


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NSA review completed



Eighth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

**(This report covers the week from
6 April through 12 April 1973)**

DIA Review
Completed.

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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13 April 1973



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13 April 1973

Eighth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
6 April through 12 April 1973)

The Key Points

- Only two small groups of specialists started the infiltration trip south from North Vietnam during the week.
- Tenuous evidence suggests that elements of two NVA divisions in northern MR 1 may be returning to North Vietnam. If all elements of these divisions leave South Vietnam, the NVA would still have a force structure in MR 1 similar to that which existed on the eve of the Communist 1972 spring offensive.
- A high level of North Vietnamese logistic activity continued throughout the week. Once again, NVA logistic movements were particularly heavy in Quang Tri Province.
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists remained at a moderate level in South Vietnam, but rose significantly in Laos.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.



[REDACTED]

The Details

NOTE: This is the eighth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

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A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. During the reporting period two new special-purpose groups started south from North Vietnam. Farther down in the infiltration pipeline we also detected for the first time two additional small groups of specialists who had left North Vietnam sometime in March. The combined strength of the newly detected special-purpose groups, however, does not significantly affect our total estimate of 35,000 North Vietnamese personnel who were either in the infiltration system as of 28 January or who started their journey south since that date. Almost all of these infiltrators have now reached their destinations.

2. No new information is available on the diversion northward of the one regular infiltration group noted in the Special Note attached to our memorandum of last week. The group, initially identified on 5 April in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam, was traveling northward--away from its original destination in northern South Vietnam.

3. A month has elapsed since the last infiltration group of combat replacement personnel entered the pipeline in North Vietnam, and it appears that this dry season's infiltration of regular combat

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troops has ended. In addition, fewer special-purpose groups have been detected entering the system during the past several weeks, indicating that the infiltration of civilian and military specialists also may be drawing to a close for this dry season. (Annex II contains a more detailed discussion, for US eyes only, of the information on North Vietnamese troop infiltration which we have received during the reporting period.)

4. Newly received evidence suggests that two NVA infantry divisions may be in the process of leaving Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam, and returning to southern North Vietnam. The evidence is tenuous, and we are as yet unable to determine whether the change in status of the two divisions reflects a permanent relocation or a temporary move to rest and refit before rotating back into South Vietnam. (This development and the evidence relevant to it are discussed in detail, [REDACTED] in Annex III.)

5. Elsewhere in MR 1, recent evidence indicates that two NVA antiaircraft regiments are in the process of moving from Quang Tri Province into the Laos Panhandle. At least one of these units is scheduled to replace a newly formed antiaircraft regiment in southern Laos, which is now moving toward northeastern Cambodia. The destination of the other regiment moving out of Quang Tri Province is unclear, but there have been continuing indications of a Communist buildup of antiaircraft defense in southern Laos and extending into Cambodia. In other air defense developments, an additional North Vietnamese SA-2 site has been established near Khe Sanh during the past week. There are now a total of 10 SA-2 sites in the Khe Sanh area which have been constructed since the beginning of this year. Four of these were observed to be occupied as of 9 April.

6. Farther south, evidence received during the week suggests that a headquarters element of a North Vietnamese armor regiment may have moved from the Hanoi area of North Vietnam to a point on the Cambodian border with South Vietnam, north of Loch

Ninh town in GVN MR 3. The headquarters element probably will serve as the controlling authority for the large number of tanks noted moving to the COSVN area during this dry season.


B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese in Violation of the Agreements

7. Heavy Communist logistic movements continued during the week in northern South Vietnam and throughout most of the Laos Panhandle. NVA vehicle activity in Quang Tri Province was even heavier than in the preceding several weeks, as the North Vietnamese continued to move supplies into forward areas. (Annex IV, [redacted] contains newly received evidence of efforts by Communist forces in Quang Tri Province to move war materiel in ways which will avoid detection by the ICCS.) The most significant observations of NVA truck traffic in southern Laos were in the areas adjacent to Quang Tri Province and the A Chau Valley, but sizeable traffic flows were also noted in the Chavane area. Traffic moving southward through the Passes out of North Vietnam was slightly above the average weekly level in March. Heavy logistic activity was also observed during the week in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle.

8. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed inside South Vietnam during the reporting period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

(a) NVA vehicle activity was observed each day on Route 9 in northern Quang Tri Province, as follows:

- (1) [redacted] 29 cargo trucks were observed moving on the route between Dong Ha and the Laos/South



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Vietnam border (7 eastbound, 15 westbound, 7 parked).

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(2) [redacted] 59 cargo vehicles were noted on Route 9 in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh (24 eastbound, 19 westbound, 16 parked).

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(3) [redacted] 85 cargo trucks were moving on the segment between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh (19 eastbound, 31 westbound, 35 parked).

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(4) [redacted] 98 cargo vehicles were noted between Dong Ha and the border (43 eastbound, 39 westbound, 16 parked).

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(5) [redacted] 63 cargo trucks were observed on the segment west of Dong Ha (20 westbound, 14 eastbound, 29 parked).

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(b) [redacted] in the A Shau Valley region, 15 cargo trucks were observed on Route 548 southeast of Khe Sanh (9 southbound, 6 parked). There were also 11 trucks noted on this route on 8 April (7 southbound, 4 northbound).

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(c) [redacted] 21 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 6089 southeast of Khe Sanh (11 northbound, 6 southbound, 4 parked).

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(d) [redacted] 16 cargo vehicles were detected moving on Route 616 southeast of Khe Sanh. Two of the vehicles were southbound, 3 were northbound, and 11 were parked. Also on Route 616 in the same area, 11 cargo trucks and 31 57-mm AAA pieces were observed [redacted] parked along the road.

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[redacted]

(e) [redacted] on Route 1 in northeastern Quang Tri Province, 16 cargo vehicles and 41 buses were observed parked along the road north of Quang Tri City. In the same area, 9 cargo trucks (4 northbound, 1 southbound, 4 parked) were observed [redacted] with 4 buses parked along the road.

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(f) [redacted] 16 cargo trucks, 5 tanks, 1 APC and 6 field artillery pieces were seen parked along Route 547 southwest of Hue.

(g) [redacted] 21 cargo vehicles were seen on Route 922 traveling on the segment immediately inside the South Vietnam/Laos border. Sixteen of the vehicles were moving south, six of them towing light artillery pieces.

(h) In the period 6 through 12 April, 130 southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1033 in the western DMZ.

(i) [redacted] nine southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1000 in the eastern DMZ.

9. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of the activity in the area probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

(a) The following activity was observed on Route 99 in the central portion of the Laos Panhandle during the reporting period:

(1) [redacted] 50 cargo trucks were observed parked between Muong

[REDACTED]

Nong and the intersection of
Route 96.

- 25X1 (2) [REDACTED] 186 cargo vehicles were detected on the segment between Muong Nong and the Route 96 intersection (33 northbound, 50 southbound, 103 parked).
- 25X1 (3) [REDACTED] 24 cargo trucks were traveling the route in the vicinity of Muong Nong (12 northbound, 6 southbound, 6 parked).
- 25X1 (4) [REDACTED] 48 cargo trucks were on the highway between Muong Nong and the Route 96 intersection (25 northbound, 15 southbound, 8 parked).
- 25X1 (5) [REDACTED] 21 cargo trucks (9 south, 2 north, 10 parked) and 1 bulldozer were observed moving north on Route 99 just south of Muong Nong. In addition, one APC was observed parked along the road in the same area.
- 25X1 (b) [REDACTED] 20 NVA cargo trucks were observed on Route 9222A near the Laos/South Vietnam border. Six of the vehicles were traveling south and were towing three 37-mm AAA weapons.
- 25X1- (c) [REDACTED] 28 cargo trucks were observed on Route 966 east of Chavane, near the South Vietnam border (9 westbound, 11 eastbound, 8 parked). On [REDACTED] 43 cargo vehicles were observed in the same area (34 eastbound, 9 parked).
- 25X1 (d) [REDACTED] on Route 9 west of the Laos/South Vietnam border, 9 cargo

[redacted]

trucks were seen parked. Ten west-bound trucks and 1 eastbound were seen in the same area [redacted] and 5 eastbound and 1 parked on [redacted]

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- (e) [redacted] 18 cargo trucks were observed on route 9211 southeast of Saravane, 11 moving south, 4 north, and 3 parked. [redacted] 25 more trucks were observed (17 moving south, 6 north, and 2 parked).

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- (f) On 8 April, a North Vietnamese logistic unit in northeastern Cambodia reportedly transported 77 tons of petroleum and diesel fuel, 88 tons of rice, and over 50 tons of food supplies to an NVA Engineer Regiment operating in the area.

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- (g) [redacted] southwest of the Ban Karai Pass, 27 cargo vehicles were detected on Route 912 (10 northbound, 17 parked). During the period [redacted] 322 vehicles were detected moving south and 323 traveling north through the Ban Karai Pass.

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10. The following evidence was received during the week of military supply movements within North Vietnam. The goods involved are probably moving toward South Vietnam and southern Laos.

- (a) On 6 and 7 April, nearly 200 cargo vehicles passed through the operational area of an NVA logistic unit south of Dong Hoi. The total included at least 85 southbound vehicles. The type and amount of supplies being carried by the vehicles could not be determined. The same unit reportedly had 146 vehicles (74 northbound, 72 southbound) pass through its area on 10 April.

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[redacted]

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces
In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

11. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (6-12 April) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (6-12 Apr) Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	721	2,546	34	91
MR 2	180	1,129	7	91
MR 3	252	1,610	24	121
MR 4	373	3,472	23	349
Totals	1,526	8,757	88 (121) <u>1/</u>	652 (597) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

12. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.


13. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.




CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


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
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MILITARY REGION 1

- (a) On 6 April, two Air America helicopters with ICCS markings were downed in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, at least one due to enemy ground fire.

MILITARY REGION 2

- (a) On 3 April, 15 miles southwest of Pleiku City, elements of an ARVN ranger border defense battalion received an enemy ground attack.
- (b) On 4 April, four miles south of Bong Son, elements of an ARVN ranger battalion received a ground attack by an enemy force.
- (c) On 8 April, an ARVN position 10 miles southwest of Kontum City was subjected to a ground attack.
- (d) On 9 April, four miles south of Bong Son, ARVN elements were subjected to an enemy ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 3

- (a) Nothing of significance to report.

MILITARY REGION 4

- (a) On 4 April, 15 miles northeast of Chau Doc, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received a ground attack by an enemy force.
- (b) On 5 April, 11 miles northeast of Chau Doc, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received a ground attack by an enemy force.

- (c) On 8 April, three miles northwest of Vi Thanh, a VNAF helicopter was struck by enemy ground fire. The aircraft was forced to crash land and sustained heavy damage.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Week from 6 through 13 April

14. North Vietnamese Army forces launched heavy, sustained attacks during the week against Royal Lao Government units defending the Route 4 corridor south-east of the Plain of Jars in Laos Military Region II, forcing several Government units to begin withdrawing from the area. One NVA infantry regiment and supporting artillery and sapper units have been identified near Route 4 north of the village of Tha Vieng. There continues to be strong evidence that this NVA force is determined to eliminate the RLG presence in the area, thereby securing southeastern Xieng Khouang Province as Communist-held territory. A general lull in military activity prevailed throughout South Laos during the week.

15. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred between 6 and 13 April, and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:

- (a) On 6 April, no significant military activity occurred throughout Laos.
- (b) On 7 April, activity again was light throughout Laos, although there was an attack by an estimated two NVA companies against a Government defensive position south of Thakhek in MR III.
- (c) On 8 April, Communist forces launched coordinated attacks against six RLG positions near Route 4 southeast of the Plain of Jars. Defenders were driven from three of the positions.

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Elsewhere in Laos, activity remained light and scattered.

- (d) On 9 April, Government troops were driven from another position south-east of the Plain.
- (e) On 10 April, Communist forces continued the ground shelling attacks against Government elements along Route 4.
- (f) On 11 April, Communist pressure intensified southeast of the PDJ. Over 1,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on Government positions along Route 4 north of Tha Vieng village, and several Government units began withdrawing southward.
- (g) On 12 April, the NVA introduced tanks into the fighting along Route 4. Fire from two such vehicles near Tha Vieng prevented medical evacuation of friendly wounded, as the dislodged Government elements continued to withdraw slowly southward. The rest of the country remained generally quiet.
- (h) On 13 April, three government positions 16 to 18 km. northwest of Bouam Long were lost following an attack by an enemy force of unknown size supported by recoilles rifle fire.

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ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese Personnel to the South

1. Two new special-purpose groups--with a combined strength of less than 80 personnel--were initially detected in Binh Tram 26's area of responsibility near Dong Hoi, North Vietnam during the past week. This is the first time since 27 March that special-purpose infiltration groups have been observed entering the pipeline in North Vietnam. In addition, two other special-purpose groups with undetermined strengths were detected for the first time farther south in southern Laos and Cambodia.

2. Since 11 March, there have been no detections of regular combat troops entering the pipeline in North Vietnam. Moreover, we have received no additional evidence regarding the northward-moving Group 7005, which was initially identified in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam on 5 April. Although this group originally was destined for MR Tri-Thien Hue in northern South Vietnam, it was sent back north when at least elements of the unit for which it was destined apparently withdrew from South Vietnam to North Vietnam.

3. The table on the following page lists those infiltration groups which were detected in the pipeline during the past week.

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Infiltration Groups Initially Reported
During the Past Week

<u>Group Designator</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date of Detection</u>
A214	Unk	Cambodia	10 Apr
A428	Unk	South Laos	7 Apr
Y272	32	North Vietnam	5 Apr
Y772	42	North Vietnam	5 Apr



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ANNEX III

1. A limited amount of evidence from communications intelligence suggests that two NVA infantry divisions--the 304th and 312th--are possibly in the process of returning to the north from Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. According to North Vietnamese civil communications some elements of all three of the subordinate regiments of the 304th Division have been identified in southern North Vietnam since late January. In addition, around the beginning of April these regiments ceased communicating with the senior NVA tactical authority for northern South Vietnam. Other COMINT, as well as collateral evidence, however, indicates that at least some elements of the 304th Division were still in Quang Tri Province as of the first week of April.

2. In the case of the 312th Division, recent changes in the communications patterns of the division could indicate that it also is in the process of leaving northern South Vietnam. Not only has there been no reflection in COMINT of tactical activity in Quang Tri Province by subordinate elements of the division since early March, there also has been a noticeable lack of communications of the subordinate regiments with the division headquarters and that of the senior tactical authority for the area since late March. Moreover, between 14 and 29 March, the division headquarters relocated from southwest of Quang Tri City to just north of the DMZ in North Vietnam.

3. If the 304th and 312th Divisions are in fact leaving South Vietnam, they would be the second and third such units to do so in recent months. The NVA 308th Infantry Division returned north to Ha Tinh Province of North Vietnam from Quang Tri Province earlier this year. The withdrawal of the three divisions would reduce Communist combat forces in MR 1 by a combined total of some 20,000 troops, but would still leave an NVA combat structure in MR 1 similar to that which existed at the beginning of the 1972 Communist spring offensive.

ANNEX IV

New Evidence of Surreptitious Supply Movements
by NVA Logistic Units

A communications compromise by the North Vietnamese during the reporting period has provided new information concerning the covert movement of war-related equipment in Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. A 10 April intercepted message from Binh Tram 12, the major NVA logistic entity operating in northern South Vietnam, contains instructions to two of the Binh Tram's subordinate transportation battalions concerning the anticipated movement of weapons and other cargo. The cargo movement cited is apparently across the DMZ since, according to the instructions, vehicles will be dispatched from Dong Ha in northern South Vietnam to pick up cargo at Dong Hoi (southern North Vietnam), for movement to Huong Hoa, located in South Vietnam near Khe Sanh.

* * * * *

The pertinent section of this message reads as follows:

"...the International Committee will be inspecting our roads for three more days, therefore we haven't been able to implement our plan to transport the weapons. The supply point at Dong Ha has been cleaned out on the morning of 11 April, all of the vehicles of the two battalions will go out to Dong Hoi to pick up the cargo and transport it to Huong Hoa. When we are able to transport the weapons, I will let you know. From 11 April, our tankers will pick up gasoline at A-19 and no longer pick up gasoline at A-17."

Reference:

2/PT/2997-73 (VCJ)

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