

**SECRET**

1. There is no evidence of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand with recent imports have been adequate to sustain necessary operations.

Facts: Stocks on Hand  
 After Strikes: 70-100 days (40-55,000 tons)

Deliveries Since Major Strikes:

By Sea: By Tanker 32,000 tons  
 Dry Cargo Ships 1,000 tons/month

Overland From China 25,000 tons

North Vietnam has demonstrated an ongoing capability to discharge large tankers using barges at a rate of 500-600 tons a day.

Daily consumption of petroleum is at a rate of 550 tons a day.

Deliveries are so close to requirements that there has probably been very little drawing of reserve stocks.

2. Air strikes against all modes of transportation in North Vietnam increased . . . but there is no evidence of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or within North Vietnam.

Facts: Attack Sorties                      End 1965 - 4,000 per month  
 1st Quarter 1966 - 6,000 per month  
 3rd Quarter 1966 -12,000 per month

Seaborne Imports

1st half 1965                      53,000 tons/month  
 2nd half 1965                      63,000 tons/month  
 1st half 1966                      80,000 tons/month

Rail Imports

1964                                  15,000 tons/month  
 1965                                  29,000 tons/month  
 1966                                  29,000 tons/month

Total Transport Performance

Tons carried is at a rate 5% higher than before Rolling Thunder program. There is a negligible decrease in ton miles.

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3. Although the movement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and made somewhat more costly, the Communists have been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam.

Facts:

Minimum Supplies through Laos:	1965 dry season	1,650
	1966 dry season	8,000
Personnel Infiltration	1965	26,546
	1966	
	(to date)	47,922

Road Network Through Laos:

End 1964	--	150 miles
Mid-1966	--	650 miles

4. Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a meaningful reduction in the current level at which essential supplies and men flow into South Vietnam.

Facts:

Road Capacity in Laos: Dry Season -- 400 tons/day  
Wet Season -- 100 tons/day

This capacity is 4-12 times current requirements  
2- 7 times projected requirements

Traffic moving through Laos is on the average only 20 percent of road capacity.

Air Force targeting specialists say air interdiction cannot hope to reduce capacity of a road by more than one-third.

A detailed FI study of 26 road interdictions in MR IV in 1965 showed only two on which capacity was reduced by more than 25 percent.