries of the socialist camp who were betraying their motherland.

Nikolay replied, reasonably, that neither the whereabouts nor the fate of traitors could be of interest to the countries they had betrayed. The man did not give up, however; he advised Nikolay to think about his offer and said that he hoped to have further conversations with him on the subject.

The incident was reported to the Center. Although the counterintelligence agent's whole behavior and the way he had chosen to make the contact gave grounds to believe that the money motive was genuine, the Center approved Nikolay's refusal and issued instructions that if the agent made another approach all his offers were to be turned down and no negotiations entered into.

This example shows that in some, let us say very rare, cases even counterintelligence officers may approach us in the hope of making money. Our people must be particularly careful in dealing with walk-ins in this category; when conversations with them are approved by the Center they should be entrusted only to the most experienced and best trained officers.

Mistaken Brush-Off

In May 1959 two men, having asked for an interview, were received by our military attaché in Stockholm and his assistant. They said that they had served in the army and had certain information, particularly about the naval base, which they would be willing to give us for an appropriate reward. The military attaché immediately broke off the conversation and asked them to leave, and a few days later he reported the incident to the official representative of the Swedish Ministry of Defense, who informed the Swedish security police.

Almost a year later, on 25 March 1960, the Swedish newspapers reported under sensational headlines the arrest of these two men for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense, the police had needed this time to establish their identity. It is characteristic that the reactionary press, reviving in this connection its periodic anti-Soviet spy-mania campaign, distorted the facts in a tendentious way. Without denying that the investigation was initiated by a warning from the Soviet military attaché, the newspapers made the deliberately false charge that he had accepted documents from the men and in informing the Ministry of Defense of their visit made no mention of these.

Both the men were brought up for trial. On the stand they denied any act or intent of espionage, declaring that they had just wanted to trick a Soviet establishment into giving them two thousand kroner to relieve them of the financial straits they were in. The trial proceedings were also used as an excuse for anti-Soviet propaganda by the reactionary press.

In this case the military attaché and his assistant had acted very thoughtlessly. Their mistake not only repulsed and jeopardized two men who may really have wanted to help us, not only provided an opening for the development of anti-Soviet propaganda, but also made the work of other Soviet representatives more difficult. The case became known outside Sweden, and it cannot be excluded that it has given pause to more than one budding walk-in, making them wonder whether an approach to Soviet officials would get them anywhere.

Haphazard Operation

During the period from April to August 1959 one of our embassies began to receive by mail a series of unsolicited reports always bearing the same signature in Russian, "Your friend Mun," but each time a different address in a certain town that was off limits to our representatives. The first reports were of no interest, but then documents of considerable value began to arrive, showing that Mun had good access to important information on military-technical matters in his country. The residency officers, however, did not move to establish contact with him. They were uncertain about his real address, and his telephone number was unknown. They therefore sat back and waited for further initiatives on his part.

For some time nothing was received from Mun, but in October of the same year a letter arrived in which he pointed out that he had sent us various kinds of "photographs" and asked us to let him know whether we were receiving his letters; if so he would continue to write now and then and "ask questions about life in the USSR." In the letter he gave his true full name and address. A check established that he really did live in the town he had named from the beginning. The residency replied that it was receiving his letters and gave him to understand that it hoped to establish personal contact with him.

Having weighed and analyzed all the details of the case, the Center decided that it was worth running some risk to establish contact with Mun and gave instructions that he should be approached by a residency officer in a position to travel around the country without informing the local authorities of his itinerary. Such a meeting took place, but then the contact was broken with no warning or explanation to Mun, who, disquieted and anxious to renew the operation, therefore came to our official mission with valuable material on his person.

Thus faulty action on the part of the residency's officers compelled Mun to behave in a way that compromised him. They failed to take advantage of the favorable circumstances that had been presented for collaboration and Mun's genuine desire to help us, acted irresponsibly in conducting the operation, and did not display the necessary discreet initiative.

Good Agent; Poor Access

At the end of 1961 the Soviet embassy in one of the Scandinavian countries was visited by a local citizen, N—, aged 22, who declared that he supported the policy of the USSR and was against that of the USA and would like to help us in any way he could. At the first meeting he refused to give his surname, wishing evidently to find out first what attitude we would take towards him, but he handed over aerial photographs of NATO airfields in his country marked "Secret" (and later judged to be of indifferent value). It was arranged that he should come back again after ten days.

This time N— brought a secret text for training in work on missiles. He said he had taken it from the safe of an officer who had left the key in the lock while off on an official trip. Now he let us have his surname, his address, and job, but he reported that he was being sent for a year to another city. The case officer arranged to meet him, however, when he was in town on leave or holiday.

The case officer got the impression that N— was genuinely anxious to help us, that he really was who he said he was, and that he was acting carefully and thoughtfully, moreover. In his conversation he displayed knowledge of the kind that a military man in his stated speciality should have; if he could not answer a question he said so straight out; he had withheld his name at the first meeting, and he had taken measures to cover up his intentions as he walked past a policeman on duty at the gates of the embassy.

The residency reported these views to the Center and suggested that we should continue working with N—. It was decided, however, that despite his genuine desire to be helpful to us it would be unproductive to maintain further relations with him: he was not now in a position to obtain information of interest to us. There remained the task of breaking off contact with him skillfully, so as to preserve his access to us in case some valuable information came into his hands, and, more important, tactfully, so that he would not feel hurt by the decision. All these considerations have to be taken into account.

Died Aborning

In 1956 a Soviet embassy received a letter from a Mr. Tom saying that he was an ex-employee of an important establishment in his country and had information which in his opinion would be of great interest to the USSR. His address and telephone number were given. A check of the city directory showed such a person was listed, but at a different address. Further checks, however, established that he had recently moved to a new apartment, at the address given in the letter.

The resident decided to make contact with Tom. A theater ticket for a certain date was sent to his home address, and a case officer, Peter, attended the same performance. Without contacting Tom, he succeeded in identifying him and even got the tag number on the car in which he drove away. Then two weeks were devoted to attempts to intercept him on the street as he left the apartment; these ended in failure.

Finally Peter, acting in accordance with a plan approved by the Center, ascertained by telephone that Tom was at home and after a few minutes paid him a visit in his suburban apartment. Tom gave particulars about himself and provided some information of apparent interest. He said that during World War II he had served as a captain in the air force. In 1954 he had applied for employment in one of the important government agencies, and after thorough security inquiries he got the necessary clearance. His work involved study of the foreign press for items which might be of interest to the government. In December 1955, however, he had left this agency of his own accord.

A second meeting with Tom took place a week later. At this meeting the question of how he could be useful was discussed, particularly the suggestion that he get a job at one of the defense targets, where he could regularly get information which would be of value to us and for which he would be paid. Yet a third meeting was held, but at the fourth meeting Tom did not show up.

Peter thereupon went to see him at home. Tom, whom he found very nervous, told him categorically that he did not wish to have any further contact with us. Two months later the residency saw a brief notice in the local press that Tom had committed suicide. A week later Peter, on leave in Mos-

cow, learned that his entry visa to the country had been canceled. After a year the publication of certain details, coupled with an analysis of material in our possession, showed that Tom's contacts with us had most probably come to the notice of counterintelligence, presumably through the telephone call to his apartment.⁷

This example shows that counterintelligence keeps employees of important establishments under observation for some time after they have stopped working there. Our officers should bear this in mind.

Well-Wishing Only

In May of last year an American soldier came to the Soviet embassy in one of the Latin American countries and asked to see the military attaché. He said he had made a special trip there in order to tell us about the preparations for war being made in the USA; he did not want to take part in another war and kill honest people in the interests of American monopolists. He gave from personal observation some details about the battle training of American troops, handed over some manuals which were of no value, and reported that after a few months he would be going with his unit to Europe.

Two months later he came to see us again, handed over a directive which was of some interest, and gave some verbal information. We arranged that on arrival in Europe he would make contact with a representative of the Soviet military attaché in one of the West European countries. The Center checked into the particulars which he had given about himself and confirmed them.

Soon the soldier did arrive in Europe and, as arranged, met our representatives in a third country, having gone there on leave ostensibly to see the sights. He was undoubtedly a genuine walk-in, but he did not have access to secret material and therefore could not be of any use. This operation was a waste of effort.

⁷ This case appears to be that of Nick Clark Wallen, a former CIA employee who committed suicide on 25 April 1956. The Washington *Sunday Star*, in reporting his death, said that Wallen had had a clandestine association with Anatoli A. Popov, assistant Soviet military attaché, and that the latter's re-entry visa had been canceled by the State Department.

We Muddle Through

In September 1961 a local citizen, K—, came to the Soviet embassy in an African country and said that he would like to see our officer S—. S— came and introduced himself, but K— refused to give his name. He did not want to talk in the embassy; could S— meet him in some public place in town? S— agreed, and they set a place and time.

When they met in town K— said that he was an employee of the security service who had taken part in watching Soviet citizens and those of other countries of the socialist camp and expressed a desire to be helpful. He gave his name, but with great reluctance. S— decided that K—'s offer of his services was an attempt at provocation. He recommended to the resident that no more meetings with him be held.

The Center, however, concluded that S— should have another meeting with K— under certain security precautions which it specified. This was the right decision: to date three further meetings have been held, and at two of these useful written and verbal information has been received from K—.

In analyzing this case note should be taken of the following mistakes. Without a prior check and the receipt of confirmatory data on K— the case officer should not have gone to a meeting with him. Having taken the risk, however, and having recognized that K— was in a position to supply information of interest to us, he should not have decided against further meetings with him but conducted them in such a way that the man would not think he was being exploited as an agent.

Key to Nothing

In October 1956 the officer on duty at one of our missions found the key to a baggage locker in the mailbox. Clearly it had come from someone wishing to establish contact with us. An officer was given the touchy job of going to the airport and railroad station to study the layout and try to find out where the corresponding locker was. He must have been either insufficiently experienced or in too big a hurry; he failed to discover anything.

On the next day a man calling himself R— telephoned the mission and asked whether the key had been used. Told we

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didn't know where it should be used, he said the locker was at the bus station. Our officer went to the bus station, but he spotted several counterintelligence cars in the neighborhood. It was clear that the telephone conversation with R— had been monitored, and of course we could not open the locker.

A day later R— telephoned the mission again, this time from another town, to find out if we had succeeded in picking up his material. After this telephone call counterintelligence again displayed activity with respect to our officers leaving the mission. R— made no further attempt to get into touch with us.

It can be hypothesized that R— was a real walk-in who did not want to make personal contact for fear of compromising himself. If this was the case then the residency was undoubtedly guilty of negligence in failing to find the locker promptly and so not discovering what was in it and losing a chance to establish relations with a person who could have been useful. On the other hand, the possibility that R— was acting under the direction of counterintelligence cannot be excluded. The residency should in any case have first found out whom it was dealing with—a genuine walk-in or a counterintelligence plant—and then acted in accordance with the situation.⁸

No Interest in U.S. Bases

In the summer of 1959 a foreigner who described himself as a Spanish journalist came to the consulate in Vienna. He said that through reliable senior officer friends in the Spanish army he had obtained plans of American military targets under construction in Spain—airfields, roads, stores, and oil pipe-

⁸In October 1956 a man using the name Dr. Rubirosa telephoned the office of the Soviet military attaché in Washington and asked for an assistant attaché who had recently been declared *persona non grata*. Later the same day an unidentified man brought a small envelope to the office door. The next day "Rubirosa" called to ask if a red key had been received. Then he called twice more: on 25 October he was told the information would be picked up as soon as possible, but on the following day the Soviets said they were not interested. A Washington bus terminal locker was found to contain schematic wiring diagrams for an electronic device. Although "Dr. Rubirosa" was never firmly identified, a likely suspect was found in a former employee of an industrial concern; a mental case.

lines. These he wanted to sell. Refusing to give his name or show his personal papers, he asked to talk to a member of the consulate staff who had the necessary authority. He also refused to show the plans to the consular official or to visit the consulate a second time, declaring that the only question to be settled was the price we would pay for the plans.

The resident was informed and he consulted the KGB resident. The two then conferred with the embassy counselor, and together they agreed on the following answer to be given the Spaniard: Since the Soviet Union has no intention of fighting with Spain, plans of military structures on the territory of Spain are of no interest whatever to us; the only thing in which the Soviet Union is interested, and what it desires for the Spanish people, is that they should rid themselves as quickly as possible of the dictatorship of Franco. When he was given this answer the Spaniard, surprised and angry, said he would find another buyer for his plans and left.

Did the residents and counselor act correctly in this case? Of course not. First of all, it is incorrect that American military bases in Spain are of no interest to us. Moreover, the officers did not even look at the plans, did not examine any details of the offer, and summarily repulsed a person who might have proved of use to us. From this example it can be seen that some of our officers do not attach sufficient importance to the fulfillment of the tasks given them, do not display intelligent initiative, and make incorrect decisions.

Archery at Dusk

In the summer of 1958 an arrow from a sports bow with a note attached to it was found in the courtyard of one of our missions. The note informed us that a person using the name Ar was prepared to give us information for a specified sum of money and designated a time and place for a meeting in town. The resident decided that we should not meet with Ar according to these instructions. He gave orders that the property across the street from the mission, whence the arrow presumably came, should be watched for two days.

On the next day, a Sunday, when darkness was falling, a car stopped not far from the mission premises. A young man and a girl got out and started to walk obtrusively toward our en-

trance, paying no attention to the counterintelligence men on duty nearby. In the meantime a second young man who had remained in the car shot another arrow into the courtyard. This was found likewise to have a note attached, with the same contents as the first.

Having analyzed all that had happened and taking into account that by that time the operational situation had become unfavorable, the residency decided that it was inexpedient to establish contact with Ar, especially since two other people were in on the offer. It cannot be excluded that this was quite a well-planned counterintelligence provocation scheme. But it cannot be stated with certainty that these young people were not genuinely anxious to help us.

Local Party Members

We do not run agents in friendly countries of the socialist camp, and in a number of other places (certain African and Arab countries, Cuba) we do not recruit local citizens as agents but use the citizens of capitalist countries who live there. Everywhere we are forbidden to maintain agent relations with members of the fraternal Communist and Workers Parties and other progressive elements.

Nevertheless it cannot be avoided that walk-ins from these prohibited categories turn up at our missions. What should be done in such cases? It is essential to listen to the visitor patiently and attentively and then explain our position to him so thoroughly as to arrive at complete mutual understanding and send him away satisfied. The following case can be cited as an example.

In January 1960 a Finnish citizen, A—, came to the Soviet embassy and asked for an interview with our military representative. The military attaché instructed his assistant to receive the Finn. The visitor, giving his name, age, and address, said that he was a construction foreman from Tampere and that until recently he had worked in the construction organization of the Ministry of Defense helping build underground ammunition storage bunkers. His visit to the embassy was for the purpose of turning over to us the blueprints of these bunkers. He displayed one of the drawings, which sketched a bunker some 50 x 20 meters in floor area and which

bore the stamp of the engineer department of the Finnish armed forces.

The assistant military attaché told A— that because of the friendly relations between the USSR and Finland Soviet representatives could not meddle in the internal affairs of his country and its armed forces. A— understood our position but explained his own by citing the fact that in spite of friendly relations between the countries some Finnish officers continued to remain hostile to the USSR and were educating their men in this spirit. He himself was a member of the Finnish Communist Party and of the Finland-USSR society, actually heading one of the local branches of this society; he therefore had considered it his duty to inform the Soviet representative.

The assistant attaché thanked A— for his warm attitude toward the USSR and for his concern and good work on behalf of Finnish-USSR relations. On this they parted.

General Precepts

The above examples illustrate that residency officers still make quite a lot of blunders and bad judgments in working with walk-ins. In order to avoid these and carry out such work in a better planned and more effective way, some general rules which should be adhered to can be summed up as follows.

Write-ins

On receiving by mail a letter with an offer of services, it is essential to note whether the sender's name and address are given, to check on the way mail is delivered to the establishment, to know whether counterintelligence in that country runs a mail scrutiny operation, and to examine any suggestion of a meeting as to place and manner. If the letter has been dropped into the establishment's mailbox without going through the mails, then the situation is simpler, but here too it is essential to carry out the appropriate checks.

After this, the question of a meeting with the writer should be settled: should he be asked to come to an official establishment (embassy, trade delegation, etc.), or to a safe house? More use should be made of meetings in various public places, for instance at athletic events, theaters, and other big gatherings, in order to avoid drawing the attention of counterintelligence from the beginning.

In talking to the write-in the main question should be cleared up first—what information can he provide? Only later and in a tactful way should efforts be made to get some particulars about him, bearing in mind that as a rule even a person who is well disposed toward us will try to conceal such particulars in order to avoid getting himself into trouble. On the other hand, a write-in bent on provocation will boast about his position and exaggerate his access, trying to make his proposition attractive.

It is only after clearing up all these questions that a decision should be taken regarding further action—whether to continue the contact and if so where to meet, or to drop it.

Callers in Person

If someone comes to a mission of ours with an offer to help us, in this case too it is important to start the conversation by clearing up the main question—what potential he has for providing material of interest—and then only gradually to inquire into his motives and other matters. If in the course of the conversation it becomes clear that the visitor's potential is limited, it is essential to tell him at once that we, the officials at the embassy (or trade delegation or attaché office), do not indulge in such activities.

If a person's offer is of interest and his position gives him access to valuable material, it should be determined whether he has perchance been planted by counterintelligence and briefed to arouse our interest. His statements about where he is employed and the kind of work he does should be checked by probing thoroughly his knowledge of the work and determining whether he really does know all the details he should or has only acquired a general acquaintance with it from counterintelligence briefings. After this uncertainty has been resolved the question of further meetings can be decided.

If a walk-in brings documents along when he first offers his services it is best for the interviewing officer to pretend that he does not know the language they are written in or on some other pretext ask permission to show them to a colleague in order to determine their value; this will provide an opportunity to photograph them. Depending on their value, the interview can be resumed with the object of determining the man's position and potential, his financial terms, etc.

If it is decided to pursue the operation it is essential to give careful thought to arrangements for further meetings, the planning of dead drops, etc. Personal meetings should be kept as infrequent as possible; when they have to be held the cover story for them should be carefully worked out and the circumstances made to appear casual and natural so as to avoid attracting counterintelligence attention.

Country Team Support

When walk-ins telephone to embassy personnel at their homes or come to the official embassy buildings or other Soviet establishments (trade delegation, TASS) asking to see a military officer, they should not be directed to the military attaché's office, but a member of his staff should be sent to the office where the visitor has called and the interview held there. The attachés and residents should establish close liaison with all Soviet establishments in order to be informed quickly when a walk-in appears, and our officers should conduct the meetings on the spot in these establishments. Only the most experienced officers should be given this assignment.

In the event of an approach by telephone it is generally better to arrange to have the interview at a trade delegation, TASS office, or similar installation rather than on the premises of the military attaché's office or the embassy. Counterintelligence watches the former less closely, as a rule, and a military representative sent to such a place can therefore hold the meeting under more favorable conditions.

Persons who come to Soviet establishments requesting political asylum, however, are handled through Ministry of Foreign Affairs channels. We should not involve ourselves in such matters.

Offers may also be made at exhibitions, receptions, and various kinds of open meetings. It is essential to treat these with the greatest caution; a person who approaches you in these surroundings could photograph or otherwise compromise you in the course of your very first conversation with him.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized once more that work with walk-ins is an important part of agent operations for strategic intelligence and when properly planned and conducted can be very fruitful.

SECRET

Economic and political intelligence representation on the J-2 staff of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.

THE ANALYST IN A WAR THEATER ROLE

Robert W. Smith

The gestation period of an elephant is said to be 18 to 21 months, and a new conception in intelligence organization is likely to take about as long to bear fruit; but the birth of a joint intelligence center including CIA overt analytic personnel on the forward bastion of Taiwan required considerably less. It was after a visit to Taiwan in early 1955, where the lack of coordination on intelligence matters in the American community distressed him, that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert B. Carney suggested the establishment of such a center. The idea appealed to the DCI, who offered to supply initially two intelligence officers, then others as needed. The Intelligence Advisory Committee was consulted on 28 March 1955, and two days later Navy Department representatives accepted the offer and approved the selection of two medium-level officers from CIA intelligence production components who were then serving in Japan. In the same month, naval officers from the Formosa Defense Command of the Seventh Fleet moved ashore and incorporated the Formosa Liaison Center—as the American military establishment there had been called—into a U.S. Formosa Defense Command, served by the new Joint Intelligence Center. In October the name was changed to U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.

The Beginnings

Civilian participation was thus a feature from the very beginning of the strong joint U.S. military presence on Taiwan evoked by the anxieties of the time. The most prominent milestones in the chronology of recurrent tensions since 1949 are recalled in the listing below:

- October 1949 ... Chicombs suffer heavy losses in unsuccessful attempt to take Chin-men.
- June 1950 ... US 7th Fleet ordered to neutralize Strait.

- April 1951 MAAG Taiwan established.
- July 1953 Chicoms redeploy combat troops from Korea; construction of roads and airfields in Fukien gains momentum.
- September 1954 After two months of propaganda on "Liberate Taiwan and Off-Shore Islands" theme, Chicoms bombard Chin-men with 6,000 shells on 3 September and continue through the end of October.
- February 1955 .. After capturing Ichang Shan in a well-coordinated air, naval, and amphibious assault in January, Chicoms force Chinats to evacuate Ta-chen Islands.
- April 1955 Chou En-lai at Bandung Conference stresses "peaceful liberation of Taiwan."
- December 1956 . Yingtan-Amoy Railroad, first rail line connecting previously isolated Fukien province to the national network, completed.
- June 1957 Chicoms artillery fires 6,000 shells on Chin-men.
- July 1958 Chicoms begin massive propaganda barrage re-viving "Liberate Taiwan" theme, dormant since 1956, and occupy coastal airfields.
- August-October 1958 Chicoms begin heavy firing on Chin-men, air and naval elements are employed, and Chin-men garrison is urged to surrender. Rapid and strong U.S. response results in ambassadorial talks and ceasefire. In October Chicoms begin odd-day firing pattern which they have maintained since.
- June 1960 Chicoms salute President Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan with 175,000 shells directed against Chin-men.
- June 1962 Chicoms redeploy six divisions from North China into Fu-chou Military Region opposite Taiwan.

The two CIA officers, one from economic and one from current intelligence production, arriving in April, found themselves among the first dozen persons comprising the Formosa Defense Command. [redacted]

[redacted] they were able to furnish logistics, transportation, and housekeeping assistance to the budding organization. An immediate order of business in those threatening days was the drawing up of a War Plan. Working relationships were established with MAAG, Embassy, and ICA personnel. At the same time the analysts began to discharge their main responsibility, that of providing current intelligence on

the vigorous antagonist 100 short miles across the strait. Files were set up, regular briefings were given, and reports written. One of the first analytic efforts was an estimate of the variables involved in the construction of the Chinese Communist coastal airfield complex opposite Taiwan.

During this time the American community was in flux. In July 1957 the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command was officially established as a subordinate unified command of CINCPAC and the bottom link in the chain of responsibility USTDC to CINCPAC to JCS to SEC DEF. This arrangement gave a fillip to the growth of a concerted, centralized intelligence effort in the American community on Taiwan and formalized the duties of the CIA officers.

In addition to their responsibilities in the USTDC intelligence organization, the analysts had work to do [redacted]


[redacted] These grew, over the years, to such an extent that one of the two officers is now working full time [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] leaving only one in the USTDC intelligence organization. 25X1

The J-2 and the J-2.1

The Intelligence Division (J-2) of the USTDC is now staffed by 17 officers and 20 enlisted men from the four armed services, along with the one CIA civilian. J-2 is charged with providing intelligence to the USTDC Commander and to CINCPAC and other commands as appropriate, formulating and coordinating joint military intelligence and counterintelligence planning, coordinating the activities of all U.S. military intelligence and counterintelligence units operating in the area, and representing USTDC and CINCPAC on military intelligence matters with the military authorities of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

The primary duty of the CIA representative is to provide information on Chinese Communist political, economic, and logistic developments affecting the USTDC mission. He is listed on the J-2 organizational chart as a Political Adviser for the purpose of coordination and in the J-2 staff nomenclature as the J-2.1.



His chief routine job is to provide political and economic intelligence items and assist in the preparation of the J-2 current intelligence briefings which are given three times weekly to the USTDC Commander, his senior staff, and guests, including Chief of MAAG ROC (Major General), Chief 13th Air Task Force (P) (Brigadier General), Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.

Embassy, and military attachés, [redacted] These briefings are based on all-source information received daily from CIA, State, Defense, DIA, Unified Commands, and Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence offices. At briefing rehearsals, the J-2.1 offers suggestions and recommends to the J-2 briefing staff changes in portions of the briefing relating to his area of interest. He sits in on each briefing in order to field any question that might fall in his corner. He similarly helps compose and as often as possible is invited to attend the Distinguished Visitor briefings given to the many U.S. military and civilian callers at the Island. (During the pre-Christmas rush to Hong Kong the traffic at this way-station is particularly heavy.)

At the weekly meetings of the USTDC Indications Review Committee the J-2.1 acts as principal drafting officer for the J-2. He also attends the Country Team Intelligence Committee, which meets monthly. He is the liaison channel from USTDC [redacted] frequently briefing the principals [redacted] on intelligence developments. Occasionally he does liaison chores for the USTDC Operations Division (J-3) and, infrequently, with the Chinese military at USTDC's request.

Crisis Activity

During a crisis the routine becomes lively. The Country Team Intelligence Committee, the Indications Review Committee, and smaller *ad hoc* groups gather frequently, and the J-2.1 has a hand in nearly all of them. He accompanies the J-2 to brief the Commander as required. He may aid the J-2 in drafting intelligence messages to higher commands and also contributes to *Sitreps* sent to CIA Headquarters. Following is the record of a fairly routine flap of a type which occurs frequently.

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Analyst in a War Theater

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Analyst in a War Theater

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- 8:00 A.M. Chinese Intelligence Chief informs J-2 via special courier that agent report states large-scale artillery bombardment of Chin-men imminent. Military convoys reportedly active in Amoy area, civilians being evacuated, and artillery units being reinforced.
- 8:30 A.M. J-2 consults with J-2.1 and passes information to USTDC Commander.
- 25X1 8:45 A.M. J-2.1 conveys information [redacted] and requests an immediate check of sources.
- 8:55 A.M. J-2 requests the intelligence staffs of 13th Air Task Force (P) and the MAAG, as well as the Service Attachés, to check their intelligence sources for confirmation or denial of report.
- 9:25 A.M. The Air Warning Center analysts of 13th Air Task Force (P) back up the USTDC Indication Center analysts' findings that Chicom aircraft and airbase activity is normal with no peculiarities noted.
- 9:40 A.M. MAAG Intelligence Section informs J-2 that its observers on Chin-men have noted nothing unusual in Amoy area; junk and naval traffic normal.
- 25X1 9:50 A.M. [redacted] informs J-2.1 that [redacted] fail to substantiate report; contrariwise, decrease in normal activities on coastal front opposite Chin-men had recently been noted.
- 25X1 10:00 A.M. J-2.1 reports information provided [redacted] to J-2, who informs Commander that agent report probably erroneous.
- 10:30 A.M. J-2 with J-2.1 assistance drafts reply to Chinese stating that intensive study of all current intelligence fails to substantiate report and requesting that Chinese keep J-2 informed should anything further develop.

The Times Between

Between crises, the J-2.1, reverting to rumination, pries and probes the manifold wrinkles of information seeking a good intelligence thread. When he finds and unravels it, he offers it to J-2 for the Command Briefing. If it deserves a wider audience, he writes it up in an Information Report for the Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA often uses these reports in its publications.

One such report may be cited as illustrating the analytic aspect of the J-2.1's job. In the spring of 1959 he found in a Chinese Communist newspaper a terse notice that planning was under way for a million-kilowatt hydroelectric power station north of Nan-ping in Fukien province. Knowing that a

project of this size would have a powerful impact on the military geography of Fukien, he began to probe. With substantial help from an ICA engineer he "constructed" on paper the dam necessary for such a plant and calculated the area required for the reservoir. Taking this abstraction he examined photography and cartography of the Min River north of Nan-ping for potential sites. Only one site emerged as feasible for so large an installation. Applying to it the theoretical requirements, he was able to state that certain major roads and towns and one airfield in the area would be inundated by the reservoir.

Some uncertainty about the validity of the whole story arose from the lack of publicity given the project; the Communists usually propagandize large construction projects heavily. A study of Communist press and broadcast reportage for the region, however, revealed that the construction of new railroads and highways was being projected around and not through the indicated reservoir area. All these data were then incorporated into a report to higher military headquarters. It was not until a year later that the Chinese Communists announced the location thus pinpointed and confirmed in a lengthy elaboration the effects the construction would have on the area.

Evaluation

The record of this civilian support to the U.S. military on Taiwan is satisfying. On short notice the CIA representatives were ensconced at a forward vantage in a critical war-of-nerves battle area more than eight years ago. They found working conditions as ideal as could be expected in an environment characterized by tension. While not deferring to the J-2.1 in every instance—though in political and economic matters his opinion generally obtained—the military officers afforded him recognition and prestige, and his ideas always got a charitable ear. If he was occasionally shot down, no dum-dums were used; he was demolished politely and with consideration. In fact, a praise worthy function of the J-2.1 was simply to be what he was, a civilian loner on whom rank was never pulled, providing the staff a convenient neutral channel through which various jobs which might otherwise

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have been dead-ended by the military structure could be carried out.

The intelligence product resulting from this liaison has matured through recurring crises down the years. Although the representation was originally conceived as one of support to the U.S. military rather than to CIA Headquarters in Washington, it has had the beneficial side effect of providing CIA with on-the-spot analysis at times of crisis. The four generations of representatives assigned there since the program's genesis have learned much from their military counterparts and, reciprocally, taught them something of CIA techniques applicable to tactical and strategic intelligence problems. And possibly their mutual collaboration may have brought a better appreciation of that essence of intelligence flagged 60 years ago by G. K. Chesterton:

There are some people—and I am one of them—who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know his enemy's philosophy.

*Diagnosis of a methodological
malady and a suggested
course of therapy.*

FOR AN ECLECTIC SOVIETOLOGY

Richard W. Shryock

Writing several years ago, Daniel Bell, an articulate sociologist, entertaining writer, and part-time student of students of Soviet affairs, identified at least ten schools of thought concerned with the analysis of internal Soviet politics. His description ranged them from the conventional approach of the political scientists through the somewhat more esoteric methods of the "content analyzers" on up to the way-out system of the Freudians ("all Communists are homosexuals"). He did not specify which school he favored but seemed to suggest that each may have something to learn from the others. We concur. In the following we shall examine the sovietological schisms in the intelligence community and enter a plea for a more eclectic approach in this pursuit.

In official Washington the methods used for studying domestic Soviet affairs are fewer than ten: I personally know of no Freudian group, alas, and there is currently a paucity of pure sociologists in the community. But there are a number of other identifiable schools each holding the others in disdain. This, obviously, is too bad; the development of strong vested interests in one approach or another has taken place at the expense of the substance of the research. There is a great deal of energy expended on destructive criticism of the work produced by other groups, with precious little exchange of helpful ideas. Something should be done about it. This paper is an effort to show how something can be done.

The Warring Schools

Some years ago a CIA analyst discovered Nikita Khrushchev referred to as the First Secretary of the CPSU, whereas previously he had been identified in the official press only in lower case, "first secretary." The conclusion from this evidence, that Khrushchev was on his way up, was subsequently hailed

as a methodological triumph, proof of a newfound world of analytic method. No matter that indicators of Khrushchev's ascending fortunes were apparent in almost all areas of Soviet life; this little "esoteric communication" became cause in part for the establishment of a whole new approach to Soviet studies and a whole new corpus of political philosophy concerning the Soviet and Communist systems.

This method does in fact provide the student with an occasionally useful tool. It is based on a truth as old as politics: all political commentary, all speeches by leaders are to a certain extent esoteric, i.e., they contain messages to the elite not ordinarily decipherable by the layman. In a closed society, naturally, the content is apt to be more esoteric than in an open one. But what is as often forgotten as remembered by the professional adherents of this school is that the important problem for the analyst is more likely to lie in distinguishing between the politician's intentions and his capabilities than in trying to ferret out the precise messages that reveal the intent.

Another problem with this school is that it raises more questions than it can answer, and so its practitioners are prone to discover messages and then forget about their possible implications. Last spring, for example, a ranking member of the CPSU Presidium, Kirilenko, was listed in official media out of the normal alphabetical order; this was quickly spotted by alert readers of *Pravda* and other Soviet journals, but no one could come up with a satisfactory explanation (except possibly that of the waggish school that discerned a plot by the Soviet typesetters' union). It could only be concluded, solemnly, that this was "unusual," could not be mere happenstance, and thus surely meant *something*.

Regrettably, those who spend their time delving into these arcane subtleties have only scorn for less sophisticated analysts and, even more regrettably, do not make use of sources other than the open Soviet press. Indeed, I have heard them proclaim their disdain for other sources: "They serve no useful function at all, merely confuse those of us using the press." This is clearly no attitude from which to see the forest. We feel, indeed, that these analysts have been rooting around one particular tree for so long as to be lost to their

wider-ranging colleagues. Many of them, however, are gifted students and well endowed, and therefore we address them an anguished plea: come back!

In the school of the political scientists we find a less recon-dite approach and a broader and more promising methodology. If adequately informed, its practitioners often come up with the right questions and, though less often, the right answers. But they too have no use for other attitudes and methods and are likely to listen only to themselves. Further, some of them sometimes seem to forget that their task is not like making an examination of the affairs of state and local governments in, say, Pennsylvania. We have, for example, very little need for a detailed map of election districts in the Ukraine and even less for a thorough study, district by district, of the election results.

Finally, the political scientists suffer from an analytical malaise all too common to students of Soviet affairs, both foreign and domestic—power fixation. They think that all politics—indeed, all life—can be diagrammed according to a set of political rules derived from the assumption that the political behavior of mankind is essentially a struggle for pure power (no matter what the Freudians say). In fact, of course, this does not work. Men do often behave as the political scientists think they should behave, and certainly power is one of the prime movers; but complete reliance on this notion can lead to ghastly errors of interpretation.

A somewhat smaller school in the intelligence community (one probably overlooked by Bell because it does not extend to academic circles) can best be called the biographic school. Analysts spend anxious hours scanning the backgrounds and careers of Soviet officials in search of clues as to their future political behavior. To these practitioners, a common element in the lives of two functionaries—a coincidence of birthplace or congruence of careers—somehow creates a political alliance in perpetuity. Thus if party secretaries A and B are found both to be Ukrainians who once served in Omsk and they are now working together in Gosplan, they obviously conspire together against non-Ukrainian, non-Omskian careerists at a similar or slightly superior level. The old school tie thus assumes a significance vastly exceeding its

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proverbial importance in Great Britain (where, as everyone knows, Conservatives and Laborites all went to the same school anyhow).

A sub-species of the biographic school is the provincial faction group, which resolves all politics by place of birth and subsequent service. Thus the chief political forces in the USSR are the Leningrad faction, the Moscow faction, and the Kiev (or Ukrainian) faction. To some extent these groupings certainly exist, but they do not ordinarily determine the direction of all Soviet political life. Like any school of study which concentrates on one analytic formula to the virtual exclusion of others, the adherents of this one are blinded by their own searchlight, and the fact that one "Leningrader" may have served in Leningrad a full decade before another does not dissuade them from tying the two together. The achievement of discovering that two men served in the same place, no matter when, is acclaimed as a breakthrough and becomes a sufficient reward in itself.

Next we must contemplate the pure researchers. These haunters of old files and library stacks are a breed apart. They escape the world of current problems and political forecasting and retire amongst the musty shelves. Every so often they may emerge with a scroll containing a seemingly endless compilation of facts. This, if turned into a paper of sorts, must be at least 100 pages long, contain no speculation, reflect no insight, and, hopefully, avoid all conclusions. A common denominator of very generally applicable qualities may be isolated, but the chances are that this will be of only marginal academic interest or else so long accepted as to be platitudinous. This school is scarcely aware of the existence of others, views current intelligence as "mere journalism" (as if there were something heinous about journalism), and when challenged deigns not to reply. After all, the facts speak for themselves.

There is a Stalinist school of Soviet studies, too. Fortunately its ablest practitioners are outside the community, usually senior professors at august universities. They once wrote a book (say in 1935), twice visited the USSR (in 1933 and 1938), and have established reputations. They do not feel secure, however, in these elongated reputations and are

therefore impelled to do two things: one, they decry the notion that there can have been changes in the USSR since the publication of their work—thus their analysis stands immortal—and two, they colonize other institutions and government offices with students trained in their ideas. Thus some adherents of this school reach Washington, and they make themselves known, but always negatively. Throw one of them a fresh idea and he tosses it right back. Being in a position always to cry nay, they are of course oftentimes right. But they are never novel.

We cannot end this examination without at least mentioning a few lesser but well-known Washington schools. A pair are formed by the economic determinists and their brethren the scientific determinists. All politics is but a reflection of economics (or science) and can be studied only in the light of this great truth. Non-Marxists, they outdo the Marxists in their devotion to determinism. And finally there is the clandestine school, for which everything is subordinated to the greater mission of espionage, clandestine sources, and secret data (Limited Background Use Only/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals). But it would be improper, really, to think of this as a school of Soviet studies; rather it is an approach which transcends the purely Soviet and all studies, including its own substantive results: it is a way of life.

These, then, are the schools, somewhat arbitrarily defined. Clearly something should be done about their dissonance, and soon. The analysis of Soviet politics is too important a pursuit to be fragmented by divisions based more on methodology than on substance. Here are some ideas for putting it together.

Curative Measures

There is no such thing as the right school or the wrong school. And there is no such person as the ideal sovietologist. All schools have something worth while to contribute and all political analysts can become good contributors. We need researchers, content analysts, biographers, economists, and even (if only to remind us of the nature of the society with which we are dealing) Stalinists. We need political scientists with broad background and insight, not necessarily Russian-speaking specialists in Soviet affairs. But we also need

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the experts whose Russian approximates native fluency. Each has a proper function and a job to do.

What we are saying, perhaps, is that there should be no single school or methodology at all, but a variety of schools, or sub-schools, which ride with the assigned function, not with the individual. But in another sense there should be only one school, one which combines the discipline of the social scientist with the insight of the empathic specialist, permitting the social scientist to lecture to the specialist and in turn be tutored by him. Most important, the various analysts should hold one another in respect, assuming the individual worthy, and should exchange thoughts and ideas; there is no room for tight compartmentation in sovietology.

This brings to mind some crucial intelligence failures and the notion that at least some of them might have been avoided if the various sovietological schools had been willing to exchange ideas and had some medium for such an exchange. It might have occurred to a good content analyst in 1955, for example, that something of a fight was brewing between Khrushchev and Molotov and that this struggle perforce involved questions of high national policy, such as the proposed peace treaty with Austria. At the same time, the political scientists who were viewing the problem from their own vantage point might have maintained a relatively flexible attitude concerning the Austrian treaty had their views not been predetermined by their devotion to power politics and firm conviction that the USSR was not about to pull back on any issue, anywhere, at any time.

As it was, the signing of the Austrian peace treaty caught just about everyone by surprise. It had never occurred to the Kremlinologists to tie the Moscow struggle in with matters of policy, much less the peace treaty; they were concerned strictly with a political struggle and esoteric manifestations thereof. They were looking under rocks for invisible writing on slugs and whatever else was uncovered, they were not looking under the headlines in their morning papers. And meanwhile the political scientists, who normally speak only to one another, were concentrating on those very headlines but were ignorant of the factional duel in the Kremlin. Neither could add the two and two together. And of course the researchers

at this point were still playing games with the removal of Beria, the Stalinists were looking for evidence of an increase in troop strength in the Soviet zone in Austria, and the economic determinists were racking up the statistics concerning the shipment of Austrian POL to the Soviet Union. And so on.

Perhaps, to be fair, we should cite at this point not another failure but a particular triumph of the Kremlinologists. Or, to be more accurate, a partial triumph: the political scientists saw to it that the victory was not total. In 1958 a small but persistent band of Kremlinologists discovered through content analysis that the Chinese Communists and the Soviets were engaged in an increasingly bitter struggle. They published their findings and sought to advertise their conclusions, but their journals were obscure and their voices were not heeded. The political scientists, in particular, suppressed any corrupting notions of Bloc disarray, in part because it did not jibe with their ideas of sensible power politics and in part because of firmly held views long expressed in their own writings.

Finally, of course, it became all too obvious that a dispute in fact existed. Still the political scientists had not learned their lesson. While they now reluctantly admitted the generalization of a Sino-Soviet struggle, they were as yet not prepared to apply the generalization to any particular area of politics or policy. Thus when the Kremlinologists demonstrated, for example, that the Chinese and Soviets were at odds over the Congo and Algeria, the political scientists were scornful. In one particular instance that we remember, an article by a content analyst concerning the Algerian imbroglio was almost killed by the strident criticism of a vested-interest political scientist. Fortunately for the readership, this effort was thwarted. In other instances, however, the Kremlinologists were less fortunate; what the political scientists lack in depth they more than make up in sheer numbers.

A small beginning toward a unified school has been made with the creation of an ad hoc working group from overt and covert elements of CIA, chaired by the chief of a Soviet research unit. Devoted in the first instance to a look at the succession struggle sure to follow the death of Khrushchev, it must of necessity deal with other political problems and in

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fact does so. The national estimates process may sometimes provide a similar opportunity: it occasions contacts on substantive matters between CIA and other intelligence organizations, and when an estimate concerned at least in part with internal Soviet politics is being coordinated there can be a profitable cross-fertilization of ideas. It might be wise to put this on a more regular basis, however, by adding to the CIA ad hoc group some representatives from other agencies.

This working-group approach in any case needs strengthening by other measures. Most practical and perhaps desirable would be a medium of written exchange among interested sovietologists, both within the community and outside it. Such a medium could be created, though it might require a small government subsidy, in a journal devoted exclusively to the field of sovietology. Researchers could be given space to display their products (many of which might otherwise never see the light of day), and analysts could present their speculations and reviews. Non-sovietologists might be permitted to ask questions and bring the specialists up to date on related matters such as foreign affairs. The experts could testify and the students learn. There is at present no periodical in existence which offers such opportunities to the practitioners of the aggregate school. What more painless way to keep the currents moving, to exchange ideas and gain inspiration? What better way to end the provincialism so characteristic of the field, to destroy the myths of exclusive infallibility nurtured by the several methodologists?

*Prescribes stronger medicine
for the foregoing ailment.*

BETTER AN OFFICE OF SOVIETOLOGY

John Whitman

It is very good that Mr. Shryock has opened a discussion of the methods of sovietology; the debate is overdue, and we are in his debt. To my mind he exaggerates, here and there, the devotion with which individual analysts cling to one methodology, forsaking all others, but as a generalization his diagnosis can stand as a fair statement of what's wrong and ought to be set right.

I am surprised, however, that an intelligence officer of Mr. Shryock's experience could bring himself to endorse, as even a partial solution, an ad hoc working group. A task force by any other name smells not one whiff better. Such a body, as anyone knows, is nothing but a floating crap game from which anyone can return and tell his boss that he won (or that the dice were loaded). An ad hoc working group produces no papers, and its chairman writes no fitness reports.

The national estimating process contributes even less to the synthesis of methods and insights for which Mr. Shryock calls. While the drafters of an NIE may be partial to one or another of Mr. Shryock's schools, they perform little sustained research of their own and are in principle eclectic. Their estimate is produced with little participation by the multifarious units of sovietologists tucked away in various parts of the community. While any of these schools may get its views presented in a contribution to the estimate, in practice it has little chance to argue them during the drafting.

There is much merit in Mr. Shryock's new suggestion that a journal of sovietology be founded, drawing on governmental and academic analysts alike. The field is small, its practitioners are scattered, and they need a medium of communication which would organize polemics and help set standards in an area of investigation that is still relatively young. Such a journal could also be a bazaar where analysts could trade with each other not only questions which have no answers but answers which have no questions (as on Kirilenko). The need

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is for a highly specialized, highly professional publication—something only a sovietologist would read—and it is unlikely to be met by private initiative, if only because more than half the talent is in the intelligence community. And by making the field respectable it might help solve the problem of where the next generation of sovietologists is to come from.

But let us focus now on the most pregnant passage in Mr. Shryock's essay: "...there should be a variety of schools, or sub-schools, which ride with the assigned function, not with the individual." The development of this thought may lead us to the fundamental difficulty and suggest its cure.

Isn't it clear that the multiplicity of schools arises directly from the multiplicity of assigned functions? If you sit a man down at a desk and tell him he is responsible for culling and translating gems from the Soviet press, don't be surprised if his analyses, and therefore his selections, take no account of the relative postures of the United States and the USSR in strategic attack forces. If you sit another man down at a desk somewhere else and tell him to keep books on the assignments and associations of Kirilenko, don't be surprised if he can't tell you whether the esoteric content of Kirilenko's speeches suggests revisionist or dogmatic proclivities. Create two offices for current reporting, tell one that it is responsible for exploiting radio and press and the other that its primary concern is "everything else" (whatever that is), and you can almost take it for granted that the resulting rivalry will not be a fruitful one.

In CIA, as a glance at the Agency's organization shows, the economic, scientific, and some other fields are legitimate subjects for research, but politics is not. Under the existing ground rules Soviet politics can be treated in CIA only as an aspect—an important one, but still one aspect—of the processing of foreign documents and broadcasts, of the production of biographic information, of the publication of current intelligence, etc.

Mr. Shryock is right that all schools are needed. But I fear that they will continue to work at cross purposes so long as they remain in different bureaucracies rather than being united in a single organizational framework devoted to exploiting all methodologies for a single aim—the analysis of Soviet politics as a research problem.

A promising start in exploiting the emergency mass admission of Red China refugees to this country.

WINDFALL FROM HONG KONG

Charles F. Turgeon

In May 1962 more than 70,000 refugees streamed across the briefly opened border between Communist China and Hong Kong. When President Kennedy announced that the United States, in a humanitarian gesture, would receive several thousand of them, the intelligence community was presented with an exceptional opportunity to collect information at first hand on the most denied of denied areas.

There is often no substitute for being able to talk to a person who has lived and worked inside a country which can otherwise be approached only through external methods such as reconnaissance, technical analysis, open literature, and third-country reporting. At a minimum, a refugee group can normally contribute a substantial amount of basic intelligence in the economic, political, geographic, and even scientific fields. To a lesser degree, refugees' knowledge of persons, places, and procedures within a country are valuable for operational intelligence. Finally, if some of them have held significant positions in the society and these are interviewed promptly, they may make important contributions to current intelligence.

Peculiarities of the Program

The program that has been developed to take advantage of this opportunity, however, is quite unlike those set up for the Hungarian refugees of 1956¹ and more recently those from Cuba² whose resettlement was sponsored by the government. The President's "Emergency Chinese Refugee Parole Program" requires that the Chinese immigrants be sponsored by private individuals or groups willing to take responsibility for their

¹ See *Studies* II 1, p. 85 ff.

² See *Studies* VII 4, p. 41 ff.

transportation, accommodation, and support. This private sponsorship has a variety of critical implications for the intelligence collection program—most of them inhibitive.

When the government pays for the transportation and arranges for the livelihood of a political refugee, it has the right to ask certain things of the refugee in return. When it does not, as in this instance, it is in no position to put pressure on him to contribute to the intelligence picture of his homeland. Under a government resettlement program there is usually a single port of entry for the refugees and a single processing center, like Camp Kilmer for the Hungarians and Opa-Locka for the Cubans, which offers an ideal opportunity for intelligence screening en masse. There are no such facilities for the Chinese refugees. They come in how and when they can, through virtually every air- and seaport on both coasts, bound for a variety of destinations in all the fifty states. Thus they constitute an extremely diffuse and difficult intelligence target. Moreover, no special funds, facilities, or personnel, except for a limited number of interpreters, have been allocated to the program.

The refugees who arrived during the first year largely antedated the May 1962 influx into Hong Kong; they had escaped during the 1950's and had been waiting there for approval to enter the United States under the normal immigration quota of 100 per year. When the quota was suddenly expanded, the rules of fair play and the regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service required that these come first, however ill it served the interests of the intelligence community or the government of Hong Kong. Not until mid-1963, with the elimination of this backlog, did the refugee group begin to assume a current character.

The earlier refugees nevertheless turned out to have information of value, as we shall see. Recency of residence can be less important than former position and currency of communications. A merchant who has lived in Hong Kong for seven years but maintained his correspondence or travels to the mainland can be a far more valuable source than a rice farmer who got out yesterday. It is from persons such as this that a large portion of the first year's intelligence was derived.

Procedures

The methods that have been devised to reach the Chinese immigrants are unique and still developing. The first notice that one of them has entered the country comes to CIA headquarters from the central office of the Immigration Service as a copy of a form giving only his name, port of entry, and probable destination. The CIA office charged with domestic collection alerts its appropriate field office to the presence of this possible new intelligence source within its area of responsibility. The field office then sends a representative to the district office of the Immigration Service to study the refugee's Form No. FS-510, the Application for Visa he filled out in Hong Kong, which is the only source of biographic data for an estimate of his intelligence potential. Because of a lack of correlation between the jurisdictional areas of the CIA field offices and the I&NS districts, the CIA officer may have to travel hundreds of miles to an Immigration office to see the papers on a refugee living in the very city where his own office is located.

If the refugee appears to have possibilities, the field office forwards a copy of the FS-510 or an abstract of its content to headquarters, where the feasibility of opening a case on him is determined. Permission for contact with him must be obtained from the FBI, not as a security check but in order to keep clear of any refugee under investigation by the Bureau, which has primacy of interest in resident alien affairs. If there appears to be no conflict of interest the field office is directed to make an initial contact for the purpose of obtaining more biographic data and making a surer assessment of the refugee's intelligence potential and willingness to cooperate.

If the first interview shows that the source is worth debriefing in depth, request is made for an Alien Security Check, a full-scale security investigation conducted primarily by the FBI, which establishes the classification of information that can be discussed with the refugee. This is the last procedural hurdle that has to be crossed, but there are other problems in making the contact.

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Hong Kong Refugees
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The Contact

The first step in approaching a refugee is to locate him, and this may be a problem. The Chinese have proved to be a highly mobile group, often taking the stated address of their sponsor as only a starting point in their travels. Some have settled in surprisingly remote areas, but the greatest number are found in the principal Chinese communities of New York and San Francisco. There the ethnic solidarity of the neighborhood affords them a dense cover under which they may hide from government representatives out of fear of deportation.

If the refugee is still living with his sponsor, the latter may stand on his rights as the party responsible for the refugee's welfare and not allow him to be interviewed except by Immigration officials. This block is rare but does occur, and from it there is no present recourse. If the refugee is approached at his place of employment, there may be no way to arrange a secure interview, or the employer may be unwilling to give him time off for it.

More basically, the intelligence officer must decide whether to make a direct approach to the refugee himself or to seek first the cooperation of his sponsor. The direct approach can sometimes be effective because of its sudden impact: out of surprise or fear the refugee may tell more about subjects of intelligence interest than he would in the presence of his sponsor. The sponsor would at least constitute an additional party in the line of communication with the refugee and might intentionally or inadvertently restrain or reshape his responses to questions. On the other hand, an approach through the sponsor can have important advantages. Because not enough qualified linguists are available to this project, the bilingual Chinese-American sponsor may be the only means of talking to the refugee. Moreover, his presence and tacit endorsement of the interviewer may give the refugee the confidence to overcome his normal reluctance to speak to a government representative. The choice between the two approaches is not easy, but because of the helpful and cooperative attitude of most sponsors the one through them is becoming the way most widely taken.

There is also the question of how the interviewer should represent his position. If he were dealing with the sponsor

alone he could perhaps present himself as a CIA officer, but he is unlikely to do so with a refugee. To the Chinese in general, intelligence is a dirty word, and for those who have lived under the police state it is doubly bad. It is normal practice therefore for the intelligence officer to represent himself as a government research worker seeking generalized, encyclopedic information on conditions in China.

In the introductory phase of the interview the officer attempts to allay any fears about the use to be made of whatever information is offered. He assures the refugee that he has no connection with tax, investigative, or police agencies and stresses that whatever is said will be held in the strictest confidence. If the refugee seems sensitive about his own current activities he is told that there is no interest in his present affairs but only in his experiences in China.

After the interviewer has established his position, secured the cooperation of the refugee, and, hopefully, built up some rapport, he can proceed to the substance of the first interview. In this he is aided by a checklist of questions developed at headquarters to elicit the maximum amount of biographic data and reveal the subjects of intelligence interest in which the source may be competent. The first interview, however, is unlikely to take the form of a regimented march through all the many questions on the checklist; the interviewer will use them selectively and economically, having studied the refugee's FS-510 record with care, to get the most information from him and cause him the least alarm. If this interview is successful and shows the source to be of value, a second one is requested. If it is granted the Alien Security Check is initiated, as described above, and a Notice of Intelligence Potential is issued in the hope of receiving consumer requirements tailored to the source. Having obtained a full security clearance and a list of specific questions, the interviewer can then return to do a debriefing in depth.

The Chinese refugee is not an easy person to talk to. Beyond the language barrier, which is often monumental because of the diversity of dialects with which the extremely limited interpreter force is confronted, there is that of his native character. If not "inscrutable," the Chinese is naturally reticent, and he manifests in particular all the family-

protective instincts of his long tradition. One of the quickest ways to quash an entire interview is to ask him questions concerning his relatives on the mainland which he feels may bring them into jeopardy. As compared with other refugees, moreover, these more frequently left China for economic than political reasons and therefore lack the volubility of men with blood stirred high by a Cuban or Hungarian revolution. Finally, there is the dominant fact, of which most of them are quite aware, that they have no legal obligation to aid the U.S. government in any way.

The Product

Despite this multiplicity of difficulties, the product of the first year's collection activity was good. In this period, according to field office records, 6,510 refugees arrived in this country, 3,133 of them adults who could be regarded as potential intelligence sources. The field forwarded biographic data on 838 of these as the most likely prospects, and headquarters opened 207 cases. 170 were actually interviewed, and 397 intelligence reports were published, an average of more than two per source.

The quality of these reports, relative to the great dearth of information on Communist China, has been uniformly high. They contain new data on such varied subjects as the state of medical treatment, the cost of basic commodities, the political climate, the numbers and kinds of newspapers published, the production of electric power, biographies of important officials, security procedures employed by border guards, town plans, travel regulations, construction projects, farming practices, dental care, research in medicine, physics, and biochemistry, and many others.

But if the quality of information elicited from these new sources is heartening, the rate of production is not. The first-year tally of 170 refugees interviewed, out of 3,133 adults available and 838 rated as having good potential, means that only 6% of the raw resource, or only 23% of its top fraction, was exploited. The production lag appears to be more directly a function of manpower shortage than of any other difficulty. The sudden introduction of several thousand new potential contacts into the case-load of the field offices has been too

much for their existing staffs. It was expected that a total of 12,000 refugees would be in the country by the end of 1963. The field officers must not only find time to see the refugees but also arrange for interpreters; and here the manpower shortage is even more critical. At the New York office, for example, only two part-time interpreters were available for the 1,961 Chinese refugees in its area.

Efforts are being made to enlist the aid of the military services, who might furnish reservists to serve as interpreters in the program. Other ways to improve exploitation have been considered—identifying refugees of high potential and making initial contact in Hong Kong, subsidizing transportation and so controlling some of the refugees, and establishing one or two interviewing centers which refugees already here would visit voluntarily. But none of these measures seems feasible at the present time.

Future Sources

The limited and admittedly select group of refugees on whom cases were opened in the first year included scientific and technical personnel (18%), other professionals (9%), executives in banking, industry and commerce (3%), and students (20%). The other half were farmers, merchants, salesmen, clerks, miscellaneous craftsmen, and housewives. 41% had finished college, and 20% had done graduate work. The great majority, as expected, came from Kwangtung Province, but nine other provinces and major cities, including Shanghai and Peking, were well represented.

This statistical picture will probably not hold true for the second year; the likelihood is that it should even improve, at least with respect to the currency of the information potential, as immigrants from the 1962 cross-over replace those who had left China earlier. Even the last months of the first year saw a marked improvement in the current and operational information obtained.

At the same time plans are being laid for the long-term, systematic utilization of the Chinese in this country. The sponsors of the refugees have unexpectedly emerged as persons with substantial intelligence potential, sometimes greater than that of their protégés. Their value lies in the fact that


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Hong Kong Refugees
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as important heads of families, businesses, or Chinese associations they have maintained extensive contacts with the mainland, and in general they are cooperative in making available their knowledge and these communications to U.S. intelligence. A second group with similar potential consists of the refugees who have now settled in this country and taken up correspondence with family and friends still on the mainland. Their letters are nearly always of intelligence interest, and in some especially cooperative and favorable cases questions pertinent to particular intelligence requirements may be introduced into the correspondence. Both the sponsors and the refugees can serve to alert intelligence to new and valuable sources coming out of China.

Thus the Chinese refugee program promises to continue as a unique and productive means of extracting information from a country which is both the most bellicose Communist power at the present time and perhaps our most difficult intelligence target.




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Intelligence Articles VIII 1



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The work of one veteran intelligence chief evokes reflections from another.

ON "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"

Frank G. Wisner

Allen Dulles's book, aptly entitled *The Craft of Intelligence*,¹ has been so extensively and variously reviewed by the professionals of the press and so much wisdom has been reflected in the more thoughtful of these reviews that it was with the greatest reluctance and diffidence on the part of the undersigned that he was prevailed upon to undertake the task of addressing a further commentary to the readership of this publication. The evident presumption of attempting to provide any useful commentary upon a work so cogently and concisely written, and more particularly of venturing views of possible value to such a uniquely sophisticated audience, would have sufficed to deter this effort but for the opportunity thus afforded of grinding certain special axes and getting in some plugs for a number of strongly-held convictions. (Incidentally, it may be of interest to note in passing that the preponderance of the book reviews have ranged from favorable to enthusiastic, with only a small proportion registering significant dissatisfaction or hostility.)

Mr. Dulles has written a most valuable book, one which, in the judgment of this reviewer, should be read and if possible possessed by all persons having a serious professional interest in the subject of intelligence, and hopefully also by a wide segment of the general public. It is essentially an encyclopedia of the terminology, concepts, and craft of the trade, abundantly illustrated by cases and anecdotes drawn from the author's own treasure-house of experience, and highly readable in form.

Intelligence Terminology

One of the chief merits of the book from the standpoint of the public in general is its clarification, through definition

¹ New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 277 pp.

and painstaking exposition, of the argot of the trade, which has sprouted and proliferated in such lush profusion as to have become highly confusing and dangerously misleading—largely as the result of loose usage on the part of the considerable and still growing number of amateurish exploiters of this rich vein of literary ore. Newspapermen, the authors of popular fiction, and, I fear, even a small number of would-be practitioners of the profession of intelligence have all made their contribution to the chaos, to the point that it was well overdue for one of the leading and most revered experts in the field to hack a clear track through the tangled undergrowth. In fact, if it were possible for the intelligence community in general to accept and conform to Mr. Dulles's definitions and supporting explanations for such variously used expressions as "deception," "defector," "double agent," and "counterintelligence," to mention but a few, much difficulty would be avoided in future; and if as an extra dividend the interested representatives of the fourth estate could be persuaded or influenced in the direction of adopting these definitions, there would be in time a constructive clarification of the public mind and a more understanding appreciation of the problems of intelligence. The repeated references in the Western press to both H. A. R. ("Kim") Philby (who recently skipped to Moscow to join his old cronies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean) and George Blake (now serving in England a heavy sentence for espionage) as "British double agents," when in point of fact they were highly important long-term *Soviet penetration agents*, may serve to illuminate the reasons for concern on this score.

In sharp contrast with the large and ever-mounting stacks of books and articles purporting to divulge the inside story of U.S. intelligence and to "tell all" about our espionage system and activities, Mr. Dulles does not reveal secrets which are still sensitive (and many of which must always remain so) but rather has confined himself to a serious discussion of the principles and methods of sound intelligence operations. Whereas the omission of such succulent tidbits has disappointed many of the reviewers and also tends to circumscribe the appeal of the book to the public, it is taken for granted that the members of the intelligence community will under-

stand and applaud its wisdom and will value this example of security-mindedness and restraint. It is in fact an excellent illustration of the general rule that persons having the deepest and most legitimate insights into intelligence matters are most scrupulous in their trusteeship of such knowledge and that the penchant for sensational revelations is the near monopoly of the charlatans and pretenders who scavenge along the flanks of the intelligence enterprise.*

Classical Espionage

In his introductory recitation of the long historical background and the more recent evolution of modern intelligence, counterintelligence, and other forms of clandestine operations, Mr. Dulles has provided some much-needed perspectives on matters which will be alluded to later in this review. Having thus set the stage for his examination and analysis of current practices and procedures of the leading intelligence services of the world, both friendly and opposed, he launches into an admirably complete discussion of our intelligence requirements and collection methods.

Here he places well-merited emphasis upon the progress resulting from the invention and adaptation to the uses of intelligence of sophisticated scientific devices, but he does not permit the glitter of these technological marvels to obscure the perduring value of the classical methods of procurement. Though the high-flying Mata Haris of today may with their glass eyes be able to discern the most minute of man-made molehills from untold miles of altitude, and though their acoustical siblings of equivalent acuteness may be able to hear across continents the rustle of a mounting missile, these are not and will never become any substitute for the older and less "exotic" measures which are essential to the discovery and frustration of subversive intent. This point is made manifest by Mr. Dulles in his numerous allusions to recent successes of the covert intelligence and security agencies of the United States. He has also called attention to many of the detections of Soviet secret operatives which have been the fruit of close cooperation as between the American services and their allied opposite numbers.

*See note p. A16.

Counterintelligence and the Adversary

The chapter on "Counterintelligence," taken together with relevant and related portions of two or three other chapters, *viz.* "The Main Opponent, etc." and "Volunteers," makes an unusually valuable contribution toward a better comprehension of the true significance and vital importance of this weapon in our own arsenal of defense. For one thing, Mr. Dulles disposes of the popular misconception that counterintelligence is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition. He shows that counterintelligence produces its most valuable results by subtle but aggressive attacks upon its chief target—the structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services. These chapters also bring out the fact that counterintelligence generates and delivers highly valuable by-products in the form of positive intelligence and the detection and exposure of enemy deception, including their so-called "disinformation" activities.

Lastly, but by no means of lesser importance, there are the frequently significant indicators of Soviet policy and intentions which are provided by our successful operations in this field. In this way our counterintelligence has been sounding a much-needed warning that in spite of the ostensible shifts of Soviet policy from warm to cold and *vice versa*, the fundamental and consistent aims thereof are essentially hostile, and that we must therefore at all times react most warily to Soviet and other Communist overtures packaged in the attractive wrappings of "peaceful coexistence," "the new Spirit of Moscow," or whatever may be the sales slogan of the moment. For example, during the peak of the euphoria which broke out in certain Western capitals as the result of and in the wake of the August treaty for a limited nuclear test ban, and long before this premature and uncritical enthusiasm was beclouded by such recent Soviet actions² as their renewed interference with the Berlin access routes and their handling of the Barghoorn affair, the best available counterintelligence sources are understood never to have ceased signaling that the thrust of Soviet policy continued to be aggressively antagonistic and that despite all of the fair words at the top there

was not the slightest diminution in the vigor and intensity of the Soviet effort at the level of the secret and subversive.

This may perhaps be another way of saying that the French seem to have had something on their side of the argument in maintaining that it would be a mistake quite capable of leading us into mortal danger to believe the test ban treaty to signify any substantial easing of tensions and that the behavior into which the Russians have relapsed most recently² is in accordance with their normal pattern—the other being both abnormal and highly transitory. Be that as it may, of such magnitude are the power, position, and prestige of the intelligence and security empire within the Soviet scheme of things as to suggest that it will be soon enough for us to begin believing in the sincerity of Soviet protestations of peaceful intent when we have received satisfactory evidence that they are muzzling their subversive bloodhounds and dismantling their apparatus of clandestine conquest—covert as well as open evidence, for example, in such matters as the Soviet position, both proclaimed and clandestine, toward so-called "wars of liberation."

Overt Aspects

It was obviously impossible for Mr. Dulles to cover in adequate depth, in even such a comprehensive work as this, all of the multiple and complex phases of the subject which are currently included in the craft of intelligence. Doubtless each member of the intelligence community reading the book would desire a fuller treatment of his own pet subject, and this reviewer, in full recognition of the unfairness of criticizing a work which covers so much ground, finds himself in basic agreement with certain observations in the most excellent review written by Professor Robert R. Bowie and published in the *New York Herald Tribune*, edition of Sunday, October 13 1963.³ It is believed that the author might himself be willing to acknowledge the existence of an imbalance in favor of intelligence tradecraft, *i.e.*, clandestine techniques and operations, and to the disadvantage of certain of the most impor-

² Written as of 20 November 1963, just before the assassination of President Kennedy.

³ In *Book Week*, distributed also with the Sunday *Washington Post*.

tant functions and problems of the research and analysis and estimative processes.

Regrettably the experience and background of this reviewer are not such as to permit him—nor would it otherwise be either appropriate or possible in this short space to attempt—to comment in detail upon these apparent deficiencies. However, in the hope that Mr. Dulles himself will soon find time to give us the benefit of his wisdom and close knowledge pertaining to these areas, it is suggested that more emphasis should be devoted to the very great reliance which our system places upon the open and above-board techniques of scholarly research and analysis and to bringing home more forcibly the weight accorded to the product of these efforts in the scientific and technical fields, for example. It is further recommended that Mr. Bowie's review be read by those interested in these spheres of activity and their attendant difficulties. Mr. Dulles has been both wise and just in the distribution of his commendations among the personnel concerned in the various departments and agencies of the Government which collectively comprise our intelligence community. In so doing he has singled out for special praise numerous non-CIA personnel and functions and he has attributed to "the men and women of the CIA," to whom the book is dedicated, no more than their fair share of the honors. Even so, some larger measure of recognition for the contribution of the researchers and analysts would be in order.

In this same general connection it may be worth noting at this point what has long seemed to this reviewer to represent one of the most notable distinctions between the West (the U.S. and U.K. in particular) and the Russians in over-all approach and philosophy of intelligence operation. The relatively greater emphasis and reliance placed by the leading Western intelligence services upon the results obtainable from extensive overt collection and expert analysis stand out in marked contrast to the Soviet attitude and credo, in which these measures and methods have heretofore and at least until very recently been regarded as distinctly secondary to, and as valuable chiefly in so far as they served to confirm or interpret, the intelligence produced by clandestine means—most notably stolen *documentary* materials. This fundamen-

tal difference in approach may be explainable in part by the origins and character of the two opposing civilizations, Soviet intelligence having developed and at all times functioned within a highly secret and conspiratorial political atmosphere in which intense suspicion of the freely spoken or written word of the antagonist has been a major hallmark.

Although he has been out of Russia long enough to have perhaps fallen behind the times, the former NKVD general Alexander Orlov has provided a most incisive commentary upon this significant distinction in his provocative and edifying little book entitled *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare*.⁴ According to Orlov, who was certainly in a position to know the facts, the Russians regard as true intelligence only that which is produced by secret informants and undercover agents, and they relegate to a category of far lesser importance and credibility material coming from overt and legitimate sources. He explains that in the Russian view the secrets of foreign states having the most vital interest for them can be procured only from the classified governmental files of those states or from cooperative foreign officials and civil servants having access thereto.

Although it is understood from other sources that the Russians have of late been paying more attention to the values of overt collection and analysis than they did during the period with which Orlov was so intimately familiar, it is nevertheless evident from the very massiveness of their clandestine collection effort—to say nothing of the rich rewards which they have to our knowledge been reaping from such sources—that their main emphasis is still centered upon espionage and the procurement of secret documentary materials. It is thus a fair assumption that these activities and functions have not been downgraded in the Soviet system and that they are not likely to be at any time in the foreseeable future.

Deception

In commenting upon the techniques and the art of deception Mr. Dulles has made some very accurate observations concerning the difficulties of mounting significant deception

⁴An adaptation was carried in Intelligence Articles VII 2, and the book is reviewed elsewhere in this issue.

operations from the base of "open societies" such as ours in peace time and the relative ease of such operations on the part of the Russians, who have all the advantages of the secrecy and discipline of their police state society going for them. If anything, he has understated the obstacles confronting Western intelligence authorities in this area of activity; and he might well have placed more stress than he has upon the free assists which the opposition receives from a certain class of representatives of the Western press who, it would appear, have been seeking to elevate to the level of a national sport the ferreting out and public exposure of the clandestine operations of their own governments.

Given the intimacy of our journalists with almost all echelons of the Government, executive as well as legislative, and taking into account the extensive coordination as between all of the governmental arms which is essential to the success of a significant deception operation, the opportunities and possibilities for some leak or revelation fatal to the operation are very great indeed; and frequently the sleuthing is done for the Russians on a volunteer though doubtless unwitting basis by those representatives of our own competitive and "scoop-minded" information media who justify even the most reprehensible forms of "keyhole journalism" on the ground that they are acting as the chief guardians of our most cherished institutions. The freedom of the press and the asserted right of the public to know all are used indiscriminately to either justify or condone actions which are damaging to our national security and the principal beneficiary of which cannot fail to be our mortal enemy. Thus the fruit that is available to our side only as the result of our most diligent and successful professional operations may be expected by the Russians to fall *gratis* into their lap, and if in any particular case the branches should appear to require a little agitation, this is easy enough to arrange by the simple device of planting a few provocative questions about any policy or program of ours, either real or apparent, that may be obscure or perplexing to them.

Sharpshooting

Although the roster of Communist methods of subversion in the cold war provided by Mr. Dulles is very extensive, it

seems to this reviewer that he omitted adequate treatment of one of the most insidious and effective of their techniques. Reference is here made to the evidence of skillful and increasingly successful attacks upon individual personalities by the Chinese Communists as well as the Russians. These are specialized operations targeted against key political and military leaders in various parts of the world—not limited to the softer areas of the so-called uncommitted nations. This method of subversion embraces the widest variety of approaches and is designed to capitalize on the vanity, cupidity, prurience, ill health, hypochondria, superstition, or other special susceptibility of the target individual. It is hand-tailored for each particular case on the basis of the most intimate knowledge and study of the individual, and it depends for its success upon great skill and perseverance on the part of the operatives employed.

This pinpoint, not to say needle-point, attack on selected individuals in positions of power obviously provides tremendous leverage if successful, and its workings are most difficult to perceive and to combat. Even though strongly suspected of being under way in a particular case, the proof to and even more so the persuasion of the subject of this mental massage that he is being victimized or duped is well-nigh impossible, once the infection has spread to the bloodstream. It is accordingly all the more important for those having the responsibility for guarding against and countering Communist subversive activities to be on a special alert against this insidious form of activity.

One of the most readily recognizable telltales of such an operation is the sudden and otherwise inexplicable souring of a leading political or military personality previously regarded as pro-Western or at least dependably neutral in his views and policies. Another indicator is the falling from grace and departure or removal from office of a number of subordinate officials known for their pro-Western and anti-Communist attitudes—for this may be the result of subtle and effective "well-poisoning" against such personages, accomplished through repeated insinuations and suggestions to their superior that they are secretly hostile to him or are otherwise unreliable

instrumentalities of his will. The Russians may be less skillful in their application of this ancient technique than the Chinese, who possess all of the subtlety and sensitivity that comes to them from centuries of familiarity with its traditional use.

To accept as valid and treat with full seriousness the necessity for remedial measures against this form of subversive threat does not require disagreement with Mr. Dulles's proposition that the Chinese have not yet achieved the full panoply of subversive tactics which have been developed and assembled by the Russians. They, the Chinese, are clearly making rapid strides and may well already have perfected certain specialized techniques for which they have a greater natural aptitude than their Communist competition.

The havoc that was wrought in Britain by the Profumo scandal has been widely interpreted in the Western press as a triumph of Soviet disruptive design, and even in Lord Denning's fascinating analysis he poses (at page 8 of his Report) the suggestion that Captain Eugene Ivanov's mission may have been directed more toward the creation of a crisis of confidence as between the Western allies than to the procurement of intelligence information. Yet it seems as though Ivanov was a fairly overt and heavy-handed operative, and that if disruption was his objective, his success was due more to lucky coincidence than to the cunning of his own contrivances. At one critical Cliveden weekend in October of 1962 Ivanov is reliably reported to have been going so flat out in his attempts to enlist high-level British sympathy and support for the Soviet position over Cuba as to render himself both objectionable and conspicuous; and it was just *lagniappe* that on the earlier occasion Jack met Christine by chance encounter at the pool and so swiftly succumbed to her charms. Moreover, if such was his mission, Ivanov was also the beneficiary of the most extraordinary series of failures of coordination on the part of British authorities concerned, the security services having been well aware of his significance and the game that he was playing with the wretched Dr. Ward as his tool nearly two years before the final explosion.

Psywar

From what may be a particularly subjective point of view, it is regretted that Mr. Dulles did not give us more in his chapter entitled "Intelligence in the Cold War," for example by pointing up more clearly the essential differences in the Communist and Western approaches to propaganda and other forms of psychological warfare. The standard Soviet practice of constant and continuing reiteration of a theme or thesis stands out in sharp contrast to the generally relevant practice among Western propagandists, which seems to have its origins in and to take its main inspiration from press attitudes toward "news." Even the most productive themes and theses are quickly abandoned or allowed to sink soon into disuse once the headlines have been made and the story has been told.

Consider the contrary Soviet practice, which is well illustrated by their treatment of what must have been for their propagandists the extremely difficult and discouraging subject of the brash betrayal and brutal suppression of the Hungarian freedom fighters in November 1956. Throughout the non-Communist world and in many areas behind the iron curtain there was at the beginning an almost universal revulsion of feeling and condemnation for this act of naked Soviet imperialism. Thus the Soviet propaganda machine was forced to begin from far behind scratch and invent and fabricate a whole series of justifications and rationalizations which few Western propagandists would have believed likely to command any significant degree of credence and acceptance. Yet in a remarkably short space of time, by continuing to hammer away at their bald-faced distortions, the Soviet mouthpieces had succeeded at the least in beclouding the issues and at the most in creating widespread belief that the Soviet action had been justified in the interests of rescuing the Hungarian people from slipping back into a state of "reactionary feudalism." In getting off to their start they enjoyed a windfall in the form of a strong assist from that self-proclaimed prophet of neutralism, Krishna Menon, who seemed only too happy to serve as the Soviet stalking-horse in the United Nations debate on intervention in Hungary and who was able to com-

pletely confuse the discussion by his strident exploitation of the Suez incident.

Neither the consistency nor the truth of Soviet representations has ever appeared to be of much concern to their propagandists. They seem to proceed on the assumption that they can get away with any amount of enlargement and tergiversation and to operate on the theory that the memory of man for words spoken and deeds done is very short. Moreover, they are not unduly concerned about being caught at and called to account for even the most transparent of their canards. The Philby case offers a good illustration of this thick-skinned attitude and approach. Those who followed the unfolding chapters of that case during the spring and summer months of 1963 will doubtless recall that many assets of the Soviet propaganda mechanism were marshaled to plant and cultivate the version that Philby's mysterious disappearance from Beirut earlier in the year was in fact no mystery at all. He was simply denounced as a British secret agent and said to be operating in the deserts and mountains of the Yemen to overthrow the "glorious new revolutionary regime" there. In less than a month's time following the propagation of this wholly fabricated story, which incidentally had picked up widespread belief and following in the West, circumstances forced upon the Russians the acknowledgment of Philby's defection to them, and they blandly announced the awarding to him of Soviet citizenship. In so doing they gave no slight indication of dismay, and there has never been any attempt on their part to explain or correct their previous account of the disappearance. And they seem, unfortunately, to have been permitted to slip off this hook with little difficulty.

Exchanges

The still current incident arising from the imprisonment by the Russians of Yale professor Frederick C. Barghoorn, taken together with the mid-October event of the exchange of two American prisoners—Walter Ciszek and Marvin Mankinen—for two Soviet espionage agents picked up last August by the FBI, provides timely corroboration for Mr. Dulles's reservations concerning the wisdom of establishing a pattern of this type of prisoner exchange. At page 119 Mr. Dulles ob-

serves—and without the benefit of these two late developments—many of the risks which are inherent in such trafficking in the persons of real or alleged espionage agents. If our Government is going to play at this game it should at least do so with eyes wide open to the hazards which are involved, including the possibility that the Russians, who are very old hands at this form of enterprise, will be the gainers in the preponderance of any such swaps as may be engineered or acceded to by them.

It would certainly appear that in the Ciszek-Mankinen exchange the Russians gave up nothing of value to themselves in releasing a middle-aged priest held since 1940 and a youthful student, whereas they realized a very significant gain in recovering two well-trained and experienced operatives—who, had they been held and subjected to the pressures and uncertainties which are the inevitable concomitants of conviction and heavy sentences, could very conceivably have ended by providing information and leads of the greatest value to the security services of the United States and presumably other Western allies. Irrespective of what may have been the controlling reason for the arrest of Professor Barghoorn, and it is anybody's guess whether the Russians were mainly motivated by a desire to retaliate for the immediately preceding arrest of their own agents—or to discourage the further development of cultural contacts of this order—or simply to put out of action a scholar who has long been a cinder in Khrushchev's eye because of his expert knowledge of the Soviet system and record of exposing the myth of "Soviet legality," it is evident that he was quite innocent of the charge of espionage for which he was claimed to have been arrested and imprisoned. Moreover, if this incident had not backfired with unforeseen violence in the faces of the Soviet policy makers, Barghoorn could have become "very large wampum" as a bargaining counter, to be held in reserve for coaxing out of us the release of one or several of their intelligence officers or agents caught *in flagrante* by the FBI.

Actually, as previously suggested, the Russians have been playing at this game of "exchanges" for many years and have on numerous earlier occasions shown themselves to be completely brazen and unscrupulous in their connected tactics.

The Kindermann-Wolscht affair, which in 1924-26 resulted in an impasse in Russo-German relations so serious as to have threatened to sever diplomatic relations between the two countries, furnishes an excellent example and a most rewarding case study of the underlying Soviet motivation and methods employed in arresting foreign persons innocent of espionage and holding them for ultimate exchange in return for their own professional spies and saboteurs.

That case began with the arrest in Russia on patently trumped-up charges of espionage of two young German students (Kindermann and Wolscht) as an offsetting deterrent to the trial which was about to commence in Germany of a number of Chekist terrorist agents for planning and attempting to promote in 1923 a revolution to overthrow the then very unstable German government. It did not conclude before the highly reputable German diplomat, Gustav Hilger (who was attached to the staff of the German Ambassador in Moscow), had been charged with aiding and abetting the students, and until after most of the ranking governmental officials on both sides had become deeply embroiled in the controversy.

In the end, the Russians got back their boy (Skoblevsky), a personal pal of Stalin who had been dispatched by Trotsky on his revolutionary mission, in return for the two obscure German students who had been guilty of no crime in the first place. For the fuller details of this highly illuminating study in Soviet motives and methods the attention of readers is invited to an article prepared by Professor Lamar Cecil, until recently of John Hopkins University, and published in the *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Volume XXI No. 2, July 1961.

The Trumpeting of Casualties

Early in his first chapter Mr. Dulles observes that "intelligence is probably the least understood and the most misrepresented of the professions," and in the concluding chapters he advances the most persuasive arguments in support of his appeal—which he clearly appears to be making on behalf of our intelligence community as a whole—for a better understanding of the difficulties and for a more sympathetic acceptance of the inevitable percentage of reverses which must

be expected in intelligence operations. The point is especially well taken at this time in view of certain quite recent and wholly unwarranted scapegoating for which the CIA in particular has been required to stand still.

But there has been a long-standing need for both official and public opinion in the United States and in the West more generally to adopt a more sensible and realistic attitude toward what might be termed the *casualties* of intelligence operations in the cold war. The fact that our freedoms and liberties and those of our friends and allies are being subjected to the ubiquitous and relentless campaign of Communist espionage and subversion on a front as wide as the world should entitle the Western intelligence and security services which are courageously and effectively striving against this unprecedented assault to a better break from their own press and public opinion. Most thinking people have long since digested and, however reluctantly, accepted the necessity of combatting the Communist threat by the expenditure of vast treasure and much blood. Why is it, then, that the occasional intelligence casualties which are incurred in the form of personnel losses and "blown" operations are the subject of so much soul-searching self-criticism and anguished cries of *mea culpa*, to say nothing of having become the standard butt of deliberate distortions and sharp ridicule?

The passages in the book which attempt to deal with this problem include numerous historical references from which it should be clear to any fair-minded reader that clandestine political warfare has been going on from time immemorial and has long been a recognized arm of statecraft. It has affected the destinies of nations and in innumerable cases has served to protect the lives of people. At the worst, its execution involves relatively few casualties, and for the most part none at all. There is simply no rationality in the fact that people, certainly including Americans, will cheer the spectacle of massed military forces exterminating one another, as well as innocent bystanders, by the millions, and when so-called "peace" comes they will deplore as somehow unnatural and immoral the kind of activity on our part which can contribute so much to forestalling the necessity for armed conflict.

To be sure, such programs involve secrecy as an essential ingredient, and there appears to be a well-developed national myth that secrecy in Government operations is bad *per se*. At the same time and again quite illogically, we all practice secrecy of one sort or another in our personal lives and business dealings and have a constitutional distaste for people who do not observe discretion in their private affairs.

No one should construe this as an appeal for a *carte blanche* to conduct covert operations without the fullest coordination with the policy levels of government or otherwise than in the most meticulously careful and professional manner that it may be possible to devise. But when these and all of the other requisite tests are met, and when a top-level decision has been taken to entrust an operation to agencies that include some of the most able and dedicated persons to be found anywhere in the service of our Government, there should be a greater public willingness to give those brethren who are "serving the rice" some benefit of the doubt. When on November 28, 1961, President Kennedy declared in commenting upon the difficulties of the intelligence profession that "its successes are unheralded and its failures are trumpeted" it was surely farthest from his intention to grant to critics an unlimited shooting license to hunt within this sensitive preserve.

*One such scavenger (as cited on p. A3) recently received his long overdue comeuppance when Kenneth Hugh DeCourcy, editor and publisher of the *Intelligence Digest*, was convicted on 13 December last in the Old Bailey of fraud, forgery, and perjury and sentenced to seven years.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

Mnemosyne and the OSS

NO BUGLES FOR SPIES: Tales of the OSS. By *Robert Hayden Alcorn*. (New York: David McKay. 1962. 209 pp. \$3.95.)

No facet of the human psyche is more strange and wonderful than the one associated with remembering. What things does it record sharply and durably? What things distortedly? What things not at all? What years of one's life does it store in discrete stacks? What in a disorderly jumble? What things that happened to someone else and what things that never happened at all does it come to register, vividly and in great detail, as one's very own? If you happen to have served in OSS and if you now read Mr. Alcorn's putative memoir, you too will find yourself ruminating about the mysteries of memory. You, even as I, will conclude that the book is a good part fiction and the rest a highly inaccurate reminiscence—which, incidentally, is contrived to do no harm whatever to the reputation of the reminiscencer.

Mr. Alcorn's account of his being hired by the Coordinator of Information in November 1941 is a case in point. It seems that General Donovan, hearing of his availability, sent him to be interviewed by a number of the branch chiefs. The interviews took place as ordered, and when Mr. Alcorn returned and told of the secrets that he had inadvertently picked up in their course, the General was mightily impressed. He turned to James Murphy, one of his personal aides, and said, ". . . 'And Jimmy this is what I want. I want all potential agent personnel [sic] channelled through Alcorn until further notice. No more passing prospects around the organization, from man to man. Alcorn can get all the basic information, clear the spot security checks and then, if OK, send them on.' He held out his hand to me. 'We need fellows like you. I'll see you tomorrow.'"

To be sure, there are only a few stories of General Donovan that are incredible. But this is one. In the first place I cannot conceive his having used the words, "agent personnel." In the second, even if the word "agent" is something that

Mr. Alcorn's memory produced well after the fact, I cannot believe the General would give such screening authority to a man of 32 whose post-college experience in gainful employment was limited to one year's teaching of English in a boys' school and two years of staff work in a congressman's office. My credulity snapped when I realized that Mr. Alcorn left General Donovan's office to take up (not the next day, by the way, but some two months later) the most junior sort of clerkship way down the line in the Personnel Division. To Mr. Alcorn's credit, be it said, he was rapidly promoted and before the year's end relieved of interviewing "agent personnel." In the autumn of 1942 he moved to the Research and Analysis Branch as the administrative officer for that rather substantial operation.

It is Mr. Alcorn's reminiscences of life in the R&A Branch that soured this reviewer on the general credibility of the book. Here he and I served at the same time, and the discrepancy between our respective memories is all but limitless. He could not have enjoyed his six months' tour much, as the following passage will show:

Vanity seemed to rule the whole setup. In several instances, men of high standing in their particular field were given key spots as division heads. Then, when another scholar in the same field became available, it was decided that one could not be placed above the other in the chain of command. So a new board or committee would be established for the late arrival from which he could function without having to take orders from his colleague. It was essential to give such a board or committee a pompous title such as the Board of Analysts or the Board of Review but to those in the know it was only a dodge, a rather tawdry and pathetic one when you realize that it was played out against the background provided by the Battle of Midway, the Coral Sea, Okinawa and the like. [NOTE: The first two battles were fought four or five months before Mr. Alcorn joined R&A, the Okinawa campaign two years after he had left.]

As the branch grew, each doctor brought in his research assistants from his former university. Then, when they were used up, the prize pupils, the "teacher's pets," were brought in to do the work. This latter move caused the General some uneasiness lest the organization might become a haven for draft dodgers. There seemed to be an increasing number of healthy young men doing paper work that could and should be done by the older men first brought in for the purpose.

I find this not only false in tone but plain wrong in almost every particular. And it is no less wrong than a dozen or more other statements in this chapter, including such nonsense as alleging that Professor Langer's intimates called him "Bull" (in 30 years' association with him I have never heard him so addressed or referred to), intimating an R&A Branch responsibility for the functions of Stanley Lovell's Research and Development unit, and misstating by 180 degrees the organization pattern of the branch he serviced as administrative officer. The funny story of the petulant professor (though left unnamed, clearly identifiable) sitting on the floor is totally untrue and a gratuitous calumny on a gifted and courageous American scholar.

Nor are all the errors confined to the passages dealing with R&A. They are generously scattered throughout. Just for example: the Ascension Island story is ruined, the tale of the courageous woman parachutist is mistold again, the source of intelligence relating to the V-weapons is wrong, the date of the creation of the COI is off by months, the steps in the dissolution of OSS and the beginnings of CIA are hopelessly confused, and so on.

These things, small in themselves, do add up. They add up to the point of pretty thoroughly discrediting the whole book. The well-told array of spy stories would in any circumstances be hard to take in their entirety. At best you would have gravely doubted the authenticity of some of their chilling details while perhaps accepting a probable core of truth. Now you might be pardoned for dismissing them as fiction from start to finish. You will feel doubly pardoned when you realize that Mr. Alcorn's position as Special Funds Officer in the European theater took him personally no closer to the spy business than it did to the clandestine trans-Adriatic supply operations he writes about. Here he disarmingly notes that his vantage point for observation of that thrilling episode was when ". . . I now found myself involved, at General Donovan's direction, with the Yugoslav court-in-exile [in London]. It was perhaps the most pleasant assignment of the war for me." How black and foreboding the Dalmatian coast as sensed from Claridges.

It is stupid in a reviewer to berate an author for not having written another kind of book. I intend the following not as berating but as bemoaning. For here and there in the book there are passages where Mr. Alcorn writes of things he really knew about. These have to do with the tasks of a special funds officer. I find them interesting and informative. They have a ring about them quite different from the rest of the book. Perhaps if he had focussed his narrative on them, at some risk to U.S. security interests and more to the sale of the book, he might have made a substantial contribution to the literature of intelligence—something that what he did produce is not.

SHERMAN KENT

Spies and Defectors

THE SECRET WAR: A Story of International Espionage Since World War II. By *Sanche de Gramont*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1962. 507 pp. \$5.95.)

The story of international espionage since World War II told by Sanche de Gramont is a collection of spy and defector case histories ostensibly recounted in support of the thesis that clandestine operational techniques are the same on both sides of the iron curtain. De Gramont limits his discussion of international espionage to the American and Soviet intelligence services, and he develops his point of view through several chapters that compare the history, organization, methods, and probable future of CIA and the KGB.

As examples of intelligence organizations at work, he tells the well-known histories of Judith Coplon, Harry Gold, Rudolf Abel, Francis Gary Powers, George Blake, Lonsdale, Burgess and Maclean, the Petrovs, Khokhlov, and Noel Field, with passing references to a miscellany of other figures. The stories are told in detail: his account of the Coplon case, for example, while not wholly accurate, is extensive and a more complete one than has previously appeared.

At first glance De Gramont appears to give equal time, pro and con, to CIA and the KGB. In the opening chapter, entitled "Total Espionage," he says ". . . the United States, like the Soviet Union and because of the Soviet Union, is practicing total espionage. It is matching the Soviet Union in the secret warfare of intelligence just as it is matching it (or trying to) in the construction of missiles. There are few techniques used by Soviet espionage that American intelligence cannot duplicate. The intelligence organizations of the two blocs are monolithic and powerful, and work in a climate of secrecy and ruthlessness."

The balance sheet which the author draws up is nevertheless curiously one-sided. In the first chapter, he says of CIA: "These days it is fashionable to describe the agency as a monster on the rampage."

"In that short time, which significantly coincides with the Cold War, it had grown like a delicate child who in adolescence becomes the bully on the block."

MORI/HRP PAGES A21-A25

"Dulles' statement that 'if you believe in a program, you may have to break a little crockery to put it into effect' is rather chilling now that the public has been given a glimpse of CIA's closet full of broken dishes."

One looks in vain for similarly specific characterization of the KGB.

At another point he remarks, "Soviet espionage, for all its ubiquity and iniquity, would have trouble matching the CIA's record in the last ten years of meddling in the affairs of other countries." He then lists eleven instances of what he considers CIA meddling. He makes no parallel list of Soviet meddling.

The nearest the author comes to comparing a single aspect of the two services is in a discussion of the degree to which they influence their respective governments' policies. De Gramont's treatment of the relative importance of American and Soviet intelligence organizations in the policy-making process betrays either an astonishing ignorance about political and administrative realities in the two states or an astonishing contempt for his readers' critical faculties:

CIA

The CIA has in fact become as direct a policy-maker as the State Department through its political forays. It is much more than an intelligence agency and serves to counter the spread of Communism throughout the world.

How can the CIA avoid being right at the heart of policy, when it selects anti-Communist regimes to support in trouble spots such as Laos, Iran, Guatemala.

It [CIA] has gone so far to meet the Soviet threat that it is now tagged an "invisible government" operating without any mandate from the people and without check of any kind.

KGB

In the Soviet Union proselytizing is a party not an intelligence function—it is up to the party to support leftist regimes, workers groups and the like. Since 1956, when the Cominform was dissolved, there has been no specific agency directing the operations of international Communism. Yet under the party's Central Committee, these operations are still an essential branch of Soviet foreign policy. They have never been the function of Soviet intelligence.

Even though the chiefs of the Soviet intelligence organizations (KGB and MVD) are high up in the party organization, qualified sources believe that the policy-making role of the Soviet espionage and counter-espionage organizations is a minor one.

Apparently indifferent, however, to conventional standards of consistency, he writes, only a few pages before the "invisible government" statement:

In fact, CIA is working under multiple government controls. It is responsible first, of course, to the President, who checks on the CIA through a board of consultants on foreign intelligence activities. The board, on which President Kennedy's father has served, travels all over the world looking into CIA's clandestine operations and reports its findings to the President. Next the CIA is responsible to the National Security Council (made up of the President, Vice-President, CIA Director, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and director of the Office of Defense Mobilization), which has a sub-committee on CIA operations. The CIA acts on directives which it has been given by the President and the National Security Council. The CIA is also responsible to four Congressional committees, the House and Senate Armed Forces and appropriations committees. CIA representatives have appeared before other committees, including the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and House Un-American Activities and Foreign Relations committees.

The reason for his criticism of CIA, De Gramont implies, is that in his opinion an intelligence organization has no place in an open democratic society. "Before the last decade," he says, "the United States was spied upon but not spying, whereas the Soviet Union was spying but not spied upon. But thanks to the pressures of the Cold War, the United States did some catching up, and in doing so, strained some of the elementary principles of a democratic society. . . . The revelation that the United States was waging an intelligence war with as much vigor and determination as the Soviet Union shattered the illusion of a 'moral' cold war, a crusade fought against godless Communism. . . . Can a society that believes in government by the people, in the people's right to know, and in noninterference in the affairs of other nations send agents to spy on foreign governments, subvert Soviet officials, and sanction the professional spy's arsenal of villainy?"

For the Soviets, on the other hand, he considers espionage a normal activity, consistent with their form of government, and therefore justified. "Soviet intelligence," he says, "operates at the heart of a system where secrecy is the air you breathe and conspiracy is the ground you walk on. It could no more be criticized for going too far than the Communist

Party could be criticized for being the only party. The tradition of an all-powerful Soviet secret police and intelligence net reaches back to the czars while the United States intelligence apparatus is a child of the Cold War."

By a kind of intellectual sleight-of-hand, De Gramont shifts almost imperceptibly from the thesis that espionage techniques are the same the world over to the notion that CIA, a late-comer to the field adopting Soviet espionage methods, is therefore a police-state mechanism using totalitarian techniques. On this basis he concludes, "The criticism leveled against CIA was eminently healthy. The dangerous similarity of methods and goals between Soviet and American intelligence was brought into the open. The tension between the democratic principle and the need for an effective intelligence service was restored . . . The CIA is considered a kind of freak in a democratic society, but it is allowed to exist (under increasing control, one hopes) because it has proved its necessity."

After his consistent disparagement, the author's final acknowledgement that the existence of CIA is a necessity leaves the reader wondering exactly what his point of view is. While he makes indiscriminate use of sources, some clearly pro-Communist, there is no indication that he wrote his book as a contribution to the Soviet defamation campaign directed against American intelligence. In some degree, nevertheless, the inaccuracies, invidious comparisons, innuendo, and specious reasoning serve the purposes of that campaign.

The observation that similar techniques are utilized by all intelligence services is not remarkably penetrating or profound. The idea that there is nothing to choose between in U.S. and Soviet intelligence activity could be interpreted as an application of the neutralist philosophy that there is no advantage in being committed to either one. De Gramont, who is a French citizen and was once associated with French intelligence, does not go so far as to advocate that the French and other European intelligence services should constitute a Third Force in espionage.

The "plague on both your houses" thesis of the book raises the question of whether it was inspired by French intelligence. There is no hard evidence that it was. The point of view which

it propounds, however, is not inconsistent with French interests and attitudes.

BURGESS AND MACLEAN. By *Anthony Purdy and Douglas Sutherland.* (London: Secker & Warburg. 1963. 191 pp. 18/-)

The flight of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean to the Soviet Union is still front-page news in Britain more than twelve years after the event. No incident, not even the Profumo affair with its frosting of sex, has so deeply shaken British complacency and self-confidence. More recent traitors such as George Blake and William Vassall have angered and frightened the British public, but these and other spies have been sternly punished, then forgotten. Only Burgess and Maclean remain close beneath the surface of British consciousness, a constant preoccupation.

Certainly the reason for this preoccupation is not far to seek. Burgess and Maclean were members in good standing of the loosely formed upper-class governing group known as the Establishment. Both men came from this social and economic class that has assumed the right and responsibility to govern. Not even its enemies expect the Establishment ever to betray the nation. George Blake, William Vassall, and Harry Houghton were not members of this elite; their betrayal, although reprehensible, was therefore not profoundly disturbing. But since Burgess and Maclean went over to the Soviets, British faith in the Establishment has been visibly shaken. It is not likely to be fully restored in this century.

British preoccupation with the Burgess-Maclean case is reflected in the number of books on it.¹ Confined within a small domain of fact by the requirements of official secrecy,

¹In addition to wide and persistent press coverage on Burgess and Maclean, the following books on the case have been published in the United Kingdom: Tom Driberg, *Guy Burgess, A Portrait with Background* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1956); Geoffrey Hoare, *The Missing Macleans* (London: Cassell & Co., 1955); John S. Mather, ed., *The Great Spy Scandal* (London: Daily Express, 1955); Cyril Connelly, *The Missing Diplomats* (London: Queen Anne Press, 1952). The British Government has published a white paper, *Report Concerning the Disappearance of Two Former Foreign Office Officers* (London: Stationery Office, 1955).

authors have been forced to tell and retell the same story, adding whatever tidbits of gossip and bizarre interpretations of events they could winnow from the chaff of oft-repeated fact. Yet the books keep coming.

Purdy and Sutherland, both British journalists, have added the latest volume to this pile. Unfortunately for them, their book hit the stands a few weeks before Harold Philby, friend of Burgess and former officer of MI-6, confounded his friends and defenders by fleeing to the Soviet Union, an action which the British Government chose to confirm only some months later. At the same time the British authorities announced that Philby had indeed been the "third man" who informed Maclean that he was under investigation.

Perhaps, however, the authors had an inkling of Philby's role. According to their account, a British diplomat in Washington told Burgess of the investigation that was closing in on Maclean. They suggest that Burgess' subsequent outrageous behavior may have been designed to force his recall to London so that he could warn Maclean. If this was indeed his intention, Burgess needed some weeks or months to achieve the desired result, and such scheming does not appear to be realistic. The true explanation might lie rather in Burgess' fear that the investigation of Maclean would also uncover him. Certainly his drinking and other escapades give the impression of a man falling apart under tension.

An interesting but hitherto neglected phase of the case is its coverage through the years by the British press. The authors review the exploits of their colleagues and the antics of such buffoons as Col. Oreste Pinto, who was hired by the *Express* to find the missing diplomats. They do not, however, describe adequately the full role of the press in the search for Burgess and Maclean, probably for obvious reasons of security.

As is natural, Purdy and Sutherland give much attention to the security aspect of the affair. During much of 1962, while this book was in preparation, Fleet Street and the British Government were at drawn daggers over the Vassall case. British security agencies had become a favorite press target. No British journalist was anxious to defend in any way the British investigative and security services. The theatrical issuance of warrants in 1962 for the arrest of the fugitives if

they returned to the United Kingdom, as was rumored, is ridiculed but not explained by the authors. Indeed they admit that they do not know the answer to this puzzling gesture of the authorities. Could it have been, they ask, an action to prevent a possible return?

After twelve years the role of the British security agencies in the drama remains a puzzle. Purdy and Sutherland clearly know far more about this role than they can publish. The actions of the security services remain the best-kept secret of the Burgess-Maclean case.

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Soviet Intelligence

HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE. By *Alexander Orlov*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1963. 187 pp. \$4.)

Any observant layman who follows the details of Soviet intelligence operations in the press soon finds that they all have one common factor. Each Soviet operation, wherever mounted and whatever its target, has a single goal—obtaining classified documents from the files of other governments.

The Soviet Government wants documents. It has little interest in opinion, although it will accept the considered judgment of experts who are its agents. It does collect overt information in great quantity also. But its principal interest remains the classified files of other governments. The Soviet regime puts first things first.

Alexander Orlov, a ranking officer of Soviet State Security who commanded the NKVD in Spain until his defection in 1938, drives this point home. It is the principal theme of his book. It is a fact that the American intelligence officer should never forget.

Orlov declares that the purpose of his book is to recreate an espionage handbook that he composed for the Soviets back in 1936. Fortunately for us, however, he has done no such thing. Instead, he has made a survey of Soviet intelligence practice, especially as it relates to the role of the "illegal" or deep-cover agent, using his wide past experience to analyze current Soviet techniques. Could his understanding of the illegal's fears and difficulties in foreign parts derive from his own personal experience? The result is in any case of the greatest value to the layman and quite useful to the intelligence expert. The central theme of Soviet preoccupation with documents, however, remains Orlov's most significant contribution.

This Soviet preoccupation must be impressed on the American intelligence officer, who, in all likelihood, has been overtrained in the relative insignificance of covert information. American students of intelligence work—usually they are scholars and therefore committed to research—take pleasure

in stressing that clandestine collection of information plays a rather minor role in the aggregate activity. The finished intelligence product, they say, usually contains not more than ten per cent of clandestine data. Then they try to smooth the clandestine operator's ruffled feelings by admitting that it is an "important ten per cent" just the same.

In Orlov's opinion, this Western reliance on overt information often leads to unprovable hypotheses and at the worst to wild leaps into the unknown. In contrast to the ten per cent maximum of clandestine intelligence in the American end product, he declares that the Soviet military intelligence service, which does use some overt materials, puts 80 per cent of its effort into secret operations, while Soviet State Security relies entirely on clandestine techniques. Orlov clearly does not approve of American intelligence practices.

Although the book is a contribution to our literature, the intelligence officer will read it with some regret. Few officers who have left the Soviet service can match Orlov's knowledge of its operations, techniques, and personalities. His knowledge of its history and development up to the late thirties is unsurpassed. Because of Stalin's purges and of losses in the war, few men like him who grew up with Soviet intelligence remain. It is unfortunate, therefore, that he avoids giving his American audience any insight into the service during the campaign against Trotsky and the great purges. His detailed comments on it and its leading personalities during these fateful years would be invaluable. Sensational accounts such as his own *History of Stalin's Secret Crimes* cannot meet this need. The reader will put down the book with the hope that some day Orlov will tell his own experiences and give us the story of Soviet intelligence as he knows it.

The weakest section of this book is the final chapter on guerrilla warfare; here the dated quality of Orlov's information is most clearly shown. His elementary generalizations on guerrilla activity are drawn from personal experience limited to the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars. Soviet guerrilla experience in World War II, which importantly influenced present-day guerrilla doctrine, is covered in only a page or two. Postwar guerrilla activities are not mentioned.

Regrettably the *Handbook* has neither index nor bibliography.

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND: A Military-Political History, 1918-41. By *John Erickson*. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1962. 889 pp. \$15.)

When he submitted his manuscript for publication, the author of this book could not know that approaching events would give it a unique timeliness. One of his principal themes is the basic and continuing conflict between the Soviet armed services and the power complex centering on the state security service. This struggle first developed in the days of Trotskiy. It reached dramatic intensity when Marshal Tukhachevskiy fell. Since the second World War the rise and fall of military personalities has revealed discontent in the armed services. Now the treason of Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy has thrown an embarrassing light on the struggle between these forces. Erickson's book permits intelligence officers to study the background and development of this conflict.

The author, who did his research while a Fellow of St. Anthony's College, Oxford, discusses the history of the Soviet army between the outbreak of the Revolution and the German invasion of 1941. This is not a history of Soviet military institutions, but rather a discussion of the impact on the Soviet armed forces of internal politics, international developments, and leading Soviet personalities. Two lengthy chapters are devoted to the military purges of 1937, their immediate causes, and their complex effects on Soviet and world affairs. Indeed, the theme of the purges, their origins, and their effect on Soviet military policy are a major element of the book. Although he cannot fully explain the military holocaust (no one can in the present state of our knowledge), Erickson performs a useful service in summarizing the events of 1937-1938, stripping away some of the more improbable interpretations of events, and placing the purge in the perspective of its time. This perspective helps us to understand the developments of the Penkovskiy affair.

A selection from the most broadly informative books on intelligence operations and processes available in English.

PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE¹

The professional intelligence officer does not disdain the study of the overt literature of his profession. Authentic published accounts or analyses of intelligence processes and techniques, case histories, and operational experiences are valuable sources for the enrichment of professional knowledge. Much can be learned through the study of this literature, not only in background information, but also for application to current problems.

The following bibliography has been confined to books available in English, with emphasis on the most broadly illuminating of these. Viewed as a symposium on intelligence methods or as a composite history of intelligence, selections from public literature cannot of course tell the whole story; many of these are at best of uneven quality, but they do offer material that should be part of the intelligence officer's basic equipment. Some items of supplementary reading are suggested in a few of the annotations, and foreign editions are noted for the convenience of the reader abroad.

The selections fall into the following categories:

The Intelligence Process—theory, procedure, organization
Operational History:

- From the earliest times up to World War II
- Activities of the Western Allies in World War II
- Organized resistance against the Nazis
- German intelligence in World War II
- The Soviet Services
- Evading Capture and Escape from Imprisonment

¹ November 1963 revision of original Spring 1961 edition.

Public Texts

Public Text

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS—**Theory, Procedure, Organization**

DULLES, Allen W. *The Craft of Intelligence*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963. 277 p.)

Here the former Director of Central Intelligence, after touching on some of the early history of intelligence, examines many current aspects of intelligence requirements, collection, and production, describes the Communist intelligence services, and explores the uses of intelligence. With the authority of his own experience he expounds the role of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community in the U.S. Government.

[An expansion of the author's article which appeared with this title in the *Britannica Book of the Year*, 1963. A shorter version under the same title was published in *Harper's Magazine*, April 1963.]

FARAGO, Ladislav. *War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence*. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954. 379 p.)

A comprehensive essay covering both the organization and procedures of world intelligence agencies and their activities in the espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and propaganda fields. Marred by doctrinal crudities, factual inaccuracies, and uncritical journalism, it nevertheless is useful as a composite of the most important information on intelligence doctrine publicly available in 1954. With source citations and index.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *War of Wits* (London: Hutchinson, 1956); *Det Tysta Kriget* (Stockholm: Ljus Forlag, 1956); *Les Secrets de l'Espionnage* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1955).]

HILSMAN, Roger. *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. 187 p.)

An academic study of the theory of intelligence, with emphasis on its relation to policy. Valuable for its provocative thesis that policy is likely to go its own way in disregard of intelligence, while intelligence tends to turn scholar, gathering and piecing together facts for their own sake. The author later became director of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

KENT, Sherman. *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949. 226 p.)

Foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production, by the present Chairman of the Board of National Estimates. Lays down many principles which have since become established in practice.

[Published in translation as *Inteligencia Estratégica para la Política Mundial Norteamericana* (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, Biblioteca del Oficial, 1951), and in pirated Japanese and Chinese editions.]

RANSOM, Harry Howe. *Central Intelligence and National Security*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. 287 p.)

A scholarly inquiry into the development, organization, and problems of the U.S. intelligence system, with particular attention to the production of national estimates. Includes a valuable bibliography.

WHITEHEAD, Don. *The FBI Story: A Report to the People*. (New York: Random House, 1956. 368 p.)

A laudatory account of FBI operations, both anticriminal and in the maintenance of internal security.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *The FBI Story* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957); *Le F.B.I.* (Paris: Morgan, 1957); *La Storia dello FBI* (Milan: Sugar Editore, 1958); *Historia del F.B.I.* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena, 1958); *Die FBI-Story* (Munich: Paul List, 1959).]

U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. *Intelligence Activities: A Report to the Congress*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. 76 p.)

The unclassified report of the intelligence task force of the second Hoover Commission, under the chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark. Considers problems of intelligence at the national and departmental levels, including those of personnel, security, administration, and functional organization.

[Also published as House Document No. 201, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955.]

OPERATIONAL HISTORY**Through World War I**

BAKELLESS, John. *Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1959. 406 p.)

The most nearly complete account of secret service in the American Revolution, covering—in an impossible attempt at encyclopedic narrative—both sides' activities on the American continent. The author had experience in military intelligence.

BULLOCH, John. *M. I. 5: The Origin and History of the British Counter-Espionage Service*. London: Arthur Barker, 1963. 206 p.)

A journalistic history of the British security service from its establishment in 1909 through the early months of World War II. In particular it describes the work and some of the methods of Captain (later Major General) Sir Vernon Kell, Director of M.I.5 from 1909 to 1940, using as illustrative material many of the espionage cases, largely German, with which the service coped during this period.

JAMES, Admiral Sir William. *The Code Breakers of Room 40: The Story of Admiral Sir William Hall, Genius of British Counter-Intelligence*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. 212 p.)

Biography of Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence during World War I, by the officer in charge of communications intelligence. Cen-

ters on the decipherment of German messages, including the notorious Zimmermann telegram.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *The Eyes of the Navy* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1955).]

[For other reading on this subject, see Chapter IX, "Secret Intelligence—1917–1919," in *The Sky Was Always Blue*, by Admiral Sir William James (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1951); *The Man of Room 40*, by A. W. Ewing (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1940); *40 O. B.*, by Hugh Cleland Hoy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1932); and *The Zimmermann Telegram*, by Barbara W. Tuchman (New York: Viking, 1958).]

ROWAN, Richard Wilmer. *The Story of Secret Service*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937. 732 p.)

The best comprehensive history of espionage and its practitioners from biblical times to the end of World War I. Often sketchy and sometimes over-dramatized, the treatment is generally sound and at its best illuminated by perceptive reflections on the ways of human kind.

[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: John Miles, Ltd., 1938).]

STERN, Philip Van Doren. *Secret Missions of the Civil War*. (New York: Rand McNally, 1959. 320 p.)

Integrated and annotated anthology of the best accounts of clandestine operations undertaken by both North and South during the American Civil War.

YARDLEY, Herbert Osborn. *The American Black Chamber*. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931. 375 p.)

Querulous history of the first modern U.S. organization for communications intelligence, by its founder and director during World War I and through the twenties.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *Secret Service in America* (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1940); *Le Cabinet Noir Américain* (Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1935); *Amerikas Svarta Kammare* (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1938).]

THE WESTERN ALLIES IN WORLD WAR II

ALSOP, Stewart and Thomas Braden. *Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage*. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946. 237 p.)

Fragmentary but authentic examples of OSS clandestine intelligence and paramilitary operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The authors were OSS parachutists.

[Published in Swedish translation as *O.S.S.* (Stockholm: Ljüs, 1947).]

BABINGTON-SMITH, Constance. *Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II*. (New York: Harper, 1957. 266 p.)

Description by a leading RAF photo interpreter of the development of photo intelligence techniques, first by British and then by Allied personnel, and their use in the European theater. Shows the role of aerial photography in planning the D-Day landings, in targeting and bomb damage assessment, in industrial analysis, and in learning the secrets of German countermeasures, radar, and the new "V" weapons.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *Evidence in Camera* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1958).]

HYDE, H. Montgomery. *Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1963. 257 p.)

An anecdotal account of British secret intelligence operations in the western hemisphere during World War II, by a member of the staff of Sir William Stephenson, then Director of British Security Coordination in the United States. Describes this organization's relationships with the FBI, the support it gave to General Donovan in establishing the OSS, and many BSC operations in intelligence collection, counter-espionage and covert action.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *The Quiet Canadian* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962).]

IND, Colonel Allison. *Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War against Japan*. (New York: David McKay, 1958. 305 p.)

Kaleidoscopic scenes from the operations of the clandestine AIB amalgamated from American, British, Australian, and Dutch personnel under General MacArthur's command in the Southwest Pacific. The author, AIB Deputy Controller, emphasizes the activities of the Australian Coast Watchers concealed on Japanese-held islands but also devotes sections to guerrilla and agent activity in the Philippines and to sabotage operations.

[For further reading see Eric A. Feldt, *The Coastwatchers* (New York and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1946; New York: Ballantine Books, 1959).]

PEERS, William R. and Dean Brellis. *Behind the Burma Road*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963. 246 p.)

History of the operations of OSS Detachment 101 behind the Japanese lines in Burma, by its commanding officer. Although the most spectacular of these were paramilitary, they were intertwined with the collection of important tactical intelligence for the regular military forces.

STEAD, Philip John. *Second Bureau*. (London: Evans Bros., 1959. 212 p.)

Wartime history of the regular French military intelligence service, comprising the Deuxième Bureau and its supporting organizations for clandestine collection and counterespionage. Based on French-language accounts and on conversations with many officers of the service, it shows the difficulty experienced in maintaining operations after 1940 in double clandestinity, secret from both the Germans and the Vichy Government.

WOHLSTETTER, Roberta. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. 426 p.)

A painstaking study of the sequence of events in the months before Pearl Harbor with respect to the acquisition and handling of intelligence, especially communications intelligence, bearing on the attack and its effect at the command level. It constitutes an exhaustive case history of this classic warning situation, giving particular attention to the uses and users of indications intelligence and tracing the influence of command organization, bureaucracy, security compartmentation, and incomplete communication on the effectiveness of warning.

[For further detailed reading see the Congressional Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. 580 p.) The full text of the Congressional hearings is contained in *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Parts 1-39. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945-46).]

RESISTANCE AGAINST THE NAZIS

BUCKMASTER, Maurice James. *Specially Employed: The Story of British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance*. (London: Batchworth Press, 1952. 200 p.)

The work of the French Section of the British Special Operations Executive as described by its chief. Covers the organization of resistance, many aspects of tradecraft, and the operations of a number of individual agents in France.

[For further reading on this subject see Buckmaster's *They Fought Alone* (New York: Norton, 1958; and British editions).]

COLLIER, Richard. *Ten Thousand Eyes*. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958. 320 p.)

Probably the best English-language account of the resistance agent networks in France which, under the direction of Free French Headquarters in London, secured information on the beach and inland defenses of Hitler's Atlantic Wall.

[Published in these foreign editions: *Ten Thousand Eyes* (London: Collins, 1958); *La Guerre Secrète du Mur de l'Atlantique* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1958); *Tienduizend Ogen* (Hoorn: U.-M. "West

Friesland," 1958); *Zehntausend Augen* (Konstanz and Stuttgart: Diana Verlag, 1960).]

DELZELL, Charles F. *Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 620 p.)

Part I of this scholarly work traces the clandestine political opposition to Mussolini from 1924 to 1943, Part II the armed partisan resistance from 1943 to the end of the war.

HOWARTH, David Armine. *Across To Norway*. (New York: William Sloane, 1952. 286 p.)

The story of Norwegian escapees assembled at a British base in the Shetland Islands (where the author was deputy commander) to sail their small boats back and forth as transport for saboteurs, agents, and refugees. Also describes contacts with the Norwegian resistance and evasion from capture by the enemy.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *The Shetland Bus* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1951); *Sie Führen den Shetland Bus* (Tübingen: F. Schlichtenmayer [n.d.]).]

LAMPE, David. *The Savage Canary: The Story of Resistance in Denmark*. (London: Cassell, 1957. 236 p.)

High spots and personalities of the Danish resistance, with much material on resistance tradecraft.

[Published also as *The Danish Resistance* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960) and in Danish as *Den Utaemmede Kanarieflugt* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1957).]

[For an excellent short panoramic pamphlet on this subject see Jørgen Hastrup, *From Occupied to Ally: Danish Resistance Movement 1940-45* (Copenhagen: Press and Information Department, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963).]

MONTAGU, Ewen Edward Samuel. *The Man Who Never Was*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1954. 160 p.)

Account of a classic British deception operation which misled the Germans about the coming Allied invasion of Sicily. The body of a Marine officer was floated onto a beach in southern Spain with secret documents indicating that Greece would be the point of invasion. Illustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documentation, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions. The author was in charge of this operation.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *The Man Who Never Was* (London: Evans Brothers, 1953); *De Man Die Niet Bestond* (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1954); *L'Homme Qui N'Existait Pas* (Paris: Juilliard, 1954); *Mies Jota Ei Ollutkaan* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1954).]

[For further study see: Ian Colvin, *The Unknown Courier* (London: William Kimber, 1953); and Sir Alfred Duff Cooper, *Operation Heartbreak* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), a fictionalized version of the operation.]

REMY (Gilbert Renault-Roulier). *Memoirs of A Secret Agent of Free France. Vol. I: The Silent Company, June 1940—June 1942.* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. 406 p.)

The first of Rémy's six volumes on his experiences. Describes his escape from France and his joining the Free French Intelligence Service in London, his trips back to set up an agent net, and his second escape with his family.

[Volume II has also been translated, as *Courage and Fear* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1950). The other four volumes are: *Comment Meurt Un Réseau* and *Une Affaire de Trahison* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947); *Les Mains Jointes* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1948); . . . *Mais le Temple Est Bâti* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1950).]

WOODHOUSE, Christopher Montague. *Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting.* (London: Hutchinson, 1951. 320 p.)

An authoritative account of Greek resistance against the Germans during World War II and the internal postwar struggle, with emphasis on the political background. Col. Woodhouse commanded the Allied Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas.

GERMANY IN WORLD WAR II

COLVIN, Ian Goodhope. *Master Spy: The Incredible Story of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. 286 p.)

Ambivalent attitude and pro-Allied activities of the head of the German Abwehr, based on published documents and interviews with many of his former associates. Climax is the Admiral's involvement in the plot to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, for which he paid with his life.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *Chief of Intelligence* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1951); *L'Amiral Canaris, Notre Allié Secret* (Paris: Editions de la Paix, 1955); *Admiral Canaris, Chef des Geheimdienstes* (Vienna: Wilhelm Fricke Verlag, 1955); *Canaris* (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1956); *Mysteriet Canaris* (Bergen: John Griegs Forlag, 1952).]

[For further reading see: Karl Heinz Abshagen, *Canaris* (London: Hutchinson, 1956); Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York: Macmillan, 1947); Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).]

GISKES, Herman J. *London Calling North Pole.* (New York: British Book Centre, 1953. 208 p.)

Story of a remarkable radio deception set up by the Germans after their capture of a Dutch officer parachuted into Holland by the British SOE to work with the resistance: undetected for nearly two years, it netted 54 agents and quantities of British weapons and explosives parachuted in to the Dutch. Also contains material on other operations of the Abwehr's counterintelligence branch. The author was chief of the counterespionage unit in Holland.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *London Calling North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); *Abwehr III F* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Bezige Bij, 1949); *Londres Appelle Pôle Nord* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958); *La Burla Maestra de la Guerra* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1954); *Spione Überspielen Spione* (Hamburg: Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1951).]

[For further study of this operation see Pieter Dourlein, *Inside North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); Joseph Schreider, *Das War das Englandspiel* (Munich: Walter Stutz Verlag, 1950).]

SCELLENBERG, Walter. *The Labyrinth: Memoirs.* (New York: Harper, 1956. 423 p.)

Political intrigues and intelligence accomplishments in the Third Reich through the eyes of Himmler's chief of foreign intelligence.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *The Schellenberg Memoirs* (London: André Deutsch, 1956); *Le Chef du Contre-Espionnage Nazi Parle (1933-45)* (Paris: René Juilliard, 1957); *Los Secretos del Servicio Secreto Alemán* (Barcelona: Mateu, 1958); *Memoiren* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959); *Den Usynlige Front* (Copenhagen: Skrifola [n.d.]).]

WIGHTON, Charles and Gunter Peis. *Hitler's Spies and Saboteurs: Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General Lahousen.* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958. 285 p.)

General Lahousen headed the Abwehr's sabotage section during part of the war. This elaboration from his diary gives popularized case histories of his agents in Great Britain, Ireland (in the British edition only), and South Africa, and of the German saboteurs landed by submarine on the U.S. coast who were rounded up by the FBI.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *They Spied on England* (London: Odhams Press, 1958).]

THE SOVIET SERVICES

AUSTRALIA. *Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage.* (Sydney: Government Printer for New South Wales, 1955. 483 p.)

An excellent study of the Soviet espionage and subversion in Australia brought to light by the defection in 1954 of MVD agent Vladimir Petrov and his wife.

[See also *Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Royal Commission on Espionage* and Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956; London: André Deutsch, 1956). *Empire of Fear* is also published in translations: *L'Empire de la Peur* (Paris: Morgan, 1957); *Imperio del Miedo* (Mexico City: Ediciones Zenit, 1957); *Fryktens Land* (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1956); *Sant Vittnesbörd* (Stockholm: Sven-Erik Berghs Förlag, 1956).]

CANADA. *Report of the Royal Commission . . . to Investigate . . . the Communication . . . of Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power*. (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1946. 733 p.)

An important detailed review of Soviet espionage, subversion, and agent recruitment in Canada uncovered through the defection in 1945 of Soviet embassy code clerk Igor Gouzenko.

[Published in the following foreign-language editions: *Russiak Spionage i Canada* (Copenhagen: Schultz Forlag, 1947); *Le Rapport de la Commission Royale* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946).]

DALLIN, David J. *Soviet Espionage*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. 558 p.)

A scholarly historical study of Soviet intelligence activities in Europe, Canada, and the United States, based on published materials, some unpublished documents, and interviews with former Soviet agents and others.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *Die Sowjetespionage* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956); *Espionaje Soviético* (Buenos Aires: Agora, 1957); *Al-Jasusiyyah Al-Shuyu'iyyah Al-Duwaliyyah* (Baghdad: Al-Ani Press, 1963).]

DERIABIN, Peter and Frank Gibney. *The Secret World*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. 334 p.)

With its four appendices, the most detailed and factual compilation available, for all its character as a defector's exposé, on the organization and activity of Soviet State Security from 1946 to 1953.

[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Arthur Barker, 1960).]

[For further study, see Deriabin's testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: *Communist Controls on Religious Activity*, May 5, 1959; and his testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities: *The Kremlin's Espionage and Terror Organizations*, March 17, 1959.]

FOOTE, Alexander. *Handbook for Spies*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949. 273 p.)

Classic case history of the operation of a Soviet wartime intelligence net. The author was a senior member of a group of agents in Switzer-

land collecting information from Germany and reporting to Moscow by radio.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *Handbook for Spies* (London: Museum Press, 1949); *Les Secrets d'un Espion Soviétique* (Brussels: Editions de la Paix, 1951); *Handbuch für Spione* (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1954); *Manual Para Espias* (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1954).]

KAZNACHEEV, Aleksandr. *Inside a Soviet Embassy*. Edited, with an introduction, by Simon Wolin. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1962. 250 p.)

Experiences of the author as a junior intelligence officer in the Soviet embassy in Rangoon before his defection in 1959. Creates an intimate picture of Soviet intelligence life in relating episodes documenting his development, training, and disillusionment and gives considerable insight into the Soviet operational system.

[Published in Germany under the title: *Wegweiser nach Westen* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1962).]

[For further study see Kaznacheev's testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: *Soviet Intelligence in Asia*, Hearing, December 14, 1959, and *Conditions in the Soviet Union*, Hearing, January 22, 1960.]

MONAT, Pawel (with John Dille). *Spy in the U.S.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 208 p.)

The only available account of Soviet Satellite intelligence operations in the United States, by a former officer of the Polish military intelligence service. Besides offering insight into Polish operational practices it shows how Soviet intelligence directs the activities of the Polish services, not only by levying intelligence requirements but by indirect controls.

[For further information along these lines see Monat's testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Soviet Espionage through Poland*, June 13, 1960.]

ORLOV, Alexander. *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1963. 187 p.)

A thoughtful and generally approving analysis of Soviet intelligence doctrine, illustrated by case histories drawn from the author's high-level service in the NKVD in the 1930's.

WOLIN, Simon and Robert M. Slusser, *The Soviet Secret Police*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 408 p.)

Historical development and philosophical bases of the Soviet state security services from the establishment of the Cheka in 1917 until 1956, presented largely through the accounts of defectors and victims. The editors have contributed documentation and an excellent summary.

[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Methuen & Co., 1957).]

EVASION AND ESCAPE

BLAIR, Clay Jr. *Beyond Courage*. (New York: David McKay, 1955. 247 p.)

Stories of American airmen who, shot down behind enemy lines in the Korean War, evaded capture and returned.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *Beyond Courage* (London: Jarrolds Publishers, Ltd., 1956); *Met de Moed der Wanhoop* (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum 1955).]

CRAWLEY, Aidan Merivale. *Escape from Germany: A History of R.A.F. Escapes During the War*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956. 291 p.)

The sanitized version of an official history prepared for the British Air Ministry. Describes the escape intelligence organizations (one of which the author headed) in the German POW camps and the prisoners' continual efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to escape.

[Published in the following foreign editions: *Escape from Germany* (London: Collins, 1958); *R. A. F. Te Woet* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Nieuwe Wieken N. V., n.d.).]

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
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How the logic of the estimating process failed, in September 1962, to apprehend an illogical Soviet policy decision.

THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.

Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

A CRUCIAL ESTIMATE RELIVED

Sherman Kent

Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, entitled "The Military Buildup in Cuba," became the official pronouncement of the United States Intelligence Board on 19 September 1962. This estimate was undertaken when reporting from Cuba began to indicate a steep acceleration in Soviet deliveries of military supplies to Cuba. The tempo of its production was more rapid than "routine," but far less rapid than "crash." At the time it was completed, those of us engaged in it felt that its conclusions A and B represented a basic analysis of the situation. Here they are:

A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.

B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home, it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America.

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And conclusions C and D were an attempt to predict what further developments might occur. They read:

C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more "offensive" character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction.

D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations.

As is quite apparent, the thrust of these paragraphs was that the Soviets would be unlikely to introduce strategic offensive weapons into Cuba. There is no blinking the fact that we came down on the wrong side. When the photographic evidence of 14 October was in, there was the proof.

Soon after the consequent crisis had subsided, a number of investigations were set in train aiming to understand why the estimate came out as it did. What follows are my own thoughts on the subject and some philosophical generalizations about the business of intelligence estimating. My central thought is that no intelligence mechanism imaginable can be anything like one hundred percent sure of predicting correctly the actions of a foreign government in a situation such as this one was. If similar situations develop in the future and if their course must be estimated from the same sort of evidentiary base, these situations too are bound to be susceptible to the same sort of misjudgment.

The Estimating Machine

Although many of our readers are aware of the process by which National Intelligence Estimates are produced, it is perhaps desirable to set forth again the general ground-rules.

When time allows (and it did in the case of the Cuba estimate) the process is fairly complicated; it involves a lot of thought and planning at the outset, a lot of research and writing in the intelligence research organizations of the military and the State Department, a drafting by the ablest staff in the business, and a painstaking series of interagency meetings devoted to review and coordination. Before it gets the final USIB imprimatur a full-dress NIE goes down an assembly line of eight or more stations. At each it is supposed to receive (and almost always does) the attention of a highly knowledgeable group. The Cuba estimate passed through all these stations.

The laborious procedure has seemed to me worth while if for no other reason than that it is aimed at achieving three important goals: the production of a paper tailored exactly to the requirements of the policy consumer; the full deployment of every relevant intelligence resource (documents and knowledgeable people) within the community; and the attainment of a best agreed judgment about imponderables, or lacking unanimity the isolation and identification of dissenting opinion.

In any of the major estimates it would not be difficult to demonstrate that a thousand, perhaps thousands of, people in intelligence work scattered all over the world had made their modest witting or unwitting contribution to the finished job. Foreign service officers, attachés, clandestine operators and their operatives, eavesdroppers, document procurers, interrogators, observers, "photographers" and the photo interpreters, reporters, researchers, sorters, indexers, reference and technical specialists, and so on have been gathering, forwarding, arranging, and sifting the factual stuff upon which the estimate rests. Final responsibility for the form and substance of the ultimate blue book rests with far fewer, but a good number just the same. These are the estimators throughout the community, including the staff of the Office of National Estimates, the DCI's Board of National Estimates, and the USIB principals themselves.

So much for what might be called the physique of the process: it has also its purely intellectual aspects. Like any solid conceptual construction, the National Intelligence Estimate

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is prepared in rough accordance with the procedures of the scientific method.

In very general and, I fear, over-simplified terms, the process goes like this. After a confrontation of the problem and some decisions as to how it should be handled, there is a ransacking of files and minds for all information relating to the problem; and an evaluation, analysis, and digestion of this information. There are emergent hypotheses as to the possible aggregate meaning of the information; some emerged before, some after its absorption. No one can say whence come these essential yeasts of fruitful thought. Surely they grow best in a medium of knowledge, experience, and intuitive understanding. When they unfold, they are checked back against the facts, weighed in the light of the specific circumstances and the analysts' general knowledge and understanding of the world scene. Those that cannot stand up fall; those that do stand up are ordered in varying degrees of likelihood.

The Search into Uncertainty

As an NIE begins to take form it carries three kinds of statements. The first is easily disposed of; it is the statement of indisputable fact ("The Soviets have a long-range heavy jet bomber, the Bison"). The second and third kinds do not carry any such certainty; each rests upon a varying degree of uncertainty. They relate respectively (a) to things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and (b) to things which are not known to anyone at all.

As an example of the former, we have seen the Bison up close and from afar, photographed it in the air and on the ground, listened to it and timed it in flight; but no reliable source we have access to has had his hands on one or put one through its paces. Its performance characteristics are accordingly a matter of calculation or estimate. Likewise, although some Soviet official knows with perfect assurance how many Bisons there are, we do not. Our calculation of Bison order of battle is an estimate, an approximation.

Over the years our estimates of these knowable but unknown things have probably come closer and closer to the objective fact, but it is sobering to realize that there is still a notable discrepancy between the CIA and Air Force estimates of oper-

ational Bisons, and that only last year our seemingly solid estimate of Bear order of battle had to be revised upwards some fifteen percent.

It is worth noting here that matters far less esoteric than Bear order of battle can and often do present literally unsolvable problems. An innocent might think that such knowable things as the population of Yemen, the boundaries of Communist China, the geodetic locus of Russian cities, and thousands of other obvious matters of fact could be had for the asking. Not only can they not be had for the asking, they cannot be had at all. The reason is, of course, either that no one has ever tried to find them out, or that those who have tried have approached the problem from different angles with different methodologies and gotten different answers, of which no single one can be cited as the objective fact.

The third kind of statement, in (b) above, represents an educated guess at something literally unknowable by any man alive. Characteristically it often deals in futures and with matters well beyond human control: Will Nkrumah be with us for the next two years? five years? Or it deals with matters under human control but upon which no human decision has been taken: How many Blinders will the Soviets have five years hence? What kind of antimissile capability? What will be their stance in Cuba next year? It may be that the Soviet leaders have temporized with these issues, agreed to go planless for another six or eighteen months. Or it may be that they have decided, but at this time next year will drastically alter this year's decision. Ask almost anyone what he plans to do with his 1965 holiday and see what you get. If you do get anything, write it down and ask him the same question a year from now.

If NIEs could be confined to statements of indisputable fact the task would be safe and easy. Of course the result could not then be called an estimate. By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown—a venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment. In the nature of things he will upon occasion end up with a conclusion which time will prove to be wrong. To recognize this as inevitable does not mean that we estimators are reconciled

to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are engaged in a hazardous occupation.

It has been murmured that a misjudgment such as occurred in the Cuba SNIE warrants a complete overhaul of our method of producing estimates. In one sense of the word "method," this cannot be done. As indicated earlier, the method in question is the one which students reared in the Western tradition have found to be best adapted to the search for truth. It is the classical method of the natural sciences, retooled to serve the far less exact disciplines of the so-called science of human activity—strategy, politics, economics, sociology, etc. This is our method; we are stuck with it, unless we choose to forsake it for the "programmer" and his computer or go back to the medicine man and his mystical communion with the All-Wise.

What can be done is to take a hard look at those stages of the method where it is most vulnerable and where a relaxation of vigilance or an undue inflexibility may lead to error in judgment. First consider the so-called evaluation of the "facts."

The Matter of Mental Set

In our business we are as likely to be faced by the problem of a plethora of raw intelligence as by one of its paucity. In many of our tasks we have so large a volume of data that no single person can read, evaluate, and mentally file it all. It gets used in a finished intelligence study only through being handled along the line by a group of people who divide the labor. Obviously the individuals of this group are not identical in talent or anything else, and each brings to the task his own character, personality, and outlook on life. There is no way of being sure that as they read and evaluate they all maintain the same standards of criticism or use common criteria of value and relevance.

Merely as an example of what I am saying: it could have been that half a dozen such readers were inclined to believe that the Soviets would put strategic weapons into Cuba and another half-dozen inclined to believe the opposite. In some measure the subsequent use of a given document depends upon who handles it first and gives it an evaluation. It could be

that a valuable piece of information falls into disrepute because its early readers did not believe its story. The obverse is also possible—that an incorrect story should gain great currency because of being wholly believed by wishful critics. It is a melancholy fact of life that neither case is a great rarity, that man will often blind himself to truth by going for the comforting hypothesis, by eschewing the painful.

What is true of the evaluation of raw intelligence at the reporting or desk officer level is generally true all along the line. The main difference between the early evaluation and that at the national estimates level is the quantity evaluated, not necessarily the quality of the evaluation. The relatively few people on the national estimates staff and board cannot, indeed do not try to, read all incoming reports. They read and appraise what survives the first few stages of the winnowing-out process—still a formidable amount of paper. For the rest they rely upon the word of the specialists who have handled the material in the first instance. The senior estimates people have had more experience than the average and their skills are probably greater, but they are still men with normal human fallibilities.

In last analysis these fallibilities lie in a man's habits of thought. Some minds when challenged respond with a long-harbored prejudice, some with an instantaneous cliché. Some minds are fertile in the generation of new hypotheses and roam freely and widely among them. Other minds not merely are sterile in this respect but actively resist the new idea.

Any reputable and studious man knows the good and evil of the ways of thought. No worthy soul consciously nourishes a prejudice or willfully flashes a cliché; everyone knows the virtues of open-mindedness; no one boasts imperviousness to a new thought. And yet even in the best minds curious derelictions occur.

The Data on Cuba

I do not believe, however, that any such derelictions occurred in the matter of evaluating the evidence on Cuba. What little data we had prior to 19 September I am sure we weighed and measured with open minds.

What was this evidence? To begin with, there was of course no information that the Soviets had decided to deploy strategic missiles to Cuba and indeed no indication suggesting such a decision. Moreover, months after that decision had been reached, and during the period when the estimate was being drafted and discussed, there was still no evidence that the missiles were in fact moving to their emplacement. With the benefit of hindsight one can go back over the thousand and more bits of information collected from human observers in the six months ending 14 October and pick out a few—a very few—which indicated the possible presence of strategic missiles. The report of CIA's Inspector General says: "It was not until shortly after mid-September that a few ground observer reports began coming in which were specifically descriptive or suggestive of the introduction into Cuba of Soviet offensive weapons."

The IG goes on to list the "handful" which "can be related" to these weapons. The list comes to eight. Of these I would agree that no more than two or possibly three should have stopped the clock. None of these was available before the crucial estimate was put to bed. Even if they had been here in time and even if we had intuitively felt (and a notable among us did so feel) that such weapons were on the way, these three bits of evidence would probably not, taken in the context of the other thousands, have been seized on as pointing to the truth. In the mass of human observation and reporting there were items to support or destroy almost any hypothesis one could generate.

Nor did the aerial photography of September dissipate the uncertainty. Not only did it fail to spot the ominous indicators of missile emplacement but over and over again it made fools of ground observers by proving their reports inaccurate or wrong. The moment of splendor for the U-2s, cameras, film, and PIs when finally the sites and associated equipment were photographed and identified had not yet arrived with the close of the business day of 19 September.

Thus of the two classical invitations to error in the estimating business, we cannot be said to have fallen for the first: I refer of course to the neglect or wishful misvaluation of evidence because it does not support a preconceived hypothesis.

Though perhaps tempted, we also did *not* kick the problem under the rug. We did ask ourselves the big question, "Are the Soviets likely to use Cuba as a strategic base?" We asked ourselves the next echelon of questions, "Are they likely to base submarines, light bombers (1L-28s), heavier bombers, and long-range missiles there?" Our answers are cited above.

The Logic of Intent

How could we have misjudged? The short answer is that, lacking the direct evidence, we went to the next best thing, namely information which might *indicate* the true course of developments. We looked hard at the fact of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba for *indications* of its probable final scale and nature. We concluded that the military supplies piling into Cuba indicated a Soviet intent to give Castro a formidable defensive capability—so formidable as to withstand anything but a major military effort on the part of an attacker. We felt that the Soviet leaders believed the worldwide political consequences of such an effort would be recognized in the United States and would be the strongest possible deterrent to U.S. military moves to overthrow Castro. Obviously we did not go on to argue that the Soviets might think they could raise the deterrent still higher by supplying the Cubans with long-range missiles, which they would still proclaim to be purely defensive.

As noted, however, we did consider the matter. And in answering the questions that we posed ourselves on the likelihood of the Soviets' building Cuba into what this country would have to regard as a strategic base, we called upon another range of indicators. These were indicators derivable from precedents in Soviet foreign policy.

When we reviewed once again how cautiously the Soviet leadership had threaded its way through other dangerous passages of the Cold War; when we took stock of the sense of outrage and resolve evinced by the American people and government since the establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba; when we estimated that the Soviets must be aware of these American attitudes; and when we then asked ourselves would the Soviets undertake the great risks at the high odds—and in Cuba of all places—the indicator, the pattern of Soviet foreign policy, shouted out its negative.

With hindsight one may speculate that during the winter and early spring of 1962, when the Soviets were making their big Cuba decisions, they examined the posture of the United States and thought they perceived a change in it. Is it possible that they viewed our acceptance of setbacks in Cuba (the Bay of Pigs), in Berlin (the wall), and in Laos as evidence of a softening of U.S. resolve? Perhaps they did, and on this basis they estimated the risks of putting missiles into Cuba as acceptably low. Perhaps, when they contemplated the large strategic gains which would accrue if the operation succeeded, their estimate of the U.S. mood was wishfully nudged in this direction. And perhaps again, to close the circuit, they failed to estimate at all the consequences of being themselves faced down in a crisis. If all these speculations are correct—and there is persuasive argument to sustain them—even in hindsight it is extremely difficult for many of us to follow their inner logic or to blame ourselves for not having thought in parallel with them.

On 15 October we realized that our estimate of the Soviets' understanding of the mood of the United States and its probable reaction was wrong. On 28 October we realized that the Soviets had realized they had misjudged the United States. In between we verified that our own feeling for the mood of the United States and its probable reaction had been correct. In a way our misestimate of Soviet intentions got an *ex post facto* validation.

Ways Out We Did Not Take

In brooding over an imponderable—like the probable intentions of the Soviet Union in the context of Cuba—there is a strong temptation to make no estimate at all. In the absence of directly guiding evidence, why not say the Soviets might do this, they might do that, or yet again they might do the other—and leave it at that? Or like the news commentators, lay out the scenario as it has unwound to date and end with a “time alone will tell”? This sort of thing has the attractions of judicious caution and an unexposed neck, but it can scarcely be of use to the policy man and planner who must prepare for future contingencies.

Even more tempting than no estimate is the “worst case” estimate. This consists of racking up all the very worst

things the adversary is capable of doing and estimating that he may undertake them all, irrespective of the consequences to his own larger objectives. If one estimates thus and if one is believed by the planner, then it follows that the latter need never be taken by unpleasant surprise.

Engaging in these worst-case exercises may momentarily cheer the estimator. No one can accuse him of nonchalance to potential danger; he has signaled its existence at each of the points of the compass; congressional investigators will have lean pickings with him. But in all likelihood a worse fate awaits. Either his audience will tire of the cry of wolf and pay him no heed when he has really bad news to impart, or it will be frightened into immobility or a drastically wrong policy decision.

It was tempting in the matter of Cuba to go for the worst case: but in the days before 19 September we knew that the evidence would not sustain such an estimate, and our reading of the indicators led us in the opposite direction.

Why No Revision?

If wrong as of 19 September, why did we not put things to rights before the 14 October photographs? Why did we not recall and modify the estimate when the early ground observer reports reached us or when we finally got the photo of the inbound Soviet ship with its deck cargo of crated IL-28s? Could we not have repaired the damage a week or so in advance of 14 October and given the policy-maker the advantage of this precious time?

In the first place, these pre-14 October data almost certainly would not, indeed should not, have caused the kind of shift of language in the key paragraphs that would have sounded the tocsin. Of themselves and in context they should not have overpowered all to the contrary and dictated a one-hundred-eighty-degree change to “The Soviets are almost certainly developing Cuba as a strategic base right now.” The most they should have contributed to a new version would have been in the direction of softening the original “highly unlikely” and adding a sentence or two to note the evidence, flag a new uncertainty, and signal the possible emergence of a dangerous threat. If we had recalled the estimate or issued a memo to

its holders in early October we would have had a better record on paper, but I very much doubt that whatever in conscience we could have said would have galvanized high echelons of government to crash action.

In the second place, it is not as if these new data had no egress to the world of policy people except through National Intelligence Estimates. The information was current intelligence when it came in and it promptly went out to the key customers as such. This is of course the route that most, if not all, important items of intelligence follow. That constituent part of an NIE that I earlier referred to as the range of knowable things that are known with a high degree of certainty is often very largely made up of yesterday's current intelligence.

In the multi-compartmented intelligence business, two compartments are at issue—an estimates compartment and one for current intelligence. They are peopled by two quite separate groups and follow quite different lines of work. Nevertheless, there is the closest interrelationship between them. The current intelligence people handle almost minute by minute the enormous volume of incoming stuff, evaluate it, edit it, and disseminate it with great speed. The estimates people work on a longer-range subject matter, hopefully at a more deliberate pace, and make their largest contributions in the area of judicious speculation. NIEs are produced at the rate of 50 to 80 a year; individual current intelligence items at that of some ten thousand a year. The current people look to estimates as the correct medium for pulling together and projecting into the future the materials that continuously flow in. The estimators for their part rely on the current people to keep alert for news that will modify extant estimates.

The estimators do themselves keep the keenest sort of watch for this kind of news. Indeed the estimates board members and staff chiefs start every working day with a consideration of new information that might require revision of a standing NIE. But the board feels that certain criteria should be met before it initiates a new estimate. These are: (1) The subject matter of the estimate must be of considerable current importance. (The situation in Blanka was important at the time of our last estimate on the subject, but it is not very

important now; hence today's news, which may give the lie to major portions of the Blanka estimate, will not occasion its formal revision.) (2) The new evidence must be firm and must indicate a significant departure from what was previously estimated. (We would not normally recall an estimate to raise a key "probably" to an "almost certainly" nor to change an estimated quantity by a few percentage points. Unless we adhere to these criteria and let current intelligence carry its share of the burden, very few NIEs could be definitely buttoned up, and those which had been would have to be reopened for almost daily revisions. Maybe this is the way we should direct our future effort; some of our critics seem to imply as much. Myself, I think not.)

The Enemy's Viewpoint

Some of our critics have suggested that we would have avoided the error if we had done a better job of putting ourselves in the place of the Soviet leadership—that if we had only looked out on the world scene with their eyes and thought about it the way they did we would not have misread indicators and all would have been clear. Upon occasion this proposition is made in a way to suggest that its articulator feels that he has given birth to a brand new idea. "Your trouble," he says, "is that you do not seem to realize you are dealing with Russian Communists and a Soviet government policy problem." As such statements are made, I must confess to a quickening of pulse and a rise in temperature. I have wondered if such people appear before pastry cooks to tell them how useful they will find something called "wheat flour" in their trade.

If there is a first rule in estimating the probable behavior of the other man, it is the rule to try to cast yourself in his image and see the world through his eyes. It is in pursuit of this goal that intelligence services put the highest premium on country-by-country expertise, that they seek out and hire men who have deeply studied and experienced a given nation's ways of life, that they procure for these men daily installments of information on the latest developments in the area of their specialty. To the extent that objectivity of judgment about the other man's probable behavior is the crux of

the intelligence business, to that extent is the importance of living the other man's life recognized and revered.

Since at least World War I intelligence services have from time to time set a group of individuals apart and instructed them to think of themselves as the enemy's general staff. Their task as a red team is to ponder and act out the way the enemy will respond to situations as they develop. The idea seems to be that by the creation of an artificial frame—sometimes going to the lengths of letting the personnel in question wear the enemy's uniform and speak his sort of broken English—you will get a more realistic appreciation of the enemy's probable behavior than without the frills. It does not necessarily follow.

Consider the case of one intelligence service that created such a unit to simulate a Kremlin staff. It not only assigned some of its own officers but also employed the talents of some real one-time Communists. This latter move was regarded as the new "something" to cap all similar previous games. In a short time all members of the group became spirited dialecticians and as such were able to give Soviet problems impeccable Marxist solutions—to which, however, a Stalin, a Malenkov, or a Khrushchev would not have given the time of day. This particular exercise always seemed to me to have reached a new high in human fatuity. Five James Burnhams may afford insights into the working of Communist minds, but by no means necessarily into those particular minds that are in charge of Soviet policy.

Of course we did not go in for this sort of thing. We relied as usual on our own Soviet experts. As normally, they did try to observe and reason like the Soviet leadership. What they could not do was to work out the propositions of an aberrant faction of the leadership to the point of foreseeing that this faction's view would have its temporary victory and subsequent defeat.

The Determinants of Action

Within certain limits there is nothing very difficult or esoteric about estimating how the other man will probably behave in a given situation. In hundreds of cases formal estimates (NIEs, for example) have quite correctly—and many

times boldly and almost unequivocally—called the turn. Behind such judgments a large number of subjudgments are implicit. The other man will act as diagnosed because (1) he is in his right mind or at least he is not demonstrably unhinged; (2) he cannot capriciously make the decision by himself—at a minimum it will have to be discussed with advisers, and in nondictatorial governments it will have to stand the test of governmental and popular scrutiny; (3) he is aware of the power of traditional forces in his country, the generally accepted notions of its broad national interests and objectives, and the broad lines of policy which are calculated to protect the one and forward the other; (4) he is well informed.

To the extent that the "other man's" diplomatic missions and intelligence service can observe and report the things he must know prior to his decision, they have done so. He has read and pondered. These and other phenomena very considerably narrow the area of a foreign statesman's choice, and once thus narrowed it is susceptible to fairly sure-footed analysis by studious intelligence types. As long as all the discernible constants in the equation are operative the estimator can be fairly confident of making a sound judgment.

It is when these constants do not rule that the real trouble begins. It is when the other man zigs violently out of the track of "normal" behavior that you are likely to lose him. If you lack hard evidence of the prospective erratic tack and the zig is so far out of line as to seem to you to be suicidal, you will probably misestimate him every time. No estimating process can be expected to divine exactly when the enemy is about to make a dramatically wrong decision. We were not brought up to *underestimate* our enemies.

We missed the Soviet decision to put the missiles into Cuba because we could not believe that Khrushchev could make such a mistake. The fact that he did suggests that he might do so again, and this in turn suggests that perhaps we do not know some things about Soviet foreign policy decision-making that we should. We can be reasonably sure that certain forces which sometimes mislead Western foreign offices are seldom effective in the Soviet government. It is hard to believe, for example, that a Soviet foreign minister has to pay much heed to an unreasonable press, or to domestic pressure

groups, or, in the clutch, to the tender feelings of allies and neutrals.

If these well-known phenomena are not operative, what things are pressing a Soviet decision-maker towards a misestimate or an unfortunate policy decision? Obviously there are the fundamental drives inherent in Communism itself, but for these and the many things that go with them we, as diviners of Soviet policy, are braced. Are there perhaps other things of a lesser but nevertheless important nature that we have not fully understood and taken into account? I would like to suggest two that are closely linked: the role and functioning of Soviet embassies; and the role of intelligence and the philosophy of its collection, dissemination, and use. I would like to suggest that if we were to study these more deeply we might discover that many a Soviet misestimate and wrong-headed policy is traceable to the peculiar way in which the Soviets regard the mission of their ambassadors and the role they assign to their intelligence service.

Whence the Decisive Intelligence?

Obviously you cannot divine the functions of Dobrynin in Washington by studying Kohler in Moscow. Obviously a Soviet foreign mission has a quite different aura from other foreign missions we know a good deal about. But just what does a Soviet ambassador's job description look like? What does his government expect him to do beyond the normal diplomatic functions all ambassadors perform? What are his reporting functions, for example, and what kind of reporting staff does he have? What do he and they use as the raw materials for their purely informational dispatches—if indeed they write any?

Does the embassy staff proper compete with the KGB men in its reporting? We know that the top KGB dog in an embassy has a certain primacy over locally-domiciled Soviet citizens—including the ambassador. Does this primacy extend to reporting? Does the ambassador check his reports out with the KGB boss before sending them off? One thing we can be sure of—the KGB boss does not check *his* out with the ambassador. If ambassadorial reports are written and sent, who in Moscow reads them? Does Khrushchev? Do

the Presidium members? How do the highest echelons of government regard them as against, say, KGB or GRU clandestine reports and pilfered documents?

I find myself wondering a lot about Dobrynin. Suppose he had been informed of Moscow's estimate that the U.S. resolve had softened. Suppose he had agreed with this estimate in general. Is it possible that he would have gone on to agree with Moscow that the risks of sending strategic missiles to Cuba were entirely acceptable? It may be that he was not informed of this second estimate. But if he was so informed, I have great difficulty believing he would have agreed with it. Dobrynin is not a stupid man, and presumably he must have sensed that Castro's Cuba occupied some special place in American foreign policy thinking. Is it possible that, sensing the U.S. mood, he did not report it, and bolster his findings from what he read in the press and *Congressional Record*, what he heard on the radio and TV? Is it not more likely that he did send back such appraisals and that Moscow gave them little notice because they were not picked up in a fancy clandestine operation? Is it possible that the conspiratorial mind in the Kremlin, when faced with a choice of interpretations, will not lean heavily toward that which comes via the covert apparatus?

We have recently learned quite a lot about this apparatus and the philosophy of its operation and use. We think we have valid testimony from defectors who have come out of the Soviet and Satellite intelligence services that enormous importance is attached to clandestine procurement of documents containing the other man's secrets of state. We know that whatever overt research and analysis work is done in the Soviet government is *not* associated with the intelligence services. That the findings of this type of effort are denied the cachet of "intelligence" may rob them of standing, perhaps even of credibility.

We know that the Soviet practice of evaluating raw reports prior to dissemination is a pretty rough and ready affair (no alphabetical and numerical scale of estimated reliability, for example) that leaves the customer with a very free choice to believe or disbelieve. There is evidence to indicate that a KGB resident abroad has the right to address a report to a military

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chief of staff or to the foreign minister or to Khrushchev himself. His boss in Moscow is in the chain of communication and can, of course, stop dissemination to the high-placed addressee. But if the resident in question is known to be a friend of the addressee the boss will think twice before he interferes. We are reasonably certain that there is a hot wire between Semichastny, chief of the KGB, and Chairman Khrushchev and that it is used to carry current raw intelligence between the two.

It is tempting to hope that some research and systematic reinterrogation of recent defectors, together with new requirements served on our own intelligence services, might turn up new insights into the Soviet process of decision-making. The odds are pretty strongly against it; and yet the—to us—incredible wrongness of the Soviet decision to put the missiles into Cuba all but compels an attempt to find out. Any light that can be thrown on that particular decision might lessen the chances of our misestimating the Soviets in a future case.

*Problems in fashioning an
estivative product suitable
for input to systems analysis
in force planning.*

INTELLIGENCE FOR DEFENSE PLANNING

W. E. Seidel

The story of intelligence support for defense planning at the national level in the current Administration offers a good case study in the relationship between national intelligence and the consumer, or at least one of its most important consumers. Although the history of long-range estimating and quantified projections has been a long and thorny one, the requirements of the new defense planners are perhaps unique in their degree of articulation, a refinement which stems from the needs of the systematic analysis techniques used in current planning. This review of the case to date proceeds from the bias that the consumer is why we are in business.

In the latter part of 1961 the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary Charles J. Hitch, laid down specifications for intelligence estimates required by new DoD methods of programming and planning initiated earlier that year.¹ Nearly two years later Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Alain Enthoven presented substantially the same requirements again.² A recent memorandum from the Office of National Estimates succinctly characterizes these requirements in the following terms: "As you know, OSD has for several years been expressing the need for *more detailed quantitative projections* of Soviet military capabilities."³

¹ Memorandum of 17 Nov. 1961 to DIA, "Future Needs Program for Intelligence Estimates and Analysis of Intelligence" (Secret).

² Memorandum for Record 25 July 1963 (Revised 22 Sept. 1963), "Notes on Long Range Intelligence Projections of Sino-Soviet Forces" (Secret).

³ Memorandum for the USIB Representatives, "Further Requirements of OSD for Quantitative Projections on Soviet Military Capabilities," Sept. 1963 (Secret).

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Below we look at the nature of the new requirements, recount the intelligence community's efforts to satisfy them, consider some of the major problems they create, and offer some hopefully constructive suggestions. To all colleagues, known and unknown, who have grappled with the problem we acknowledge our indebtedness and regret any inadequacy in this presentation.

The New Programming

What were the methods of programming and planning referred to by Mr. Hitch that generated new demands on intelligence? Here they cannot be described in detail, but they are of such importance to our study that we must outline their major aspects relevant to the intelligence problem.⁴

Under these methods the analysis of alternative U.S. strategies, forces, and weapon systems is done within the frame of reference of nine major categories or programs of defense:

- Strategic Retaliatory Forces
- Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
- General Purpose Forces
- Airlift and Sealift Forces
- Reserve and Guard Forces
- Research and Development
- General Support
- Civil Defense
- Military Assistance Program

These programs are subdivided into more than 1000 elements, sometimes at as many as four aggregative levels, constituting well-defined, homogeneous groupings of particular types of forces—B-52 squadrons, Atlas squadrons, Polaris submarines, infantry divisions in Europe, etc.—each of which reflects quantitatively the strength requirements of any particular strategy.

⁴ A short bibliography for the reader desiring more details might include: "Study Report on the Programming System for the Office of the Secretary of Defense" prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, 25 June 1962; Novick, David, *Program Budgeting: Long Range Planning in the Department of Defense*, The Rand Corporation, RM-3359-ASDC, November 1962; Enthoven, Alain C., "Systems Analysis and Decision Making," *Military Review*, January 1963.

There are figured also for each element of this framework the inputs of manpower, equipment, military construction, and other resources needed to attain the required strength. Ultimately, the resources required to constitute any given element, force structure, or strategy are gauged by the single measure of cost in dollars, the only unit of measure applicable to all the diverse elements. The total military output, the sum of all program elements, is equal to the sum of all resource categories, the total input.

Two other aspects of the programming are highly relevant to the intelligence problem. First, a program change control system makes the quantitative data relevant to proposed program changes promptly and fully available for decision making. And second, a "Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program" provides a basic reporting format for the entire force structure through time.

Programming is thus the determination of the specific time-phased resource inputs necessary for accomplishing a given output, while planning is the selection of the desired output. The analytical process has been described as

... a cycle of definition of objectives, design of alternative systems to achieve those objectives, evaluation of the alternatives in terms of their effectiveness and costs, a questioning of the objectives and a questioning of the other assumptions underlying the analysis, the opening of new alternatives, the establishment of new objectives, . . . and so on.⁵

What is new in the process, as Dr. Enthoven points out,

... is that more than ever before, top defense officials are now being aided in making these judgments by the systematic availability of quantitative information on the effectiveness and costs of alternative strategies, forces, and weapon systems. This information is produced by a method sometimes called "Systems Analysis."⁶

Systems analysis, the balancing of output in terms of the program elements and their operational effectiveness against input in terms of resources, thus provides for programming any given force structure through time against its alterna-

⁵ Alain C. Enthoven, "Systems Analysis and Decision Making," *Military Review*, January 1963, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*

tives in pursuit of our defense objectives. The primary input of systems analysis is quantitative data; the primary characteristic of the method is articulate detail. Finally, a fact of utmost relevance in its implications for intelligence, it is a unified management system; and one of the interdependent inputs it requires for planning is intelligence on the opposing forces.

The Intelligence Requirement

Any significant change in key operations of the government bureaucracy is likely to be preceded by a long period of suggestion, study, and experimentation at various subordinate or even non-government levels. So it was with the new programming and planning process in the DoD. The intelligence community, as a part of the larger national security community, was aware of this early activity and participated in it. Intelligence responses already manifest in early 1961 were mission-oriented Soviet military estimates, a Soviet military cost estimating system—for the most part in a format later adopted by the DoD—and weapon system effectiveness evaluation methods developed from operations research techniques employed in systems analysis. These were individual adjustments, however; the intelligence community had not unified and systematized its research and production in military intelligence as a whole, had not made the organizational and managerial changes necessary to create an integrated, consumer-oriented program. It still has not.

One of the earliest frontal attacks on the problem of getting improved military estimates for the new defense planners was Project Lamp, initiated in early 1961.⁷ A group of outside consultants brought together at CIA produced a report entitled "Systems Analysis and the Military Estimates Process"⁸ which contained views and suggestions very similar to those

⁷ By Robert W. Komer, then a special assistant to the Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA.

⁸ The authors were A. W. Marshall, J. E. Loftus (both from the Rand Corporation) and G. E. Pugh. The report was later rewritten by Marshall and Loftus and published as a Rand Memorandum (RM 2892-PR, August 1962).

issued later as requirements by the new defense planners.⁹ Although the authors offered some suggestions for implementing their recommendations, they recognized that they had not been asked, and indeed were in no position, to weigh the merits of alternative organizational plans and the bureaucratic problems associated with them. Little or no action seems to have been taken on the Project Lamp report.¹⁰

The next development, in late 1961, was the statement from Assistant Secretary Hitch, to which we have adverted, of the requirement for intelligence support to the defense planners. It was articulate and thorough. We shall return to its substance shortly.

The first major response to this requirement was the implementation of a CIA study¹¹ suggesting that a group of senior intelligence officers from CIA and DIA prepare annually an analysis of ten-year programs for alternative Soviet force postures and of their associated costing, and that these reports be submitted to USIB for review and then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by the Director of Central Intelligence. By August 1962 such a CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group had been formed and was at work on a report of essentially the kind suggested. This first report, entitled "Alternative Ten Year Projections of Soviet Military Forces," was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 1 April 1963.

Although these JAG projections were of considerable value to the defense planners,¹² they had the shortcoming of being limited to the time period not covered by the corresponding national estimates. It was evident to the Office of National

⁹ Not surprisingly, since the latter had been closely associated with Marshall in Rand. Anticipation of this result seems likely to have been the reason for Komer's initiative.

¹⁰ Presumably because of the many top-level personnel changes then taking place or about to take place.

¹¹ Dr. Don R. Harris, "Intelligence Support for Long-Term Planning of U.S. Force Requirements" (21 February 1962).

¹² In a Memorandum for Record dated 25 July 1963, Dr. Alain Enthoven noted that "the *Alternative Ten Year Projections of Soviet Military Forces* is a great step forward, and is already proving to be one of the most valuable documents in the Pentagon."

Estimates that the data in the national estimates and the annual JAG paper did not serve to fill the planners' requirement.¹³ In the summer of 1963 the defense planners restated their needs for an adequate intelligence support program. The requirements statement of 25 July 1963 essentially reiterated the needs listed on 17 Nov. 1961,¹⁴ as shown in the following parallel presentation of key passages.

17 November 1961

25 July 1963

Projection Time

In order to evaluate specific weapon systems programs it will be necessary to study US military requirements in various functional areas to cope with the estimated Soviet (and where relevant Sino-Soviet Bloc) military posture during the next five to ten years. . . . That estimates of Soviet military posture need to be extended at least 5 years into the future is an obvious point.

DoD planners and decision makers need to have projections of the Soviet forces for at least 5 to 7 years into the future for all major military forces as a basis for decisions about force levels and procurement.

Specific Quantification

Each projection could itself be detailed and specific. One of the problems with current estimates is that as uncertainty increases they become hazy, vague or simply terminate. There is a tendency to become less quantitative and more literary.

The number and specific characteristics of future Soviet forces are essentially a quantitative matter. We may be uncertain about them, but we must have an expression of what we know about them in the numerical terms.

¹³ In a memorandum 15 July 1963 to the Assistant Director for National Estimates, an estimates staff expert on military matters noted, "Over the years, the detail contained in our military estimates has increased far beyond what we have considered to be necessary for the highest policymakers and their immediate staffs. The added detail has been designed to serve the needs of military planners, but now the needs of DoD go considerably beyond even this expanded coverage."

¹⁴ Cited in footnotes 1 and 2 above.

Format

In the kinds of analysis we have in mind, estimates of Soviet military posture in weapon system terms are required. It would also be useful if estimates of Soviet forces were produced in format comparable to the functional areas we are using for US forces: General War Offensive Forces, General War Defensive Forces, General Purpose or Theater Forces, etc.

I would recommend strongly that the intelligence projections be published in a book that is as close in format as possible to the Department of Defense Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program with an appendix like our Weapon Systems Dictionary describing individual weapons in detail.

Over-all Estimate

More generally, taking an overall programming point of view may be a useful method of improving estimates of the future Soviet military posture. Almost invariably, projected estimates of Soviet forces structures arrived at piece-meal end up overstating Soviet capabilities . . .

We need to have a projection of the total Soviet program, and not just piece-meal estimates of individual weapon systems and forces.

Cost Data

It would be useful if estimates of Soviet forces were accompanied by estimates of their cost to the Soviets, preferably in rubles. . . . Such cost estimates would have an interest in terms of comparing US expenditures in various functional areas with the corresponding Soviet expenditures.

We need estimates of cost. It would be useful to have this both in terms of ruble costs, in order to get a feel for the impact of the programs on the Soviet economy, and also in dollar costs which are more familiar to us.

Treatment of Uncertainties

They [current estimates] give no notion of the main alternatives in most cases. Some more constructive treatment of uncertainties is needed both for the direct use of the decision makers and for the use of systematic analysis that will be undertaken of US military problems.

Next we need to have an explicit statement of the range of uncertainty associated with each projection. We can live quite easily with three numbers expressing a high, a low and a most likely estimate. . . . I believe that the use of three numbers calls attention to the whole range and suggests to the user that if he absolutely must use a single number, he use the single most likely rather than the pessimistic.

Patterns

In addition to the constraints imposed by projected patterns of expenditures more systematic account could be taken by a programming approach of known patterns of Soviet weapon system replacement and phasing practices, lead time problems, etc.

Next we need to have a feeling for the recent history of the Soviet program, to know what Soviet forces have been, say, for the last three years . . .

The latest response of the intelligence community to these requirements is a new series, "Intelligence Assumptions for Planning—Soviet Military Capabilities Over the Next Six Years," to be produced for the first time in the spring of 1964. The production procedure is to parallel that for national estimates: ONE preparation of terms of reference, contributions by USIB agencies, ONE preparation of the draft paper, review by USIB representatives, and finally approval by the USIB. The record of this move brings up to date of writing the case history of the requirement.

Let us look now at some of the problems in the way of fulfilling the requirement and in doing so try to offer constructive criticism and suggest some positive measures that might assist in meeting the needs of an important and articulate consumer of the intelligence product. The problems could be considered as lying in the realm of (a) communication, (b) intelligence organization and bureaucracy, (c) intelligence production and research methodology, or (d) intelligence and policy.

Communication

Project Lamp was an attempt to communicate a requirement. It made most if not all of the specific points contained in the two later official requirement statements. The surrounding noise level created by personnel changes and the way the problem was presented, together with the newness of the problem and the unfamiliarity of the new planning methods, led to a failure of this communication.

The Hitch memorandum of 17 November 1961 was much more specific. It resulted in considerable activity within DIA (to which it was formally addressed), and at the USIB level it elicited some real measure of response in the formation of

the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group and changes in the estimates. It may be that the memorandum was underpowered for the weight of its communication content, that the planners were too busy organizing their new methods to concentrate on communicating to the intelligence community the needs these engendered; the restatement of the requirement in mid-1963, referring explicitly to numerous desiderata not covered in the NIE's, at any rate shows that the community's response was still inadequate.

It is difficult in retrospect, however, to find any real weaknesses in the history of the communication of the requirement. The primary problem seems to have been the essential difficulty of communication on a complex matter between two unfamiliar communicators; and this problem appears to have been reduced with time, by numerous meetings between planning and intelligence personnel, to relatively insignificant proportions.

Intelligence Organization and Bureaucracy

Problems of organization and bureaucracy seem to have had much more influence than strictly communication problems on the intelligence community's response throughout. We have already suggested that personnel changes at higher organizational echelons tended to delay the initial response, that to Project Lamp. In both this and subsequent presentations the requirement had also to overcome the force of bureaucratic inertia.

A natural bias against change arises in any organization from the fact that change is likely to disturb current relationships. More often than not, in addition, the status quo psychology tends to associate demand for change with criticism of the current regime. The intelligence community is no different from any other bureaucracy, government or private, in this respect. Thus there was an initial tendency in the intelligence community to downgrade the new requirement, to suggest that the major part of it was already being filled and the remainder could be taken care of with minor adjustments. The adjustments in question would be substantive entries in existing national intelligence estimates.

The subsequent formation of the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group attempted to meet the long-range aspects of the re-

quirement not covered by the estimates. The Joint Analysis Group represented an organizational adjunct of unspecified duration which permitted continuance of existing organizational relationships. Although the planners applauded the JAG effort and product, the over-all requirement still remained a problem. The dynamics of bureaucratic interrelationships and realities also appeared to be having some effect upon the views of the planners: in restating the requirement they not only reiterated their substantive needs but also appeared to be asking for official approval on the national intelligence level.

From an organizational standpoint the latest solution, the projected Intelligence Assumptions for Planning, again accommodates the requirement within the existing structure and at the same time guarantees USIB endorsement in some form. The new IAP cannot help creating an improvement in meeting the planner's requirements. It is suggested, however, that consideration of further organizational changes could enhance our responsiveness and effectiveness even more.

Briefly, it is suggested that a new staff group be established within the Office of National Estimates to produce the IAP and deal with other problems of the planners' total requirement on a full-time basis, without becoming involved in other estimative production. This move would afford continuity of work on the many problems inherent in the requirement. Such a staff could prepare detailed terms of reference and formats for contributors according to their capabilities and integrate the contributions when received. Both CIA and DIA could furnish personnel for the staff, in much the same fashion that military and civilian personnel now serve in ONE and on the JAG. One might even consider eliminating, under this arrangement, the time-consuming and expensive consideration of the IAP by the representatives of the USIB members, personnel for the new staff being so selected as to be themselves representative of the intelligence agencies. The product could then be presented directly to the USIB principals for approval.

The planners' views on the deficiencies of the national estimates as an input to their process suggest that new habits

and techniques are needed in patterning the new product, and this is still another reason for full-time attention to the requirement in ONE. Some further considerations with respect to these methodological problems are developed below.

Intelligence Production and Research Methodology

In a military planning and programming system of the new type, the intelligence inputs to the quantitative analysis must consist of data comparable to those on the U.S. forces, ordered in a similar format. "Comparable" means equally amenable to the rigors of the analytical technique. Such inputs must be derived through intelligence's own detailed systematic analysis of Soviet military and related objectives, alternative means for achieving these objectives through a given number of years, and the effectiveness and cost of the program elements under each of these alternatives. The analytical cycle is the same as that of the U.S. military planner, but the intelligence analyst must simulate the complex of historic, economic, political, technological, and institutional influences operative in Soviet military planning and programming.

Because systems analysis is a discipline with a logic of its own, its requirements on the intelligence community include the demands of that logic. Two areas in which it demands fundamentally different methodological treatment from that currently provided in the intelligence community are quantification and ranges of uncertainty. Systems analysis, like the quantitative analysis practiced in the social sciences and operations research, requires that the quantification used be consistent and inviolate within the precincts of the stated area, so that one must accept all of the explicit derivatives and interactions which result from offering a quantity or series of quantities as representative of a given condition. Even a cursory examination of the quantitative data in present intelligence output would show that this criterion could not be applied to most of it. These impressionistic figures were of course never meant to be subjected to this criterion, and it could be strongly argued that the national estimates cannot be subjected to it for many reasons.

A like problem arises in the treatment of uncertainty. Intelligence estimates of military capabilities have always had to contend with a proliferation of uncertainties resulting from some lack of knowledge of the enemy compounded by ignorance of the future. What is required here is explicit projection of ranges of uncertainty in estimates of future weapon systems and force structures, where "explicit" refers again to a quantitative expression of which all derivatives are acceptable in terms of their logic, the factual substantive base, and the consequent interrelationships. In most current estimates there appears to be an intentional inconsistency in criteria for the measurement of uncertainty, a device used at times to make critical problems stand out from matters of lesser importance. It is true that even impressionistic quantifying has a logic of its own, which can be considered sophisticated in terms of requiring a consensus of conceptual understanding among users; but the point is that it cannot be subjected to any systematic analysis in depth.

This is not to say that quantification and specified ranges of uncertainty in the intelligence input will necessarily make the systems analysis output a satisfactory exclusive basis for decision making. The specified range of uncertainty may often be so great as to produce derivatives that are completely ambiguous, and at best the analysis can serve only as an aid in what must remain a process of human judgment. But the man who must decide whether to start building this year, say, a \$40 billion antimissile system around our cities in order to have it operational in 1974 deserves all such aid he can get, even if it should cost some millions or hundreds of millions of dollars.

One other aspect of the question of research methodology is its relationship to management and organization. Operations research and economic analysis techniques are not new to the intelligence community; what is new is the way defense planning has integrated them in a unified management system to produce a complex systematic analysis woven of interdependent parts. The resultant demands upon intelligence call for its management of research and production resources in a comparable system. Without the unified management disciplines of explicit format and channels for pro-

gramming, change control, and progress reporting, the entire fabric of the answer to the planners' requirement is jeopardized by the likelihood of inconsistent data and uncontrolled variables.

Intelligence and Policy

The new defense planners not only plan and offer alternatives, they make defense policy. The old question of the proper proximity of the intelligence officer and his product to the policy maker and his decisions is not academic here; the demands of the new programming and planning methods for intelligence input increase the problems inherent in the relationship. As one of the primary strategists of centralized intelligence pointed out nearly fifteen years ago,

The only way out of the dilemma seems to me to lie in the very compromise that is usually attempted: guarantee intelligence its administrative and substantive integrity by keeping it separate from its consumers; keep trying every known device to make the users familiar with the producers' organization, and the producers with the users' organization.¹⁸

Although this advice appears to have been taken more seriously during the current administration than ever before, particularly in the field of defense planning and policy, it is sobering that the familiarization effort has not been effective enough to produce yet a satisfactory program of intelligence support for the military planners, as our history of this requirement shows.

One trend in intelligence estimating in the military field relevant to the problems of producing the new Intelligence Assumptions for Planning is worth noting: for some time now our military-related national estimates appear to have oriented themselves more and more closely to current collection techniques rather than consumer problems. This has produced a tendency to equate information with intelligence and confine estimating for the most part to derivatives of direct current information instead of covering the needs of the consumer. Planning demands intelligence judgments. The intelligence input to the planner (be it called estimates or planning assumptions) is the intelligence officer's judg-

¹⁸ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence*, pp. 200-201.

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ment, based upon the best available evidence in broadest sense and the best available research and analytical techniques. As defense planners have repeatedly pointed out, if intelligence does not provide the substantive judgments required, then the planner must do it himself on the basis of his own limited knowledge and experience. When this happens, intelligence has failed in one of its fundamental missions.

*The role of intelligence in
the U.S. and multilateral
trade control programs.*

INTELLIGENCE FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE

Sherman R. Abrahamson

The desirability of autarky, economic self-sufficiency, is a recurrent theme in the literature on the theory of Communism. That it continues to be a cherished goal of the Communist countries might seem questionable because the Bloc has increased rather than decreased its imports from outside. A closer look at the trade information, however, reveals that much of the increased importation is of high-quality, latest-design machinery and equipment. Such imports are consonant with autarky because they bring savings in costly research and development effort. These savings, invested in the domestic manufacture of such equipment, accelerate Bloc economic growth and so hasten the day when even this kind of import is both unnecessary and disadvantageous.

The Soviet program of quick-step economic growth and its methods have received widespread attention, but not so well publicized are the measures taken by the Western world in general and the United States in particular to prevent the Bloc from acquiring military equipment of advanced design and related industrial technology. The industrialized countries of the West have joined together in a multilateral, cooperative trade control program for this purpose; and unilaterally, the United States has adopted a program with much more stringent controls over the export of U.S. goods and technical data.

To illustrate how these programs operate we shall examine two recent cases. Within the past year the USSR ordered from the Japan Electron Optics Laboratory, a Tokyo firm, two electron-beam machiners valued at US\$127,000 and from the Finley-Moody Trading Corporation, an Illinois manufacturer of farm equipment, two forage harvesters and eight self-unloading farm wagons worth about US\$55,000. Because electron-beam machiners at the present time are used

almost exclusively in fields related to advanced military technology—nuclear energy, missile and jet engines, microelectronics—the United States, operating through the multilateral trade control program, was influential in preventing the shipment of the Japanese equipment to the USSR. The export of the U.S.-produced farm machinery, on the other hand, was approved after the White House decided that our political and economic gain from the sale would exceed any technological loss.

The Trade Control Programs

Although the United States had controlled exports to some degree for a number of years, the security aspect of its program was not embodied in any peacetime legislation until the Export Control Act of 1949. This act, seeking to provide for "the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to national security," conferred on the President very broad powers to restrict and control them. These powers have from the beginning been delegated to the Secretary of Commerce.

Even before the act was passed, restrictions on exports of strategic goods from the United States to the Communist countries had become increasingly effective. The Bloc therefore made greater efforts to get such exports by transshipment from third countries, and sometimes achieved amazing results. For example copper, which was in critically short supply in the Soviet Bloc, was also in short supply in the West; and the United States, dominating the world copper market, had a unilateral embargo on its export to the Bloc. The Bloc nevertheless succeeded in obtaining U.S. copper from Italy, a major recipient of Marshall Plan aid, showing the ineffectiveness of unilateral controls. Moreover, Italy accepted grain from the USSR in exchange for the copper when there was a surplus of grain in the United States. This and other anomalies in the trade of West European countries brought the realization that multilateral controls were necessary.

In mid-1949 multilateral discussions were held on the subject, and in November a secret, informal, voluntary Consultative Group was organized in Paris to formulate policy and guidelines for selecting materials to be embargoed multilat-

erally from the Bloc. All NATO countries (except Iceland) joined the organization, and a Coordinating Committee, COCOM, was established to carry out day-to-day and item-by-item deliberations.

The Communist conquest of the Chinese mainland in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 opened a new phase in the controls program which culminated in the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. This, commonly called the Battle Act, provides in effect for an embargo on the shipment of arms and other materials of primary strategic significance to the USSR and nations under its domination. An item is considered to be of primary strategic significance if more than a minimal quantity would contribute to Soviet war potential. The act also calls for termination of all U.S. aid to countries that knowingly ship embargoed materials to the Bloc except in "unusual circumstances" when "the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States." Of the few actual shipments of embargoed goods made to Bloc destinations by COCOM countries, none have been considered important enough to require this retaliation.

Not long after the passage of the Battle Act, the U.S. effort to reduce the trade of other non-Communist countries with Communist China led to the formation of a separate China Committee under the Consultative Group. CHINCOM controls were much broader than those imposed on the Soviet Bloc through COCOM: in addition to military articles and related strategic material they covered most types of capital goods such as industrial machinery and equipment, steel mill products, and non-fabricated metals. The embargo was also broadened through the inclusion of more countries in COCOM and CHINCOM—Japan at the time of the Korean War, Greece and Turkey in 1953—and strengthened by pledges of cooperation from important neutral countries, notably Sweden and Switzerland.

The West European countries, however, although they cooperated with the United States by embargoing the export of strategic goods to China, continued even during the Korean War to ship such material as textiles, textile machinery, fertilizer, dyes, and drugs. The end of that war, together with

the emergence of a new regime in the USSR and a recession in the United States that might bring a decline in U.S. purchases of European goods, increased the pressure from these countries and Japan for a "substantial relaxation of regulations" limiting trade with the Bloc. In several re-examinations of the lists of embargoed goods the special differential controls for Communist China and North Korea were abandoned, COCOM and CHINCOM became the same committee wearing two hats, and the number of items on the COCOM list was reduced to about one-third of what it had been. The new lists focused more sharply on items embodying advanced technology or unique materials whose denial would have a relatively direct impact on Bloc military programs.

COCOM is an informal and almost amorphous organization, having no direct relationship to any of the multilateral military or economic organizations in Europe such as NATO, OECD, and GATT. It has no charter and is based on no treaty. Its agreements, accordingly, represent moral obligations rather than legal commitments. But it does fulfill its major purpose, to preserve a common policy on strategic trade controls, and thus assures the participating governments that they are according generally equal treatment to their respective business communities. The one exception in this respect is the United States, which does not limit its controls to those agreed in COCOM and approaches more inclusively the complex and vexing question of what constitutes strategic goods.

The United States does not consider the multilateral system of export controls adequate. Since 1950 it has maintained unilaterally an embargo on practically all goods to Communist China, imposing both financial and shipping controls, and has since extended them to North Vietnam. Even towards the European Satellites and the USSR, the U.S. policy is to embargo more items than any other member of COCOM. And the U.S. embargo consistently cuts deeper than the COCOM list into the field of general industrial goods.

U.S. policy thus contains a strange dichotomy, emphasizing on the one hand the necessity for continuing the rather liberal multilateral program—for the effectiveness of any limitation imposed on exports is dependent on support from other countries capable of supplying similar goods—and on the other

the maintenance of the more stringent unilateral program. This ambivalence has been a continuing source of difficulty in the executive branch, especially between the Department of State, which has primary responsibility for administering the multilateral program, and the Department of Commerce with its Export Control Act responsibilities. Both departments agree that the severer program should apply only when a unilateral U.S. embargo is likely to have a recognizable impact on Bloc capabilities. But determining when to deny and when to approve sometimes generates troublesome problems of judgment and evaluation, and these problems are carried over into COCOM when other countries are affected by U.S. unilateral actions.

Some U.S. exporters, and perhaps others as well, are distressed by what seems the use of a double standard. Traders in some COCOM countries are permitted to sell some goods that U.S. traders are prohibited from selling to countries of the Communist Bloc. Moreover, the standard for U.S. exporters appears to vary from time to time: the same or a similar commodity that has been approved for export to the Communist Bloc at one time may be denied at another, depending on how the request is presented and what conditions are estimated to prevail then in the Bloc. A classic example was an application of the Bryant Manufacturing Company to ship high-speed grinders used in the manufacture of ball bearings to the USSR. Deliberations on this case began in 1960, and successive decisions at intermediate levels in the U.S. government oscillated between approval and denial for two years before a final decision to deny was reached.

The Role of Intelligence: EDAC

Within the United States the machinery for coordinating activities concerned with the multilateral program is the Economic Defense Advisory Committee. The Chairman of EDAC is the Battle Act Administrator, who also is the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Other member agencies are Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, AEC, AID, and CIA. The Office of Emergency Planning has observer status. Representation on EDAC is at the assistant secretary level, and the full committee is called into session only when im-

portant policy recommendations must be made. Otherwise EDAC's advisory function is carried out by its Executive Committee, a smaller group at a lower level of representation. Two working groups concern themselves respectively with control policies and with problems of application and enforcement.

With respect to the U.S. unilateral program a similar structure, the Advisory Committee on Export Policy, assists the Secretary of Commerce. ACEP, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business, includes all members of EDAC except AID, plus FAA, Interior, and NASA. As in EDAC, routine matters are handled for ACEP by a lower-level group, the Operating Committee. CIA is represented at every level in both the EDAC and ACEP structures by personnel of its Office of Research and Reports, and these representatives draw on the resources of the whole intelligence community.

The headquarters of the multilateral program has remained in Paris since its inception. There a resident delegation representing the United States on the Consultative Group and COCOM works with the foreign policy delegates of the other member countries. When the State Department in Washington is apprised by its Paris representatives of problems relating to the program, it convenes the appropriate EDAC committee to study them and render its advice, which is generally influential in determining the instructions to be sent to Paris. CIA representation on the EDAC groups guarantees that each case is reviewed by economic intelligence analysts in the specialty concerned, and their responses frequently play a pivotal role in the formulation of the instructions.

They did so in the case of the Soviet order for Japanese electron-beam machiners. For many years COCOM members have agreed that advanced equipment used in the production of war material should be embargoed, and the advertising brochure on these machines emphasized their use in nuclear energy and microelectronic applications; but the COCOM program provides for exceptions, if no member objects, to this embargo. Here the Japanese had applied to COCOM for an exception on the grounds that, since the USSR already manufactured similar machines and hence was abreast of the tech-

nology involved, no strategic risk was involved in selling it the two Japanese models. If no COCOM member had objected, Japan would have been free to go ahead without risking the termination of U.S. aid for violation of the Battle Act.

The United States could, of course, object to any and all exceptions to the list of embargoed items, since the list itself is limited to items agreed to be of strategic significance. But such systematic objection could conceivably jeopardize the whole COCOM arrangement; it would give substance to a suspicion that the entire program is designed mainly to achieve U.S. political objectives. Therefore the policy has been to steer a middle course, scrutinizing each exceptions request carefully in order to stop shipments that would be of really significant benefit to the Bloc military program. Which these are is in nearly all cases determined in EDAC Working Group I after analysis and discussion in committee sessions.

When the Japanese request for exception of the electron-beam machiners was discussed at an EDAC Working Group I meeting, intelligence information was produced to show that research and development work on such devices in the USSR was still in a primitive stage and that the Soviets had mounted, before turning successfully to Japan, a multipronged effort in the United States, the UK, and probably in France and Germany as well to acquire technology and equipment in this field. In their exceptions request the Japanese had alluded to broad industrial applications for these devices but neglected to mention that such applications are only potential, that at present the machiners are used exclusively in strategic applications. In view of this fact, together with the intelligence finding that Soviet electron-beam technology is still in its infancy, as opposed to the Japanese contention that it is on a par with that in the United States, EDAC recommended denial, and the delegation in Paris was instructed to interpose an objection. The Japanese government accordingly refused to license the export of the equipment, and the USSR continues to lag behind in this important field.

Intelligence, broadly speaking, is central to the operations of EDAC Working Group II, the enforcement group. Its most active members are the departments of Treasury, State, Commerce, and Defense. Each of these in one way or another

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participates in checking on export activities. Treasury's Bureau of Customs, for example, examines all export declarations and permits, and when necessary its agents physically inspect articles to be exported. Foreign Service officers ascertain the reliability of certain consignees before an export license is granted, and they determine whether licensed goods were received and used in accordance with the license issued.

During these investigations much information on the export activities of many firms is acquired. Sometimes sufficient evidence of illegal exports is uncovered to support judicial or quasi-judicial action, which may lead to criminal proceedings against the offending firm or individual. In other cases, when the evidence is not conclusive enough to support litigation, it is forwarded to EDAC Working Group II for possible administrative action. If the Working Group agrees that a company or individual has violated the security trade control laws, appropriate agencies are authorized to take administrative action, the withholding of various government privileges and facilities which generally serves to curtail significantly the business opportunities of an exporter.

The investigations are aided by certain information available to CIA which must be screened and sanitized before being passed to the enforcement agencies. Frequently this information is the first indication that a particular firm or individual may be conducting illegal export activities. Occasionally it contains hard evidence that a violation of the laws has occurred.

The COCOM list of embargoed items is periodically re-examined in Paris in order to add new items embodying the latest technology and remove those no longer considered strategic under the agreed criteria. Before each such international review, CIA economic analysts prepare an intelligence statement on each item on the list, giving the latest information on the situation in each Communist country with respect to that item—actual and planned production, trade, requirements, use pattern, technology, costs. Each statement concludes with an assessment of the adequacy of the Bloc's supply for strategic and non-strategic needs. These analyses are indispensable to the EDAC members responsible for recom-

mending changes in the embargo list and ultimately U.S. policy in the multilateral program.

Intelligence in ACEP

Under the unilateral U.S. program, the Department of Commerce has developed an extensive system for licensing exports, both of commodities and of technical data, and all commercial exports except to Canada are prohibited unless the Department has established a "general license" covering them or has issued a "validated license" for particular shipments. The bulk (85 to 90 percent) of U.S. exports move to friendly countries under general licenses. A General License Subgroup A lists a small number of items that can be exported to the Soviet Bloc without special application.

A detailed application must be submitted for a validated license to ship any other exports to the Soviet Bloc (except Poland) or to export to any country except Canada about a thousand items carried on a "Positive List." Most of the latter are considered strategic or critical in some way to the Bloc's military-industrial mobilization base. The remainder are items in short supply whose export would contribute to inflationary pressures in the United States.

Now the goods that the Bloc has shown the greatest interest in buying are not on either the GLSA or the Positive List. In deciding whether to issue licenses for them the Secretary of Commerce must determine in each case—usually after inter-agency review in the ACEP structure—whether the item falls under the control criteria of the Export Control Act of 1949, and particularly under its criterion, as amended in 1962, of whether the "export makes a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of such nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States."

The workings of the ACEP and its Operating Committee and the part played by intelligence can be most easily illustrated by the case of the harvesters. In October 1962 the Finley-Moody Trading Corporation applied for a license to export two self-propelled forage harvesters to the USSR. Although harvesters are not considered strategic and therefore are not on the Positive List, the "economic criterion" cited above required

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that it be determined whether the export would contribute significantly to the economic potential of the Bloc in a way detrimental to U.S. welfare. Thus the request was taken up by the Operating Committee, which had hitherto been most often concerned with exceptions to the Positive List.

In the Operating Committee the CIA representative presented information developed by the Agriculture Branch of the Agency's economic research organization. The intelligence conclusion was that this equipment would not produce a significant increase in Soviet green fodder output. The USSR had designed, constructed, and was currently testing a machine of the same type, and acquisition of the U.S. machines would be of benefit mainly by providing another design for testing purposes. In the United States, moreover, self-propelled forage harvesters have not been widely used despite the fact that our farms are organized to permit their use if they offered significant economies. A number of companies, including International Harvester, that build forage harvesters have never produced a self-propelled model because prospects for selling them are so poor. In the USSR, which has been traditionally short of harvesting machinery and where the collective and state farms have chronic difficulty maintaining agricultural equipment in operating condition, the economic loss in the event of a breakdown would be greater with a self-propelled machine than with a conventional tractor-drawn model: the tractor would still be available for other work. In a number of recent articles in the press Soviet engineers have themselves questioned the advisability of large-scale production of self-propelled agricultural equipment. Thus even if a large number of these new machines were available to the USSR it is doubtful that they would create a notable improvement in Soviet agriculture.

Several meetings of the Operating Committee were necessary to review evidence and hear different points of view before a decision was reached to deny the license. The Departments of State and Commerce voted in favor of licensing; Agriculture and Defense opposed. Because of this disagreement the case was reviewed at the next higher level, the ACEP proper. Evidence on the case was heard again here, and when CIA repeated its presentation on the situation and prospects for

forage harvesters in the USSR the ACEP Chairman reversed the decision of the Operating Committee Chairman and approved the export. This position was in turn reversed by the Secretary of Commerce, an action that sent the whole matter to the Export Control Review Board, which is composed of the President and the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Defense and to which the Secretary of Agriculture was invited this time because of the nature of the case. After the discussion in the Review Board the Secretary of Commerce decided to approve the shipment. Thus the ultimate decision in this case, just as in the EDAC case of the Japanese electron machiners, was clearly responsive to the intelligence information supplied.

Although in these two typical cases the intelligence support came from CIA's economic research organization, it should not be inferred that this is the only intelligence component supporting the export control programs. While it provides the representation on the interagency committees and is thus the channel through which intelligence is brought to bear, the information itself is acquired and the analyses coordinated with the participation of other parts of CIA and other agencies. This procedure brings the entire intelligence community into contact with the EDAC and ACEP structures and assures their members that all relevant intelligence information is made available on each case.

The security trade control program of the United States is not and never has been directed at cutting off all trade with the Communist countries; the consensus is that the national interest is better served by permitting some trade with them. It is a program of selective embargo which requires judgments on what trade to allow and under what conditions. It is these judgments that render the role of intelligence in the program a primary one.

*Responsibilities, machinery,
and problems in the over-all
direction of U.S. information
procurement efforts overseas.*

THE COORDINATION OF COLLECTION

Theodore H. Tenniswood

The total U.S. foreign intelligence collection effort is a composite of efforts by many government agencies and military commands. For some of these agencies intelligence collection is peripheral to their primary responsibilities, a small detail in the perspective of their total functions. For others it constitutes, not their major function, but a prominent and essential part thereof; an overseas military command, for example, must have up-to-date intelligence in order to carry out its mission. For the Central Intelligence Agency, on the other hand, information gathering is a primary responsibility. An effective over-all collection effort requires coordination of all agencies and commands with respect to collection potential and activity, and it was in part with this in mind that the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and charged it with making recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of U.S. intelligence activities.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the locus of responsibility and authority for the coordination of collecting elements abroad, to describe the machinery and procedures which have been established for this coordination with respect to a major category of collection, that of positive intelligence through the use of human resources and related methods, to highlight some of the attendant problems, and to suggest some steps which might be taken to make our efforts more effective.

Responsibility

In December 1947 the National Security Council charged the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for the coordination of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities. This charge, reiterated over the years, was specifically reempha-

sized and strengthened by President Kennedy in his letter of January 16, 1962, to Mr. McCone:

In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence, it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort.

Neither the NSC injunction nor this letter from the President distinguishes between coordination at home and coordination abroad or between overt and covert activities. Co-existing with these, however, are other NSC directives and a presidential letter of May 29, 1961, to all U.S. ambassadors. These documents place upon each ambassador the responsibility for coordinating overt intelligence collection activities in his area while giving the DCI the responsibility for coordinating all clandestine collection efforts abroad. In addition, they require the DCI to "ensure that planning for the utilization of the collecting and reporting capabilities for intelligence purposes of each of the several departments and agencies avoids undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and provides adequate coverage for national security purposes."

The existing directives taken together thus appear to contain inconsistencies which could be reconciled only by assuming that the President intended to make the ambassadors the representatives of and responsible to the DCI when coordinating overt intelligence collection efforts. There is, however, no precedent or practice to support such an assumption, and it is generally accepted that each ambassador is accountable in this field, as in the discharge of his other responsibilities, to the President, normally through the Secretary of State. Some of the deficiencies in overt collection pointed out below stem from this unresolved contradiction.

The Overt Collection Process

The overt procurement of foreign intelligence is an important part of the duties of military attachés and of those foreign service officers who are assigned reporting responsibilities. Representatives of other U.S. agencies—USIA, Department of Agriculture, AEC, and AID, as well as CIA, the military commands, and other military elements—at times collect and re-

port information; and in most countries nearly all of these have a very considerable potential for overt collection, one which if pursued with vigor could add much to the total body of useful information in the hands of U.S. policy makers. Requirements for intelligence information are placed upon embassy reporting officers through Department of State channels and upon military attachés and other field representatives through the channels of communication of their respective parent agencies.

Most information collection requirements are generated, assembled, and processed in Washington for levying upon the collectors abroad. The more critical national intelligence needs are periodically arrayed in orderly perspective in terms of their priority by the USIB and issued as Priority National Intelligence Objectives. The PNIOs serve to guide the planning for collection by all means and methods. The individual departments and agencies have in addition their own "departmental" needs as distinct from the "national." Each agency thus drafts its own lists of requirements and sends them to its field representatives for overt collection. Copies are often sent to other agencies that have collection capabilities in the hope that their representatives may also pick up some of the desired information.

Frequently more than one department or agency has a need for the same or very similar information, and so collectors are asked to collect information "more than once." Suggestions have therefore been made that some sort of inter-agency clearing-house be established in Washington to screen requirements and minimize overlapping and duplication; and within the DoD, DIA has established a central point to clear and authenticate the requirements of the individual military services.

For coordinating the actual overt collection efforts in the field there are no formal community-agreed directives setting procedures to be used. Guidance is given newly-appointed ambassadors concerning their coordination responsibility before they leave for their posts, and the guidance papers issued to embassies often refer to information reporting and coordination responsibilities. But each ambassador is at liberty to establish whatever local coordination procedures he believes

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necessary and conducive to the orderly collection of information.

In some capitals the counselor of embassy or chief political reporting officer is directed to exercise a general supervision over these activities, and some ambassadors have charged the local CIA station chief with the responsibility. In other countries the Country Team introduces some measure of coordination. In West Germany, where there are major military commands, representatives of their intelligence components and of the CIA station and the embassy meet regularly as a coordination committee to handle all manner of local intelligence problems other than the coordination of clandestine collection. In many places, however, the ambassador has established no formal or informal procedures for coordination, and it has been left to the inherent good sense of the individual collectors to extemporize and keep within bounds the consequences of an uncoordinated pursuit of information and material. On a few occasions CIA station chiefs have made an effort "on their own" to bring some coordination into the local overt collection activity (and sometimes been rebuffed for their "unauthorized" pains).

Deficiencies in the Overt Process

As indicated above, considerable efforts have been made in Washington to coordinate the information requirements of the several agencies. At times these efforts have been confused by the intrusion of an erroneous view that no more than one agency should require a particular kind or individual item of information. The legitimate need of several agencies for the same information cannot be eliminated by coordination, nor is it realistic to expect an inter-agency coordination process to be a vehicle for telling an agency that its stated need for a particular piece of information is not legitimate.

Inter-agency coordination of requirements should, theoretically, insure that none of the required information is available anywhere in the United States, make a consolidated compilation of the requirements of all agencies, and transmit them to the various collectors in the field with agreed priorities and in as orderly and non-duplicative a fashion as possible. But in practice the exhaustion of all stateside resources

Coordination

before levying a requirement on an overseas collector would require a greater research capability in each agency, or in a centralized inter-agency locator system (or perhaps both), than exists or is foreseeable. It is also inevitable that each agency will continue to look to its own field representatives as the ones most likely to make the effort necessary to satisfy its needs.

Unless there is a strong collection coordination hand in the field, therefore, several collectors may be looking for the same information or material in the same places at the same or different times, asking the same questions and making similar or identical requests of friendly local nationals and officials. This duplication of effort not only is wasteful but frequently makes all collection efforts progressively more difficult as local resources are picked clean by the first collector on the scene or indigenous personnel develop a reluctance to tread the same ground several times for benefit of the U.S. government.

Ideally the coordination process, both in Washington and in the field, should not only act negatively against fruitless duplication and unproductive efforts but also serve as a stimulus to more aggressive, dynamic, and imaginative collection efforts on the part of all. It should be part and parcel of a well-planned embassy-wide collection effort. The ambassador should feel that an aggressive collection effort is one of the major functions of his mission, on a par with representation, negotiation, and the exercise of the established consular functions; and through an effective coordinated process he should give positive direction to the overt collection efforts of all the agencies represented in his mission, bringing together all the requirements placed upon the representatives by their respective headquarters in Washington and by military commands and other U.S. units elsewhere.

In this process the capabilities of all elements for overt collection should be laid out on the table, the requirements matched against them, and collection assignments so meted out as to take full advantage of them. Here the capabilities of the host government which are available to U.S. elements through local liaison must also be considered, and steps should be taken to insure that a requirement is placed only once on any element of the host government, and then in accordance

with its known capabilities. The coordination process should include marshalling the material and information collected, dispensing it to the agency representatives upon whom the requirements had been levied from Washington, and, as these transmit it back to their respective headquarters, indicating which other agency representatives are receiving the same material and transmitting it to their headquarters through their own channels.

A careful survey would probably uncover regrettably few examples of such well-planned and coordinated overt field collection efforts. The Foreign Service does not wish its officers, and most of the individual FSOs do not wish themselves, to be looked upon as "intelligence officers." Similarly USIA, AID, and MAAGs are inhibited by concern (sometimes more strongly felt in their headquarters in Washington than by the field representatives) over possible adverse effects on the performance of their basic missions if they become associated in the minds of the host government or people with U.S. intelligence efforts. They frequently tend toward even greater cautiousness than is justified by this legitimate concern and often pass up opportunities to collect and hand on information and material of intelligence value.

We are most often, then, in a situation in which the overt intelligence efforts of the U.S. mission are limited to three discreet activities:

Political and economic reporting by embassy officers who normally confine themselves to the most circumspect methods for acquisition of the information they report. (Only recently the USIB formally noted without reservation a statement by the Department of State member that Foreign Service reporting is not to be considered as intelligence material.)

Overt collection by CIA station personnel as a by-product of their official cover duties or of their clandestine operational activities, often reported through embassy channels.

The aggressive pursuit of intelligence by the service attachés, looking for information wherever they can find it and expecting and getting little assistance from other members of the mission.

It should be that the ambassador and all U.S. representatives in his mission look upon themselves in some degree as intelligence officers and act accordingly. The directives on overt collection, in addition to providing that the senior U.S. representative in each foreign country coordinate activities in his area, also direct that "full utilization shall be made of the assigned duties, individual initiative, or favorable contacts of departmental and agency representatives"; and they specify that information collected by any U.S. agency in the field shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the local representative of the Department of State, Department of Defense, or CIA, according to the subject matter, who, in turn, shall be responsible for its onward transmission.

Clandestine Collection: The Rules

In contrast to practices in overt collection abroad, clandestine collection activities have been made subject to standardized coordination procedures. The basic principles of authority for conducting U.S. clandestine collection abroad and of responsibility for its coordination were laid down in 1947 by the NSC. Subsequent revisions of its directive have not changed these principles, which can be simply stated as follows.

The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility for conducting U.S. clandestine collection activities abroad.

Subject to coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, the U.S. military services are authorized to carry on supplementary clandestine collection activities abroad to satisfy their own departmental needs.

The Director of Central Intelligence has responsibility for the coordination of all U.S. clandestine collection activities abroad.

The purpose of this coordination, the directive declares, is "to ensure centralized direction," through "prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities" abroad; and the procedures necessary to achieve this centralized direction and coordination are to be established by the DCI in consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Board. To this end the DCI, with the concurrence of the USIB, issued

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four directives on 8 December 1959 establishing the implementing procedures. These directives provide that:

The DCI shall designate representatives abroad to act for him in exercising the clandestine coordination responsibilities assigned to him. Each department or agency concerned shall likewise provide for the designation of representatives abroad to carry out the coordination required.

All clandestine intelligence activities abroad, including liaison with foreign clandestine services or with any foreign intelligence or security services on clandestine matters and including the establishment of cover, commencing with the proposals therefor and including any exploratory activities conducted in support thereof, shall be coordinated prior to their initiation by the appropriate designated representatives of the DCI.

The DCI's designated representative shall determine and indicate whether the proposal or activity being coordinated is harmful or potentially harmful, and if so why, to the U.S. clandestine effort, and whether there is duplication which is undesirable or would cause uncoordinated overlap with a similar activity planned or in being.

The DCI's representative shall provide full cooperation, support, and assistance, including any appropriate suggestions, for improvement in the planning, exploration, and implementation of the proposed activity.

If, during coordination, the DCI's representative considers a proposal or activity to be harmful or potentially harmful to or undesirably duplicative within the U.S. clandestine intelligence effort, the action shall not be carried out unless adjustments are agreed upon (or unless the commander of a major overseas military command considers the proposed activity essential to the immediate conduct of his mission or critical to the security of his forces and time does not permit referral of the matter to the national level).

In the event agreement cannot be reached in the field, the matter may be referred either by the department, agency, or military command concerned or by the DCI's

representative to the national level for agreement between the DCI and the appealing intelligence chief; but the intelligence activity being coordinated shall not be carried out until such agreement has been reached.

The DCI directives provide that the procedures thus established be promulgated through the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned. Although it has been the view of some that no further implementing instructions are needed, that it should be sufficient to distribute copies of the directives to the field components concerned, nevertheless CIA and the Army have each unilaterally issued separate field instructions on the subject.

In 1961, as a result of the apprehension and detention in the USSR of some U.S. citizens, higher authority urged representatives of the DCI to see that the coordination directives were fully implemented and at the same time made it clear to intelligence chiefs in the armed services that this was to be the order of the day henceforth. A more comprehensive CIA field instruction was consequently sent out at this time.

Procedures

The DCI has designated the CIA station chief in each country his representative for coordinating all clandestine collection activities in that country. The mechanics of the coordination process in the field are worked out locally. Where the volume of military clandestine activity is considerable, as in Germany, the procedures have been formalized. There they include the assignment of fairly senior officers from both the military components and the CIA station to devote nearly full time to the coordination effort, the use of an agreed format in submitting the details of each proposed activity to the CIA station, and a formal memorandum recording the station chief's concurrence or non-concurrence. In countries where the military services are less active in the clandestine arena, the procedures are more informal.

The procedure is inevitably more complicated when a military element in one country proposes to run an operation into another. The coordination of the part of the operation that is to be carried out in the second country must be done by the station chief in that country, because he is in the best posi-

tion to appraise the security problems involved and the harm to or duplication of other U.S. clandestine activities in the area. In such instances CIA station-to-station communications are usually used, but sometimes the military element may send an officer to the second country to discuss the proposal with the station chief in person; or both methods of communication may be used in the same case. If more than two countries are involved, the coordination procedures are not basically different; it simply requires messages to more stations and trips to more countries.

A considerable volume of coordination for military clandestine activities abroad is done in Washington, occasioned by military proposals originating at the Washington level, problems in the field which require consultations in Washington, and appeals from decisions of the DCI's representatives abroad. Procedures for the coordination of proposals originating in Washington parallel those employed in the field. A proposal is normally submitted to the DCI in writing by the Defense Intelligence Agency on behalf of one of the intelligence components of the DoD. It is handled for the DCI by a Departmental Coordination Group in CIA, which obtains the views of the appropriate area divisions and field stations of the Clandestine Services. When necessary in order to insure that all facts concerning the proposed activity are clear or the reasons supporting a decision are fully understood, oral discussions are held among personnel from CIA, DIA, and the originating component before a formal reply is made.

When a military element appeals from a decision by a DCI representative in the field, it sends its proposal and position, with the decision of the DCI representative and his reasons, through military channels to the DIA, which in turn addresses a memorandum to the DCI. The DCI representative likewise submits the entire case to his headquarters, where the DCI obtains the views of the responsible Clandestine Services officers. In most instances CIA officers hold oral discussions with people from DIA and the component service in an effort to work out an agreed position between the DCI and the intelligence chief concerned. Then this can be ratified by a formal memorandum of response from the DCI to the DIA.

Interagency Source Register

One of the useful facilities furthering the basic purposes of coordinating clandestine activities is an Interagency Source Register which was established in 1957 by agreement among CIA and the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and State. Reference to this central file of human sources of foreign intelligence prevents multiple recruitment or other unintentional duplicate use of sources or agents. The Register is managed by the CIA Clandestine Services on behalf of the entire intelligence community, but only the three armed services and CIA have participated to date.

A participating member submits to the ISR a source's true name and address, other identifying data, and the results of field traces, with a request that he be registered on behalf of the submitting member. A field component submits its requests for registration through its parent service in Washington, not through the CIA station chief. If a check of the ISR files and of the Clandestine Services' register show that the person is not being utilized by one of the other members, the submitting service is so notified and the name is registered in the ISR. If another member has already registered the person, the submitting member is notified that there is a prior interest, but without identification of the member holding that interest.

Once a source is registered, under the terms of the agreement which established the ISR, no other member can use him without permission from the registering member. Arrangements are often made for joint usage or for the turnover of a source, but only after discussions, set up through the ISR, between the interested agencies. When a clandestine operation is submitted for coordination in the field, the submitting service states that the persons to be used in the operation have been registered in the Interagency Source Register in Washington.

Clandestine Collection Requirements

There is, or should be, a paramount question in the mind of every clandestine collector and in the minds of those who plan and manage clandestine collection activities, namely: "What information do I hope to acquire by this activity?"

Clandestine collection is costly and risky; it should not be undertaken for trivial information nor for information obtainable by overt means, and certainly not as an end in itself. It should always have a worthy intelligence information goal.

To insure that CIA's clandestine collection is directed toward satisfying national or interdepartmental intelligence needs and getting significant information not obtainable by other means, the USIB Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee, commonly called the IPC, maintains a community-agreed list of intelligence information requirements on the CIA service. Derived primarily from the PNIOS, this list provides important guidelines for the orientation of CIA espionage activities.

Difficulties in Practice

The National Security Council declared that although it wants "centralized direction" of all U.S. clandestine intelligence activities abroad, the DCI is to achieve this not through the exercise of command authority over other agencies' activities but through agreed coordination procedures. In order to achieve centralized direction in this way, the procedures must be and are stringent; they give the DCI's representative authority to prevent an activity from being carried out until he (or the DCI on an appeal) is satisfied that it is not harmful or potentially harmful to or undesirably duplicative within the U.S. clandestine intelligence effort (except for the loophole granted a major overseas command in critical circumstances).

In spite, however, of the apparent lack of ambiguity in these directives, there have been and continue to be differences in interpretation and misunderstandings between CIA and military personnel which have made it difficult to implement them fully in the field. One source of difficulty is lack of a common understanding in the community as to the basic elements which make an activity clandestine. At times the misunderstandings appear to verge upon refusal to accept the principles and purposes of the directives.

There is a school of thought suggesting that the military services should not engage in clandestine collection activities at all and that the coordination process should be used to

limit their operations. In truth, clandestine activities are frequently started by military elements and are well on the road to implementation before being submitted for coordination. In some instances the impression is clear that a military component has apparently made the deliberate decision not to submit a number of activities for coordination, and on a few occasions a particular service has consciously withheld an operation from coordination on the grounds that it is "too sensitive" (as though sensitivity did not make coordination all the more important). In some instances the information goals of military clandestine activities can be construed as "departmental needs" only by the most liberal interpretation of that phrase.

An additional source of misunderstanding lies in the role of the CIA, as opposed to the DCI, in the coordination process. Because the actual exercise of the DCI's coordination function, both in the field and at headquarters, is of necessity done by the CIA Clandestine Services on his behalf, the suspicion has from time to time arisen that the coordination process was being used to further CIA's own clandestine activities. Such suspicions are fed by a sentiment, held by some in the community, that clandestine collecting organizations are competitors in the collection business rather than co-workers, one with the "primary" and the others with the "supplementary" roles respectively assigned by the NSC. (The Joint Study Group noted in 1960 that CIA had been criticized for acting as both "pitcher and umpire" in the handling of the coordination process.)

The separate instructions which CIA and the Army have each unilaterally sent to the field have done little to alleviate these difficulties; they may have had the opposite effect. The CIA instructions lay great emphasis upon the station chiefs' responsibility as designated representatives of the DCI and oblige them to apply generally the same operational judgment to the proposals of the military services as they apply to their own. The Army instructions, on the other hand, lay down the "basic policy" that "Army intelligence collection operations will be conducted within the letter and the spirit of the DCIDs in order to insure the capability of taking to the highest governmental level all significant conflicts of interest of any other intelligence service with Army intelligence re-

quirements" [emphasis supplied]—a purpose out of harmony with the emphasis in the directives on centralized direction in order to avoid harm to the over-all effort or unnecessary duplication within it.

Particular Sensitivities

One of the touchy matters is disclosing to the DCI's representative, i.e. the CIA station chief (and in practice to a few additional members of the field station), the details of another service's clandestine operations. Understandably, it goes against the grain for any clandestine operator to disclose his activities to anyone else, especially to someone outside his own intelligence organization. And yet the DCI's representative clearly cannot make the required appraisal of a proposal or activity unless he is given the details about it. The directives attempted to resolve this dilemma by specifying what items of information should be furnished the DCI's representatives—area or base of operations, size and scope of the operation, areas through which it is routed, cover to be utilized, communications system, objectives and targets, agreements or arrangements with offices of any foreign governments having knowledge of the operation, type and status of sources, and "such other details as may be required."

The CIA instructions, taking advantage of this final phrase, emphasize that the DCI's representatives shall require whatever information they need to form a judgment and in sufficient detail to enable complete coordination. The Army instructions, on the other hand, state that the information specified in the directives constitutes the "maximum" the Army will provide and that for some operations less will be required. After receiving these instructions Army representatives in several instances declared that they were no longer at liberty to provide as much information as they had before.

The most sensitive information pertaining to an operation is that concerning the source or agent employed. The agent is the key element in any clandestine activity, and the potential harm or undesirable duplication of a proposed operation cannot, in most instances, be judged with any degree of assurance without information concerning this element. The directives require information on "type and status" of sources but provide for their complete identification only in "except-

tional circumstances where it is required because of the sensitivity or importance of an operation."

The armed services have for the most part interpreted this provision narrowly and been very reluctant to disclose the true identity of their agents. When it is argued that such disclosures can be asked for under the "such other details may be required" provision of the directives, the Army has taken the position that this provision was not intended to apply to any items specifically mentioned, as source identification is, in the directives. The services also argue that it is the function of the ISR to prevent duplicate use of sources and that their statement in coordinating an operation that all sources and agents involved are duly registered therefore should be sufficient. It is not, however, to prevent duplication of use that the DCI's representatives in many cases need to know the true names, but to determine whether the agent or sources have connections which while generally unobjectionable may nevertheless create a potential risk to the proposed operation or to others.

Prospective Questions

These varying instructions, interests, and points of view have not prevented the generally effective coordination of individual operations, both in the field and in Washington; there is general recognition that effective coordination is a practical necessity. But whenever reluctance to disclose details of proposed activities has to be overcome or whenever a seemingly unreasonable demand for more information has to be clarified or withdrawn, the coordination process is unduly delayed while the DCI's representatives wait for more detail and military units wait upon instructions from higher headquarters.

Of concern to some in CIA is the absence of any specific authority in the directives for the DCI's representatives to weigh the importance of the intelligence information objectives of a proposed activity as a criterion in the coordination. Although "objectives and targets" are listed among the information to be supplied, they are not mentioned as grounds for withholding concurrence. Yet one of the basic considerations in all clandestine activities is to balance the risk of an operation against the information it might yield if successful. Should a rather serious potential for failure or for harm in

case of failure be controlling, no matter how important the information would be in case of success?

In the absence of specific authority most DCI representatives have made no effort to take the information requirement into account in the coordination process; they have concurred or withheld concurrence without considering the importance of the information requirement or whether it is confined to "departmental" needs. The few who have attempted to include this consideration in the coordination have usually found the effort unproductive; their authority has been challenged by the service concerned. And it can now be argued with respect to DIA-validated requirements that those best in a position to know the importance of departmental requirements have already passed judgment on them.

A new factor which may complicate coordination procedures in the field is the enlarged role which the DoD envisages for the unified commands with respect to clandestine collection. As the unified commands assume greater responsibility for and supervision over the clandestine activities of the component commands, they must inevitably become involved in the coordination process. Several possible alterations or additions to present procedures come to mind, but it will remain an overriding requirement that the coordination be accomplished by the DCI's designated representative, the CIA station chief in the country in which the proposed activity is to take place. He is the one in the best position to judge the probability of undesirable duplication or harm entailed in a particular proposal and to give it the most realistic and effective assistance.

Centralized direction is normally considered possible only through the exercise of command. The NSC's concept that centralized direction of clandestine collection should be achieved through coordination rather than through command has made planning and execution of the over-all U.S. effort slower and more difficult. Direction by central command might have eliminated more undesirable duplication and caused more opportunities to be exploited than coordination allows. But a single command over all clandestine collectors is obviously incompatible with their being scattered among different agencies and military commands abroad. Perhaps we should lower our sights, for the time being, and worry less about centralized direction than about attaining greater pro-

fessionalism all along the line. This is probably the key to an effective coordination which can keep harm, undesirable duplication, and instances of missed opportunities to a minimum.

For it is clear that the achievement of a fully coordinated and at the same time effective U.S. clandestine collection effort, difficult enough because of the misunderstandings which persist concerning rights, authority, responsibilities, and the procedures to be followed, has been made doubly so by a lack of continuity among the personnel who handle the military operations. Personnel assigned to this kind of duty for two or three—or in a few instances more—years cannot be expected to achieve competence through a formal course of training of a few months' duration; and "on-the-job training," dangerous in this business, should be permitted only under the most careful supervision of experienced officers.

Although CIA's own operators may in some instances fall short of the desired level of experienced competence, the great body of them have reached the point that professional standards are high in the Agency, while the professional standards of their counterparts in the military services have not in the past kept pace. Recent steps taken by the DoD to increase the number of military personnel permanently assigned to intelligence work (as by the creation of an Army intelligence corps and selection of personnel for it from the upper levels of all Army schools) and to centralize and improve training for clandestine activities give promise of raising professional qualifications in this field and should within a few years produce real benefits.

The Role of the Ambassador

Ambassadors are of course concerned about possible political embarrassment or adverse repercussions on the U.S. Government if a clandestine operation were to go awry, and over the years the DCI has taken steps to insure that clandestine collection activities are conducted with minimum risk of such embarrassment or repercussions. The CIA station chiefs have been instructed accordingly with respect to their own operations and in addition, as the DCI's designated representatives, have been told to consider the political risk as one of the criteria for concurring in operations proposed by the military services. One of the consequences has been a tendency on their

part to consult more closely with the ambassadors in order to keep apprised of political sensitivities which may be affected by operations. Actually, however, there are likely to be adverse political repercussions from a clandestine collection activity only if the activity and the U.S. hand in it are discovered. The possibility of such repercussions depends primarily, therefore, on whether the operations are soundly planned and executed, a matter in which ambassadors must largely rely on the judgment of the chiefs of station.

It should be kept in mind that the risk of political repercussions may not in all cases outweigh the importance to the U.S. government of the information sought by an operation, and this is not a matter on which the ambassador would necessarily want to have the last word. Clandestine operations abroad are run in response to requirements which the U.S. intelligence community has carefully considered or in response to information needs which a military commander abroad has determined must be filled to carry out his mission; and the risk of political embarrassment which an ambassador believes they entail may not in all cases be of decisive significance when weighed against the value of the information sought.

Overt-Clandestine Coordination

To complete the picture of the coordination of overseas collection efforts, one should sketch the situation with respect to coordinating overt and clandestine collection with each other to prevent unnecessary duplication and overlap. There is an intriguing clause in the directive setting forth the DCI's responsibility for coordinating all U.S. clandestine activities abroad which stipulates that he shall "also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad." There has been no elaboration of this clause nor any attempt to lay down procedures for its implementation; the matter has in fact remained dormant.

In practice there have been few complaints concerning overlap or unwarranted duplication between overt and clandestine efforts, and those which do arise are usually found, on analysis, to refer to requirements, rather than collection efforts, in which the overt and clandestine overlap. A requirement stated in fairly general or broad terms can in many instances be fully satisfied only by employing all methods of collection,

and it is not surprising that both overt and clandestine collectors are sometimes striving to satisfy the same requirement. Such "duplication" of collection efforts will often produce complementary rather than duplicatory information.

Greater efficiency could no doubt be achieved if such requirements were more thoroughly broken down into the elements suitable for overt collection and those which can be filled only by clandestine means. Efforts are made in Washington to do this through the IPC machinery and on a less formal basis by consultation between those who originate requirements and those responsible for levying them on the collectors. In reality, the high-priority targets of today generally require action by all elements, and there is little wastage in duplication. The possibility of operational harm from overlap or duplication has in some missions been practically eliminated by keeping the CIA station chief sufficiently informed of overt collection operations to enable him to keep the security of his clandestine efforts from being jeopardized by overt approaches to the same or similar targets.

The total U.S. collection program could be considerably improved if coordination began at the beginning, i.e. in the early planning stages at the Washington level. Community planning for collection has been sporadic, sometimes done through the USIB committee structure or ad hoc groups, and generally confined to individual countries or subjects. In addition, one suspects, much is left to be desired in the way of comprehensive planning by the departments and agencies for their individual collection programs. This is not to deny that some of the agencies make considerable effort to plan collection activities, but the pattern is to plan for each function or area separately.

The Joint Study Group recommended that the USIB review the plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community at the beginning of each annual budget cycle for consistency and proper allocation of effort. Efforts were made to implement this recommendation for the fiscal years 1963 and 1964, but with only marginal effectiveness. The difficulty stemmed in part at least from a lack of compatibility among the planning methods of the several departments and agencies. Recently the DCI, in his continuing effort to discharge the responsibilities laid on him by the presidential letter of January 16, 1962, appointed a Deputy for National

Intelligence Programs Evaluation with a staff of experienced assistants. From the review which this group will make of the programs of the intelligence agencies should come a better knowledge of the complexities and feasibility of more effective community planning for collection abroad.

In the collection planning process due weight should be given to policy considerations which might militate against a proposed activity, and the ambassadors in the areas concerned should be consulted. But when the final decision taken in Washington is favorable and plans have been formulated, it is assumed an ambassador would wish to consider these facts overriding.

The Essentials

It is frequently said that our collection efforts abroad can be successfully coordinated if we display the old-fashioned virtues of common sense, good will, and cooperation. No one can doubt that without these ingredients they will suffer from lack of effective coordination. But more is needed. There must be a clear delineation and assumption of responsibilities for the conduct of collection activities, for their coordination, and for the presentation of proposals to those responsible for coordination. There must also be an understanding on the part of all collectors of the relative importance of their work and their collection goals with respect to other U.S. intelligence and policy interests, and there must be an understanding of the practical limitations on collection through the exploitation of human resources in foreign areas. Finally, it should be recognized that coordination means more than cooperation and that the responsibilities of the coordinator are, in the national interest, transcending.

The adversary's view on a second aspect of agent operations.

MEETINGS WITH AGENTS¹

A. A. Kononov
and
V. S. Sokolov

The conditions under which intelligence work has to be carried out in capitalist countries change periodically for better or worse, and in the last few years these changes have led to a considerable deterioration in the situation. Since last spring, with the wrecking of the summit conference by the Americans and a number of other important international political events, the relations between our country and the USA and NATO countries have deteriorated considerably and still remain strained.

This has led in turn to a sharp deterioration in the agent situation and conditions under which intelligence work under official cover has to be carried out in the most important capitalist countries. These conditions depend to a great extent on our political relations with the country in question, and sometimes they are entirely dependent on these relations. This fact has given rise to a necessity to switch agent work, to the extent possible, to illegal² methods. Yet the official base, which has to bear the brunt of operational work at present, will retain its importance for some time.

Operational Hazards

The severer conditions currently encountered have not been marked by any new or special counterintelligence devices or methods unknown to us, though such a possibility should of course not be excluded. They are due mainly to greater activity on the part of counterintelligence and more intensive

¹ This article is adapted from a paper issued in 1960 under Top Secret classification by the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army, Department of Special Training. For the circumstances of its issue see *Studies VIII* 1, p. 16.

² Deep-cover.

use of familiar methods and procedures. In countries where counterintelligence is very active—the USA, the Federal German Republic, Great Britain, Sweden, Holland, and some others—the operations of counterintelligence have a number of more or less similar features. Some of those which figure in the present intensified activity are the following:

Considerable intensification of stationary surveillance.

Surveillance by groups in cars, sometimes fully equipped with radio. (In the past this was not so.)

Troublesome attempts to infiltrate provocateurs into our network by exploiting our people's acquaintances among local residents.

Stricter application of discriminatory measures against our people when they travel about the country. (Before making such trips it is necessary to have special permission, to provide details of the route, which has to be approved by the authorities, and to indicate where one is going to stay overnight.)

Introduction of stricter security measures for safeguarding secrets at target installations in a number of countries.

Greater use of covert surveillance of intelligence officers. Installation of signalling and eavesdropping devices in the cars of our officers.

Recourse in the USA to flagrant provocation of our intelligence officers (even by arbitrary and unlawful acts).

The next-to-last item above is especially noteworthy. American counterintelligence, for instance, surreptitiously installs in our officers' cars various types of radio-signalling equipment which, when the car's ignition is switched on, emits a constant radio signal on a particular frequency (but no sound audible to the human ear). It thus becomes unnecessary for enemy counterintelligence to follow very closely behind the target car, for it can determine the location of the car at distances up to 20 miles by D/F'ing the signal. There have been cases when eavesdropping equipment connected to radio transmitters has been placed in our cars so that the conversations between our officers in moving cars could be picked up by the cars of counterintelligence men following a long way (2-3 km.) behind.

It is known for certain that in some countries the personnel of our military attaché offices are investigated not only by the counterintelligence of the country concerned but also by American counterintelligence organs. Several cases have convinced us that American counterintelligence has a special department devoted to investigating our officers, evidently with a view to mounting provocation operations against them. For example, one of the American assistant military attachés was outwardly very friendly towards one of our assistant military attachés. This put our officer on the alert, but he continued to meet the American concerned. In the end, it became evident that the reason for this "friendliness" lay in nothing else than the intention on the part of the American to collect as much information as possible about our attaché.

It is important to note also the intensification of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda in the press, radio, movies, and television, the systematic frightening of the population and the rousing of spy mania by dragging up old so-called spy cases, and attempts to compromise our establishments and citizens by sending fabricators, "walk-ins," etc., to us. It is known that the counterintelligence services of countries in the aggressive blocs try, under the direction of American counterintelligence, to coordinate their efforts in the common struggle against Soviet intelligence and exchange information regarding our modus operandi and our intelligence officers.

All this makes intelligence work more difficult and puts a high demand on the ability, tradecraft, and personal qualities of our workers. Experience shows, however, that an able and conscientious intelligence officer can achieve good results even in difficult conditions, and on the other hand there have been examples of unsatisfactory work on the part of intelligence officers under conditions that did not appear to make the fulfillment of their tasks difficult. Therefore in assessing this or that officer abroad one must not weigh too heavily the difficulty of the situation but center one's attention on the efforts he makes to fulfill his tasks and on his personal qualities.

The Need for Meetings

Of all aspects of agent work the most crucial is that of personal meetings. The frequency, content, and duration of meetings and the conditions under which they are held depend on

many circumstances. It is not necessary to have frequent meetings with a well-trained and conscientious agent who has secret writing materials and photographic equipment, a system of reliable deaddrops and signals, and one-way radio communications with the Center.³ With such agents personal meetings can be held at intervals of one and a half to two years and sometimes even longer, without detriment.

It is almost impossible to avoid personal meetings altogether, however. The following are some of the circumstances that require them.

Some agents refuse to have anything to do with impersonal means of communication, have no confidence in deaddrops and secret writing, and do not regard contact via a local principal agent or a cutout as satisfactory. If such agents are in a position to obtain documentary information, then personal meetings with them are essential. The frequency of meetings with such agents can vary: they may be held often, or rarely. When the agent situation deteriorates greatly, our intelligence officers under official cover may have to drop all personal meetings for a certain length of time.

Personal meetings are also essential for firming up, briefing, and training new agents or ones with whom contact has been broken for a long period. Others, working for us for ideological reasons, express a desire to meet our officers because this provides them their only opportunity to talk to Soviet people, and it is not always possible to turn down such a request from an agent.

Personal meetings are required for agents assigned agent-organizational tasks, particularly the recruitment of new agents; these obviously cannot do their work without consultations. And finally, occasional meetings are needed with persons in charge of safehouses and accommodation addresses. As a rule such persons are not taught to use secret writing and other operational devices, so impersonal means cannot be used for contact with them.

³ Headquarters.

Of the several kinds of meetings with agents, those held abroad by an intelligence officer working under the official cover of a Soviet establishment in that country are the most dangerous, because the intelligence officer is often under surveillance and is naturally not always successful in ensuring his own secure approach to a meeting. Despite the fact that such meetings involve great risk, however, they are still the main means for directing agents.

It would be safer if meetings with an agent in the country where he lives were carried out by a representative from our Center arriving illegally⁴ in the country. If this man has entered the country without having aroused the suspicion of the authorities, one can be more or less certain that the meetings he holds will not come to the notice of counterintelligence. In spite of their advantages, however, such meetings cannot be used as the regular thing. They can be held only infrequently, once or twice a year, since it is difficult to arrange the entry of an illegal officer at shorter intervals. If such trips are made according to a pattern and do not have sufficiently good cover stories, they can lead to compromise.

Another arrangement that can be regarded as secure is meeting in a third country to which the agent and our intelligence officer can go in accordance with a prearranged plan, having prepared a cover story to explain their simultaneous arrival. But it would be difficult both for the agent and for the intelligence officer to have a good cover for such trips more often than, say, once a year, even if the meetings were held in different third countries.

The most favorable conditions for working with agents can be created on our own territory. Now that a large number of foreigners come to our country as tourists or as members of various scientific, cultural, and social delegations, it is comparatively easy for an agent to enter the USSR. These trips, however, can likewise be made only infrequently. Although the entry into the USSR can be concealed, most agents, particularly those in government service, have no opportunity to go abroad oftener than once a year, during their leave. Moreover,

⁴ Under deep cover.

it is necessary to have a cover story every time for the agent's trip to another country and also to back up the cover story, and this requires that additional measures be taken.

Consequently, despite all the advantages of holding personal meetings with agents in third countries or in the USSR or having intelligence officers enter the country illegally to hold them, the practical possibilities for such arrangements are limited by a number of circumstances. The result is that official-cover intelligence officers have to carry out personal meetings with agents in the country where they live; and at present the number of such meetings considerably exceeds the number of all other kinds of meetings.

Security under Official Cover

First let us examine the elements of a personal meeting held by an officer under official cover which it is essential to disguise and the ways of doing this. The requirements fall into five phases:

Disguise for the departure of the intelligence officer from the official building where he works, his home, or some other place.

The carrying out of checks on the way to the meeting place, including countersurveillance dispositions.

A cover story for the intelligence officer's actions at all stages of the operation—his movements to the meeting place, his establishing contact with the agent, his presence together with the agent at the meeting.

Security in receiving material from the agent and in passing instructions and money to him.

Secure delivery of the agent's material to the residency.

The departure of an intelligence officer working under official cover for a meeting with an agent is one of the most complicated actions in agent work; it has to be covered by some artifice because it is made from an official building or place of residence that is likely to be under the eyes of counterintelligence agents. The officer can never be sure what the situation will be after he has set out, whether he will or will not be under

counterintelligence surveillance. The following devices have been used in practice to make a successful departure possible:

Some dispersal of the efforts of counterintelligence by previous and simultaneous departures for town of other intelligence officers with convincing cover stories.

Covering the purpose of the departure by visits to establishments and business offices connected with the intelligence officer's official duties.

Covering it by taking members of his family to stores, a movie, the theater, or a sports event.

Evasive departure by the officer (possible if he for instance lives in a house containing many apartments and having several exits) to pick up an operational car parked at a prearranged spot.

Smuggling the officer out concealed in a car.

If one of these actions is carried out naturally and does not arouse the suspicions of counterintelligence, the officer will be able to proceed to the meeting without being followed. If he does not succeed in evading surveillance and it is absolutely essential to have a personal meeting with the agent, he may (with the permission of the resident,⁵ obtained in advance) make attempts in a natural way to shake off the surveillance. But as a general rule, if the agent is a valuable one, if the officer does not know the city well, if he has not had much experience holding meetings in complicated circumstances, and in a number of other cases, he should not attempt to shake off surveillance but abandon the meeting. Precise instructions as to the conditions under which he is permitted to go through with the meeting must be given by the resident.

Different methods can be used for evading surveillance. Sometimes for this purpose two persons go out in one car, one of them being the intelligence officer, who gets out unobtrusively in a downtown area. Or the car is driven to the center of town or along the main arteries in the evening rush hours, with the expectation that the counterintelligence cars will be caught in traffic and not be able to maintain the surveillance.

Good knowledge of the city and the situation, skillful driving, ability to spot surveillance, and knowledge of the counter-

⁵ Chief of station.

intelligence's weak points have, as a rule, enabled our intelligence officers to shake off surveillance quite naturally in cases where this has been essential. It goes without saying that when an officer not engaged in an agent operation notices he is being followed he should not try to shake off the surveillance and so alert counterintelligence unnecessarily.

Surveillance en Route

After convincing himself that he is not being followed, the intelligence officer proceeds to the meeting place by a route planned in advance with a view to suitability for checking thoroughly against surveillance all along it. Only after he is absolutely confident that he is not being followed does he go to the agreed place and hold the meeting with the agent. In addition to the usual visual checks against surveillance, a countersurveillance setup and certain technical means* are used for detecting it.

Countersurveillance is set up at two or three points on the intelligence officer's route to the meeting place. At these points a second, sometimes more experienced, officer watches the other drive or walk past and determines whether or not he is being followed. Having detected surveillance, the supporting officer gives an agreed signal at a specified time warning the other that he is being followed; this signal also denotes that the arranged meeting should not be carried out. The points selected for countersurveillance must lie on a section of the route where it is impossible for counterintelligence to maintain surveillance from parallel streets.

Regardless of the use of technical means (with which it is not always possible to detect the presence of surveillance), an intelligence officer going to a meeting with an agent must have a well-developed ability to check reliably and without mistake for surveillance and spot it for certain if it is there.

The Cover Story

An important matter which calls for special attention on the part of an intelligence officer going to a personal meeting with an agent is the cover story to account for his activities and in

* Presumably monitoring the radio communications of the surveillance team.

particular for his presence in various parts of town at various stages of the operation. If the meeting is in the evening, the ostensible purpose of his movements about town might be to visit a movie theater, sports event, or any public place that is open in the evening in the suburbs.

It is much harder to have a convincing cover story for the actual contact with the agent and for being together with him at the meeting place. A brief contact can be attributed to a casual encounter, either party asking for example the way to some address or where the movie theater is, but it is often difficult to account for spending a longer time together. Because of this, meetings must be kept as short as possible when it is only a matter of passing material and money.

If in the course of the work it becomes essential to have a lengthy meeting with an agent in order to settle important handling problems, then the plan for such a meeting should be carefully thought out and usually approved by the Center. Long meetings are usually held in safehouses or, in summer, out of town under the guise of picnics, trips to the beach, fishing parties, etc. For prolonged discussions we have recourse also to meetings in third countries or in our country.

Some may question whether it is essential to have a cover story for such an agent operation as a meeting. They may argue that if enemy counterintelligence apprehends our case officer together with an agent, then no cover story will help. This is not in fact so. A cover story is necessary in all stages of carrying out any agent operation in an urban area. When counterintelligence is very active, a case officer must keep ever in mind ostensible motives for all his behavior which will account for it in the eyes of counterintelligence and conceal its clandestine nature, so that his actions appear as natural and plausible as possible to the counterintelligence agents. Thus a cover story does not mean just having a verbal explanation ready in case it is required but calls for a whole range of actions by the intelligence officer tacitly explaining his behavior.

Since counterintelligence carries out surveillance of our people in official positions abroad, it is important to succeed in acting out a prepared cover story and support it by observable moves; the vigilance of counterintelligence's external surveillance can thereby be weakened, experience shows, and the intelligence officer left to carry out the operation undisturbed. Thus

a cover story reduces the likelihood of compromise by being caught together with an agent.

Moreover, a cover story plays an important part if the intelligence officer does happen to be apprehended, alone or with the agent. The circumstances may vary: our case officer may accidentally, without any connection with his agent operation, have aroused the interest of the police by some action that seemed to them inexplicable, suspicious, or unlawful; or the police may have been summoned by observant local volunteers who suspected that something was wrong (one of our cars, for example, was once stopped by American counterintelligence on suspicion that "an abortion was being carried out in the car"). In either case our officer can escape unpleasantness (being taken to the police station, etc.) only if he has a clear and convincing cover story and acts calm and confident.

Or the enemy counterintelligence may have definite information that an intelligence officer is involved in agent work and decide to arrest him in the act of meeting the agent. This is undoubtedly the worst case, but even here our case officer, acting in accordance with a previously prepared cover story which accounts for his contact and presence with the agent, must endeavor to prove that the arrest is unjustified and demand that he be set free. In practice there have been quite a number of cases where counterintelligence has been compelled to release our men just because they acted with determination and insistence. If he has a prepared cover story, an intelligence officer can thus avoid a compromise or, in the extreme case, attribute the incident to provocation on the part of enemy counterintelligence.

Passing Material

When material is to be collected at meetings with agents, one must take steps to minimize the possibility that the case officer, if detained by counterintelligence, would be found to have the agent material on him. Some useful arrangements are provision for another officer to pick up the material and deliver it promptly to the residency, the construction of hiding places in operational cars in which the material can be securely conveyed to the residency, and equipping operational cars with means for the rapid destruction of compromising agent material.

The process of taking the material from an agent and passing it to another officer is a crucial one which calls for good and clear planning, thorough checking to be sure that the second officer has not been followed, and a well-thought-out cover story to account for the movements and actions of all persons taking part in the operation. The supporting officer must reach the area of the meeting with such timing that in the event of his having been followed the principal intelligence officer is not exposed to the risk of compromise. It is important that the routes followed by the principal and the supporting officer should not cross, but meet in the area coming from different directions. This enables the supporting officer to carry out a thorough check on the way and arrive with full assurance that there is no surveillance. If he does find that he is being followed, he must lead the counterintelligence men away from the area of the meeting and must on no account go where the principal officer is.

There is some difficulty constructing a cover story for an evening meeting between two intelligence officers in an area far from where they work and live. Suitable places for passing material under cover of an "accidental" meeting are the large parking lots at suburban movie theaters, business centers, and some grocery stores, drug stores, and restaurants.

Excursion Meetings

Our intelligence officers working under official cover have in practice used illegal trips to distant towns in the country where they are assigned as a means to hold secure meetings with agents. In planning such meetings there are certain peculiarities which are described below.

Serious attention must be paid to finding a way to leave the city securely. If the officer has a car and the trip is comparatively short, it is not particularly difficult to do this: it is easy to invent a cover story for a trip by car. But it is quite often necessary to make long-distance trips, for which the most suitable means is train or aircraft. The officer can leave his car where he usually parks it in order to give the impression that he is at home. He can leave the city, after careful checking for surveillance, by municipal or suburban public transportation. The security of the operation would be endangered if he bought a train ticket at the railway station or a ticket office

in the city, for in these places there are, as a rule, fixed counterintelligence surveillance posts which might set up surveillance on him. Usually he goes to a nearby town on his planned route where the train stops.

It is best to do the next stage of the journey by train because it is not necessary to give one's name when buying a ticket at the station. You can buy one there one or two hours before the train leaves. For a long train trip it is best to get a ticket for a one-passenger Pullman compartment, in order to avoid undesirable companions. (Persons of average means do travel this way.) Moreover, it is much easier to get a Pullman ticket on a busy rail line.


To save time it may be desirable to go part of the way by air. A drawback in travelling by air is that you have to give your name when you buy a ticket. A case officer should therefore not go by air from the city where he lives or from neighboring towns; if counterintelligence should notice that he is away and make inquiries at the airline, it could easily establish when he left and where he went.

In buying an airline ticket you can, if necessary, rent a car to be available at your destination, where you have only to show your receipt to the representative of the rental company and pick up the key to the car (USA practice). A person renting a car while buying his ticket does not have to give any particulars about himself but only show an operator's license and deposit \$50. The use of a rented car has a number of advantages. In the first place it enables the case officer to move about freely. Secondly, it enables him to stay at roadside motels, which require no particulars when one registers except name and address. Registration at hotels, on the other hand, is now more complicated: you have to give your place of work and the purpose of your visit. Thirdly, the car makes it possible to conceal your final destination.

Sample Meetings: One

It will be useful to give some examples to illustrate what we have said about methods of holding meetings with agents.

Last summer a meeting was set up in the city where an intelligence officer and his agent lived: this operation is pictured in Sketch 1. Three or four hours before the meeting was due to take place (it was set for dinner time), the case officer who



was going to hold it, together with a supporting intelligence officer and a chauffeur, left the embassy and drove by their usual route toward the house where the embassy staff live. Shortly before reaching the house both intelligence officers got out of the car and went down into the subway. The chauffeur (also an intelligence officer) went on to the area of the meeting, to take his stand outside a large store in which the supporting officer would be posted.

After changing trains en route, the intelligence officers left the subway, went into a store, and made some purchases. Altogether, they were there about 40 minutes. On leaving the store they hailed a cruising taxi and went to another large store. They went up to the top floor by escalator and then down again and left the store by another exit. They walked several blocks and went back down into the subway. They changed trains once and came out at the opposite end of town from where the meeting was to be.

Having spent some time in a restaurant, they took the subway again to the vicinity of a third large store. The supporting officer telephoned from the store to the embassy residence, spoke to his wife about his purchases, and was told (in coded form) that technical means (TS—*tekhnicheskoye sredstvo*) had detected no surveillance. Then both intelligence officers went a few more stations by subway and finally arrived on foot in the meeting area 20 minutes before it was to take place. Ten minutes before the meeting the supporting officer fell behind the officer who was to hold it and, having checked for surveillance, went off to the large store where the operational car was stationed.

The officer holding the meeting proceeded to the agreed place, checked it, and made contact with the agent. They walked a block to the agent's car, got in, and transferred the material from agent to officer. A short distance from the store the officer got out of the car, entered the store, and passed the material to the supporting officer, who immediately took it in the operational car to the embassy. The principal officer meanwhile got back into the agent's car, and they finished discussing their business while driving around. Then, after checking for surveillance, the officer got out of the agent's car, went home by public transportation, and immediately informed the resident

by a code phrase that the meeting had been held successfully. Later he saw the resident and reported verbally in detail.

Meeting Two

Another example of a meeting in the city where the intelligence officer and agent live is shown in Sketch 2. On the day of the meeting the case officer made no trips into town. He remained at the embassy up to the end of the working day and drove toward home a few minutes after most of the staff had left the building. About half way home he turned off to the grocery store where he usually bought groceries. Now he noticed a suspicious car behind him.


He went into the store, bought some groceries, and started home again. The car he had seen still followed him. He drove straight home, parked his car near the house, and decided to wait a while. He could afford to because the meeting had been arranged for 10 o'clock in the evening.

He waited for an hour and a half and then left the house by a side door and walked toward the nearest drug store, about one kilometer away. He checked for surveillance and detected none. After buying a few things at the drug store he began to walk toward home. Then, having seen no signs of surveillance, he turned into a side street and, following a route he had planned along quiet streets and crossings, came to where an operational car with a supporting intelligence officer was waiting for him. If this car had been followed and so could not get to the agreed place, another officer was in position in another car a short distance away.

The case officer and supporting officer now drove along a previously planned route, avoiding major arteries and crossroads, in the general direction of the place where the meeting was to be held. On the way they made repeated checks for surveillance; there was none. The route included one segment where it was impossible for counterintelligence to carry out surveillance by using parallel streets. Here the case officer checked for surveillance once more, and in addition a counter-surveillance station had been set up: another intelligence officer sitting in a car in a movie theater parking lot was in a position to observe the case officer drive past. If he had seen a car following, he would have set up a danger signal at an

Meetings with Agents

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Legend to Sketch 2

- 1. Embassy building
- 2. Counterintelligence car
- 3. Case officer's home
- 4. Drug store
- 5. Grocery store
- 6. Place where operational car is parked
- 7. Place for alternate operational car
- 8. Parking lot from which countersurveillance is carried out
- 9. Movie theater
- 10. Segment where counterintelligence could not use parallel streets
- 11. Place for countersurveillance's danger signal
- 12. Place for TS's danger signal
- 13. Place where case officer leaves car
- 14. Meeting place
- 15. _____ Travel by car
- 16. Travel by foot

Remarks

Participants checked against surveillance at all stages.

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Meetings with Agents

agreed place, and the officer would not have gone to the meeting.

There being no danger signal, the officers drove on to the meeting area. The cover for their presence in this area was to go to a movie, the last performance beginning at 10:30. Ten minutes before the time of meeting, 600 to 700 meters from the meeting place, the case officer checked to see whether another danger signal, this one based on information from TS, had been set up. The signal, which was to have been an office car at an agreed spot, was not there, so they drove on another 300 meters.

The supporting officer remained near the car while the case officer proceeded on foot to the meeting place. Fifteen minutes later he returned with the material, and they drove off. The case officer got out near another movie theater and, while the supporting officer delivered the material to the residency, made his own way home and slipped unobtrusively into the house through the side door.


Other Meetings

Here we shall only mention our experience in holding more lengthy meetings (say three to five hours) outside the city. For this purpose the case officer, after making checks and acting in accordance with an appropriate plan, drives out to a resort area, where important operational matters are discussed with the agent at a suitable spot (a wooded park, a restaurant) in quiet surroundings.

It will be useful to give an example of arrangements for a meeting having the purpose of severing relations with a provocateur. Sketch 3 shows one of these.

In the past year it was established that agent K, whom officer V of our military attaché office was actively engaged in developing, was a provocateur. For operational reasons we could not reveal to K that we were aware he was collaborating with counterintelligence. We managed to discover that counterintelligence intended to arrest V with compromising material on him at a routine meeting during which K was to pass it to him.

On instructions from the Center, an operation was planned to mislead counterintelligence. Instead of V, an officer G, who had a diplomatic passport, was sent to the meeting place



SKETCH 3

- 1. Military attaché's house
- 2. Cafe
- 3. - - - - - Route followed by operational car
- 4. - - - - - Route followed by the counter-intelligence car
- 5. V
- 6. G
- 7. Counter-intelligence agents
- 8. The provocateur
- 9. Area of meeting
- 10. TS (Technical means)
- 11. Route followed by G. on foot

with instructions not to contact K but to behave in such a way that counterintelligence would come to the conclusion that he was checking out the place. After examining the area, officer G obtrusively telephoned the military attaché that he had established the presence of surveillance. Officer V had driven into town at the same time, but on the way to the meeting place he went into a restaurant and stayed there. With technical means we discovered that surveillance was mounted against the officers' cars on these trips.

Several hours after the meeting was missed, officer V telephoned the provocateur, apologized that it had been impossible for him to come, and warned him to be careful: he had noticed something suspicious when he was driving into town. He would call him again after a time and set up another meeting. Needless to say, there were no more meetings of any kind with K. Thus this operation succeeded in deceiving enemy counterintelligence and frustrating the provocation planned by it.

Emissaries from Headquarters

Illegal trips made by case officers of the Center for the purpose of meeting agents require complicated and careful preparation, but the preparatory effort is well worth while. Such meetings provide an opportunity to work with an agent in a calm and businesslike atmosphere, increase confidence in the reliability of communications, and make it easier to induce agents to work more actively. The preparation (working out a cover story and a route, ordering and producing the main and supporting documents) usually takes up to two months. For officers going on a second illegal trip the time can be reduced; in practice, the only limiting element is the time it takes to produce the necessary documents.

The most complicated and delicate part of an illegal trip is passing through border and customs controls in the first capitalist country. The reason for this is not only that border officials take a somewhat greater interest in travellers from the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp, but mainly that our intelligence officers usually have with them documents of a very compromising nature—two passports—which could be found if a search were made. Another awkward and vulnerable moment is the visit that our intelligence officer has to

make, before returning home, to one of our consulates abroad in order to obtain an entry visa to the USSR. Both these hazards can be avoided, however, by arranging that passports be passed to the intelligence officer through deaddrops in the countries where they are.

After passing through border and customs controls in the first capitalist country, the Center case officer, merging with the mass of tourists and moving about freely, can easily carry out agent operations. As a rule, however, he does not travel directly from the USSR to the country where the meeting with the agent has been arranged but passes through one or two intervening countries in order to confuse his trail and make sure he is not being watched.

If he and the agent do not know each other, contact is made through a prearranged recognition meeting. As a rule, the agent is given a place where he must arrive at a specified time and a route to take from there. This is done so that our officer can recognize the agent and see whether he is being followed before contacting him. The first meeting is usually a short one, for making the agent's acquaintance and arranging another meeting; the place for this is selected in advance or by agreement with the agent, taking into account the nature of the business to be taken up.

Third Countries

As a result of the great increase in tourist traffic, many of our agents can make regular trips under good cover to European and other countries. A meeting between an agent and one of our intelligence officers who has just arrived or is living in the third country illegally is quite safe for both.

The counterintelligence of the country in which the agent lives may use its operational apparatus to watch him carefully but covertly. Sometimes such surveillance is mounted "preventively" on a person because he has access to valuable classified information, not as a result of his having been compromised; or it may be that interest in him has arisen in connection with his past activities or because he is active in progressive organizations. But when the agent leaves the country, counterintelligence loses the ability to organize secret surveillance along the route.

Recently the press reported details of legal proceedings in London against five individuals accused of espionage.⁷ From these details it is evident that British counterintelligence was able to keep close secret surveillance on them for six months undetected but was unable to organize surveillance when they made trips to other European countries. The validity of this inference is attested by the fact that not a single one of the arrested persons was charged with any kind of illegal activity connected with espionage while he was travelling on the continent.

Since the best and most reliable arrangement from the security viewpoint is an illegal meeting, it is desirable that meetings, especially with valuable agents, be carried out from illegal bases in third countries. When this is not possible, an officer from the Center can go to the country concerned under a cover story. In some European countries where counterintelligence is very active, our official residencies often resort to holding meetings with agents in other countries where counterintelligence is not so active. This method has been used for several years and fully justifies itself.

The summoning of an agent to a third country is done by sending instructions and details of the arrangements for the meeting through deaddrops, by radio, or by technical means (secret writing, microdots). On arrival in the country, the Center's representative or the officer from a neighboring residency establishes contact with the agent, the first meeting being as a rule a short one to tell the agent what the arrangements for further work will be. Depending on the nature of the business to be settled, work with the agent may be carried out in safehouses, in public places, or out of town.

Agent Visits in the USSR

Bringing an agent to the USSR is by its nature and scope a complicated operation. It is undertaken only for the most important reasons, for example training in the use of radio or planning an agent's future work. It is used very often for training radio operators; such training is almost impossible in the country in which the agent lives, because radio equipment

⁷ The Lonsdale-Kroger-Houghton-Gee case.

is fairly complicated and calls for at least some technical knowledge.

An agent may also be summoned to the USSR with a view to firming him up as a member of an existing net. Cases arise from time to time when such a measure becomes necessary, as for instance when an agent is not yet sufficiently involved in practical work and additional measures are called for, even to getting compromising material on him, to force him to work actively on behalf of our intelligence efforts. Sometimes the summoning of an agent is connected with the necessity of assessing him. In such a case his arrival will provide a test of his attitude toward us as well as an opportunity to assess his personal qualities and feelings. Finally, for agents who work with us out of ideological motives and whose friendship for us has been confirmed, a trip to the USSR can be regarded as a great reward for their efforts.

The best way for the agent to enter the USSR is illegally, though in certain cases the use of legal ways (tourists, scientific-technical and cultural conferences, congresses, symposiums, etc.) is not excluded. In such cases the Center and the agent must be absolutely certain that the visit will appear entirely natural and will not attract the attention of the counterintelligence service of the agent's country. One must also take into account the circumstances in which the agent will find himself with respect to his intelligence work in Moscow. If he travels as one of a party, it will be difficult or practically impossible for him to explain convincingly his absence during the times he has to meet with us. Consequently, it is preferable that agents come here alone, without any connection with groups of tourists or scientists. Naturally, the agent must have a good cover story for such a trip.

There are at least three ways to bring an agent illegally into the USSR. In the first the agent, under a suitable pretext and with a good cover story, travels on his own documents to an intermediate country. There he makes a secure contact with a representative of ours and gets from him a new passport with entry visas to the USSR affixed in advance. He enters the USSR on this passport. After completing his tasks here, he leaves on the same passport for either the same or another in-

termediate country, where he changes back to his own passport for the journey home.

Under a second procedure the agent arrives in West Germany, whence he flies (in order to avoid entries in his documents) to West Berlin. He crosses into East Berlin⁸ and is brought by air to the Soviet Union. In travelling to West Berlin he has used his own documents, which will show only that he has been in West Germany. There will be nothing to show that he has been in Berlin but his name on the airline's flight list. In travelling from Berlin to the Soviet Union he uses new documents (passport, certificate of identity, travel orders).

A third way, when a good cover story is available, is for the agent to use his own documents for travel to one of the countries of the socialist camp and from there be brought to the USSR, the visa being issued on a separate sheet of paper. The reliability and the value of the agent, his social position, and his personal qualities must be taken into account in choosing among these procedures.

The use of an operational passport, as in the first two procedures above, is quite an acceptable device, but one must take into account the necessity for a great deal of preparatory work. A cover story for the agent's departure from his country, his travel route, and arrangements for changing over to the operational passport have to be worked out. The operational passport has to be made ready, and for this it is necessary to obtain from the agent in good time his photograph and all the passport data. Arrangements must be made for contacting the agent in a third country in order to give him the new documents and, if necessary, to pick up his own documents for safe-keeping. And finally, signals have to be set up to denote his departure and his safe return to his own country.

A Case History

An actual case from last January will serve as an example. At that time agent A was brought to Moscow for training in radio communications, codes, and secret writing and for briefing about his future work. Two residencies participated in the

⁸The wall now puts a crimp into this procedure.

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planning for this operation. The preparatory measures included:

Detailed planning and study of the route by which the agent should be taken to an intermediate country and from there to the USSR.

Study and analysis of the operational situation on the route (visa and passport regulations, border controls, customs, currency restrictions, rules governing foreigners in the country of transit, etc.).

Working up a cover story for the agent, coordinating it with him, and getting the necessary data for a passport.

Estimating logistical requirements (the cost of the trip).

Settling the details of the travel route.

Making arrangements for handling the agent at the Center (safehouse, schedule of work, entertainment, transport, food).

The route the agent was to follow was selected in the light of his very good knowledge of the situation in adjacent countries and in Western Europe generally and his familiarity with passport and visa requirements and currency restrictions. A change to air transport was envisaged because it was known that there was no strict control at the airport involved. To give the agent his forged passport a recognition meeting was pre-arranged at an intermediate point, where the agent also gave his real passport to our officer for safekeeping.

Before the agent left his country, a meeting was held at which his knowledge of his cover story was checked, arrangements were made for contacting him on his return, and he was given money for travelling expenses. He was also informed in advance of the data and entries in the forged passport so that he could get used to the cover story supporting it.

His cover for absence from his country was a vacation trip to another country. Since there were then many West European tourists in that country, such a trip would not arouse suspicion. Another favorable circumstance was that the trip required no visa and documents were not stamped at the border. To support this cover story the agent, on arrival in the intermediate country, wrote several postcards to his acquaintances at home and gave them to our intelligence officer, who mailed them off at intervals while the agent was in Moscow.

The agent's journey to Moscow and back to the third country and then his return to his own country took place without incident or suspicious sign. His documents were not photographed anywhere. On reaching his country he set up at the agreed place the signal denoting his safe arrival home.

While he was in Moscow he was trained in quiet surroundings by experienced instructors in radio communications, codes, and operational equipment. He was given directions for his future work. In addition, his presence in Moscow was utilized to exert moral influence on him with a view to strengthening his sympathy for our country and thereby promoting closer collaboration with us.

Alternatives

Despite all the advantages of training and briefing agents in Moscow, a number of drawbacks make it difficult to use this procedure. Some agents would have trouble getting a convincing cover story to account for a lengthy absence from their work, family, etc.; moving an agent to the Soviet Union is always a fairly complicated business; one cannot exclude the possibility of a sudden change in the operational situation while the agent is on the way to the Soviet Union, so that data on him and his photograph come into the hands of hostile counterintelligence services; and the agent must be a sufficiently confident person to be able to pass calmly and naturally through all the border checks without arousing anyone's suspicion. These difficulties lead to the necessity of holding some lengthy meetings with agents both in the countries where they are operating and in third countries where counterintelligence is less active, particularly when it is a question of giving them refresher courses in radio communications or briefings on their work. Sometimes such meetings with agents can be held right in the country where they are operating, especially if a safehouse is available.

When their official positions allow an agent and an intelligence officer to visit the same events and establishments (receptions, conferences, business houses, sports arenas, stadiums), it is convenient to use these for short meetings and conversations. Brief instructions can sometimes be passed to an agent surreptitiously, by slipping him a note, and the intelligence officer can get information from the agent in the same way.

In the summer there are good opportunities to cover meetings by going on picnics, making trips to the beach, and going fishing. At picnics or on the beach the cover can be made still more convincing if the officer takes along members of his family. He and the agent, having agreed to meet at a particular place, arrive in the area at different times. At an appointed hour they leave their families on some natural pretext (taking part in a game, visiting a snack bar, etc.) and meet and have a talk. If a long meeting is required, a lonely, secluded spot should be selected. The beach or picnic area should not be one frequented by Soviet representatives, and thorough checks for surveillance should be made on the way to it.

Fishing trips provide good cover for long meetings in the summer time. It can be agreed with the agent to meet somewhere on the outskirts of town early in the morning. From there, after a thorough check for surveillance, they can drive in the agent's car to a place where motor boats can be rented, rent one, and go out fishing. Or they can arrive separately at the place where boats are rented, each rent a boat, and then contrive to meet on the water. The first alternative is better since only the agent's car is left parked at the dock, the boat is rented in his name, and so there is no trace whatever of the intelligence officer's presence either during the meeting or afterward. He needs only make sure that he is not followed on his way to meet the agent in the first place.

Many meetings are held in motels. Thus an agent, acting in accordance with instructions, drives one evening to the outskirts of the city (or to a small town nearby), rents a one-room cabin in his own name, and spends the night there. The next morning our intelligence officer drives out to that vicinity, making sure that he is not followed. He conceals his car and walks to the motel. He recognizes the agent's quarters by his car parked outside and enters without being noticed by anyone. Throughout the day he briefs the agent on his work, leaving after darkness falls. Thus his presence at the motel is undiscovered.

People who live in small apartments have begun a fairly widespread practice of making arrangements for out-of-town guests of theirs to stay at motels. The rooms or cabins at the motels are rented, not by the guests when they arrive, but by the hosts themselves as soon as they know that guests are com-

ing. This practice also has possibilities for covering agent meetings.

Other ways of covering meetings have been used. In some residencies, meetings have even been held in the houses where the Soviet officers live. Whatever cover measures the intelligence officer takes, however, their effectiveness depends considerably on whether the agent conducts himself correctly, his ability to conceal his work, and the extent to which his behavior is disciplined. If he is undisciplined and does not strictly observe contact arrangements, so that it becomes necessary to take irregular steps such as calling him on the telephone or intercepting him, all the cover precautions used by the intelligence officer may at times become futile. The same thing will happen if the agent does not take adequate steps to conceal the temporary removal of documents or does not have a convincing cover story to tell the members of his family to account for absences and for having extra money.

An agent is unreliable if he is timid or lacks self-confidence. Such an agent can attract suspicion to himself by his timid behavior, whereas a bold and enterprising agent, behaving naturally in accordance with a good cover story, will not stand out from other local residents. The agent, like the intelligence officer, can take helpful initiatives to enhance the security of operations under way in making checks for surveillance, inventing cover stories, etc. This is why agent training is a continuing concern.

New, more effective measures for cover, which could ensure that work is continued under worsening conditions, should be thought out and readied in advance. Some of the possibilities are holding personal meetings with agents at night, holding them in specially selected officers' living quarters, using new forms of impersonal contact, smuggling agents into official establishments for meetings, and getting them in in the great throng of guests coming to large receptions. But one must not be limited to such examples; the whole body of intelligence officers must work actively and creatively on this problem. In present conditions, when counterintelligence in most of the capitalist countries is very active, great importance must be placed on measures for making personal meetings between intelligence officers and agents secure.

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Intelligence Articles VIII 2

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*For a touch of individualism
in the standardized product.*

STYLE AND STEREOTYPES IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

Droning monotony, fancy jargon, and Victorian stuffiness in government prose, long the butt of an excessive amount of satire, have again become a favorite target of journalists. A top official of the Department of State acknowledged the vulnerability in a recent speech before a group of career officers in his agency. Pointing out his concern over the abstruse style used in the reports which he received, he made a plea for the revival of the straightforward "declarative sentence" and for direct expression of ideas.

In this wave of public baiting intelligence writing has not been singled out for special attention, for the obvious reason that it is classified, has limited distribution, and does meet a high standard. On the other hand, it has certainly not escaped periodic jibes, often justified, from intelligence writers and editors and from the recipients of their products.

A truism about any form of communication is that effectiveness depends on not only what is said but how it is said. Format and style are perhaps even more important in intelligence than in most forms of writing. A keen analysis of any given event or development can be mangled in the process of presentation, for example by burying the critical portions in superfluous detail. The emphasis on brevity and clarity in intelligence reports implicitly recognizes that the key officials who are of influence in the formation of our foreign and defense policies are under a variety of pressures and demands, that they can devote only a limited part of their time to the great volume of intelligence materials which flow across their desks. Aware of this competition for time and attention, all intelligence producers would like to feel that their efforts are presented as sharply, clearly, and effectively as possible.

Mass Perfection

A uniform style adopted by all producing agencies and for almost all types of intelligence production has been perfected to a degree which may have reached the point of being self-defeating. Extreme uniformity, even in perfection, risks having a deadening effect. Regardless of originator, subject matter, area, or type of study—from reports of coup attempts and general political estimates to specialized economic surveys—finished intelligence is beginning to have a remarkably familiar ring. How necessary is this uniformity?

Intelligence style has had to develop within the strict framework of acceptable official prose and of course is limited by these formal confines. However, since the product is classified and not subject to general scrutiny, it would appear that intelligence components should have at least a little more flexibility of expression than other government bureaus. In addition, it would have been reasonable to assume that the different intelligence agencies and the several staffs for different types of intelligence production—basic, current, estimative, etc.—would have attempted to achieve some degree of individuality, each developing its own style and format. But quite the opposite has happened.

One of the causes of uniformity is the widespread and recurring use of a high percentage of fashionable words and phrases derived from an invisible elite phrase book. Thus intelligence studies are generally chock-full of such words as image, posture, mystique, offload, dialogue, presence—terms currently considered choice in government, journalistic, and academic circles. To borrow a phrase from the sociologists, “cross-fertilization” explains the wide propagation of these terms. All producers are perusing the output of the others and consciously or unconsciously borrowing or plagiarizing from it. This literary osmosis soon becomes a kind of disease which adversely affects good writing.

The Editorial Compulsion

Not content with the osmotic leveling, editors have exercised their authority to impose an extreme rigidity of style on intelligence publications. Their usual explanation to the writer is that the next echelon of editors will perform even

more drastic surgery on a manuscript if it is not carried out at the initial stage. Other rationalizations for manuscript changes go something like this: “We just don’t use this word (or phrase).” “This is inappropriate to our style.” Or “the chief simply writhes in anger whenever he sees this word.” Most frequently, however, editors make changes in the interest of “the reader” (aka “consumer”). The editor smooths the ruffled feelings of the analyst in the following terms: “The reader will see a double meaning in this idea.” “The reader won’t understand the terminology in this context.” “The reader will infer such-and-such from this paragraph.” The clairvoyance of editors with respect to the thoughts and reactions of this lone reader is nothing less than preternatural. Embarrassingly, however, their psychic or telepathic finds are occasionally reversed by the higher editorial echelon, which not infrequently restores the analyst’s original phrasing or something like it.

No one would deny that intelligence production of all types requires a closely controlled style and format in order to fulfill its purposes. Considerable uniformity is inevitable, in part because of the pressure of deadlines and the variance in writing skills among analysts. If the latter were unleashed to give expression to their personalities in their reports, chaos would soon reign and the reputation of the producing component be ruined. Some stereotyping, moreover, is necessarily introduced by the primary additive of finished intelligence—interpretation, estimates, analysis, meaning. These cannot be couched in absolutes, and the English language has just so many synonyms to qualify unknowns and signal the difference between fact, reported fact, and significance. The words possibly, probably, likely, unlikely, may be, seem, almost certainly, according to, presumably, allegedly, ostensibly, believed to be, and a few others are bound to recur in intelligence writing. They are accepted as indispensable guides and warnings.

But there still remains a small degree of indeterminism in the relatively rigid framework of both style and format. And this small bit of leeway could provide a refreshing breath of variety in intelligence presentation, sharpening the interest and receptivity of the reader. For example, editors might lower the bars slightly to permit the occasional passage of sentences beginning with “But” or “And,” a form of sentence

structure widely approved in the best grammatical circles and highly effective when used sparingly. Or a single striking phrase without a predicate. The granting of such small liberties might encourage initiative and originality among analysts who otherwise tend to feel too hopelessly tethered by editorial regulations. Too often an analyst will excuse a perfunctory job of writing and organization on the ground that "the editors will rewrite the piece anyway, so why waste my time on anything but the content?" A greater flexibility in presentation than may be possible for periodic reporting under short deadlines would be feasible for special studies and memoranda which develop a subject in depth and detail and at greater leisure. An occasional sampling of consumer opinion could serve as a guide.

The Elegant Cliché

It is always easier to take negative action, and one eminently practicable means of improving intelligence presentation and at the same time eliminating some of its sameness requires only a negative action on the part of editors and analysts—the elimination of as many as possible of the popular clichés that saturate the content of most government and journalistic reporting. Clarity, accuracy, brevity, and directness are among the cardinal qualities of intelligence writing and indeed of any good non-fiction. These characteristics should not be confused with the excessive and often contrived introduction of terms once pungent and effective which through overuse have become a mere jargon, perpetuated to give the sophisticated a feeling of "belonging" and "togetherness." Shopworn pretentious phraseology can be distracting if not actually repelling to a reader.

For example, *image*, *posture*, *presence*, and *confrontation*. The flexible word "situation" should not be made a cover for all sins; it is often superfluous embroidery. A recent government publication mentioned "the fat cow surplus situation" in a particular foreign area; did the surplus of fat cows *have to be* a situation? And are we really being more sophisticated in saying that a cargo is "onloaded" or "offloaded?" The English-speaking peoples survived for many centuries with plain-vanilla *load* and *unload*, and I have yet to get through my obtuse skull the advantage in the new coinage.

The following is a small sampling of currently fashionable clichés, listed for handy reference of analysts and editors. All of them are recommended for the most "Limited Official Use" to which it is possible to limit them.

NOUNS AND PHRASES	VERB FORMS
image	to play in low key
posture	to stem from
presence	to structure
mystique	to restructure
confrontation	to onload
situation	to offload
structure	to move forward
infrastructure	to kick off (a political campaign, program)
dialogue	to trigger
on balance	to step up
political infighting	to add a new dimension
dichotomy	to back-stop
thrust (of an argument)	
take-off stage (a program or economy)	

Finally, the editors might to advantage dispense with the term "the reader" when defending their changes during confrontations with analysts. The implication of this word in the singular—an audience of only one—is wilting of the analyst's posture and has an adverse impact on the projection of his image. Besides, analysts always speak of editors in the plural, because there always seem to be several echelons. Since the analyst is guaranteed at least so many readers, the plural form—on balance—would appear to be good usage in the editorial dialogue.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

British Services

MI-5. By *John Bulloch*. (London: Arthur Barker. 1963. 206 pp. 21/—.)

Because this is the only book extant devoted entirely to the British internal security service, there is a risk that intelligence officers generally, and even those with particular interest in the British services, may give it exaggerated deference. It is a journalist's account, with the advantage of the readability and the hazard of the inaccuracies that mark also the author's earlier publication on the Lonsdale-Houghton espionage case.¹ This time, moreover, he had a special axe to grind.

The timing of the MI-5 story is significant. It appeared almost squarely in the middle of the bone-crushing Profumo scandal and after nearly ten years of successive exposures of deeply set Soviet long-range penetrations involving British officials in sensitive positions at home and abroad. The book summarily reviews some of these cases, but most of its content is concerned with British security's first and longest-lived chief, Sir Vernon Kell, who founded the service in 1909 after the Committee of Imperial Defence, which had been set up five years earlier, finally agreed that some action was necessary to combat growing German aggressiveness.

Kell began as a Captain. He left the job in 1940 as a Major General, the bureaucratic victim of two successful security breaches by the Germans—Lieutenant Prien's penetration of the Scapa Flow naval base and the sabotage of the Royal Gunpowder Factory in Essex. He died, one judges from the book an unhappy man, two years later.

With the encouragement and assistance of Lady Kell, Bulloch here attempts to interpret the main developments between 1909 and 1940 in a manner favorable to the old chief and so to create a sort of memorial to him. It is therefore not surprising that the book is less than accurate in all detail, that it contains little new with respect to previously pub-

¹ John Bulloch and Henry Miller, *Spy Ring* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1961.) Reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* V 4, p. 41.

lished cases, and that it falls short of really illuminating the record of British security's encounter during this period with multiple, concurrent foreign adversaries.

It begins with an error in the fundament, characterizing MI-5 (p. 9) as "an autonomous department directly answerable to the Prime Minister." The recent report by Lord Denning on the Profumo case makes it very clear that MI-5 has not been directly responsible to the Prime Minister since 1952.² The case histories that follow for the most part illustrate Kell's prowess in World War I against the Imperial German service. Almost all of these had been hashed and re-hashed for many years in primary and secondary accounts.

The fragmentary and selective considerations which the book gives to the record of the security service since 1940 suggest plainly that MI-5 did not make a successful transition in its estimation of the main adversary during the preceding period—this notwithstanding Bulloch's claim that British security in Kell's day "was very good indeed," largely because "Kell was a very good Director" and "chose very good men to work for him." The Burgess/Maclean and Philby cases suggest that it was precisely during Kell's tenure that the foundation of Soviet long-range penetration in the United Kingdom was laid.³

There is, however, considerable material in *MI-5* of anecdotal value for a selective and critical reader. One item, for example, is an explanation for the tradition in MI-6 (foreign intelligence) to refer to its chief as "C." Bulloch traces this practice to the World War I inter-service mystique under which Kell signed official papers "K" and the head of MI-6, Captain Mansfield Cumming, signed his "C," with the result that "the Head of MI-6 is still known as 'C,' though Captain Cumming

² Pp. 79-80, *Lord Denning's Report* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, September 1963). The report is probably the best available source of accurate detail on MI-5 as a whole.

³ For an insightful treatment—although the author stops short of the conclusions warranted by his own data—see Neal Norman Wood, *Communism and British Intellectuals* (New York, 1959), pp. 83-85, 118. Alexander Orlov lays down the doctrine for such penetrations—in a teasing statement that suggests he knows more than he can put into print—in his *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (Ann Arbor, 1963), pp. 15-16.

is long dead, and the name of the present occupant of the post does not begin with that letter." If you—like this reviewer—thought "C" began as "Chief," you have some cortical re-grouping to do.

It is clear from all Bulloch says that he finds nothing to criticize in Kell's administration and much to condemn in the banishment which he in effect suffered. Kell's only operating rule was that no one should be accepted for service who was not of pure British stock. Bulloch, noting that this rule is still followed, adds: ". . . this precaution is still a sound one. The latest example, that of George Blake, demonstrates that MI-6 would do well to adopt the same principle, if it could be done." The closest he comes to a judgment on MI-5's current capabilities is the statement (p. 133): "I believe, too, that the time is overdue for another change in the pattern of espionage and counterespionage."

On balance, the book represents an uneven treatment of what from the U.S. viewpoint is a major ally's crucial activity in defense of its secrets, which now include many of our own. The author's special plea for MI-5's founder is nowhere more evident than in his omission of any mention of his successors. Not one is recalled by name or by indirection—not even Sir Percy Sillitoe, who, from 1946 to 1953, reversed the policy of his predecessor (and was in turn reversed by his successors) with respect to the anonymity of the service.

BALTIC EPISODE. By Captain *Augustus Agar*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1963. 255 pp. 21/—.)

This memoir is a story primarily of British naval action in the Gulf of Finland against the background of political irresolution in the international relations of 1919-20. Although it is subtitled "A Classic of Secret Service in Russian Waters," and although the author was indeed on an intelligence mission assigned personally by Director "C" of the Secret Intelligence Service, the remarkable thing about the episode is the extent to which he prejudiced this mission for the sake of more spectacular self-assigned activity and nevertheless apparently won commendation from everyone, including C, after its consequent failure.

Directed to establish a secret hideout on the Finnish coast near Petrograd for two fast Coastal Motor Boats by which he could sneak in to reestablish contact with and eventually exfiltrate an important agent cut off in Bolshevik Russia,⁴ Agar did establish his base and make the initial contact; but then at the time of the Kronstadt rebellion he couldn't resist putting a torpedo, on his own initiative and in spite of the hazard to secrecy, into a Red battleship. This exploit gave the British naval commander in the Baltic the idea of raiding Kronstadt harbor with a whole squadron of the CMB's, and Agar enthusiastically joined as a volunteer in the raid, which of course left the situation impossible for the CMB's on his intelligence mission. The agent whom he had been supposed to rescue had to make his way out as best he could by land frontier. Yet Agar harvested the VC and DSO, warm words from C, and apparently even the gratitude of the agent. The intelligence moral in all this is a dubious one.

⁴ Sir Paul Dukes, who gave his own account in *The Story of "ST 25"* (London: Cassell, 1938).

World War II

THE WEEK BEFORE PEARL HARBOR. By *A. A. Hoehling*. (New York: W. W. Norton. 1963. 238 pp. \$4.50.)

TORA, TORA, TORA. By *Gordon Prange*. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1964. Condensed in *Reader's Digest*, October–November 1963.)

The literature on the intelligence failure that led to the disaster at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, is growing apace. Last year Mrs. Wohlstetter, using as one of her primary sources the lengthy congressional hearings on the case, published her excellent study¹ analyzing in depth the breakdown of the warning function. Now two new books have appeared, one from the U.S. viewpoint, the other from the Japanese.

A. A. Hoehling has taken an approach emphasizing the human relations at work in the complex of events; he has interviewed most of the key command and intelligence personnel available and reviewed the papers of others. The resulting book is much more readable, if less scholarly, than Mrs. Wohlstetter's, probably because the role that personalities played comes through more strongly. Perhaps their role is overly stressed, and that of organization or the lack of it is underplayed. It is noteworthy that there was no system for coordination of intelligence either in Washington or in the field, so that what exchange of views did take place was the result of friendships or personally developed relationships like those between McCollum of ONI and Bratton of G-2.

In this reviewer's opinion, the author makes too much of the state of health of the key officials in Washington—Roosevelt, Hull, Knox, and others. That decision-making statesmen should have the health problems of advancing age is no historical abnormality. Mr. Hoehling makes Roosevelt's sinus treatments sound almost sinister, the villain that opened the door to the Japanese surprise. But even if the President's nasal passages had been completely clear—a condition practically impossible to achieve in Washington—this

¹ *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford University Press, 1962). Reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* VII 3, p. 119.

could have had little effect on his appreciation of intelligence reports which he never personally received. Moreover, it was Roosevelt who had been most certain that the breakdown of the negotiations with Japan meant war and was under the impression that all military units had been put on the alert. Hoehling also takes too much at face value the statements of Admiral Zacharias, a Naval Intelligence expert on the Far East who, however, was never noted for the moderation of his views: "Zacharias estimated," for example, that "there were approximately 1,000 Japanese agents in the [Hawaiian] islands."

Despite these shortcomings, *The Week Before* is not only interesting reading but valuable to the history of intelligence.

Tora, Tora, Tora ("Tiger, Tiger, Tiger," a code message sent by the attacking task force to report "Complete surprise achieved") is the Japanese side of the story. It describes Yamamoto's three-page letter of January 1941 to Admiral Onishi outlining the plan for a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor, the war gaming of the attack in September, an October meeting of the Japanese admirals at which there was strong opinion that the American fleet would be alert and ready, the opposition to the plan mounted by the Naval General Staff, and the ultimate acceptance of Yamamoto's views.

Once a decision in favor of the attack was made—as a result of Yamamoto's threat to resign if his plan were not accepted—Japanese espionage in Hawaii was stepped up, using the legally assigned consuls who were trained intelligence officers. Low-level bombing practice was begun on Kagoshima Bay, selected because it is shaped like Pearl Harbor. Finally, the details of the attack itself are described through the eyes of the Japanese attackers.

OF SPIES & STRATAGEMS. By Stanley P. Lovell. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 191 pp. \$3.95.)

In 1942, a 52-year-old New England manufacturer and inventor found himself, to his surprise, taking on the job of assistant to Dr. Vannevar Bush in Washington. Soon, even more surprised, he was involved in an additional job as an assistant to General Wild Bill Donovan, with the title Director of Research and Development, Office of Strategic Services.

Now 73, having fulfilled the obligation laid on him by Donovan to wait twenty years before publishing any account of his OSS experiences, he has written an amiable and attractive memoir.

Dr. Lovell's short book is both rewarding and disappointing. It is marked by a modesty and generosity of spirit which other OSS authors would do well to emulate. Here is one who does not suggest, as some others have, that he would have won the war single-handed if only he had not been thwarted by the knaves and fools around him; he does not even mention the fact that his work won him the Presidential Medal of Merit. He writes as a man who liked his outfit, his job, and his colleagues, and he succeeds in communicating his enthusiasm for them. The eventual biographer of General Donovan will be glad to draw on this warm, lively portrait and these telling anecdotes of him.

It was the job of Dr. Lovell's men to invent or perfect the devices used in clandestine operations of all kinds by OSS and by resistance movements all over Europe and Asia. His book is at its best and most useful when he describes the development of more than a dozen of these devices, including the following.

"Casey Jones," an explosive charge affixed to the underside of railroad cars and activated by an electric eye responding to the sudden darkness when the train entered a tunnel (of special value for disrupting traffic between Italy and Germany).

A silent, flashless pistol and submachinegun, which General Donovan demonstrated to President Roosevelt under circumstances which the reader will probably find as shocking as the President did.

"Firefly," a small plastic cylinder for slipping into a gas tank, carrying an explosive charge to be activated several hours later when the gasoline had slowly swelled a rubber retaining ring.

"Caccolube," a compound in a small rubber sac to be introduced into an automotive lubricating system through the breather pipe; when heated it became a colloidal dispersion in the oil and converted the cylinders to shrapnel.

"Bushmaster," a tube equipped with a .30-caliber rifle cartridge and a delay mechanism, useful for posting along jungle trails to persuade the Japanese that the woods were full of snipers.

The famous tire spike which when dropped on roads and runways always had one prong pointed into the vitals of any approaching tire.

"The Stinger," a one-shot pistol containing a .22 over-loaded cartridge, easily concealed because its size was one-half by three inches.

"Aunt Jemima," a high explosive disguised as ordinary flour, which could be kneaded, raised with yeast, and even baked for concealment until it could be used.

Dr. Lovell describes these infernal machines with a wealth of anecdotal detail, of which the best concerns Aunt Jemima—what happened when he was told that the way to get rid of an extra hundred pounds he had lying around his office was to flush it down the toilet, and then, too late, was warned that organic matter in the sewer would react with the compound and blow up every building in Washington. The book is equally interesting in telling about ideas that did not pan out, such as pre-positioned charges to be activated by the ground shock from air raids, and researches into post-hypnotic suggestion. Lovell believes that two of his devices—some of the silent flashless weapons and an explosive charge set off by an increase of 5,000 feet in the altitude of an aircraft—got into the wrong hands with disastrous results. But he is sure that the whole array of unconventional weapons helped shorten the war and thereby saved the lives of a great many fighting men.

Even so, the kind of detail which an R&D man can give about his work of twenty years ago was bound to be disappointing. Some of his shop's inventions are still classified; some probably could not be described fully for fear of putting weapons into the hands of criminals. The whole book appears to have been written from memory, without benefit of records of any kind, and though Dr. Lovell's memory seems to be pretty good it does not begin to answer all the questions one would like to ask. He knows very little about the actual uses to which his devices were put in the field and the results they

achieved; this was inevitable in the nature of things, but it leaves the reader wondering.

The author has been ill served by his publishers. The book's jacket touts it, with gruesome inevitability, as "incredible secrets of World War II revealed by a master spy." It also capitalizes on the author's weakness for telling irrelevant and not very persuasive stories he heard from other people, which detract from the value of his own personal reminiscences. A better editor would have persuaded him to stick to things he knew for certain at first hand—life in the OSS, and the work of research and development.

Doctrine and Pseudo-Doctrine

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE IN MODERN WARFARE. By Lt. Col. Irving Heymont. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co. 1960. 244 pp. \$6.)

Col. Heymont's work might more appropriately have been entitled "Handbook for Combat Intelligence Personnel": it is a sort of primer for enlisted personnel and junior officers assigned to combat intelligence units for the first time. It should be useful for this purpose, although developments in the techniques of intelligence collection and production, organizational changes in the Pentagon, and the evolution of new concepts in both conventional and nuclear warfare—together, perhaps, with security and classification barriers that inhibited the author—tend to give it an already dated quality.

A little less than half the book—107 pages—is devoted to the fundamentals—*What is intelligence? Principles of operation, Collection of information, Processing information into intelligence, Counterintelligence*, etc. The rest is a series of annexes—short essays or illustrations—on subjects ranging from the national intelligence organization to order of battle, from technical intelligence to the format for intelligence estimates. All of these subjects are treated in specific relevance to combat intelligence in the field, never as viewed from the national level.

To the extent that this field orientation results in a lack of perspective, it is unfortunate that the author's experience had not included an assignment in intelligence at the Washington level. To us at the national level it shows also that we have failed to reflect downward the Washington viewpoint and a knowledge of the way matters are handled here: even on a totally unclassified basis much more could have been told about the central process. In fairness to the author, however, it should be noted that he clearly intended this volume not as comprehensive analysis but as an elementary statement of method.

THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE. By Joachim Joesten. (New York: Abelard-Schuman. 1963. 314 pp. \$5.)

This sleazy potboiler devotes its opening paragraph to the tired joke about the second oldest profession and then goes

rapidly downhill. It tries to prove that intelligence "is all a huge waste of time, money and energy, to say nothing of the human agony, bloodshed and tears involved. Except perhaps in a few instances, the results of all this frantic spying are pitifully small. And in most cases they could have been obtained by conventional means." (p. 9)

Joesten's qualification to sit thus in judgment is possession of a file of newspaper clippings in eight languages. He boasts that he is a know-nothing:

This book is based in its entirety on information that has already appeared in print in one country or another. Not one iota of it has been obtained from classified material or through personal contact with any Intelligence source whatsoever. As a matter of fact, the author, in his research covering a period of many years, has scrupulously avoided any opportunity to make such contacts. He has never even spoken to any person whom he knew to be in this game!

For, from the moment I had done so, I would have been automatically disabled in the task I had set myself to accomplish: to show in an objective, impartial, truthful way the workings of intelligence throughout the world. The moment I had laid myself open to the charge of using any still secret—that is unpublished—information, I would inevitably have become one-sided, a reporter of half-facts. (pp. 17f.)

This disarming confession seems to explain why Joesten has forsaken journalism for potboiling with other men's clippings, but it doesn't help his book. Half-facts would have been a great improvement over what we get, and the charge to which he lays himself open is that he has not even made good use of the published sources. Ignoring all serious books on postwar intelligence, he has limited his selection of quotations from newspapers and magazines to what serves or can be made to serve his thesis.

His information on American intelligence is drawn from the likes of Westbrook Pegler, Robert Ruark, a notorious anonymous pamphlet, and the rumors about intelligence which are often dished up by the *New York Times*. His account of British intelligence is a farcical garble concocted from Sefton Delmer and a book full of howling misinformation about the George Blake case. (The Lonsdale-Houghton-Gee-Kroger case, which was much more accurately described in the newspapers,

is dismissed in a few words, perhaps because its solution reflected credit on Western counterintelligence.)

His view of Soviet intelligence varies with the point he is trying to prove: when he argues that all intelligence is evil and futile he thoroughly belittles the value of Rudolf Abel to the Soviets, but when he wants to show that American intelligence is especially futile he emphasizes our folly in trading off that "very valuable man" for "an airplane driver." He concludes his comparison of Soviet and American services by saying, "We have the best-paid spies in history. They have, as so unimpeachable an authority as Mr. Tompkins has testified, the best, period. The difference goes a long way towards explaining why we do so much losing in the cold war." (p. 67) "Tommy" Tompkins, unimpeachable certainly but not an authority on the over-all calibre of Soviet spies, prosecuted Abel in 1957 and now practices law in Newark. The use Joesten makes of him typifies his citation of "highly authoritative" sources throughout the book.

Joesten's sources keep letting him down. Take the matter of definitions: Asking a man to spy for you "is known, in English, as 'letting one's hair down.' The Germans have an even more expressive phrase for it: *die Hosen herunterlassen*, which literally means 'to pull one's pants off.'" (p. 44) "A 'walk-in' is a store or office operated by an Intelligence Service as a commercial front for the convenience of volunteer informers." (p. 45) "A 'live mail drop' . . . is a courier whom the agent meets at a secret rendezvous outside his operating territory." (p. 171) Doubling an agent is always referred to as "turning around." These are only the simplest of his blunders; the important ones would take too much space to demonstrate.

But Joesten makes up for any little slips by the vast sweep of his judgments: "Virtually all major Intelligence operations throughout the world now hinge on bribery." (p. 5) "Of all the great nations in the world, the U.S., without question, has shown the most marked ineptitude in spying." (p. 47) But it would be immoral of us to improve: "To make proficiency in spying a matter of national pride, as some misguided Americans do, would seem to be on a level with the self-satisfaction of that famous all-American whore who used to boast that she was 'the goddam best lay in the country.'" (p. 48) Thus he

gets us going and coming. "The world's most successful spy, nowadays, is the radar eye." (p. 58. The proof adduced, from *Aviation Week* and the *New York Times*, might seem to argue against American ineptitude.)

Joesten dearly loves a big round number. The U.S. "employs more than 100,000 people in military intelligence and spends \$2.5 billion a year on their upkeep and operations." (p. 6, citing *U.S. News & World Report*) CIA "alone is believed to employ upward of 30,000 people," (p. 6) and its budget "is generally believed to run to around 1 billion dollars a year." (p. 163) There is a passing reference to "the billion-dollar slush fund which Congress has set up precisely for the purpose of enticing defectors from the Soviet camp." (p. 259) It "can hardly be doubted" that "the aggregate number of Germans spying upon each other . . . runs into at least six figures" (p. 6), leaving open the scary possibility that it might run into seven or eight. This should not surprise anyone who learns that "about forty" intelligence services are operating in West Berlin alone (p. 150), and that, on the authority of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of Hanover, the total for all Berlin is "no less than eighty." (p. 151, Joesten's italics)

About three-quarters of the book is made up of short chapters rehashing newspaper accounts of twenty-odd postwar spies and defectors, tricked out in revolting journalese of which it would be tedious to give further examples. These appear to reproduce accurately what the press said, but Joesten has added his own touches—invented conversations, imagined trains of thought, phony pathos, heavy irony. The book's best single line comes at a moment of heavy-breathing drama: "Pass me the pepper," he commanded matter-of-factly." (p. 211)

Opponents of intelligence as a function of government will have to do a lot better than this. When the book comes out as a fifty-cent paperback, don't waste all that money on it.

TRUJILLO: The Last Caesar. By *Arturo R. Espallat*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery. 1963. 192 pp. \$4.95.)

This breezily written (presumably ghost-written) memoir by the man who served Trujillo as chief of security from 1957 until his assassination characterizes intelligence work and

political warfare in the Caribbean as “gutter fighting,” “the claw and fang,” “an endless series of truly epic deceptions, duplicity and betrayals.” To the extent that this was a chief message the author wished to convey, his book is successful: the reader indeed feels plunged into the midst of habitual deception and duplicity. For this very reason, however, he is left without basis for sorting out General Espallat’s deceptive fictions, self-serving or merely sensational, from whatever kernels of truth may hide in his account.

One can only remain skeptical that Trujillo gave U.S. congressmen and State Department officers “at least \$5 million” in bribes, that the U.S. ambassador’s wife received a \$17,000 brooch from him, that as early as 1957 Dominican intelligence had made a “factual and in retrospect entirely accurate analysis . . . of the Castro-Communist designs on our hemisphere” and paid a U.S. senator—in vain—a quarter million dollars to do something about them, that the assassination of Castillo Armas “was the culmination of a conspiracy already known to diplomats and intelligence officials in capitals from Washington to Rio de Janeiro,” that “whole segments of the Guatemalan secret service were controlled more by Trujillo than by Armas,” that the State Department “insisted that CIA’s anti-Castro operation be balanced off by also knocking Trujillo out of the saddle” and therefore the Department is “better skilled than the CIA when it comes to cloak and daggering,” or that that author’s only connection with the Galindez case was such as to enable him to “state with some authority” that Galindez’ disappearance “was a factor in permitting the Communist capture of Cuba.”

The main impact of the book is that of an attempt to discredit the U.S. government—congressmen, diplomatic officers, the State Department, CIA. If that was also its main purpose it defeats itself by acting too smart, swinging too wildly, smoke-screening too heavily, and then expecting to be believed on its own say-so or that of columnists like Drew Pearson.

STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



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
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An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

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Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

AN INTELLIGENCE ROLE FOR THE FOOTNOTE

A. John Alexander

After some dozen years' immersion in intelligence, I still find myself reacting uncomfortably to its rather cavalier disregard for the footnote. In that strange way each profession has of altering accepted words to its own meanings, "footnote" in the jargon of the intelligence community designates primarily the notation of a major disagreement on the part of a member with an otherwise agreed estimate. Here, however, I am referring to the footnote in its academic, scholarly, or scientific sense, as a device for identifying and in some cases even evaluating the source material used for a particular textual statement. Such a footnote is deeply scorned by practitioners of intelligence and makes only a rare appearance in most intelligence products.

During my years of intelligence apprenticeship I of course noted the omission, but I assumed that the master craftsmen knew best and there were very good reasons for it. I assumed that the suppression of footnotes was part of one's overall conversion from scholarship to intelligence: the paramount need of intelligence was a timely answer to a current problem. Intelligence could not afford the luxury of extended research, the comforting security of having explored all possible sources, the devotion of a lifetime of effort to the isolation and exact determination of one particular item of knowledge—culminating in a painstaking and exhaustive documentation of the entire research process.

And now, I suppose, after these several years I am something of a master craftsman myself. I have my brood of apprentices—and I teach them the same doctrine and they practice it. But throughout the whole process I continue to be troubled. I wonder if the abandonment, for the most part, by the intelligence community of the somewhat elaborate and carefully developed apparatus of scholarship has been altogether to the good. I wonder if we have not in fact been pay-

ing for it by an undesired but nevertheless real degradation of the intelligence effort.

Bare Heights

As one trained in the rigorous academic disciplines, I find abandonment of the reassuring apparatus of scholarship disturbing in itself. But it is more than this general loss that disturbs me. There are certain specific practices that also provoke a sense of uneasiness. For example, and I find this quite ironic, the higher the level of the intelligence product, the less complete is its visible documentation. In other words, the more serious its import and the closer it is to the influential official who will act upon it, the slighter is its overt back-up.

At the lowest level, of course, is the raw intelligence report. This report is generally extraordinarily well evaluated and supported. No scholar could really, within the normal limits of national security, ask much more. The source, particularly in CIA-originated reports, is carefully and intelligently described as to his professional knowledge and competence, his outlook, his opportunity to gather the information, and his previous reliability. Not only the date of acquisition of this information but place as well is given. In some reports the rapporteur also provides a field evaluation of the substantive information elicited from the source. The user of this kind of report can easily and effectively apply the canons of evidence in evaluating and testing the information.

But as we move up the ladder of intelligence reports the documentation gets sparser. The NIS, to use a well-known example, is in effect a scholarly monograph, digesting a great multitude of raw reports. Its total documentation usually consists of a single, very brief paragraph commenting on the general adequacy of the source material. No individual item within the NIS section can be tracked down to a particular source or specific group of sources. As one moves in the NIS from the individual chapter sections to the overall brief, the documentation becomes even more general and less meaningful.

At the more exalted level of the NIE, documentation even in the generalized form of comments on sources has usually disappeared altogether. One is forced to rely on the shadings

given to "possibly," "probably," and "likely" and on other verbal devices for clues as to the quantity and quality of the basic source data. These examples from the NIS and NIE are paralleled in a great many other publications of similar refinement. One may admire the exquisite nuances and marvel at what a burden of knowledge and implicit validation the compressed language of a finished "appreciation" can be forced to carry, but one cannot help being concerned about the conclusions. Upon what foundations do those clever statements rest?

If the final products were at least based upon documented intermediate inputs, the uneasiness might be somewhat less. But in my own experience the "contributions" or inputs, with the exception of certain economic papers, are normally devoid of any specific identification of the kinds and types of reports or other evidence upon which they are based. And in my experience those inputs are often based on other inputs prepared at a lower echelon until at last we reach the analyst with access to the raw data. At the upper level of joint or national discussion and negotiation and compromise, which eventuates in the exquisite nuance, the carefully hedged phrase, or sometimes a dissenting footnote, the remove from the original evidence can be, and often is, considerable.

The situation is not, of course, quite as dire as I have portrayed it. The intermediaries, in the process of review and consolidation of inputs, do query the preparers of these concerning items of unusual importance or of a critical nature, and in some cases they join the basic analyst in an examination of the raw data itself in order to get a firmer grasp of a particular issue. Furthermore, the final product, before being accepted and promulgated, is often returned to the analyst who prepared the initial input, and he has an opportunity to note any deviations from what he believes the situation to be. These processes do provide a measure of control and cross-check, some assurance that the available material has been thoroughly exploited and properly interpreted. But such processes seem partial and makeshift at best. They do not always occur. And they do not, of course, provide external participants in the final product with any real insight into the quality and quantity of material utilized by their fellow participants.

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Topside Review

Another situation that troubles me—and this is a related problem—is the vast array of editors and reviewers under various guises and the several levels of examination to which an intelligence product is subjected before it is finally approved for publication. What troubles me is not the review, but the basis upon which it is accomplished. I recognize that many of these reviewers are highly talented, experienced individuals. Many are extremely devoted and conscientious and do their best to do a thoroughgoing job. But what basis do they have for their exalted “substantive” review?

In my experience, these reviewers have not generally—the notable exception would be members of the Board of National Estimates—been systematically exposed to the current take of raw data. Their knowledge of current intelligence events is based on hurried reading of generalized intelligence reports or on sporadic attendance at selected briefings. They are not aware in any particular instance—nor should they be—in any real detail of the material actually available on a particular subject. How do they know that this study in their hands for review has indeed explored the appropriate material? What variety of data has been utilized? Has the most recent material been examined? How can they do a spot-check on a particular item? Was a certain report seen, read, evaluated, and then discarded as erroneous, or was omission of the data in it inadvertent?

Lacking the apparatus of documentation, the reviewer generally has available only two methods by which to analyze the draft before him. One is to discover an internal inconsistency which calls into question the paper's overall accuracy or logic. The other is to find a statement that seems to contradict something he may have seen recently in his generalized reading and, on a hunch, to question its validity. The great bulk of any study, despite the reviewer's best intentions, is beyond his capability to question, analyze, evaluate, or critically review. What a haphazard and random method this is for high-level substantive critique!

As a result much high-level review, in my experience, has consisted of the discovery of occasional typographical errors, small inconsistencies in numbers cited in different paragraphs or on different pages, minor inconsistencies in nomenclature,

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say between a figure or chart and a textual reference, unpreferred usage in spelling or hyphenating certain words, and other venial errors which a diligent proofreader should have caught. Any commentary on substantive validity, depth of research, or adequacy of analysis has been rare and exceptional. The minor changes are dutifully made, assurances given that more care will be exhibited next time, and the study is accepted and published as the agency's or the community's considered view.

I know that this is the system we live with, and I know that it often works surprisingly well. I know also that at times there are many vigorous discussions involving substance, and that in this oral exchange there is often a rigorous testing of propositions by an examination of the pertinent evidence. But much reviewing is done without this stimulating personal dialogue, without considering the evidence, and it is of this that I seriously wonder, is it worth the time and effort? Are we in fact getting our money's worth? Or are we not deluding ourselves? Is the review structure we have erected to assure ourselves that we are getting a high quality product not for the most part really a mere facade? Does the Emperor have any clothes?

Undocumented Analysis

If reviewing is sometimes a pious, well-intentioned fraud (one that I myself have had to commit), analysis at the basic journeyman level also at times leaves much to be desired. Not all analyses, of course, are based directly on the raw data, with its usable annotations and evaluations. Much analysis incorporates so-called finished intelligence, some of which is poorly dated, and the exact sources of which are not at all identified. Even the good and conscientious analyst does not know, nor does he have any means of learning, upon how solid a foundation that finished intelligence is based. It has an official imprimatur; so, not having supporting raw data in his files or time to procure and re-examine it—and, more important, following the traditional procedure of analysts—he uses it in his own study. His product eventually becomes a new piece of finished intelligence, which he or his successor will use in yet another study. And so the fragile structure can continue to be built of fragile materials. The weaknesses continually compound.

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Another danger is the overconfident, glib, and persuasive analyst who writes his studies "off the top of his head." He can prepare a report rapidly and defend it with great self-assurance, relying on his memory and general knowledge of the subject matter. Sometimes this assurance is justified. But how do we know when? Then there is the intermediate intelligence officer who sometimes, for whatever reason, ignores his analytical staff and prepares a report on his own—again off the top of his head. It gets into the chain, and how is the next reviewer, or even consumer, to know that it has no substantial basis of research?

The hazards of insufficient documentation are evident enough to need no further elaboration. The value of proper documentation, moreover, and the system for it are not unknown to intelligence officers of the community. Most—whether in uniform or out—have at some time in their formal training been exposed to documentation and its virtues, if only in the preparation of a term paper. Many continue to evaluate externally prepared reports and monographs in part by reference to their bibliographies and footnotes. The scholarly habits persist—except in the intelligence field itself.

Source Protection

Part of the reason for this condition is an item of cardinal intelligence doctrine: do not betray the source. Concern for protection of sources is of course legitimate, but it can be carried to extremes. As illustrated above, there appears to be a contradiction in the respective application of this doctrine to raw reports and to finished intelligence. Meticulous definition of the source in an individual raw report is accepted (and correctly) as necessary to the proper appreciation of the report's content. It would appear equally necessary in finished studies derived therefrom.

The argument can be made that finished intelligence has a wider circulation than the raw reports and that there is therefore a greater risk of jeopardizing sources by identifying them in the finished product. In some cases this concern may indeed be valid—and could certainly be met by producing undocumented versions for the bulk of the circulation. But for internal consumption by operating officials who want to know (or *should* want to know!) the actual amount, validity, and reliability of the basic information, a documented form

should be available. And it should certainly be available during the process of shaping up the final report—to the intermediate analysts, reviewers, and negotiators.

I am not persuaded, however, that fear of source compromise is a wholly valid argument. Footnotes will reveal report numbers, subjects, place of origin, and rapporteurs, but would not necessarily identify sensitive sources. Many sources are open or obvious and could be cited without danger. If a source is particularly sensitive, even its nature need not be revealed, but a neutral documentary reference should make it possible for a properly cleared user to run it down. (In exceptional cases of extremely sensitive sources it might of course be necessary to prepare versions at that level of sensitivity.) With effort and imagination, I believe that the source-compromise problem can be successfully met. One practical suggestion is included in the procedure recommended below.

Practical Difficulties

Another argument that can be and often is advanced is that documentation is time-consuming and time is a luxury that intelligence cannot afford. Admittedly it is time-consuming to prepare documentation; it would increase analytical, typing, and perhaps reproduction time. It could even be argued that it would increase editing, review, and final processing time. This is a plausible argument—but anyone familiar with the realities of much intelligence production will, I'm afraid, be unimpressed. Anyone who has been personally involved with the time lags in production of NIS sections, say, with the prolonged back-and-forth traffic of editing and "nit-picking" at most routine papers, will not believe that in much intelligence production time is quite so greatly of the essence. I strongly feel that the additional burden would be more than compensated by the improved substantive quality of the final product and that, as a matter of fact, much time would be saved. There would, for example, be no frustrating searches for the uncited sources of questioned statements.

It can also be argued that footnoting is a cumbersome, awkward, and excessively time-consuming method of documentation—and here I would agree. I would not, for intelligence purposes, advocate the adoption of the formal, extended-entry, bottom-of-the-page footnote system, requiring exasperatingly frequent repetition of document source and

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title and producing further complications in proper textual alignment and pagination. I would propose a very simple system based upon that used in scientific journals. In this system sources are listed in a single bibliography and numbered serially. Textual references to sources are made in parentheses following the relevant statement by use of two groups of numbers separated by a comma, the first identifying the source by the number it has in the bibliography and the second giving the page reference.

Extended discussions of particular source problems can appear as a series of appended numbered notes, referenced in the text by the appropriate note number in parentheses. This system is easy to employ and should present no difficulties to the analyst; it should cause only minor inconvenience to the consumer. And if a particular report needs to be sanitized quickly of specific source references the bibliography and appended notes can simply be detached.

Why documentation has languished so long and amiably in desuetude in the intelligence community I do not know. Inertia and the relief from old academic requirements may be part of the answer. But however it came about, the present non-documentation system is well established and flourishing. The habit is almost an addiction. Efforts to upset it fly in the face of human laziness, tradition, even vested interest. In a sense, it is job protection for the mediocre analyst: it does not expose his work to careful examination. Years of living with undocumented intelligence has blunted our perception of its dangers and inadequacies. The voice of protest—or is it conscience?—that is sometimes heard is exceedingly small. Yet I think it is challenging.

Import an Old Revolution

It seems to me that we need a major revolution in intelligence doctrine. What we need is the intelligence equivalent of the Academic Revolution that occurred in our schools of higher learning some hundred years ago when modern research methods were first introduced, primarily from Germany. This Academic Revolution, as all students of intellectual history know, brought to graduate academic disciplines (both scientific and humanistic) the tools, concepts, and apparatus of modern scholarship. Along with concepts of free inquiry, thorough exploitation of original sources, and objec-

tivity it brought the requirement for precise documentation. A common methodology and certain common standards were developed; and the field of scholarship, originally the domain of the self-trained amateur, gradually became professionalized.

Intelligence is undergoing this kind of evolution. Its operations are becoming professionalized; a professional esprit and a common methodology are gradually developing. This journal has been an important step in that direction, following the classic pattern: it provides a necessary forum for the discussion of professional problems and helps create a common background of classic cases, basic concepts, general principles, and key problems in intelligence. It is in this forum that I should like to see argued out the advantages and disadvantages of a proper documentation of intelligence conclusions and findings. I have stated—perhaps overstated?—the case in its favor as a real necessity. Is there a valid defense for the status quo?

In addition to a serious, probing, and hopefully rewarding discussion of the problem, I would also recommend experimental application of the proposed doctrine to some specific areas of intelligence production. As a beginning, I would suggest it be tried on selected NIE's and NIS's, with careful evaluation of the results after reasonable trial periods. Do they seem worth the additional encumbrances? What is the response of consumer officials to the improved documentation? Has there indeed been a qualitative improvement in the product? Or is it clear that formal, detailed documentation has no real part to play in intelligence, that it is and has been properly excluded from intelligence methodology?

In addition to this formal trial on standard products, it seems to me that policy officials requesting ad hoc intelligence studies or reports could very well consider including among their proposed terms of reference a requirement for thorough documentation. Since such a requirement may not occur to them (assuming they are unlikely to have read this particular plea), the intelligence officials discussing the proposed terms of reference might suggest it be included. Let us make the offer and see if it is opted.

The end result of this discussion and selective application should be the development of an agreed working methodology for intelligence documentation. The methodology must be realistic. I should not like to see (and shudder at the possi-

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bilities!) the establishment of inflexible requirements for its application. The apparatus of documentation should be applied only where it helps, not where it hinders. Certainly daily field operational intelligence is an area where it might prove to be an impediment and costly luxury. But through intelligent trial and error a practical doctrine should evolve.

A system that has proved its worth in every other professional field surely deserves careful examination and consideration by members of this one. It does not seem too soon to consider applying here the concepts of a revolution now some hundred years old.

A system for the overt collection of pictorial intelligence world-wide.

THE GRAPHICS COORDINATOR PROGRAM

Anthony Porcaro

Areas of low priority in terms of current intelligence interest can become extremely important with little advance warning, as the British found out at Dunkirk and after with respect to the all-too-familiar coast across the Channel,¹ and one of the first limitations to be placed on foreigners in a new "hot spot" is a restriction against photography. It is plain that the community's effort to keep ready against the possibility of surprise good basic intelligence on all areas, centered in the NIS program, needs to include a comprehensive and up-to-date collection of photography. Our military attachés abroad have primary responsibility for such collection with respect to military subjects, but for photographs of political, economic, or sociological interest the vehicle is the community's Graphics Coordinator Program. It encourages a continuing flow of pictorial information from low-priority areas, in particular from places where U.S. mission photographic activities would otherwise be limited or non-existent, as from minor posts in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

History of the Program

The Program, rather new in its developed present form, has antecedents in many years of less systematic effort. As early as the summer of 1948, acting on the request of the CIA Graphics Register, the Department of State sent out a serial outlining for its foreign posts a program for the collection of photography primarily on political, geographic, social, and economic matter and listing types of subjects on which coverage was desired. A year later a follow-up serial was sent out, and as a device to encourage volunteer participation a limited amount of film was made available for officers interested in photographing the types of subjects specified.

¹ See chapter on topographical intelligence in James Leasor's *The Clock with Four Hands* (New York, 1959). The BBC's broadcast appeal for tourist photography brought in nine million snapshots.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 11-15

In 1957, to stimulate further the interest of volunteers and guide their efforts, Graphics Register adopted a practice of briefing as many outgoing foreign service officers as possible. This did increase the number of pictures sent back, but the program still suffered the disadvantage of depending on voluntary, extra-curricular activity for which no one at the foreign post felt any particular responsibility. The Chief of Mission was often unaware of its existence.

Seeing this deficiency, State Department's intelligence chief suggested that the responsibility could be tied down by designating one officer to act as Graphics Coordinator at each post. If an amateur camera fan, actual or potential, were given this job and furnished camera and film, he would be likely to produce a good deal of photography himself as well as encourage others. This idea was explored with a number of Chiefs of Mission during a trip to Africa in 1958 and met with their approval. Circular instructions were therefore prepared, in collaboration with the Graphics Register, and sent to the field asking each post to name such a Coordinator, listing general requirements for photography, suggesting possible sources, outlining arrangements for providing equipment, and prescribing what to do with the product.

This instruction produced an immediate increase in the volume of photography reaching the Register, but it became evident that Coordinators should have in handy form some standard instructions on the use of the camera and more specific guidance for the collection effort. In March 1960, accordingly, a booklet entitled *Guide to Graphics Coordinators* was produced and copies sent to 260 posts abroad. The *Guide* has a large section on the technical aspects of photography, explains the rationale of the collection program, specifies the subjects on which coverage is needed, and lists sources from which the Coordinator might supplement his personal effort and that of other officers at the post—local publications, American travelers, and business firms for economic subjects. The Political Section of the *Foreign Affairs Manual* also now contains a section on the "Collection of Photographs" giving standing instructions and encouragement.

Today the Program has become an effective effort for the collection of ground photography world-wide. There are Coordinators in 191 foreign service posts with 219 cameras at their disposal. During fiscal year 1963 they were responsible

for the procurement of 42,000 photographs, more than 16,000 of which were suitable for acceptance into the photographic files of the Graphics Register. As an official activity of foreign posts, the Program is now one aspect under which these are subject to periodic review by Foreign Service inspectors, and the Graphics Register is asked to comment on the quality of the Coordinator at each post.

The Register, one of CIA's services "of common concern" to the community, directs the entire program, using the informal State Department Operations Memorandum (for which it has been delegated signing authority, subject to clearance through the State country desks). It issues collection requirements, furnishes supplies and equipment, when necessary provides funds for the purchase of photography, and receives, processes, and files the product.

Requirements and Response

Graphics Coordinators, like most collectors, work best under the guidance of a requirements list which contains specific targets. Such a list, prepared for every country where the Program is active, is sent to the posts with a reminder that whether or not to attempt photography of any item on the list is left to the discretion of the Chief of Mission. The exercise of local discretion is particularly necessary in places where restrictions have been put on the use of cameras.

A great deal of effort is put into the preparation of the requirements lists. An attempt is made to anticipate the needs of scheduled intelligence production, particularly the NIS series and a handbook program of the CIA Clandestine Services. Consideration must be given to the requirements of targeting groups, specific NPIC requirements for collateral material, the standing requirements of CIA offices, and deficiencies in the Register's general file. At the same time duplication of items in the requirements lists of military attachés or of requirements already levied on other collectors must be avoided.

The resulting list contains both general categories and specific items. It can be supplemented at any time by ad hoc requests to fill needs as they arise. Current requirements and additional guidance may be sent to a Coordinator after he has informed the Register of travel he has planned.

The response to requirements is generally good; recent examples can be cited from Lisbon and from Ecuador. A list of requirements prepared for Portugal reflected needs in the preparation of NIS sections relating to health and sanitation, fuels and power, and industrial development in that country. Taking this list, the Coordinator collected all the required photography not only on Portugal but on Portuguese Africa as well, the latter from embassy personnel who had recently travelled there. He also made excellent use of local publications.

The Coordinator in Ecuador, supplied with a list of airfields on which there was no photography, obtained good photographs of the majority of these and reported that the rest of them had been photographed by the air attaché, so that the pictures could be obtained through military channels. He also obtained from local AID personnel exclusive photographs in response to requirements on agriculture, terrain, and ethnic groups.

In these two examples, as in experience generally, the value of a list of specific photographic needs stands out. Without such a list the Graphics Coordinator tends either not to function or to produce photography which is duplicative or otherwise not worth incorporating into the Register's files.

Coordination with Military Attachés

In the second example above there was spontaneous coordination with a military attaché in obtaining photography. Photography of military activity, personnel, and installations is ordinarily the exclusive responsibility of the military attachés. Nevertheless the Graphics Coordinator does not ignore opportunities to photograph significant military items in the absence of the appropriate attaché. The attachés are often overloaded and appreciate any help they can get. It is only necessary, as the requirements instruction usually points out, to coordinate with respect to overlapping civilian-military interests.

In practice the military and civilian photo collection activities seldom duplicate but rather complement each other. Not infrequently, therefore, they may combine in a team effort, as when the Coordinator in Phnom Penh flew with the air attaché along the border with South Vietnam in order to photograph the sections on which he had requirements.

Non-military subjects which are yet militarily significant—like highways, bridges, and harbors—and therefore normally covered by attaché photography can be deemphasized by the Coordinator in favor of his economic and sociological requirements. But this does not mean that he should neglect targets of opportunity related to the military requirements.

Individual Spectaculars

Photo collection under this program, primarily a contribution to basic intelligence and production with long-range requirements, occasionally turns up items that have startling application to current intelligence problems. In the developing nations, in particular, the Coordinators have provided significant first-hand reporting on Bloc shipments and on new construction done with Bloc aid. The two following cases illustrate the use of such photography as collateral material in reaching important intelligence conclusions.

The Army attaché in Panama photographed covered deck cargo on two Soviet vessels that passed through the canal together. One of the two went to Cuba; the other, carrying cargo of identical configuration, went to Ghana. That en route for Cuba was believed to be a military shipment until a report with photography was received from the Coordinator in Ghana showing that the second ship had carried only a variety of agricultural machines. This pointed to a probability that the shipment to Cuba was also not military but agricultural.

The Coordinator at Khorramshahr, Iran, photographed for a period of years the deck cargo of Soviet ships which came up the Persian Gulf en route to Iraq: there was a requirement for information on the economic and military aid Iraq was receiving. The resulting "Khorramshahr collection" became a key matrix in developing the technique for identifying military cargo such as Soviet MIG aircraft and related items from the size and shape of crates or other packaging, a technique that came into its own at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

Ways in which Soviet military intelligence officers abroad are likely to betray themselves.

PITFALLS OF CIVILIAN COVER¹

A. S. Rogov

In present-day conditions the work of GRU residencies² under civilian cover in Soviet establishments abroad has certain advantages over that of intelligence officers in military attaché offices. Case officers of these legal³ residencies have great opportunities to establish contacts among the people, and it is more difficult for counterintelligence to detect their activities when under civilian cover. There are usually far more civilian officials in a country than military personnel staffing attaché offices, and it would be very difficult to keep a watch on all of them; counterintelligence therefore has to establish which civilians are in fact intelligence officers, whereas in a military attaché office they can assume that every member of the staff is a potential intelligence officer.

These advantages can be realized, however, only by an intelligence officer who is well versed in security practices, has high moral qualities, and is well trained for the work. Those who do not meet this high standard soon blow their cover and miss their operational opportunities. On arousing the slightest suspicion, intelligence officers under civilian cover attract more counterintelligence attention to themselves than military personnel do, the probability of compromise increases, and they have to drop operational work and often even be recalled.

This article will examine shortcomings and errors in the work of case officers under civilian cover during the last few

¹ Adapted from a Top Secret study published in 1961 by the Soviet GRU under the circumstances described in *Studies* VIII 1, p. 16. It had recently been decided to increase the use of civilian official cover (Tass, trade mission, foreign service) for military intelligence officers abroad, replacing the transparent cover afforded by the offices of the service attachés.

² Field stations.

³ Official-cover.

years. It is based on data taken from the actual work of our officers, and it cites many real instances as examples. It takes advantage of a number of documents of the intelligence services of foreign countries which have fallen into our hands and show how and from what indications they unmask our military intelligence officers in their civilian cover.

The sources of the inadequacies and errors that have been manifested in the work fall roughly into four categories:

The personal qualities and cover behavior of the case officers and their families.

Relations with the heads of the establishments providing the cover.

The level of operational competence and tradecraft skill shown in working with agents.

The soundness of direction from the Center.⁴

Living the Cover

Although considerably more attention is now being paid to the training of each officer to be put under civilian cover, both when he is studying at the Military-Diplomatic Academy and particularly when he is being instructed in the GRU operational directorates before leaving for abroad, it is still often the case that intelligence officers first assuming this cover have failed to rid themselves completely of military habits or of other habits or weaknesses that enable counterintelligence to unmask them by their behavior. Some retain the habit of clicking their heels, say "Yes Sir," "Aye, aye," and "Certainly, Sir," and sometimes even salute in greeting.

Some officers display vanity, trying to show that they know more than others of the same rank in the cover establishment, especially foreign languages, or acting the eager beaver for benefit of the head of the establishment. Others, without thinking of the consequences, make it a point to reestablish old friendships with former colleagues from military school or previous assignments who happen to be in the country or with personnel of the military attaché offices or other officers under civilian cover who have already drawn some suspicion on themselves.

Considerable harm is done by having inadequate qualifications for the cover jobs, particularly that of engineer in trade

delegations. Counterintelligence looks for this in studying new arrivals posted to Soviet establishments. "Representatives of business firms" call on them, ostensibly for trade talks, but actually to determine the extent of their expertise. This practice on the part of counterintelligence is very widespread; most of our officers have to pass such surreptitious examinations.

Not all officers show initiative, imagination, and a creative approach to the problems of maintaining cover. Many use primer methods, stereotypes, for instance to discover whether they are being followed during their first days in a country—looking back, "losing" a handkerchief or gloves, "tying" their shoelaces, etc. Some study the layout of places that are difficult for counterintelligence (interconnecting stores, passageways between streets and houses) without proper regard to security, some like to get counterintelligence agents to follow them with a view to determining their methods or sometimes simply out of curiosity, and some have taken photographs under the eyes of counterintelligence. Some officers exaggerate the danger of being followed by counterintelligence, while others, like our officer K, have proved unable to detect it. All officers should keep a constant and attentive eye on the activities of counterintelligence and report objectively everything they notice.

Sometimes case officers are too active in ordering all kinds of local magazines and publications. This attracts the attention of counterintelligence.

An important shortcoming is failure to adhere always and without exception to security measures in dealing with friends and relatives. Some comrades being put under civilian cover do not keep this secret while they are still at the Academy, so that many persons at the MDA get to know about their appointment before they leave the country. Their unmasking may start from this. Others do not observe security measures in communicating with members of their families left behind. The following case occurred quite recently: One of the officers under civilian cover in France asked a civilian colleague who was going on leave to take a parcel to his wife, giving him the Moscow address. When the man went there he not only could tell that this was obviously a military officer's home but actually saw a photograph of our officer in his colonel's uniform. On returning to France he expressed his astonishment.

⁴Headquarters in Moscow.

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Cases still occur of officers sending letters home (and getting them) via the residency and the GRU instead of through the cover establishment. Arrangements are now being put into effect in the GRU to get all correspondence into the channels of the covering department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, etc.).

Some officers do not pay enough attention to indoctrinating the members of their families, so that breaches of security occur through them. Some wives are chatterboxes, and in the course of conversation they often unintentionally reveal that they have military husbands; many of them are indiscreet on the telephone. A special danger is presented by children, who often let it out that their father is a military man. Members of families must be given special briefings on security matters both before they leave for abroad and at their post.

Some officers try to get a private car as soon as possible, even though other employees on their level in the cover establishment do not have cars. Car owners returning from receptions where they have been drinking often drive themselves though they know they should not; this is fraught with serious consequences, especially as it may attract the attention of the police. Such infractions were committed twice by our officer Orlovskiy, under cover on the staff of the trade delegation in England, who had to be recalled. The rule against driving after drinking has to be obeyed.

It should be borne in mind that counterintelligence can tell whether our officers' cars have been used in the evening as well as on their cover business during the day; it runs speedometer checks for this purpose. We have a device which will let us switch off the speedometer when making trips that should not come to the knowledge of counterintelligence, but this device has not yet been brought into use.

Despite the fact that in training courses serious attention is given to the use of caches in cars to hide material collected from agents in the event of an accident or a surprise search, some officers still do not use these caches but continue to carry the material in their pockets or under the seat.

Some officers are indiscreet in using prearranged phrases in telephone conversations, visit the embassy too often, especially on holidays, though their cover establishment is not there, stay too long in secret offices, and are seen without reason in areas where there are military targets. All this in-

creases the interest of counterintelligence in them and enables it to identify the intelligence officers among the civilian employees.

One should also be careful about social parties in the evening (on birthdays, name-days, 23 February, etc.) to which an officer invites others who are under cover. If the host happens to be compromised to any extent, counterintelligence will as a rule make a note of all others present on the occasion.

Some of our officers do not get along with their colleagues in the cover establishment; they do not always show the necessary tact in relations with the other employees, quarrel with them, and in this way unwittingly arouse the suspicions of counterintelligence.

The Cover Boss

The success that officers under civilian cover enjoy in their intelligence activities depends to a considerable extent on the attitude the heads of the cover establishments have toward them, on the experience, tact, and skill of these, on their appreciation of the importance of the intelligence tasks and their willingness to help in any possible way. It happens quite often that some establishment heads make things more difficult for our officers because of inexperience, while others refuse to give them the necessary help. If the local resident⁶ does not take steps in time to eliminate the troubles, situations arise which make it easier for counterintelligence to identify our people. Several of the most outstanding examples of this are given below.

Often our officers are not met on arrival at the railroad station or the port of entry. Some do not attach any significance to this and make their own way to their destination. Others, however, behaving incorrectly from the very beginning, show great indignation and demand special consideration (as in the case of G in England), as a result of which they may at once attract counterintelligence attention.

Sometimes our officers arriving in a country are not given accommodations in the same houses as other employees of the cover establishment on the theory that the military intelligence resident should make arrangements for housing his own people and only "clean" employees should occupy establishment quarters. That leaves our people to find accommo-

⁶ Chief of station.

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dations for themselves and at once attracts attention to them. A similar situation exists in regard to our officers' private cars. Some establishment heads for the same reasons will not accept these in their garages, and this also arouses suspicion.

Heads of establishments sometimes will not agree to a change in cover jobs, or they do so unwillingly. As a result, it often happens that the replacement for an intelligence officer who may have been compromised must take over the same position and live in the same house, unaware that by these acts of succession he is enabling counterintelligence to draw the appropriate conclusion.

As a rule, our officers do not work full time in their cover jobs; they are often called "three-hour men." Establishment heads usually do not like it that our men cannot devote all their efforts to the interests of their establishment, and sometimes they even send cables to the Center about the undesirability of giving them a three-hour man. Their displeasure finds its expression in various ways. They often fail to invite our officers to receptions they arrange, pleading either forgetfulness or economy. Our residents must intervene in each such case and take steps to eliminate the trouble.

Heads of establishments usually do not take steps to make all their employees more active in order to cover intelligence activity. As a result, while the intelligence officers are out in town in the evenings, the other employees are likely to be sitting at home with their families. This makes it easier for counterintelligence to mount surveillance on our people. The intelligence officers also travel about the country more, work more energetically, are considerably more active at various kinds of receptions, and show greater curiosity. This difference in behavior is bound to arouse the attention of counterintelligence.

In order not to draw attention to themselves, not to stand out, our officers must weigh the situation in each specific case and make their actions fit in with those of the other employees of the establishment. This will make it more difficult for counterintelligence to detect their real employment. At the same time, all possible steps must be taken to make all employees of cover establishments more active. Then our people will not stand out. In this respect the situation in our establishments abroad is still bad.

Cases of bad relations between our officers and the heads of establishments or other employees are not infrequent. In one of our establishments in the UAR, the relations between its head, Consul-General S, and our officer P were so bad over the two years of their association that operational work suffered seriously. Unpleasant interdepartmental talks were held on this subject at the Center. And there have been similar cases in other countries.

It should be emphasized that most of the heads of cover establishments are on the whole satisfied with the work of our people, and our residents make an effort to have our officers work actively, without watching the clock, in their cover jobs. Nevertheless establishment heads sometimes complain to our residents about the bad work of our officers. There are in fact a few lazy ones, who explain their idleness in their cover jobs as due to their preoccupation with residency matters and at the same time justify the ineffectiveness of their work in the intelligence field by claiming to be overloaded in the cover jobs. In such cases only the resident can be an objective judge. There is of course no room for idlers. On the other hand, establishment heads cannot be allowed to give our officers so much work that they cannot perform their operational duties properly.

Operational Competence

Errors and shortcomings in operational work are caused by inadequate experience, low intelligence qualifications, or inability (and sometimes unwillingness) to adapt operations to the particular modus operandi of the opposing counterintelligence. This can be demonstrated by examples taken from practice. It is known, for instance, that counterintelligence is less active on weekends and holidays. Instead of making use of this circumstance, however, case officers still do most of their agent work on ordinary weekdays.

A case officer selecting deaddrops usually has other persons (a driver, a second case officer) along. If counterintelligence detains one of them, it usually gets to know others, because operational workers often do not adhere strictly enough to security rules, now and then are simply careless, and in particular do not take steps to avoid betraying whoever is with them. In London, for instance, a case officer engaged in selecting a site for a deaddrop was approached and asked by a counter-

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intelligence agent what he was doing. Instead of giving some plausible explanation to allay the man's suspicions and shake him off, he tried to get away by saying that a car was waiting for him around the corner. Naturally, the counterintelligence agent followed him to the car where the driver and another case officer were waiting and examined their papers. Thus counterintelligence learned the names of three of our officers.

In another case an officer who had determined in the course of carrying out an operation that he was being watched went to the car where his supporting officer was waiting and so gave him away.

Agents are not infrequently given inaccurate descriptions of deaddrops and their sites, and the selection of the sites and deaddrops is not always sound. This makes the work much more difficult. Thus on one occasion an agent placed the material to be passed on the left of an agreed tree, but our case officer was expecting it on the right; not looking on the other side, he went off empty-handed. Another agent was told that material was being left for him under cover of a stone. The agent took this literally; at the agreed spot he found the stone, picked it up, and was much surprised that nothing was under it. He put it back and went away, not realizing that it contained 2,000 pounds sterling wrapped up and smeared over with cement to look like a stone. Another time a report was rolled up and concealed in a bone. The report was well hidden, but a dog ran off with the bone.

There has been one case when a photograph of the agent himself was passed via a deaddrop. This is of course quite impermissible. In this connection one may mention that case officers sometimes photograph a prospective agent, one under assessment, at meetings and thereby arouse his suspicion.

The methods of setting up signals in conjunction with deaddrops are deficient in variety. As a rule chalk of various colors is used, although it is often washed away by the rain. On one occasion "a twig from a tree, hung on a fence" was to serve as a signal. But that day the wind was blowing hard and not one but several twigs were on the fence, so there was no telling whether one was the signal. Many case officers still do not attach enough significance to the matter of setting up signals, considering it to be of little importance. But defective signals often cause operations to break down and have to be repeated, thus increasing the danger of compromise.

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Not all case officers know what is meant by a *system* of deaddrops or do not give it serious attention, so that they work with agents for a whole year, say, through two or three deaddrops. Training at the Military-Diplomatic Academy is evidently bad in this respect.

Not infrequently case officers drive to deaddrops or meeting sites directly from their cover establishment. This naturally makes it possible that they are followed. They frequently park their cars at deaddrops or at meeting sites, and these can attract the attention of counterintelligence agents who may be passing by by chance.

Case officers on trips and staying at hotels often carry on conversations without taking security precautions, so that the contents of the talks become known to counterintelligence through the use of eavesdropping or recording devices. More generally, our officers pay too little attention to the possibility that their conversations may be overheard by counterintelligence and to the fact that an eavesdropping or recording device may be installed in any building or car. Often conversations whose content could serve as the starting point for unmasking our case officers are carried on in the most unsuitable places. Once more officers must be reminded always to take into account the possibility that a conversation may be overheard and to find a place for it that makes this impossible.

A lookout should also be kept for new methods being used by counterintelligence in pursuit of our people and countermeasures taken as necessary. Cases have lately come to our notice in which fingerprints are taken of our officers staying at hotels by means of dishes placed specially for them.

Some officers still indulge in the practice of using false names when registering at hotels or making purchases at shops. This can only give counterintelligence cause for reflection and may serve as grounds for expulsion from the country. Others, despite repeated orders to the contrary, still visit night clubs, where counterintelligence is particularly active.

Especially serious mistakes are made in recruiting work, and it is consequently advisable to go into these in greater detail.

Recruiting

Many of our case officers reveal themselves prematurely, often on first acquaintance, make arrangements with the re-

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ruit for a meeting in town, warn him about the need for being careful, or take material of little value from him. Thus our man "I" took material of little value from a Frenchman of Polish origin; counterintelligence learned about it, and "I" had to be recalled as blown. One officer under civilian cover made the acquaintance of a local inhabitant while visiting an exhibition and at once gave him the task of photographing a naval exhibit which was of interest to us. Some officers quite unjustifiably offer money to acquaintances or give them expensive presents, which only arouses unnecessary suspicions and puts them on the alert instead of furthering the recruitment. Often case officers are led up the garden path by extortioners whom they are "developing," paying them money they have not earned. (This actually happened, for instance, in Pakistan.)

By and large our officers do not display sufficient ability and initiative in finding agents of use to us in the right places, and meanwhile they cultivate persons of little value with the result that they have many acquaintances but none of them suitable candidates for further study and recruitment. Thus they give an impression of great activity, but in reality all this work is unproductive and unpromising.

Some officers still resort often to the recruitment of persons whom they have met a few times at receptions and in whom counterintelligence is therefore undoubtedly to some extent interested. They make little effort to find persons who do not come to receptions and do not visit our establishments, the ones with whom really promising relationships can be established. They do not exercise the initiative and ingenuity to establish and develop such connections through their friends, avoiding receptions in order to preclude observation by counterintelligence.

Not all of our officers have the ability to develop relations with an acquaintance correctly and gradually in order to bring him to the point of recruitment; and residents and their deputies give them little help in this respect. Not enough effort is made, either, to use trusted agents for talent-spotting or recruiting.

As a rule, the operational situation is studied superficially, so that features in the internal situation of a country which could facilitate recruiting work often remain unexploited. (For example, national and class antipathies create a field

for recruitment among those who are dissatisfied with the political regime.) Many favorable opportunities such as the revolutions in Turkey, Ethiopia, and Laos, when certain persons could have been recruited or intelligence officers could have been dispatched to take advantage of the circumstances, have been lost.

Documents of foreign intelligence services in our possession show that they are aware of some of our working practices. They know that our case officers usually make recruiting approaches to journalists, students, and employees of business houses and pay particular attention to people in NATO who are short of money; and watching out for such approaches, their counterintelligence quickly mounts surveillance on our people and starts to bring about their downfall. The documents also mention cases of our recruiting post and telegraph employees for the purpose of getting access to correspondence.

The documents declare that the main task given to our agents is to obtain information on nuclear weapons and on industrial targets concerned with defense (one agent being assigned to get such an important NATO document as MC-70) and that the methods of recruitment fall into a definite pattern: at first money or presents are often given, then small tasks to obtain material of little importance, and then more complicated assignments aimed at getting classified documents, which as a rule bring large financial rewards. Counterintelligence agents planted on us, knowing this pattern, can act with confidence and carry out their work without arousing any special suspicion on the part of our officers.

The documents report that we do not look for agents among Communists or prominent progressive figures, all the more so as practically all Communists have been removed from classified targets. It is believed, they say, that contact with agents is established and maintained mainly by our people holding medium-level diplomatic ranks, very seldom by employees in technical and ancillary jobs. All this must be taken into account by us; some comrades do think that agent operations can be carried out only by persons who hold diplomatic passports.

Recent experience shows that case officers under civilian cover, having little contact with military circles in their cover duties and also partly barred by security considerations,

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have practically no acquaintances in the armed forces of the country where they are assigned. Consequently there have been very few recruitments of military personnel. Since our officers in military attaché offices do not now recruit personally, we may be heading into a situation in which we not only have no prospect of expanding our operational work among armed forces personnel but are out of this field altogether. It is therefore time to start seeking better and more effective ways for officers under civilian cover to recruit armed forces personnel, with special attention to more active work by the staffs of military attachés in spotting and assessing candidates for recruitment and then handing them over to case officers under civilian cover.

There are many shortcomings in work with so-called walk-ins.⁶ Not all of our case officers have the right approach in determining their real motives and intentions, and this leads now and then to unfortunate consequences. Quite recently, in Washington, for example, there were two cases in which our officers, in spite of our strained relations with the USA, arranged to meet a walk-in in town, though not much effort was needed to establish that both were obviously counterintelligence plants. It was only through intervention by the Center that these meetings did not take place. On the other hand, in another country (in the jurisdiction of the Third Directorate) two walk-ins were turned over without sufficient reason to the police. They were brought to trial and an uproar in the press was precipitated, while in the end it turned out that they had really come to us with good intentions, being genuinely eager to give us all the help they could. It is doubtful that any walk-in will take the risk in that country in the future.

Now we do have good agents who originally came to us as walk-ins, so it is important to have the right approach in dealing with such persons. It must, however, never be forgotten that the offer may be a provocation on the part of counterintelligence, which is endeavoring under various pretexts to infiltrate or plant its people on us and get our people to come to meetings in town or accept documents of little value in order to detect them or compromise and catch them red-

⁶This subject was covered *in extenso* by General Serov in *Studies* VIII, 1, p. 17 ff.

handed. There are cases in which direct invitations are given to our people to become traitors to the Motherland.

To avoid getting himself into the position of having such an invitation put to him, to evade the traps set by counterintelligence, to weigh the situation correctly, to pass with honor any test connected with attempts by counterintelligence to plant agents on us or perpetrate some other provocation—all this can be achieved by an intelligence officer who possesses high moral qualities and ability, is mature, experienced, and enterprising, and knows how to behave in complicated circumstances and find a way out of any situation.

Some case officers fall into the error of becoming careless when dealing with trusted cutouts, notably in buying topographic maps or technical equipment of which the sale to us is forbidden. Our officer T in the trade delegation in England, for example, was actively engaged in buying equipment through a person he trusted. The operation involved a great deal of correspondence with the Center and the planning of concerted action for transportation and delivery of the equipment via other countries. It turned out, however, that all this trouble was for nothing; the trusted intermediary was acting under the control of counterintelligence.

Another case was the following. Our officer V in the USA went with a trusted person to the latter's office to get maps. While this man went into the office to pick out the maps, V stayed in the car. That was fortunate, because it turned out that a counterintelligence agent was watching all the time out of a window, waiting for him to come into the office and be caught on the spot. What had happened was that counterintelligence had already mounted an intensive surveillance on V, and he had discussed the matter of obtaining the maps on the telephone, in disregard of security measures. Although V escaped a flagrant compromise, representations about him nevertheless followed from the State Department.

It should be borne in mind that most stores selling maps are under the surveillance of counterintelligence. In Canada there occurred the following incident. Our officer K failed to establish proper communications with a trusted person in connection with the purchase of city maps. One day this person threw a note into K's mailbox saying that counterintelligence was taking an interest in him and he was therefore stopping work. Later, however, four days before a pre-

arranged meeting, K found another note in which the man said he would continue working. Despite the obvious contradiction in these notes, which should have put K on his guard, he decided to go to the meeting. There he received some maps, but not the ones he wanted; and after a few days he had to leave Canada.

Headquarters Failings

In the direction and management at the Center there also are quite a lot of shortcomings which impede the activities of officers under civilian cover.

The rule we have made that data on our officers who are sent abroad should be removed from information offices has become known to the counterintelligence services of foreign countries, and this measure obviously now does more harm than good. If counterintelligence knows that a person it is checking on is a military man or that he lives in Moscow, and an information office will not give any data about him, then it can only conclude that he is probably an intelligence officer. We must go into this question and find a remedy. Formalism won't work; in some cases, possibly, it would be better not to remove the files from information offices.

Some case officers under civilian cover continue to remain in their posts for longer than the customary four years without getting a cover promotion. Worse, there have been cases, because of lapses on the part of GRU directorates, in which an officer is given a cover post junior to one he held earlier in another country, or vice versa (for instance, a chauffeur in one country becomes a diplomatic official in another). Our officers are given leave once every two years instead of annually as customary in the cover position. All these discrepancies arouse the attention of counterintelligence in all NATO countries, among whom, according to the documents in our possession, such information is regularly exchanged.

There are cases when officers under civilian cover receive their salaries directly from the residency, thus revealing themselves in the cover establishment as belonging to another department. Here in Moscow, correspondence goes on between the finance departments of the GRU and other agencies regarding the payment of the difference in rubles, so that many employees in the other agencies get to know the iden-

tity of officers under cover. Steps are now being taken to eliminate these shortcomings.

Not infrequently the operational directorates make miscalculations and try to keep a case officer in place even though he has been compromised instead of hurrying to recall him. At the present time the situation changes so quickly—and usually for the worse—that such a delay sometimes leads to the most unfortunate consequences. This happened in the USA, for example, to our case officer M, who not unavoidably was apprehended, is now being interrogated, and will be brought to trial.

There are important shortcomings in the management and execution of reporting functions. Officers under cover are less effective in their reporting than the personnel of military attaché offices. They send in few reports of their observations during trips they make around the country; they are ignorant of the military situation; they produce few records of conversations. It is necessary to eliminate these shortcomings as soon as possible.

Until recently our residents or case officers under civilian cover, when they obtained some important information, reported it first to the heads of the cover establishments and then to the GRU, so that it was transmitted to the Center in duplicate channels, and often the report via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even arrived first. Now such cases practically never occur.

Cooperation and coordination between GRU and KGB residencies have now improved greatly, so that it has become possible to eliminate unnecessary inquiries and duplication almost completely. Thus the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU in this matter is being brought into force.

The legal residencies set up under non-military cover in most countries have found themselves without the necessary technical security resources. They do not have their own transport to use in operational work. Darkrooms for photography and radio and operational equipment are still in the military attaché offices in most countries. These matters must be put right as quickly as possible.

Residencies under civilian cover are still being sent officers who lack the personal qualities to be good recruiters (ability to attract those with whom they talk by their cheerfulness, natural behavior, attentiveness, etc.), qualities which facili-

tate the establishment of rapport and consequently lead to success in recruiting. Not infrequently they are sent tongue-tied, unsociable, sullen, and unattractive officers, bad mixers who are unlikely to be able to establish a wide circle of acquaintances. There are also still cases when they are sent officers who are without experience in running agents or have displayed incompetence in solving operational problems.

Within residencies also, the direction of intelligence officers working under civilian cover leaves something to be desired. Many residents try to direct each case officer separately; this is done with great difficulty and often results in having some officers really doing nothing. In present-day conditions it is essential that our legal residencies be organized on more efficient lines. In any establishment where there are even two case officers they should be constituted as an administrative group, and in large residencies the subordination direct to the resident of any single officer working under civilian cover should be avoided. The organization of legal residencies should be such as to facilitate keeping an eye on the progress of operational work, keeping each person active, and maintaining the necessary security.

In conclusion it should be emphasized once more that in the work of legal residencies there are still many shortcomings and errors which bring, above all, poor recruiting results. Lack of good and thoughtful direction on the part of residents and a low level of personal responsibility in individual case officers are likewise important shortcomings. Not enough effort is made to study and take into account the actual operational situation in the country in question, and favorable situations for recruitment are not always exploited. Recruiting methods are allowed to follow a pattern. Security is weak. Little use is made in legal operations of such a good method for directing agents as communication by secret writing.

The operational directorates of the GRU must give better briefings to persons being sent out, bringing to their attention examples of poor methods which cause errors and shortcomings in the work, and the directorates should also guide the operational work of the legal residencies more efficiently. In the field, the practical situation must always be taken into account and working in a set pattern must be avoided. We must

increase the responsibility of the individual case officer with respect to recruiting; a case officer to whom recruiting tasks have been assigned has done his job when he returns only if he has recruited at least one agent. We must improve the training at the Military-Diplomatic Academy for work under cover, stressing the development of students' ability to adapt themselves to life in civilian positions.

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*Composite character sketch of
a category of potential agent.*

PORTRAIT OF A CUBAN REFUGEE

Andrew Wixson

A recent article on the personality of the Libyan pointed out that "any attempt to characterize all members of a society . . . is necessarily a stereotype, subject to error in individual application."¹ The following attempt to describe the composite personality of certain Cuban refugees is fraught with even greater likelihood of error with respect to individuals because the sample under study is much less homogeneous than the Libyan was. It ranges from illiterate peasants to highly educated members of professional groups; the level of intelligence, which is comparable over-all with that found in the United States, runs from nearly deficient to superior. In addition, while the Libyan data were gathered through the administration of a psychological test designed for such purposes, the data analyzed in the present study are the by-product of assessments conducted for a variety of reasons, often under much less than ideal conditions.² Two characteristics were common to all members of the group: all had fled Cuba because of their opposition to the Castro regime, and at the time of their assessment all were either candidates for anti-Castro clandestine activity or actively engaged in such activity.

With such great variability in the sample it is not anticipated that the personality descriptions which follow will be accurate for any given individual. But a delineation of the psychological features common to the majority of the group will serve to describe a composite or representative Cuban agent who manifests certain critical areas of adjustment. These areas must be examined in each agent by the case offi-

¹ *Studies*, VII 1, p. 85 f.

² This study is based on an analysis of tests administered to 201 male and 19 female Cubans between May 1960 and October 1963. The sample includes only those subjects for whom complete data are available.

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cer, but the general portrait presented below may give a frame of reference from which to consider the individual operational assessment. Successful handling will of course require careful study of the individual agent, for how any individual reacts to the psychological and environmental forces acting upon him at any given time depends upon his own life history and his current needs and motives.

The Male: Social Relationships

During his early years the typical Cuban male is inclined to be highly responsive to the world around him and to the people in it. Since he is very sensitive to others' needs and can respond appropriately to these needs, people tend to seek him out as a companion and cater to him. As a result he is apt to be somewhat spoiled, relatively immature, and over-dependent upon those who take care of him. He discovers it is easy to find people who will do things for him and make allowances for his deficiencies. As he grows older, however, and is expected to show more independence and self-reliance, he may see, perhaps for the first time in his life, that his ability to play on others' feelings is not enough; rather than being able to gain support from others for what he is, he only meets with criticism for what he cannot do. His solution for this problem is to develop means to keep people at a distance, not only so they will be less demanding of him but also to control his own tendency to become involved with them. At the same time he learns, unconsciously, to become more rational and less emotional in his response to his environment.

On the surface, then, this representative Cuban exhibits considerable defensiveness and control, a kind of detachment in dealing with others. He is actively social, relating easily to others on a superficial basis, but the chip on his shoulder is readily apparent when he is threatened with becoming intimately involved. He makes a very favorable first impression but deliberately holds people at a distance so that they will make no more demands on him than he thinks he can tolerate. If they do demand more, he may withdraw from the situation, thus gaining the reputation of being fickle and disappointing. If withdrawal is not possible, he can be actively cruel and hostile toward those with whom he is most intimate, turning on them unexpectedly and violently as a means of forcing them to retreat. He has at all times the potential

for over-responding: he can be too demonstrative toward and involved with people and activities which by his criteria he finds proper and worthy, and at the same time he can be equally demonstrative against and hostile toward objects which he considers bad or improper. This sort of loss of control is often followed by guilt reactions characterized by depression and apathy, and in this phase there may be many expressions of inferiority or unworthiness.

There are a considerable number of Cuban males who lack the natural social skills and interpersonal sensitivity described above. Most members of this second group emphasize intellectual or procedural skills as a means for gaining acceptance. That is, they try to achieve recognition for what they can do, not for what they are. Since they are very much aware of the need to maintain some sort of social adjustment, even though it be superficial, they tend to be much concerned with the impression they make on others. They are quite moody and unpredictable in their prolonged associations with others, reacting strongly to real or imagined criticism of their behavior. An alternative solution for this group is the adoption of a limited but reasonably comfortable social role which is rigidly maintained even if it becomes inappropriate. The displaced person who does not change his way of behaving in spite of loss of wealth, rank, position, or status probably belongs in this subgroup. An example would be the former military officer who acts toward his civilian colleagues as if he were still in command of troops.

Attitudes toward Work

At the same time he is making this adjustment in his relationships with other people, the typical Cuban tries to be less emotional and more rational in his view of the world. He tends to immerse himself in his daily routine and to behave as if he were a self-disciplined individual without need for external direction and control. He admires intellectual achievement in others and can himself learn facts and procedures fairly rapidly, but these attributes only make him appear better informed and intellectually oriented than he is in fact or he himself feels. Since he can retain information with more ease than he can assimilate or understand it, he tends to be defensive when he meets with any form of testing or criticism. Unless he has a supervisor whom he respects

and admires, his work productivity tends to fall off when he is criticized. On the other hand, he can work quite competently without constant supervision if he knows exactly what he is supposed to do or if he is working alone. It is stressful for him to be subjected to continual demands to relate to others. His initial reaction to such demands is further withdrawal, and then if the demands persist either violent reaction against those making them or flight from the situation.

There is a smaller but still numerous group whose outward behavior under normal circumstances is quite similar to that just described but whose reaction to solitude is quite different. These, though also active and dedicated to their jobs, become very tense and agitated when placed in situations which do not allow them to interact with others. For them stress is solitude; they require outside distraction and social demands in order to maintain their adjustment.

Emotional Expression

Another mental mechanism the Cuban male uses to control his tendency toward emotional involvement with associates is denial of his inherent sensitivity. He avoids the necessity for expressing his feelings by relying on procedures, rules, and regulations of social intercourse and work activity. His underlying sensitivity is evident in his ability to temper this impersonal behavior with judgment; at the same time, however, he does not have his emotions under complete control, so that he is apt to be somewhat inconsistent and unpredictable in his behavior. He can be cruel or even sadistic when one least expects it or, on the other hand, almost overwhelmed by guilt and remorse at having been cold or cruel to others.

By virtue of the very sensitivity he is trying to control, the Cuban strongly retains the imprint of the culture from which he springs: he is apt to be devoted to the traditions and mores of his early surroundings. He has so learned the rules, regulations, customs, and procedures his society follows that he has a blueprint to guide him in almost every situation he may meet. As a result, he is very cautious about adopting new ways to meet new situations; he does not readily accept new ideas unless he has some assurance that his peers understand and accept them. In this sense he lacks versatility and adaptability. He may be prone to prejudgments and logic-tight mental compartmentation; that is, he may be un-

able to recognize that he is behaving inconsistently and inefficiently from one situation to another.

The Female

In general, the composite Cuban female sampled parallels the male in her development.³ Initially sensitive, she, too, must learn to become more aloof and less involved with the people in her world. But her solution for the problem is considerably less efficient, psychologically, than that of her male partner.

The typical Cuban female tends to be oriented somewhat less to the intellectual than the male. This does not mean that she is less intelligent but rather that she is much more aware of the demands made on her by the environment. She tries to reduce these demands by losing herself in the routine activities of her life, compensating a certain lack of procedural skill with sheer conscientiousness and determination. Somewhat more than the male, then, she can perform boring, tedious, and repetitive activities for long periods with little apparent fatigue or loss of efficiency. Since she is deliberately not interested in making herself socially acceptable to more than a few persons, she can function quite adequately in environments which most people would consider unfriendly, cold, or unrewarding.

At the same time, however, since she is fundamentally dependent upon someone in her world for support, guidance, and gratification of her needs, she tends to be loyal to and involved with a few key individuals. (The bond she has with them is not a permanent one, for she can switch her allegiance, albeit with considerable initial difficulty, from one to another supporting figure.) Thus on the one hand she discourages most approaches to social involvement by an impersonal and fairly rigid adherence to conventional social relationships or, when particularly pressed, by being actively negative or hostile, and on the other she jealously guards the few more intimate relationships which she has cautiously established and views any threat to these with considerable anxiety and suspicion. In the absence of threat, her long-term relationships are more predictable and less fickle than

³ The observations which follow are tentative indeed; they are based on a very small sample, probably not at all representative of Cuban women in general.

those of the male, but they are no more satisfying, in the long run, than his disappointing superficiality.

Operational Implications

Given these personalities as generic, what tendencies with respect to major strengths and weaknesses and potential handling problems can be anticipated? The male, especially, may have a potential for being particularly adept at recognizing and describing the feelings and attitudes of others without himself becoming so involved as to lose his objectivity. To the extent that this ability were verified in the individual agent he could be used to evaluate the emotional states of individuals or assess the relationships among members of a group. The female is much less likely to be adept at such evaluative tasks; she has more often pushed the development of impersonal work skills at the expense of her fundamental sensitivity.

The main psychological disadvantage of the adjustments we have discussed here is that they take a great deal of energy to maintain. Both male and female are under considerable pressure to become more involved with others than they wish to be. Keeping uninvolved leads to marked strain and tension which are often relieved by the use of alcohol and drugs, although not usually to the point of alcoholism or addiction. Obviously, the case officer must check on his agent's tolerance for fatigue and stress and how he counters these strains.

From a management point of view the Cuban may seem disappointing in long-range performance and at the same time overly sensitive to criticism. The male, seeming more intellectual than he himself feels and being verbally fluent and able to learn procedures quickly, may appear to understand something when he really does not. Thus he may be overrated during training, and in operations the discrepancy between expected and actual results may be increased by his lack of versatility: once he has found a way of doing things he does not readily shift to new patterns which may be demanded by the operational situation. On the contrary, he may persist in partially learned but inappropriate modes of behavior. The female, as we have seen, is somewhat less capable procedurally, but her dogged application covers her inefficiencies.

Each therefore has a potential for underlying feelings of inferiority. Direction and control are necessary, but criticism and testing, especially from someone who is not respected

and admired, may be extremely threatening. A supervisor must be careful to direct his criticism to the methods and procedures being used rather than to the performance of the individual. But any change of procedures must be preceded by long and careful training.

The biggest problem appears to be that of long-term loyalty and control. Essentially, the Cuban is loyal only to himself. With a few exceptions, he cannot tolerate close relationships for long periods of time; only temporary liaison is possible. In his relationship with a case officer he will tend to view himself as a colleague rather than as a subordinate.

In the approach to the female, a painstaking study of her emotional needs must be made in order to find a way to win her from those to whom she feels loyalty. The male, on the other hand, can often be subverted by appeals to his intellectual orientation and devotion to objectivity. One consequence of these mental mechanisms is that he usually has quite adequate justifications, in his own mind at least, for all his behavior. It may then be possible to provide him with an intellectual rationale for engaging in activities inconsistent with or contradictory to his usual pattern. If this is done the new action will no longer be perceived as being inconsistent and can be carried out with little or no anxiety.

*The preservation of personal
dignity as a wellspring of
Muslim behavior.*

“FACE” AMONG THE ARABS

Peter A. Naffsinger

George Washington, American children are told, having cut down his father's favorite cherry tree, showed his sterling character by confessing to the deed. An Arab hearing this story not only fails to see the moral beauty of such behavior but wonders why anyone would ever compromise his integrity by admitting thus his guilt. As to Washington's explanation that "I cannot tell a lie," the Arab asks how a man could rise to the presidency if he were not suave enough to use a well-concocted falsehood as a tactic in emergency behavior.

The values and rationale underlying these reactions are an aspect of "national character," a factor said to be of importance in estimating likely courses of national action and certainly of importance in dealing man to man with individuals. A syndrome of the Arab values can be called the face concept, an understanding of which is essential for a case officer in his interpersonal relationships with peoples stretching across North Africa and from Greece to Japan. Although we are concerned here specifically with Arabs, the same concept is applicable in a broad way to most Muslim groups and to some Far Eastern peoples.

An understanding of the concept will help define an area of potential difficulty in personal relations and give insight into stated and unstated Eastern attitudes. It will explain the extreme difficulty of resurrecting once-fallen political figures and getting them any public acceptance. It will show motivating forces which may be operationally useful, for example in contriving a character defamation.

The high value which the cultural patterns of the East place upon the concept of personal dignity is central to that behavior from which the frustrated American encountering it for the first time is likely to conclude that an Arab is a living

non-sequitur or else deliberately perverse. Although there are many demographic and cultural subgroupings of the Eastern peoples—even the Arab may be an agricultural peasant, a nomad of the desert, a seafarer of the Persian Gulf, a sophisticated urbanite, a university student—the ideal of maintaining face has a universality among them, so that a general analysis of the concept will be pertinent, with minor variations, to all. Yet it should be borne in mind that, since cultural groups consist of individual men, there will be individual deviations from the generalizations drawn in the following discussion.

Dignity vs. Objectivity

A society expects from all its members an adherence to its own norms and values. According to the degree to which they do so adhere, people are judged acceptable or not acceptable in that society. For the American, earning social acceptability by maintaining his honor is a matter of equating honor with personal integrity. The American manifests his integrity by an uncompromising willingness to face objective truth and fact. Personal respect and acclaim go to him who makes a ruthless search for facts regardless of how self-damaging the results may be.

The American can apologize for revealed shortcomings and gain respect and prestige with an honest effort to correct his own errors. In our culturally determined scale of values the achieving of impersonal objectivity with regard to facts and truth is thus more important than preserving a man's personal dignity before the world at large. At all times and in all circumstances the American is culturally obliged to reconcile his position and his person with truthfully interpreted reality: witness the fact that the verb "to rationalize" usually has for us an ethically negative flavor.

The Arab in his society is likewise expected to show personal integrity in order to be socially acceptable. He, however, manifests his honor and integrity by making a public, outward impression of dignity derived from an ostensible lack of guilt. Even if facts and conditions speak to the contrary, the social veneer of non-guilt must be maintained evident and dominant if he is to achieve the socially demanded face. Dignity and stature are granted only to those who show themselves as flawless; the society of the Arab world has no place or respect

for one whose faults or errors come to public knowledge. Blame, fault, or error accruing to an Arab personally brings his immediate fall from social grace and a loss of dignity or face. He therefore feels revulsion and bitterness for anything that tends to compromise him in this way.

Americans and most other Western-bred persons regard it as merely socially inconsiderate or impolite to mention another's errors in public. Management courses teach psychologically graceful ways to correct erring employees without hurting their feelings, suggesting for example "Maybe it would be better if we did this another way" instead of a blunt and ego-damaging "You are doing this all wrong." The Arab would be quick to grasp the wide divergence between the two approaches. But what in American life is a matter of tact and consideration is to him a highly charged social confrontation with many complexities and subtle ramifications of which the American would never have dreamed.

If, as becomes evident after some exposure to Arab behavior, a lack of guilt is what confers on an Arab the dignity or face by which his personal integrity and social acceptability are measured, there must be further consequences flowing from such a displacement of criteria in the social value system as this seems from the viewpoint of Western culture. If lack of guilt gives social dignity, the Arab must maintain his guiltless appearance at all costs. Facts and circumstances can combine in many different ways to reflect unfavorably upon any man, but the Arab cannot afford to allow accrued facts or logic to impute any flaw or guilt to him personally. In self-defense he must interpret the assembled facts subjectively, deny them outright, or reject as illogical any construction that leads to intimations of personal shortcomings. To the American this defense is non-objective, a distortion of truth, and therefore paradoxically destructive of integrity, unless he can take the Arab point of view and recognize personal face as having a higher value than fact or logic in the society.

There are, it is true, many situations in American and Western society in which this kind of defensive thinking tends to arise; but Westerners are expected to be able to recognize and admit the logical flaws when they are pointed out to them. Severe cases of inability to achieve objectivity are interpreted in American society as manifesting pathological symptoms of

neurosis or psychopathic personality. Not so in the Near East. In the dynamics of the Arab social system dignity or face is not compromised for the sake of the lesser values found in fact and logic.

In an oil company installation near the Persian Gulf, an American linguist in the training department, after drafting some exercises to be used in instructing American employees in spoken Arabic, gave them to three bilingual Saudi Arabs working for him to check for syntactic and orthographic correctness before publication. The drafts were all tacitly okayed, returned without change; but after they had been published several glaring errors in the work were discovered. Distressed, the linguist questioned the three Arabs, who reluctantly explained that the inaccuracies had of course been obvious to them but they did not feel it would be right to point them out and thereby cause embarrassment to their boss and good friend!

Here the incompatible American and Arab attitudes reflected well the different dominant criteria of each. The American was interested solely in the objective accuracy of the work, a matter which was of secondary importance to the Arabs. They believed in good faith that they had acted with honor as gentlemen in protecting the linguist's dignity above all other considerations.

If an American family in the Near East uses domestic help from the local populace, it may often happen that a vase, say, is accidentally knocked over and broken during the cleaning of a room. When the housewife comes upon the pieces, perhaps picked up and disposed of, her only minimally tactful "How did you break the vase?" will be met with a startled look of surprise, a sheepish grin, and then, after a few hesitating moments of agonized embarrassment, likely the reply, "Oh I didn't; I would never break anything of yours!"

The housewife's account of the incident to her husband will probably center on the outrage to her Western ethic—"... and after I saw the pieces he had the nerve to stand right there and deny it to my face." But the servant, though he truly regrets the accident and would not have done anything of the sort on purpose, has by his own lights reacted naturally and properly in repelling the immediate challenge to his dignity. A subtler approach by the housewife, merely taking notice of the debris in the presence of the servant, would probably have

elicited from him a discreet explanation of how "... the vase fell while I was dusting the furniture" and thus graciously permitted him to save face.

In matters that may involve him in guilt or blame the Arab's untruths, half-truths, avoidance of reply, or other ploys that jar Westerners do not spring from any perverse desire to deceive; they are facets of the need to maintain that personal dignity and face which in his system of values take precedence.

Public Image vs. Personal Conscience

As the American is taught to respect objectivity and facts, he is also encouraged to reconcile his personal position with the relevant facts in any given situation. From his earliest years he is impressed, by story and example, with the nobility his culture attaches to the act of admitting his guilt or personal failings which have contributed to some acknowledged larger wrong. He is imbued with the conception that it is manly to own up to his guilt straightforwardly, even at the price of self-injury or extreme embarrassment.

So firmly is this idea imposed that every American, except the psychopathic personality, can have intense feelings of personal guilt and may even lie awake nights worrying about wrongs, real or fancied, that he has done to cause hurt to others. He can relieve these guilt feelings by making an apology to the injured party or otherwise rectifying the wrong. The embarrassment entailed in admitting error is of less consequence than the need to alleviate the pangs of guilt.

Christianity emphasizes the personal God within each man, who enforces an ideal of perfection in behaviour and in thought. The sacrifice of the "only begotten Son" dramatizes this personal God interested in each individual soul. The Christian is supposed, by prayer or confession, to ask pardon for every instance of failure to reach perfection, and it is not difficult to see how this concept could instill a sense of personal guilt and obligation beyond self. The development of conscience or capacity for feeling guilt in religious life naturally spills over into non-religious contexts in cultures where Christianity is dominant and so is evident in other acts of life.

Offering sharply contrasting principles to these, Islam—religion, social force, and almost complete way of life of the

Arab Near East—naturally shapes much of the Arabs' cultural attitude. Even the Christian Arabs are immersed in a background of Muslim culture. By definition and profession, Islam is the "surrendering of the self to the will of Allah," and it portrays a God remote, all-pervading, and wholly out of contact with the individual man. In prayers, to be sure, Muslims implore God to do well by them and lead them on the right path. But all of Muslim theology conveys the feeling that God is so all-pervading and at the same time so far above and removed from the individual that all human actions and their consequences are but the sequels of God's doings: the individual is merely an animate pawn. This supremely impersonal God, above and beyond rather than within a person, impresses on the individual no requirement to accept guilt or personal responsibility for anything or to develop a conscience differentiating between intrinsic right and wrong.

Thus when a Westerner tries to show an Arab that he is to blame for something, he never really succeeds in getting the point across. Western personnel at oil installations in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf area are frustrated in trying to correct mistakes of Arab trainees on industrial equipment. When confronted with having made a wrong move that could have had the most serious of safety or technological consequences, the Arab is unwilling and unable to accept the idea that he should feel either sorry or responsible for his mistake. He dismisses both blame and censure with a casual "min allah"—"It is from God." To the remonstrance that it had better not happen again he answers "inshallah," "If God wills it," with exasperating nonchalance. In agent work, where supervision cannot be so close, this indifference to personal responsibility and tendency to atomistic thinking will necessarily be even more troublesome.

To the Arab, all is from Allah, and if Allah does all, the individual cannot be held responsible. Man is required to follow the teachings of the Koran and the Hadith and to perform his religious obligations, but he is not answerable to an inner God, a conscience. Instead of a sense of personal responsibility for his acts, the Arab has a deeply inculcated fear of outside forces; he realizes he must answer for his actions to society. This social sensitivity, together with his all-is-from-Allah fatalism, may in some measure explain why the Arab world knows scarcely any suicides, that common aberration

of Christian living in the West. At any rate it explains why he is more interested in the face he presents to society than in exposing the facts of a situation.

The Surrogate

The Arab's need to project his self in a form completely acceptable to the harsh judgments of society renders his face, his dignity mask, a type of surrogate as thought of in the philosophy of Jung, one in which he wraps the very essence of his being. This is another form of that transference of self in complete allegiance which is an easily accomplished maneuver in the Arab world and the entire Near East. In politics the surrogate takes the form of a popular personality who has become the leader. The political surrogate with which the people identify themselves and their very souls must almost undergo deification to be worthy of their complete faith, allegiance, and devotion, and he must necessarily remain free of any conceivable flaw, unblemished in their eyes. At the first sign of failure, faltering, or political error, he immediately loses all allegiance—transferred to some new strong political personality moving in—and suffers his demise without anyone wondering why he was once in such high acclaim. There is a pointed moral here for anyone trying to influence political developments in Muslim countries: once a charismatic leader had been overthrown, it would be most difficult to arouse support or popular following to place him in power again. Promoters of a countercoup would be hawking tainted goods.

A similar surrogate within the individual is the outside mask or face to which the self or ego is transferred by the Arab, along with all his pride and self-esteem. This face presented to society at large then assumes more importance than his real self. The finding of defects or faults in it constitutes an attack on his very being, for there is no alternative surrogate to which the ego can be transferred. Hence the Arab whose integrity or face is challenged and in danger of being found imperfect is in quite a delicate position. He has to go to extremes to keep his social mask intact, thus taking actions completely contrary to the Western ethic and bewildering to the Westerner.

The constant effort to keep up face seems almost paranoid by Western standards. Entertaining delusions of grandeur, claiming to be persecuted, magnifying faults in others that

one wants to hide in oneself, calling constantly for redemption and resurgence of past greatness—all this is behavior typical of paranoia, but it is manifested in every Arabic political newspaper and among individuals in day-to-day social intercourse. It cannot be considered abnormal in the Arab cultural setting. Given the importance of face to the Arab, such behavior must be recognized as a socially practical and accepted method of warding off or refuting any outside attack on his integrity. The Westerner who, recognizing in the Arab the personality traits which in Western culture signify paranoia or inferiority complex, is pleased with himself for being able to "see through the Arab's attempts at deceit and trickery and his lies" shows his lack of appreciation of the face concept in the Arab culture. It is the Westerner who has learned always to allow the Arab a graceful way to save himself from implications of guilt when difficulties arise who will make him a friend and avoid many frustrations and impasses in the relationship.

There is a proverb in Chinese which can be roughly translated, "Point at the chicken to scold the dog." On its face incomprehensible to the Westerner, it means that if the dog has done something wrong you should berate the chicken in his presence in order to get at the wrong-doer without causing undue embarrassment. The chicken is not embarrassed because everyone knows it was not he who did it, and the dog does not lose face through public shame or direct censure.

This principle was illustrated by an episode which occurred in Teheran but could as easily have come from the Arab world. A small radio had been stolen from the house of an American employing two Iranian servants, A and B. A was clearly the culprit, but direct accusation would have brought a quick denial and reduced the chances for recovery of the radio. Servant B was consulted; he advised the American housewife to chastize *him* severely in front of A. She did, and the radio was recovered with a minimum of interpersonal difficulty.

An incident cited by an American sociologist¹ illustrates another kind of situation. An Arab who caught another man in bed with his wife leveled a gun at them, but instead of shooting he offered to let the man off if he would keep the af-

¹ Hamady, Sania; *Temperament and Character of the Arabs*, Twayne Publishers, New York. 1960. p. 37.

fair secret. The man promised and was let go. Later the Arab divorced his wife quietly, and the incident was considered closed. The double murder that might have been the outcome in Western cultures would have made newspaper headlines, a result diametrically opposed to the Arab's priority considerations. His pledging the wife and cuckold to secrecy on pain of death guaranteed that no outsiders would learn of the matter and thus saved him an embarrassing loss of face. The quiet divorce rid him of his problem. The emotional distress which other husbands might have felt was for the Arab a problem of secondary importance; he could tell himself that Allah determines all and therefore not to trouble himself with the sequels of any acts. This story illustrates well the principle that the Arab is the reverse of the Westerner in that he feels very strongly the force of public shame in loss of face but is able to slough off the feelings of personal inadequacy which would be acute in a Westerner.

Subjective Fact

In Western cultures a fact is an objective absolute not subject to mutation through human interpretation. But the Arab mentality treats fact and truth as relative, to some extent a projection of the mind for the benefit of the self or ego. With this subjective processing the facts become what the Arab emotionally wants to believe is true. They can thus be made to mesh harmoniously with criteria which stand higher on the value scale because connected with the maintenance of face. Neither facts nor their connotations can stand up against the Arab's facade of personal dignity or be arrayed to form an attack on his surrogate of face.

Many concepts of the philosophy of the ancient Greeks have been discussed, adapted, and adopted by major Arab thinkers, but there is little sign in present-day Arab culture that Greek analytical self-critical philosophy ever entered the Near East. The motto "Know thyself" is not quoted by the Arabs; if it were, it would have to have an entirely new meaning. Knowing oneself, to include defining and acknowledging one's weaknesses, would destroy the principle that the surrogate of face or personal dignity must be defended at all costs and ostensible perfection maintained. The concept of self-examination, whether for purposes of self-management or self-improvement, could not be accepted because of its conflict with

the more honored cultural requirement of blameless dignity. The Arab is likewise quite unacquainted with the idea of examining his conduct to find the sources of his mistakes or misfortunes. If he did engage in such introspection he would be forced to intensify the subjectivity of his factual interpretations in order to avoid findings which might be detrimental to his face. In short, the Arab will not find anything wrong with himself.

Many say that the Arab has no capacity for self-analysis; but this is a rather shallow observation. If he lacked analytical ability, no Bedouin would ever have survived the desert drought problems. It is when analysis impinges upon the prime value of personal dignity that the use of subjective interpretations in order to preclude embarrassing conclusions begins to give outside observers doubts about the Arab's ability to reconcile himself with reality.

During the Israeli invasion of Sinai in October 1956, the Saudi Arabs in the oil fields along the Persian Gulf felt personal concern about the plight of their Egyptian brothers. In one instance some of those at a particular plant were much worried about a news item to the effect that in three days of fighting Israeli troops had captured five thousand Egyptians. They held a powwow, buzzing and chattering about it among themselves. After some time, however, the group broke up and all went away looking relieved and happy. Asked how they had resolved their anxiety, one of the more articulate explained that they had decided Israeli troops could never have captured 5,000 of anything, even sheep, in the Sinai region. Therefore the story was not true, and that ended the matter. All was right with the world again.

A former German army doctor who specialized in psychiatry and the diagnosis of mental disturbances was resident in Damascus during 1953 and 1954. During this time he was denied permission to practice in Syria, with the explanation that although medical doctors were always welcome, there was nothing wrong with Arabs mentally and hence no need for his services.

Knowledgeable Arabs realize that their people and countries fall in some measure short of the progress and development that some other nations have achieved. Unable to find themselves at fault for this, they are naturally led to seek the cause

of their troubles in outside sources—the will of Allah, the imperialists, Israel, family and personal obligations, and many real wrongs which have been done them. This saves the collective face from appearing defective and allows those who can accept subjectively interpreted facts to maintain their sense of personal dignity and self-confidence.

The lack of objective self-analysis in the Near East generally permits a type of boasting which is honest in that there is no real discrepancy between an Arab's outward show of, say, fantastic courage and his true feelings. In the absence of analysis he does not realize that he has weaknesses and could not perform accordingly. Unending talk of courageous endeavor and boasting his own virtues in order to give himself faith in his surrogate of face may make the Arab seem insincere to the Westerner; but if the latter challenges his boasts the two are brought to an impasse. The Arab could not be made to recognize his own weakness, and even if he could he would not admit the threat to his dignity.

Some of the secondary schools of the Middle Eastern countries schedule athletic contests with one another, and after each game members of the losing team will get together and discuss the event. Not infrequently they conclude that "the referee was against us" instead of acknowledging their own faulty plays or the other team's superiority.

In any situation in which shame or guilt threatens the Arab he will be able to explain away whatever impinges on his personal dignity with an array of facts that are meant to be accepted by the listener and not challenged. Whether the story is believed or not and whether the facts are objective or logical are secondary considerations; it is considered quite unmanly to embarrass him by challenging his explanations. Many of the stories of Juha and his donkey which abound in Arabic folklore have their point for the Arab not in the happenings, logical or illogical, they portray but rather in the quick wit and inventive genius with which the hero survives each incident.

In many phases of the Arabic cultural setting the Westerner with his fetish for objectivity is decidedly out of place, for a subjective interpretation of facts and truth is most suitable in a milieu where face and personal dignity are the things of prime importance.

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In summation, the face concept can be said to have three interrelated aspects. The Arab's extreme effort to show himself blameless, an effort which seems too transparent and unrealistic to Westerners, is the product of the high value his culture puts upon personal dignity, of his feeling answerable for his conduct to society rather than to any divine conscience within himself, and of his sense of the subjectivity of fact.

Conceptual exploration and inter-departmental maneuvering under pressure of war that laid the foundation for a centralizing agency.

ORIGINS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ¹

Arthur B. Darling

The processes of intelligence and their attendant propaganda, sabotage, and guerrilla tactics received tremendous stimulus during the second World War. Fifth-column activities had become famous in the Spanish civil strife prior to the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland. An interdepartmental committee of the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau of Investigation in July 1939 sought to control spies, saboteurs, and subversive persons. The overthrow of France in June 1940 and the expulsion of Britain's troops from the continent at Dunkirk convinced leading Americans that this country must prepare in every way for the eventuality of war. German agents under Nazi direction were already at work in Latin America as their predecessors had been for the Kaiser. The specter of an invasion even of North America possessed some minds. The British fleet had long supported the Monroe Doctrine against foreign encroachment upon Anglo-American dominance in the western hemisphere. If Britain fell, there would be no British fleet.

Arrangements were made to supply the British fleet with destroyers in return for air and naval bases. Congress revived the Selective Service of 1917 in September. Ambassador Kennedy was making statements that Britain could not stand up to the German attack. The President sent William J. Donovan in July to find out. Donovan was to study too Germany's fifth-column practices. He returned by August 4 to report orally to Secretary Knox and the President upon those practices, Britain's organization for secret intelligence, and what Donovan liked to call "unorthodox warfare." The German ac-

¹ With slight adaptations and the omission of documentation, this article reproduces Chapter I of a history of the Central Intelligence Agency to 1950 completed by the author in 1953.

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tivities were spread before the American public in a series of newspaper articles signed by Edgar A. Mowrer and Colonel Donovan. British advices and plans entered from time to time into the development of an American system of intelligence and clandestine operations.

Donovan believed that Britain would stand. He was abroad again before Christmas to make a strategic survey of American economic and political interests in the Mediterranean and the Near East. Many Americans found it hard to discover those interests, though the Navy had once fought Barbary corsairs on the coasts of Africa and put the Marines ashore in Tripoli, and there still were American missionaries, hospitals, and colleges in the Near East. Donovan saw them, and a good deal more as he worked with a British officer against the pro-Nazi regent, Prince Paul, in Yugoslavia. The Germans sensed enough of his purposes to keep him from conferring with the French commander, General Weygand.

Strategic Information

By March 18 Colonel Donovan was home to report upon the dangers to shipping, the importance of northwest Africa to the United States, the use of psychological and political warfare, and upon a central intelligence committee which he saw taking form in London under the exigencies of war. At Roosevelt's direction he talked with Secretaries Stimson and Knox and Attorney General Jackson about his concept of an intelligence agency with the accompanying forces of propaganda and subversion. They recommended it to the President. The result was Donovan's proposal on June 10, 1941, that there should be a "service of strategic information." Strategy without information, he said, was helpless. Information collected for no strategic purpose was futile.

With this memorandum, his first written statement on the subject, Donovan began the foundations for what has become the Central Intelligence Agency. Whether or not he was aware of it at the time, he indicated, too, the difficulties that would perplex the administrators of this common service for the departments of the Government.

He suggested that a Coordinator of Strategic Information should have an advisory panel consisting of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the heads of the intelligence services of the Army and the Navy, and corresponding

officials from other departments concerned. He would draw the personnel of his central agency from the Army and the Navy as well as from civilian sources. He would make sure that the agency should not displace or encroach upon the departments, although it might collect information independently. It was to analyze and interpret information of many kinds for use by the departments. Above all, it was "to constitute a means by which the President, as Commander in Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions could be based."

Donovan would place under the direction of the Coordinator of Strategic Information that psychological warfare which he had observed the Germans using so effectively upon "the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation." He did not include in his memorandum the physical subversion and guerrilla warfare which he had also in mind. They had been discussed with the cabinet officers; they were implicit in the plan. True to the military character of his whole conception, he proposed that the Coordinator of Strategic Information should be responsible directly to the President.

This led at once to disagreement with the armed services which has complicated relationships ever since between them and the central intelligence service. President Roosevelt's military order of June 25, 1941, as Commander in Chief, created the office of Coordinator of Strategic Information and gave him military authority. It aroused so much opposition that it had to be rewritten. Another order on July 11, 1941, established the office of Coordinator of Information, omitting the word "Strategic." It carefully protected the regular military and naval advisers of the President from interference or impairment of functions by this new aide to the Chief Executive.

Many in the armed services were far from pleased. It still was in effect a military order. Colonel William J. Donovan was of course to be the Coordinator of Information. Senator Taft caught up their feeling, though in an overstatement of the facts: Donovan could "boss the intelligence services of the Army and Navy in the name of the President and have more influence with the President on military and naval strategy than the General Staffs."

Criticism from another quarter was more in keeping with the facts. After a conference on June 18 with Donovan and

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Benjamin Cohen, counsel for the National Power Policy Committee, regarding Donovan's ideas on a "service of strategic information," President Roosevelt sent Cohen to consult with the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Donovan too explained his plans for the future of the organization. From the beginning officials in the Bureau had the impression that he was ambitious to make the powers of his new agency "all-inclusive." He was interested in domestic morale and economic defense, in research upon Latin America, in the negotiations for peace at the end of the European war, in post-war economic planning, and apparently anything and everything else that pertained to the strategic intelligence necessary to the formulation of national policy.

It is not surprising that members of the Bureau of the Budget thought Donovan eager to compete with "many of the old line agencies and most of the defense agencies." It was rather soon for all of the possibilities which his avid imagination conceived. It was altogether too soon to draw the lines and establish the interstices between rival institutions of the government so that they worked harmoniously to the common end. The criticism was fair at the moment. It did not, however, show due appreciation of the fact that, regardless of his personal ambitions, Donovan was pioneering in the public interest beyond the experiences and assumptions of the moment. He believed that it was his duty as well as opportunity to put all elements of intelligence in one central organization. This, he declared in 1953, was an American contribution in the history of intelligence.

From COI to OSS

The office of the Coordinator of Information developed so rapidly under Donovan's direction that many elements of a central intelligence service were in operation by the time of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor in December. To broadcast radio messages, issue pamphlets, and spread the propaganda of truth regarding American principles, his Foreign Information Service had begun to take shape even before the President's order of July 11. With its listening outposts, it was also soon obtaining information for the production of intelligence. A Research and Analysis Branch, well established in August, began to collect and evaluate the basic materials for intelligence reports. By October a Visual Present-

tation Branch was at work upon the techniques of delivering such reports and related data to the departments and services concerned.

An Oral Intelligence Unit was created to interview persons recently arrived from abroad. Foreign nationals within this country came under study to discover what they might reveal concerning the conditions and opinions in the countries of their origin. The collection of information by undercover agents outside the western hemisphere had begun upon agreement with the Army and the Navy in October that their clandestine intelligence services should be consolidated under the Coordinator of Information.

There was agreement also with the British. During the first World War an intimate relationship had existed between the two governments on the diplomatic level, resulting in the exchange of information of great value. Now, with the consent of Churchill, Donovan placed a branch office in London. The British services had quarters in New York. The cooperation was close between the intelligence systems of the two countries.

There was even planning for the eventuality of war before it came with the disaster at Pearl Harbor. A section in Donovan's office named "Special Activities—K and L Funds" was established on October 10, 1941, to take charge of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and guerrilla units. There had been no formal authorization for these. The President's order of July 11 merely provided for "such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government." But the intent was clear. Donovan sent an officer to study British practices in close association with the British Special Operations Executive. It was only a short step into guerrilla warfare after the declaration of war. He submitted to President Roosevelt on December 22, 1941, the plan long in mind for an American force like the British Commandos, "imbued with the maximum of the offensive and imaginative spirit," an excellent weapon of physical subversion to accompany the black propaganda of psychological warfare.

The burst of war which he anticipated had two effects upon Colonel Donovan. He pressed the organization of his office to completion so that he might leave for a combat command, and he urged that the Coordinator of Information be placed under

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the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These held their first meeting on February 9, 1942, as they prepared to work with their British counterparts in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Donovan sent a proposal through Secretary Knox to the President that there be attached to the Navy an independent force of land, sea, and air raiders, five thousand men, which Donovan himself would command; and he suggested a successor as Coordinator of Information. Donovan was not permitted to take command of American commandos. He had instead to develop within his office the forces of physical subversion and guerrilla warfare. But the Office of Strategic Services which succeeded the Coordinator of Information was placed as he had wished under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by military order of the President on June 13, 1942.

Meanwhile the Coordinator of Information had come under pressures that were generated by diverse temperaments quite as much as by differences of opinion concerning methods in war. Over Donovan's protests the Foreign Information Service was removed from his jurisdiction and joined with other information services in the new Office of War Information. Donovan believed that the effectiveness of psychological warfare would be impaired if the control of propaganda directed abroad were taken from the Coordinator of Information. It is to be noted too that with the Foreign Information Service went the listening outposts which were sources of information for the production of intelligence reports by the Coordinator. But this caused little hardship, as the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service of the Federal Communications Commission provided complete summaries of its auditing and the Office of Strategic Services soon enlarged its own system of collecting secret intelligence overseas.

Psywar Setup

There was a prolonged dispute over psychological warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had created a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee in March but reorganized it on June 21, 1942, to make Donovan the chairman, as Director of the Office of Strategic Services. The committee was composed of representatives from the Army and the Navy and supported by an advisory committee drawn from the Department of State,

the Board of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Office of War Information.

For the next six months plans and proposals, suggestions and exceptions, basic estimates, reports, and dissents were tossed back and forth between the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and its subcommittees on the one hand and the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate groups on the other without ever reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However stated or argued, specifically or in general terms, the real matter at issue would seem to an outsider to have been whether the OSS was to be an agent directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the conception and conduct of psychological warfare. If it reported to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, OSS would run the risk of having its projects stopped there by the overwhelming majority representing the Army and the Navy. The armed services did not like any sort of independent paramilitary command. As Donovan recalled in 1953, it was a critical moment in the whole endeavor to establish an American system of central intelligence.

The issue came to conclusion in December 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General McNarney and Admiral Horne to inquire into the Office of Strategic Services. They visited it separately. Donovan talked with them, showed them papers, and asked them to spend a day watching it in operation. There followed a directive from the Joint Chiefs on December 22 abolishing the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and designating OSS the "agency" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the military program of psychological warfare.

Donovan received a note from General Marshall saying that he could not let the holiday season pass without expressing gratitude for his cooperation in the trying times of the past year. Marshall regretted that Donovan, after voluntarily coming under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs, had not enjoyed smoother sailing. Marshall hoped that the new directive would eliminate most of the difficulties.

The Office of Strategic Services gained most of the points for which it had contended. To supervise the military program of psychological warfare and integrate it with military and naval operations, there was established within OSS a new Planning Group composed of one member from the Department of State, two from the Army, two from the Navy, and four in-

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cluding the chairman from OSS. An advisory committee was to have representation from the Board of Economic Warfare, Office of War Information, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Treasury, and other agencies from time to time as their interests were concerned. After approval by the OSS Director, the plans and projects of the Planning Group were to be submitted through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

The operations of propaganda, and of economic warfare within the military program for psychological warfare, were reserved to the Office of War Information and to the Board of Economic Warfare respectively. The Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to prepare such special information and intelligence studies as the Joint Chiefs required.

Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, was unwilling to share in this cooperative effort in psychological warfare. He declined representation on the Advisory Committee of the OSS Planning Group. Admiral Leahy had written for the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Planning Group would be confined to recommendations to them; they would be the ones to decide upon the propaganda they wished Mr. Davis to execute. But he saw it differently. There was no purpose to be served in giving advice to another group upon matters which one was already under obligation to the President to formulate and execute. The President, he said, could "hardly be overruled by lesser authority." His representative would be a visitor to the OSS group, not a member.

Intelligence Interchange

The intelligence needs of the Office of Strategic Services were restricted by the directive of December 22, 1942, to those "necessary for the planning and execution of the military program for psychological warfare, and for the preparation of assigned portions of intelligence digests and such other data and visual presentation as may be requested." Moreover, OSS intelligence collection was confined to the special operations of sabotage, espionage, and counterespionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory, guerrilla warfare, underground groups, and contacts with foreign nationals in the United States.

These restrictions upon the OSS intelligence service were not permitted to hamper its work for long, on paper. They were removed from the text of the directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 4, 1943. And by the final revision of the directive on October 27, 1943, OSS's function of collecting information for the production of intelligence was fully restored. But collecting is not the same as receiving dissemination from others, and having the right to receive information is different from actually getting particular items. General Vandenberg and Admiral Hillenkoetter were to find this true again and again as Directors of Central Intelligence.

It had been agreed by both Army and Navy in October 1941, before the attack upon Pearl Harbor, that the "undercover intelligence of the two services" should be consolidated under the Coordinator of Information. As General Miles expressed it, the work was "much more effective if under one head rather than three..." A civilian agency, such as the Coordinator of Information, had distinct advantages, he said, over any military or naval agency in the administration of such a service. At the same time the Army and Navy set up their Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Committee to forestall the Coordinator of Information. Ludwell L. Montague became its secretary on October 14.

Following the agreement with the Army and Navy, Donovan planned at once to put a wireless station and agents in North Africa. But the understanding had contained the reservation that in the event of war the Army and the Navy should have full power to operate undercover intelligence services of their own. After Pearl Harbor, the best that could be obtained in the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a statement that the military and naval intelligence services and the Office of Strategic Services would "provide for the complete and free interchange of information, evaluated as to creditability of source, required for the execution of their respective missions."

In practice this meant to the intelligence officers of the Army and the Navy no obligation whatever upon them to turn over to Donovan's OSS information about operations which they thought should not be revealed. It is to be said on their behalf that they had some reasons to fear that the civilians in his agency were not disciplined in military security; the OSS deserved part of its reputation for being a sieve. (When Gen-

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eral Donovan read this statement in February 1953, he blurted: "How could you say such a thing! That makes me sore." The military men, he said, were the "leaky boys.") It is also to be said that intelligence reports worth submitting to the policy-makers cannot be had if strategic information is withheld from those who have the task of making the reports.

According to one who remarked that he ought to know because he was one of them, men in the armed services looked with suspicion upon the expert economists, geographers, historians, and scientists whom Donovan gathered about him; they "lowered their horns" against those experts, said General Magruder, and they kept their horns down. We might add that there was milling and bawling and pawing the dust, but no stampede.

A case in point was the refusal of the Navy to release its radio intercepts to the Office of Strategic Services. Donovan protested on October 22, 1942, that such action would impair his ability to discharge his mission. When he had agreed to refrain from cryptographic work, he had understood that the proceeds from decoding by the armed forces would be made available to the OSS. Otherwise it could not carry out the duties specifically assigned to it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His undercover representatives in foreign countries were entitled to the protection and help which would come from the interceptions of enemy messages. The Research and Analysis Branch needed the information for its strategic studies. The Office of Strategic Services could not function completely without such important materials.

Donovan's protest got a cool reception in the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman, General George V. Strong, was unwilling to accept even the obvious provisions in the directive of December 22, 1942, arguing at first that it confined the Office of Strategic Services to the planning and execution of psychological warfare. When Donovan's deputy, General Magruder, showed that OSS had much wider functions in the field of intelligence, General Strong abandoned the argument but remained obviously reluctant to yield. The Navy representative then read a letter from Admiral King stating that he would not agree to any increase in the dissemination of intercept material. The attitude of the Committee as a whole was unsympathetic. So

General Magruder, having in mind "the longer range point of view of being able to reconstruct harmonious relations with the armed forces," did not press the legal point that the Office of Strategic Services was entitled to such information.

The issue was seemingly closed on January 19, 1943, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They ruled that release of information was within the province of the representatives of the Army and Navy in the OSS Planning Group. This of course reduced the question to specific instances and left power with the Army and Navy still to withhold any particular piece of information. They are reluctant to this moment in 1953 to give a central civilian agency intelligence which exposes their capabilities in war. The result has been interference with the flow of raw materials essential to the realistic estimates which should go to the makers of diplomatic policy and military strategy.

Integration Efforts

Early in 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. The joint agencies were not to engage in initial procurement; they were only to assemble material in the field offices and forward it to Washington. In theory this cooperation should have been helpful to the OSS Secret Intelligence Branch; in fact it laid its secret agents open to exposure in the field and delayed their material in reaching the Branch in Washington. Such interference gave Donovan's supporters opportunity to argue that the armed services had established the joint collection agencies to thwart OSS and keep it from being the central agency in the national intelligence system. The situation did seem to prove that instead of three or four collecting agencies, there should be a single and exclusive collector in the field of secret intelligence and counterespionage abroad.

The Office of Strategic Services came under another cross fire. After the experience at Pearl Harbor General Marshall and Admiral King were convinced that something had to be done about combining the intelligence services of the Army and Navy, regardless of any arrangement with the OSS. Their agreement apparently led in the spring of 1943 to a proposal that the Joint Intelligence Committee should be reorganized. It should have a civilian member besides the representatives of

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the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and OSS to form a better estimating board for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This civilian, by reason of exceptional performance, might even become the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. There was resemblance here to the British estimating committee, in which the civilian representing the Foreign Office sat as chairman with the military experts.

Each member of the reorganized Joint Intelligence Committee should have access to all of the intelligence in the service which he represented, and presumably he would purvey it to the Committee under restrictions which remained to be established. The proposers of the plan seemed confident that such ranking officers could be trusted to decide whether they could release any item of information to the Committee without jeopardy to their respective services and at the same time supply the Committee with the proper materials for its estimates.

More important in the plan, and perhaps the telltale, was the suggestion that the OSS Research and Analysis Branch should be linked with similar functions in the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Service. The idea was that the Research and Analysis Branch would thus become a central agency. Files and personnel transferred from the Army and Navy would be integrated with similar OSS files and persons so that there would be a single activity engaged in making strategic surveys.

The Research and Analysis Branch, thus augmented with officers and other experts from the armed services, would be directly under the Joint Intelligence Committee. The presumption was that the transferred officers would no longer be directly responsible to the Army or the Navy but belong to the central agency. The fact remained, however, that in the Joint Intelligence Committee itself the OSS would have only one representative while the Army, Navy, and Air Forces together would have three. Even if the civilian in the chair agreed with the OSS representative, they would still be in the minority on the Committee.

General Magruder broadly favored the plan. He reported to Donovan in September that on the whole it recommended steps "very close to our own desires." But he believed that the Secret Intelligence and Counterespionage branches should also be elevated to the "strategic level" along with Research

and Analysis. They belonged in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if it were to be the "authoritative body of the future superior strategic intelligence service." The three were, after all, the essentials in any central intelligence service.

On the other hand, he did not want to mix the intelligence experts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with the civilians or "scholar experts" in Research and Analysis. Each group should retain "its own sense of responsibility"; the results of their separate efforts should be brought together. Otherwise, he said, their efforts would be wasted, and the chiefs of the groups would not demand the best personnel. In hindsight, military men and civilians since then seem to have worked together in the same group on problems of intelligence more effectively than General Magruder anticipated.

General Donovan did not take to the plan so readily as Magruder. Possibly it looked to Donovan, as it well could, more like an immediate attempt to deprive him of a major service within the OSS and narrow his activities still further in the field of intelligence. The plan did not materialize.

In the words of a contemporary observer, the Army, Navy, and Department of State were always glad to use the OSS Research and Analysis Branch as a servant. They were not willing to accept it as an equal partner in final judgments. By depriving it of the "sensitive information" which they had within their control, they were able to keep it from being what it was supposed to be, the competent research agency in the political-economic-social field of national intelligence.

Functional Development

Notwithstanding serious blocks to the production of strategic reports and interference with its activities in other ways, the Office of Strategic Services established institutions and practices that are requisite to a national system of intelligence. It accumulated the wealth of experience for its successors to enjoy. Among its legacies to the Central Intelligence Agency were the methods and means of procuring both overt and secret intelligence, the devices of counterespionage, the procedures of research and analysis, and a considerable number of skilled persons.

The foreign groups in the United States, a mosaic of nationalities, were certain to be useful as sources of intelligence.

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It was important to exploit those who had come from nations under the Nazis and the Communists. It was wise to keep them under surveillance also for subversive activities. The Foreign Nationalities Branch, established to scan the foreign language press and to deal with political refugees and leaders of foreign groups, at first met opposition from the Departments of Justice and State. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was afraid that the Branch would interfere with its work. Members of the State Department were suspicious that the Branch might usurp functions of policy-making. But the Foreign Nationalities Branch demonstrated its value so effectively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it was fixed as part of the intelligence system. It obtained a large amount of significant information concerning Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Poland.

The Secret Intelligence Branch grew from a small organization with a few overseas units which supplied the armed services with fifty reports in May 1942 to a system of penetration by land, sea, and air, producing five thousand reports a month at its peak. Its area desks were increased and regrouped to direct operations more effectively in neutral countries and to gain access into adjacent hostile or occupied territories. A Reporting Board controlled the dissemination of intelligence. The Branch developed a section to enlist the support of labor in all countries not only for intelligence but for sabotage and subversion. A "ship observer unit" obtained the especially valuable intelligence to be had from seamen, their organizations, ship operators, and other maritime sources. A technical section provided information on roads, bridges, aqueducts, weapons, and similar matters of engineering. It maintained daily contact with the "Manhattan Project" in atomic energy.

The counterpart of Secret Intelligence, known as "X-2," developed a counterespionage network which spread from London to Shanghai through Europe, Africa, the Near East, India, Burma, and China, with each headquarters reporting directly to Washington. By October 1945 a registry of enemies and subversive persons had been developed in Washington that ran to some 400,000 names. This with the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation constituted the backbone of security intelligence. Moreover, working agreements with the British, French, and others were ready for the future.

The British were willing to let Americans into their organization to learn about Hitler's agents but were not so disposed to have the American intelligence services entering regions where Britain had primary interests. In some instances the reluctance amounted to downright refusal. This appears to have been the case for some time in northern France, the Low Countries, and Southeast Asia. It is to be said, though, that the situation in the Far East was complicated further by Chiang Kai-shek and Douglas MacArthur.

Before long, geographical understandings were established upon the principle that the OSS would take a leading position in the work of intelligence as the American military forces penetrated certain areas. This was particularly true in Western Europe as the invasion gained momentum. In other regions the British intelligence services continued to dominate and in some instances made it practically impossible for American intelligence officers to go about their business. In Istanbul and doubtless other places like it, for very good reasons of security or rather the lack of it, the British did not care to become involved with American intelligence.

In spite of all this, there was cooperation to a great degree both in London and in New York. The British supplied OSS with information on occasion when the U.S. Army and Navy either could or would not do so. To be appreciated as well, the British allowed American officers to observe the interrelationships of their services and the working of their intelligence system as a basis for improving the American system. The study which William H. Jackson made of the British organization in 1945 and then with Kingman Douglass in 1946 influenced the development of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Other Accomplishments

However valuable in themselves, the first reports of the Research and Analysis Branch, under the Coordinator of Information, were neither well related to one another nor focused properly upon the needs of the Army and Navy. For this condition the services were in part responsible until they gave better explanation of what they wanted. In 1942 strategic surveys became the major enterprise of the Branch. This basic intelligence laid bare at the demand of war the hard economic and geographical facts within the conflict of nations. The R&A strategic surveys were the predecessors of the Joint

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Army-Navy Intelligence Studies, which in turn were superseded by the program of National Intelligence Surveys.

The Research and Analysis Branch also provided intelligence on contemporary events. Information came from outposts of the Branch in such advantageous places for observation as London, Algiers, Cairo, Stockholm, New Delhi, Chungking, Bucharest, Istanbul, Rome, Lisbon, and Athens. This current intelligence had usefulness distinct from the information which came from Secret Intelligence and from the Department of State. Collection by R&A was not hampered by the secrecy of the one nor by the diplomatic protocol of the other.

Reporting by photography as well as words was fully appreciated in the Office of Strategic Services and passed on to its successors in the national intelligence system. There was a War Room with maps, charts, projectors. There was a *Daily Intelligence Summary* and a *Political Intelligence Weekly*. Called by whatever name, things indispensable stay much the same.

There is always a need for supporting services like the recruitment and training of personnel, legal advice, accounting, procurement, and maintenance of equipment. The Office of Strategic Services had such supporting services. Improvement and expansion came with experience, but little change in the essential functions. The methods of communication were the best in existence at that time. The OSS used three kinds of cover for its agents and operations—governmental, commercial, and professional. The choice today among these types of concealment is determined as then by the peculiarities of the particular situation.

The covert activities of the Office of Strategic Services have been examined in its War Report and are not to be appraised project by project in this study. The Special Operations Branch, in charge of sabotage and physical subversion, was uppermost in the purposes of General Donovan; accordingly it grew from small beginnings in 1941 until it had become a valuable auxiliary to military operations in the theatres of war where it was allowed to participate. Because no arrangements satisfactory to both MacArthur and Donovan could be made, OSS did not operate in the western Pacific, though it had a role in China.

Opinions of OSS varied from praise to blame in accordance with the predilections and interests of the observers. Agreement appears to have been general outside the Office itself, however, that its Special Operations Branch should be liquidated at the close of the war, along with its paramilitary enterprises such as guerrilla Operations Groups and the Maritime Unit, whose frogmen have attracted so much attention. This was even more true of the Morale Operations Branch engaged in black propaganda, although a movement began shortly afterward to apply the lessons learned in this art of war. On March 5, 1946, Secretary of War Patterson wrote to Secretary Forrestal of the Navy urging that a body of experts institute some kind of system to develop weapons for the psychological warfare of the future.

Looking Ahead

Long before the troops of the Allies invaded Germany or the atomic bombs had fallen on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thoughts were upon profiting in times of peace from wartime experience with the intelligence services. Brigadier General John Magruder, before his association with OSS and while head of Lend Lease in China, had observed in practical operation the need for joint intelligence among the services. Because of his official position he obtained information more easily than the military attaché and others. He therefore suggested that all should cooperate in gathering and verifying intelligence, and he proposed to General Stilwell that the practice be extended to Washington among the armed services at the highest level. General Stilwell did not believe that it would succeed in Washington. When Magruder returned to the United States in the summer of 1942, however, he conferred enthusiastically with General Donovan and put his coordination proposal on paper. Donovan assured him that the Office of Strategic Services was designed for just such a purpose and invited him to join the organization as its Deputy Director for Intelligence.

The plan which Magruder proposed in August 1942 stressed the imperative need for coordinating all of the agencies concerned with intelligence. The collecting services of the departments obtained valuable information, he said, but not a single one was competent to furnish the complete information necessary to "national decisions." There were no "sure and continuous" connections between the intelligence agencies

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and those who were responsible for making the decisions and plans. He found all of the intelligence services so "compartmented" that the only escape from the situation was to establish a "superior joint intelligence agency." No vital decisions could be made for the conduct of the war without "complete and digested intelligence."

Looking back upon this memorandum, we may well admire the perception with which the author wrote of difficulties that still persist in 1953. General Magruder did not then visualize the intricate system for coordinating departmental intelligence with strategic studies made independently by experts in research and analysis. But he did appreciate the necessity for synthesis of the information from all services for strategic planning and decisions by those who had to make both diplomatic and military policies. Since the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was then at work on problems of intelligence for the Army and Navy, he thought of it rather than of some other central agency for his purposes. But he observed that the Joint Intelligence Committee would have to be reorganized and its functions augmented or it could not operate effectively as the body of advice, coordination, and recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Magruder proposed in August 1942 that in place of the working staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee there should be established a Joint Intelligence Bureau. This Bureau should act as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under its director and deputy director there should be research divisions in the several fields of intelligence—political, economic, military, and others. The product of their effort should be systematically administered by an initiating and reviewing committee. This key committee should make assignments to the working groups, should requisition material from the various departments concerned, and should approve the studies and estimates of the Bureau before they went through the director's office to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The committee of initiation and review within the Bureau was to be composed of representatives from the intelligence services of the departments. But it was clear that Magruder intended that they should not be merely visitors from their respective departments; they were to be members of the Bureau. Although representing separate interests, they were to

be gathered into one body with functions expressly delegated in accordance with the federal principle.

Congress itself, with sovereign powers expressly delegated in the Constitution, is the best example of the principle. Though representative of the states, component parts of the Union, Congress exercises powers that are superior to and exclusive of powers retained by the states; the product of its action is national. The concept that the federal principle was applicable within an agency of the government seems to have been ahead of its time in the fall of 1942. There were, of course, military men in the Office of Strategic Services, but the idea that they represented the services from which they had come at the same time that they worked as members of a central intelligence agency was then highly theoretical.

General Magruder clung to his ideas and strengthened them in dealing with those who obstructed the actual working of the Secret Intelligence Branch and the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS. He wrote on July 30, 1943, to the Executive Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a series of observations upon the U.S. intelligence service which explicitly cited the obstructions: the Secret Intelligence Branch had reached an impressive stage of development in spite of the fact that it was handicapped by outright resistance in some quarters and by limitations imposed by well-intentioned officials who lacked familiarity with its objectives and failed to appreciate its value as a national asset.

The Research and Analysis Branch, he said, could be the very core of an agency which could not be duplicated in any other intelligence organization restricting itself to the needs of a particular department. The Branch was uniquely designed to serve a particular need. Its group of highly qualified specialists should be the "servitors" of the Joint Chiefs and have functions befitting their ability to produce. Instead, they were being denied access to information by other agencies in spite of what were believed to be both the terms and the spirit of the directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Magruder wished now in the fall of 1943 to see the Secret Intelligence Branch and the Counterespionage Branch taken up to "the strategic level" and incorporated with the Research and Analysis Branch in a superior intelligence agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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The Donovan Plan

General Donovan looked beyond the immediate exigencies of war even more than his deputy, General Magruder. At the request of General Walter B. Smith, recently Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces in North Africa, Donovan wrote on September 17, 1943, to give his ideas in detail on the creation of a strategic intelligence organization as an integral and permanent part of the military establishment. Donovan had worked with Smith to put the Office of Strategic Services under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though produced in war and quite naturally reflecting that fact, Donovan's paper revealed that his thinking ran far ahead into times of peace.

His was a long-range view of requirements. There must be independence from other nations' intelligence for reasons of security, verification of information, and control. Friends today might not be so cordial tomorrow. Secret means had to be maintained for collecting political, economic, sociological, and psychological data. There should be counterintelligence as a matter of course to protect these primary services. He stressed the use of the radio and the need for independent communications and passport privileges. A separate budget and unvouchered funds were essential.

Donovan advocated a civilian director supported largely by civilian personnel. He explained the importance of research and analysis by experts in critical appraisal, by skilled technicians and specialists on particular regions. And, as was to be expected of him, General Donovan associated these requirements for an intelligence service closely with physical subversion and warfare upon morale. They were all indispensable parts of a national intelligence system.

It may be only coincidence, but it is a striking coincidence, that General Smith later became Director of Central Intelligence and adhered to much these principles in administering the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As General Smith had asked, Donovan consulted other officers experienced in intelligence, particularly Colonel Dudley W. Clarke, a friend in the British Army who had much to do with the Commandos. Taking up Clarke's suggestion of the "ideal control" for a strategic intelligence organization, Donovan proposed that it should be included with the Army, Navy, and Air Force as the "fourth arm" under the jurisdiction of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chief of the intelligence organization, or "Strategic Services," would be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All, of course, were under the President as Commander in Chief.

General Donovan did not then let a question interfere which later wrecked his plan in the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whether the chief of "Strategic Services" should be responsible directly to the President or to the Secretary of a department, he said in his letter to General Smith, did not affect the issue, but he did not wish to have the strategic intelligence organization placed under the control of one department. It was to serve and support not only the armed forces but the diplomatic, economic, and propaganda services; that is to say the Department of State, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Office of War Information of those days.

Here Donovan acknowledged "distracting political consequences" in placing "Strategic Services" directly under the control of the President. If it should be decided to have a Department of Defense in which all the "Fighting Services" would be placed, then the strategic intelligence organization should be included on a parity with the others. If no such legislation were enacted, "Strategic Services" could continue under the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a civilian head appointed by the President.

What led General Donovan to endeavor later to bring the Office of Strategic Services back directly under the President is hard to discover in the documentary evidence. His enemies were certain that he was intent upon building the proverbial empire. The hypothesis is too simple. One difficulty with it is that he was instantly removable from office at the President's whim as even political appointees were not. Donovan will be found fairly reasonable in discussing with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the possibility, though he did not favor the idea, of placing the Director of Central Intelligence under a board consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. His opinion seems consistently to have been that the responsibility should be individual; it should not be "diffused through intermediate echelons." If he had to compromise he preferred to have the Director under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He thoroughly understood the principle of chain of command.

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Peacetime OSS

Drawing further upon his staff, General Magruder and others, for ideas and suggestions, Donovan stated his views again in October 1944, when public thoughts, though still in the midst of war, were upon the solemn endeavor at Dumbarton Oaks to establish a United Nations which might settle international disputes by some means other than war. It was the time of greatest cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was before the Russian armies had driven the Germans from Poland. It was also before British and American troops had broken the last great German effort on the western front in the deathly fog and gloom of the Battle of the Bulge, before they had swept over the Rhine deep into Germany to meet the Russians on the Elbe, suspicious friends becoming foes. It was before the uncertain agreements at Yalta and the rising quarrels over Poland, the Balkan States, and Red China. It was before the United States had the atomic bomb to drop upon Japan and complicate further its negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The essentials to any central intelligence service, he wrote, were plain and clear. There must be an uninterrupted flow of intelligence in peace as in war so that national policy, military and political, could be based upon knowledge. This was to be obtained by both overt and clandestine means abroad; there should be no clandestine operation within the United States. Moreover, the central agency should have no police power, nor should it be identified with any law-enforcing body either at home or abroad. This statement should be kept always in mind by those who are wont to accuse "Wild Bill" Donovan of wishing to set up an American Gestapo.

The outstanding purpose of the central intelligence service which Donovan proposed was to collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence "on the policy or strategy level" to the policy-makers of the government as directed by the President. This intelligence was to serve the Army and the Navy as well as the Department of State or any other branch of the government. He would not interfere with the operational intelligence of the departments. But he did intend to make the principle of individual responsibility for national intelligence starkly clear.

A director, appointed by the President and under his orders, was to administer this central service and determine its policy

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with the advice and assistance of a board of representatives from the Department of State, the Army, and the Navy. Donovan did not say "with the advice and consent" of those representatives; he said "advice and assistance." Here was a source of much argument, heated argument, and great difficulty from that time on.

Charged with the duty of collecting information and producing intelligence for the national defense, the central agency should have its own means of communication and of control over all secret activities, espionage and counterespionage, cryptanalysis, and subversive operations. It would have to use both vouchered and unvouchered funds. It would need as a matter of course a staff of specialists professionally trained in analysis, expert in languages, informed about particular regions, possessed of the many skills necessary to the working of so complicated an organization.

All of these essentials to a central intelligence service, General Donovan believed, he had in the Office of Strategic Services. There was no need to create a new agency. There would be only the task of adjusting the OSS to peacetime conditions and establishing it within the Executive Office of the President. The way to accomplish this now in the fall of 1944 would be an executive order replacing that of June 13, 1942, which had put the OSS under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There were conferences about the plan with the President's advisers in the White House. There were discussions with members of the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom the proposal would be eventually referred. There were negotiations with representatives of the Foreign Economic Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of State. For Donovan was well aware that there were many in the armed services and elsewhere who did not share his views and who had ideas of their own about the kind of intelligence service the country should have.

The Department of State in particular, as having the major interest in foreign policy, had begun to make provision for an intelligence service within its organization. Donovan had among his papers such a program dated September 30, 1944; he knew that members of the State Department were conferring with persons in the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Bureau of the Budget. And then there was the Federal Bureau of Investigation at work in Latin

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America as well as the continental United States, guarding its prerogatives and patrolling its jurisdiction. It was apparent that he must have his plan well in hand and properly explained in advance of its presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At this juncture, shortly after receiving from Donovan a preliminary draft, Roosevelt referred to him a different kind of proposal that had been submitted. The President did not give the name of its author, but Donovan knew that it came from John F. Carter, commentator and author known as "Jay Franklin." His plan had interest for opinions and purposes other than General Donovan's. It afforded Donovan an opportunity to speak his mind forcefully as usual and place credit where it was due.

Carter felt that "the British Intelligence" had already "penetrated" the Office of Strategic Services, whose usefulness after the war therefore would be impaired. The British would pursue their own ends; these might not be "synonymous" with American purposes. Carter offered to establish a less expensive and adequately camouflaged central office. He would use the foreign contacts of American businessmen for sources of information, working of course with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the intelligence services of the Army and Navy. He would leave the evaluation of reports to the State Department. Carter had formerly worked in the Department.

Donovan dismissed the suggestion. The author's thinking on intelligence, he said, was in the "horse and buggy stage." As for British penetration of the Office of Strategic Services, it was in fact cooperation from which OSS had greatly profited. He might have added that his organization was dependent upon British sources for much of its information. He declared that it had maintained its integrity. In point of fact, he said, the President would be interested to know that "both our Allies and our enemies know less about our inner workings than we do about theirs."

No more was heard from Carter, unless he was one of those who were advocating the expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation into an intelligence service overseas. By November 7 word came from the White House to discourage that movement. The Bureau was to have no intelligence functions outside of the United States. But talk of it continued. At-

torney General Biddle favored it in the spring of 1945. His successor, Tom Clark, proposed a similar measure in the fall of 1945. It was some time before the question was settled and the Bureau's agents finally withdrawn from Latin America.

Invitation to Battle

Donovan's final draft of his plan for a "Permanent World-Wide Intelligence Service" went to the President on November 18, 1944. In it he stressed two requirements. Control of the system should return from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President. There should be a central authority reporting directly to the President with responsibility for setting objectives and coordinating the material necessary in planning and executing "national policy and strategy." Though they were in the midst of war, he said, before they were aware of it they would be in the "tumult of rehabilitation." An orderly system of intelligence would contribute to informed decisions. They had in the government at the time the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed.

In the draft of a directive which he inclosed, Donovan proposed that the board to "advise and assist" the director of this central intelligence service should consist of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and other members whom the President might subsequently appoint. This designation of the secretaries themselves is not to be overlooked. Donovan had no thought here of making the departmental chiefs of intelligence advisors to the director, unless of course they might happen to be named severally by the secretaries to sit in their places as deputies. We shall find later that the opponents of Donovan's plan advocated the use of the departmental chiefs of intelligence as an advisory board. We shall also find that General Donovan adhered to his idea that such a board of advice should be at the high level of the secretaries or their representatives.

The proposed executive order for the transfer of the Office of Strategic Services and the directive to accompany it, as finally drafted near the end of November 1944, contained the expected provision for national intelligence, carefully distinguishing it from the operational intelligence of the Departments. The directive laid plans for subversive operations

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abroad and for liaison with the intelligence agencies of foreign governments. It prohibited the use of any police power either at home or abroad. In addition, it called for the dissolution of all joint intelligence committees and agencies then operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments. Their functions, personnel, and facilities were to be given over to the Office of Strategic Services. In time of war or unlimited national emergency, its operations were to be coordinated with military plans and subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; theatre commanders were to have control in their areas. Under other conditions, there were to be no geographical restrictions upon the operations of the Office of Strategic Services. These last provisions were certainly not designed to win friends in the Army, the Navy, or even the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Donovan's plan looked like an invitation to ordeal by battle before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So it proved.

A memorandum from Magruder on November 22, 1944, had specifically urged that the executive order be precise and detailed. Otherwise, he said, the matter would not be "tied up"; the services would "worm out of generalities." The Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would fit into the plan, once the authority for it was obtained. It could of course remain responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for correlating and evaluating military intelligence as such, though eliminated as a body having to do with the estimates for "national policy and strategy" which the Office of Strategic Services should provide.

General Donovan was ready by November 27 for the hearing before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wrote to General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold of the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces, to Lieutenant General Embick, chairman of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Vice Admiral Horne, deputy of Admiral King as Chief of Naval Operations, to Secretary Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy of the War Department, to Secretary Forrestal and Assistant Secretary Bard of the Navy, and to Mr. James C. Dunn, the State Department's Officer of Foreign Affairs. To all of these ranking officers, heads of departments and their assistants, Donovan explained his plan for turning the OSS into a permanent central intelligence system and enclosed a copy of his final memorandum for the

President of November 18, 1944. He reiterated again and again in these letters that he did not propose to interfere with the operational intelligence services of the department nor seek any police functions for the central agency. It was to be a coordinating agency. As he closed this phase of the endeavor, General Donovan declared that it "might be well to capitalize on our errors of the past two years and put it into effect at once."

But this was not to happen. The FBI and the armed services accepted the invitation to combat vociferously and a length. Shouts of "Gestapo" echoed through the committee, and Congress into the press and back again from far corners of the world. The Department of State proceeded with its own plan, aided and encouraged by the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Justice. Another full year passed before a central intelligence service began to operate in times of peace, and then the Office of Strategic Services was no longer in existence.

Conceptual Controversy

The scene of action shifted to the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1944 as General Donovan went abroad on a tour of inspection. Members of the Joint Intelligence Staff, working committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee, for some time had been dissatisfied with the system of collecting and appraising intelligence. They were discussing issues and problems among themselves in the hope that they might discover common ground for the Army and Navy, Department of State, Foreign Economic Administration, and Office of Strategic Services. The Donovan plan disturbed their thinking; it contained a provision agreeable to none of them. This, of course, was the idea that the Director of Central Intelligence should be immediately responsible to the President and subject only to advice from the departments. In the end, the Joint Intelligence Staff had reason to thank General Donovan. His thoughts were so great a shock to departmental minds that the members of the Staff got for their own suggestions an audience they otherwise might never have received from their superiors in the Joint Intelligence Committee.

A large part of the resistance to the Donovan plan in the meetings of the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew

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out of malice toward General Donovan himself. Some remarks were kept from the record, but enough of the bitterness came through to convince any reader that Donovan's proposal would not be accepted because it was his. There was, fortunately, also a body of criticism based upon honest and constructive disapproval. There was agreement too with many of his major principles.

Two separate proposals called for brevity's sake the "services plan" and the "civilian plan" emerged from the controversy. Both were influenced by the Donovan plan but rejected his provision that the head of the central intelligence agency should report directly to the President. They seriously modified, though they did not entirely remove, his concept of individual responsibility. As so well expressed during the argument in the prolonged meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee on December 22, 1944, the issue lay between "the principle of coordination and the principle of chain of command."

The services plan placed authority jointly with the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, but did not elaborate upon their conduct as a board. The thought may simply have been that no one of them would be allowed by the others to have control; all three therefore should operate by unanimous consent. They could watch one another as each looked out for his own interests. The idea that this group should function as a whole, however, was inherent in the authority descending to the secretaries from the President. Authority is single; it is not divided when shared by several persons. The secretaries were individually responsible to the President. But he could assign tasks to them individually or collectively at his own pleasure. As indicated in the debate of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the assumption was logical that the three secretaries would function as a whole.

The real intent of the services plan seems nevertheless to have lain in the word "federal" as it was applied to the "Intelligence Directorate" designed to operate under the secretaries. This Directorate was to have a civilian head from the Department of State and deputies from the War and Navy Departments. It should have powers of inspection, coordination, and planning. It should have no administrative or operating functions; apparently these were to remain with the

respective departments. A "single national intelligence service," according to this plan, was "undesirable."

Separate from the Directorate, however, there would be a joint intelligence service to conduct operations of "common concern" to the three departments and, it may be supposed, any other agency or department which had interests involved from time to time. Stress upon matters of common concern in this manner accentuated the desire to keep other interests of the departments distinctly their own concern.

Those who favored this plan, mostly representatives of the armed services, wished to have the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to provide intelligence estimates, or synthesis of departmental intelligence, on a "strategic level." From their point of view, the fact that the Department of State, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Office of Strategic Services all had representation in the Joint Intelligence Committee made it possible and fairly easy to develop the committee into a national estimating board.

The "civilian plan" accepted Donovan's principles and methods for the most part. The proposed central intelligence agency for coordination and secret collection should operate with an independent budget. All departments, though maintaining their own operational intelligence, should make available to the central agency whatever materials the director might request. The central agency should have no police functions. In time of war it should come directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But the advocates of this plan did not make the director immediately responsible to the President. Though appointed by the President, he would be subject to the "direction and control" of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy sitting as a board of authority. In time of war a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also be a member of this board. A further exception to Donovan's plan appeared in the statement that the collection of intelligence, except by clandestine methods, should be the function of the existing agencies and not of the central service. Nor would the civilian plan allow the agency to engage in subversive operations abroad; these were not considered an appropriate function of the proposed intelligence service. We should note also that the civilian

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plan did not give to the central agency the power of inspection which the services plan had provided for its Directorate.

Before he went abroad on December 26, General Donovan sent to President Roosevelt a memorandum upon these two proposals from the Joint Intelligence Staff. The plan of the military members, he said, evaded early action. Worse than that, it approached the problem of national intelligence from the departmental point of view, providing a minimum of centralization. He was surprised at the lack of understanding among responsible officers in the field of intelligence. They did not seem to comprehend, he said, the importance of a central service in which military and civilian experts would work together to synthesize all available information and to make estimates before the event of political or military developments. The plan of the civilians was another matter. It closely followed his own ideas. Its end in view was a complete system for producing estimates which should aid in the construction of national policy.

Donovan reported to the President that he had appeared at its request before the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff on political matters. He had done so with apparent willingness to entertain the idea in the plan of the civilians that there should be a board between the President and the director of the proposed central intelligence service. But there is no mistaking that he was unwilling at that time to make such a concession unless it were clearly understood that the director would be free to administer the affairs of the agency. He might be a general manager, with the secretaries over him as a board of directors. Put in colloquial language perhaps more accurately conveying the thought, this meant that the general manager might be hired and fired by the secretaries, but so long as he was in charge he was not to be bossed by them. Donovan was determined to get an agency in which there would be real centralization and coordination of the intelligence services under a single administrator ultimately responsible to the President.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported in January along much the same line which Donovan had given to the President, but conveying the impression that he had been more willing to concede to the "advice and control" of the sec-

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retaries as proposed in the plan of the civilians. The Committee spoke of a diagram subsequently furnished by Donovan's office to comprehend the possibility of an "Intelligence Directing Board" over the Director.

The difference in interpretation did not lay General Donovan's statement open to question. It put different emphasis upon the possibilities of the future. The position which he took now anticipated the practical situation of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Council. Although by the 1947 Act of Congress the Council had authority over the Director and the Agency, the Director had frequent access to the President. His responsibility to the President in actual working conditions was often immediate and direct. President Truman used the Agency as his personal information service.

Convergence and Crash

Pressure from above seems to have come upon the representatives of the armed services in the Joint Intelligence Committee. The long meeting of December 22, 1944, had ended in agreement that the Joint Intelligence Staff should go over the plans and perfect them. No hope was expressed that they ever could be consolidated into one. The idea appears nevertheless to have lurked in the atmosphere; and when the representative of the Army suggested that his subordinate on the Joint Intelligence Staff should help the authors of the "civilian plan" to perfect their inadequate proposals, results came fast.

Within a week there was a single plan which had the merits of General Donovan's original concepts coupled with specific provision that the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy with the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (Admiral Leahy) should constitute a National Intelligence Authority. Later the fourth member was changed to be simply a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unmistakably intended to function as a whole, the National Intelligence Authority would be charged with responsibility for all federal intelligence activities related to the national security. Under it there was to be established a Central Intelligence Agency headed by a Director who should be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Authority.

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As a body of advisers to the Director, there was to be set up a board consisting of the heads of the intelligence services of the Army, Navy, Department of State, and other agencies concerned with the national security. This advisory board would be subordinated to the National Intelligence Authority by the directive which established it. Its members, of course, were severally responsible to their secretaries. There was no indication in the plan that the advisory board was to dictate to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was to be only a means for conveying advice from the intelligence officers of the departments.

Thus the members of the Joint Intelligence Staff, with a good deal of independent thinking and inspiration as well as external pressure, arrived at the principles for a national system of intelligence which took account of conflicting interests and yet centralized controls under an authority receiving its power from the Chief Executive of the United States.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 18, 1945, that the plan of the Joint Intelligence Staff, now the proposal of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was superior to General Donovan's plan. His would "overcentralize" the intelligence service. It would subject the departmental intelligence agencies to central control without making that control responsible either to the head of a single department or to the heads of all of the departments as a body. The plan of the Joint Intelligence Committee, on the other hand, would hold the Central Intelligence Agency within bounds set by the secretaries in the National Intelligence Authority.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee accepted the provision in the new plan that the Central Intelligence Agency should have the power to inspect the operations of the departmental intelligence agencies in connection with its planning function. But to make certain that the use of this power should not jeopardize military operations the JSSC amended the plan so that the Authority and the Agency under it should be responsible for protecting "intelligence sources and methods" which had direct and important bearing upon "military operations." Military men evidently did not at that time object to inspection if it were accompanied by a duty to protect military operations. Restriction came later upon the

right of inspection. In addition, it was separated from the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to guard sources and methods of intelligence from unauthorized exposure.

Essential features of the Central Intelligence Agency were clearly in view during the month of January 1945 before the conference at Yalta, the surrender of Germany, and the collapse of Japan. The national system of intelligence, however, was not to come into operation in time of war, when a people is more easily governed, it is said, than in time of peace. Donovan's plan was released to the public by someone who has yet to confess. Circumstantial evidence narrowed suspicion to two or three who might have violated the secrecy of the documents. Motive for doing so could easily be found in hatred. Donovan and his Office of Strategic Services had bitter enemies. But no useful purpose is served in speculations here.

On February 9, 1945, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Washington Times Herald* simultaneously produced Donovan's memorandum to the President and proposal. There were headlines and editorials on a "super-spy system," "bigger and better spying," and "police state." There were interviews with Congressmen who obliged with accusations of "super-Gestapo" and the like. Then the plan of the Joint Intelligence Committee got into the same newspapers. This rather successfully destroyed the insinuations that Donovan and Roosevelt were establishing a personal regime. But the exposure seemed to dismay the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or possibly they were glad of an excuse to set the whole question aside.

Reports from the Yalta Conference sent "super-spy" off the front pages immediately. The American public was much more interested in news of the troops driving into Germany. Had the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to settle the issue at that time, they might have completed their study in secret session without much attention from the public and put aside the resulting plan for establishment later. Instead, they recalled their papers on Donovan's proposal and the plan of the Joint Intelligence Committee. They made some effort to discover who had released the papers. Donovan persisted in trying to find out, and he continued to urge acceptance of his plan for a central intelligence system. Others who seemed really to care were few.

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Revival and Relapse

On April 5, shortly before his death, President Roosevelt sent a brief note asking Donovan to call together the chiefs of intelligence and security units in the various executive agencies so that a consensus might be obtained regarding a central intelligence service. It must have seemed like going back to the beginning and starting again, but General Donovan was nothing if not persistent. He sent letters the very next day to the secretaries and heads of agencies as suggested, with a statement of his principles, a copy of the President's note, and another copy of his memorandum for the President of November 18, 1944.

To judge from the replies, these familiar proposals were a new idea to some of the officials who received them. The objectives were not "sufficiently clear" to permit the Secretary of the Treasury on April 12 to express a "firm opinion"; but Henry Morgenthau was certain that the burdens upon the President were already too heavy for him to be directly responsible for the proposed central intelligence agency. Roosevelt died that day. Postmaster General Walker advised Donovan that "it must be clear that any government intelligence service outside the Post Office Department must operate through the Post Office Department and recognize the absolute jurisdiction of this Department." This must have been a new notion to General Donovan.

Secretary Wickard was content with the existing arrangements between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of State. He saw no reason for a separate office to coordinate intelligence on foreign conditions and developments. Additional coordination of such intelligence he believed could be and in fact was being secured through the Bureau of the Budget. Another original view: Donovan had received much from the Bureau of the Budget on financial matters, plans, programs, but nothing worth the name of foreign intelligence.

Attorney General Biddle replied with terse comment reflecting the interests of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was satisfied with existing arrangements for the exchange of intelligence among the Bureau, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Service of the Army. He did not wish any change in the "middle of the war," nor did he believe that Congress would grant an appropriation for such a

purpose. The intelligence service "should be organized quietly and not in the manner suggested." He favored the idea of a policy committee consisting of representatives from the agencies chiefly concerned—State, War, Navy, Justice, and the Office of Strategic Services. The Attorney General's reply could have left no doubt where he stood. It may have recalled Carter's proposal to President Roosevelt in the preceding fall, the one General Donovan had placed in the "horse and buggy stage."

Secretary Ickes replied that the central intelligence service would be a handicap to his Department of the Interior if it were to foreclose in any manner the ability of the Department's bureaus to secure intelligence from any source, domestic or foreign, which concerned matters under his jurisdiction. To Ickes, General Donovan replied that he need have no concern: one of the principle objectives of the agency would be to coordinate intelligence for the very purpose of facilitating and increasing the flow of material to the departments.

For the Department of Labor, Secretary Perkins replied that she could not support the proposal to create an "Intelligence Officer reporting directly to the President." She favored keeping the State Department above any other agency in coordinating foreign intelligence except the "narrowly defined military subjects." She favored improved arrangements among the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, so that there would be no gaps and no need for coordination by some officer reporting directly to the President.

The reply of Stimson, Secretary of War, on May 1, 1945, was the most significant. General Donovan's plan had received careful consideration in the War Department. It was in entire agreement with his objective. It differed with regard to methods. From Stimson's point of view, responsibility should not be separated from the authority to discharge that responsibility. Security against foreign aggression was the primary concern of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Secretary of the Navy. All responsibility, therefore, should remain with them. Donovan's intelligence service, moreover, would subject the operations of departmental intelligence to control outside the respective departments. This was not advisable. Secretary Stimson agreed that coordination must be attained, but he did not think that "the coordinating authority should engage in operations." The inevitable tendency,

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he declared, would be to expand its operating functions at the expense of the agencies which had the responsibilities for operations in intelligence.

Secretary Stimson's position was clear. The methods of coordination and what combined operations were necessary should be determined by the heads of the departments controlling the operating agencies. This coordination was one of the matters to be considered in the general problem of a single Department of Defense. In short, Secretary Stimson did not wish an independent agency with a separate budget. In any event, he said, the Departments of State, War, Justice, and the Navy had examined together the proposed central intelligence service; they were in substantial agreement that it should not be considered before the end of hostilities against Germany and Japan. This statement gave further evidence that the armed services had been more pleased than dismayed in February when the Donovan plan got into the news.

General Magruder advised Donovan that the letter from Stimson left two courses of action. Either he could try to develop political pressures upon President Truman that were stronger than the influence of the four Departments, or he might compromise his cherished idea of independence from them in order to obtain immediate action. Magruder knew that he was recommending to Donovan a pet abomination in suggesting compromise, but he felt that it would win over many high-ranking officials in the Army, Navy, and the Department of State. It would eliminate the Federal Bureau of Investigation from consideration. It would make the situation less difficult for the President. If it won his support, "he could restore large powers to the director" later in executive orders.

General Donovan, however, would keep trying. He had found some encouragement in the interest of the State Department after the latest version of the so-called compromise plan had come from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had been pleased, too, that Admiral Horne had requested a copy of the Joint Intelligence Committee's final paper, presumably for study and report to Admiral King. Donovan had cabled from London that he would like to have his deputies at home pursue these opportunities. They should keep in mind as they discussed the matter that so far as he was concerned the ultimate interests

of the country required that the responsibility should be vested in the President and not "diffused through intermediate echelons."

Donovan replied to Secretary Stimson on May 16. The secretaries were to provide for security against aggression. It was their primary concern. But that did not give them the right, said Donovan, to exercise exclusive control over the proposed central intelligence agency. That was the responsibility of the President, who was Commander in Chief in peace as well as in war; the "authority of decision" resided in him. Policy was necessarily dependent upon intelligence. To make that decision, the President was entitled to an intelligence service free from domination by one or any group of the departments. Secretary Stimson's reply, however, had been made on behalf of the Administration. Nothing further was to be done after General Eisenhower took the surrender of the Germans on May 7 until plans had been carried out for the overwhelming defeat of Japan. The atomic bomb was tested at Alamogordo on July 16.

Liquidation for OSS

After the surrender of Germany the House Appropriations Committee inquired whether General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz wished to use the Office of Strategic Services in the Pacific war. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without personal comment, Admiral Leahy replied on May 25 and 27, 1945, by quoting from messages of Admiral Nimitz and Generals MacArthur, Sultan, and Wedemeyer in the Far East and also from Generals McNarney and Eisenhower concerning Europe.

General Sultan, in the India-Burma Theater, said that OSS had furnished most effective assistance but was no longer needed. Its present functions would be "more economically and efficiently" accomplished within the War and Navy Departments "through normal command channels." Admiral Nimitz answered that use of OSS in the Pacific had been very limited. In his "considered opinion," better results could be obtained if its tasks were "reassigned to the War and Navy Departments."

General MacArthur's view on the matter was as definite, and characteristic: "No statement," he said, "has emanated from this headquarters nor so far as known from this area in comment on OSS. Any items that may have appeared in the

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press along this line must be regarded as speculative conjecture. The OSS has not up to the present time operated within this area, I know little of its methods, have no control of its agencies, and consequently have no plans for its future employment." Donovan considered this a "very fair statement" from MacArthur's own point of view.

General Eisenhower wrote that the future of OSS in the European Theater would be subject to certain contingencies. It would be confined of course to the functions of an intelligence-gathering and counterespionage organization. Complete control of its activities by each theater commander would be essential to efficient and smooth operations. But its value in the European Theater would "continue to be very high."

General McNarney reported that OSS had done an "outstanding job" in Italy. So long as conditions there, in Austria, and in the Balkans remained unstable, it was essential to continue its secret intelligence work in that theater. Its staff in the Mediterranean area could be reduced, but he specifically recommended that trained OSS personnel be re-deployed to the Pacific.

General Wedemeyer declared that OSS's potential value in the China Theater was high. It was training twenty commando groups and intelligence teams there. These and others already trained were to be charged with "responsible missions in direct support of contemplated future plans." According to Donovan's memory, they might have accomplished much to appraise the situation in Manchuria before the atomic bomb was used in Japan.

The opinions of such commanders as Nimitz and MacArthur, however, were likely to have more influence in this country than Wedemeyer's plans for the China Theater. After the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was little point to arguing the need for OSS activity in China. If the mood of the American people prevailed, there was going to be no theater of war in China.

It may be harder to govern in time of peace than in time of war. It is more difficult still to control a people turning from war to peace. Public relaxation in America with the news from Tokyo Bay took on the aspects of an orgy; the treatment of gasoline rationing that summer's evening, August 14, 1945, was but one response of a people cherishing the belief that government draws its just powers from the con-

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sent of the governed. More ominous was the rush to disband America's forces. The fleet went into mothballs for a possibility which later became fact in Korean waters. But there were too many instances where demobilization meant disintegration. Personnel disappeared beyond recall. The ruin of much valuable organization was complete.

The Bureau of the Budget, obliged by the nature of its office to peer into the costs of future events, quickly sensed the change in the American mood following Japan's surrender. Replacing the notice which he had sent on July 17 in regard to expenditures for war, Director Smith of the Bureau advised General Donovan on August 25, 1945, that the "overriding consideration" now in estimating budgets for 1947 would be to retain full employment and to resume the social and economic progress which had been interrupted by the war. To this end, there would be no expansion of present "peace-time activities" unless it were to contribute to the "reconversion process and the expansion of industry and trade."

The Office of Strategic Services was a wartime enterprise with no "peacetime activities" established in the past. In short, although Mr. Smith did not say so, it looked as though General Donovan were going to have a very hard time maintaining his independent agency, whatever happened to its indispensable functions. The Bureau of the Budget itself had been studying for months the problems of an intelligence system and had a plan of its own to propose.

Donovan strove to keep his organization intact. He wrote on September 4 to Samuel Rosenman in the White House that it was absurd to allocate different segments of its function to different departments. The Office of Strategic Services had been established "as an entity, every function supporting and supplementing the other." It was time "to grow up" and realize that the new responsibilities of the American people required "an adequate intelligence system."

The expectation of the American people, however, was clearly that expenditure for war would be stopped with the fighting, and the "boys brought home." Apparently the mood of the Negro spiritual was rather general that there would be "no war, no more." There would be no place now in American policy for sabotage, psychological warfare, and guerrilla tactics. Whatever services were necessary in peacetime for the collection of information and the coordination of in-

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telligence might be had within the established Departments of State, War, and the Navy, as so many of the Cabinet officers had written to Donovan in the spring. The Office of Strategic Services should be closed.

Responsible observers took stock as the OSS went out of existence. For the first time in the history of the United States, there had been established an organized network of espionage and counterespionage operating in Europe, North Africa, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East. American scholars had been mobilized to supplement current information with comprehensive surveys and to blend them into intelligence reports for the policymakers of the Government. OSS had demonstrated the usefulness of a central body to process materials from every source of information. Its experiences indicated that a single authority ought to have charge of collecting secret information outside of the United States. Cooperation with the agencies of other governments left much still to be desired, but the value of the endeavor had been shown. The Office of Strategic Services had closely associated secret intelligence with covert operations, economic intrusion, and other subversive practices. The latter perhaps could have been kept separate and administered in a "Department of Dirty Tricks." The immovable fact was that the two were complementary. Each seemed to work better when associated with the other. But the problem of their articulation was not yet solved.

President Truman praised General Donovan on September 20, 1945, for exceptional leadership in a wartime activity. More than this, he could say that General Donovan retired to private life with the reward of knowing that the intelligence services of the government for times of peace were being erected upon the foundations which he had laid in the Office of Strategic Services. It went out of existence as a wartime expedient commended for many accomplishments. It was entitled to the greater praise of close study by those who had charge of creating and administering the organization which succeeded it.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

Europe Long Ago

SECRET DIPLOMACY, ESPIONAGE AND CRYPTOGRAPHY, 1500-1815. By *James Westfall Thompson* and *Saul K. Padover*. (New York: Frederick Ungar. 1963. 290 pp. \$6.50.)

Reprinted from 1937, a formidable title over feeble text. Can hardly be recommended except for its bibliography: it meticulously cites sources both primary and secondary. There are 18 pages of illustrations; an appendix of 10 pages reviews in an antiquarian spirit early developments in cryptography.

The text runs through European history from 1500 to 1815 giving hurried and often confused anecdotes of sensational incidents—an old professor of history scandalizing himself with stories our age takes with calm. He underlines the ironies, deploras the wickedness:

The age which was dominated by Voltaire in literature produced a number of diplomats and statesmen who were the apogee of Machiavellism. International law was a mockery and public ethics practically non-existent. Statesmen were systematically bought, diplomats regularly bribed, and letters intercepted and copied . . .

In spite of the tedium engendered by the author's small-town view of history, most readers with intelligence experience will discover something here they would like to know more about. The notes show where to find out more.

H. H. Cooper

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Recent Books: Irregular War

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Irregular Warfare

WARFARE IN THE ENEMY'S REAR. By *Otto Heilbrunn*.
New York: Praeger. 1963. 231 pp. \$6.50.)

With this his third major work in English on unconventional or irregular warfare,¹ Dr. Heilbrunn reinforces his position as the foremost analyst in the field. It is a product of painstaking research on the origins, structures, missions, tactics, and battle records of irregular or special-purpose forces that have operated during declared international wars. While not neglecting earlier irregular units it centers on the plethora of special forces formed by the main belligerents in World War II. Counting only the larger ones like Merrill's Marauders, Popski's Private Army, and Skorzeny's SS Special Formation, and omitting the independent guerrilla formations in eastern and western Europe, these ran to the astonishing number of nineteen. The book thus offers us a systematic comparative examination of different types of operations conducted in different degrees of depth behind the enemy's front by different kinds of irregular forces.

It also offers an answer to a question debated periodically by a number of World War II commanders when they recall (with mixed emotions) the diversity of special-purpose units ("private armies") and the frequent difficulty of coordinating their operations with the main battle plan: when do unusual or special operations require special forces and when can they be carried out by orthodox line units with a little variation in their composition and training? Noting that Britain alone had more than twelve special-purpose units in the last war, Heilbrunn argues for a sharp reduction by means of amalgamating some specialized functions and returning others to the conventional forces: "Too many special units are undesirable because they can't easily be controlled, and uneconomic because they can't easily be employed if they become too specialized."

The author concludes that "World War II has made the importance of the rear war evident; it has shown what special

¹The others were *Communist Guerrilla Warfare* (with Brigadier C. A. Dixon as co-author) and *Partisan Warfare*.

forces and guerrillas, the air force, paratroops, and air landing troops can do." He argues that special operations behind the fronts, now that improved techniques of radio communication and air resupply make for better coordination and efficiency, are likely to become a permanent feature of modern warfare. Even under nuclear conditions there is scope for special operations; formations in the enemy rear, he points out, will be comparatively safe from nuclear attack, and they will find even more targets because troops and installations will be more widely dispersed. Elsewhere he shows the continuing need for OSS-type agent operations in advance of and in conjunction with the commitment of army special forces in enemy-occupied territory.

In analyzing the role the ubiquitous Soviet partisans played in the German rear, Heilbrunn remarks that "the most startling innovation was their systematic use for army intelligence and reconnaissance." In the beginning the partisans sent this intelligence across by messengers, carrier pigeons, and dogs, but by 1943 army intelligence officers had been assigned to partisan staffs, and instructions and reports were transmitted by radio. In the same year the French underground began to be charged with intelligence tasks. "The value of partisan intelligence was frequently very high."

Most of one chapter is devoted to OSS and British SOE activities in cooperation with partisans. Functioning in great part as support and supply mechanisms, these two agencies provided arms, radios, supplies, training in leadership and tradecraft, and military missions. That both agencies regarded their activities as those of a special force is apparent in their designation of field elements as either "Special Force HQ" or "Special Force Detachment." Both had similar aims—to encourage and help people in enemy-held territory form secret forces for economic and military sabotage, harassment, armed raids, and intelligence collection.

Heilbrunn contrasts the use of guerrillas in Burma with that in Europe. In Burma OSS and various British elements together brought into action against the Japanese army some 16,000 guerrillas, who, although command control and communications were tenuous, also collected some valuable intelligence. It is virtually certain that if the Anglo-Americans had not organized, trained, deployed, and supplied these irregulars the Japanese would have faced no local guerrilla action. In

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Europe, on the other hand, where command relations and communications were tidier, the partisans sprang up independently and OSS and SOE were never able to establish control over them. The European resistance was supplied, enabled to build strength, and sometimes influenced, but almost never commanded.

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: ALGERIA 1954-1962. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO. 1963. 151 pp. Not for sale.)

This is the third study of an excellent scholarly series being done by the Army-sponsored Special Operations Research Office at American University. It portrays and analyzes the character and dynamics of the French-Algerian agony of 1954-62. After detailing the historical background of the Algerian dissidence it goes on to describe the organization, strategy, and techniques of the revolutionary movement. Although it does not have the study of French policy as part of its central theme, it does describe French strategy and tactics and the distracting political imbroglios, including the intrusion of French army elements.

The book shows amply that the economic plight of the multiplying masses and the political frustrations of the intellectuals lay at the base of the revolution, that the *immobilisme* of French policy, stemming from the paralysis of weak metropolitan governments by the reactionary right wing at home and the colonists in Algeria, precipitated violent action, and that the rise of Nassirism, the debacle in Indochina, and the independence of numerous former colonies (importantly including Tunisia and Morocco) contributed to the revolutionary process. This reviewer would add, as another appreciable contributory factor, racial and communal antipathies.

The analysis of the early period of the revolt points by implication to a grossly inaccurate French intelligence appraisal which led to a critically inappropriate reaction. In the first place the revolt caught the French by surprise; in the second, they had not measured correctly the discontent of either the masses or the elite; in the third, they misread the character of the rebellion. In short, they did not see a *revolution* coming.

The FLN launched hostilities in November 1954, under the leadership of the younger political nationalists, with a force of no more than two to three thousand. Included, however, were veterans of the European and Indochinese wars, and from the outset their operations showed sophistication in unconventional warfare. From an inaccessible mountain base the main force raided small military outposts and police stations to obtain weapons, while militants from underground cells carried out acts of terror and sabotage in urban centers.

The French reacted as to the outbreak of a classical tribal revolt. Bombing, strafing, and sweep operations were launched against areas in which rebel activity had taken place, but they achieved no useful results. Even pro-French clans and tribes were disarmed. Lack of discrimination by the French forces and mistreatment of passive civilians made FLN recruitment an easier task and silenced anti-FLN Moslem leaders. The mass support base, dangerously small for the militant rebels in the beginning, thus grew apace as the French counter-guerrilla and counterterror operations alienated the people. Moreover, the French had been caught with a NATO-type military force having the wrong equipment and training for unconventional warfare, a deficiency not made good for more than eighteen months.

By the end of 1957 the French army had developed a panoply of counterinsurgency activities—to be carried out by "Specialized Administrative Sections"—comprising civic action, "nation-building," and self-defense programs. But by this time the revolutionary movement had established a redoubtable mountain base, supply mechanisms in Tunisia and Morocco to handle massive quantities of material from abroad, an army able to engage the French at battalion level, the support of the vast majority of Algerians, and information offices in the major world capitals. Between 1958 and the cease-fire in 1962 the French were able to achieve at best a military stalemate.

Writings on counterinsurgency operations abound with statements of the need to win the people and with advice on how to do it through civic action, nation-building, hygiene-improving, we-help-you-to-help-yourself projects. Students of this aspect of counterinsurgency will want to dig into the experience in Algeria to examine and judge the French measures. It will unfortunately be difficult to assess their effec-

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tiveness: the picture is muddied by cross-currents from the coup attempt of army elements, the return of De Gaulle, and his decision in late 1960 to suspend the programs in Algeria while switching to a policy of disengagement. The SORO study does not attempt to analyze the French psycho-economic-civic program. It merely states in one place that "French efforts to win the population over . . . came too late to be really effective," and in another that "civic action programs in the rural areas . . . were successful but too late." Just what the program comprised and what its impact was remain to be studied.

At least one authority known to this reviewer is convinced that the French mistake was in their timing. They launched their civic program and announced politically appetizing goals only after failing to make progress in the war. Their actions and proclamations thus bore the stamp of reluctant concessions. What is more, according to this authority, the record of broken French political promises to the Algerians goes back at least to the Blum government. It is likely, therefore, that the latest assurances may have been regarded as counterfeit. Finally, perhaps the French had not demonstrated the essential condition for civilian cooperation: the clear ability to protect cooperators from the wrath of the insurgents.

On the other hand, another expert holds that by late 1960 the French were very close to the last stage of counterinsurgency—mopping up the hard-core remnants. By then the rebel force inside Algeria had been reduced to eight or nine thousand and broken up into small, not very effective units suffering from a critical ammunition shortage. The borders had been sealed against supplies and reinforcements from outside. The population was being returned increasingly to French control. In short, the complex military-police-civic action program for counterinsurgency—called *quadrillage*—was working.

Thus the question of French effectiveness and prospects at the time De Gaulle switched policies is controversial. In any case, international opinion had by 1960 clearly tilted in favor of independence for Algeria.

The rebels' intelligence-gathering system seems to have been simple and effective. In the countryside they maintained a large number of civilian auxiliaries with a dual mis-

sion, intelligence and quasi-military. These "infiltrated French-held villages, prowled ahead of regular rebel columns, and provided a steady stream of fresh information." They were apparently well trained in observation and reporting, and they were given specific requirements. They normally reported to the intelligence officer of the regular unit operating in their area, usually by courier. This unit would in turn transmit the intelligence laterally and up to rebel army headquarters by courier or radio.

In the urban centers the rebel leaders' agents were instructed "to report on the daily activities of the French police and armed forces." A large number of double agents were used, with the mission of obtaining information on French administrative measures, troop movements, and materiel, and this information was transmitted to higher headquarters.

With respect to the French forces, the study contains brief illuminating passages on their operations but nothing on their intelligence mechanisms.

COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE. By *David Galula*. New York: Praeger. 1964. 143 pp. \$4.50.)

Drawing upon a rich military experience in West Europe, Greece, the Far East, and Algeria and upon an incisive analytic talent, Galula has set forth a theoretical doctrine for counterinsurgency operations which shines with logic and simplicity. *Counterinsurgency Warfare* is surely the most penetrating, most illuminating, and most constructive of all the works in English on the theory and practice of combatting revolutionary insurgency.

The author, a former French citizen and officer schooled at St. Cyr, opens with an examination of the nature and general characteristics of revolutionary war. He proceeds to develop a statement of the prerequisites for successful insurgency from which early-warning specialists might do well to compile a list of indicators. He then analyzes the growth patterns, the environment, and the characteristics of the developing revolution.

Turning to the problem of defeating the insurgent, Galula sets forth and proves four "laws," or principles, by which the counterinsurgent authority should be guided. From these principles he advances a series of deductions which form the

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general strategy of counterinsurgency, and then eight tactical steps or procedures emerge. These steps or operations, spelled out in convincing detail, provide for the orderly and systematic concentration and intensive employment of all the assets available to the government—the state's administrative apparatus, economic resources, information and propaganda machinery, and military superiority in unit strength and equipment. The design is to take and hold the initiative, and the mood is relentlessly offensive. There is a brief demonstration of the essentiality of good intelligence, and the need for professional skills in procuring intelligence is emphasized.

Conventional warfare has been thoroughly analyzed and war-gamed over the centuries. Counterinsurgency warfare is only beginning to be analyzed, and fogs of uncertainty and confusion still drift across some current approaches and practices aimed at beating the insurgent. In advancing an apparently sound, coherent doctrine for counterinsurgency, simple in concept and almost mathematically logical, Galula may be taking us a long way toward the goal of a practical, effective framework for mounting such operations in the future.

This book should be highly regarded in our counterinsurgency schools and courses. It should be read by all who have even a role behind a role—be it intelligence, operational, or administrative—in the counterinsurgency field.

MODERN WARFARE. By Roger Trinquier. Translated from the French *La Guerre Moderne* (Paris, 1961). (New York: Praeger, 1964. 115 pp. \$3.95.)

Colonel Trinquier opens and closes his book with a rap at the traditionalist mold of the French Army, which he blames for the loss of Indochina and Algeria. In between he analyzes and discusses his "modern warfare" as "an interlocking system of actions" of military, political, psychological, and economic nature—i.e., insurgency and counterinsurgency. Paratrooper and hard-nosed veteran of some of the grimmest actions in Indochina and Algeria, he spells out a general strategy and tactics for counterinsurgency which are enough like Colonel Galula's, as described above, to suggest the coalescence of a French "school" on this subject.

Both soldier-authors focus on the people—"The stake in modern warfare is control of the people. . . The modern battle-

field is limitless; the inhabitant is the center of the conflict." Anti-guerrilla sweeps and pursuits by themselves do no good; even the occasional spectacular success in battle is worthless because the enemy quickly replaces his losses from the population he controls. Both writers return time after time to the axiom that the support of the people is the "*sine qua non* of victory." Both show the need for good intelligence personnel, putting heavy stress on police special-branch-type operations against the insurgents' political apparatus. Trinquier in particular gives considerable space to the application of the craft of intelligence to counterinsurgency operations.

Both propose procedures and techniques obviously developed from the *quadrillage* plan adopted in 1957 by the French in Algeria, which might eventually have brought victory if high policy had not changed. *Quadrillage*, in turn, appears to be a sophisticated descendent of the *tache de l'huile* strategy² by which Marshal Lyautey defeated the Moroccan rising in 1925.

Briefly, the French design comprises a series of highly coordinated, complex, and intense military, police, and civic operations, to be applied sector by sector. Military garrisons and police reinforcements move into the towns in a designated sector, controlling and restructuring the population, obtaining intelligence, and destroying the insurgents' urban political and terrorist machine. Civic action and economic assistance help win over the inhabitants, who are given help in forming self-defense units. The program spreads outward, encompassing villages and settlements, and there may be some relocation of the people. Increasingly isolated and cut off from the population which has sustained them, the guerrillas are pursued relentlessly by elite trained forces reinforced from the town garrisons and are driven to their ultimate inaccessible refuges. There they can be denied food and supplies, worn down, and eventually annihilated. Then the whole process is repeated in another sector. It is a complicated, lengthy, and unspectacular program, but it gives to the counterinsurgents the initiative and the opportunity to use to full advantage their preponderant strength and resources and their organized administrative apparatus.

² This metaphor—and the idea—has been reanimated in Vietnam; a current operational concept has been referred to as "the spreading oil stain."

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Both authors' experience with the guerrilla has been intimate, and both's knowledge is factual. But within their agreement on strategic principles they show appreciable differences in approach and emphasis. Galula insists upon the value of a civilian taking over-all leadership of the counter-insurgency campaign; Trinquier assumes that a military figure will orchestrate the operations. Trinquier downgrades the importance of civic action, information programs, and economic projects before the victory is in sight—"Be generous after victory." The main thing for him is the mounting of intense, highly professional military and police operations, the destruction of the insurgents' apparatus in the towns and villages, the restructuring of the population under local civilian leaders chosen carefully for their initiative and intelligence, and the development of self-defense units within an assuredly secure environment. Galula tends more to a balance of the two kinds of ingredients, but he agrees that "the population's attitude in the middle stages of the war is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety." He says that the fundamental criteria governing the people's stand are which side gives the best protection, which threatens the most, and which is likely to win.

Trinquier asserts that terror is the basic weapon of "modern warfare"—though he emphatically opposes "unnecessary violence"—and argues that the terrorist is no more criminal or reprehensible than the bomber pilot who kills defenseless people. Galula, while he does not discuss that point, might disagree with the Trinquier dictum that terrorism is the "most effective means" for either side to secure popular support. He proposes administrative, or bureaucratic, measures to force recalcitrants to cooperate.

Only Trinquier takes up the problem of foreign aid for the insurgents. He says that if the nation aiding them cannot be persuaded or pressured to stop, then it becomes an enemy and the war should be carried to it, but not by conventional methods. He elaborates a technique for emplacing the hard core of a revolutionary movement across its borders.

Trinquier's detailed treatment of anti-insurgent operations and intelligence techniques contrasts with Galula's summary approach. Both, however, emphasize that intelligence has to come primarily from the population and that the people won't

talk until they can be made to feel safe. Propaganda and new bridges are unlikely to budge a man when his life is at stake. As Trinquier puts it, "Fear of reprisal will always prevent [people] from communicating to us information they possess. . ."

Both stress the requirement that intelligence interrogators be skilled professionals in the business, versed in techniques and in substance. Trinquier discourses at length on this point. He also goes into detail on follow-up procedures for the arrest of personnel and roll-up of a clandestine urban organization and for the employment of stool pigeons. Both emphasize the need to protect sources, and they propose techniques for covering informers and agents from detection by the enemy. Trinquier notes too the value and the "delicacy" of inserting agents into the enemy organization.

In a grandiose and unrealistic passage, Trinquier cites the need for a "vast intelligence network," great numbers of agents trained in elementary clandestine procedures and placed in appropriate cover jobs throughout "all phases of human activity" to report on the insurgents' low echelons—the fund raisers, propagandists, provocateurs. This network, despite its extent, can be created at little expense, he says. Over this essentially passive activity he proposes to place an "intelligence-action service," an elite, highly trained corps of staff officers. These officers would be capable of a variety of missions, including the pursuit and surveillance of leads spotted by the network, their arrest and interrogation, and the doubling of suitable enemy agents. In a curious passage he remarks: "Experience has shown that, although confessions and conversions may be difficult to obtain at lower echelons, they are, at a higher level, and especially among intellectuals, usually easy and quick."

Modern Warfare may be opaque in a few places, too categorical in others, and debatable in still others. Its doctrinal concepts may at times seem to neglect some practical difficulties. But it remains a thoughtful and provocative work by a French officer of rare counterrevolutionary experience, and it deserves to be read by those who have or expect to have counterinsurgency responsibilities.

B. T. Closeterides

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
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


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Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

CRATOLOGY PAYS OFF

Thaxter L. Goodell

During the 1962 Soviet military buildup in Cuba the term cratology came into general use in the intelligence community to designate a new technique for identifying military cargoes from the appearance of their shipping crates. Although the Cuban crisis was not solely responsible for the development of the technique, if it had not made crates a prominent issue the word would probably never have been coined. This article describes how the catalog of information constituting cratology was acquired and how it paid off at a crucial moment. Its success rested on a foundation of dozens of separate reports, photographs, and other pieces of evidence, most of them individually inconsequential, which proved invaluable collectively.

Prior to 1961, reasonably complete reporting on arms deliveries to countries receiving Soviet military assistance was made possible by a variety of sources. In early 1961, however, a number of these sources dried up, and an intensive search was mounted for new methods of monitoring the movement of Soviet military equipment. Although needed for the entire Soviet military aid program, this effort was spurred by the situation even then in Cuba, where the first delivery of MIG jet fighters was imminent in the spring of 1961.

CIA officers discussed with the Office of Naval Intelligence ways to improve reporting on Soviet arms traffic and at ONI request agreed to prepare a Collection Guide on how Soviet military equipment is shipped. Tailored especially for observers in the Turkish straits and other waterways where Soviet merchant ships must pass, the guide was to lay out the broad outlines of Soviet military aid policy and then detail methods of spotting arms shipments. It could explain that almost all such shipments moved from the Black Sea on Soviet ships, point out that military and civilian cargoes were seldom mixed, and list characteristics such as light loads, false declarations, and other tip-offs betraying the Soviet arms carrier.

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Deliveries on Deck

Primarily, however, the guide was to show examples of military deck cargoes on Soviet ships and in particular the kinds of crate used for aircraft. Extensive reporting had established that all Soviet military aircraft are delivered as deck cargo, which alert observers can easily report on if they know what to look for. MIG crates, for example, had frequently been reported as looking like railroad cars.

A search was therefore begun for photographs of crates in order to include them in the guide. The files of the Graphics Register were combed for pictures of crated deck cargoes. Offices throughout Washington were asked to dredge up examples of crates. Aircraft production specialists and merchant shipping experts were consulted on how aircraft are shipped. Most importantly, hundreds of photos of Soviet ships passing through the Turkish straits were scanned for deck cargoes. U.S. Navy personnel in Istanbul had been taking these photos for years although there were relatively few consumers for them in the intelligence community.

Quantities of photographs poured in as the search went on. Most of them were discarded as inadequate in showing deck cargo, and in many that had good pictures of crates these could not be identified; but by collating the photos with other intelligence it became clear that different kinds of Soviet aircraft were invariably shipped in distinctive crates on deck. Aside from the Cuba problem, air order-of-battle intelligence for such countries as the UAR and Indonesia had become increasingly important as Soviet military aid deliveries had mushroomed, and crate counting seemed a reasonable way to make up for a lack of other delivery information.

At this time the most clearly identifiable crate was that for the MIG-19 fighter, which had just begun to be shipped abroad. In 1961 a Royal Air Force reconnaissance mission photographed a ship in the Red Sea which had on deck 16 crates of a type never seen before. Subsequent clandestine reporting had that ship delivering 16 MIG-19s to Iraq. Four shorter crates aboard the same ship—later identified as for MIG-15s—remained a puzzle for some time during this infancy of cratology. Nevertheless, the incident was a milestone in the development of the new technique.

The incident also illustrates well the difficulty at that time of getting good reporting on Soviet military shipments. Earlier photographs than those the British took in the Red Sea and passed to the U.S. analysts had been taken when this ship sailed past Istanbul, but

these had been lost in the shuffle and did not become available in Washington for many weeks; and the interim reporting described the MIG-19 containers as large vans. Then later, as the ship proceeded up the Shattalarab toward Basra, it was photographed again, but the Washington analysts concerned were not even aware that this was being done. Thanks largely to efforts of personnel in the Graphics Register, these photos were obtained for use in the guide; they were the best shots then available of crated aircraft and the most useful material collected for the guide. By the time the guide was published, however, the Soviets had unfortunately all but stopped shipping MIG-19s.

Even after it was clearly established that these crates were used for MIG-19 fighters, there were few in mid-1961 who would accept the evidence. When in June of that year a ship en route to Cuba was seen with a dozen of them on deck, it proved nearly impossible to report the shipment in a coordinated publication before it was confirmed—much later—by high-altitude photography. The failure to observe the first deliveries of MIG-15s to Cuba the month before, in May, was not due to any extraordinary Soviet security measures but to the fact that U.S. intelligence did not photograph ships en route to Cuba and did not yet accept cratology as an analytical technique.

Step Toward Respectability

In the summer of 1961 the Collection Guide finally took shape. It described the reporting needed to follow Soviet maritime arms traffic, and it included all photographs possible of identifiable deck cargoes. It correctly identified the crates for MIG-15 and MIG-19 jet fighters, MI-4 helicopters, and IL-28 bombers. Although it was a relatively primitive effort, the putting it together had been good exercise in the use of intelligence from all sources. The MIG-19 identification depended on the cited RAF reconnaissance mission in combination with clandestine reports from Iraq and the UAR and an East European defector's sketch of the crate. Identifying the MIG-15 crate was partly guesswork, but a clandestine report from Indonesia giving its dimensions narrowed the choice; confirmation was achieved much later by putting together clandestine reports and ship photography. MI-4 helicopter crates were identified chiefly through the report of a U.S. air attaché in Morocco: it described the one used for an MI-4 shipped to a Soviet trade fair in such detail that photo-

graphs of similar crates taken in the Shattalarab were recognized and could be included in the guide.

The most important crate identification in the guide, that for IL-28 bomber fuselages, had also been made through a combination of information from different sources. The clandestinely procured report of an Indonesian arms mission which visited the USSR and Eastern Europe in the late 1950s contained accurate dimensions for these crates. Photographs of Soviet ships taken at Istanbul over a period of several years showed many long crates fitting the specifications of the Indonesian report. A check into the particular voyages of these ships showed they had all gone to countries holding IL-28 bombers. The conclusion that these were indeed IL-28 crates was virtually inescapable.

When the Collection Guide was first published in 1961 its authors were generally skeptical about how much interest or effort it would arouse. To their surprise, it stimulated considerable interest in reporting on arms shipments, including photography and reports on crates and the contents of crates. Observers especially in Istanbul but also in the UAR, Indonesia, and other countries where Soviet arms aid is prominent began to increase their reporting on crates. This enhanced awareness of crates as a source of information on Soviet military aid led gradually to the solution of additional identification problems. At the same time the acquisition of most of the major documents concerning Soviet-Indonesian arms deals provided a gold mine of detailed data on Soviet military aid practices, frequently including information useful in solving crate puzzles. Similar information obtained later in Iraq also contributed substantially to the development of cratology.

Expanding Scope

An officer from the U.S. naval attaché's office in Djakarta turned in a perfect performance in using the guide to identify a group of crates on the docks in Indonesia. As instructed in the guide, he paced off the dimensions of the crates, he photographed them, he noted their markings, and he wrote a report describing them. Moreover, he did not hesitate to reach conclusions about them: he identified both a helicopter crate and IL-28 bomber crates. His photos of the latter turned out to be most important; they were the only close-ups of IL-28 crates available to the intelligence community.

In late 1961 another advance was made when IL-14 transport aircraft were moved by sea for the first time. Previously they had

always been flown to their destinations, but when Cuba bought them they had to be sent by ship. The Soviets placed them, wings removed, on the deck of ships designed to carry timber, usually two or three aircraft to a ship. Around each they built a large wooden structure, usually of a shape like a cello. About a dozen of these transports reached Cuba in late 1961 and early 1962, but only a few of them were photographed and these could not be specifically identified by the photo interpreters, who were not working with other intelligence sources. A few budding cratologists, however, got hold of the photos, and this bit of information was tucked away with all the rest.

In early 1962 a major step forward was taken when MIG-21 jet fighter crates were spotted in the UAR. Several months were to pass before photographs became available, but alert case officers in Egypt provided a description of the crates soon after the Soviets had begun shipping this plane abroad. In the summer of 1962 the first photographs were received, from the assistant naval attaché's office in Istanbul. Alone these would have been useless, but taken in conjunction with the earlier information from Egypt they clearly showed the shipment to consist of MIG-21s.

The Cuban Buildup

By the time the 1962 Soviet military buildup in Cuba started in July, cratology was an established technique, but its adherents were confined to a very small circle. It was not accepted in many quarters of the community, and coordinated intelligence based on crate counts was a rarity. Nonetheless, what knowledge there was of crates was incorporated into the efforts that were being made to bolster collection on Cuba. Photos of identifiable crates were included in a large Cuba collection guide, and efforts to improve the monitoring of Soviet shipping were continued. But because so many in the intelligence community were unconvinced of the usefulness of these efforts, information on the first military shipments of the buildup was most incomplete.

The first military shipments were detected as they left the Black Sea in mid-July, and steps were taken immediately to provide for photographing all ships and identifying any significant deck cargoes; joint ONI-CIA efforts at the Bosphorus had improved considerably by mid-1962. But now many of these ships unfortunately transited the straits at night or in bad weather, making photography impossible.

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Cratology

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Moreover, a sizable number of the military shipments were for the first time made from Soviet Baltic ports, where our capabilities were rather limited. And in the Atlantic there was no adequate network to cover Soviet shipping and get photographs. Thus not all of the ships carrying military cargoes were photographed during the first six weeks, and the results on those that were were seldom disseminated in time to be useful. By mid-August the system for ship photography was much improved, but it was not perfected until after the October crisis.

Meanwhile, intelligence analysis focused on the flood of clandestine and refugee reports from Cuba. By mid-August it was abundantly clear that something extraordinary was going on there, involving an exceptionally large amount of materiel and of Soviet manpower. Military construction was under way at many separate locations. By mid-August many were convinced that a missile-equipped air defense system, among other things, was being set up. The evidence included ship photography and descriptions of activities in many separate reports. Some of the reports were remarkably similar to those generated when the Soviets first shipped surface-to-air missiles to Indonesia.

High-altitude photography of 29 August gave the first confirmation of this conclusion. It also showed for the first time that six Komar guided missile boats had been delivered to Cuba. There was no immediate explanation of how these boats reached Cuba; it seemed the system for watching shipping must have broken down badly. A review of the ship photography, however, turned up a ship which appeared to be carrying a big pile of wood. A sharp-eyed expert in Soviet naval matters with a keen interest in the Komars correctly concluded that the pile of wood was in fact two Komar boats covered by a wooden housing to protect and disguise them. Eventually all six Komars were pinned down to specific ships, and subsequent Komar shipments were detected well in advance of arrival. The Komar "crate" had taken its place in the files of cratology.

The MIG-21 Story

MIG-21s were the next major crate issue in Cuba. High-altitude photography of 5 September showed one assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield and fuselage crates for a dozen or more others. At that time no photographs of ships en route to Cuba had come in showing crates like the recently identified MIG-21 containers. Was

it possible the Soviets were changing their ways and starting to carry aircraft crates below deck? Those skeptical of cratology quickly seized on this failure as reason to distrust crate counts for determining aircraft inventories.

Gradually, however, the pictures belatedly came in. Crates spotted on the decks of two ships accounted for at least 22 MIG-21s, probably a few more. These, along with some U-2 photography and ground observer reports, led to the conclusion that MIG-21 holdings in Cuba were at least in the 25-to-30 range. The publication of this conclusion in early October and the subsequent raising of the total to 35 on the basis of new ship photography touched off a lively intelligence controversy over the validity of crate counts. There was still only one MIG-21 that had actually been seen in high-altitude photography, and that nearly a month before. The backers of cratology argued that in the absence of new photographs of Cuban airfields one had to reach conclusions on the basis of whatever information was available.

Cratology received its vindication on 20 October, when aerial photography over Santa Clara showed 35 fully assembled MIG-21 fighters, as well as four other aircraft identified as probable MIG-21s. The achievement was lost in the crush of events, of course, for by now the photos of medium-range missiles had touched off the climactic East-West confrontation. Nevertheless the advance knowledge of a buildup of high-performance jet fighters in Cuba had been of considerable value. Without the warning provided by cratology, the military planners who went into crash programs in October would have been far more startled by the photos of the 20th showing 35 to 40 MIG-21s ready to bolster Cuba's air defense system.

From Defense to Offense

While the resolution of the MIG-21 controversy was a triumph for cratology, the most important contribution the technique made to the intelligence effort in the Cuban buildup was in identifying IL-28 bombers. If it never leads to another significant conclusion, this one achievement assures cratology at least a small niche in the annals of intelligence.

In early October the increasing tension generated by the buildup was illustrated in a dispute over a large "cello-like" object seen on the deck of a ship. The container was large enough for any of a variety of aircraft, including the IL-28 bomber, a weapon of offense.

The cratologists, however, were sure that such a structure housed transport aircraft, being exactly the same as those used earlier to ship IL-14s to Cuba. Again argument flared over the validity of concluding anything about contents from the shape of a wooden structure on deck. This time, however, the negative conclusion that the structure probably did not contain an IL-28 bomber was backed up by a timely clandestine report and a photograph from Leningrad showing an aircraft being loaded onto a ship.

Meanwhile, clandestine reports and refugee interrogations continued to pile up. Aerial photography had established that the buildup encompassed a number of defensive systems, but ground observer reports increasingly suggested items which could not be reconciled with defensive measures. Two observers reported the arrival of IL-28 bomber crates about 20 September, and at least one of the two had based his identification on photographs of IL-28 crates in the Cuba collection guide. As usual, these reports were not considered "hard" evidence, although in retrospect at least one was valid.

The moment of truth for cratology occurred on 10 October, when the first photographs of IL-28 crates en route to Cuba reached headquarters. Taken on 28 September, these showed the Soviet ship *Kasimov* carrying ten crates which could only be for IL-28 bombers. To make doubly sure and to convince others, however, the cratologists drew together all the precedents and evidence—photos and report from the naval officer in Djakarta showing an end section of the crates, the Indonesian document giving the dimensions for IL-28 containers, an old picture from Istanbul showing such crates being shipped in 1959, a recent Istanbul photo showing the IL-28 crate still in use on a ship en route to the UAR, and of course the clandestine reports that the bombers had recently arrived in Cuba. A memorandum was prepared for the DCI reporting the new information and detailing the basis for the weighty conclusion.

The observer reports which during the previous three weeks had pointed to the possibility of a radical change in the nature of the military buildup in Cuba had not been generally accepted as firm. They had raised the flag of caution, but so-called hard evidence was required for a conclusion that there really had been such a change. The IL-28 crates provided this evidence. On the heels of persistent reports pointing to MRBMs on the island, they led to the 14 October flight of the U-2 which brought back the first photos of strategic missile installations.

Additional air photography shortly thereafter turned up solid proof, if it were still needed, of the validity of crate counting. Low-altitude photographs at San Julian airfield in Pinar del Río province caught a cratologist's dream—IL-28s being uncrated and assembled. This convincing evidence of the validity of crate information was entirely eclipsed at the time by the threat of the Soviet strategic missiles, but further evidence was obtained during the withdrawal of the bombers from Cuba in early December. The Soviets, in order to show they were not cheating, broke open the crates on the decks of ships to allow inspection by U.S. personnel hovering nearby in helicopters.

As the crisis receded and efforts were directed toward sorting out the pieces and reviewing the status of Soviet forces on the island, a few other bits of cratology were produced. Largely by means of crate counts, for instance, it was discovered that roughly 100 Soviet helicopters had been delivered to Cuba, perhaps two-thirds of them during the buildup. The size of this formidable counterinsurgency weapon in Cuban hands was not apparent from other sources. Crates for two types of cruise missiles were also identified as a result of the repeated high and low altitude photography over Cuba, and the information has since proved useful in other countries.

Reflections

The upshot was acceptance of cratology; the Cuban experience demonstrated that this is a legitimate tool for intelligence analysts. In a broader sense, it demonstrated the way many of the intelligence community's resources can be successfully combined to solve a problem—the sort of problem which normally looms large for only a few specialists but in this instance took on greatly increased significance.

Since that time regular procedures have been adopted to insure that photographs are obtained of every Soviet ship which is a potential arms carrier. The intelligence community has never worked together better than now in following Soviet arms shipments. On those to Cuba, the intense effort now applied is a far cry from the rather haphazard picture-taking described at the beginning of this article.

Oddly enough, despite public attention to cratology, the Soviets do not seem to have radically changed their procedures in shipping arms abroad. We continue to see combat aircraft being crated in precisely the way they have been for the past decade. With the notable exception of a recent delivery of MIG-17s to Cuba, aircraft continue to be carried as deck cargo. Recently it was determined

that Egypt's holdings of MIG-21 jet fighters have climbed to over 100, and this conclusion was based almost entirely on crates; fewer than half this number have ever been seen on the ground.

The list of identifiable crates has grown to cover about 17 different containers, including all the types of combat aircraft the Soviets have shipped abroad. It will probably continue to lengthen. The Czech L-29 jet—now becoming the standard trainer—is being shipped overseas, and the USSR is selling the huge MI-6 helicopter to non-Communist countries.

Cratology is a very narrow intelligence specialty. It cannot hope to have answers for more than a very limited number of intelligence puzzles, and its chief use may lie in helping to get accurate air-order-of-battle information on countries receiving Soviet military aid. But the story of its use in Cuba does have a moral applicable to dozens of intelligence problems, namely, that momentous conclusions must frequently rest on evidence piled up in a humdrum fashion, and obscure knowledge can often provide the key piece in a larger picture. Many a collecting officer abroad must wonder why anyone would want some of the information the cratologist asks for. The individual pieces are indeed trivial, but together they have frequently served useful purposes and in at least one instance paid off handsomely.

Exposé: The artificiality of socio-economic statistics on the new nations.

AFRICAN NUMBERS GAME

Walter McDonald

The proliferation of independent tropical African states has been reflected in a proliferation of U.S. government publications, including intelligence papers, on these countries. The National Intelligence Survey program has sharply increased both the coverage of its series on Africa and the frequency with which articles are updated. National Intelligence Estimates on the area have multiplied. More recently there have been a number of National Policy Papers. These publications require, in varying degree, supporting socio-economic statistics. At a minimum they are likely to carry population data (present size and rate of growth), Gross National Product, and per capita variations on the GNP theme. Many, if not most, such statistics contained in these reports—and drawing prestige from the high classification at the top and bottom of every page—are patently absurd.

National Accounts

Official numbers coming out of tropical Africa are apt to be more misleading than helpful. The state of backwardness in these underdeveloped—or developing, to use the second-generation euphemism—countries is such that the elaborate statistical organizations taken for granted in the industrial West just do not exist. Many kinds of data considered basic to economic measurement simply are not available, and where data does exist it is often suppressed or grossly distorted by government leaders for assorted political purposes. Despite these obstacles, numbers which suggest great accuracy are continually enshrined in intelligence publications and by repetition have quickly gained currency.

Emergent nations promptly acquire the accepted badges of independence—flag, anthem, national flower and bird. They also, largely because Western—as well as Eastern—suppliers of financial aid insist, soon formulate development plans, make population esti-

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mates, and devise systems of national accounts. Reasonable development planning and population estimating are defensible and desirable, but national accounting in most African countries is by almost any standard ludicrous. And the countries that fail to provide their own national accounts find in Washington people eager to play the make-believe game for them.

The theoretical and practical problems of calculating national accounts for underdeveloped countries with very large non-monetized sectors—that's *lingua economica* for "most of the people living in the bush"—are formidable ones that would be of interest chiefly to economists were it not for the current propensity of the policy maker and others to make welfare comparisons among African countries and between Africa and the rest of the world. To suggest by statistical comparison, such as is contained in the CIA-prepared Basic Intelligence Factbook, that Cameroon, with a "per capita GNP of \$86," is a shade better off than the Malagasy Republic with a "per capita GNP of \$85" misleads rather than informs. The uselessness of such comparisons has been pointed out by one economist as follows:

... the usual African economic aggregates are certainly valueless at present for most purposes; welfare comparisons using per capita income ... are obviously nonsensical when income estimates themselves are in part derived by multiplying per capita averages of doubtful accuracy by population estimates equally subject to error.¹

The development of national accounts which reflect the actual economy is a sophisticated process, assuming a great quantity and variety of accurate statistics. It is the more practicable the smaller the non-monetized, or subsistence, sector, for it involves valuing the product of the whole economy, including, in the case of Africa, the output of those who live by the shifting agriculture of the bush and the even more primitive hunting-and-fishing societies; and village chiefs and subchiefs do not forward detailed statistical reports on wages, output, and village government services to central statistical offices maintaining the accounts.

In this situation, economists resort to imputation. Prices are assigned, where in fact money prices don't exist, to goods and services in the subsistence sector; huts are valued and given rates of depreciation. The figures for the products of one person are summed, multiplied by the estimated subsistence population, and lumped with the output of the monetary sector. When this total is divided by the

estimated population of both sectors combined, the result is the statistic called per capita GNP, which is supposed to tell something about the nature of the economy and its rate of growth.

National accounting is most useful when applied to modern economies. But even when national accounts are quite accurately developed they are often used improperly, and the resulting comparisons are sometimes ridiculous. What useful purpose, for example, is served by a finding that Kuwait in 1963 had the highest per capita national income in the world, \$2,800 as against the United States' \$2,500 and Germany's mere \$1,300?

Head Counts

Let us look closer, not at statistical practices involving complex concepts or requiring some economic sophistication, but at the simpler matter of counting population. This, perhaps the most basic of all statistics, is a building block for most of the more complicated economic and social aggregates and the one from which all per capita series are derived. Unless population statistics are relatively accurate and detailed, the economic aggregates derived from them can only be wrong, the sole question being how wrong. From our survey of African censuses we conclude that the officially released economic and social aggregates for most of these countries must be wildly erroneous.

Census-taking in tropical Africa is subject to all of the technical difficulties it encounters in industrial societies. In addition it is hampered by special circumstances typical of countries with large subsistence sectors and also by factors peculiar to the African scene. Finally, there is the problem of political manipulation of the census.

Many African population figures currently in vogue were initially the product of a colonial administration, later embellished by national statistical offices. Generally the colonial figures tended to be low; underreporting was fairly widespread because of general colonial disinterest in the indigenous population and because the colonial census was used as a basis for taxation or *corvée*. Independence has usually brought no notable improvement in either procedures or results.

Even when trained census takers are used, social problems can markedly distort the data. Take the question of age. Few Africans live by the clock, fewer still by the calendar, so enumerators must attempt to date their lives by important local events such as memorable floods or fires. Even those who keep better track of years have a tendency to report in decades, giving the age of 40, say, instead of

¹ P. Ady, *African Studies in Income and Wealth* (London, 1963).

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46. In Muslim Africa the tendency is to omit daughters, especially those who have reached puberty but are not yet married, there being a stigma on unmarried daughters. This results in a sharp drop in the number of reported females from about 12 years old until time of marriage, when they can be reported respectfully as wives. Such phenomena are not limited to the more primitive African countries. The age data in the 1960 census of Ghana, which had been under British colonial administration for more than a century, was characterized by the United Nations as "Very Rough," in the lowest category of reliability.

Outright dishonesty in handling population statistics is quite common throughout Africa. Even when that is absent, a conscientious attempt to alert the user to the limitations of the data is rare except on the part of foreign statisticians with reputations to preserve. The disclaimers are in any case soon detached from the statistics, and these magically assume exactitude when printed in intelligence reports. The classic disclaimer quoted below was attached to the 1953 Pilot Population Census in the Sudan.

It must be clearly understood that the Department of Statistics accepts no responsibility for what will be said in this chapter. It must be stated clearly and without any qualifications that most, if not all, comments and remarks in this chapter are of little value. Nevertheless, the temptation to aim at producing a figure in respect of a country where no such figure has been produced in the past is too great, even if in the process of doing it more guesswork is undertaken than any respectable statistician, having the good name of his trade in mind, would care to admit. It must also be stated that should, by any chance, the population figures arrived at during the main census agree in any way with the sheer guesses in this chapter, it will be pure coincidence and no credit will be claimed by the Department of Statistics. On the other hand, should the guesses, as guesses often are, be widely off the mark, no blame will be admitted.

The problems with African population statistics are best illustrated by example. The countries discussed below were selected not because they are the worst cases but because they exhibit different typical forms of technical or politically inspired distortion.

Ghana

Ghana, often described as having a well-trained civil service and administratively head and shoulders above its African neighbors, was thought capable of producing a reasonably good census. The 4,118,000 Ghanaians reported in 1948 were expected to increase to 5,100,000

by 1960. The 1960 census, however—the first since independence—counted 6,726,820. Underestimation in the last colonial census would account for some of the unexpectedly large increase, but not all; and examination of the census procedure shows government manipulation to achieve a political end.

President Nkrumah clearly decided to inflate the census. Instead of having a single cut-off date for the entire country, as in usual practice, he decreed two, one for the north and a later one for the south. At first glance this would not seem cause for major distortion. But in Ghana there is a substantial seasonal migration from north to south. The northern area was counted before the migration began, the southern after the displacement reached its peak. This procedure not only increased the total population by double-counting the Ghanaians that moved from north to south and including as Ghanaians the large number of non-Ghanaians from neighboring countries who regularly join the southward migration, but it exaggerated in particular the population of the southern area from which Nkrumah has drawn much of his support.

The population figure is therefore probably inflated by about 30 percent, and the more than 4 percent annual increase indicated is likewise an overstatement, the true figure probably lying closer to 2 percent. While double-counting gives Nkrumah the political benefit of a larger population to rule, it also yields a larger divisor for the derivation of per capita statistics. By government manipulation Ghana thus became a larger but a per capita poorer country.

Liberia

Estimates made before the Liberian census suggested a population anywhere between 750,000 and 2,500,000. The lower figure was based on a hut count made on aerial photographs and multiplied by 5 inhabitants in some areas, 6 in others. The larger number was President Tubman's personal estimate made on the eve of the census. When the census then produced the disappointing figure 1,089,000, he promptly suppressed it.

Apparently Tubman found it embarrassing to become ruler of a country with only a million people after twenty years of ruling more than twice that many. The higher figure was also convenient when seeking foreign aid; the United States and other benefactors often use per capita aid comparisons. It suggested an abundant untapped labor force, moreover, to work new rubber plantations and mining con-

cessions. It promised a good domestic market for foreign investment in consumer industry; a German investor was in fact dissuaded from building a plant in Liberia by the information that the population was less than half the number he had been told officially. (The census results had become an open secret, and Tubman has recently been leaning toward releasing them.)

Upper Volta, Sierra Leone

Some countries find it inconvenient to change the official population estimates even when better data become available. In Upper Volta, for example, the government reported for 1960 an "administrative" population of 3,500,000, derived from a head count for tax purposes. Then in 1961 a well-qualified Frenchman estimated, on the basis of an adequate sample, a total of 4,400,000—an upward revision of roughly one-fourth. Nonetheless the government still uses its old figure as the basis for fiscal planning. Acceptance of the better estimate would deflate all the Upper Volta per capita statistics and present the country as even more abysmally poor than must be admitted now.

Sierra Leone's census, undertaken with substantial U.S. assistance, gave a population of 2,183,000 as of 1 April 1963. Initially the government refused to accept the census at all because it created problems of political representation. It now accepts the total figures but not the regional breakdown. The reason is clear. The opposition party is allowed only two seats in the legislature for an area (Koinadgu) which the census shows to have a population of 729,000, while the ruling party gets six seats to represent the population of the Western Rural Area, enumerated at only 69,000. The government also continues to report the total of registered voters—males and females of 21 years and older—as 1,129,000. Such a voting list suggests a population approaching 4 million, more than 70 percent too high. Tombstone voter registration is not unknown in Africa.

Ethiopia

In all the countries discussed above there was at least some basis for the cited estimates. But there are population statistics for which no basis at all can be discerned. Ethiopia is a case in point. The U.N. Demographic Yearbook generously describes the source of Ethiopian figures for 1961—giving a population of 21,600,000—as "con-

jectural." Most likely the statistics developed from official Ethiopian statements rather than any basis in fact. Even now a new Ethiopian population estimate is gaining currency in just this fashion. The *Ethiopian Herald* of June 27, 1964, reported an interview with Ato Seyoum Ejigu, Director-General of the National Election Board, who had just completed an extensive study tour of the country. Here is an excerpt:

... the present population of the country is 27,824,120 . . . this figure was according to his personal findings while he was touring the Empire. He received the figures and facts of the increase of population from provincial and district governors, electoral stations and officers of the Governorates-General. According to Ato Seyoum's estimate of population the number of parliamentarians to the Chamber of Deputies would have risen to 286 but, he said, since the official figure is 22,000,000 the number would be 250. However, the Director-General believed that when his findings are approved the 4th General Election Chamber of Deputies would have 286 representatives.

Thus Ethiopia will probably add 5,824,120 citizens to the population rolls. But we have no reason to assume that the result will be any closer to the true number than the old 22 million was. We really have no idea at all how many Ethiopians there are.

The situation would be amusing were it not that people insist on making welfare comparisons based on per capita statistics. Should we use the new estimate now to reduce further the Ethiopian per capita GNP, already reported as one of the lowest in Africa? By simple arithmetic Ethiopia might become the poorest country on the continent. The absurdity of the entire per capita exercise becomes apparent with this question.

Nigeria

The most extreme example of population confusion is currently Nigeria. The 1952 official census reported a population of about 32 million, which, with a subsequent partial census, suggested a 1963 population between 37 and 41 million. But the 1963 census results announced last February 24 put the number at 55,653,821 (a delightfully precise statistic). There is substantial evidence that chicanery in taking the census greatly inflated the population; because of the federal structure in Nigeria, changes in regional representation have very serious political implications. But we are concerned here with the economic aspects.

Many analysts are reluctant to use the new data; they would prefer to use the 40 or so million. Even on the basis of this figure it had been concluded earlier:

Even if all the economic development plans were successfully completed, the annual per capita increase in private consumption would be about 1 percent during the plan period, hardly enough to make a significant impression on the consuming public; per capita GNP currently is less than \$85.00. We conclude that successful fulfillment of the development schemes is not likely to make an appreciable contribution to political or social stability. On the contrary, the necessarily slow pace of economic growth postulated is likely to engender disillusionment with the machinery of government and the country's relatively democratic institutions.²

The outlook is even gloomier if we accept the new population figures, which—probably falsely—depress the whole series of per capita economic and sociological indicators—doctors per thousand, hospital beds, investment, GNP, etc. But we may be required to accept them by our customers.

Pakistan

The inadequacies of African statistics are paralleled in much of the undeveloped world. At present the African statistical bias is usually upward, but it can also be down. Mr. Said Hasan, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Pakistan's Institute of Development Economics welcomed members of a seminar³ some years ago with the following observation.

We decided that population and its growth in South and Southeast Asia must be understated so that the task of economic development of this area may not appear to be a hopeless one. Again in our own country when the first Five Year Plan was being framed I urged, and successfully too, that the rate of [population] growth should not be shown as higher than 1.4 percent. This was to keep despair away. We are, however, convinced that population is growing faster than that. But as has been said, hope builds sooner than knowledge destroys.

Prospects and Some Suggestions

There is little the intelligence analyst can do to improve the quantity or quality of African statistics. Better statistical information will come only with time and with the development of statistical offices in

² CIA/ORR comment on Nigeria Policy Paper, January 1964.

³ On Population Growth and Economic Development with Special Reference to Pakistan, September 8-13, 1959.

the countries concerned. Deliberate, politically inspired distortion of social, economic, and political data by African leaders will probably continue also for some time, until these leaders or their successors reach a degree of political and economic maturity.

Although unable to improve the African statistics, we could at least avoid giving them the currency and respectability they now enjoy by virtue of inclusion in high-level intelligence reports. It is recognized that it would be difficult to dispense with such numbers entirely; it is proposed only that they be treated gingerly. If reports which persist in using statistics with too many significant digits don't mislead the reader, they must at least impress him with the naiveté of the drafting officer.

The solution to the problem requires a command or customer decision: in present practice the analyst is compelled by the requirements laid on him to include in his reports statistics which he knows are silly at best. Officers at all levels who request reports, whether short papers for the same afternoon or long ones months ahead, should so frame their requirements that the analyst's judgment may prevail with respect to statistical presentations, as in the case of Nigeria. The present assumption on the part of requesting officers that all countries have common statistical series suitable for comparative purposes ought also to be discarded. Fact books and other statistical compendia should recognize that in a great many cases "facts" just do not exist.

Intelligence publications rarely originate statistics on the non-Communist countries. The intelligence operation on them is for the most part a sifting and evaluating process intended to qualify them properly. The most copious source of the new statistics is probably the U.S. foreign aid program, for which voluminous "data" are produced in connection with various country aid schemes. These country program books are later reduced and presented, with the field's caveats removed, in expensively bound volumes to the Congress and the Executive. Here the process really takes off; the proliferation of new "statistics" gets under way in earnest.

Knowledge of the utter unreliability of Ethiopian data on population, as discussed above, is by no means the exclusive property of the writer. Yet consider what happens when Ethiopia is reduced to "numbers" and printed in a foreign aid publication. We find that the annual population growth is 1.4 percent. We really have no idea what the population growth is at all, but the report says 1.4 percent, which means that the true rate of Ethiopian population increase falls

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Numbers Game
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between 1.35 percent and 1.45 percent. Put another way, it implies that our information on the rate of increase is accurate to 5 one-hundredths of 1 percent. The same report contains a population total of 19.4 million for 1962, a per capita agricultural production index, electric power per capita, acres per capita, literacy rate, pupils as a percent of population, and people per doctor. This exercise in pseudo-accuracy is repeated over and over again, country by country, with ingenuous indifference to the real situation. It recalls Mark Twain's observation that "one gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of facts."

Where we must give statistics we could use rounded figures. We could express doubtful data in ranges, doing more qualitative and less quantitative analysis. Population statistics, in particular, would be more useful to the consumer presented in ranges, as perhaps 40-55 million for Nigeria. The loss in aura of exactness would be more than compensated by increased credibility. Per capita GNP could be given as "under \$100" rather than \$67. This rougher measure would convey adequately the subsistence nature of the economy; \$100 per year is only about 27 cents per day.

And that is all it needs to convey. Simple welfare comparisons made among per capita GNP's for relatively primitive economies are not very profitable. When you come down to it, it is quite apparent that an individual cannot exist on 27 cents per day. And he doesn't. He actually exists, in Africa, on a variety of goods and services provided largely by himself. These are valued at some kind of market prices (usually by a foreign economist and often using city prices), expressed in the local currency, and converted into dollars by simple arithmetic. The result is then viewed, in our community, by an individual who has a weekly income that is some multiple of the African's annual "per capita GNP," who is familiar chiefly with his own price structure, who knows nothing of the original sins committed in the GNP data, and who has little or no conception of the statistical errors upon which his mental comparative processes must rest.

Some of the ways in which Soviet missile flights and the missiles themselves can be reconstructed by monitoring their signals.

TELEMETRY ANALYSIS

David S. Brandwein

A ballistic missile stands on the launch pad poised for a test flight. As the countdown nears zero, its rocket engines light up, the umbilical cable linking it to the launch pad is cut, and the "bird" lifts off to begin its trip into space. From the moment the umbilical cable falls away, the missile's designers must rely on telemetry (measurements of key variables converted into electrical signals and radioed to ground stations) for their observation of the performance of its components.

While the missile is in flight these multi-channel telemetry signals are received at ground stations along the trajectory and relayed back to the control center, where the measurements are displayed, usually in the form of line traces, one for each channel, on long strips of paper. Anxious engineers cluster about a set of these "analog records" to get a first quick look. Along with the records, the instrumentation specialists provide a key to the assignment of the telemetry channels so as to identify which trace is recording which kind of measurement and a list of calibrations, conversion factors for translating a given trace deflection into so many units of pressure, temperature, flow rate, or other variable.

All this must be done by any missile launch facility, whether it be the U.S. Atlantic or Pacific missile range or the Soviet sites at Tyuratam or Kapustin Yar. Thus when we intercept Soviet telemetry we may be able to use it to measure the performance of Soviet missiles. There are two very serious handicaps, however; first, the intercept usually covers only the time when the missile is above the horizon of the place of interception, and second, we have neither a key to the channel assignments nor a list of calibrations. The analyst can do little about the first handicap; this is a problem for the collectors. How we seek to overcome the second one and the kinds of information we get when we succeed are described below.

Which is Which?

In trying to identify the various Soviet measurements, we make use first of all of the fact that certain basic measurements are required on any flight, regardless of what additional specialized ones may be called for. For instance, the propulsion system will always have a measurement of acceleration and one of thrust chamber pressure; and if the engine is liquid-fueled, with gas-driven turbopumps feeding the propellants in, then we are likely to see pairs of measurements of the pressures at the inlet and outlet of the pumps for both fuel and oxidizer and readings of gas generator pressure, turbine speed, and fuel and oxidizer flow rates. A liquid propellant missile stage with the common instrumentation on the propulsion and propellant feed systems is pictured schematically in Figure 1. We thus know what to look for and can search the Soviet telemetry for counterparts of readings on U.S. missile flights.

If a tentative identification is made, we can then apply various tests, based on the laws of physics and on reasonable design practice, to check its validity. A trace suspected of being an acceleration measurement, for example, we check against the theoretical plot of acceleration against time for a constant-thrust missile, a hyperbola governed by the equation

$$a (K_1 - t) = K_2,$$

where a = acceleration,
 t = time, and
 K_1, K_2 = constants.

If the identification of acceleration is validated, the next step derives from the fact that the force producing the acceleration, the thrust of the rocket, is proportional to the pressure in the thrust chamber. If minor perturbations in the acceleration record, therefore, correlate very closely with some in another trace that does not have the hyperbolic characteristic, this second trace becomes a fair candidate for the thrust chamber pressure.

From here on, the analysis gets more complex as we delve deeper into the system; but there is usually a reasonable expectation that, so long as a good sample of telemetry is available, it will be possible to identify all the major measurements. Of key importance here is that the sample include a major transition period such as engine shutdown. In a liquid-fueled turbopump-fed engine, for example, the fact that the pressures in the propellant feed system drop to zero at shutoff in considerably less than a second while the turbine,




FIGURE 1. Typical Missile Stage Instrumentation.

rotating at high speed with a great deal of inertia, takes 4 to 8 seconds to coast to a stop is most useful for identification purposes.

Merely to have made a few of the key identifications brings a considerable intelligence benefit, because we can then relate the firing under study to earlier ones and form an opinion on whether it is one of a series or is testing a new vehicle or possibly a new model of a known missile. Given a fair sample of powered-flight telemetry, the analyst can usually say whether the vehicle is liquid- or solid-fueled, whether it has a single burning stage or multiple stages, and what ratio of payload to total weight it probably has.

Acceleration

The single most important measurement and the one most useful in the analysis is the acceleration of the missile along its longitudinal axis. Every so often we intercept the signal before first-stage burnout, and the trace looks like the example shown in Figure 2 (but without any annotations except time). From this record we would know immediately that the missile had two main burning stages of which the first shut down at 100 seconds, that it then coasted for five seconds until the second stage ignited, and that this burned for an additional 145 seconds to shutdown. The low plateau in the record after second-stage shutdown would tell us that small vernier rocket engines (for fine regulation of burnout velocity) operated for 10 seconds after main-engine cutoff, and the ratio of this acceleration to that at main-engine cutoff would be the ratio of vernier engine thrust to total thrust. The short negative displacement at 270 seconds signals the firing of retrorockets to separate the rocket body from the payload.

Note in the same figure the dotted line starting at second-stage burnout and continuing the hyperbolic curve that would reach infinity at 308 seconds. This is a theoretical extension of the acceleration, showing how it would rise if the missile had continued burning and losing weight at the normal rate of fuel consumption, so that when the weight dropped to zero the acceleration would become infinite. The significance of this is that it gives us an upper bound on the payload weight in the form of a ratio between the weight of the vehicle at burnout (payload plus empty rocket stage) and the weight of the propellants burned by the stage, these two weights being proportional respectively to the time from burnout to infinite acceleration and the time from firing to burnout. Then, if through some additional analysis




FIGURE 2. Typical Missile Acceleration History.

it becomes possible to introduce an actual weight into the equation, an estimate can be made of the ratio of empty stage weight alone (largely tankage) to propellant weight, the stage can be sized, and the payload can be determined. This process can now be repeated for the first stage, so that the complete weight history of the vehicle from liftoff to burnout becomes known.

Vibrations and Transition Times

Another approach of telemetry analysis, one which probably holds the most promise for determination of missile size, is the examination of time-related functions such as vibrations and pressure transients. Telemetry traces identified as measurements of liquid level in the propellant tanks have occasionally showed a rather slow oscillation of low magnitude. This usually is indicative of wave action at the liquid surface, or sloshing. Now the interesting thing is that the rate of these oscillations, which can be measured directly from the traces, is dependent only on the diameter of the tank, the acceleration of the missile, and the shape of the tank bottom. Further, if the phenomenon occurs when the liquid is more than a tank diameter away from the bottom, then the shape of the bottom has no effect either, and we need to know only the acceleration to get a measurement of the diameter of the tank.

Analysts have also noted an oscillation of higher frequency superimposed on measurements of pump inlet pressures. Because a conventional missile will have its tanks in line, feeding the propellant from the upper tank to the engine requires a long pipe passing through or around the lower tank. It has been found that in U.S. missiles this pipe acts somewhat like an organ pipe: the longer it is, the lower the frequency, or pitch, at which it will vibrate. The phenomenon enables us to get the length of the pipe by measuring the frequency and comparing it with that from known missiles, and this pipe length is essentially equal to the length of the lower propellant tank.

Another occasional observation, one that seems promising but has not yet proved productive, is that the entire missile vibrates at a frequency which gradually changes as the burning proceeds and makes a step change when the nose cone is separated at burnout. This is as it should be, because the vibration frequency is related to the stiffness of the missile, which is in turn a function of the length, diameter, weight, and construction materials. Thus while the propellants are burning the missile weight and stiffness are changing continuously,

but when the nose cone is separated the weight and length change instantaneously, producing the step change in stiffness. Very little intelligence has so far been derived from this type of analysis, however. The ballistic missile cannot be treated as a simple hollow cylinder; its complex structure has to be considered in detail.

The study of transient phenomena is another area which gives promise of providing intelligence. Very recently it has been shown that for a wide variety of U.S. rocket engines the time it takes for the chamber pressure to fall at cutoff from its operating level to near zero seems to vary directly with the size, i.e., thrust, of the engine. The relationship seems to hold for engines using different propellants and operating at different chamber pressures. Furthermore, it seems to hold for Soviet engines as well; those whose thrusts have been estimated by other methods show pressure decay times that fall right on the curve described by the U.S. data. The precision with which we can read out the thrust is quite poor, but the method does give us a rough cut at the size of the engine in a new missile, discriminating between, say, a Saturn-size engine and a Titan-size one.

Liquid Level Measurements

A third approach which has been very useful is analysis of telemetered data on liquid levels. So far all the major Soviet ballistic missiles have used liquid propellants, and they are often equipped with instrumentation for measuring how full the tanks are. The sensors are usually installed in both the fuel and oxidizer tanks, and they allow us to monitor the efficiency of propellant utilization. Ideally, one wants a missile to reach burnout with an excess of neither fuel nor oxidizer, and how closely this ideal is approached is a measure of the effectiveness of the system.

Information on the shapes of propellant tanks can be gained from the level sensors. When the liquid is up in the main cylindrical portion of the tank the rate of drop in level will be constant, but as soon as the level enters the tank bottom it will start dropping at a faster rate, and the precise way it falls with time will be a result of the geometry of the tank bottom—conical, elliptical, spherical, or some other shape. Thus if we have a good record of the changing liquid level near burnout we may be able to determine the shape of the bottom. This is not just an interesting academic exercise, because if we know the geometry of the bottom along with the time needed to empty first the cylindrical part of the tank and then the bottom,


we can calculate the ratio of length to diameter and exert some leverage on the sizing problem.

Another important product of liquid level analysis is measurement of the volumetric ratio of oxidizer to fuel. If, for instance, the level sensors show twice as fast a drop in one tank as in the other, and if we make the reasonable assumption that the two have the same diameter, then we know that two volumes of one propellant are burned for a single volume of the other. We would therefore know that nitric acid is more likely to be the oxidizer than liquid oxygen, because oxygen burns efficiently with the common fuels at volumetric ratios lower than 1.6:1, whereas a 2:1 ratio would yield efficient combustion for a nitric acid system. This kind of information, when supplemented by other data such as specific impulse (thrust per unit of propellant flow rate) allows one to narrow the choice of propellant combinations significantly.

Calibration

Up to this point we have been talking mostly about measurements in the form of ratios, because it has been very difficult to determine absolute magnitudes. Two notable successes in calibration have been achieved, however—with liquid level sensors and accelerometers. These are described below.

The level sensor which has been calibrated is of the "hump" type, so called because its trace looks like this:



The calibration became possible when tank length for the vehicle was determined by an independent method. The total burning time was known, as well as the time it took for the instrument to cycle through eight humps. Then the ratio of these two times could simply be multiplied by the tank length to give the drop in level represented by the cycle. Having the calibration, we could now obviously turn it around and use it to measure tank length on any other Soviet missile which might use the instrument.

Acceleration traces have been calibrated by two techniques. The first is quite complex, requiring the history of the missile's acceleration and velocity to be reconstructed from its powered flight trajectory

(usually with the help of a digital computer) by utilizing known or estimated data such as probable launch location, staging and burnout times, burnout position and velocity, ratio of acceleration at staging to acceleration at burnout, pitch program, drag coefficient, and the ratio of thrust in a vacuum to sea-level thrust.

The second technique, much simpler, can seldom be employed because it requires an intercept of telemetry before lift-off. Such intercepts are obtained only rarely because at launch the missile is always below the horizon of our intercept sites; we receive on-pad telemetry only when special atmospheric conditions cause the signals to be ducted along the earth's surface. If we do receive such a signal, and if an accelerometer is registering, then it will be reading one "g" (the accelerometer measures gravitational effect rather than acceleration proper) and by comparing this to its reading when the missile is under power we can calculate the acceleration at any time.

Whichever method is used, if the accelerometer is calibrated then we can go back to the equation for acceleration presented earlier,

$$a (K_1 - t) = K_2,$$

and determine the magnitude of the constants K_1 and K_2 . Now K_1 is the initial weight of the missile stage divided by the flow rate, while K_2 is the specific impulse, the thrust of the missile divided by the flow rate. Taking the last term first, the specific impulse is a figure of merit for a rocket engine reflecting principally the chemical energy available in the propellant combination, and it will be different for different propellants. Further, if we have (from liquid level sensor analysis) an idea of the ratio in which the propellants are mixed, we can make a pretty good stab at identifying the propellants. Then if by other methods we have sized the propellant tanks, we can now calculate the propellant flow rate, which multiplied by the constants K_1 and K_2 gives respectively the initial weight of the missile stage and its thrust.

It is hoped that these explanations will have given the reader a better understanding of some of the mysteries of telemetry analysis and its usefulness in acquiring missile intelligence. Perhaps he will also appreciate more the fascination it holds for its devotees. One should note here the cumulative effect of a successful analysis: one breakthrough leads to another, that to another, and so on. Conversely, an erroneous conclusion will propagate errors, and in this respect this intelligence endeavor is probable no different from any other.

Highlights of our scientists' success in intercepting and reconstructing the video from Soviet spacecraft.

SNOOPING ON SPACE PICTURES

Henry G. Plaster

Lunik III's pictures of the far side of the moon in October 1959 excited the world and proved that the Soviets had then the technology to aim a camera in space by remote control, command it to take pictures, automatically develop the film on board the spacecraft, and finally scan the fixed film electronically and transmit fair-quality pictures back to earth from lunar distances. Since then they have employed real-time (i.e., concurrent, "live") television systems in some of their earth-orbiting vehicles to monitor the behavior of dog and human passengers, and they have used in some of their Cosmos satellites a delayed transmission system somewhat similar to that of Lunik III.

A fascinating and extremely important aspect of the U.S. intelligence effort devoted to these video systems is the work of engineering analysis in "breaking out" the pictures contained in the radio transmissions. The process has a trial-and-error aspect like cryptanalysis: since both the horizontal and vertical sweep periods are unknown variables, there are an infinite number of possible combinations. The engineer usually begins by trying to synchronize the vertical axis by hand while synchronizing the horizontal sweep electronically. It requires hours of experimentation with the oscilloscope controls for sweep speed, filtering, and focus, displaying and redisplaying sometimes as little as two seconds worth of recorded data, to get results.

The results of this technical analysis have been valuable to intelligence consumers, and the successful effort deserves general recognition. It has involved special Elint collection techniques, new approaches to signal analysis, feedback to assist in subsequent collection, and intelligence interpretation of the pictures for the consumers.

Lunar Surface Video

The very weak signals returning to earth from Lunik III could not be picked up by standard Elint collection facilities and equipment.

Through the cooperation of the University of Manchester in England, therefore, use of the 250-foot radiotelescope at Jodrell Bank was obtained. The Soviets announced that pictures of the far side of the moon were taken between 0330 and 0410Z (Greenwich Mean Time) on 7 October 1959. Jodrell Bank succeeded in getting a signal on the announced frequency of 183.6 megacycles between 1410 and 1445Z that date. A ten-hour lag behind the actual picture-taking is not excessive: the film first had to be developed, and then the electronic scanning and transmission had to wait until rotation of the earth brought the Soviet deep-space station in the Crimea into position to pick up the signal.

The graduate students working for Sir Bernard Lovell at Jodrell Bank, however, in recording their intercept, narrowed the receiver bandwidth so far, in order to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, that they "clipped off" much of the video information. Confirmation that the Lunik III pictures released by the Soviets (See Figure 1) were valid thus rested on a single poorly recorded intercept from which it could be judged only that the picture was more likely of a test pattern than of the moon. The signal bandwidth, however, was compatible with the parameters announced by the Soviets, and on the basis of technical extrapolation it could be concluded that the Soviet lunar pictures were authentic.

Spacecraft Passengers Televised

Sputniks 5 and 6, launched respectively on 19 August and 1 December 1960, both transmitted signals on 83 megacycles which were initially reported by field Elint operators and later confirmed through detailed analysis to be video transmissions. Soviet announcements that the dog passengers on these satellites were being watched while in orbit by means of a "radio-television" system spurred on analytical efforts to demodulate this new type of signal, and before long CIA technical analysts did succeed in producing pictures from Sputnik 6's recorded signals. (See Figure 2.) These substantiated the Soviet claim of having developed a special television transmission system which could provide instantaneous reporting on the behavior of animal or human passengers aboard a Soviet spacecraft.

More important to intelligence in early 1961, however, was the establishment of a capability to determine as soon after launch as possible whether the Soviets had successfully orbited the first man in space, a feat they were expected to attempt at any moment. The



FIGURE 1. Soviet-released photograph of the far side of the moon taken by Lunik III.



FIGURE 2. Demodulated video from Sputnik 6 showing face and forelegs of a canine passenger.

National Security Agency undertook to design and produce special field collection equipment that would present oscilloscope pictures while the transmission was being received. Several such sets were produced on a priority basis, and the first two were sent to Elint sites in Alaska and Hawaii.

Demodulation of video transmissions from Sputnik 9 (9 March 1961) and Sputnik 10 (25 March 1961) substantiated the Soviet announcements that each of these single-orbit flights carried a dog passenger. Then on 12 April 1961 Sputnik 11 was launched, and 83-megacycle transmissions were detected twenty minutes later as the spacecraft passed over Alaska. Only 58 minutes after launch NSA reported that reliable real-time readout of the signals clearly showed a man and showed him moving. Thus before Gagarin had completed his historic 108-minute flight, intelligence components had technical confirmation that a Soviet cosmonaut was in orbit and that he was alive (See Figure 3).

Earth/Cloud Pictures from Orbit

In March 1962, after several failures, the Soviets launched the first satellite in what they referred to as the "Cosmos series." They announced the purpose of the new project to be scientific data collection, including study of "the distribution and formation of cloud patterns in the earth's atmosphere."

Cosmos 4 of the series, launched on 26 April 1962, transmitted signals, identified initially only as "a new data transmission system," in the frequency band between 162 and 175 megacycles, one not previously used in Soviet space operations. CIA technical specialists mounted an effort to demodulate these signals and similar ones from Cosmos 7, launched on 28 July 1962. Through rigorous analysis they established many of the signal parameters, but no identifiable pictures could be produced. Though recorded by a number of Elint collection sites, the signals were of insufficient quality for picture reconstruction because the general-search equipment used was not suitable for recording a highly complex wide-band, frequency-modulated video signal. From the unrecognizable pictures that were achieved it was nevertheless concluded that a camera or cameras on board these Cosmos vehicles were taking photographs, probably of cloud formations, that these photographs were developed by an on-board film processor, and that the fixed film was subsequently scanned electronically and the signals transmitted to ground-based receivers in the Soviet Union.



FIGURE 3. Demodulated video from Sputnik 11 showing movements of Gagarin.

Cosmos 9, launched on 27 September 1962, the third Cosmos vehicle to transmit video signals, was the first from which recognizable pictures could be reproduced. Since cloud cover was readily identifiable in a series of six pictures, CIA geophysics and electronics specialists consulted representatives of the National Meteorological Satellite Center of the U. S. Weather Bureau, the organization which processes the Tiros weather satellite photographs. Through photogrammetric analysis of the pictures, Cosmos 9 was adjudged to be an experimental weather satellite, stabilized about three axes, earth-oriented, and carrying a camera system with provision for delayed readout from the film. NASA was briefed on these findings prior to the 5 December 1962 signing of its agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences on cooperative space research and the exchange of data from meteorological satellites. The findings were also presented to a December 1962 meeting of technical representatives of the intelligence community, including some from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory working under an intelligence contract.

In direct consequence of this latter presentation, JPL technical experts embarked on a detailed study of all intercepts of the Cosmos video transmissions, making use of the most sophisticated electronic and photographic equipment available. By the following May they had succeeded in breaking out three overlapping pictures each composed of sixteen subframes which had been transmitted in sequence. (That they had been transmitted by electronically scanning the fixed film, as in Lunik III, was confirmed by their showing readily recognizable emulsion impurities.) Two of these pictures clearly showed Lake Van in Turkey (See Figures 4 and 5), and thus the entire land area in the pictures, where free from cloud cover, could be identified and the camera's field of view thereby defined. The wide-angle (85°) lens employed was such as would be expected in a meteorological satellite and not suitable for military reconnaissance. To achieve with this lens a military reconnaissance resolution on the order of twenty feet, the film would have to be five feet wide, a technological impossibility at present.

After Cosmos 15, launched on 22 April 1963, the Soviets orbited no further Cosmos vehicles with video transmissions, though they have launched and recovered more than a dozen that are believed to have had reconnaissance cameras aboard. On the basis of the stage of development manifested by the four that did transmit video, NASA was again briefed concerning Soviet weather satellite capa-



Figure 5. Map of approximate area pictured in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Cosmos 9 photo transmitted 30 September 1962 on 165 megacycles, showing clouds and surface features of the Turkish landscape.

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Space Pictures
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Space Pictures

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bilities prior to the formal implementation on 16 August 1963 of its agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences regarding cooperative space programs. This agreement called for a regular exchange of data from meteorological satellites beginning in the second half of 1964, preceded by occasional exchange of experimental data during the first half of the year. It set as an objective pictures covering an area at least a thousand kilometers square with a resolution initially of 2.5 kilometers, ultimately of one kilometer.

No further flight testing of the video system having occurred since the spring of 1963, it became increasingly obvious as time passed that the Soviets were not going to be able to meet their 1964 commitments. As flown, the camera system identified through the video transmissions could not have met them: the 85° lens would need an altitude of 280 nautical miles to produce the required area coverage. At this altitude, however, the Cosmos system could transmit photos with an average resolution of at least 1800 feet, considerably better than the 3280 feet ultimately aimed at in the agreement.

This information plus an estimate of the characteristics to be expected in the initial "operational" Soviet weather satellite was passed along to NASA in advance of the May 1964 discussions in Geneva on further implementation of the meteorological agreement. Although the formal "memorandum of understanding" resulting from these discussions does not specify a new date for beginning the exchange of data, the Soviets informally agreed to aim for early 1965.

Future Prospects

When the exchange of data from meteorological satellites begins, anticipatedly in 1965, it will be up to the intelligence community to establish that the cloud pictures the Soviets give us are as complete and as good as what they receive from their satellites. After the initial determination, periodic spot checks will be required.

Real-time television signals will undoubtedly be transmitted from future Soviet manned spacecraft. TV pictures of Soviet cosmonauts' movements would be of great help to us in assessing pilot participation in rendezvous and docking operations. The activity of passengers in future Soviet orbital space stations will probably be monitored through live TV cameras, and U. S. intelligence will be in a position to check on it at the same time by operating readout devices at Elint sites peripheral to the USSR.

Future Soviet lunar and planetary probes will probably use a technique of picture taking and delayed electronic scanning and transmission. For manned lunar missions, some sort of picture transmission system will undoubtedly be employed, probably one with more advanced techniques.

Constant upgrading of collection equipment and continued analysis of transmitted video signals will ensure that U. S. intelligence will remain in as favorable a position for assessing future Soviet space efforts as it has enjoyed so far.

Tour through one type of space-flight tracking system.

THE DIYARBAKIR RADAR

Stanley G. Zabetakis
and
John F. Peterson

In September of 1938 five British radar stations which had just been set up to cover the approaches to the Thames estuary were able to monitor Mr. Chamberlain's historic flight to Munich. These stations were the first of an extended network that was soon maintaining twenty-four-hour radar surveillance of the English coast. With this act the art of war entered a new technological stage, and intelligence acquired a new instrument for data gathering. Today collectors of scientific and technical intelligence use radar for gathering denied information on missile and space activities, as well as aerodynamic developments, which is necessary for the analysis of opposing weapon systems.

Today's radar is much more powerful and more complex than that of 1938, but its operation is not beyond lay understanding. The analyst, though he will probably never be called upon to operate a radar system, will find his appreciation of and confidence in the data produced by these systems increased by an acquaintance with how they work. Here we describe a ground-based radar at Diyarbakir, in eastern Turkey, which is not unlike other radar systems currently deployed to satisfy S&T intelligence collection requirements.

The first installation (designated AN/FPS-17, XW-1) at Diyarbakir was originally intended to provide mere surveillance of the USSR's missile test range at Kapustin Yar south of Stalingrad—that is to detect missile launchings. The data it came to produce, however, transcend surveillance, permitting the derivation of missile trajectories, the identification of earth satellite launches, the calculation of a satellite's ephemeris (position and orbit), and the synthesis of booster rocket performance. The success achieved by this fixed-beam radar has led to the co-location with it of a tracking radar (AN/FPS-79) which, beginning in mid-1964, has given an additional capability for estimating the configuration and dimensions of satellites or missiles and observing the reentry of manned or unmanned vehicles. This article, however, will confine its attention to the fixed-beam AN/FPS-17.

Genesis

Experimentation with the detection of missiles by a modified SCR 270 radar in 1948 and 1949 at Holloman Air Force Base, along with U.S. experience in the use of high-power components on other radars, created a basis for believing that a megawatt-rated radar could be fabricated for operation over much longer ranges than ever before. The need for intelligence on Soviet missile activity being acute, a formal requirement for such a radar was established, and Rome Air Development Center was given responsibility for engineering the system. In October 1954 General Electric, which had experience in producing high-power VHF equipment and radars, was awarded a contract for the fabrication, installation, and testing of what was to be at the time the world's largest and most powerful operational radar. The contract stipulated that the equipment was to be in operation at Site IX near Diyarbakir within nine months, by 1 June 1955. Construction began in February, and the scheduled operational date was missed by fifteen minutes.

The original antenna installation was a large D.S. Kennedy parabolic reflector, 175 feet high by 110 feet wide, radiating in the frequency range 175 to 215 megacycles. Standard GE high-power television transmitters, modified for pulse operation, were used at the beginning. Surveillance was carried out by six horizontal beams over the Kapustin Yar area. In 1958 a second antenna, 150 feet high by 300 feet long, and new 1.2-megawatt transmitters were installed as part of a modification kit which provided three additional horizontal beams, a seven-beam vertical fan, and greater range capability. The elaborated system includes automatic alarm circuitry, range-finding circuitry, and data-processing equipment; it is equipped to make 35-mm photographic recordings of all signals received. A preliminary reduction of data is accomplished on-site, but the final processing is done in the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson.

From 15 June 1955, when the first Soviet missile was detected, to 1 March 1964, 508 incidents (sightings) were reported, 147 of them during the last two years of the period.

Operation

The system has eight separate radar sets or channels, each with its own exciter, transmitter, duplexer, receiver, and data display unit. These eight channels feed electromagnetic energy into sixteen fixed

beams formed by the two antennas, each channel, or transmitter-receiver combination, being time-shared between two beams. Pneumatically driven switches operate on a three-second cycle to power each beam alternately for 1.5 seconds. There are antenna feeds for two additional beams which could be made to function with some patchwork in the wiring.

The antenna feeds are positioned to produce in space the beam pattern depicted in Figure 1. Beams 1 and 18 are those not ordinarily energized. Beams 1 through 7 use the older of the two antennas; 8 through 18 are formed by the newer, "cinerama" antenna, whose 300-foot width gives them their narrow horizontal dimension. Beams 2 through 9 are projected in horizontal array; 10 through 17 (although 10 actually lies in the horizontal row) are grouped as the vertical component. All beams of each group are powered simultaneously.

Except for being controlled by a master timing signal, each of the eight channels operates independently of the others. Each trans-




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2

mitter is on a slightly different frequency to prevent interaction with the others. The transmitted pulse, 2000 microseconds long, is coded, or tagged, by being passed through a tapped delay line which may reverse the phase at 20-microsecond intervals. Upon reception the returned signal is passed through the same tapped delay line and compressed¹ 100:1, to 20 microseconds, in order to increase the accuracy and resolution of the range measurement, which is of course a function of the interval between transmission and return.

Figure 2 shows the beam pattern superimposed on the target area. The total azimuthal coverage is from 18° to 49.7°. The system normally detects missiles or satellites launched from Kapustin Yar at a nominal range of 800 nautical miles; it tracks one type of missile out as far as 1625 NM. The missiles and satellites are not sensed at their maximum detectable range because the coverage of the fixed-beam configuration does not conform with the test range layout.

¹ A delay line is what it sounds like, an artificial transmission detour that serves to retard the signal. Here it is made up with series inductances and parallel capacitances that yield a constant delay. Pick-off points at 20-microsecond intervals permit these sub-pulses to be extracted in such sequence that they all arrive together, to achieve the compression effect.

The electrical characteristics of each of the channels can be re-capped as follows:

Frequency	175-215 megacycles
Peak power per beam	1.2 megawatts
Pulse length	2000 microseconds
Pulse repetition rate	30 cycles per second
Duty cycle (portion of time transmitting)	0.06
Beam width (horizontally elongated) ..	2.5° x 1.8°
Beam width (vertically elongated)	1° x 2°
Pulse compression ratio	100:1
Range accuracy	within 5 nautical miles

To illustrate how the capability of the system is calculated, we can take typical logs which show channel 4, for example, operating with the following parameters:

Peak power output	1.0 megawatt
Minimum discernible signal	130 decibels below one milliwatt
Frequency	192 megacycles

Channel 4's maximum range of intercept capability for a target one square meter in cross section is then determined by using these parameters in the radar range equation

$$R = \left(\frac{P_t G^2 \lambda^2 A}{(4\pi)^3 S} \right)^{1/4}$$

where:

- R=Range in meters
- P_t=Peak power transmitted in watts
- G=Antenna gain over isotropic (omnidirectional) radiator
- λ=Wave length in meters
- S=Minimum discernible signal in watts
- A=Target size in square meters

Substituting,

$$R^4 = \frac{10^6 \text{ watts } (5000)^2 (1.56\text{m})^2 1\text{m}^2}{(12.57)^3 (1 \cdot 10)^{-16} \text{ watts}}$$

and

$$\text{Range} = 2250 \text{ nautical miles.}$$

Sightings made by the fixed-beam system include vertical firings (for upper-atmosphere research vehicles or booster checkout), ballistic missiles fired to the nominal 650, 1050, and 2000 NM impact areas, launches of Cosmos satellites, orbiting satellites, and natural abnormalities such as ionospheric disturbances or aurora.

Measurements and Processing

Data on target missiles or satellites are recorded in each radar channel by photographing a five-inch intensity-modulated oscilloscope with the camera shutter open on a 35-mm film moving approximately five inches per minute. The range of an individual target is represented by its location across the width of the film, the time by a dot-dash code along the length. In addition to this positional information, the target's approximate radial velocity (velocity in the direction of observation) is determined by measuring the doppler frequency shift in the radar signal when it is returned. The doppler shift is found to within 500 cycles by determining which of eighteen frequency filters covering successive bands 500 cycles per second wide will pass the return signal. This measurement of radial velocity runs from -4 to $+4$ nautical miles per second in increments of .219 NM. All these data, together with the elevation and azimuth of the observing beam, are automatically converted to serial form, encoded in standard teletype code, and punched on paper tape for teletype transmission.

Data is thus received at Wright-Patterson first by teletype and then on film, the latter accompanied by logs giving data on the target as read by site personnel and data on equipment performance such as peak transmitted power, frequency, and receiver sensitivity. The film when it arrives is edited and marked to facilitate reading on the "Oscar" (preliminary processing) equipment. Targets are sorted one from another by differences in range and rate of range change, and the returns on each are numbered in time sequence.

The FTD Oscar equipment consists of a film reader which gives time and range data in analog form, a converter unit which changes them to digital form, and an IBM printing cardpunch which receives the digital data. The Oscar equipment and human operator thus generate a deck of IBM cards for computer processing which contains the history of each target's position through time. The first step in the computer processing is to translate Oscar units into actual radar range, "Z" (Greenwich mean) time, and beam number, the

latter fixing the azimuth and elevation of the return. During this first step three separate quality-control checks are made on each IBM card to eliminate erroneous data.

Those observations that succeed in passing all these tests are taken to the second step of computer processing, the fitting of a second-degree polynomial curve to the raw range/time data in accordance with the criterion of least squares.² A standard deviation from this curve is established, and any raw datum point showing a deviation as large as three times the standard is discarded. Then second-degree curves are similarly fitted to the azimuth/time and elevation/time data. The three second-degree polynomials—for range/time, azimuth/time, and elevation/time—are used to generate a value for position and velocity at mean time of observation, and on the basis of these values an initial estimate of the elliptical trajectory is made.

In computing the elliptical path the earth is physically considered a rotating homogeneous sphere and geometrically considered an ellipsoid—that is, its equatorial bulge is ignored in the gravitational computation but not with respect to intersections of its surface. An ellipse not intersecting the earth's surface represents a satellite orbit; one intersecting the earth's surface describes a trajectory above the point of intersection.

The parameters of the ellipse are iterated with the computer, establishing a best-fit ellipse constrained by a weighted least-squares criterion. Along this ellipse the target's track is computed—the history through time of latitude, longitude, altitude, and such velocity and angular parameters as may be of interest. A missile's actual range is probably shorter than that of its computed trajectory because of its non-elliptical thrusting path and atmospheric drag after its reentry. The difference is on the order of 10 to 25 nautical miles for short and medium range missiles, 50 NM for ICBM's.

² Under which a mathematical function is judged to be the one best approximating a series of observations if the sum of squares of its residuals (deviations from the raw data) is least. If there is systematic irregularity in the reliability of the data the residuals are weighted accordingly.

The case for consistent, unambiguous usage of a few key odds expressions.

WORDS OF ESTIMATIVE PROBABILITY

Sherman Kent

The briefing officer was reporting a photo reconnaissance mission.¹ Pointing to the map, he made three statements:

1. "And at this location there is a new airfield. [He could have located it to the second on a larger map.] Its longest runway is 10,000 feet."
2. "It is almost certainly a military airfield."
3. "The terrain is such that the Blanks could easily lengthen the runways, otherwise improve the facilities, and incorporate this field into their system of strategic staging bases. It is *possible* that they will." Or, more daringly, "It would be logical for them to do this and *sooner or later they probably will.*"

The above are typical of three kinds of statements which populate the literature of all substantive intelligence. The first is as close as one can come to a statement of indisputable fact. It describes something knowable and known with a high degree of certainty. The reconnaissance aircraft's position was known with precision and its camera reproduced almost exactly what was there.

Estimative Uncertainty

The second is a judgment or estimate. It describes something which is knowable in terms of the human understanding but not precisely known by the man who is talking about it. There is strong evidence to sustain his judgment: the only aircraft on the field are military aircraft, many are parked in revetted hard-stands, the support area has all the characteristics of similar known military installations, and so on. Convincing as it is, this evidence is circumstantial. It cannot justify a flat assertion that this is a military airfield. It makes the case, say, 90 percent of the way. And some sort of verbal qualifier

¹This particular briefing officer was *not* the photo-interpreter. See page 61 for the special language of P/Is.

is necessary to show that the case is a 90-percenter, not a 100. This is why the briefer said "almost certainly."

The third statement is another judgment or estimate, this one made almost without any evidence direct or indirect. It may be an estimate of something that no man alive can know, for the Blanks may not yet have made up their minds whether to lengthen the runways and build up the base. Still the logic of the situation as it appears to the briefer permits him to launch himself into the area of the literally unknowable and make this estimate. He can use *possible* to indicate that runway extension is neither certain nor impossible, or he can be bolder and use *probably* to designate more precisely a degree of likelihood, a lower one than he had attached to his estimate regarding the character of the airfield.

Generally speaking, the most important passages of the literature of substantive intelligence contain far more statements of the estimative types two and three than of the factual type one. This is the case because many of the things you most wish to know about the other man are the secrets of state he guards most jealously. To the extent his security measures work, to that extent your knowledge must be imperfect and your statements accordingly qualified by designators of your uncertainty. Simple prudence requires the qualifier in any type-three statement to show a decent reticence before the unknowable.

Concern over these qualifiers is most characteristic of that part of the intelligence production business known as estimates. This is no small recondite compartment; it extends to almost every corner of all intelligence research work, from the short appraisals or comments of a reports officer to the full-dress research study of the political or economic analyst. Practically all substantive intelligence people constantly make estimates. The remarks that follow are generally addressed to all these people and their readers, but most especially are they addressed to that particular institution of the estimating business known as the National Intelligence Estimate and its audience.

The NIE, taking into account the high echelon of its initiators, producers, and consumers, should be the community's best effort to deal with the relevant evidence imaginatively and judiciously. It should set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key statement. Ideally, once the commu-

nity has made up its mind in this matter, it should be able to choose a word or a phrase which quite accurately describes the degree of its certainty; and ideally, exactly this message should get through to the reader.

It should not come as a surprise that the fact is far from the ideal, that considerable difficulty attends both the fitting of a phrase to the estimators' meaning and the extracting of that meaning by the consumer. Indeed, from the vantage point of almost fourteen years of experience, the difficulties seem practically insurmountable. The why and wherefore of this particular area of semantics is the subject of this essay.

Let me begin with a bit of history.²

Early Brush with Ambiguity

In March 1951 appeared NIE 29-51, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951." The following was its key judgment, made in the final paragraph of the Conclusions: "Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe that the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 *should be considered a serious possibility*." (Emphasis added.) Clearly this statement is either of type two, a knowable thing of which our knowledge was very imperfect, or of type three, a thing literally unknowable for the reason that the Soviets themselves had not yet reached a binding decision. Whichever it was, our duty was to look hard at the situation, decide how likely or unlikely an attack might be, and having reached that decision, draft some language that would convey to the reader our exact judgment.

The process of producing NIEs then was almost identical to what it is today. This means that a draft had been prepared in the Office of National Estimates on the basis of written contributions from the IAC³ agencies, that a score or so of Soviet, Satellite, and Yugoslav experts from the intelligence community labored over it, and that an all but final text presided over by the Board of National Estimates had gone to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. There the IAC

² Harry H. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) carries on pp. 196-7 a bob-tailed and somewhat garbled version of it.

³ Intelligence Advisory Committee, USIB's predecessor.

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members, with the DCI in the chair, gave it its final review, revision, and approval.

As is quite obvious from the sentence quoted above, Soviet and Satellite intentions with respect to Yugoslavia were a matter of grave concern in the high policy echelons of our government. The State Department's Policy Planning Staff was probably the most important group seized of the problem. Its chairman and members read NIE 29-51 with the sort of concentration intelligence producers can only hope their product will command.

A few days after the estimate appeared, I was in informal conversation with the Policy Planning Staff's chairman. We spoke of Yugoslavia and the estimate. Suddenly he said, "By the way, what did you people mean by the expression 'serious possibility'? What kind of odds did you have in mind?" I told him that my personal estimate was on the dark side, namely that the odds were around 65 to 35 in favor of an attack. He was somewhat jolted by this; he and his colleagues had read "serious possibility" to mean odds very considerably lower. Understandably troubled by this want of communication, I began asking my own colleagues on the Board of National Estimates what odds they had had in mind when they agreed to that wording. It was another jolt to find that each Board member had had somewhat different odds in mind and the low man was thinking of about 20 to 80, the high of 80 to 20. The rest ranged in between.

Of my colleagues on the Board at least one—maybe more—shared my concern. My most obvious co-worrier was Max Foster.⁴ He and I were shaken perhaps more by the realization that Board members who had worked over the estimate had failed to communicate with each other than by the Board's failure to communicate with its audience. This NIE was, after all, the twenty-ninth that had appeared since General Smith had established the Office of National Estimates. Had Board members been seeming to agree on five month's worth of estimative judgments with no real agreement at all? Was this the case with all others who participated—ONE staffers and IAC representatives, and even IAC members themselves? Were the NIEs dotted with "serious possibilities" and other expressions that meant very dif-

⁴ Maxwell E. Foster, one of the original eight members of the Board of National Estimates, a lawyer by trade, and a gifted semanticist by avocation. Some will remember him for his elegant and precise writing; none will forget his eccentricities. He was the man who always wore his hat in the house.

ferent things to both producers and readers? What were we really trying to say when we wrote a sentence such as this?

What we were trying to do was just what my Policy Planning friend had assumed, namely to quote odds on this or that being the case or taking place in the future. There is a language for odds; in fact there are two—the precise mathematical language of the actuary or the race track bookie and a less precise though useful verbal equivalent. We did not use the numbers, however, and it appeared that we were misusing the words.

The No-Odds Possible

Our gross error in the Yugoslav estimate, and perhaps in its predecessors, lay in our not having fully understood this particular part of our task. As Foster and I saw it the substantive stuff we had been dealing with had about it certain elements of dead certainty: Stalin was in charge in the USSR, for example. These, if relevant, we stated affirmatively or used impliedly as fact. There were also elements of sheer impossibility (Yugoslavia was not going to crack off along its borders and disappear physically from the face of the earth); these we did not bother to state at all. In between these matters of certainty and impossibility lay the large area of the *possible*. With respect to the elements herein we could perceive some that were more likely to happen than not, some less likely. These were the elements upon which we could make an estimate, choosing some word or phrase to convey our judgment that the odds were such and such for or against something coming to pass.

At the race track one might say:

There are ten horses in the starting gate. It is *possible* that any one of them will win—even the one with three legs.

But the *odds* (or chances) *against* the three-legger are overwhelming.

Here, as in estimating Yugoslav developments, there is evidence to justify the citing of odds. But in the world that intelligence estimates try hardest to penetrate—a world of closed covenants secretly arrived at, of national business conducted behind walls of all but impenetrable security, of skillfully planned deceptions, and so on—such evidence is by no means invariably at hand. In a multitude of the most important circumstances—situations you are duty bound to consider and report on—about all you can say is that such and such

is neither certain to happen nor is it happening an impossibility. The short and proper way out is to say that its happening is possible and stop there without any expression of odds. If you reserve the use of "possible" for this special purpose—to signal something of high importance whose chances of being or happening you cannot estimate with greater precision—hopefully you will alert your reader to some necessary contingency planning. (You may not if you have dulled him by citing a lot of "possibles" of little real consequence.)

If our gross error lay in not perceiving the correctness—or at any rate the utility—of the above formulation, our particular error lay in using the word "possibility" with the modifier "serious." Foster and I felt that it was going to be difficult enough for the estimators to communicate a sense of odds even if they stuck to a fairly rigorous vocabulary; it was going to be impossible if the vocabulary were permitted to become as sloppily imprecise as in normal speech. We had to have a way of differentiating between those possible things about which we could make a statement of likelihood and the other possible things about which we could not. The first cardinal rule to emerge was thus, "The word 'possible' (and its cognates⁵) must not be modified." The urge to drop into ordinary usage and write "just possible," "barely possible," "a distinct [or good] possibility," and so on must be suppressed. The whole concept of "possibility" as here developed must stand naked of verbal modifiers.⁶

⁵ See page 59.

⁶ This usage is wholly in accord with the findings of the lexicographers, who almost invariably assign it the number one position. Further, it is readily understood and generally employed by statisticians, scientists, and the like, who sometimes define it as "non-zero probability." This is much to my taste.

At the same time there can be no question of the existence of a second usage, especially in the ordinary spoken word. The meaning here is most emphatically not the broad range of "non-zero probability," but a variable low order of probability, say anywhere below 40 or 30 or 20 percent. Thus it would fall last in a series that named descending odds: certain, probable, possible. When people use it to signify very low odds, for example below 5 percent, they may say "remotely possible" or any of its many cognates. This of course is not to my liking, but the intended meaning is clear. The serious trouble comes when another group of users lifts the word out of its position in the cellar of odds and by the addition of augmenting adjectives makes it do duty upstairs: "serious possibility," "great possibility," "highly possible."

An Odds Table

Once Foster and I had decided upon this first cardinal rule we turned to the elements where likelihood could be estimated. We began to think in terms of a chart which would show the mathematical odds equivalent to words and phrases of probability. Our starter was a pretty complicated affair. We approached its construction from the wrong end. Namely, we began with 11 words or phrases which seemed to convey a feeling of 11 different orders of probability and then attached numerical odds to them. At once we perceived our folly. In the first place, given the inexactness of the intelligence data we were working with, the distinctions we made between one set of odds and its fellows above and below were unjustifiably sharp. And second, even if in rare cases you could arrive at such exact mathematical odds, the verbal equivalent could not possibly convey that exactness. The laudable precision would be lost on the reader.

So we tried again, this time with only five gradations, and beginning with the numerical odds. The chart which emerged can be set down in its classical simplicity thus:

	100% Certainty		
The General Area of Possibility	93%,	give or take about 6%	Almost certain
	75%,	give or take about 12%	Probable
	50%,	give or take about 10%	Chances about even
	30%,	give or take about 10%	Probably not
	7%,	give or take about 5%	Almost certainly not
	0% Impossibility		

Important note to consumers: You should be quite clear that when we say "such and such is unlikely" we mean that the chances of its NOT happening are in our judgment about three to one. Another, and to you critically important, way of saying the same thing is that the chances of its HAPPENING are about one in four. Thus if we were to write, "It is unlikely that Castro will attempt to shoot down a U-2 between now and November 1965," we mean there is in our view around a 25-percent chance that he will do just that. If the estimate were to read, "It is almost certain Castro will not . . .," we would mean there was still an appreciable chance, say five percent or less, that he would attempt the shoot-down.

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We had some charts run up and had some discussions in the community. There were those who thought the concept and the chart a very fine thing. A retired intelligence professional thought well enough of it to put it into a book.⁷ CIA officers, addressing War College audiences and the like, would sometimes flash a slide and talk about it. A few copies got pasted on the walls of estimates offices in the community. Some people were sufficiently taken that they advocated putting it on the inside back cover of every NIE as a sort of sure-fire handy glossary.

There were also those who did not think about the idea at all, and others in opposition to it. Some fairly important people who had a professional stake in this kind of thinking never took the trouble to learn what it was all about. A good many did take a little trouble and laughed. Still a third group found out all they needed to know and attacked the whole proposition from a hard semantic base point. Of these more later.

In the face of this inertia and opposition and with the early departure of my only solid ally, Max Foster, I began backing away from bold forward positions. I did continue harassing actions and in the course of making a nuisance of myself to associates and colleagues did pick up some useful converts, but I dropped all thought of getting an agreed air-tight vocabulary of estimative expressions, let alone reproducing the chart in the rear of every NIE. With the passage of time it has appeared that the guerrilla strategy thrust upon me by circumstance was the only one holding any chance of success. In almost fourteen years this article is my first serious and systematic attempt to get the message across, and it probably would not have been written if David Wark⁸ had not consulted me about his foray into the same semantic problem.

The Aesthetic Opposition

What slowed me up in the first instance was the firm and reasoned resistance of some of my colleagues. Quite figuratively I am going

⁷ Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production* (N.Y., 1957). The chart appears on the inside cover and again on page 208—not exactly as above but in full accord with my principles. The trouble comes on pp. 209–210, where General Platt departs widely, and to me regrettably, from my notion of legitimate synonyms.

⁸ See the next following article.

to call them the “poets”—as opposed to the “inmathematicians”—in my circle of associates, and if the term conveys a modicum of disapprobation on my part, that is what I want it to do. Their attitude toward the problem of communication seems to be fundamentally defeatist. They appear to believe the most a writer can achieve when working in a speculative area of human affairs is communication in only the broadest general sense. If he gets the wrong message across or no message at all—well, that is life.

Perhaps I overstate the poets' defeatism. In any case at least one of them feels quite strongly that my brief for the “mathematicians” is pretty much nonsense. He has said that my likening my side to the mathematician's is a phoney; that I am in fact one with the sociologists who try by artificial definitions to give language a bogus precision. He has gone on to stress the function of rhetoric and its importance. And he has been at some pains to point out how handy it would be to use expressions like “*just* possible,” “*may well*,” and “*doubtless*” as they are loosely used in conversation. Could there not be an occasional relaxation of the rule?

Suppose one wrote a sentence: “Khrushchev *may well* have had in the back of his mind such and such, or indeed it is *distinctly* possible that somebody had just primed him. . . .” Now suppose you delete the “*well*” and the “*distinctly*”; has anything been lost? There will be those who point out that “*may well*” and “*distinctly possible*” do convey a flavor which is missing without them. Of course the flavor in question is the flavor of odds, communicated without quoting them. The poets would probably argue that in a sentence of this sort the introduction of any of the terms for particular odds would make the writer look silly. Everybody knows that you could not have the evidence to sustain the use of, say, “*probably*” in these two instances. Hence you can only suggest odds by the use of the “*may well*” and “*distinctly possible*” and so say something without saying it, in short fudge it. The poets feel wounded when urged to delete the whole ambiguous sentence, arguing that this serves only to impoverish the product. They grow impatient when you advocate dropping only the “*well*” and the “*distinctly*.” And as for your accusation of fudging, they generally counterattack, inviting you to write something that fudges nothing.

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There is a point which the poets can make with telling effect. It is that there are probably just as many reading poets as there are writing poets, and these are going to be numb to the intended meaning of the "mathematician" writer. If you write to give no more than just the general idea or general feel you may get through with great success. Per contra, if you break your heart in an endeavor to make yourself fully and precisely understood, you may not.

I realize the truth in the above; I am not reconciled; I deplore it.

The Growth of Variants

Even if there had been no poets it would have been an impractical idea to print a chart on the inside of the back page of each NIE as a sort of glossary. To have used the one on page 55 and stuck to these words exclusively would have imposed intolerable restraints upon the prose. Even if it had been desirable it would have been impossible to enforce such rigidity. But this was really never at issue: from the start a number of perfectly legitimate synonyms for the concept of possibility and a number for each of the five orders of likelihood were generally recognized.⁹

⁹ Some of these synonymous meanings are expressed in verb forms. Thus it is syntactically possible to use them closely coupled to one of the adverbial expressions of odds, e.g., "we believe it likely that . . ." or "we estimate it is almost certain that such and such will not . . ." If we really mean to assign an odds value to these verb forms good usage would forbid this kind of doubling-up. Mathematically, the probabilities would have to undergo a quite ridiculous multiplication. Thus "we believe" (75±percent) multiplied by "likely" (75±percent) would yield odds worse than 3 to 2 instead of 3 to 1. If we are not assigning an odds value to "we believe" and "we estimate," the purist would say we should not use them. Yet on many occasions a writer will feel uncomfortable—and justifiably so—with a bare "It is likely that . . ." Such a bald statement is seemingly more confident than the situation would warrant. The writer will feel something akin to a compulsion towards modesty and a drive to soften the "likely" by introducing it with a "we believe" or "we estimate." Almost invariably he does not intend to change the odds associated with "likely." If one could set himself up as the arbiter, one would, I believe, rule that the "likely," or the "probably," or the "almost certainly," etc. was the operative expression of odds and that its message was unaffected by the introducing verb.

Doubling up in the "possibly" category is a different matter. We should avoid "it might (or may) be possible for the Blanks to . . ." The verb should be present or future indicative, normally "is" and "will be."

For example:

Possible ¹⁰	{ conceivable could ¹¹ may might perhaps ¹²
Almost certain	{ virtually certain all but certain highly probable highly likely odds [or chances] overwhelming
Probable	{ likely we believe we estimate
50-50	{ chances about even chances a little better [or less] than even
Probably not ¹³	{ improbable unlikely we believe that . . . not we estimate that . . . not we doubt, doubtful

¹⁰ These synonyms must not be modified; might *well*, could *well*, *just* could, *barely* conceivable, etc. are as inadmissible as the original sin.

¹¹ "Could" is included here because of many years' duty as a synonym for "possible." It has also served as a short way of noting a capability as in "The Soviets could develop [for "have the capability to develop"] such and such a radar though we have no evidence that they are doing so." The two usages are close, to be sure, but not identical.

¹² As in, "It is almost certain that such and such will occur in the delta, *perhaps* in Saigon itself."

¹³ This group of words poses at least one very vexing problem. Suppose you wish to make a positive estimate that there is, say, about a 30-percent chance that such and such thing is the case. Assuming that the thing in question is important, a 30-percent chance of its being the case is highly significant. If you stick with the chart and write "it is improbable [or unlikely etc.] that such and such is the case" you will probably convey a much more negative attitude than you intend. There are many ways around the problem; they will, however, require a few more words.

Almost certainly not	}	almost impossible virtually impossible some slight chance highly doubtful
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If the chart were expanded to take care of these, it probably would not fit on the inside back cover of the NIE, and even if it could be made to, its complexity would probably exasperate gentle reader more than it would edify him. Still worse, he would be confused by changes that would have to be made in it from time to time, always to accommodate newcomers among the accepted expressions.

The table of synonyms above did not come into being all at once; it has grown to its present size by accretion. "We believe" came in rather early, and as I remember via General Smith himself. "We estimate" was a bit later; "we think," "we expect," and "we judge" are part way in.¹⁴ If they make it all the way I trust they will be used and understood in the "probably"/"we believe" bracket. "We doubt" has been accepted within the last few years as a legitimate equivalent of "probably not." There will be others—I sincerely hope not very many. Keeping them out will take some doing. In the past, whatever the rigor insisted upon at the working and drafting level, who was there to tell a General Smith or a Mr. Dulles, as he presided over the IAC or USIB, that the revision he had just written out on a piece of yellow paper was not permissible?

Consistency in Usage

From my remarks about the poets, it should be clear that my sympathies lie with their mathematical opponents. But we mathematically-inclined are ourselves not in good array. You might almost say that some of us are talking in the decimal, others in the binary, and still others in the root five or seven systems.

For example, consider the letter-number device which has been standard with attaché and other reporting services, A-2, C-3, F-6, etc. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 designating the quality of a report's content stand for, respectively: (1) confirmed by other independent or reliable sources; (2) probably true; (3) *possibly true*; (4) doubtful; (5) probably false; and (6) cannot be judged. Note that the

¹⁴ "We anticipate," used regrettably as a synonym for "we expect," is also part way in. I hope it gets out.

number 3, "possibly true," is in the middle of the scale of odds, doing the duty I have hoped it should never be asked to do.

Or consider the findings of a distinguished intelligence research project. The object was to identify certain military units with respect to the chances of their existence or non-existence. One group of units was called "firm," another "highly probable," a third "probable," and a fourth general group "possible." Except for one important thing, this kind of ordering was wholly to my taste. The word "firm" was unfortunately not used, as one might expect, to describe a condition of 100 percent certainty. Its begetters, upon cross-examination, owned that it was meant to indicate something like 90-95 percent—roughly the equivalent of my "almost certain." This usage puts the lower categories slightly askew from the terminology of my chart—"highly probable" equating to my "probable" and "probable" to my "chances better than even." "Possible," however, was used exactly as I have felt it should be used, to designate something in the range of chances between the absolute barriers of "certainty" and "impossibility" to which no numerical odds could be assigned.

There are other heresies among the mathematicians, if they can be so proclaimed. For example, look at the way in which photo-interpreters have defined their key evaluative words:

Suspect—Evidence is insufficient to permit designation of a function with any degree of certainty, but photography or other information provides some indications of what the function may be.

Possible—Evidence indicates that the designated function is reasonable and more likely than other functions considered.

Probable—Evidence for the designated function is strong and other functions appear quite doubtful.

This kind of formulation shows that someone—probably a number of people—had spent a good amount of time striving for a set of rigorous definitions. If you pause long enough to realize that the photo-interpreter's first problem is identification and then take a hard look at his word "suspect," you will see that it parallels my usage for "possible." But the P/Is have preempted "possible" for other duty. Their "possible" fits nicely into the slot of "probable" in my scale of values, and their "probable" into my "almost certain."

We are in disarray.

To Estimate or Not

The green language of ordinary conversation abounds with estimates given lightly and with a high order of confidence: "You're a shoo-in,"

"Not a Chinaman's chance," "A million to one." When you hear one of these expressions or read its more decorous counterpart you may realize that the matter at issue and the related judgment required little soul-searching on the part of the estimator. In the intelligence business, too, there are many occasions when the obscurities of the unknown are easily pierced and we can launch an estimative "probably" or an "almost certainly not" with speed and conviction.

There are, however, estimates at the other end of the spectrum—estimates which are patently impossible to make. The green language is equally rich in coping with these: "Search me," "I wouldn't have the foggiest," "Your guess is as good as mine," and so on.

It is unfortunate that intelligence estimators are not allowed this kind of freedom in brushing off requests for estimates of the totally impenetrable. Some way or another a convention has been established by which we may not write the sentence: "It is impossible to estimate such and such." If we try this maneuver our masters will often rudely ask, "Why can't you; what are you paid for, anyway?" If they do not bludgeon us thus, they employ a combination of blackmail and flattery before which even the most righteous among us are likely to fall. The play goes like this: "You say you cannot estimate the number, type, and performance characteristics of Chinese Communist long-range missiles for mid-1970. This is data which is absolutely essential for my planning. Obviously no one expects you to be wholly accurate or very confident of your findings. But you people are after all the experts, and it would be too bad if I had to go to others for this stuff who know far less about it than you. And that is exactly what I will do if you refuse my request."

At this point we do not invite our would-be consumer to seek out his own crystal ball team. We accept his charge, but with grave reservations. Sometimes we try to stay honest by introducing contingencies. "This will probably continue to be the case but only if . . . , if . . . , and if . . ." Then without closing out the contingencies with firm estimates (which we are plainly unable to make) we merely talk about the "ifs," hoping that he will keep them in mind as time unfolds and that when sufficient returns are in he will himself make the estimate or ask us to have a second look.

At other times again, when it is the whole subject rather than one of its parts that cannot be estimated, we meet the impossible frontally. We scrupulously avoid the word "estimate" in describing the document and its findings. Rather, we proclaim these to be intelligence assumptions for planning. In our opening paragraphs we are likely

to be quite specific as to where our evidence begins and ends, how we are speculating about quantities of things that the other man may produce without knowing whether he has yet made the decision to produce so many as one. We acknowledge our use of the crutch of U.S. analogy, and so on. We promise to speak, not in discrete figures, but in ranges of figures and ranges of our uncertainty regarding them.

Some years back we were obliged by *force majeure* to compose some tables setting forth how the Blanks might divide up an all-but-undreamed-of stockpile of fissionable material among an as-yet-unborn family of weapons. There were of course the appropriate passages of verbal warning, and then, on the chance that the numerical tables should become physically separated from the warning, the tables were overprinted in red, "This table is based on assumptions stated in. . . . Moreover, it should not be used for any purpose whatever without inclusion, *in full*, of the cautionary material in. . . ." More recently we have issued a document which not only began with a fulsome *caveat* but was set off by a format and color of paper that were new departures.

The Lurking Weasel

Unhappily, making the easy estimate is not the commonplace of our trade; making the impossible one is happily equally rare. What is the commonplace is the difficult but not impossible estimate. And how we, along with all humanity, hate the task! How fertile the human mind in devising ways of delaying if not avoiding the moment of decision! How rich the spoken language in its vocabulary of issue-ducking! "I have a sneaker that . . . ," "I'd drop dead of surprise if . . ."—expressions with sound but upon reflection almost without meaning. How much conviction, for example, do you have to have before you become possessed of a sneaker; how much of the unexpected does it take to cause your heart to fail?

Even the well-disciplined intelligence brotherhood similarly quails before the difficult but not impossible estimate and all too often resorts to an expression of avoidance drawn from a more elegant lexicon. What we consciously or subconsciously seek is an expression which conveys a definite meaning but at the same time either absolves us completely of the responsibility or makes the estimate at enough removes from ourselves as not to implicate us. The "serious [or distinct] possibility" clan of expressions is a case in point.

Look at our use of “apparently” and “seemingly” and the verbal “appears” and “seems.” We, the writers, are not the unique beings to whom such and such “appears” or “seems” to be the case; with these words we have become everybody or nobody at all. So also with “suggests” and “indicates.” Perhaps the “to us” is implicit, but we do not so state; and far more importantly, we practically never say why our suggestibilities were aroused or assess the weight of the reason that aroused them. So still again with “presumably,” “ostensibly,” and—most serious of all—“reportedly” otherwise unmodified. The latter taken literally and by itself carries no evaluative weight whatsoever, and who should know this better than we ourselves who each day handle scores of “reports” whose credibility runs up and down the scale between almost certain truth and almost certain nonsense. It is a pleasure to report—authoritatively—that you will find very few unmodified “reportedlys” in the NIEs.

We say “the Soviets probably *fear* that such and such action will cause thus and so.” What I think we mean is “The Soviets probably estimate that if they do such and such the reaction will be disadvantageous to them.” If we say “they probably *hope* . . .” we mean roughly the opposite. We talk of another country’s willingness “to risk such and such.” This is a shorthand, and probably an unconscious one, for the country’s having estimated the odds against the unwanted thing’s happening as well as how unacceptable the unwanted thing would be if it occurred. Its “risking the danger” removes the critical judgment a step or two from our personal responsibility.

Words and expressions like these are far too much a part of us and our habits of communication to be banned by fiat. No matter what is said of their impreciseness or of the timidity of soul that attends their use, they will continue to play an important part in written expression. If use them we must in NIEs, let us try to use them sparingly and in places where they are least likely to obscure the thrust of our key estimative passages.

Here may I return to the group to which I have especially addressed the foregoing—the brotherhood of the NIE. Let us meet these key estimates head on. Let us isolate and seize upon exactly the thing that needs estimating. Let us endeavor to make clear to the reader that the passage in question is of critical importance—the gut estimate, as we call it among ourselves. Let us talk of it in terms of odds or chances, and when we have made our best judgment let us assign it a word or phrase that is chosen from one of the five rough categories of

likelihood on the chart. Let the judgment be unmistakable and let it be unmistakably ours.

If the matter is important and cannot be assigned an order of likelihood, but is plainly something which is neither certain to come about nor impossible, let us use the word “possible” or one of its stand-ins—and with no modifier.

Survey shows general agreement on the meaning of "probable" and some equivalents, elsewhere much disagreement.

THE DEFINITION OF SOME ESTIMATIVE EXPRESSIONS

David L. Wark

Finished intelligence, particularly in making estimative statements, uses a number of modifiers like "highly probable," "unlikely," "possible" that can be thought of as expressing a range of odds or a mathematical probability, and these are supplemented by various other expressions, especially verb forms, conveying the sense of probability less directly—"may," "could," "we believe." Certain other words express not probability but quantity, imprecisely but perhaps within definable ranges—"few," "several," "considerable." Some people object to any effort to define the odds or quantities meant by such words. They argue that context always modifies the meaning of words and, more broadly, that rigid definitions deprive language of the freedom to adapt to changing needs.

It is possible, however, to state the definitions in quantitative terms without making them artificially precise. And if two-thirds of the users and readers of the word *probably*, for example, feel it conveys a range of odds between 6 and 8 out of 10, then it is more useful to give it this definition than to define it more or less tautologically in terms of other words of probability. This would not deny to context its proper role as the arbiter of value, but only limit the range of its influence. Nor would it freeze the language in perpetuity; as the meanings of the words evolved the quantitative ranges could be changed.

This article describes the results of a survey undertaken to determine if such words are indeed understood as measurable quantities and if so to ascertain the extent to which there is a consensus about the quantitative range of each. A three-part questionnaire on the subject was distributed in the intelligence community—to INR/State, the DIA Office of Estimates, and five CIA offices—and a simplified version of it was sent to policy staffs in the White House, State, and

the Pentagon. Responses were received from 240 intelligence analysts and 63 policy officers.

The responses showed a satisfactory consensus with respect to various usages of likely and probable, phrases expressing greater certainty than these, and modifications of chance—good, better-than-even, slight. There was no satisfactory agreement on the meaning of possible or a wide variety of verb forms such as we believe and might. There was also little agreement on the non-odds quantitative words such as few and many. The policy offices consistently assigned lower probabilities than intelligence analysts did. Correlation between values assigned in and out of context was good.

The Questionnaire

Part One of the questionnaire listed 41 expressions that might be thought of as indicating odds and offered the choice of 0, 10, 20, etc. through 100 as the percentage probability or chances out of 100 signified by each. If the respondent believed that no quantitative answer was satisfactory he could mark "Not Applicable" instead. These expressions of course had to be judged without benefit of context, but in order to check on the validity of such judgments some of them were repeated in Part Two, where they were included in 17 sentences taken from intelligence documents which had been produced in six different offices of the community. The names of all persons and countries in the sentences were changed to sterilize them against bias. Part Three then listed nine expressions of magnitude not referring to probability and offered an assortment of ranges for each.

The idea of a consensus is relative, but for purposes of Parts One and Two it was defined as requiring 70% or more of respondents to name odds within 10 points, plus or minus, of the most frequent response. If the odds or chances most frequently specified for possibly were 50 out of a hundred (as they were) and 70% of all the responses had fallen within the range 40 to 60, the requirements for a consensus on this word would have been satisfied. Only one figure was recorded for each question: when an answer was ranged by marking several adjacent figures, it was recorded as the mean. Mr. Kent's range of 10 to 90 for possible would thus have been recorded as 50. Definitions were also considered invalidated by 20% or more of "Not Applicable" responses rejecting the question.

The replies were tabulated in four categories in descending order of valid definition, as follows:

- Category A—a consensus including 90% or more of all respondents.
- Category B—a consensus including 70% to 89% of all respondents.
- Category C—no consensus, but fewer than 20% of respondents marked "Not Applicable."
- Category D—no consensus, and 20% or more of respondents marked "Not Applicable."

Findings

The following tables summarize the findings of the survey. After each expression from Parts One and Two are shown the odds most frequently specified and the percentage of respondents within 10 points of that. For questions submitted to policy officers as well as analysts, their responses are shown separately. The expressions of magnitude in Part Three are listed with the percentage of "Not Applicable" responses and the most frequent response for each.

Of the 41 expressions in Part One three fell into Category A (super-consensus), thirteen into Category B (consensus), seventeen into Category C (no consensus), and eight into Category D (rejected as indefinable). From Part Two five expressions in context fell into Category B, twelve into Category C, and three into Category D. All the quantitative phrases in Part Three were rejected as not measurable by 20% or more of the respondents except for next few years and next year or so. Though rejected by only 7%, next few years found no consensus: 19% marked 2 to 3 years, 30% 2 to 4 years, and 34% 2 to 5 years. Next year or so meant 1 to 2 years to two-thirds of the respondents, 1 to 3 years to the rest.

EXPRESSION	PART ONE (No Context)			
	ODDS—MOST FREQUENT RESPONSE		PERCENT AGREEING WITHIN 10 POINTS	
	Analyst	Policy	Analyst	Policy
Category A (90%–100% Consensus)				
Almost Certainly	90	90	99%	94%
Are	100	100	96%	92%
Will	100	100	91%	91%
Category B (70%–89% Consensus)				
Probably	75	70	90%	86%
Probably not	20	20	85%	76%
Probably will	80	—	85%	—

EXPRESSION	ODDS—MOST FRE- QUENT RESPONSE		PERCENT AGREEING WITHIN 10 POINTS	
	Analyst	Policy	Analyst	Policy
Category B (70%–89% Consensus) (Continued)				
Highly probable	90	85	83%	87%
Likely	70	—	83%	—
Undoubtedly	100	90	81%	86%
Good chance	70	70	81%	81%
Highly likely	90	80	80%	81%
Unlikely	20	20	80%	79%
Seems likely	70	—	80%	—
Better than even chance	60	60	78%	87%
Some slight chance	10	10	77%	79%
May	50	—	73%	—
Category C (No Consensus)				
Seems unlikely	20	—	68%	—
Might	50	50	66%	59%
May indicate	50	—	66%	—
Could be expected	60	—	65%	—
Expect	80	—	64%	—
Could	50	50	60%	56%
Must	80	—	59%	—
Evidently	70	—	59%	—
Apparently	70	—	58%	—
Suggests	60	—	58%	—
Believe	70	70	55%	54%
Should	70	—	54%	—
Possibly	50	50	53%	51%
Might be expected	50*	—	51%	—
Indicates that	70	—	51%	—
Might be anticipated	50	50	56%	50%
Apparently is intent	60*	—	50%	—
Serious possibility	60*	70	49%	55%
Category D (Rejected)				
Estimate	75	70	56%	57%
Seems	50	—	55%	—
Ought	60*	—	41%	—
Feel	50†	—	35%	—
Reportedly	50	50	35%	52%
Somewhat	50*	—	27%	—
Ostensibly	50	—	20%	—

* The most frequent response to these questions was of the same order as a second most frequent. Graphed, the responses would show two frequency peaks, forming, in statistical terminology, a "bimodal" curve.

† The curve for this response is trimodal.

EXPRESSION (IN CONDENSED CONTEXT)	ODDS—MOST FRE- QUENT RESPONSE		PERCENT AGREEING WITHIN 10 POINTS	
	Analyst	Policy	Analyst	Policy
PART TWO (In Context)				
Category B (70–89% Consensus)				
We believe the chances are good that . . .	70	—	86%	—
We believe . . . will not be . . .	80	80	76%	63%
Undoubtedly, . . . will not be . . .	100	—	76%	—
We estimate . . . will not be . . .	80	70	74%	70%
Barring . . . , the economy will probably continue . . .	80	—	71%	—
Category C (No Consensus)				
Apparently, . . . will not be . . .	70	—	68%	—
If . . . continue . . . , the president might . . . be willing . . .	50	50	65%	54%
. . . might also take . . . action . . .	50	—	62%	—
. . . references . . . to undiminished im- portance . . . suggest a belief . . .	60*	—	59%	—
It is possible that . . . will become . . .	50	50	56%	57%
. . . visit . . . indicates that . . . is be- ing . . . ¹	70	—	53%	—
. . . visit suggests . . . progress . . . ²	60	—	51%	—
We believe . . . there is a possibility that . . .	50	50	50%	43%
. . . speech . . . conveyed the impression that . . . ³	60*	—	46%	—
. . . comments suggest . . . changes may well be less than speech . . . might indi- cate . . . ³	70*	65	43%	40%
Category D (Rejected)				
. . . comments suggest . . . that . . . gov- ernment is not committed . . . ⁴	0†	50†	18%	25%

¹ The full context on these questions was the sentence, "Although lacking the drama of visits by top leaders, the travel of these delegations to Albania indicates that the momentum of the Albanian-Polish rapprochement is being maintained and suggests that some progress is being made in reducing the area of remaining ideological differences." Respondents were asked to specify the probability that Albania and Poland were headed toward a rapprochement and the probability that the ideological differences would be settled.

² Respondents were asked for the probability that the speaker believed what he conveyed.

³ Respondents were asked for the probability that changes would be minor.

⁴ Respondents were asked for the probability of that to which the "government is not committed." The full context is given on page 73.

* Bimodal.

† Trimodal.

EXPRESSION (IN CONDENSED CONTEXT)	ODDS—MOST FRE- QUENT RESPONSE		PERCENT AGREEING WITHIN 10 POINTS	
	Analyst	Policy	Analyst	Policy
Category D (Rejected) (Continued)				
This raises the question whether . . . they might . . .	50	—	51%	—
We do not expect them to change . . . ⁶	90†	—	22%	—
Cuba has allegedly bought . . .	50	—	38%	—

In context:

CATEGORY

"The North Koreans have thus far shown marked respect for US power, and we do not expect them to change this basic attitude" expresses what probability that the North Koreans will continue provocations against South Korea? D

"At the same time, the reservations conveyed in the military comment suggest that the practical military changes resulting from the new line may well be less dramatic than the tone of de Gaulle's speech might indicate—and that in any event, his government is not committing itself to a one-weapon system of defense" expresses what probability that the military will have a one-weapon system? D

⁶ This question was a non-sequitur. The full context is given on page 73.
[†] Trimodal.

PART THREE (Words of Magnitude)

EXPRESSION	PERCENT REJECTING	MOST FRE- QUENT RESPONSE
Considerable	47%	10-100
Many	40%	10-1000
Substantial (portion)	36%	20-50%
Significant (portion)	34%	20-50%
Limited (portion)	30%	2-10%
Several	27%	2-5
Few	28%	2-4
Next few years	7%	2-5 years
Next year or so	1%	1-2 years


The difference between the good consensus on a set of odds for one expression and no consensus on another shows up clearly when the odds are graphed according to how frequently each set was specified in the responses to a question. When 70% of all responses fall within 10 points of the most frequent one, the graph has a steep curve and a narrow base. The high, narrow peak indicates a clearly defined consensus, whereas a broad-based curve with a single peak shows less agreement and a curve with several peaks reflects clear differences about what the word means.

Steady retrogression from consensus can be seen in graphs of sample responses from successive categories. Following are these seven from Parts One and Two.


CATEGORY

Out of context:	
Almost Certainly	A
Probably	B
Possibly	C
Serious Possibility	C
Seems	D


The red line in each graph traces the response pattern of 239 analysts, the black line in the first four that of 63 policy officers. The dotted black line is the latter adjusted to scale. "Mode" designates the peaks of most frequent response.



GRAPH No. 1. Category A: *Almost Certainly* (Significant Range 75-99).




GRAPH No. 2. Category B: *Probably* (Significant Range 50-90).




GRAPH No. 3. Category C: *Possibly* (Significant Range 10-60).

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL




GRAPH No. 1. Category A: *Almost Certainly* (Significant Range 75-90).




GRAPH No. 2. Category B: *Probably* (Significant Range 50-90).




GRAPH No. 3. Category C: *Possibly* (Significant Range 10-60).




GRAPH No. 4. Category C: Serious Possibility (Significant Range 25-95).



GRAPH No. 5. Category D: Seems (Significant Range 30-80).



GRAPH No. 6. Category D: Korean Question (Significant Range 5-95).



GRAPH No. 7. Category D: Question with Suggest (Significant Range 0-90).

Conclusions

Of the 303 questionnaires returned, only one indicated that no quantitative equivalent was suitable for any of the probabilistic expressions. All others selected sets of odds for at least half of those listed in Part One, and 80% did so for two-thirds of them. Even though a number who disapprove of quantitative definitions probably just did not bother to return their questionnaires, the results appear to indicate that the vast majority in the intelligence community consider it legitimate to think of such expressions in quantitative terms.

On the other hand, although more than 70% of both analysts and policy officers agreed within a 20-point range on the expressions in Categories A and B, the results for some offices on the analytical side did not agree with the consensus for all analysts, and there were similar exceptions among the policy offices. So when an analyst in one office uses the word probably, policy officers and analysts in other offices do not necessarily interpret the word to mean the same thing. In Categories A and B, however, the differences are usually not great. There follows the quantitative definition—most frequent plus and minus 10—of expressions on which there was found to be a satisfactory consensus.

	CHANCES OUT OF 100
Are	90-100
Will	90-100
Almost Certainly	80-100
Undoubtedly	80-100
Highly Likely	75-95
Highly Probable	75-95
Probably Will	70-90
Probably	60-80
Likely	60-80
Good Chance	60-80
Seems Likely	60-80
Better Than Even Chance	50-70
May	40-60
Probably Not	10-30
Unlikely	10-30
Some Slight Chance	0-20

The out-of-context definitions in Part One were spot-checked by the sentence questions of Part Two. The results are not conclusive: only one sentence was provided for context, and there was no way of telling if respondents were influenced by personal knowledge of the subject matter. But despite these limitations, because the most

frequent definitions in and out of context agreed within 10 points, it appears that nearly the same meanings were conveyed either way. The comparison appears below.

MOST FREQUENT RESPONSE					
IN CONTEXT			ALONE		
	Analyst	Policy		Analyst	Policy
Undoubtedly	100	—	Undoubtedly	100	90
Believe	80	80	Believe	70	70
Estimate	80	80	Estimate	75	70
Apparently	70	—	Apparently	70	—
Indicates that	70	—	Indicates that	70	—
Believe the chances are			Indicates that	70	—
good	70	—	Good chance	70	70
Possible	50	50	Possibly	50	50
Might	50	—	Might	50	50

Although the coupling of a verb of opinion with an expression of odds, as in "We believe the chances are good," seemed not to affect the meaning of the latter for the respondents to the survey questions, this writer agrees with Mr. Kent's purist that the doubling up of probabilistic words is potentially confusing and should be avoided. The response pattern on the Korean question (page 73 and Graph 6) has an interesting side light in that the probability queried does not follow from the estimative sentence. The questionnaire was not designed to test the propensity of analysts and policy officers to draw unsubstantiated conclusions, but in this one instance only 35% of the respondents showed they recognized the non-sequitur by marking "Not Applicable."

The survey showed that for expressions on which there was a consensus (and some others) the most frequent response was the same from policy officers as from analysts within 10 points plus or minus. But where differences did occur, the policy definitions were consistently on the conservative side; see the following examples.

MOST FREQUENT RESPONSE		
	Analyst	Policy
Undoubtedly	100	90
Highly Probable	90	85
Highly Likely	90	80
Probably	75	70
Estimate	75	70

The results from Part Three showed there is little consensus on the common expressions of vague magnitude, at least without the guidance of context.

Faults in the Survey

An effort was made to keep the questionnaire as simple to understand and as short as possible. In Parts One and Three the effort was generally successful, but Part Two was neither simple nor short. Most of the questions in the latter related to specific people and places, and there was danger that respondents would permit their opinions and knowledge of the subject to influence their answers. In addition, several of the estimative sentences were long and involved, carrying the hazard of confusion about what they meant and what was wanted in evaluation of them.

For pragmatic reasons, administration of the survey had to be informal. It is possible that such things as attitudes of supervisors, office collusion, or misunderstanding of the purpose of the survey could have introduced bias. A careful perusal of each of the questionnaires failed to turn up any obvious evidence that such factors influenced the findings. But if it were done again the questionnaire should be modified in Part Two and the conditions under which it is filled out should be controlled and standardized.

A "master craftsman" from State's intelligence bureau takes up a challenge and presents the case—

AGAINST FOOTNOTES

Allan Evans

The eloquent lead article in the last issue¹ challenges anyone to come forth with a valid defense of the status quo that prevails in our community with respect to footnotes. Age predisposes me to defend status quos; my frequent statements in talking to intelligence officer groups put me on the spot to repeat my arguments against the use of footnotes. It may be that these views are conditioned by circumstances in the Department of State and that these circumstances differ materially from those in the Department of Defense— if so, it will be all the more useful to unearth variations in the taste and requirements of major groups of consumers at whom our community is aiming. Let us see what can be said.

Customer is King

The first and most important arguments are that our customers won't read fat papers and "almost certainly" in overwhelming majority don't want to be bothered with documentation. I think no truth in our business is more thoroughly substantiated by experience (either footnoted or not) than that the impact of a paper varies in close inverse relation to its size. We have, of course, the NIS, which is indifferent to bigness, but it is an intelligence document of a very special kind, designed for universal reference. The Department of State issues stout papers, but for policy more often than intelligence purposes. There are technical areas of the government which revel in extensive analyses. So far, however, as the general run of day-to-day operation in this Department goes, our Bureau is prepared to stand by the idea that, other things being equal, the shortest paper has the most impact.

In closely related vein, our consumers are not going to spend their time summoning up the documents they see referred to in footnotes.

¹ A. John Alexander, "An Intelligence Role for the Footnote," *Studies* VIII 3, p. 1 ff.

They think of our intelligence papers as the product either of particular analysts whom they know by name and whom they have learned to trust, or of a particular organization which they trust to employ analysts who are reliable. They expect Intelligence to speak as authority, to present its conclusions with confidence, and they don't want it to transfer to them the responsibility of reviewing the evidence all over again.

Indeed, many consumers couldn't review the evidence. Many readers—those overseas, for example—simply don't have the files of material that we use here at headquarters. Why tantalize them with alluring footnote references to luscious sources that are inaccessible to them?

I appreciate the excellent suggestion that footnotes be organized in the modern manner at the back of the paper and be therefore removable. When for special reasons footnotes are actually used, the device would be valuable. In the usual case, however, it would leave unjustified superscript figures throughout the text, to annoy people and intrude a real if small barrier to smooth absorption of the message. There might well be physical problems about tearing off and restapling. These are minutiae, but in the bulk they might grow important. I doubt that the real answer to the problem with consumers lies along this line.

Quality and Control

These then are two positive arguments against introducing an apparatus of footnotes into intelligence papers. Let us now look at some of the arguments put forward in favor of this procedure. As an historian, I can only applaud the appeal to the past in evocation of the great scholarly revolution brought about by German methods well over a century ago. But aren't a number of people becoming a little sceptical about some parts of this revolution? Are there not even sporadic attempts to escape from the yoke of that ultimate German invention, the Ph.D.? Only the other day I heard a notable authority on American scholarship draw a distinction between the research associated with our Germanic discipline and what might rightly be called thinking. Perhaps we should patronize the scholarly revolution of our own age rather than that of the past, and stress the production of ideas.

There is worry that without footnotes mediocre analysts will float texts which are unreliable. What about the danger that mediocre

analysts, under cover of footnotes, will float texts in which they are able to avoid the challenge of decisive thinking? I don't say that only one of these two dangers exists. I think that they both exist, and I suspect that they rather cancel out as arguments one way or the other.

The article suggests that without the footnote the operation of review and upper-level control is a hollow pretense. The answer here would be in brief that without good supervision and control no amount of footnotes will guarantee quality, but that if the supervision and higher control are good the footnotes will not be necessary. I think the article is a little unfair to the reviewer. According to the terms set forth, every reviewer would have to be an expert in the subject of the paper he was reviewing, or would have to make himself an expert by reading all the material in the footnotes. Teachers, I think, will realize that this concept is too categorical. With good but not infinite knowledge of the subject, and with sound intuitions about how style, logic, and marshalling of ideas relate to accuracy and integrity of thinking, teachers and scholars do very well at reviewing the works of students and colleagues. These are the qualities required in the leaders of intelligence operations; without these qualities no apparatus will make intelligence products worth the money.

It is true that the judgments of an NIE float in the empyrean and impress with their apparently unrooted boldness. It is also true, however, that the writers of those sentences approach them with prayer and fasting, and work them out in fiery give and take, often over long periods of time, in working groups which can test to their heart's content the background of information and fact that underlies each agency's opinion. If sometimes our NIEs approach being a little too empyrean, so do the problems that our superiors and world affairs force us to examine.

Intracommunity Practice

There are many lesser points. Certainly for intercommunication within the intelligence community indications of source might be useful; it would be a question of time and effort. As for the awful thought that many analysts may take advantage of the status quo to scamp their scholarly attention to detail in intelligence work, I should argue both that most of them are thoroughly dedicated and that the few who do try to get away with it are quickly found out. As a matter

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Against Footnotes
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of fact, the working drafts of analysts often do have annotations, and are carefully filed for reference.

There is one small suggestion in the article on which comment requires a reference to the inner workings of a friendly agency; let me nevertheless rush in and remark that some part of the difficulty about documentation may be peculiar to the Defense Department because of its habit of sending estimators rather than the basic analysts to working groups. Is it possible that this mode of operating through layers accounts for some of the feeling that we lack full exchange of working data? I venture to suggest that the advantages and disadvantages of this procedure well merit discussion.

In the end, there is one final and to my mind clinching argument. As I have told many audiences, the essence of an NIE is what it says about things to come—indeed, the culminating feat of the whole intelligence process is to project the customer's view near or far into the coming weeks or years. And, who will footnote the future? Here internally, within the intelligence game itself, resides the chief positive argument against footnotes—that a reliance on them will blunt our willingness, if not our ability, to push along trails that cannot be blazed with documents or references, and to explore what may lie ahead.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

More Against Footnotes

Dear Sirs:

Mr. Alexander does not consider the different circumstances that apply to intelligence analysis and research in the academic world. First, intelligence analysis is a team activity. The analyst commonly does his work under the professional supervision of a section or branch chief; he coordinates his manuscript with other specialists; and the results are reviewed by an editor who is, in my experience, a professional in his own right. Mr. Alexander omits the first two and deprecates the last of these mechanisms most unjustifiably. This team effort constitutes a properly rigorous apparatus for maintaining quality control. Admittedly, it doesn't always do what it should, but then neither do footnotes. If a report is of doubtful quality, it is the competency of staff rather than the adequacy of apparatus that we need worry about.

A second difference is that most finished intelligence reports are directed at a non-specialist. Footnotes documenting sources have constituted an apparatus by which one scholar might convince another of his views despite separation in space or time; papers in scholarly journals may thus effectively address themselves to distant scholars. Such scholarly communication is not, however, the purpose of most intelligence reports. To document definitive intelligence statements like the NIS and NIE would beg the question that led to their preparation. We do use footnotes in some intelligence research designed mainly to increase the body of knowledge available to analysts. These are for the convenience and edification of other specialists, who are the primary end users. But finished intelligence is not issued so that the recipient, who has his own work to do, can check the work that has gone into it. Having stated his requirement, he must have faith enough in the system to accept what he gets.

R. T. Allan, Jr.

Dear Sirs:

The major substantive shortcoming of Mr. Alexander's article is, paradoxically, a lack of documentation—any evidence, that is, that a lack of footnotes *has* caused "an undesired but nevertheless real deg-

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radation of the intelligence effort." His rhetorical questions give the reader no basis for believing that the final intelligence products would have been better if footnoted.

The analogy with other professions may be misleading. A scholar writes for colleagues equally versed in the field of his particular study, who can and will double-check his sources, and whose disagreements may bring about a closer approximation to truth. The intelligence analyst, on the contrary, writes not laterally, to his colleagues, but vertically, to his superiors and ultimately to the policy makers—persons whose elevation in the intelligence structure is inversely proportional to their time or inclination to check sources.

The footnote requirement might indeed preclude top-of-the-head analysis. But the greatest asset of many skilled analysts is their own undocumented experience. One immersed in Soviet propaganda can say authoritatively that never before has some particular line appeared, but he would be hard pressed to document his statement, based as it is only on his acquired sensitivity. If one is to trust our system at all, one must believe that most such undocumented interpretations are well based, and that any advantages of source citation would not justify the cost.

David McConaughy

*Probing for some profit from
a past mistake.*

THE MISSILES IN CUBA

J. J. Rumpelmayer

Mr. Sherman Kent's thoughtful review¹ of the USIB's mistaken estimate of 19 September 1962 and his explanation for its conclusion that the Soviets would be unlikely to install strategic missiles on Cuba leave the clandestine collector—who must necessarily be at the same time something of an analyst and estimator—with two kinds of reservation involving principles which will remain of importance in the future work of the community. The first is an alternative reconstruction of the Soviet attitude toward the opportunity and hazards of this move, and by extension toward any future such opportunity and aggressive moves in general. Here we are clearly intruding into the professional estimators' business, but a fresh view from outside their circle may be of use to them. The second is a matter close to the collector's heart—recognition of the quality of his information and the putting it to proper use.

The Soviet Position

Mr. Kent's central point is that the Soviet leaders, unexpectedly misjudging the severity of the potential U.S. reaction, made a serious mistake in trying to put the missiles in. He writes:

On 15 October [when the missiles were identified in U-2 photographs] we realized that our estimate of the Soviets' understanding of the mood of the United States and its probable reaction was wrong. On 28 October [when Khrushchev agreed to withdraw them] we realized that the Soviets had realized that they had misjudged the United States.

We submit that neither the U.S. estimate of the Soviet view of U.S. reaction nor that Soviet view need have been wrong. On the contrary, there is evidence that the Soviets did show, as the estimate put it, "a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far"—because the stakes were higher than ever before—but were prepared to back down if caught.

¹"A Crucial Estimate Relived," *Studies* VIII 2, p. 1 ff.

A large democratic country like the United States cannot take an adventurous position in foreign affairs if only because of the heavy inertial factor which makes it so difficult to generate a program of foreign action or, once having mounted one, to call it off. The Soviets, not needing to worry about this inertial factor, can with minimal hazard to political integrity undertake a desired course as a mere probing action.

An indication that they were prepared to pull out of Cuba if detected lies in the promptness with which they executed the disengagement operation as soon as they were convinced that the United States was ready to act. They recalled to Soviet ports all vessels suitable for missile loadings and began unloading the missiles without even waiting for the blockade to be put into effect, evidently acting on a contingency plan they would presumably not have had ready if they had really underestimated the probable U.S. reaction.

The alternative explanation, then, which "might lessen the chances of our misestimating the Soviets in a future case," is that they judged the United States correctly but were not taking irrevocable action and considered the possibility of a radical improvement in their strategic posture worth the risk involved in a probe.

The Soviet Decision

Turning now to the quality of the reporting, we note Mr. Kent's statement:

There was of course no information that the Soviets had decided to deploy strategic missiles to Cuba and indeed no indication suggesting such a decision.

There was doubtless no firm information or verified indication, but there were reports first hinting at and finally almost spelling out such a decision. Consider the following series from the network of a single clandestine source on the island disseminated between 5 July and 6 October.

5 July: Cuban CP member describes NATO as a belt of bases surrounding the Soviet Union and says that in September Cuba is going to be the buckle in this belt. (Speaker is livid and uses very authoritative tone.)²

13 July: Close associate of Che Guevara says "he" [possibly Fidel] has desperate plan to ask the Soviet Union to locate in Cuba an atomic base which would be like a buckle in the belt of bases surrounding the USSR.³

² TDCS-3/515,834, paragraph 5.

³ TDCS-3/516,558.

- 13 July: Guevara, still very worried, had no recourse but to send Raul Castro to Soviets to find out what aid Cuba can count on. Guevara, a Stalinist and friend of Mao, does not have confidence in the Soviets but knows that Cuba has extraordinary value for the Bloc. Before making any decision he wants to know all the possibilities.⁴
- 23 August: Soviet ships unloaded at Mariel large quantity of prefabricated concrete forms, some tubular five meters wide and others semicircular three by ten meters and six inches thick.⁵
- 5 September: In mid-July Soviet ships received orders to speed up loading and unloading and leave Cuba quickly.⁶
- 7 September: Son of Cuban CP president says certain officer had accompanied Guevara on recent trip to Moscow because he served as liaison officer on "rocket project."⁷
- 20 September: Fidel's personal pilot says, "We have . . . [in addition to 40-mile rockets and a radar system] many mobile ramps for intermediate-range rockets. They don't know what is in store for them."⁸
- 21 September: Cuban war plans chief says, "We will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have everything including atomic weapons. . . . 1000 Soviet technicians are working day and night to build the nuclear weapons base."⁹
- 6 October: The Cubans, having the buckle to the belt of atomic bases surrounding the Soviet Union, can loose the belt and save the USSR from strangulation.¹⁰

Note that the viewpoint in the belt-and-buckle metaphor is Soviet: it is the USSR that is to be saved; the enemy is NATO, not Yankee imperialism. These ideas of Soviet origin were reflected in the subsequent proposals to trade the Cuban foothold for Turkish bases. It is true that the unequivocal spelling out of the meaning in the last of these reports was much too late for the crucial estimate, but it still came more than a week ahead of the photographic evidence that was regarded as decisive.

It is not that these reports were lost in the mass of intelligence information coming in; they were brought to the particular attention of the analysts. It must be simply that they were not taken seriously enough. We know by hindsight, both from the confirmation of their

⁴ TDCS-3/516,555.

⁵ TDCS-3/520,583, paragraph 3.

⁶ CS-3/521,533.

⁷ TDCS-3/521-936.

⁸ TDCS-3/522,948.

⁹ TDCS-3/523,169.

¹⁰ TDCS-3/524,449.

main purport and from intensive debriefing and testing of the source, that he was giving us strategically important information with no concoction or exaggeration. The failure of the warning function was not in the observing or reporting but in interpretation. The problem is one of how to get the right valuation put on this kind of material when it comes in.

Signs of Deployment

With respect to "evidence that the missiles were in fact moving to their emplacement" Mr. Kent writes:

With the benefit of hindsight one can go back over the thousand and more bits of information collected from human observers in the six months ending 14 October and pick out a few—a very few—which indicated the possible presence of strategic missiles.

Certainly they were comparatively few, but when you actually read them they seem more impressive than when you just count them. We sample in the abstracts below a half-dozen disseminated before the date of the estimate and four others put out before photography at last convinced the analysts.

- 10 August: Describing the exceedingly secure unloading of a Soviet ship at Mariel on 1 August, source says that trucks unloaded with extreme care probably carried rockets, nose cones, or most probably atomic bombs.¹¹
- 24 August: On 5 August about 2000 Soviets arrived at Casilda with long and short range rockets, construction equipment, and extremely large tanks. By 9 August a total of five ships had arrived at Casilda.¹²
- 31 August: Since mid-August no unauthorized personnel have been allowed at the Mariel docks. A 12-ft. concrete wall was built around the port in less than 24 hours. Among cargo unloaded were prefabricated concrete blocks two by four meters by a foot thick with special hooks or metal bases on the ends. These are welded together and cement poured between sections to form platforms for rocket launch pads. Rockets 40 feet long and 3 feet in diameter have also been offloaded.¹³ [Note that the blocks described had been designated one of the specific indicators for ballistic missiles of medium or longer range.]

¹¹ TDCS-3/519,345.

¹² TDCS-DB-3/651,139.

¹³ TDCS-DB-3/651,223.

- 31 August: Source saw in military area [later verified as MRBM site] a truck loaded with a fifty-foot-long rig that looked like a launcher. On the ground nearby were more than a dozen dark metal cylinders 30 feet long and 18 to 20 inches across.¹⁴
- 18 September: Source observed at certain location [later verified as MRBM site] a larger Soviet-guarded perimeter than had ever before been established.¹⁵
- 18 September: In early August a chauffeur for Soviet military technicians constructing a missile base at Monte de Soroa saw two very large missiles being transported there.¹⁶
- 21 September: During wee hours 12 September source saw two-axle trailers 65-70 feet long being pulled west toward Campo Libertad, believes canvas-covered loads projecting over ends were large missiles.¹⁷
- 23 September: Source saw on Port Isabella docks 20 metal cylinders 45-50 feet long by about five feet in diameter. Later these were hauled away on trailer-trucks.¹⁸
- 1 October: In mid-September source saw two cylindrical objects 40 feet long by three feet in diameter loaded on each of six semi-trailers.¹⁹
- 12 October: Ultimate source declared about 20 September, "Cuba now has a Soviet missile with a range of about 600 miles."²⁰

These are the kind of reports which, perhaps out of skepticism regarding the capabilities of human observation, were set aside in the absence of confirming photographic evidence.

Majority Rule

Although Mr. Kent did not intend the implication and would deplore it, it is an infelicitous fact that many of his expressions and metaphors tend to imply that intelligence conclusions are controlled by numbers of reports rather than the quality of individual reports:

Aggregate meaning of the information . . .
 A plethora of raw intelligence . . .
 So large a volume of data . . .
 The quantity evaluated . . .
 Still a formidable amount of paper . . .
 We weighed and measured . . .

¹⁴ OOK-3/218,381.

¹⁵ TDCS-3/522,702.

¹⁶ OOK-3/218,886.

¹⁷ OOK-3/219,040.

¹⁸ OOK-3/236,675.

¹⁹ OOK-3/219,189.

²⁰ TDCS-3/525,154, first line.

A few—a very few . . .
 A handful . . .
 The list comes to eight . . .
 No more than two or possibly three should have stopped the clock . . .
 Three bits of evidence would probably not, taken in the context of the other
 thousands . . .

This quantitative approach would explain how the needle of a key strategic report might be smothered and lost under the haystack of a mass of other information; but it is not an explanation that we can resignedly accept and live with. It is diametrically opposed to a basic doctrine of the clandestine collector—that the ideal item of intelligence is a single nugget of great worth recognized and pulled out of the general mass of indifferent information. Certainly that is the concept under which the collecting is done.

Perhaps our problem is a peculiarly American one, paralleling our faith in government by a consensus of the majority and our belief in the intrinsic desirability of mass production. Perhaps, as suggested above, it comes from having more confidence in machines than human observation. The clandestine operator is prepared to fight for the recognition of his rare nuggets against the tons of dross, but he needs help from the analyst in pinpointing where the trouble lies. If we are to learn from our historical mistakes and so be saved from repeating them, this problem must be solved. The writer feels there are solutions to be found.

*An analyst view on the problem
 of the clandestine collector.*

TWO WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE

**Harlow T. Munson
 and
 W. P. Southard**

We have read Mr. Rumpelmayer's statement of his reservations¹ and we feel both qualified and obliged to offer some testimony. We were the principal officers of two CIA groups which spent a year—working separately on complementary studies—making reconstructions of the Soviet venture in Cuba; neither of us had been previously engaged with Cuba. Our two studies,² which considered the same range of questions but different bodies of evidence, arrived at similar conclusions, which are far from Mr. Rumpelmayer's.

Mr. Rumpelmayer's basic contention—the burden of his article—is that not enough credence was given to clandestine reporting about the strategic missiles, reporting which in his view pointed accurately both to the decision to deploy them and to the actual deployment. We will answer this first.

The Clandestine Reporting

In the course of one of our two studies, the vast body of this reporting—comprising more than 14,000 reports—was examined minutely. The reports cited by Mr. Rumpelmayer were included in this review. It was our judgment that the bulk of this material could not have been evaluated with confidence at the time unless information were available from other sources against which it could be checked, and that there would have been no way to identify the "rare nuggets" among the "tons of dross." We found, indeed, that even in retrospect one could not construct from the clandestine reporting alone a coherent account of the course of the venture.

With respect to Soviet intentions, of the six reports disseminated before 19 September—the date of the estimate—which are said to point to those intentions, the first and sixth do point vaguely in that direction. But the first seems to be cancelled by the second (which

¹ See the foregoing article.

² Cuba, 1962: *Khrushchev's Miscalculated Risk*, ORR/P/ST, spring 1964, and *The Soviet Missile Base Venture in Cuba*, DDI/RS, spring 1964.

makes both look like reports of Cuban hopes, not Soviet intentions, and moreover of hopes which would have lagged behind the actual agreement by about three months); and the sixth does not specify the kind of "rocket project" (SAMs were known to be on the island). Even if the source had been known to be reliable (and he was not so known), neither report would seem to take the analyst as far as Raul Castro's public boast, in the same period, that his negotiations with the Russians had changed the balance of power in the world—a remark which precisely described the aim of the missile base venture.

Similarly with respect to the actual deployment, of the ten reports cited by Mr. Rumpelmayer under "signs of deployment" not one carried a source appraisal that would have commanded the credence of an analyst at the time. Three were evaluated F-3 and two F-6; five carried no evaluation. The first four of the six disseminated before 19 September would not be accepted even now as accurately reporting on deployment (although the third, dated 31 August, described credibly preparations for receiving missiles), because there is pretty good evidence that no strategic missiles arrived before mid-September.³

And the later reports (in addition to the good report of 31 August) would have had to struggle for acceptance, because all such reports had to be read in the light of the many false reports of previous months: there had been more than 200 reports of Soviet missiles in Cuba before January 1962, and the many reports of construction activity and equipment observed during the spring of 1962 (some in areas where SAMs were later discovered) had been negated by photography of those areas during or after the reported period of observation.

It was never a question of "majority rule" but rather, as always, a question of *credentials*, grounds for credence. Majority rule, with no attempt to discriminate, would have produced an estimate favoring the large number of affirmative reports (long before the fact) over the smaller number of negative photographs. But the credentials of the two sets were very different. As for discriminating among the reports themselves, Mr. Rumpelmayer makes clear, with respect to the single good source of all of the reports cited as pointing to Soviet intentions, that it was only afterwards that he was checked out as a reliable source; in other words, his credentials had not been estab-

³One of the four described a missile sighting at a "base" later identified as a resort area.

lished even to the collector's satisfaction at the time. Was there any source with established credentials who was ignored?

As a matter of fact, these reports that could not be accepted without corroboration were not ignored, were not "set aside." They had long provided a part of the reason for conducting systematic aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. And during September, when the reconnaissance flights were basically peripheral and did not provide thorough coverage of the island, these reports did the best thing they could have done: they set off the process which led to the collection of photographic evidence on 14 October. That is, by late September those making the decisions had concluded—mainly on the basis of the sharper and more credible reports after mid-September—that whatever the reasons for contenting ourselves with less than thorough coverage, there were better reasons for making a maximum effort; and this decision was vindicated by the first subsequent flight.

The Soviet Attitude

Mr. Rumpelmayer puts his other contention—about *Soviet* estimates—in these terms: the Soviet leaders were willing to increase greatly the level of risk because the gains to be made from a successful venture were so great—but they were prepared to withdraw "if caught." To take the second part of the proposition first, this is manifestly false unless one assumes that the missiles were to be used solely for a surprise attack on the United States; their usefulness for anything else depended directly on their being "caught," on their presence being known when the program was completed.

Suppose we replace this second part with a formulation that many observers would accept—that the Russians were prepared from the start to withdraw (as Mr. Rumpelmayer says later of the actual disengagement) as soon as "convinced that the United States was ready to act." But if we define the risk as the risk of U.S. military action against Cuba or the USSR, then the first part of Mr. Rumpelmayer's proposition is also false. That is, if Khrushchev was confident that he would be given time to withdraw—that the venture would be accepted as a "mere probing action"—then he was *not* consciously accepting a high risk of this kind.

But what of the other kind of risk, the risk of failure, of a humiliating withdrawal in the face of an American ultimatum? As Mr. Rumpelmayer puts it, the Russians would not have had ready a "contingency plan" if they had really been wrong about the "probable U.S. reaction."

Taking these words at face value, Khrushchev regarded U.S. willingness to fight as the *probable* response, thus *expected* the venture to fail, in other words was one of those sports who fly into Las Vegas hoping for the best but cheerfully expecting to go home without a dime (or with just a dime). This proposition is not patently false; but the evidence does not support it.

Our two studies, cited above, agree Khrushchev recognized from the start that there was *some* degree of risk of an American attack at one or another point in the venture but believed this risk to be small. As witness, the Russians were aware of U.S. reconnaissance capabilities but did not camouflage the strategic missiles or conceal their deployment, left the MRBM sites identifiable for a long period prior to the establishment of an IRBM capability (which would have completed the program), and did not employ their air defense system against U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Moreover, they sent the missiles into Cuba *after* President Kennedy's firm and explicit warnings of early September, without knowing that the pattern of reconnaissance was to be changed to their advantage.

Similarly, the two studies agree that Khrushchev recognized from the start a *possibility* of failure but believed at least until September—perhaps until mid-October—that the United States would *probably* acquiesce and until late October that the venture could be managed to his profit even if the United States did not acquiesce. He seems to have calculated—judging from some of his statements before the crisis and his conduct during the week of the acknowledged crisis—that the United States would at most impose a blockade and could probably be tied up in negotiations in the course of which he could either complete the program (and thus increase his deterrent) or at least gain large concessions for withdrawal.

We agree with Mr. Rumpelmayer that Khrushchev had so much of a “contingency plan” for withdrawal. But the character of the “plan” is one of our reasons for thinking that he did not expect to fail. Much of his behavior in the week of the crisis seemed improvised and erratic: he lied about the missiles after their presence had been established beyond doubt; he continued work on the bases while frantically attempting to pacify the United States; he threatened to run the blockade *after* ordering his ships to turn around; he warned that he would fire the missiles and at the same time promised not to; he transmitted an explicit offer of withdrawal for a no-invasion pledge before transmitting his letter *implying* a willingness to withdraw; he

made his Cuba-for-Turkey proposal after having implicitly and explicitly offered a better deal; and he finally accepted the proposal which President Kennedy attributed to him, a capitulation at Castro's expense, without consulting Castro. This was hardly the smooth performance of one who had been *expecting* to be forced to withdraw.

Thus we agree with Mr. Kent that Khrushchev made a serious mistake in judgment. He seems not to have recognized what American estimators recognized and, not unreasonably, expected *him* to recognize—that, if Soviet gains from a successful venture were to be so great, it was probable that the United States would recognize what was at stake and would act to deny such gains to its principal antagonist, just as President Kennedy had repeatedly told him.⁴

The Real Lessons

We too have some opinions as to lessons to be learned from the Cuban venture—lessons which if learned would reduce the possibility of “misestimating the Soviets in a future case.”

The lesson for the collector is obvious: that he cannot expect his good reports to be recognized and accepted at once if the record of reports from the same kind of sources is a poor one. (“Wolf! Wolf!”)

The lesson for the estimator might be this: to allow a bit more, regularly, for Khrushchev's disposition to wishful thinking and for his inclination to commit himself to a serious action without thinking it through. He seems to have just now (August) done it again, in making and publicizing his arrangements for the meetings of the Communist parties.

For the analyst, the lesson might be to give Soviet public and private statements the closest possible scrutiny, looking at them again and again until satisfied that all of the possible implications have been recognized. For example, the Soviet insistence on the formula of the defensive *purpose* of the weapons in Cuba seems to have been in part a means of inviting the United States to acquiesce in the deployment under this euphemism. Similarly, some Soviet statements seem to have been implying an offer by Moscow (another observer has privately made a good case for this) to continue doing what it was

⁴ Khrushchev's failure to recognize this was foreseen by the only official known to us to have *predicted* the deployment of the strategic missiles in Cuba. Challenging the draft estimate, this observer argued that Khrushchev might well be so dazzled by his possible gains as to be unable to recognize the true level of the risks.

doing in Cuba but not to embarrass the Administration by *revealing* this until after the U.S. elections—at which time the program would be complete—if the United States did not reveal it. A sense of these implications need not have led to the conclusion that the Russians did indeed intend to deploy strategic missiles in Cuba, but they might have placed stronger qualifications on the official judgments of what Moscow was up to and might have led to earlier warning.

There may be lessons for the policy-maker too. One of these was apparently learned very rapidly and expressed in the decision of late September to restore the pattern of *thorough* aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. The lesson was that a nation might be embarrassed by the utilization of a given intelligence asset but might be destroyed by the failure to use it.

The other lesson relates to the adversary's reading of U.S. behavior. As the observer cited above was the first to remark, no American official (so far as we know) chose to question the Russians directly about this crafty formula of defensive *purpose*, to ask a knowledgeable Russian official point-blank just what kind of weapons were going into Cuba—a restraint which may have encouraged Moscow to believe that its invitation was being accepted. And there were other features of American behavior, including the failure to make a maximum reconnaissance effort between 5 September and 14 October, which could have been read by Moscow as indicating tacit agreement. The policy-maker may be able to use more help than he normally gets in judging how the signals he is sending—or things that he is doing which may be taken as signals—will be read.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE From World War II

AN INSTANCE OF TREASON: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring. By *Chalmers Johnson*. (Stanford University Press. 1964. 278 pp. \$6.50.)

Popular spy anthologies have long paraded a strange combination of fact and fantasy about Richard Sorge's espionage operation on behalf of the Soviet Union twenty and more years ago in the Far East. The first English-language work on the case was the heavily documented but somewhat inadequately researched *Shanghai Conspiracy: the Sorge Spy Ring* by Major General Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's intelligence chief.¹ General Willoughby and his staff, working with a large number of documents procured by the occupation forces upon entering Japan, assembled for the military establishment, a congressional committee, and the public an illuminating collection of facts about the espionage activities in China and Japan of Sorge, confessed member of the CPSU and agent of Department Four (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army General Staff, and his ring. It was this material which served as the basis for General Willoughby's book. Details copied indiscriminately from the Japanese documents available at the time, English transliterations from Japanese transliterations of Russian names, errors made by translators unfamiliar with the Soviet espionage establishment and its personalities, a tendency to accept colorful characterizations of members of the ring, and a concentration of interest on the angle of American involvement left the Willoughby study an interesting but not unflawed account of the activities of the net.

Later *The Man With Three Faces*, by Hans-Otto Meissner,² a former member of the German embassy staff in Tokyo, intermingled fact, near-fact, and completely erroneous information with the author's personal recollections. This uncritical work carried in an epilogue the oft-repeated legends that Sorge was not executed as reported and that the mysterious "Kiyomi," Sorge's mistress, had been machine-gunned to death in a Shanghai cabaret in 1947 for having betrayed

¹ New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952.

² London: Evans, 1955. Meissner should not be confused with Joseph Meisinger, a colonel in the Gestapo, who was assigned to the German embassy in Tokyo as security officer at the time of Sorge's arrest.

him. But the memoirs of the mistress, Miyake (Ishii) Hanako, very much alive and running a boarding house for students in Tokyo, were published the same year as Meissner's book.

It is from the Willoughby and Meissner English-language materials that most of what has appeared in various anthologies and I-knew-Richard-Sorge-when stories has been taken—and sometimes embroidered on to please the public taste.

In the meantime, however, some two hundred books and major articles were written in Japan about Sorge and his associates. One, we noted, was by his mistress, some came from minor members of the net, one was a collection of letters written by a central figure in the net, Ozaki Hotsumi, to his wife from prison, and yet another was written by Ozaki's half-brother, who had been 13 years old when Ozaki was arrested. With rare exception each of these many writings contributed a little something to improve later ones. The most important single work was the three-volume *Materials on Modern History: The Sorge Incident* published in Japanese by Misuzu Shobo, a leading publishing house.³ Devoted entirely to the police and court records of the case, it printed for the first time many documents unavailable at the time of the Willoughby study. These three volumes probably did more than any of the others to dispel myths which had grown up around the figures in the Sorge net.

In *An Instance of Treason* Chalmers Johnson now brings together and analyzes the most significant of these Japanese contributions to the history of Soviet espionage. His study is centered on the background and activities of Ozaki Hotsumi, probably the most effective member of the net. It gives also an excellent picture of the times which produced Ozaki and of the other members of the net, but we must wait for some future work to treat the many German-language documents publicly available which deal with Sorge's earlier life and German and Soviet associations.

Mr. Johnson corrects the several transliteration errors found in earlier books and correctly identifies and discusses in extensive footnotes the Soviet personalities mentioned by Sorge in his confessions. The professional student of the Sorge operation will be particularly grateful to him for having included a glossary of pertinent Japanese names in both romanized and ideograph form, a lengthy bibliography, and a complete index. For the more general reader he debunks many of the old myths; in only a few instances does he perpetuate previous

³ *Gendai-shi Shiryo: Zoruge Jiken*. Tokyo, 1962.

irregularities, and these are minor, generally a matter of being misled by earlier writers' colorful inventions about personalities in the net.

The reader may not agree with Mr. Johnson's high evaluation of Ozaki as an individual or as a revolutionary, but he will most certainly be impressed by the chronicle of Ozaki's rise within Japanese circles of influence and consequent access to official opinion and secret information. As a revolutionary a man such as Ozaki, it could be argued, would likely have been purged if he had been within the Soviet borders, for he was feudal in approach, supported the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a means of encouraging a resurgence of nationalism throughout Asia, and dreamed of a revolution in Japan coming not from the lower strata of society but from the intellectual elite. However this may be, within the Japanese society existing at the time he served the Soviet intelligence services almost if not equally as well as Sorge himself.

Another point at which intelligence officers could possibly disagree is when Mr. Johnson attempts to distinguish between cooperators and real members of the net. His probings, however, of the status of cooperator vs. agent, Soviet agent vs. Comintern agent, and the like are more than semantic exercises. He explores in depth and accepts the hypothesis that Sorge and Max Clausen, the net's radio operator, were the only ones who knew that their superiors were officials of Red Army intelligence, the other members of the net, including Ozaki, believing themselves to be working for the Comintern. Then he makes one of the most interesting points of the entire book: he explains how the Japanese authorities found it legally advantageous to the prosecution to keep characterizing the net as a Comintern activity, as Sorge first called it, despite his later confession of the role of Department Four. Had this aspect of his confession been accepted, he might have been spared from execution under Japanese law. This seeming technicality is particularly intriguing in the light of the recent Soviet acknowledgement (Mayevsky article in Pravda, 4 Sept. 1964) that Sorge was indeed an agent of the USSR.

The Mayevsky article confirms another conclusion reached by Mr. Johnson, that the greatest achievement of the net was its report in the fall of 1941 that the Japanese would not attack the Soviet Far East but the Allied-controlled territory to the south, a report that made it possible for Soviet forces to be moved west to save Moscow. It also confirms that the net's earlier reporting on the German plan to attack the USSR was highly accurate though ignored by Stalin. As Mr. John-

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son points out, Sorge considered this one of his major achievements, and he claimed to have received a message of thanks and congratulations from Moscow after his advance warning proved to have been right.

The Soviet acknowledgement of Sorge, twenty-three years after his arrest and twenty after his and Ozaki's execution, makes particularly timely the publication of *An Instance of Treason*, the most complete study in English to date of the operation of the net.

Edward M. Zivich

AMATEUR AGENT. By Ewan Butler. (London: Harrap. 1963. 240 pp. 21/—.)

Butler worked for the British wartime covert action organization, SOE, in Cairo, where he was in charge of black propaganda for the Balkans and the Middle East, and then in Stockholm, from where, under cover as assistant military attaché, he was supposed to run nuisance sabotage and morale operations into Germany. By the end of the war he had placed eight sleeper agents in North Germany, whose primary job, however, turned out to be reporting to the new occupation authorities on the true loyalties of local dignitaries.

The book reads easily, but one feels some annoyance at the author's air of superiority; he seems persuaded that the things he said and did are of importance because it was he who did and said them. The annoyance is enhanced for American readers by his patronizing attitude toward the OSS covert action mission in Stockholm. The incidents he relates to show the Americans' lack of clandestine know-how are, according to the recollections of the OSS officers concerned and a check of the mission's records, products of his imagination. Both OSS and SOE had to work primarily not on their own but as backers of the Norwegian and Danish resistance and toward the war's end through the Swedish service; but in the spring of 1945 OSS was beginning to be the dominant mission and had an agent not in North Germany but in Berlin.

Except for these inventions and misrepresentations and one astounding error, declaring it to be the Scandinavian custom to put up a big wreath in the main room instead of a Christmas tree, the events seem to be recorded with only such embellishments as it's normal to allow a story-teller. One can perhaps take seriously, therefore, a significant footnote to the history of Hitler's last days which Butler makes avail-

able in the words of a friend, Jack Winocour. On 28 April 1945 Reuters carried the story of Himmler's offer to Count Bernadotte to surrender Germany to the Western Allies only, and this story was the immediate cause for Hitler's disowning Himmler, naming Doenitz his successor, and completing his suicide arrangements. It has not been known how Reuters got the story. Winocour, then a British Information Services officer attending the United Nations conference in San Francisco, now tells—taking, quite unnecessarily, 15 pages to do so—how he heard it in confidence from Anthony Eden and after struggling with his conscience half a day leaked it to a Reuters man.

Albert Twone

Visible Today

THE BAY OF PIGS. By *Haynes Johnson* with Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Román, Erneido Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. (New York W. W. Norton. 1964. 368 pp. \$5.95.)

Haynes Johnson's "Story of Brigade 2506," told from the viewpoint of the Cubans who fought at the Bay of Pigs and survived Castro's prisons, quite naturally follows his sources in laying the disaster at the door of their presumed sponsor, the CIA. Beside extensive interviews with the four leaders, he says he consulted many other members of the Brigade and of the Cuban Families Committee, used four works published by the Cuban government, and got "information and other documentary material from sources which cannot be divulged." To the best of this reviewer's knowledge he did not get any material from the CIA or discuss the book with anybody in the Agency.

The passages that reflect badly on CIA range from Artime's resentment at having to take a polygraph test and Oliva's adverse comments on the training program in Guatemala—actually, a Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment team gave the training favorable marks—to charges that the leaders were deceived about getting U.S. support and given faulty intelligence for the operation.

San Román and Oliva say they were told by a mysterious "Frank" that the Brigade would not be the only unit involved in the landing, that their air force would include fighter planes as well as B-26's, and that the Marines, though not going in with them, "would be close to us when we needed them." The Brigade leaders learned that they were to establish and hold a beachhead until the civil government arrived, set itself up, and asked for help from the United States and Latin American countries. "Frank" is said to have told them that there were forces in the Administration trying to block the invasion, and that if they received an order to stop they were to ignore it and go ahead with the plan.

Infiltration teams sent in by the Brigade, it is claimed, felt that CIA didn't trust them because many messages sent from Cuba were never acted upon. The Brigade commanders are reported to have been told that Castro would not be able to react for seventy-two hours (an estimate presumably based on the effect a dawn air raid would have on his forces—but the raid was canceled). They were told that Castro's communications were poor, that there would be few tanks and no

planes in the defending forces, and that in the first two days five thousand Cubans would join the Brigade in a voluntary uprising. Erneido Oliva, who had defected from Castro's army, is quoted earlier as saying: "They asked me if I thought a guerrilla force could overthrow Fidel, and I said no, because I knew the regular army. Fidel had been too long in power and was too strong. I asked what backing we had and I was answered, 'We have all the backing necessary.' I asked what the United States was going to do and they didn't answer. . . ." San Román, it is said, "first began to doubt the intelligence information when his flagship arrived at Playa Girón. Instead of the deserted resort houses the CIA had said he would find, the shore was ablaze with lights." And so on.

The allegation that the Brigade's leaders were told to disobey any orders from Washington to cancel the operation is serious enough to have required refutation, and that has been given under oath by the officer involved. But it would be futile to try to check every statement the Cubans claim was made to them. With respect to those promising U.S. support, explicitly or by implication, the question is what other approach the sponsors could or should have taken. You don't send men into battle with a negative attitude. Nearly everybody, American and Cuban alike, was convinced that victory was assured and that the United States would be solidly behind the invaders. Partly for this reason no disaster plan had been formulated—though precious little about the covert operation was put into writing at all. And to those who take at face value the stories of flaps in the action I would recommend a study of the after-action reports done by participants in any battle: there will be little consistency among them about what happened before and during the fighting. No two human beings see or hear alike, particularly under conditions of stress.

So much in defense of CIA. More generally, *The Bay of Pigs* is well done, and a reasonable book about a disaster. Considering what happened to them, the Cuban leaders show remarkably little bitterness. The book is especially good, and probably quite accurate, about the efforts made to free the prisoners and their eventual release. It is weak and sketchy, for obvious reasons, about the planning and execution of the operation from the U.S. viewpoint. It takes its place on the shelf of literature about a battle that may one day be as well covered as Gettysburg.

L. B. Kirkpatrick

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THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. By David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. (New York: Random, 1964. 375 pp. \$5.95.)

The journalist-authors of this best-seller admit that Communist subversion and espionage pose a unique threat to the American people and their government, and they accept the necessity under certain circumstances for secret American efforts to prevent Moscow and Peking from gaining new allegiances. But they profess to believe that our secret attempts to meet the Communist challenge constitute so real a threat to our own freedoms that they must be exposed in as detailed and dramatic a way as possible. If the Soviets are profiting from these revelations, as they are, Wise and Ross apparently think that such self-inflicted wounds must be endured in the battle against excessive secrecy.

Broadly stated, their thesis is that the U.S. intelligence community, with the CIA at its heart, has grown so big and powerful that it threatens the democracy it was designed to defend. The CIA, they say, conducts its own clandestine foreign policy, and even the President has been unable to control it. The State Department is powerless to exert policy direction because its ambassadors are kept uninformed and are habitually by-passed by CIA operatives. The Congress has abdicated its legislative role and votes huge secret funds without adequate knowledge of how the money is spent.

If all this were true, American democracy would certainly be in serious trouble, and the alarm professed about the "invisible government" would be justified. But is it true? Strangely enough, the authors themselves provide, ambiguously, a negative answer to this question which is so central to their major thesis. They concede the existence of institutional arrangements designed to give the President and his principal foreign policy advisors the very kind of close policy control over secret operations that they ought to have. Early in the book, they mention the existence of a "Special Group" which makes the major decisions regarding clandestine operations, though they say it is so secret that it is "unknown outside the innermost circle of the Invisible Government." The reader must wait through 255 pages to learn that the members of this policy group are no sinister shadows but McGeorge Bundy in the White House, Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence. These are just the officials that one would expect the President to have

chosen to advise him on matters of high clandestine policy, and they are far from invisible.

The authors, in order to prove their thesis, do try to show that the Special Group is ineffective: they claim it meets in "a highly informal way without the elaborate records and procedures of other high Government committees"; there is no "outside analysis" and "little detached criticism"; the members are too busy with their other duties to perform their supervisory function adequately. The impression is left that the President and the Secretary of State are not even informed of the Group's decisions. One must have a very low opinion of the sense of responsibility and competence of the men in these key government positions to believe they behave so cavalierly. And yet if one does not believe this, the authors' whole portrayal of an irresponsible and invisible government becomes inherently incredible.

Similar treatment is accorded the President's Board on intelligence activities formed under the Eisenhower administration and reconstituted by President Kennedy. This is dismissed as a superficial façade with the remark that "both committees were composed of part-time consultants who met only occasionally during the year," and it is implied by use of the past tense that the Board is now extinct. Actually it is very much alive and its membership is no secret, having been announced in a White House release of April 23, 1963. It includes Clark Clifford, William O. Baker, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy, and Frank Pace. These are able, experienced men who discharge conscientiously their duty of advising the President on the workings of the intelligence community, and it wouldn't have taken much journalistic initiative to find this out. They have a right to resent being dismissed as "veneer."

In his last public reference to the CIA, at the time of the Diem crisis in Vietnam, President Kennedy declared, "... I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last nine months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. . . . I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions. . . ." The impression grows that Wise and Ross felt obliged to ignore or at least belittle any evidence that the supervision of American intelligence activity is in responsible hands.

This impression is strengthened by their description of the role of Congress. They grant that the CIA budget and program is subject to review and approval by special subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of both Houses, but they reject this congressional scrutiny as inadequate. They charge that the subcommittees "are controlled by the most conservative elements in Congress, men who are close personally and philosophically to those who run the 'Invisible Government.'" Then they state the case for a joint congressional watchdog committee, the one specific institutional reform they argue for. So far the watchdog committee idea has been opposed not only by successive administrations but also by the congressional leadership.

If this book is widely accepted at its face value within the United States, it can only reduce public confidence in the intelligence services and make it more difficult for them to recruit the able men and women we shall need in the difficult days that lie ahead. Although incomparably better researched than its forerunner by Andrew Tully,¹ it too tends to portray the American on the clandestine fronts of the cold war as typically a reactionary, unscrupulous blunderer. One chapter purports to describe the desperate efforts of the Peace Corps to prevent itself from being infiltrated by the CIA. Leaders of the Corps are represented as being so fearful that CIA will disobey presidential directives and attempt to infiltrate that they take the most elaborate precautions. The implication is clear that CIA's irresponsibility made such precautions necessary. Only at the end of the chapter will the reader find a brief sentence admitting that no single case of attempted infiltration was ever discovered.

Another effect of the book is to expose for the first time certain individuals and organizations as having intelligence connections and thus sharply increase their vulnerability to Soviet attack. A spokesman for Random House has been quoted as claiming that the book contains nothing that had not already appeared in public print, but in the first chapter the authors boast that "much of the material has never been printed anywhere else before." They insist that they have stayed "within the bounds of national security" but appear to have reserved to themselves the right to decide what those limits are. Such an attitude raises serious questions as to the responsibility of the journalist in a free society in a time of cold war. In Great Britain, which is second to none in its devotion to liberty, there exists an

Official Secrets Act under which the authors would have been tried and sentenced to prison. Such a law in this country is not feasible, but in its absence the American journalist carries an even heavier responsibility than his British counterpart.

By far the most damaging consequence of this book will have been its exploitation by the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet and Chinese regimes. The CIA has understandably been for a long time a primary target of the Soviet KGB, and everything from forgeries to full-length books have been inspired by the Soviet propagandists in their efforts to destroy the reputation of American intelligence organizations and undermine their effectiveness. The KGB technicians must find it hard to believe their good luck in being donated so much useful ammunition by a reputable American publisher and two certifiably non-Communist journalists. The book is being reprinted and replayed in press and radio from one end of the world to the other. That much of this material has been printed before does not reduce the value to the Soviets of having it gathered in one volume under such genuine American auspices.

The problem of balancing freedom with security has been an ancient dilemma for democratic states in their long struggle to survive against aggressive totalitarianisms. This book may serve to dramatize the problem, but it does not provide any deep insight or new solutions. It was written not to enlighten but to shock and to sell.

Charles E. Valpey

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. By *Jack Zlotnick*. Revision of original 1960 edition. (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 1964. 75 pp. Not for sale.)

This is a textbook in the Industrial College's series "The Economics of National Security." It describes the structure and functioning of the U.S. intelligence community, takes the student through the production of national estimates, current intelligence reports, and basic surveys, explains procedures at successive stages of the intelligence process from the levying of requirements to the dissemination of the product, and then discusses each of the subject-matter specialties of the intelligence spectrum—political, military, etc. It is slightly more expansive with respect of the process of analysis than other functions and with respect to economic intelligence than other subject specialties.

¹ *CIA: The Inside Story* (New York, 1962).

Though an elementary text is inevitably less than exciting to an experienced practitioner and an open work on intelligence is inevitably curtailed by security considerations, for the newcomer or outsider this is probably the most complete unclassified statement covering its range of subjects available, and it is thoroughly sound. The new edition has an updated text and improved format. There remain more typos than there should and a few textual slips—the “recent” Suez crisis, “skilled agents” like Pontecorvo and “Allen” Nunn May—but these are not frequent enough to shake the reader’s justified confidence in the authority of the work. It is a good textbook.

Robert Wolms

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