

MEMORANDUM: The Dimensions of Soviet Aid to North Vietnam

I. General Review of Aid Programs

A. Historical Role of Aid

The almost complete dependence of North Vietnam on external sources to support virtually every facet of its economic and military development has made the country a ward of the Communist world. The USSR and Communist China together since 1954 have accounted for two-thirds of North Vietnam's imports, more than 85 percent of the total economic aid and almost 100 percent of the military aid offered to North Vietnam.

Although China has been the traditional supplier of military aid, the USSR has made the greater contribution to North Vietnam's military establishment. The value of Soviet deliveries of military equipment has been three times that provided by Communist China, principally because the USSR has provided the more sophisticated weapons, especially defensive systems. The USSR has provided most of the aid for developing North Vietnam's military infrastructure such as airfields and naval bases.

In the field of economic assistance, however, the Soviet and Chinese contributions have been almost equal -- \$604 million for the USSR and \$582 million for Communist China.

Soviet and Chinese aid programs -- economic and military -- have tended to follow well established lines which reflect the capabilities of the donors. In the economic field the USSR has tended to concentrate on heavy industry, principally mining, manufacturing, and power. Chinese aid projects, with some notable exceptions such as the iron and steel complex at Thai Nguyen and some projects in the power and chemical industries, have focused on light industry and agriculture. A similar trend toward specialization is observed in military aid programs. The USSR has provided heavier and more advanced equipment such as anti-aircraft guns, radar, tanks, and artillery. The Chinese have been the main suppliers of trucks, small arms, ammunition, and equipment for ground forces. Since the start of the sustained bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, the USSR has become the major supplier of sophisticated air defense equipment and advanced all weather fighter aircraft. The USSR, after making its large inputs of aircraft in 1965, also assumed the training of North Vietnamese pilots, a task previously performed by the Chinese.

B. Developments in 1965-1966

The Communist countries responded to the intensified allied air offensive against North Vietnam by increasing sharply the

levels of their economic and military assistance to North Vietnam (see Table 1). Thus, after a two year hiatus, economic aid deliveries amounted to about \$150 million in 1965 and \$275 million in 1966. Over half of this aid in each year came from the USSR, and about one-third from Communist China.

Table 1

Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam*

	Million US\$			
<u>Military</u>	<u>1953-64</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Total</u>
USSR	70	225	175	470
China	70	35	55	160
Eastern Europe	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
<u>Economic</u>	<u>1955-64</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Total</u>
USSR	369	85	150	604
China	457	50	75	582
Eastern Europe	130	15	50	195

* These figures change periodically as new evidence becomes available. Our estimates of 1966 deliveries will undoubtedly increase as we acquire more information.

Deliveries of military equipment to North Vietnam, which previously had been on a very small scale, reached an estimated \$260 million in 1965 and at least \$230 million in 1966. This aid was provided almost exclusively by the USSR and Communist China. The dominance of the USSR in this assistance -- 86 percent of the total in 1965 and 76 percent in 1966 -- reflects the large inputs of air defense equipment and all-weather MIG fighters and IL-28 jet light bombers. In 1965, for example, Soviet deliveries of air defense equipment -- operational SAM sites, antiaircraft artillery and radar -- reached an estimated value of \$145 million, or almost 65 percent of total Soviet military deliveries in 1965.

The cost to the USSR and Communist China of providing this economic and military assistance to North Vietnam is small in terms of their capabilities and does not bulk large when compared with their assistance to non-Communist countries. In 1965, for example, the USSR supplied the less developed countries of the Free World with about one and a half times as much military equipment (by value) as it supplied to North Vietnam. Similarly, Soviet economic aid extended to the less developed countries in 1965 was about twice the amount that the USSR is estimated to have extended to North Vietnam. The contributions made by Communist China are also well within that country's capabilities. The delivery of at least \$55 million of military equipment during 1966 can be compared with the

\$50 million of military equipment delivered to Pakistan, Cambodia, and Tanzania during 1966.

Both the USSR and Communist China have provided military advisers and technicians to North Vietnam. The Chinese contribution in this area is far greater than that of the USSR.

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C. The Probable Trend of Aid Programs

Barring a radical change in the nature of the military aid provided to North Vietnam -- such as the introduction of advanced SAM systems, coastal defense missiles or ships to establish an effective naval force -- deliveries of Soviet military equipment will probably slacken in 1967. The value of military aid is likely, therefore, to become both relatively and absolutely smaller. Our final estimates for deliveries of military equipment in 1966 will probably be at about the 1965 level. The share of total aid (military plus economic) represented by military deliveries in 1966 will be lower than the 72 percent reached in 1965. The trend for military deliveries to decrease reflects the completion of the build-up of North Vietnam's air defense system and the more rapid growth of aid for repairing bomb damage, maintaining North Vietnam's economy, and developing a war-supporting industrial base.

II. Comments on Specific Statements

The following discussion is addressed to a set of 17 specific statements on the importance of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. These statements appeared in an article entitled, "Russia: The Enemy in Vietnam," which was published in the US News and World Report of 30 January 1967.

1. "It is the Russians, however, who are furnishing the real sinews for major and prolonged war."

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The simple North Vietnamese economy is almost completely dependent on external sources for all major items of military hardware and for many of the supplies needed to maintain its military forces. Without these supplies which are furnished by its Communist allies, North Vietnam's military potential would be greatly reduced. It is difficult, however, to ascribe dominant importance to the military aid of either the USSR or China. The military aid programs of each country differ significantly in dimension and purpose, but both are essential.

The quoted statement is true if it refers to the ability of North Vietnam to withstand the pressures resulting from the bombing of North Vietnam. Over 55 percent of Soviet deliveries of military hardware (excluding aircraft) in 1965 and 1966 were for North Vietnam's air defense system. This share would be even higher if the value of antiaircraft ammunition were included.

The quoted statement is not true if it refers to the ability of North Vietnam to sustain its aggression in South Vietnam. From this point of view, the aid from Communist China has probably been more significant.

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Chinese military deliveries which emphasize small arms and ammunition, trucks and vehicles, are more directly related to the fighting capabilities of the DRV forces in South Vietnam. For example, an analysis of Bloc-origin weapons captured in South Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 shows that of those of Communist origin at least 85 percent came from China and less than 5 percent from the USSR.

2. "The Russians now are investing close to 1 billion dollars a year in the war."

This statement considerably exaggerates the value of Soviet aid. Our estimates of Soviet military aid -- \$225 million in 1965 and at least \$175 million in 1966

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An alternative methodology using US costs would inflate this figure considerably, but the total value of Soviet military aid on an annual basis would still be less than \$450 million.

The \$1 billion figure is often reported in press commentary on military aid to North Vietnam. It apparently originated from an October 1966 announcement of the Warsaw Pact powers pledging to give Hanoi about \$1 billion of assistance. The announcement was vaguely worded without specific details on the types of assistance -- military or economic -- or the time period in which this assistance would be provided. All intelligence sources fail to show the

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drastic increase in aid deliveries which would be necessary if military assistance were to be delivered at an annual rate of \$1 billion. It should be noted that the delivery of Soviet military aid at a rate of \$1 billion a year would probably be far in excess of North Vietnam's capacity to absorb such aid.

3. "Most of the trucks that move the needed supplies from North to South Vietnam, for example, come from Russia or her satellites."

North Vietnam imports all of its trucks from Communist countries. It is, of course, not often possible to distinguish between military and civilian importers of trucks or to know to what use the trucks will be put. During 1965, the last year for which firm estimates of truck imports are possible, North Vietnam imported over 3,500 trucks of which about 2,000 were estimated to be for its military forces. The USSR supplied about 20 percent of total truck imports in 1965 and Communist China and the East European Communist countries each supplied about 40 percent.

The North Vietnamese truck inventory is estimated to have been about 11,500 at the end of 1966. Imports of trucks during 1965 were more than sufficient to compensate for losses due to bombing and retirement. Imports during 1966 were at least equal to losses. Of the total inventory of 11,500 trucks we estimate that probably only 400-500 are involved in the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam through the Laotian Panhandle.

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However, since the trucks usually move only at night, and Chinese-built trucks are copies of Soviet models it is an exercise in futility to attempt to differentiate trucks by country of origin.

4. "Many of the automatic weapons that we capture from North Vietnamese troops are of Russian manufacture."

Two independent studies of the origin of weapons captured from Communist troops in South Vietnam indicate that the majority of them are of Chinese origin. The first study, based on a small sampling of ground engagements showed the origin of captured weapons to be as follows:

	Percent			
	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Other</u>
1964	22.7	29.1	32.6	15.6
1965	27.0	50.0	8.0	15.0
1966 (estimate)	35.0	30.0	15.0	20.0*

* Includes 5 percent from the USSR.

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The second study, [redacted]

[redacted] revealed the following.

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	Percent			
	<u>China</u>	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>North Vietnam</u>	<u>USSR</u>
1965 (1,770 weapons)	91.7	1.4	2.7	4.2
1966 (2,489 weapons)	84.3	7.4	5.5	2.8

The preponderance of Chinese manufactured weapons among those of Communist origin reflects the fact that the North Vietnamese troops and Viet Cong main force units in South Vietnam are armed with the new family of 7.62 mm weapons produced in Communist China. We believe, however, that a large percentage of the VC main forces and most local force units are armed with captured US weapons and to a lesser extent French weapons.

5. "Most of our plane losses have resulted from the use of Soviet Russia's antiaircraft guns, missiles or MIG jet fighters."

During 1955 and 1966 alone a total of 510 manned aircraft were lost in air operations against North Vietnam. Of these, 457 were combat losses. Only 40 or less than 10 percent of the combat losses were due to SAM attacks. MIG aircraft accounted for 13 of the losses. The MIG's were supplied by the USSR and Communist China. Antiaircraft and ground fire accounted for 404 of the combat losses.

6. "Soviet aid to North Vietnam trickled along at an average yearly rate of 35 million dollars until early in 1965, when, even before US began bombing in the North, the Russians started moving in a big way -- with SAM antiaircraft missiles, jet fighters, military vehicles, oil, other paraphernalia of war."

Soviet economic and military aid through 1964 was at low levels and did not increase drastically until after the Tonkin Gulf incident in August, 1964. We estimate that Soviet deliveries of military equipment prior to 1964 were in the order of only \$5 million a year. If aid furnished for the development of North Vietnam's military infrastructure were included annual deliveries could have totaled about \$25 million. Chinese deliveries of military equipment prior to 1964 were at about the same annual level as Soviet deliveries. Chinese deliveries since then have increased but at a much lower rate than Soviet deliveries.

The first large jump in Soviet military deliveries occurred in 1964 when \$25 million in equipment was delivered. These deliveries included the first shipments of Soviet antiaircraft guns and

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radar to be used in creating an air defense system for North Vietnam. Soviet military deliveries, which jumped even more dramatically in 1965 and 1966, consisted of the items described in the quotation. Petroleum imports, mostly from the USSR, jumped from 150,000 tons in 1964 to 177,000 tons in 1965 and 237,000 tons in 1966.

7. "Almost 1,000 SAM's have been fired at US planes. These Soviet missiles, launched by Russian-trained crews, have themselves destroyed 30 US planes and contributed in a large measure to an over-all loss in the North of more than 460 planes."

By the end of 1966, almost 1,300 SAM's had been launched against US aircraft. These missiles accounted for the destruction of 40 manned aircraft out of a total of 457 lost in combat over North Vietnam. The SAM's also destroyed 21 drone aircraft during 1965-1966. By forcing US aircraft to fly at low altitudes, however, the SAM's do contribute in large measure to US aircraft losses over North Vietnam.

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8. "Cost to the Russians in spent missiles: about 25 million dollars. Cost to the US in planes alone: more than 1 billion dollars."

We estimate that the cost of the missiles fired against US aircraft were at least \$40 million, compared to a cost of about \$75 million for the US aircraft lost to SAM's.

The estimate of \$1 billion for US aircraft losses over North Vietnam reflect losses from all causes both combat and operational. This cost should properly be compared with the total cost of North Vietnam's air defense operations and the damage inflicted by US air strikes and not with the cost of missiles alone. Although we are unable to estimate the cost to North Vietnam of operating its air defense system, these costs are large. The North Vietnamese also lost about 41 MIG aircraft valued at about \$20 million in 1965-1966. The damage inflicted by the air strikes against North Vietnam was about \$200 million by the end of 1966.

9. "The North Vietnamese landscape is also studded with conventional antiaircraft positions, about 6,000 in all. The original antiaircraft system was installed by the Chinese. Now bigger guns are coming in. They are Russian."

[redacted] indicated that North Vietnam had about 4,000 AAA weapons at the end of 1966. In addition pilot reporting and other information indicate that there may be as many as 2,500 additional antiaircraft weapons in North Vietnam. The USSR is believed to be the major source of AAA weapons for North Vietnam. We believe that the establishment of the antiaircraft system was probably a joint Soviet-Chinese undertaking, with the USSR providing the bulk of the weapons and the Chinese providing much of the ammunition and support work.

The USSR is known to have begun shipping substantial numbers of AAA weapons to North Vietnam in late 1964 before the bombing began in earnest. Total Soviet deliveries of AAA weapons for confirmed sites from 1953 through 1966 were over 4,000 units valued at \$80 million. These deliveries include all the heavy caliber (85 and 100 mm) weapons in North Vietnam. The Chinese, in the same period, provided a minimum of 685 weapons valued at about \$12 million.

10. "The North Vietnamese Air Force now consists of 75 to 100 fighter planes and a handful of light bombers supplied by the Soviet Union. About one fifth of the forces are the most up-to-date MIG-21s; the remainder, MIG 15s and MIG-17s. The MIG's are replaced by the Russians as they are lost in the fighting."

The Soviet Union and Communist China delivered 155 MIG-fighter aircraft to North Vietnam during 1964-66. Forty-four came from Communist China and 111 from the USSR, including 34 supersonic MIG-21 fighter aircraft. The end-1966 inventory was about 124 fighter aircraft, including 28 MIG-21's.

Deliveries in 1966 amounted to 75 aircraft, or about 3 times the losses sustained during that year. Both the Soviets and Chinese would almost certainly be willing to replace aircraft losses if they do not become substantially higher than in 1966. The majority of the aircraft provided to date -- MIG-15/17's -- have been no match for US fighter aircraft. The USSR would probably be more reluctant to undertake a continuing replacement of the supersonic MIG-21's if losses of this aircraft should increase significantly.


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11. "There are upward of 2,000 Russian technicians working at air bases and at SAM sites. North Vietnamese pilots are trained in Russia and supervised by Soviet fliers when they return to Hanoi."

We estimate that there are from 1,000-1,500 Soviet technicians currently in North Vietnam as part of the military assistance program. This is a decline from the 2,500-3,000 estimated to be in North Vietnam during 1965 when the major build-up of the air defense system was taking place. Probably not more than 10 percent of the 1,000-1,500 personnel advise and train the North Vietnamese air force.


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12. "Within the past few months, the Russians have taught North Vietnamese to man approximately 350 SAM missiles and an estimated 3,000 antiaircraft guns."

This statement is somewhat confused. At the end of 1966 there were about 150 SAM sites in North Vietnam. The number of SAM sites occupied at any one time, however, was about 25. The differences is explained by the mobility of the SAM system which enables missiles and equipment to be moved from site to site.

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13. "For the first time, Soviet helicopters are being spotted in North Vietnam. Russian cargo aircraft are also making an appearance."



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The first deliveries of Soviet helicopters to North Vietnam were made in 1962-63. A total of 20 MI-4's have been delivered to date. In addition the USSR, during 1966, provided North Vietnam with six MI-6's, the largest helicopter used by the USSR. The MI-6 helicopters have taken part in resupply operations at Dien Bien Phu.

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14. "The North Vietnamese war machine runs almost entirely on Russian oil. In the past 18 months, the Russians shipped in 300,000 metric tons." ... "Last month alone, the Soviets shipped nearly 25,000 metric tons of gasoline and oil into Haiphong."

The figures on imports of petroleum are generally accurate. Almost all North Vietnamese petroleum imports are from the USSR. Small amounts are also imported on occasion from Rumania and Communist China.

Imports during 1966 totaled 237,000 tons and were about 40,000 tons more than North Vietnamese consumption. This surplus was apparently imported as part of the program to create dispersed stockpiles.

We estimate that about 40 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum consumption is by military consumers. An unknown amount is probably also used indirectly for military consumers by civil transport organizations, which account for over 35 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum consumption.

15. "The Russians use ships to transport 80 percent of their aid to North Vietnam." ... "All told, the Russians are said to be delivering 80,000 tons of goods a month to Hanoi."

We estimate that the Russians use ships to transport about 90 percent of their exports to North Vietnam. Moreover, we estimate that, during 1966, Soviet ships delivered an average of only 45,000 tons of goods a month to Hanoi, rather than the 80,000 claimed in the quotation.

17. "Tonnage by sea from all sources -- Russia, China, East Europe and non-Communist countries -- was estimated at 2 million tons in 1966. Of that, the Russian share was estimated at half the total, Red China's about one fourth."

These figures overstate North Vietnam's seaborne imports in 1966. We estimate that North Vietnamese seaborne imports during 1966 totaled slightly over one million tons. Over 493,000 tons or about 50 percent of all seaborne imports originated in the USSR.

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<p>This may be <u>interesting</u> background for those responsible for preparing the response to Senator Mundt's recent letter.</p>			
<p>[Redacted Signature]</p> <p>John S. Warner</p>			
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 9, 1967

transportation needs of the retail shopper who comes to the central city only occasionally, for a few hours, are also different. In any judgment, no single mode of transportation—neither highways nor mass transit—can properly serve all the different transportation needs of residents in any large urban area. A balanced system of transportation is needed—a system in which each substantial needs for transportation is met by a means of transportation best suited to it.

How is this balanced system to be achieved? At present, we often seem to be trapped in political battles between single-minded advocates of highways, and equally single-minded advocates of mass transit. But each position is, in my view, equally fallacious. The mass transit proponent focuses almost exclusively on the rush hour commuting problem—but ignores the basic urban services and activities which only the highways can provide. The single-minded highway advocate argues that highways alone can solve the rush hour commuting problem—but ignores the probability that exclusive commuter reliance on highways will defeat other purposes—such as rapid, all-hour movement of freight—which only highways can serve. The highway advocate thus ignores the great benefits to highway usage which mass transit systems can provide.

Neither extreme position can do the job. A balanced system is needed. And it seems to me that, as a simple matter of economic self-interest, the leading advocates of mass transit, as a means to solve commuter congestion problems, should be those who need highways for transportation purposes other than commuting. A balanced transportation system is in everybody's best interests.

There is today, however, one major obstacle in the way of achieving a balanced system. The availability of money—in particular, Federal money—for highways and for mass transit is drastically out of balance. The fact that cities and states can use Federal funds to finance much of their highway construction programs, while Federal funds available for mass transit are relatively puny in amount, in my judgment seriously distorts sensible urban transportation planning. To eliminate this distortion, Representative Bingham in the House and I in the Senate have proposed that cities or states should have an option to use funds for mass transit which are now available only for highway construction. This is not meant to be an anti-highway proposal. It is a pro-balanced transportation bill. And, as I have stated, a balanced transportation system is in everyone's best interest—and particularly in the interest of those who must use the highways.

The Federal Interstate Highway Act will expire in 1972. In the near future, Congress will begin deliberations on the allocation of our national transportation resources for the 1970s. I believe that those who support continuation of the interstate highway construction program must also become supporters of a complementary urban rapid transit program—so that highway programs will not be jeopardized by the inescapable pressures from the cities in need of rapid transit.

In the Washington metropolitan area, a number of transportation planning issues have just recently come closer to resolution. We are going to have a subway system, and we are going to add significant new roads to our urban complex. But many basic decisions still must be made—decisions regarding highway design and the use of space around the highways, decisions regarding subway routing, and the relationship of that routing to highway construction. We have a dramatic opportunity to achieve a sensible, balanced transportation system in this area—a system that will serve our many and differing transportation needs while enhancing the character of urban life. Active and enlight-

oned community leadership can capitalize on this opportunity. We cannot afford to fail.

BAD TIMING FOR CONSULAR TREATY RATIFICATION

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, the dean of American columnists, and one generally recognized in Washington as the most widely read and influential of them all, David Lawrence, editor of the famed news weekly, U.S. News & World Report, had a column in last night's Washington Evening Star which points up most graphically a realistic reason why the proposed consular treaty with Russia in this time of war should not be ratified.

As the great debate goes on, Mr. President, despite the almost frantic efforts of the White House and the State Department to win support from individual Senators whose disposition is to oppose this wartime treaty with the very Communist power whose shipments of sophisticated weapons, oil, antiaircraft guns, SAM missiles, nearly 200 and perhaps more Mig jet fighting planes, coastal ships, helicopters, radar defense systems, rolled-steel products, military trucks, heavy infantry weapons, and so forth, the evidence is rolling in that to ratify that treaty without getting a quid pro quo from Russia to stop its participation in this war against American troops is likely to do far more to prolong the war and to increase our casualty lists than it is to stop it.

I hope all Senators and all who read this issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will read these words by highly regarded, international minded, David Lawrence before casting their votes late this month on the Consular Treaty ratification. It is an issue which cannot be divorced from its potential consequences in the escalation of this bloody war in far-off Vietnam.

Incidentally, Mr. President, I hope those who read this statement will also refer to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for yesterday—February 8—where, starting on page S1784, I submitted in considerable detail the evidence which continues to grow in volume and significance in condemnation and opposition to administration policies which defer the likelihood of peace in Vietnam and points up how Russia is the major obstacle to convincing the Government in Hanoi that it should come to the negotiation table and work out with the United States of America the approaches to an early peace.

Without the steadily increasing shipments of the means to fight and the weapons with which to kill our fighting men which flow from Russia to Hanoi, many here believe the war would long since have been ended and the capacity of the Vietnamese Communists to continue the war would be terminated. The title of my statement in yesterday's RECORD is "Building Bridges to the Executioner."

Let me quote now a single comment from the David Lawrence column of last night. It reads:

For the Moscow Government is at present the real adversary of the United States in Vietnam and has been indirectly responsible for the killing of thousands of American sol-

diers. Yet, instead of demanding an end to such acts of war, the President and his administration are actually asking Congress to ratify a new consular treaty which could mean assistance to the Soviet system of infiltration.

Mr. President, that statement by David Lawrence is closely similar to the statement I placed in the RECORD during my remarks yesterday in quoting an article from Our Sunday Visitor—highly respected Catholic newspaper—which will also be found on page S1784.

It seems clear to me, Mr. President, that consideration of a Consular Treaty with Communist Russia in time of peace is one thing, but that to consider it and to ratify it during a costly and savage continuing war which is being prolonged and abetted by this self-same Russian Government is quite a different challenge to the judgment of the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to place the entire column by David Lawrence in the RECORD at this point of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

RUSSIA CALLED REAL FOE IN VIETNAM

(By David Lawrence)

Peace could come overnight in the Vietnam war if the Soviet Union—which is spending billions of dollars to supply war planes and other weapons, and is providing military technicians to the North Vietnamese—were to decide to withhold its aid unless hostilities are ended.

For the Moscow government is at present the real adversary of the United States in Vietnam and has been indirectly responsible for the killing of thousands of American soldiers. Yet, instead of demanding an end to such acts of war, the President and his administration are actually asking Congress to ratify a new consular treaty which could mean assistance to the Soviet system of infiltration.

The figures derived from official sources show that in the last two years more than \$2 billion worth of supplies—oil, field artillery pieces, heavy infantry weapons and modern jets, including light bombers—have been furnished by the Soviet Union to the North Vietnamese military forces. In addition, hundreds of pilots have been sent by the Hanoi government to Russia to be trained. More than 2,000 Soviet technicians are in North Vietnam training missile crews and operating military supply stations.

The tendency heretofore has been to portray Red China as the principal factor in the bolstering of the North Vietnam government. But the evidence is coming out now that Russia has become in the last two years the mainstay of the North Vietnamese. The Red Chinese, despite their internal troubles, are continuing to supply light weapons, ammunition and rice, all of which is a big help to the guerrilla forces. The Russians, however, are providing the real sinews of the war which is causing America and its allies to incur thousands of casualties.

Oddly enough, the United Nations and its secretary general, U Thant, have not said or done anything to protest this action. Inside the United States the facts about the Russian aid have not been publicized. Historically, the action of the Soviet government would long ago have been the subject of a formal protest by the American government and could have brought about a severance of diplomatic relations. The Moscow government in 1953 openly boasted that it had been furnishing arms and supplies to Red China, though that country had been denounced in 1951 by a formal resolution of the United Nations as an aggressor in South Korea.

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Today the Russians are again giving military aid to an aggressor, and the subject isn't even being discussed in the United Nations. Nor is it being mentioned by administration spokesmen in Congress or elsewhere. Instead, the pressure for peace moves is centered on the North Vietnamese without regard to the fact that the Soviet government is encouraging the Hanoi regime to keep on fighting and is supplying the necessary military aid for that purpose.

Incidentally, the Soviet Union, according to news dispatches in the last 24 hours, has achieved its "first major success in a campaign to get Russian arms and military technicians into pro-Western nations." Arrangements have been completed for Russia to supply military aid to Iran, which is a member of the Central Treaty Organization along with Turkey, Britain, Pakistan and the United States. This is the organization which the American government played an important part in forming so as to defend the Middle East against Communist penetration.

Also, the news dispatches tell of the use of Cambodian territory by the Communists to attack American troops in Vietnam. Thus, the forces aided by Moscow are spreading the war into other countries in Southeast Asia.

The question is why the President and the Congress remain silent though they have indubitable proof that the Soviet Union is North Vietnam's principal ally.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, additionally, so that all Senators may know completely and accurately the full extent to which the Russian Communists are aiding their Communist comrades in North Vietnam in their insane insistence on continuing the bloody fighting which has already cost us over 50,000 American casualties, I ask consent that an article from the January 30 issue of U.S. News & World Report, entitled "Russia: The Enemy in Vietnam," be reprinted at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RUSSIA: THE ENEMY IN VIETNAM?

SAIGON.—Soviet Russia, not Red China, is turning out to be the major enemy of the U.S. in Vietnam. A steadily expanding Russian involvement is causing this war to be the second most costly in dollars in American history.

The American people have not previously been told of this situation that is regarded by military commanders with increasing concern.

Instead, high officials in Washington have pictured the Russians as anxious for peace.

The U.S. policy has been to portray Communist China as responsible for prolonging war and to try to buy Russian friendship by American concessions in many fields.

SINews OF WAR

The facts, just beginning to emerge, tell a different story.

The Red Chinese, torn by troubles at home, still are supplying light weapons, ammunition and rice to the North Vietnamese. Their aid is helpful to guerrilla forces when it reaches the South. It is the Russians, however, who are furnishing the real sinews for major and prolonged war.

Extent of Soviet participation is great and expanding. The Russians now are investing close to 1 billion dollars a year in the war. With this billion—and no real loss of life—they are helping to force the U.S. to wage a war that now is taking thousands of American lives and costing directly about 30 billion dollars a year.

On January 19, U.S. headquarters reported that U.S. forces in Vietnam suffered in the second week of January their heaviest

casualties of the war—1,188 men killed or wounded in action.

The U.S., because it is bogged down in Vietnam and burdened with over-all defense spending that is to reach 73 billion dollars or more in the year ahead, is hampered in trying to keep Russia from forging ahead in the nuclear-arms race.

The Russians, with the U.S. tied down, have made a major "break-through" in anti-missile defense and are pushing ahead with that decisively important defense while the U.S. talks and delays because of money problems.

The Russian investment in the Vietnam war today is impressive. The chart on pages 28 and 29 spells out that investment not only in terms of dollars, but also in terms of specific armament and vital technical assistance.

THE BIG QUESTION

Says a top U.S. officer: "There no longer is any question about it—the Russians are at war with us in Vietnam in a very real sense. They are more important than most people realize in the operation of the war. Most of the trucks that move the needed supplies from North to South Vietnam, for example, come from Russia or her satellites. Many of the automatic weapons that we capture from North Vietnamese troops are of Russian manufacture. Most of our plane losses have resulted from the use of Soviet Russia's antiaircraft guns, missiles or MIG jet fighters."

From another officer: "If Russia were to pull out of the war, so would Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and other suppliers of vitally needed equipment. Red China alone couldn't start to carry the supply burden alone. Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi would have a tough time continuing his infiltration. It would have a noticeable effect on the war, maybe a decisive one."

Soviet aid to North Vietnam trickled along at an average yearly rate of 35 million dollars until early in 1966, when, even before U.S. began bombing in the North, the Russians started moving in a big way—with SAM antiaircraft missiles, jet fighters, military vehicles, oil, other paraphernalia of war!

The Russian rockets and guns are directly responsible for mounting U.S. losses over the North. Almost 1,000 SAM's have been fired at U.S. planes. These Soviet missiles, launched by Russian-trained crews, have themselves destroyed 30 U.S. planes and contributed in a large measure to an over-all loss in the North of more than 460 U.S. planes.

Cost to the Russians in spent missiles: about 25 million dollars. Cost to the U.S. in planes alone: more than 1 billion dollars.

The North Vietnamese landscape is also studded with conventional antiaircraft positions, about 6,000 in all. The original antiaircraft system was installed by the Chinese. Now bigger guns are coming in. They are Russian.

The North Vietnamese Air Force now consists of 75 to 100 fighter planes and a handful of light bombers supplied by the Soviet Union. About one fifth of the force are the most up-to-date MIG-21s; the remainder, MIG-16s and MIG-17s. The MIG's are replaced by the Russians as they are lost in the fighting.

RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS, TOO

Intelligence sources estimate there are upward of 2,000 Russian technicians working at air bases and at SAM sites. North Vietnamese pilots are trained in Russia and supervised by Soviet fliers when they return to Hanoi.

Within the past few months, the Russians have taught North Vietnamese to man approximately 350 SAM missiles and an estimated 3,000 antiaircraft guns. Other Soviet advisers help operate North Vietnam's industry, its coal mines and the port of Haiphong, and are helping in the building or rebuilding of hydroelectric plants, other major works.

For the first time, Soviet helicopters are

being spotted in North Vietnam. Russian cargo aircraft are also making an appearance.

The North Vietnamese war machine runs almost entirely on Russian oil. In the past 18 months, the Russians shipped in 300,000 metric tons. The Chinese provided almost none. Last month alone, the Soviets shipped nearly 25,000 metric tons of gasoline and oil into Haiphong.

The Russians use ships to transport 80 per cent of their aid to North Vietnam, the balance going by rail or by plane across Red China despite severe restrictions set up by Peking. All told, the Russians are said to be delivering 80,000 tons of goods a month to Hanoi.

Intelligence sources in Saigon report that the Soviet ships going to Haiphong carry not only civilian goods, as the Reds insist, but jet aircraft, SAM's, radar gear and antiaircraft guns.

During 1966, an average of one ship a day reached Haiphong. Six Soviet ships docked there during the past two weeks.

Tonnage by sea from all sources—Russia, China, East Europe and non-Communist countries—was estimated at 2 million tons in 1966. Of that, the Russian share was estimated at half the total, Red China's about one fourth.

The point is stressed that the number of Chinese ships entering Haiphong went down in 1966, the Russian total up.

CHINA'S ROLE

Chinese propagandists, pushing their fight for world Communist leadership, maintain that Peking still is the main supplier to the Communists of Vietnam. "What the Chinese are bragging about," says one Western expert, "is volume. Tonnage from Red China may run higher, but the dollar-per-ton value and the strategic value of Russian aid is much greater."

In the words of another expert: "The vital suppliers are the Soviets. If the flow of supplies from Red China were cut off, the Soviets would be able to handle the whole job. The Chinese could not if the situation were reversed."

The Russians, when possible, avoid shipping vital items across Red China. One reason, according to intelligence sources: The Chinese insist on opening all shipments crossing their territory, often stamp, "From China With Love" over the Russian characters.

Reports are heard, also, that the Chinese have delayed shipments of SAM's and late-model MIG's while their technicians removed them from the crates to make copies for themselves.

SOVIET PRUDENCE?

It is agreed here in Saigon that the Russians have not gone as far as they could in arming North Vietnam. "In fact," says one U.S. official, "the Russians have been extremely prudent in some ways. We think it very likely that Hanoi has asked for such items as battlefield missiles for use in the South, perhaps even for submarines to use against the Seventh Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf."

Another senior officer adds:

"It is clear what the Russians are up to. They want to keep us tied up in knots out here. So far they have refused Hanoi the weapons to wage a bloody campaign against U.S. forces in the South, but is that to be permanent? The Soviets want Hanoi to win, and they are playing a very clever and cagey game."

Top analysts insist that Russia's basic strategy for conquest in the world has not changed: to weaken the U.S. position wherever it can in the world, while the Soviets seek to strengthen their own.

Russia is viewed as supporting a "war of national liberation" in Vietnam in precisely the way foretold by their top strategists.

Despite an impression fostered in Washington that the Russians really want peace

S 1916

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 9, 1967

in Vietnam, analysts here find the evidence in the other direction. "The Soviet Union," reports one official, "has done nothing publicly or privately to help start negotiations. We don't buy the Moscow line that they have no influence in Hanoi."

In view of the Russian record in Vietnam, fighting men here are puzzled at what seem to be efforts by U.S. to make one accommodation after another with the Soviets—space treaties, airline pacts, efforts to set up more consulates in both countries, attempts to expand East-West trade while war goes on.

In Washington, Senator Karl E. Mundt (Rep.), of South Dakota, said on January 18 he was appalled at the number of key U.S. items already being traded behind the Iron Curtain. He said: "We're doing this in the face of the fact that every sophisticated weapon being used to kill our boys in Vietnam is furnished by Russia. The deaths of many of them could be marked: 'Made in Moscow.'"

VITAL WAR SUPPLIES—EVERYTHING FROM
OIL TO MODERN JETS

Supplied by Russia in past 18 months: SAM surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft batteries, 75 to 100 MIG warplanes, coastal ships, IL-28 light bombers, field-artillery pieces, helicopters, advanced radar defense system, heavy-construction equipment, bridge-building materials, military trucks, rolled-steel products, fertilizer, pyrites, drugs, surgical instruments, 300,000 metric tons of oil, cargo transports, heavy infantry weapons.

In addition, Soviets are training hundreds of North Vietnamese pilots in Soviet Union, have sent about 2,000 Russian technicians into North Vietnam to train and help SAM missile crews. Soviet experts help run North Vietnam's mining, power, engineering and technical industries, serve at the port of Haiphong, at Hanoi factories, supervise construction of new plants.

Soviet military aid to North Vietnam
(In millions)

1955 to 1964 (yearly average, Soviet figures)	\$35
1965 (Soviet figures)	550
1966 (estimated)	700
1967 (Soviet promise)	800

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, may I conclude with a few direct and simple questions which somebody high in this administration should answer to the Senate and to the country—including the mothers and fathers of our 500,000 troops now in the Vietnam war theater—before we are called upon to vote on a consular treaty which many informed and knowledgeable Americans sincerely believe would prolong the war and increase our American casualties and which none have as yet been able to demonstrate would stop the Russians from their continuing efforts to bring victory to Communists in Vietnam through slowing down or shutting off the Russian shipments of supplies of war without which our efforts to bring peace to that unfortunate area of the world might well succeed.

What would be the impact on the morale and the determined cooperation of our allies in Vietnam—the Koreans and the Filipinos for example, whose men are fighting side by side with our American troops—when they learn that, despite the efforts of the Russians to bring death and disaster to our common cause, we now grant them treaty rights which strengthen their hand and reward their malicious actions?

Why does this administration not insist on a *quid pro quo* in such a treaty, making it effective and operative only

after the Russians discontinue their shipments of war supplies to our enemy in Vietnam?

What will be the reaction of our fighting men in Vietnam—and their mothers and fathers back home together with the many thousands soon to be called to the colors—when they read that we succumb to the pressures of men in high places in this administration and ratify a treaty which will expand the capacity and the ability of the Russian Communists to do us mischief in this country?

If feeding and fighting the enemy at the same time—overlooking its war moves against us while we cozy up to it in diplomatic concessions never before granted any country—is sound national policy why is it that no other wartime administration in American history has every engaged in such curious and counterproductive actions?

How shall we ever convince the Communists of Russia that we frown on their shipments of death-dealing weapons to our enemy in North Vietnam and how shall we ever prevail upon them to stop it if we now ratify this consular treaty with its unprecedented concessions to them without insisting on a change of policy in their efforts to weaken us, to defeat us, to bleed us to death, or to outlast us in Vietnam?

Mr. President, there are many other unanswered questions which Senators might well ask and answer, which their constituents now bring to their attention in their daily mail, and which should be carefully considered before we take a diplomatic action which can have most serious repercussions on the length and the success of our continuing war in Vietnam. Let us look behind the text of the proposed treaty and consider the potential consequences from every angle before yielding to the pressures being mounted by this administration to pass this treaty ratification quickly, to ask no embarrassing questions, and to play a game of make believe that our actions will have no impact on our major responsibility as Senators to try to help bring this war to the earliest possible conclusion and to bring out a peace which will not come as a defeat and which will decrease rather than increase the likelihood of a greater and a bloodier war.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
10 POINTS

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, with Lincoln Day approaching, I am pleased to assist Lincoln Republicans, a dwindling breed for whom I have high regard, in correcting a persistent myth which is regularly perpetrated by rightwing extremist organizations and their close associates among the leadership of the investor-owned utilities. Recent republication of fictitious quotes suggests that it is again time to straighten the record.

I refer to the phony "Lincoln's 10 Points" which sprang from the imagination of Rev. William J. H. Boetcker, who copyrighted and printed them in 1916. It was the Committee for Constitutional Government, however, that sold and circulated the spurious quotations

and, thus, earned the dubious honor of having first associated Mr. Lincoln with the maxims. Lincoln scholars and magazine articles have dissociated Lincoln from the maxims. The Republican National Committee has warned that the "10 maxims are not Lincoln's. Do not use them as Lincoln's words."

The phony Lincoln quotes are nevertheless circulated by some State Republican organizations, in Montana, for example, and are used by officials of leading power companies. President Gerald L. Andrus, now head of Middle South Utilities, and former president of New Orleans Public Service—one of the utility contributors to the Committee for Constitutional Government—closed his 1962 Junior Achievement banquet address in New Orleans with the 10 Lincoln maxims. The September 1966 issue of Edison Electric Institute Bulletin, house organ of the IOU—Investor Owned Utilities—trade association, carried the text of a speech by F. J. Funari, vice president of West Penn Power, who documented one of his statements with a phony Lincoln quote.

Mr. President, the Library of Congress has for years been distributing a memorandum, "Abraham Lincoln and the Ten Points," which deals with the fabricated sayings attributed to a great President. I ask unanimous consent that the Library memorandum be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1950]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE 10 POINTS

The *Ten Points*, which have been the subject of numerous inquiries, have been erroneously attributed to Abraham Lincoln, but the identity of the person who first willfully or unwittingly ascribed them to Lincoln has not been discovered.

The text of the *Ten Points* most frequently used is as follows:

1. You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift.
2. You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong.
3. You cannot help small men up by tearing big men down.
4. You cannot help the poor by destroying the rich.
5. You cannot lift the wage-earner up by pulling the wage-payer down.
6. You cannot keep out of trouble by spending more than your income.
7. You cannot further the brotherhood of man by inciting class hatred.
8. You cannot establish sound social security on borrowed money.
9. You cannot build character and courage by taking away a man's initiative and independence.
10. You cannot help men permanently by doing for them what they could and should do for themselves.

The earliest dated appearances of any of the *Ten Points* that have come to our notice are in publications of the Reverend William John Henry Boetcker (b. 1873). One of these booklets entitled *Inside Maxims, Gold Nuggets taken from the Boetcker Lectures* (Wilkinsburg, Pa., Inside Pub. Co., 1916) contains several maxims which bear a strong resemblance to Points 2, 3, 4 and 10; his *Open Letter to Father Charles E. Coughlin* (Erie, Pa., Inside Pub. Co., 1935) reproduces Maxim 25 (i.e. Points 2 and 4) on page 56, and the same page contains lines which greatly resemble Point 3.

Also, the "Ten Don'ts," enumerated in an

Swiss Review of World Affairs, February, 1967

North Vietnam in Perspective

By Eric Mettler

This article was written for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* by one of its foreign editors.

For a long time there were but few Western reports on conditions in North Vietnam. One had to content oneself with the distorted versions given by various Communist sources or articles by fellow-travelers who had come to Hanoi with preconceived notions. This has changed of late. A few accredited correspondents of internationally known papers have suddenly received North Vietnamese visas—for a limited period—as for example Jacques Decourcy of *Le Monde* and Harrison E. Salisbury of *The New York Times*. To be sure they represent papers that have so far been known to consider American policy on North Vietnam a mistake. It is just another of the many bizarre features of the Vietnam conflict that American reporters and American women pacifists are being shown around the same region on which American bombs are being dropped.

The Western correspondents' reports from North Vietnam roughly present the following picture: A small people of 16 to 20 million is "successfully defending itself" against the war arsenal of a super-power. Apparently, a large part of the urban population has been evacuated, and industry has been decentralized. Food rationing and air defense, we are told, function well. When the American bombers appear, every one takes cover in one of the innumerable ditches and pipe-like, underground one-man shelters. Legions of auxiliary forces are permanently at work repairing damaged roads. Where small trucks are no longer able to pass, tens of thousands of bicycles, or simply human shoulders, carry with ant-like efficiency whatever must be transported. Above all at night, it seems, supplies and reinforcements pour southward—not to be deterred by the bombardments.

Moreover, the Western correspondents who have been temporarily admitted to North Vietnam and have been shown certain specific sectors of the war scene, all concur in stating that American bombs have taken their toll among the civilian population. In addition, they convey the impression that the bombing is more likely to strengthen the spirit of resistance than to weaken North Vietnam's military staying power.

Not only the Pentagon but also *The New York Times* and the *London Times*, which printed Salisbury's reports, have since then pointed out editorially that no war can be waged without damaging housing and injuring sectors of the civilian population. In the face of a deluge of suggestions it will be well to remember how strangely the various aspects of total and limited war have so far been juxtaposed in this conflict. Neither the Vietcong nor the Communist aggressor from the North have spared the "population" that was hostile to them in South Vietnam. The monstrous chronicle of butchery, torture and arson in villages which would not submit to them is well-known. But the Americans have so far consciously refrained from destroying North Vietnam as an economic organism. They have neither bombed key industries, nor dams, nor

ports. They have limited themselves to the attempt of impeding or paralyzing the transportation of war supplies from the North to the South by bombing roads, fuel depots and defense plants, thus hoping to contribute to the efforts of bringing Hanoi to the point of negotiation. In so doing they have lost five hundred or more planes, and this principally perhaps because they have always tried to come as close as possible to their targets, to spare the civilian population and to make a direct hit. It is a war in which the North wanted, and still wants, to convert the South to Communism, whereas the United States is willing to let the North remain Communist once a peace agreement is reached.

No one will deny Ho Chi Minh and his followers some grudging respect. It takes a great deal to put up a fight in the name of national independence against the Japanese, the French, the internal forces of opposition and the Americans. But Ho Chi Minh and his adherents were—needless to say—engaged in waging not only an anti-colonial war of independence, which ended in 1954, but also a Communist war of conquest, in which they also nearly succeeded in 1965. They are representatives of a system which is inevitably ruled by compulsion and in which human dignity is of infinitely less importance than in the free world. No Western correspondent will be able to ascertain within a few days' time how much the North Vietnamese population's war effort is based on voluntary patriotism and how much derives from the fact that the only way to survive under Communist rule is to cooperate. Since 1954 a million people, refusing to support the regime any longer, have "voted with their feet," that is, have fled to the South.

The facts relayed by Western news agencies differ considerably from the reports written by the Western correspondents who have been traveling through a few carefully chosen sectors of North Vietnam, convinced that Washington's policy, which has always been determined by the extremely difficult choice between two evils, was wrong from the start. The standard of living in North Vietnam has remained one of the lowest in the whole world. The bombing has seriously checked production, distribution and supplies. Hundreds of thousands of men are required to make only the most urgent repairs on all that is destroyed daily. The 45,000 Chinese who mend railways and roads create an unwelcome dependence on China, as do the bad harvests that have made Chinese grain imports a necessity for North Vietnam. Disease and hunger weaken the fighting contingents headed for the South.

According to reliable sources there are also "counter-revolutionary" centers of opposition in North Vietnam, against which the public is warned by the North Vietnamese press. Moreover, there are tensions within the North Vietnamese leadership similar to those between Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. So far those leaders have prevailed in Hanoi—apparently headed by Secretary General Le Duan—who want to continue the war with the South. But differences have arisen over the manner in which it is to be conducted: with the support of larger regular units, or once again solely by means of guerilla warfare. The quarrels with Peking, which keeps calling for intransigence and teaches lessons but remains carefully aloof, have become more frequent. Conversely, the influence of Moscow, which has after all strengthened North Vietnam's air defense, has grown accordingly. But the Soviet Union, too, offers advice—North Vietnam is to effect a compromise—which has so far not been accepted by Hanoi.

In this situation, in which the Vietcong and

Hanoi certainly still hold their basic position, but in comparison to 1965 have nevertheless clearly been forced into the defensive, Washington is being assailed from all sides by demands that it discontinue the bombing of North Vietnam—unilaterally and for good—in order to prepare the way for the negotiation of peace. Such requests come from Moscow, in the name of the Hanoi "moderates" so to speak, from Paris, from U Thant, from *The New York Times*, discreetly from Prime Minister Wilson, and are also part and parcel of the Pope's mediation efforts. One seems to have forgotten that the American bombardments of North Vietnam were already stopped for several weeks more than a year ago. The Communists made use of that interval to prepare new military advances—just as they made use of similar intervals in Korea; in Korea incidentally the will to fight to the victorious end was also proclaimed by the North with seemingly unswerving purpose and then suddenly dropped for the sake of negotiation when the enormous reserves, the endurance and the limited war aim of the opponents were belatedly recognized.

That the present onslaught of demands—some of which smack of appeasement—is met by Washington with the statement that the bombardments will be stopped only when the other side has given some indication that it will reciprocate, is understandable considering all that has been learned in dealing with Communist opponents in Europe and in Asia so far. Only if an American delegation were to arrive at a new Geneva Conference with the resignation displayed by the French and the British in 1954 would there be reason to deplore Washington's fatal blunders.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 February 1967

TRIAL OF SUKARNO IS ASKED BY COURT

By United Press International

JAKARTA, Indonesia, Feb. 13.—The Indonesian Supreme Court demanded today that President Sukarno be tried for treason on charges of having stolen large amounts of money for his personal bank accounts and having given his blessing to an attempted Communist coup 18 months ago.

In a 120-page decision, the court demanded that Indonesia's Congress act against Mr. Sukarno when it meets next month. The court's report was based on documents presented by the military strong man, General Suharto, who assumed most of Mr. Sukarno's powers last March.

The court concluded that President Sukarno had had prior knowledge of the plot on Oct. 1, 1965, knew that its purpose was seizure of the Government and approved of the final execution of the plan. It said he had an "obligation to account for everything he knows, for his attitude toward and for the action he took in regard to the coup."

In its statement, the court

said Mr. Sukarno had stolen funds estimated at the equivalent of \$7-million and charged that some of the money was deposited in banks in Tokyo and Amsterdam. The court also accused Mr. Sukarno of having accepted graft from foreign companies in return for "special licenses and tax exemptions."

The findings of the court will be used by Congress when it meets in special session early in March to decide the President's fate.

The Indonesian Parliament adopted a resolution last week urging Congress to dismiss Mr. Sukarno from the Presidency and initiated proceedings to try him for treason. The Congress, established by Mr. Sukarno in 1960, includes the full membership of Parliament plus other regional and functional representatives. It is the nation's highest policy-making body.

Mr. Sukarno, now little more than a figurehead, has been Indonesia's first and only President for 21 years. In its ruling, the Supreme Court accused him of having received "prior knowledge and understanding" of the coup plot from the former Air Force commander, Omar Dhan, who has since been tried and convicted as a traitor.

Mr. Sukarno "failed to act as indicated by the law in his position as head of state and Supreme Commander of the Armed Services," the court said.

"The conclusion is that President Sukarno wilfully gave pro-

THE DOMINION, Wellington
26 January 1967

Inside view of Vietnam war

South Vietnam's Prime Minister came here with the avowed intention of thanking New Zealand for its support of his country and setting the record straight on the nature of the war in which both countries are involved. During his hectic nine hours in Wellington he discharged this mission with dignity and aplomb. At a State luncheon and later at a Press conference he spoke with great conviction about the aims and the agony of South Vietnam—"no people look forward more than the Vietnamese to peace"—and answered complex questions in a manner which won the admiration of interviewers.

It is too much to expect that his brief visit will have mollified those who are totally opposed to New Zealand's involvement in Vietnam. But upon those who recognise sincerity, who are able to evaluate dispassionately what they read and what they are told, his visit will undoubtedly have made a deep impression.

Air Vice-Marshal Ky made nonsense of the notion still clung to by people who naively accept Hanoi's version of the conflict that it is a civil war. "How can this be a civil war," he asked, "when all the weapons and munitions are coming from Red China and other Communist countries—when all the orders, all the instructions, all the policies come from Hanoi?"

Hanoi, he added, no longer made any secret of its running of the war. A North Vietnamese general directed operations in the South. There were seven divisions of North Vietnamese regulars in the South and the rate of Communist infiltration was estimated at 8000 a month.

As for South Vietnam's progress toward representative government, its Prime Minister said that it would have a new constitution next month and by the end of the year would hold nationwide presidential elections—though it would be a mistake to expect rapid evolution of a Western-style democracy.

That is a fair and reasonable observation. His country, as he pointed out, has yet to be brought into the twentieth century. But it is clear that the present regime is bent on securing social justice and fighting ignorance, disease and poverty in addition to prosecuting the war.

tection to leaders of the coup against legal action," it said. "His actions in solving the problem in its aftermath were always partial to the Communist party."

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<p>Remarks: Attached is what looks like a fairly large job to be responsive to Senator Mundt. As you will note, the Director simply bucked it on to me for action and I assume he wishes to be forthcoming in his response. [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] if these appear necessary. The Congress generally is out of business until 15 February, possibly completion date by 14th would be reasonable.</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER <i>JSWarner</i>			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Legislative Counsel 7D 01			9 Feb 67
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

S-2185

TO : Ch/E

DATE: 10 February 1967

FROM : D/ORR

25X1

SUBJECT: Attached letter

25X1

25X1 [redacted] John Warner has asked [redacted] if we could have a response back on this by Tuesday (14 February). As soon as you have talked with [redacted] I would like a reading on this. Jack Smith, as I indicated this morning, wants the answers put in proper context as he explained it. [redacted] is concerned that if we answer some of the questions as given, it may not clarify the situation for Senator Mundt. I wish you would tell Paul to look out for this problem although I am inclined to agree with you that Mundt has probably purposely put most of these questions the way he did so that he can hit the Administration over the head. Incidentally, I will call [redacted] on this problem and will let you know his answer.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

KARL E. MUNDT
MADISON, SOUTH DAKOTA

R. L. McCAUGHEY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
ABERDEEN, SOUTH DAKOTA

ROBERTA VAN BEEK
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ABERDEEN, SOUTH DAKOTA

WALTER C. CONAHAN
PRESS SECRETARY
LEOLA, SOUTH DAKOTA

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 7, 1967

MEMBER:
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
SENATE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Executive 7-155-11
67-513

Mr. Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Dick:

In reading the January 30 issue of U.S. News & World Report, I was disturbed when I read the article entitled "Russia: The Enemy in Vietnam?"

In this article, which was evidently written by an editor of U.S. News & World Report stationed in Saigon, there are statements made to the effect that it is the Russians who are furnishing the needed materials to the North Vietnamese which makes it possible for them to continue their war effort. Therefore, I am enclosing a copy of the article with this letter and would appreciate having your comments on it and the questions which I am setting forth below.

1. Is it true as stated that "It is the Russians, however, who are furnishing the real sinews for major and prolonged war." I would like to have any comments you care to make with regard to this statement.

2. Is it true that "The Russians now are investing close to 1 billion dollars a year in the war." Is this a correct figure or is it more or is it less?

3. Is it true that "Most of the trucks that move the needed supplies from North to South Vietnam, for example, come from Russia or her satellites." If it is true, I would appreciate any documentary evidence or figures on truck supplies which you could provide me.

4. Is it true that "Many of the automatic weapons that we capture from North Vietnamese troops are of Russian manufacture." I would like to have any statement or documentary evidence that you would have on this allegation.

5. Is it true that "Most of our plane losses have resulted from the use of Soviet Russia's anti-aircraft guns, missiles or MIG jet fighters."

6. Is it true that "Soviet aid to North Vietnam trickled along at an average yearly rate of 35 million dollars until early in 1965, when, even before U.S. began bombing in the North, the Russians started moving in a big way - with SAM anti-aircraft missiles, jet fighters, military vehicles, oil, other paraphernalia of war."

10 FEB 1967

Mr. Richard Helms

-2-

February 7, 1967

7. Is the statement true that "Almost 1,000 SAM's have been fired at U.S. planes. These Soviet Missiles, launched by Russian-trained crews, have themselves destroyed 30 U.S. planes and contributed in a large measure to an over-all loss in the North of more than 460 U.S. planes." If the figure is different and larger or perhaps less, I would appreciate having any information which you would provide me.

8. Is the statement true that "Cost to the Russians in spent missiles: about 25 million dollars. Cost to the U.S. in planes alone: more than 1 billion dollars."

9. Is the statement true "The North Vietnamese landscape is also studded with conventional antiaircraft positions, about 6,000 in all. The original antiaircraft system was installed by the Chinese. Now bigger guns are coming in. They are Russian." I would appreciate having any additional comment you would care to make about this statement.

10. Is the statement true that "The North Vietnamese Air Force now consists of 75 to 100 fighter planes and a handful of light bombers supplied by the Soviet Union. About one fifth of the force are the most up-to-date MIG-21s; the remainder, MIG-15s and MIG-17s. The MIG's are replaced by the Russians as they are lost in the fighting." I would appreciate having any information on this statement which might supplement it and give me up-to-date information on your estimate of what might be plane support or any kind to the North Vietnamese from the Soviet Union.

11. Is the statement true that "There are upward of 2,000 Russian technicians working at air bases and at SAM sites. North Vietnamese pilots are trained in Russia and supervised by Soviet fliers when they return to Hanoi."

12. Is the statement true that "Within the past few months, the Russians have taught North Vietnamese to man approximately 350 SAM missiles and an estimated 3,000 antiaircraft guns."

13. Would you please comment on the statement "For the first time, Soviet helicopters are being spotted in North Vietnam. Russian cargo aircraft are also making an appearance."

14. Please advise me as to whether or not it is true that "The North Vietnamese war machine runs almost entirely on Russian oil. In the past 18 months, the Russians shipped in 300,000 metric tons." The statement goes on, "Last month alone, the Soviets shipped nearly 25,000 metric tons of gasoline and oil into Haiphong." Since this article is January 30th, that must refer to the month of December, 1966.

15. The article states that "The Russians use ships to transport 80 percent of their aid to North Vietnam." It further states that "All told, the Russians are said to be delivering 80,000 tons of goods a month to Hanoi."

Mr. Richard Helms

-3-

February 7, 1967


Is this statement factual and I would appreciate having any comments on it.

16. The article states that "The Soviet ships going to Haiphong carry not only civilian goods, as the Reds insist, but jet aircraft, SAM's, radar gear and antiaircraft guns." I would appreciate having your comments on this statement.

17. The article states that "Tonnage by sea from all sources - Russia, China, East Europe and non-Communist countries - was estimated at 2 million tons in 1966. Of that, the Russian share was estimated at half the total, Red China's about one fourth." I would appreciate any information which you could provide me as to the accuracy of that statement.

Thanking you for your kind consideration and assuring you I would appreciate hearing from you at your earliest convenience in response to the questions I have posed and any other comments which you might care to make about allegations and statements in this article, I am, with best wishes,

Cordially yours,



Karl E. Mundt, U.S.S.

KEM:mdc
Enclosure