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RR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 10958/1 3190950

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ZNY SSSSS
R 150909Z NOV 66
FM ANEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMTBK/ANEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMJFS/ANEMBASSY VIENTIANE

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SECRET SECONE OF TWO SAIGON 10958

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LIMDIS L I M D I S
PER 210-202

SEACoord MESSAGE

SUBJECT: SEACoord MEETING ON CAMBODIA

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1. SEACoord MEETING WAS HELD NOVEMBER 10 TO DISCUSS THE INCREASED USE OF CAMBODIA AS A SANCTUARY AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AREA BY THE VIET CONG. AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WAS PRESENTED BY MACV J-2, FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER THE THREAT.

2. THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING GAVE CONCRETE AND IMPRESSIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE SIZE OF THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE VC/NVA AND THEIR USE OF BASE AREAS IN CAMBODIA CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO OUR EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. OWING TO THE CLANDESTINE NATURE OF THE COMMUNIST USE OF CAMBODIA, WE DO NOT NUMERICALLY

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KNOW THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DANGER; HOWEVER, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT EXISTS, THAT WE ARE BEING HURT BY IT NOW, AND THAT IT IS GROWING IN MAGNITUDE. THE FOLLOWING DATA FROM THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING (DETAILS OF WHICH ARE BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO WASHINGTON THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS) HIGHLIGHTS THE PROBLEM:

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CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE THROUGH CAPTURED VC DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS AND RALLIERS CONFIRMS THE VALUE OF CAMBODIA AS A LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AREA TO THE ENEMY. TOTAL OF 9 BATTALIONS, AND OTHER NVA GROUPS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE PASSED THROUGH CAMBODIA ON THEIR WAY TO SOUTH VIET-NAM. INFILTRATION, OF COURSE, IS CONTINUING IN SPITE OF OUR EFFORTS AT INTERDICTION IN LAOS AND NORTH VIET-NAM. ONE SOURCE

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LOCATED COMBAT HEADQUARTERS ON THE CAMBODIAN BORDER 16 KM NORTH OF KATU. VILLAGES

State Dept., JCS reviews completed

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AND THE NFL RADIO STATION AND SO-CALLED FRONT HEADQUARTERS OF NGUYEN HUU THO ON CAMBODIAN TERRITORY NEAR BA CHAU. THERE IS EVIDENCE COSVN MOVES INTO CAMBODIA WHEN ITS SECURITY IS THREATENED. DIRECT COLLUSION BETWEEN CAMBODIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND THE VC FOR TRANSPORTATION OF RICE AND CHICOM ARMS AND MUNITIONS TO VC UNITS IS CONFIRMED IN SEVERAL REPORTS

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 BY RALLIERS. MACV CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATES THAT CAMBODIA SUPPLIES THE VC WITH 100,000 TONS OF RICE ANNUALLY (55,000 TONS BY OFFICIAL RKG-VC AGREEMENT). A FORCE OF 300,000 TROOPS REQUIRES ONLY 82,000 TONS OF RICE ANNUALLY.

(B) SEVEN LARGE VC BASE AREAS IN CAMBODIA ALONG THE BORDER HAVE BEEN PINPOINTED. THESE AFFORD NOT ONLY RESUPPLY CAPABILITIES BUT SERVE ALSO AS STAGING AREAS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO CONTAIN THIS THREAT IN THE WESTERN PLEIKU AREA, APPROXIMATELY ONE U.S. DIVISION HAS TO BE KEPT IN PLACE TO MEET POTENTIAL ATTACKS BY FIVE REGIMENTS OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION FROM THE CHU PONG BASE AREA IN CAMBODIA. FOUR MAJOR BATTLES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE AREA THE PAST YEAR IN WHICH THE VC UTILIZED CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY. MACV ESTIMATES THAT FROM JANUARY TO AUGUST 1966 THERE WERE 7317 U.S. AND ARVN CASUALTIES (INCLUDING U.S. CASUALTIES OF 639 KIA AND 3744 WIA) IN THE BORDER PROVINCES INVOLVING VC CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS. THIS, OF COURSE, EXCLUDES RECENT HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE BORDER AREAS. IN ADDITION, APPROXIMATELY 10,000 CIDG AND OTHER VIETNAMESE FORCES ARE PERMANENTLY ALLOCATED FOR BORDER CONTROL.

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3. OUR ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER THIS THREAT IS GOVERNED BY THE BASIC CONSIDERATION THAT WE DO NOT WANT TO EXPAND THE WAR ACROSS THE BORDER. MACV BELIEVES OUR TOLERANCE LEVEL IS BEING REACHED. THE NEED TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF OUR MEN AND ALLIED TROOPS JUSTIFIES, WE BELIEVE, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS. WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSE A SEQUENTIAL NONBELLIGERENT APPROACH AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WE RECOMMEND, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, USING AS A STARTING POINT THE INFORMATION BEING FORWARDED BY MACV J-2, CONDUCT AN IMMEDIATE REAPPRAISAL OF THE

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PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID THE CONSIDERABLE BODY OF INFORMATION NOW EXISTING

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(D) WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF THE MAGNITUDE AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM AFFORDED BY SUCH A REAPPRAISAL, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD ARRANGE FOR WIDER DESSIMINATION OF THE FACTS ON VC USE OF CAMBODIA. THIS WOULD BE WITH THE AIM OF CREATING GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. POSITION AND MAKING IT MORE BELIEVABLE. THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN A HIGHLY SELECTIVE WAY. INFORMATION ON THE PROBLEM COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE SELECTIVELY TO KEY COLUMNISTS AND OPINION-MAKERS. WE SHOULD PUBLICIZE TO OUR BENEFIT THOSE

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MOMENTS WHERE THE RKG OR VC TAKES INITIATIVE ACROSS THE BORDER. IT COULD ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PUTTING INFORMATION INTO THE HANDS OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS, NOTABLY THE AUSTRALIANS (FOR USE IN PHNOM PENH) AND THE CANADIANS (FOR USE WITHIN THE US), AND PROVIDING IT TO STABLE, SENSIBLE CAMBODIANS IN PHNOM PENH WHO MIGHT OPPOSE SIHANOUK'S PRO-COMMUNIST POLICIES. WE BELIEVE THAT WE ALSO UNDERTAKE A PROGRAM TO GET THE HARD FACTS OF CAMBODIAN NON-NEUTRALITY TO PEOPLE WHO ARE CLOSE TO SIHANOUK WHO ENJOY HIS CONFIDENCE AND RESPECT, AND WHO, ON OCCASION, HAVE HAD SOME INFLUENCE.

THE INFORMATION COULD BE BASED ON EDITED AND DECLASSIFIED EXTRACTS FROM STUDIES PREPARED BY MACV AND OTHER SOURCES. MACV INTENDS TO KEEP THESE STUDIES CONTINUALLY UP-DATED. OUR EFFORTS ALONG THESE LINES, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SIHANOUK WILL CHANGE HIS POLICIES FROM HIS OWN APPRECIATION OF THE WAR'S SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME FOR THE FREE WORLD. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN IMPRESS THE FACTS ON CAMBODIANS WHO HAVE ACCESS TO HIM, SIHANOUK MAY BE INFLUENCED OVER TIME BY WHAT THEY SAY AND THINK.

(C) ADDITIONAL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO REDUCE THE LOGISTICAL

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ACCESS CAMBODIA TO THE VC. THE GVN, WITH OUR ASSISTANCE, IS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING A CONVOY SYSTEM TO CONTROL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING ON THE MEKONG TO PHNOM PENH AND WILL REEVALUATE EXPLOITATION OF THAT CHANNEL. WE MIGHT ALSO EXPLORE

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
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SOME MEANS OF BETTER SURVEILLANCE AND PERHAPS CONTROL OVER SHIPPING BETWEEN SIHANOUKVILLE AND BLOC PORTS, AS WELL, IN FREE WORLD PORTS FROM FREE WORLD PORTS.

(C) WE COULD USEFULLY RENEW EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SOVIET APPROVAL OF AN EXPANDED ICC IN CAMBODIA TO CONTROL THE BORDERS. DESPITE PAST REBUFFS WE SHOULD EXERCISE FULLY ALL THE MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL FOR INFLUENCING THE SOVIETS TO COOPERATE.

(D) AN EXPANSION OF OUR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CAPACITIES, CLANDESTINELY AND BY OTHER MEANS, SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. WE ARE EXAMINING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR GROUND AND AIR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

Good
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
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4	Many thanks				
	Bill				
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Bill: This is the hodge cable on the Cambodian infiltration study. State is following up & will probably request a SNIE.					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
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