

S-3111

Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies

22 Sep 69 Typescript IM, Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies

25X1 23 Sep 69 [redacted] memo commending OER's
report on adequacy of NVN's stockpiles and attaching
a suggested expansion of the conclusion paragraph
to include in basic paper for review by Special Actions
Group

25X1 23 Sep 69 [redacted] memo re Requested Changes to OER
Memorandum, Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies (responding to
25X1 [redacted] above)

Logistics - late 69

S-3111, Adequacy of NVN's
Stockpiles of Military +
War Related Supplies.

① Requested Changes in OER Memorandum.
on S-3111 Secret
23 Sept '69

27 SEP 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [redacted] DDP

25X1

SUBJECT : Requested Changes to OER Memorandum,
Agency of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies

1. I have reviewed your suggested changes to subject memorandum and have several comments.

2. The suggested change to the first sentence of paragraph 3 would be incorrect. You could have the sentence read: "A cessation in food imports at this time (almost half of which come from China) would not --."

3. Your revision of the conclusion paragraph is acceptable. It would be desirable, however, after the sentence ending --- "air or sea interdiction is extremely unlikely," to add the following sentence: "Moreover, North Vietnam would undoubtedly turn to Free World markets to maintain its rice supplies."

4. Your request to downgrade the report to TOP SECRET has been reviewed [redacted] and is approved for submission to [redacted] provided the following amendments are made to the text:

a. Paragraph 5, p. 3 -- Revise the sentence starting on the bottom of this page to read as follows:

This judgment is supported by highly reliable data on North Vietnamese imports, data on the flow of supplies into Laos and South Vietnam, as

[redacted]

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b. Paragraph 6, p. 4 -- Revise the first sentence in this paragraph to read as follows:

[redacted]

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
c. Paragraph 7, p. 4 -- Revise the sentence starting on the bottom of this page to read as follows:

"Reliable intelligence on shipments..."



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deputy Director
Economic Research



25X1

23 September 1969

TO: [redacted] (OER)

FROM: [redacted]

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1. The Working Group of the Washington Special Actions Group working on the Sino-Soviet problem was grateful for your paper on the adequacy of North Vietnam's stockpiles. They particularly appreciated the fact that your paper was prepared during the weekend.

2. As a result of the Working Group's deliberations yesterday, it was decided to take the conclusion paragraph of your paper, expanded as you see it in the attached, and include it in the basic paper for review by the Special Actions Group. The Intelligence Memorandum itself, less the conclusion section, is to be included as an annex with only one minor proposed change. The change is on page 3, first sentence paragraph 3, which would read "A cessation in food imports at this time (virtually all of which come from China) would not --".

3. Would you please let me have your concurrence on the above change plus on the attached paper as soon as possible. The Working Group wishes to have the whole paper ready for submission to the SAG today (23 September).

4. The classification of the SAG paper is Top Secret and distribution of it is highly restricted. They wish, however, to avoid all use of code word classifications. Would you please let me know what changes need to be made in order to avoid the code word classification of your paper.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 September 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies

Introduction


North Vietnam's military capabilities rest almost entirely on imported equipment and supplies furnished by its Chinese and Soviet allies. If the flow of these supplies were interrupted or discontinued, Hanoi's war-sustaining capabilities would be almost completely a function of the size of its stockpiles of military and war-supporting supplies. This memorandum examines the current state of North Vietnam's stockpiles in order to estimate their adequacy over time for a continuance of Hanoi's military activities in both South Vietnam and Laos.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification


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
Reserves and Stockpiles

Essential Economic Goods

1. Although no precise quantification of North Vietnam's reserves of essential economic goods is available, there is a great deal of evidence that supports the general conclusion that with but few exceptions stockpiles are maintained at relatively high levels. 


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
2. Petroleum stockpiles are currently estimated at about 100,000 tons, equal to about 100 days of supply at the estimated 1968 consumption rate. A portion of this reserve is maintained at more than 150 dispersed storage sites with an estimated total capacity of at least 60,000 tons. In addition, some 400,000 petroleum drums are now dispersed through North Vietnam, representing a substantial additional stockpile. Imports of petroleum during 1969 have been at levels sufficient to preclude any drawdown of these stockpiles.

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


3. A cessation in food imports at this time would not be critical until next spring, although it would result in some belt-tightening. Estimated stockpiles of food at the end of the May-June harvest were equal to 4-5 months consumption and will be at a peak in December after the October-November harvest. The overall agricultural situation has deteriorated enough, however, that if food imports were cut off this month and remained stopped throughout the winter, North Vietnam would be confronted by severe food shortages by early spring, before the May-June rice crop would be ready for harvest. But since rice supplies are freely available on the world market the supply of foodstuffs is unlikely to be a meaningful restraint on Hanoi's war-sustaining capabilities.

4. The adequacy of stockpiles of transport equipment -- trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft -- depends largely on the effectiveness of the air war in Laos. For example, enemy truck losses in Laos have been very high during the past two dry seasons (October-May) and the truck inventory could fall to an unsatisfactory level in a few months if the North Vietnamese attempted to mount the same level of logistical effort this coming dry season as in the past and the US continued the air war in Laos.

Military Supplies

5. Military stocks in North Vietnam appear to be maintained at very high levels.



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[Redacted] All of these data indicate that the North Vietnamese have successfully implemented a logistics doctrine that provides them a deep cushion of military supplies.

[Redacted]

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addition, the North Vietnamese maintain so-called strategic reserves which are massive and diversified stockpiles located in safe areas in Laos and North Vietnam.

7. There are many indications that large military stockpiles have indeed been accumulated in North Vietnam and Laos. Although our estimates of imports of ammunition are subject to a wide margin of error, the data that are available indicate that during 1968 these imports were on the order of four times greater than the amounts expended or lost by enemy forces in both Laos and South Vietnam. Even though ammunition imports fell sharply following the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, the stockpiles of the types of military goods used in Laos and South Vietnam are apparently being maintained at high levels.

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Conclusion

8. Hard intelligence is lacking on the stockpiles of military and essential economic goods maintained by North Vietnam. The evidence that is available, however, makes it clear that these stockpiles are being maintained at high levels. Even if all foreign military aid to North Vietnam were cut-off, the existing stockpiles of weapons and ammunition would be adequate to sustain military activities in Laos and South Vietnam for a period of at least 6 months at the 1968 level of combat. By adopting tactics in South Vietnam or Laos that would enable it to conserve its supplies, Hanoi could make its military presence in South Vietnam felt for a considerably longer period of time. The major logistical constraint to North Vietnam would be its supply of

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trucks, particularly if the air war in Laos were carried on at the high levels of 1968. Trucks, however, represent one of the essential war-related goods that Hanoi could procure from Free World sources.

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