

Vietnam Statistics
Sep-Dec 67

STAT

19 Sep 67

[] (OCI) memo re Appraisal of Vietnam Statistical
Charts

STATINTL

Attachments: [] to DD/OER memo, dated 19 Sep
67, re Comments on US Statistics
Related to the War in Vietnam (with
the following charts attached)

Ratio of VC/NVA Friendly Forces Killed
in Action

The Chieu Hoi Program

VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Strength

Rolling Thunder Sorties, 1966-67

Ratio GVN to US KIA

Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA

VC/NVA Initiated Attacks

Rate of SVN Desertions per 1,000 OB

VC/NVA Defections

Ratio of Military Chieu Hoi-VC/NVA KIA
to Confirmed Enemy Strength

VC/NVA Incidents, Sabotage-Terrorism-
Harassments

Ratio of VC/NVA ARVN Weapon Losses

STAT

29 Sep 67

[] Blind Memo re Indicators of Progress in Vietnam

26 Oct 67


Carver to Rostow memo re Preliminary Report of Data
Task Force

Attachment: Blind Memo, dated 26 Oct 67, re Report
of Task Force on Vietnam Data and Trend
Indicators

Vietnam Statistics
Sep-Dec 67
(Continued)

- 27 Nov 67 Carver to DCI (and various) Short Note re The Little Blue Book
- Attachment: Rostow Memorandum, dated Nov 1967, forwarding "The Little Blue Book," Statistics on the War in Vietnam prepared by MACV Headquarters, Saigon
- 27 Nov 67 Carver Memo for Record re 17 November White House Data Meeting (to review the Vietnam data problem and current related actions)
- 22 Dec 67 Carver to Ambassador Leonhart (and various) memo re Vietnam Data Task Force Progress Report (draft report attached)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington



November 1967

MEMORANDUM

These charts were compiled at the headquarters of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), in Saigon.

They reflect the best data available at this time to our field commanders on the movement of the war in Vietnam in the period from the third quarter of 1965, when substantial U. S. forces were committed to Vietnam, to the third quarter of 1967.

Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland used these charts in briefing the President in November 1967. They emphasized -- and it is important to note -- that these working estimates are only part of the data on which their judgments are formed.

The evidence of progress these statistics demonstrate is confirmed by captured documents, prisoner interrogations, estimates of field commanders, and by other sources.

W W Rostow

W. W. Rostow

SENDER MUST CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDI	29 Nov 68	[Signature]
2	DOER	5 Dec	[Signature]
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4		4F42Hg	
5	STAT		
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Remarks:			
<i>File Vietnam Statistics</i>			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
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O/DCI

V

DATE: 27 Nov 67

TO: DCI, DDI, D/OCI, D/ONE, C/FE

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT: The Little Blue Book

Executive Registry
67-5568/1

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REMARKS:

1. Attached is a "Little Blue Book" of MACV statistics brought back by General Westmoreland on his recent trip and shown by the General to the President. Walt Rostow has told me that the President liked this book very much and has instructed that it be given wide circulation throughout the Executive Branch and to selected members of Congress. The attached cover memorandum was written by Mr. Rostow at the President's direction.

2. Rostow was rather apologetic in relaying the above information. He said he had been presented with a fait accompli. On the whole, these statistics could be worse, but there are some tables we feel should not have been given such wide circulation. In any event, the deed is done and the attached copies are being circulated for your information.

3. The Data Task Force will endeavor to rectify the errors in the attached book. On the whole, I doubt if any serious damage has been done.

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[Redacted Signature Box]

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

NOV 1967

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**STATISTICS ON THE WAR
IN VIETNAM**




**PREPARED BY MACV HEADQUARTERS
SAIGON**

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POPULATION DISTRIBUTION (MONTHLY AVERAGE)




■ GVN ■ VC
■ CONTESTED

NOTE: 1965 AND 1966 FIGURES ARE FROM THE GVN SYSTEM; 1967 FIGURES ARE FROM THE HES SYSTEM.

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SOUTH VIETNAM ELECTIONS (MILLIONS)




ADULTS REGISTERED




ADULTS VOTING

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
SECURED HAMLETS (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



RD CADRE TEAMS




VC/NVA STRENGTH (100,000)




(FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF ABOUT 80,000)

VC/NVA MANEUVER BATTALIONS (MONTHLY AVERAGE)




COMBAT EFFECTIVE NOT COMBAT EFFECTIVE

KILLED IN ACTION (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



GVN
 VC/NVA
 U. S.
 OTHER FREE WORLD


**FREE WORLD STRENGTH
(100,000) MONTHLY AVERAGES**



DOES NOT INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FORCES ANNOUNCED BY AUSTRALIA, THAILAND, SO. KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES



U.S.




OTHER

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GVN STRENGTH (100,000)


(MONTHLY AVERAGE)




DOES NOT INCLUDE ADDITIONAL 65,000 ANNOUNCED BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500290001-2

GVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS (MONTHLY AVERAGE)




KVNAF KILLED IN ACTION (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



REGULAR ARMY REGIONAL FORCES POPULAR FORCES


QTR DESERTIONS

(AVERAGE MONTHLY RATE PER THOUSAND)




INCLUDES REGULAR ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, REGIONAL FORCES, AND POPULAR FORCES.

WEAPONS LOST (MONTHLY AVERAGE)




CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS)

MONTHLY AVERAGE




AIRFIELDS




OVERLAND HAUL (ROAD)


(THOUSANDS OF SHORT TONS) (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



PORT THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY (THOUSANDS OF SHORT TONS)



DEEP DRAFT BERTHS



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Preliminary Report of Data Task Force

1. Per your request, an interagency working group including representatives from Ambassador Leonhart's office, the Department of State, Department of Defense and CIA has reviewed the whole Vietnam data problem in detail. Attached is the working group's report, outlining the group's findings and action recommendations. This report reflects the unanimous views of all participants.

2. If you concur, we will proceed with the implementation of the working group's recommendations on the time-schedule outlined in the attached report.

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George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

Report of Task Force on Vietnam Data and Trend Indicators

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Distribution

Mr. Rostow
Ambassador Leonhart
The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary
 The Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
 The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary
 The Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis
 The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
 The Comptroller
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
 SACSA

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26 October 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Report of Task Force on Vietnam Data and Trend Indicators

SUMMARY

During the week of 9 - 13 October, an interagency working group reviewed data used to measure trend in the war in Vietnam. The group concluded that the data most frequently used for both internal and public purposes are not adequate for the task and recommends that a special interagency task force be established to systematically develop new ways of measuring progress.

The group believes that indicators of trends should measure results toward broad objectives, not the progress of individual programs, or simply activities associated with our programs. Effective indicators of progress will come only from a systematic interagency analysis of statistics, reports, and candid assessments by people experienced in South Vietnam. Moreover, the group strongly believes that Vietnam is so diverse that as much indicator data as possible should be analyzed on a district and province basis in order to determine whether trends shown in countrywide data reflect wide-spread change, or simply changes in small areas of intense activity.

In the short term, the group recommends that efforts be undertaken immediately to: (1) improve the current indicator charts, (2) develop additional indicators from the Hamlet Evaluation System, (3) explore other potential indicators of trends (such as road and waterways control, provincial price indices, etc.), and (4) prepare monthly narrative statements on progress which cannot be portrayed statistically. Results of these tasks should be furnished as they become available, and a comprehensive report submitted on December 4, 1967.

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In the medium range, the group concluded that improved measurements of RVNAF effectiveness and VC military potential should be developed and that periodic soundings of Vietnamese attitudes should be provided to complement other indicators. Existing data are not adequate to measure RVNAF effectiveness and the group recommends that detailed data requirements be developed and discussed with the US Mission and the GVN. On the other hand, a system for measuring the impact of friendly operations and programs on enemy military potential probably can be developed in Washington by relating various individual indicators to each other on a systematic basis (e.g., activities, and reported condition of VC/NVA forces). Vietnamese opinion could be sampled by development of opinion polls and by use of various collection mechanisms. These efforts should begin now, with data requirements and proposed programs to be reported on December 4, 1967. A report of substantive results should be provided on January 30, 1968, with interim results reported as they become available.

The long term objective of all the foregoing efforts should be to develop a small number of credible measurements which can be presented in a clear, concise manner. The ideal would be a single "Dow Jones" index of how the war is going, but such an index is not currently feasible. It is likely, however, that substantial progress toward such a balanced group of valid indicators can be made if the foregoing actions are undertaken with sufficient priority and allocation of resources.

The group recommends that: (a) action assignments and suspense dates be established as indicated in the text below; (b) that the results be monitored by a special interagency task force, which will report periodically beginning on 4 December; (c) interim results of all efforts be provided as they become available; and (d) that plans be made now to brief MACV and the US Embassy in Saigon not later than 15 December 1967.

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1. During the week of 9 - 13 October, representatives of Ambassador Leonhart's office, the Department of State (INR), CIA, and the Department of Defense (DIA, JCS, OASD/Systems Analysis) reviewed data currently used to measure trends in the war in Vietnam. The group concluded that the data most frequently used to measure progress for both official and public purposes are not adequate for the task and recommends that a special interagency task force be established to systematically develop new ways of measuring trends in the war in all its facets.

2. The group focussed on four major aspects of the problem:

- a. The current state of the art -- existing data and presentational forms;
- b. Short-term add-ons -- additional data and charts that could be developed for early use;
- c. Long-term add-ons -- developing an optimum system for measuring trends in the war; and
- d. Specific recommendations for courses of action necessary to implement the group's findings on the first three items.

3. Current State of the Art

Discussions of indicators of trends tend to confuse such indicators with criteria for program evaluation. An indicator tells if we are winning (or losing) and measures significant trends; it does not measure program activities. Thus, a progress indicator may be quite independent of US or GVN programs, and may not correlate with particular programs. (For example, province price indices or the price of the piaster in world markets could be indicators. Conversely, the recruitment rate for RD cadre may have little relation to real progress.) In short, the group believes that indicators of progress should measure movement with respect to broad objectives, not with

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regard to individual programs. Progress indicators, furthermore, should not be confused with indices of activity associated with the implementation of our programs.

4. Several kinds of data, systematically analyzed by several types of analysts, are needed to develop the required indicators. Statistical data is a basic starting point because it can show trends and help define base points and end points. However, statistics by themselves, particularly those from Vietnam, present their problems: reports from several sources often do not agree, gaps exist, results are sometimes faked, reporting systems are frequently changed, and reporters often are not objective. Thus, narrative reports embodying the judgment of qualified field observers also must be used to help the analyst understand the trends in the statistics and help to highlight the biases and inadequacies of various data series. In addition, field visits by Washington observers and detailed "off the record" sessions with returning officials from all echelons are both necessary. Thus, effective indicators of progress will come only from a systematic analysis of statistics, reports, and candid assessments by people with experience in SVN.

5. Moreover, the group felt strongly that Vietnam is so diverse that the data used for indicators should be analyzed on a district and province basis wherever possible in order to determine whether trends shown in country-wide data represent pervasive, widespread change, or simply reflect changes in small areas where activity is intense.

6. The committee reviewed the commonly used statistical indicators, including VC/NVA attacks, VC/NVA incidents (sabotage, terrorism and harassment), VC/NVA defections, VC/NVA confirmed combat strengths and VC/NVA weapons losses. It concluded that some of the statistical indicators are helpful in assessing trends which may reflect progress, but are usually presented without the explanations needed to put them in proper context. Moreover, there is little or no systematic effort to analyze enemy documents or to use systematic reports of US field officials in conjunction with the statistics.

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7. In examining data showing VC/NVA incidents, for example, the committee found that changes in reporting criteria can have a drastic effect on the trends shown in the graphs currently used as indicators. The VC attacks graph shows a high level of attacks during 1962 and 1963, a drop from 1964 through mid-1966, followed by a substantial increase. However, the high level of attacks in 1962 - 1963 probably results from counting many harassing fire and other lesser incidents as attacks. In similar fashion, about 25% of the increase in total attacks during 1967 results from reporting mortar incidents as attacks even if no assault occurred; before that, mortar attacks without assault were counted as harassing fire. As with population control and enemy strength statistics, a retrospective set of data is required to show the trend accurately.

8. The committee concluded that the current state of the indicator art was inadequate and that a comprehensive action program should be initiated, with full participation of all appropriate agencies (State, DOD, (JCS, DIA, OASD/SA) CIA, White House). The program should include the short term, medium range, and long term efforts indicated below.

9. Short-Term Actions

The group felt that an effort should be made to improve charts in current use to the extent feasible. For example, a retrospective incident line should be developed along with guidelines for interpreting the data. This effort should be started immediately with results furnished as they become available. (Primary action: DIA; Participant: CIA; Suspense: November 1967)

10. On the basis of short term analysis, we must develop additional statistical indicators from data currently available. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), for example, has not yet been fully exploited. Analysis of the HES is likely to provide some indicators of GVN effectiveness, hamlet security, and the willingness of the people to commit themselves to the GVN by moving from VC areas to GVN secured hamlets and urban areas. Data series based on some of these indicators will complement and amplify the overall population control picture presented by the HES, and should provide a useful add-on to the current charts. (Primary action: DOD/Systems Analysis; Participant: JCS, DIA, CIA; Suspense: 28 November 1967)

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11. In addition to the HES data, the committee agreed it must explore data on other potential indicators of progress, such as road control, provincial price indices, rice harvest and distribution, neutralization of base areas, refugee resettlement, and movement of enemy units away from populated areas, in an effort to develop valid indicators. (Primary action: DOD/Systems Analysis; Participants: JCS, DIA, CIA, State; Suspense: 28 November 1967.)

12. It was agreed that a monthly list of narrative statements should be developed, similar to that prepared by CIA in September, of those factors which cannot be portrayed statistically, but which demonstrate real progress. Such narrative statements, covering a variety of political, economic and military factors, can be gleaned from existing periodic field reports, and would highlight trends in areas related to specific US aims and purposes. These would include political development, popular attitudes, Free World support, anti-corruption activities, land reform, Viet Cong morale problems, reflections of VC logistical difficulties, etc. This effort should be systematized, so that an overall checklist can be developed against which incoming reports can be scrutinized, with pertinent data summarized. Charts should be developed as feasible to illustrate individual items, although this series will not always produce recurring data and must remain flexible. (Primary action: CIA; Participants: State, DIA; Suspense: 1 November and monthly thereafter.)

13. Medium-Range

The group concluded that two broad areas for which better measurement could be developed are those related to Viet Cong military potential and RVNAF effectiveness. Data Measurement Systems for these factors, together with the HES, would provide complementary analytical and management tools covering a broad spectrum of US objectives in Vietnam. The group agreed, however, that substantial research using existing data was necessary, and that additional data might be required before any meaningful new systems could be implemented.

- 6 -

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14. The group agreed that existing data clearly were not adequate for developing a meaningful measurement of RVNAF effectiveness as an indicator of trends. Detailed data on RVNAF deployments, missions and operational units will be required to facilitate research and permit an effective evaluation. Data requirements on this subject should be developed in coordination with the US Mission in Saigon and the GVN. (Primary action: JCS; Participants: DIA, CIA, DOD/Systems Analysis; Suspense: 28 November 1967.)

15. The group agreed that a system for measuring the impact of friendly operations and programs on enemy military potential probably can be developed by relating various individual indicators to each other on a systematic basis. In this effort, we should discern the relationship between VC/NVA incident data and the data reported in the Hamlet Evaluation System. In turn, those data should be related to order of battle strength and location data for VC/NVA and friendly forces. In addition, friendly operations data should be examined in conjunction with VC activity and HES data to determine the impact of friendly activities and their probable long term effect. Because of uncertainties regarding the meaningfulness of potential combinations, we cannot now envisage the precise form this measurement may take. In any event, all relationships should be checked carefully against a comprehensive analysis of the non-statistical data in US/GVN reports and VC documents. (Primary action: CIA; Participants: OSD/Systems Analysis; JCS, DIA; Suspense: 15 January 1968.)

16. The long term objective of all the foregoing efforts should be to develop a small number of credible measurements which can be presented in a clear, concise manner. The ideal would be a single "Dow Jones" index of how the war is going, but such an index is not currently feasible. It is likely, however, that substantial progress toward a balanced group of valid indicators can be made if the foregoing actions are undertaken with sufficient priority and allocation of resources. Interim results which would provide individual useful indicators of progress will be made available as the research effort progresses.

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17. The group anticipates that in addition to data on the RVNAF mentioned above, some modifications in field reporting formats may be desirable as optimum measurement systems evolve. This will be necessary to obtain some additional data, and particularly to obtain narrative field explanations of phenomena derived from data analysis, and to focus the reporting on supplemental information. Also required are certain data files held in Saigon which would facilitate retrieval of documents and interrogation reports. (Primary action: CIA; Participants: DIA; Suspense: 28 November.)

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19. Recommendations

The group recommends that: (a) action assignments and suspense dates be established as indicated above; (b) that the results be monitored by an interagency task force, which will provide periodic reports beginning on 4 December; (c) that interim results be provided as they become available; and (d) that plans be made now to brief CINCPAC, MACV and the US Embassy in Saigon and solicit their assistance not later than 15 December 1967.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

22 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador William Leonhart
Major General William E. DePuy
Rear Admiral William Lemos
Mr. Jerry Bush
Brig. General Burton Brown
Dr. Victor Heyman
Mr. Fred Green

SUBJECT : Vietnam Data Task Force Progress Report

1. Attached is a draft progress report of the Vietnam Data Task Force which has been coordinated among and agreed to by all of our working-level colleagues. If the principals on the Task Force (i. e., the recipients of this memorandum) so agree, I plan to submit this report to Mr. Rostow.

2. I would appreciate your advising me by phone of your concurrence, or non-concurrence, in this draft report. If necessary we can, of course, schedule a meeting of the principals to iron out any major differences. If none of you has any serious problems with this draft, however, I do not believe we need burden this crowded time with an avoidable additional meeting.

3. We probably should meet no later than the first week in January to agree on the timing of our representatives' field visit and the composition of the delegation.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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22 DEC 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Data Task Force Progress Report

1. Representatives of agencies participating in the Data Task Force met at CIA on 4 December 1967 to review progress since the initial meeting in October. The status of assigned research and analytical projects was reported on and discussed. Agreement was reached on the direction which further analysis should take, on the timing of coordination visits to CINCPAC and MACV, and on general procedures to tighten coordination on certain tasks. The results of the meeting are summarized below.

2. Retrospective Incident Line (DIA). The DIA representative reported that an initial pilot study is being developed to classify Viet Cong attacks by type and scale. Subsequent studies will be attempted on terror, sabotage, and possibly harassment incidents. When completed, these data files can be used to demonstrate more reliably trends in the nature and level of Viet Cong activity. This improved data series will also permit more meaningful analysis, in conjunction with other data series, of the relationships between the various trend lines, such as casualties, pacification trends, and the impact of friendly operations on over-all Viet Cong capabilities and unit effectiveness.

3. Research to date has uncovered a number of problems regarding criteria and methodology in reporting the data over the years, and in coding the inputs into the data base. It was agreed that coordination with MACV to refine reporting and coding procedures would facilitate the handling of incident data in the future. It was also agreed that it is essential that we obtain from MACV copies of their past reporting directives so that we can better evaluate apparent anomalies in the incident data series since mid-1966.

4. Progress in this key project has been slow because of the limited manpower resources which can be devoted to it.

5. Hamlet Evaluation System Exploitation (DOD/SA Action). A study produced by DOD/SA on "Statistical Trends from the Hamlet Evaluation System" represents the results of this project thus far. This study led to the following conclusions:

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a. The individual indicators can be analyzed separately to show meaningful trends, since the evaluators apparently are grading each indicator individually rather than mechanically attempting to arrive at some predetermined over-all grade for the hamlets;

b. The initial program formats which displayed only net changes do not adequately reflect the internal dynamics of pacification operations, since they tend to mask the large gross number of hamlets changing ratings -- both upward and downward; and

c. The HES data should provide a most useful base against which to compare other data series (VC incidents, friendly operations, opposing orders of battle, etc.) and analyze interrelationships. CIA noted that its limited investigation of HES data showed that aggregations at higher levels (national and regional) also tended to mask dynamic movements internally at lower levels. Thus, while very little over-all movement was indicated when the data were displayed at corps or province levels, a disaggregation at district level showed dynamic movements in various districts. Analysis of the average scores for the nine security indicators at district from March through September showed significant improvement in 33 districts, and significant deterioration in 28 districts.

6. The DOD/SA study analyzed trends between March and September in eight of the 18 HES indicators. The analysis reflected slight over-all progress in reducing the capabilities of village guerrilla forces, although there was some regression evident in II Corps. With respect to VC main and local forces, there was an over-all slight regression indicated, with II Corps again reflecting the largest downward movement. No significant changes were reflected in the status of hamlet and village infrastructure components.

7. [] reported that new computer programs were being developed to permit analysis of total movements rather than net changes, and that further analysis of HES data using these programs should produce meaningful results. It was agreed that the effort to develop the optimum presentation of HES data should continue on a priority basis, and that closer coordination between the participating agencies on this matter was desirable.

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8. Potential Indicators of Progress (DOD/SA). Several of the environmental factors had been explored to determine their suitability as progress indicators, but in each case difficulties either in acquiring basic data or in developing meaningful criteria were encountered. Data on such factors as provincial price indices and rice production are too scanty and diverse. Data on the status of lines of communication are very general, and the criteria not sufficiently precise for effective analysis at this time. DOD/SA stated further information was needed on MACV's route control system, including the precise criteria used, before a broader and potentially more meaningful measure can be developed. DIA reported its plan to analyze a number of data packages in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of operations aimed at neutralizing enemy base areas.

9. Monthly List of Narrative Statements (CIA). This project has been temporarily held in abeyance because of extensive interagency and field actions that have otherwise been meeting the need for subjective accounts of progress in the war. The need for action on this project will be reviewed periodically, with a view to quarterly rather than monthly preparation.

10. RVNAF Effectiveness Measurement (JCS/SACSA). The Joint Staff has developed a proposed list of detailed data requirements to improve the measurement of RVNAF effectiveness. The list, which is keyed to computerization, requires comprehensive periodic information on all tactical units down to battalion, ship, or district level. Comments have already been received from data task force agencies and from MACV. The latter indicated that it is developing a new RVNAF evaluation system, which is scheduled to be implemented in January. Data from this new system may satisfy many of the requirements listed by the Joint Staff and assist DIA in its automation of RVNAF order of battle. Further action is dependent on coordination with CINCPAC and MACV which will reveal the extent to which MACV's new reporting system will meet Washington requirements as developed by the Joint Staff, DIA and DOD/SA. DIA reported that automating the RVNAF order of battle, which is currently in progress (but encountering difficulties), should aid in meeting task force requirements.

11. Measuring Viet Cong Military Potential (CIA). This key project is partially dependent on the completion of certain related projects. As a minimum, automated data files on friendly and enemy order of battle now being developed by DIA, are a prerequisite. CIA reported on the status of a pilot project on Binh Thuan province. Data on Viet Cong incidents, friendly tactical operations, friendly air strikes, and the hamlet evaluation system have been converted to periodic computer plots and are being analyzed, using a

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videotape recording technique to demonstrate relationships over time. Other data, including friendly and enemy order of battle, and pacification plans, are to be added. Detailed friendly order of battle for this project -- not yet available in Washington -- has been requested from the field. This project is being developed essentially for visual presentation, using either videotape or bound overlay folios, with accompanying narrative. Development of this project is continuing, and may require several additional months.

12. DOD/SA reported on a parallel project which attempts to collate various data at the Corps level. A preliminary study of III Corps was published in its November publication. This study analyzed opposing force strengths, military operations, hamlet evaluation system results, and election data, presented in tabular form. Detailed comments from task force participants were solicited to facilitate further work on this project.

13. Saigon Data Files (CIA). A copy of MACV's Combined Document Exploitation Center index files had been requested and its receipt was expected momentarily. Arrangements are also in train to acquire selected Combined Intelligence Center reference files, and to obtain CORDS monthly province reports and copies of the 1967 provincial pacification plans. DIA reported that it was now able to service requests for copies of any MACV Intelligence Report since September 1966.

14. Balanced Set of Indicators (CIA). This project is contingent on further development of all related research projects referred to previously. The Joint Staff noted that both CINCPAC and MACV have evinced considerable interest in the over-all scope of the Data Task Force mission, and apparently are reviewing current reporting and evaluating procedures in a common search for improved measures of progress.

15. Briefing of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. The Joint Staff representative suggested that the timing for the projected field coordination visits to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV be changed from mid-December to mid-January. It was agreed that January would be more opportune from the standpoint of the forthcoming holiday truces, as well as allowing further development of our own research projects.

16. Management and Coordination Arrangements. It was agreed that closer collaboration among the agencies involved in research projects of mutual interest was required to accelerate progress. Most participants reported difficulties in allocating requisite resources to Data Task Force

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responsibilities because of the press of other high priority tasks related to the Vietnam problems.

17. Recommendations. The participants recommend that:

- a. All components press ahead with their research and developmental projects, maintaining close liaison and coordination with other components and reporting results as available.
- b. That the liaison visits to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV be re-scheduled for mid-January.
- c. The participants meet again before mid-January to review progress on the various projects and coordinate preparations for the projected field visits.

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FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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FORM NO. 241
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REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

27 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 17 November White House Data Meeting

1. At 1700 on Friday, 17 November, a meeting was convened in the White House Situation Room by Mr. Walt W. Rostow to review the Vietnam data problem and related actions currently in train, both in Saigon and Washington. The session was attended by Ambassador Robert Komer, Mr. William Jordan, Mr. Richard Moose, Mr. Philip Habib, Dr. Victor Heyman, Ambassador William Leonhart, Major General William DePuy, Mr. George Carver and Mr. George Allen.

2. The specific occasion for the meeting was consideration of a Washington reply to Saigon Embtel 10573, 7 November 1967. As Mr. Rostow explained, however, the more general objective was to get the US Mission in Saigon and the Washington community thinking together on the data problem and thus forestall a burgeoning exchange of lengthy cables attempting to argue out differences of opinion better settled around a table. Mr. Carver pointed out that Ambassador Bunker had been advised at lunch on 17 November that such a meeting was going to be held and had expressed a great interest in attending. Since this was obviously impossible because of the conflict with a speaking engagement in New York, it was agreed that the results of the meeting would be shown to the Ambassador for his review prior to the dispatch of any further messages to Saigon.

3. Dr. Heyman went systematically through the argument of Saigon Embtel 10573 outlining the elements in the US Mission's position with which the Washington community had problems. These were, principally, the Mission's proposed treatment of recruitment, infiltration, and related net loss computations on VC strength.

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4. After some brisk but helpful discussion, two fundamental points were unanimously agreed to:

a) A sharp distinction must be and will be made between data series and computations used as management tools by the US Government and data publicly surfaced for general consumption to enlighten the world at large with regard to the status of the Vietnamese struggle.

b) Henceforth, public explanations of the state of the war and progress being reported therein will not be pegged on statistics, though statistics will be used where relevant as illustrative examples to support general qualitative judgments.

5. In line with the policy agreed to in (b) above, the thesis (that all accept) that the Viet Cong are having recruitment problems will henceforth be publicly argued on the basis of captured documents describing such problems and will utilize available evidence of the increasing number of North Vietnamese assigned to what were historically Viet Cong units. Our estimates of recruitment rates (probably 7,000 per month for 1966 and probably down to the order of 3,000 per month for 1967) may be cited, but as ancillary illustrations and not as the keystone of the argument. Infiltration rates and loss calculations will be similarly handled in a low key with appropriate caveats, so that we may let the facts speak for themselves without appearing to claim that our statistics are better than they are or prove points they do not necessarily demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt.

6. The Washington participants in the 17 November meeting reviewed all aspects of the data problem and work being done on it with Ambassador Komer. Ambassador Komer was given a copy of the 26 October 1967 preliminary report of the Washington interagency Data Task Force and brought up to date on the current activities of that Task Force's various components. He, in turn, outlined work going on in Saigon and new projects being initiated there. Of these, the most important was the development, under Ambassador Komer's aegis, of a reporting procedure designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, and to give reliable information on the strength, disposition and current duties of Regional and Popular Force units. Ambassador Komer agreed to furnish this information to Washington and also agreed to furnish the Washington community with copies of the provincial pacification plans for each of South Vietnam's provinces. We, in turn, agreed to provide Ambassador Komer with analytic back-up and support, particularly computer support, to assist him in analysis required in the field.

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7. The Hamlet Evaluation System was discussed in considerable detail. While acknowledging its weaknesses, Ambassador Komer praised it highly as the best thing ever developed and an indispensable management tool. There was unanimous agreement that HES was designed primarily as a management tool, not as a way of measuring population control, and that it should not be allowed to be corrupted for public relations reasons. Ambassador Komer emphasized that he had given personal instructions to every district advisor to report honestly through the HES mechanism, making it plain that he was interested in problems, not progress. Ambassador Komer gave his personal assurance that pressure for "results" would not be allowed to corrupt the HES system.

8. A number of other technical data questions were raised, discussed and resolved at this meeting. In general it was a most useful session which gave every appearance of achieving its principal object, i. e., getting Washington and Saigon on the same wave length. Ambassador Komer is now reviewing the Data Task Force report in detail. Dr. Heyman is charged with drafting a message to Saigon outlining our substantive agreements and making detailed recommendations in light thereof. This will be reviewed by the Data Committee and by Ambassador Bunker prior to transmission.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

1@ - Members Rostow Data Ctte
1 - DCI, *DDCF, ER*
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1 - DDP

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29 September 1967

Indicators of Progress in Vietnam

South Vietnam

1. Economic Stability and Growth

The most relevant measures of improvement in the civilian economy of South Vietnam are: (1) the price level, (2) trend in real wages, (3) trend in farm income, (4) and trends in farm and industrial output.

Some of these measures are prepared at present, including: (1) a weekly index of retail prices in Saigon, (2) Saigon free market rates for gold and US currencies, (3) monthly cost of living index for working class families in Saigon, (4) the money supply and the level of GVN foreign exchange reserves. Other reports are issued periodically from South Vietnam on rice stocks, domestic rice movements to Saigon, rice imports, production of agricultural and industrial commodities.

Unfortunately, the above indicators are available largely for the urban areas, primarily Saigon. Price and wage data for rural Vietnam and for provinces beyond the direct influences of Saigon are not regularly reported. Indicators that include rice prices to farmers in the delta, prices of consumer and capital goods outside Saigon, and wages and incomes of civilians in all provinces would be a prerequisite for a meaningful understanding of economic conditions in areas undergoing pacification.

Additional useful economic-statistical measure would be data -- sex, age -- on the manpower situation, in areas long under GVN control as well as areas undergoing pacification.

It would be useful to provide data on rents charged by landlords and taxes paid by them as indications of the degree of interest and control by the GVN in rural areas. As land reform programs are implemented, it would be useful to report periodically the volume of land distributed to farmers.

Unfortunately, the underdeveloped state of the GVN economy and the complications and confusions of years of war make it extremely unlikely that the GVN can institute a statistical reporting system that will be thorough enough and responsive enough to changing trends

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Excluded from automatic
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throughout the country to become a "leading" indicator of overall progress against the Communist insurgency.

2. Economic Indicators of Military Progress

Numerous statistical series are being reported that measure changes in GVN control and influence over the GVN population. Each of these series has only limited value and the appropriateness of each will change over time as the war progresses. The major problem in all such series is that the criteria for inclusion of a specific reporting item may change over time so that long-term trends are more an illusion than a reality. Taken together, however, such statistical series as listed below can supply a basis for measuring the overall progress of the war. Possible measures that could be refined to become valuable indicators include:

- (1) Miles of various types of transport routes, in use and open with military escort, closed at night. Number of miles travelled per public carrier per "incident,"
- (2) growth in number of Revolutionary cadre engaged in pacification duties, length of service of such cadres, re-enlistment rates,
- (3) Index of GVN hamlet control by area,
- (4) Voluntary enlistments in ARVN and other friendly military organizations. Deduction in desertions from ARVN; enlistments of former VC; enlistments from "neutral" refugees,
- (5) VC/NVA incidents by some weighted intensity-measure, by area of country,
- (6) In depth psychological studies of attitudes of former VC controlled areas to measure changes in will to persist.

Viet Cong

There are no regular indicators on VC supply conditions and financial situation. Prisoner interrogations, Chieu Hoi, captured documents, and reporting on the rural economy can provide indicators. Taxation by the VC on transport of products to GVN markets, if reported regularly, could give clues to the status of the VC economy. Similarly, food availability to the VC cadre and the military indicate to some extent the control over indigenous production as well as the success of procurement from outside. VC control over rice producing areas and estimates of the rice being produced in these areas can indicate VC economic conditions as rice is the source for income as well as food for the VC economy.

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North Vietnam

North Vietnam plays two important roles in sustaining the war in South Vietnam. It supplies personnel to fight in the South and it acts as a conduit for movement of military supplies from other Communist countries to its own and Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. In addition, North Vietnam must retain the capability of defending its own country and maintaining at least a subsistence standard of living. Indicators of North Vietnam's ability to persist must measure how effectively these roles and requirements are being met.

(1) Imports of military and war-supporting goods by type and quantity. More information from place of origin of imports. More information on the level and characteristic of imports of military goods would be a useful indicator of the determination of the North Vietnamese to carry on the war and the degree to which other Communist countries are willing to underwrite the war.

(2) Imports of economic goods by volume and type -- such as more detailed information on portable generators -- would give insights into the disrupted effects of the bombing program and the possibility of effective countermeasures.

(3) More information on current military manpower situation including draft regulations, lowering of age limits, calling of reserves, ease of draft exemptions. Information of this nature has been very inadequate.

(4) Diversion of manpower from service-type occupations to war-related activities; employment of normally unemployed, employment of students, old people, very young.

(5) Any use of the Draconian measures to force workers to work in unusual places or at abnormal hours. Hours of work and willingness to do additional part-time repair work could give some indication of the will and efficiency of the labor force.

(6) Repair of LOC's -- The ability of the North Vietnamese to keep open their lines of communications indicates their capability to continue military efforts in the south. Any evidence of serious delays in repairing vital transport facilities would indicate either a severe manpower shortage or a severe equipment shortage. Information on this subject is usually complete and accurate.

(7) Although information on food imports is good, that on production is inadequate. Food availability is considered to be the prime indicator. Domestic prices give some indication of food availabilities. Price information has been very sketchy.

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1. RVNAF effectiveness by component, CTZ, mission

2. GVN performance

ed., welfare, resource control, admin corruption

3. U.S. Forces, effectiveness

air, land, sea

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by CTZ (or province better())



4. Enemy forces and infrastructure

Chieu Hoi, POW, size, losses and gains, infiltration, recruitment activity

5. Population Control

by whom, why changes

6. Civilian casualties

SVN and NVN

how many, how, by whom

7. Econ performance

econ indicators of war (use of roads, railroads, waterways)

progress

8. State of econ - agriculture, industry, etc.

ind. real incomes by econ segment

9. NVN capability to sustain the war

men, equipment, food, etc.

bombing impact

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9. Comparative Burden

GVN, U. S., Free World

DD/P **10. Burden inflicted on SVN by VC**

Sawyer **11. Political Development (popular engagement in political life)**

12. Measurement of infrastructure struggle

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PERFORMANCE EVALUATORS

RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS (1)

US/TN EFFECTIVENESS (3)

GVN POLITICAL PERFORMANCE (2, 11)

GVN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (7)

VC PERFORMANCE ($\frac{10}{12}$)

IMPACT EVALUATORS

ENEMY FORCES and INFRASTRUCTURE (4)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (6)

NVN CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN WAR (8)

MANPOWER RESOURCES (5)

COMPARATIVE BURDEN (10)

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RVNAF

Overall Personnel Strength

Graph:

1. Variations in total strength of ARVN, RF & PF forces.
2. Variations by Corps area in ARVN strength (with explanatory note as to historical deployment of ARVN)
3. Average available for duty strength all ARVN battalions combat and support.
4. Desertion and AWOL rate per 1000 of ARVN, RF and PF \times (percentage of officers, non-cons & em's as a factor in ARVN rate).
5. Average time in service of ARVN personnel broken out by officers, non-cons & em's, (ie., ARVN experience level)

Combat Effectiveness

Graph:

1. Type of operations by ARVN overall (ie., sweep and destroy, small unit - large unit, clear and hold)
2. ARVN battalion days of operations (overall, by Corps and division)
 - a. also time battalion in the field at night
 - b. also percentage of battalion contacts with enemy during operations.
 - c. also percentage of contacts initiated by friendly forces.
3. Small-unit operations byu Corps and Division (if info available)
 - a. Percentage night-time small-unit operations
 - b. Percentage contacts with enemy and those self-initiated.
4. Enemy KIA by ARVN (overall by Corps and division) (per battalion day in field?)
 - a. Prisoners and detainees by ARVN
 - b. Weapons captured by ARVN
 - c. ARVN casualty ratio to enemy
 - d. ARVN weapons loss ratio to enemy.
5. Number of ARVN battalions rated combat effective by MACV by month.
6. Average present for duty strength of ARVN combat battalions per 1000.

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RVNAF

Miscellaneous

Graph:

1. **Percentage ARVN officers, non-coms & Em's receiving formal military training.**
2. **Number small arms, heavy weapons, armoured vehicles available to ARVN per 100 troops.**
3. **Number air sorties flown in support ARVN operations.**

Note:

- **No detailed breakout in many aspects suggested for RF & PF as data probably not available.**
- **No detailed breakout for NVAF Air Force & Navy as data probably not available and combat activities not greatly significant by themselves.**

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US Ground Forces

Combat Effectiveness

Graph:

1. Number of combat battalions by field force and MAF (idea to show extent of deployments to meet enemy threats)
 - a. Average present for duty strength per 1,000 in combat battalions by FF and MAF area.
 - b. Average number of riflemen per battalion (weighted) by FF & MAF area.
2. Battalion days of operation by FF & MAF.
 - a. Percentage of battalion contacts with enemy
 - b. Friendly-initiated contacts.
 - c. Length of battalion operations
 - d. armament expended per operation
3. Small-unit operation by FF, MAF & Division (if info can be developed)
 - a. Percentage night-time small unit operations.
 - b. Percentage contacts with enemy & friendly initiated contacts.
4. Number US companies rated combat effective or available for combat duty.
5. Enemy KIA
 - a. break out by FF & MAF area.
 - b. Prisoners and detainees.
 - c. Weapons captured during combat and in caches.
 - d. casualty ratio to enemy.
 - e. Casualties per 1000 friendly in combat units.
6. Average length of service in Vietnam for combat personnel per 1000 in combat units.

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US Ground Forces

Overall Personnel Strength

Graph:

1. **Variations in overall incountry strength, Army and Marines**
 - a. **By Army field force (FF) and Marine area (MAF)**
2. **Ratio of manpower in combat units and support units.**

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US Air Force

Air War in North

- I. Sortie Data**
 - A. Sorties Flown Per Month**
 - B. Sorties Flown by Route Package**
 - C. Sorties--Primary Targets/Armed Recce**
 - D. Sorties--Strike/Support**
- II. Ordnance Data**
 - A. Total Ordnance Delivered**
 - B. Ordnance By Route Package**
 - C. Types of Ordnance Delivered**
- III. Loss Data**
 - A. Losses to All Causes**
 - B. Combat/Operational Losses**
 - C. Loss to AAA/Sams/MIGs**
 - D. Losses By Route Package**

Air War in South

- I. Sortie Data** **Same as North**
- II. Ordnance Data** **" "**
- III. Loss Data**
 - A. Losses to All Causes**
 - B. Combat/Operational Losses**
 - C. Losses by Corps Area**

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Sea War in North

- I. Shore Bombardment Data
 - A. Average Number of Guns On Line
 - B. Number of Rounds Fired (By Type)
 - C. Counter-Battery Fire Received
 - D. Rounds Field By Route Package
- II. Mining Operations
 - A. Total Mines Laid (By Type)
 - B. Mines Laid by Route Package
- III. WBLC Interdiction Operations
 - A. Number Vessels Sighted/Destroyed
 - B. WBLC Activity By Route Package

Sea War in South

- I. Shore Bombardment
 - A. Average Number of Guns On Line
 - B. Number of Rounds Fired (By Type)
 - C. Rounds Fired By Corps Area
 - D. Troop Support Operations
- II. Infiltration Interdiction
 - A. Number Vessels Sighted/Search
 - B. Number of Vessels Detained
 - C. Types of Cargo on Detained Vessels
 - D. Number of Vessels Sighted/Detained by Corps Area

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CONFIDENTIAL

19 September 1967

MEMORANDUM

FROM : OCI/Indochina Division

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Vietnam Statistical Charts

1. Methodology: The overall purpose of the statistical charts is to provide a pictorial display of the progress of the war in Vietnam. Of the 21 individual charts, 15 are calculated in a "three-month running average" which tends to even out extreme short-range variations. The basic design of the charts, all based on monthly cycles, are of manageable size and are sufficient to depict a relatively good description of long-range trends and tendencies.

2. Accuracy: A spot check of several selected charts revealed some discrepancies with figures used in OCI. In most cases, however, the delineation closely coincides or parallels similar charts currently prepared in OCI. Two specific questionable charts were the "VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Strength" and "VC/NVA Maneuver Battalions (Confirmed)." Figures shown in these two charts do not agree with MACV-supplied information used by OCI for similar charts.

3. Sources: Of course, any charts are only as representative as the reliability of the information on which they are based. It appears for the most part, that these charts were prepared on the basis of information supplied by MACV and integrated into the Statistical Services unit of the Department of Defense. OCI and DIA generally use the same sources for the preparation of statistical reports and therefore achieve similar results.

4. Conclusions: Most of these charts are generally of limited value to the OCI analyst because of their content, scope, or method of presentation; however, they may be useful generally for briefings, etc. to describe general trends, etc. Charts which do not show important short-range

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20 SEP 1967

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fluctuations are not truly representative of the situation. Such events as pre-holiday increase in terrorism followed by a holiday lull in the overall incident rate would not necessarily be represented in this type of graph.

An exacting review of these presentations would be necessary to fully determine their accuracy. Assuming these charts were based on MACV/DOD-supplied information, which is also used by OCI and DIA, the reasons for the many minor and some major variations are unknown.

Charts showing the ratio of South Vietnamese casualties in relation to US killed, etc., are questionable in regard to drawing valid conclusions about the overall progress of the war.

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REMARKS: <p style="text-align: center;">STAT</p>		
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FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55	REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.	(47)

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19 September 1967


MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Economic Research
SUBJECT : Comments on US Statistics Related to the War in Vietnam

General Comments

Statistics, regardless of how effectively presented, constitute only tools to be used in reaching a conclusion. They are never answers or conclusions in themselves. Well qualified experts can legitimately arrive at completely different sets of conclusions from the same statistics. These statements are particularly applicable to the immense mass of data produced regarding the war in Vietnam. It is impossible to use any set of statistics up as an absolute indicator of US progress, if only because it is difficult to arrive at an agreed judgment as to what constitutes real progress.

Well chosen and effectively presented statistics can, however, be an effective tool in explaining and understanding what has happened in the past and in identifying new trends as they emerge. The attached set of graphically presented statistics contains some series that are quite useful as analytical tools, and others that are of questionable value. For example, the graph of VC-Initiated Battalion or Larger Attacks clearly shows the precipitous climb in the attack rate during 1964 and 1965 that resulted in large scale US intervention. It is followed by a decline in the rate during 1966 which appears to be continuing in 1967, after a brief spurt

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in the early spring. At the same time, total attacks (composed mostly of small-size unit attacks) have continued to rise at a relatively constant rate. If this pattern persists, it may signal Hanoi's intentions to continue the war on a guerrilla and harassment basis. On the other hand, the Ratio of GVN to US KIA graphic is of little use in understanding the war. It depicts only what everyone already knows; the US has taken the initiative in combat operations and given GVN troops pacification duties. It would be useful to add two additional graphs -- first, a three-month moving average of NVA infiltration and second, a simultaneous display of VC/NVA main force strength and Free World military forces. A plot of the ratio of the two force strengths could be superimposed on the graphic.

In almost all cases the data could be presented more effectively. For example, the graphic of VC/NVA Incidents would be more useful if sabotage, terrorism, and harassments were plotted separately and the total superimposed.

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Specific Comments on Individual Series

1. VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Strength. Order of battle date prepared by MACV for main force troops since 1965 is among the more reliable data available on the war and should be included in any statistical analysis.

2. Ratio of VC/NVA - ARVN Weapon Losses. Unfortunately, US military authorities do not report losses of weapons by US troops. The ratio would be more meaningful if these were added to GVN losses. The graphic could be made more useful if losses for both sides were displayed along with the ratio between them.

3. VC/NVA Incidents. Reporting on this series has not been reliable over time -- GVN has attempted to soft-pedal reporting during some periods, and in some areas no reports whatever are made. In addition, the seriousness of individual incidents are not weighted. As suggested above, various types of incidents should be separated and plotted separately, along with the total.

VC

4. Ratio of Military Chieu Hoi/NVA KIA to Confirmed Enemy Strength. A display of total Allied and VC/NVA losses excluding wounded graphed together would be more illuminating than the relationship of enemy losses to strength. It should be borne in mind, however, that loss data is based primarily on a body count which may fail to include enemy soldiers killed by air strikes, but may also include civilians killed by artillery and mortar crossfire.

5. Rate of SVN Desertions per 1,000 OB and VC/NVA Defections. Desertions are useful as an indicator of morale on both sides. However, GVN desertions should be compared only to regular forces. Desertions from

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25X1

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25X1



other elements of the GVN military structure are sometimes only seasonal and not morale-associated. Similarly, VC/NVA Defections should be presented as a ratio to main force OB and superimposed on the graphic of the SVN desertion rate.

6. VC/NVA Initiated Attacks. As explained above, this series is useful in judging the level of organized military effort expended against allied forces. However, all attacks are aggregated despite differences in intensity and duration and analysis of small changes in the data may lead to erroneous conclusions.

7. Various Ratios of GVN to US KIA. These series are of little value in a continuing analysis of the war and should not be included.

8. Rolling Thunder Sorties. No one has ever demonstrated a relationship between Rolling Thunder sorties and the war in the South.

9. The Chieu Hoi Program. Information in this graphic duplicates that given in 5, above, and should be eliminated.

10. Ratio of VC/NVA Friendly Forces Killed in Action. The information in this graphic is indirectly conveyed in 4, above, and should be eliminated.

25X1




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


RATIO OF VC/NVA FRIENDLY FORCES KILLED IN ACTION (3 MONTHS RUNNING AVERAGE)




THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

BY MONTH




THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

THREE MONTHS' RUNNING AVERAGE





MILITARY
TOTAL


VC/NVA CONFIRMED COMBAT STRENGTH
(3 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGE)




VC/NVA MANEUVER BATTALION GROWTH (CONFIRMED)
(3 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGE)




ROLLING THUNDER SORTIES 1966-1967




RATIO GVN TO US KIA




Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA





Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA Per 1,000 OB



GVN KIA/MIA/Cap and US KIA Per 1,000 OB



VC/NVA INITIATED ATTACKS (3 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGE)



RATE OF SVN DESERTIONS PER 1,000 OB





(Regular, Regional, Popular, & CIDG)

THREE MONTHS RUNNING AVERAGE




VC/NVA DEFECTIONS
(3 MONTH ~~MOVING~~ AVERAGE)

*max. military strength
at end of 66*
*continued and
increased in 67
despite...*




RATIO OF MILITARY CHIEU HOI-VC/NVA KIA TO CONFIRMED ENEMY STRENGTH


(PER 1,000 MEN)



VC/NVA INCIDENTS SABOTAGE-TERRORISM-HARASSMENTS (3 MONTHS RUNNING AVERAGE)



RATIO OF VC/NVA ARVN WEAPON LOSSES (3 MONTHS RUNNING AVERAGE)



Statistics

- 1) Rate of SVN Desertions per 1,000 OB.
- 2) VC/NVA Initiated Attacks
- 3) Ratio of VC/NVA ARVN Weapon Losses
- 4) VC/NVA Incidents (Sabotage - Terrorism - Harassments)
- 5) Ratio of Military Chieu Hoi - VC/NVA KIA
to Confirmed Enemy Strengths
- 6) VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Strengths
" " Maneuver Battalion Groups (Confirmed)
(NVA) (VC)
- 7) Ratio GVN to US KIA
- 8) Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA
- 9) Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA, per 1,000 OB
- 10) GVN KIA/MIA/Cap and US KIA per 1,000 OB
(GVN ———
US - - - -)
- 11) Ratio of VC/NVA Friendly Forces Killed in Action (3 mo)
- 12) VC/NVA Defections (3 mo)

- 13) The Chieu Hoi Program (By month) - Military, Total
- 14) The Chieu Hoi Program (3mo)
- 15) Rolling Thunder Strikes