

Cambodian Role in Supplying the  
Vietnamese Communists

Sep 1970

IM 70-126, New Evidence On Military Deliveries to  
Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969

Attachments: Carver to DCI memo, dated 5 Sep 70, re  
Distribution of ER IM 70-126, September  
1970, New Evidence on Military Deliveries  
to Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969  
(re timing of distribution)

Distribution List for IM 70-126

STAT

25 Feb 71

[redacted] to DD/ER Blue Note re [redacted] second installation  
of his Sihanoukville paper (attached) STAT

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*New Evidence On Military Deliveries  
To Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969*

**Secret**



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ER IM 70-126  
September 1970

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## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
September 1970

ER IM 70-126  
Sept 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

New Evidence On Military Deliveries  
To Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969

Introduction

For some time the community has been carrying on an all-out effort to obtain detailed documentary intelligence on the Communists' logistic activities carried out through Cambodia to support Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army operations in South Vietnam.

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supplies detailed information on the historical development of the enemy's logistical operations in Cambodia.

*Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with other concerned offices of the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Plans and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.*

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The Agency has also undertaken a major analytic effort, complementary to its collection effort, to screen, collate, evaluate and analyze the material already obtained and the additional material which is being submitted on a continuing basis from the field. Evidence now in hand and already studied includes a bill of lading covering a military shipment to Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) on the Chinese ship *He Ping* and eight transportation and packing lists that, [redacted]

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[redacted] represent deliveries on other Chinese ships. Each transportation and packing list itemizes the military supplies contained in the delivery. The lists do not identify the ships, but each bears a handwritten date that appears to be the date of delivery. [redacted]

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This memorandum presents the findings of our preliminary analysis of the new information now in hand. As explained in detail below, the new evidence processed to date indicates that Chinese Communist deliveries to Cambodia of military supplies, food, clothing, and medicine for VC/NVA forces totaled about 26,000 tons, of which about 22,000 tons were military supplies, an amount far higher than previously estimated. The documents now in hand indicate that these deliveries were made between December 1966 and April 1969. Copies of these documents are being disseminated separately.


Additional analysis of the impact of this new information on estimates of the enemy's logistical position in Cambodia and South Vietnam is continuing. Subsequent memoranda and reports based on this research will be issued as quickly as the wealth of new data can be validated, screened, and analyzed; but in light of the volume of material involved, this process will take an extended period of time. In addition to the material already obtained, we have recently gained access to a further set of sensitive Cambodian records consisting of several thousand pages of documents. These new data should shed light on at least some presently unanswered questions, but readers

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of this memorandum are cautioned that the additional material -- which we in Washington have not yet seen -- may conflict in some important respects with the data presented herein.

In the aggregate, we believe the documents to which the CIA has now gained access constitute a virtually complete set of the Cambodians' records on the supplies and materials furnished the Communists with the cooperation of the Cambodian Government.

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Ship Arrivals

1. In ship arrivals as in other areas, our new evidence answers some questions but raises others. For example, some of the dates on documents [redacted]

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[redacted] coincide with, or are close to, the dates when Chinese ships previously considered confirmed or probable arms carriers arrived at Kompong Som, but other document dates are in apparent conflict with shipping information derived from [redacted]

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[redacted] The dates on six of the nine shipping documents now in Washington coincide with or are within four days of the arrival dates of previously known or suspected Chinese arms carriers (see Table 1).\* The bills of lading for the *He Ping*, however, contain a 27 January 1967 date, a month after this ship is known to have arrived in Kompong Som. The date of another document -- 23 August 1967 -- was four days prior to the arrival of the *Ji Ning*, a probable Chinese arms carrier. The date associated with another document -- 28 March 1968 -- was ten days after the arrival and two days after the departure of the confirmed arms carrier *Wu Xi*.

2. No satisfactory explanation has been found for these apparent discrepancies or incompatibilities in dates. The bills of lading on the *He Ping* show that it was loaded in Tsamkong, China, on 14 December 1966, and the cargo represented by the bills of lading was probably unloaded when the ship was in Kompong Som during 23-28 December. In the case of both the *He Ping* and the packing list dated 23 August 1967, the dates on the documents may represent something other than the date of arrival of the ship or the completion of unloading. The discrepancy of the 28 March 1968 document -- only two days -- is of less moment but still puzzling.

Origin of the Cargoes

3. [redacted] supplies for the VC/NVA forces were brought in only on Chinese ships, [redacted] the cargoes came from both China and North Vietnam. Analysis of the packing lists indicates that the bulk of the

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Table 1  
Chinese Deliveries to Cambodia for VC/NVA Forces

Year	Source Documents		Cargo (Tons)	Probable Ship <u>a/</u>	Port of Loading	Port Information	
	Date	(Loaded)				Arrival	Departure
1966/67	14 Dec	(loaded)	1,063	He Ping	Tsamkong	23 Dec	28 Dec
	27 Jan	<u>c/</u>					
1967	2 Feb		2,102	Hang Zhou	Tsamkong	30 Jan	2 Feb
	19 Mar		2,983	He Ping	Tsamkong <u>d/</u>	17 Mar	25 Mar
	23 Aug		1,236	Ji Ning	Tsamkong <u>d/</u>	27 Aug	28 Aug
1968	10 Jan		3,503	You Yi	Tsamkong <u>d/</u>	10 Jan	25 Jan
	28 Mar		2,457	Wu Xi	Whampoa	18 Mar	26 Mar
	25 Aug		3,853	Fo Shan	Tsamkong <u>d/</u>	22 Aug	29 Aug
1969	11 Jan		4,454	Li Ming	Tsamkong	9 Jan	12 Jan
	3 Apr		4,270	Huang Shi	Tsamkong <u>d/</u>	31 Mar	5 Apr

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c. Bill of lading contains date of 27 January 1967 which conflicts with 28 December 1966 departure date of the He Ping.  
d. Probable.

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arms and ammunition are Chinese types. There are also small numbers of Soviet rockets, and the identification numbers on some items in the 1969 shipments appear to be North Vietnamese. A notation on a packing list dated 25 August 1968 indicates that some of the explosives were of Romanian manufacture.

4. Except for the December 1966 voyage of the *He Ping*, the new documentation sheds no light on where the cargoes were loaded. The bills of lading on the *He Ping* show that the cargo was loaded in Tsamkong (Fort Bayard), which has been the traditional port of loading for Chinese arms deliveries. Shipping intelligence indicates that the other shipments implied by the newly acquired documents were also loaded in south China, probably at Tsamkong. There is no evidence that any of the nine ships stopped at Haiphong en route to Kompong Som. It is, therefore, likely that any North Vietnamese materiel had been shipped from Haiphong to the port of loading in China.

#### Volume of Deliveries

5. The documents we have processed to date indicate that the total tonnage of supplies for VC/NVA forces which apparently entered Kompong Som on nine Chinese Communist ships during the 29-month period December 1966 to April 1969 was about 26,000 metric tons. Military supplies comprised about 22,000 tons of the cargo.\* On the first four ships (December 1966 - August 1967) military supplies represented 98% of the total tonnage carried. Non-military supplies accounted for about one-fifth of the tonnage delivered thereafter. The total of 26,000 tons consisted of the following major categories.\*\*

\*  an average of about 10% of the ordnance delivered on these shipments was earmarked for the Cambodian military forces. It is possible that more complete documentation may show that the Cambodian cut was covered by separate packing lists.

\*\* A complete breakout by shipment is given in Table 2.

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	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Military	<u>21,748</u>	<u>84</u>
Ordnance	21,033	81
Weapons	2,565	10
Ammunition	17,128	66
Other	1,340	5
Non-ordnance	715	3
Non-military	<u>4,174</u>	<u>16</u>
Food	2,166	8
Clothing	388	2
Medical	1,620	6
<i>Total</i>	<i>25,922</i>	<i>100</i>

900  
270  
270

6. The principal categories of weapons and ammunition delivered to Kompong Som during the period were as follows\*:

<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Number of Units</u>	<u>Metric Tons a/</u>
Crew-served	16,078	733
Individual	221,836	1,512
	<u>237,914</u>	<u>2,245</u>
<u>Ammunition</u>	<u>Rounds</u>	<u>Metric Tons a/</u>
Crew-served	10,721,092	10,814
Small arms	173,253,630	<u>4,017</u>
Mines and hand grenades	516,624	<u>1,011 b/</u>

*1 metric ton = 106 weapons.*

a. Including packaging. The tonnages do not include related items such as spare parts, carrying cases, and so forth.

b. Including 203 tons of unspecified mines and explosives.

\* Because the documents do not provide a detailed breakdown by type for approximately 22 tons of weapons and 983 tons of ammunition which arrived in the December 1966 He Ping shipment they could not be included in this tabulation.

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Weapons and Ammunition Deliveries

7. A total of about 238,000 weapons were identified in the deliveries. Individual weapons constituted 93% of the total number of weapons and represented 67% of the weight of all weapons. New-family weapons -- the AK 47, RPD, and SKS -- represented about 83% of the total small arms deliveries.

8. Weapons so far identified in shipments to Kompong Som are shown below:

<u>Individual Weapons</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u> <sup>a/</sup>
7.62-mm pistol, Type 54	30,911	42
7.62-mm submachinegun, Type 56	115,000	955
7.62-mm semiautomatic rifle, Type 56	64,000	347
7.62-mm light machinegun, Type 53	125	5
7.62-mm submachinegun, Type 54	2,500	16
7.62-mm AK submachinegun	100	1
7.62-mm submachinegun, Type 56 (56-1)	3,000	21
7.62-mm machinegun, Type 56	5,700	120
Individual rifles	500	5
<i>Total</i>	<i>221,836</i>	<i>1,512</i>

<u>Crew-served Weapons</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u> <sup>a/</sup>
7.62-mm heavy machinegun, Type 57	1,450	165
12.7-mm AA machinegun, Type 54	600	106
40-mm rocket launcher, Type 56	9,000	53
60-mm mortar	1,800	77
82-mm mortar	1,250	158
120-mm mortar	120	55
75-mm recoilless rifle	390	78
57-mm recoilless rifle	250	18

a. Including packaging. The terminology and weights used in this tabulation are those given in the documentary materials.

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<u>Crew-served Weapons</u> (Continued)	<u>Units</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u> <sup>a/</sup>
107-mm rocket launcher <sup>b/</sup>	28	10
RPG launcher	1,190	13
<i>Total</i>	<i>16,078</i>	<i>733</i>

- a. Including packaging.
- b. The apparent anomaly of such a small number of 107-mm rocket launchers when compared with the large number of 107-mm rockets is undergoing further investigation.

9. Individual ammunition rounds in the deliveries total 173 million and crew-served ammunition totaled 11 million rounds, a ratio of 16:1. The total weight of small arms ammunition shipments was approximately 4,017 tons, compared to crew-served deliveries of about 10,814 tons. The major categories of small arms and crew-served ammunition are shown below:

<u>Individual Rounds</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u> <sup>a/</sup>
7.62-mm Type 56 incendiary cartridges	7,001,280	141
7.62-mm pistol, Type 51	9,205,560	113
7.62-mm rifle, Type 56	39,144,600	920
7.62-mm machinegun, Type 56	83,362,320	1,714
7.62-mm steel core, Type 53	22,450,060	649
7.9-mm cartridge, rifle	4,000,000	129
7.62-mm tracer, Type 56	7,744,300	156
7.62-mm tracer, Type 53	199,760	6
CKC launcher antitank rounds	24,800	35
CKC rifle grenades	70,950	79
Type AT/K44 AT grenade	20,000	30
Antitank grenades for rifles	30,000	45
<i>Total</i>	<i>173,253,630</i>	<i>4,017</i>

- a. Including packaging. The terminology and weights used in this tabulation are those given in the documentary materials.

<u>Crew-served Rounds</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Metric Tons <sup>a/</sup></u>
RPG 7 ammunition	79,946	374
40-mm rocket	397,010	1,256
107-mm rocket	15,000	379
60-mm mortar	365,152	844
82-mm mortar <sup>b/</sup>	639,246	3,191
12.7-mm, Type 54	8,120,500	1,337
85-mm	10,000	221
120-mm mortar	53,000	1,219
57-mm recoilless	60,000	240
75-mm recoilless	90,000	1,446
Rockets (not further identified)	15,006	71
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA machinegun	400,010	66
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA machinegun tracer	100,130	17
14.5-mm	340,092	83
37-mm	36,000	70
<i>Total</i>	<i>10,721,092</i>	<i>10,814</i>

- a. Including packaging.
- b. Including some 81-mm.

Organization

10. Recent reporting and newly acquired evidence also provides detailed information on the organization of the Cambodian support operation. Earlier reporting had provided a picture of the general framework of the Cambodian/Communist logistical apparatus in Cambodia but had given little hint of the extent of Cambodian involvement and the relative sophistication of the operation. The new reporting, for example, describes the existence of Cambodian Provincial Committees which facilitated the flow from Cambodian depots to Communist border caches; it also notes the detailed accounting procedures used to verify deliveries to the Communists. [redacted] also implicated as involved in this traffic a number of high Cambodian officials whose detailed involvement was hitherto unknown or unproved.

11. Still, some details concerning the traffic remain unclear. A full analysis of the arms traffic requires more information on the timing, quantities,

[redacted]

and final border destinations of deliveries from Cambodian depots to VC/NVA forces. Preliminary field summaries indicate that at least some of these needed details are contained in additional documents now being dispatched to Washington.

Overland Movements

12. In addition to the recently received data on military shipments into Kompong Som, new information also has become available [redacted] on enemy supply movements south out of Laos into Cambodia.

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13. [redacted] ordnance was moved west on Route 110 in southern Laos to Koh Russey and then south by boat on the Tonle Kong to Stung Treng, where it was loaded onto trucks and delivered to Communist forces deployed along the Cambodian border opposite II and III Corps. The ordnance reportedly consisted of 107-mm and 122-mm rockets -- no launchers were included. [redacted] 107s and 122s came into Stung Treng from Laos once a year in 1966, 1967, and 1968, and estimated that the shipments totaled between 1,000 and 1,200 tons. In comparison, the shipments to Kompong Som included a total of about 450 tons of large rockets, of which about 380 tons were 107-mm rockets. Additional data on overland movements of Communist supplies through Cambodia from southern Laos may be contained in the material now en route to Washington. This aspect of the Communists' supply operation will be reviewed in greater detail after all the evidence has been examined.

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Table 2  
Reported Chinese Communist Shipments to Kompong Som a/  
23 December 1966 - 3 April 1969

	Metric Tons <sup>b/</sup>											Total
	He Ping 23 Dec 66	Hang Zhou 2 Feb 67	He Ping 19 Mar 67	Ji Ning 23 Aug 67	You Yi 10 Jan 68	Wu Xi 18 Mar 68	Fo Shan 25 Aug 68	Li Ming 11 Jan 69	Huang Shi 3 Apr 69			
Military	1,063.281 (100)	2,102.258 (100)	2,963.760 (99)	1,130.095 (91)	2,488.346 (71)	2,406.229 (98)	2,456.884 (64)	3,392.470 (76)	3,744.725 (88)	21,748.008 (84)		
Ordnance												
Weapons	21.981 (2)	151.750 (7)	405.996 (14)	225.705 (18)	296.774 (9)	309.188 (13)	440.070 (11)	473.570 (11)	240.082 (6)	2,565.116 (10)		
Ammunition	982.520 (92)	1,768.447 (84)	2,545.014 (85)	734.432 (59)	1,798.844 (51)	1,757.506 (71)	1,882.170 (49)	2,385.640 (53)	3,272.989 (76)	17,127.562 (66)		
Other	-	182.061 (9)	10.050 (Negl.)	136.476 (11)	248.377 (7)	244.077 (10)	-	366.950 (8)	152.025 (4)	1,340.016 (5)		
Non-ordnance	58.780 (6)	-	2.700 (Negl.)	33.482 (3)	144.351 (4)	95.458 (4)	134.604 (4)	166.310 (4)	79.629 (2)	715.314 (3)		
Non-military	0	0	19.664 (1)	105.490 (9)	1,014.920 (29)	50.516 (2)	1,396.429 (36)	1,061.290 (24)	525.558 (12)	4,173.867 (16)		
Food	-	-	-	-	954.500 (27)	-	-	803.000 (18)	408.400 (9)	2,165.900 (8)		
Clothing	-	-	-	-	-	-	387.700 (10)	-	-	387.700 (2)		
Medical	-	-	19.664 (1)	105.490 (9)	60.420 (2)	50.516 (2)	1,008.729 (26)	258.290 (6)	117.158 (3)	1,620.267 (6)		
Total	1,063.281	2,102.258	2,963.424	1,235.585	3,503.266	2,456.745	3,853.273	4,453.760	4,270.283	25,921.875		

a. Tonnages for weapons and ammunition reflected in this table include related equipment such as accessories, fitting tools, spare parts, fuses, detonators, firing mechanisms, etc. The tonnage figures are as shown in the documents after correction for errors in addition.

b. The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of the total supplies which were of a particular category.

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*Ret to file re IM 10-126*

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5 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Distribution of ER IM 70-126, September 1970, New Evidence on Military Deliveries to Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969

Parameters.

1. We are all aware of the problems and ramifications of this memorandum which bear on decisions regarding the manner and timing of its distribution. One other relevant consideration is the fact that this memorandum is, in effect, a revision or "memo to holders" of ER IM 69-177, December 1969, Chinese and Soviet Military Deliveries to Cambodia. Hence, recipients of the December memo should get the new memo as well. (As a practical matter, they will get the new one anyway, even if we restrict the latter's circulation to a handful of senior officers. Hence, from the standpoint of political cosmetics, it would be better for such distribution to come directly from the Agency.) Given the above, we recommend the following scenario.

2. Top Level Distribution.

a. Kissinger. You should personally hand Kissinger his copy on Tuesday, 8 September. Because you will be there, the buckslip can be short.

b. Rogers/Alexis Johnson/Cline. For several reasons, Cline should give Rogers and Alexis Johnson their copies. This can be achieved by sending Cline three copies with a note from you requesting him to deliver one of them to the Secretary and one to Alexis Johnson.

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✓ Laird. I can hand deliver Laird's copy at my session already scheduled for 1100 Tuesday, 8 September. Same bucksliip text as Kissinger's, for similar reasons.

✓ Moorer should receive a personal copy transmitted on Tuesday, 8 September, by a personal note from you. Hand delivery is not necessary and would be too much of a good thing.

✓ Bennett should be hand delivered his copy -- with an accompanying note from you -- by either R.J. Smith or John Bross accompanied by Paul Walsh, who can defuse his irritation and answer any immediate questions. Bennett should be getting his copy at about the time Kissinger and Laird are getting theirs. We want all three to hear about this memo first from us, not from each other (in any permutation).

✓ Gayler. Since the other USIB principals are getting personal copies, Gayler should get one too. This can be done on 8 September via a short bucksliip (Kissinger/Laird text will suffice).

✓ Admiral Anderson. The fact that you are having lunch with Anderson on 8 September is fortuitous. He can simply be handed a copy informally at lunch and told that we will be happy to brief him and/or the PFIAB in further detail if he so desires. No note required.

### 3. Senior Subordinate Distribution.

a. I can send copies to the following, timed to go out Tuesday afternoon:

1. Marshall Green
2. William Sullivan, with info copies to the other members of the NSC Vietnam Committee.
3. Assistant Secretary of Defense/SA Gardiner Tucker, with whom we have dealt on the logistics data collection problems.



4. Wayne Smith (Larry Lynn's successor).

b. John Bross, for form and politics sake, should send a courtesy copy to Froehlke. On Tuesday afternoon.

c. R.J. Smith should send personal copies on Tuesday afternoon to the following:

1. General Chapman

2. General ~~Grover Brown~~ Stewart

3. Admiral Harlfinger

4. General Triantafellu

5. General McChristian

4. Working Level Distribution.


The working level distribution of the December memorandum is as follows:

State	5
DIA	14
Air Force	16
Army	13
NSA	7
Navy	1
NSC	1
NIC	1

We should make similar distribution of the new memo via normal channels on Wednesday morning, 9 September.




five copies

to be personally delivered to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. In making the deliveries, emphasis should be laid on the preliminary nature of the document and its sensitivity,  therein.



6. Raw Data Distribution.

At my request, OER and FE/Reports are translating the field documents into a dissemination package which can be distributed Thursday morning, 10 September.

  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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cc: General Cushman  
Mr. Karamessines  
Mr. R. J. Smith  
Mr. Bross

Distribution of Intelligence Memorandum Entitled "New Evidence on  
Military Deliveries to Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969"  
ER IM 70-126      September 1970      SECRET

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- Copy No. 1 - Dr. Kissinger (Delivered by DCI)  
2 - Secretary Rogers  
3 - Secretary Laird  
4 - Deputy Secretary Packard  
5 - Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (Chairman, JCS)  
\*6 - Lt. General Donald V. Bennett (Director, DIA)  
7 - Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson  
8 - Ray S. Cline (State)  
9 - Admiral Anderson (PFIAB)  
10, 11, 12 & 13 - DDI  
14 - John Bross for Mr. Froehlke  
15 - Vice Admiral Noel Gayler (Director, NSA)  
16 - Marshall Green  
17 - William H. Sullivan  
18 - Gardiner L. Tucker  
19 - John Holdridge  
20 - James Engle  
21 - Roger Kirk  
22 - Brig. General F. E. Karhohs  
23 - Brig. General Foster Lee Smith  
24 - Robert Nooter  
25 - Dr. K. Wayne Smith (National Security Staff)  
27 - ~~SAVA~~ *Frank Hand*  
28 - ~~DD/OER~~  
29 - ~~SAVA~~  
30 - Ch/D/I  
31 - Adm. Harlfinger  
32 - Gen. Chapman  
33 - Gen. Stewart  
34 - Gen. McChristian  
35 - Gen. Triantafellu

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*copy 43-47*



185 - SAVA

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/OER

[redacted] has just given me the second installment of his Sihanoukville paper. I haven't had time to go over his first chapters but I thought that in the meantime I would get you a set of everything I had. There is still more to come that is supposedly in the typewriter.

[redacted]  
/ Frank

25 Feb 71  
                      
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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