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Revised Text for Pages 6 - 10 (after "enemy
troops in the South")

Concentration on Military Objectives

There is a large body of evidence from on-the-spot observers that United States attacks in the North have been directed at military objectives and conducted with all the care that a pilot under intense anti-aircraft fire can exhibit.

First-hand reports from non-Communist newsmen, from western diplomats and from other third country sources have all told of the precise nature of most air strikes and generally have indicated that civilian casualties from these air strikes have been low.

British Journalist Norman Barrymaine, who completed a three-week stay in the Haiphong area, wrote that US pilots were "very courageous" in pressing home their attacks and in "not unloading their bombs on civilians by design."

A third country observer who was in Hanoi last June at the time of the strikes against the petroleum storage facilities in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas reported that the bombing had been "exceedingly accurate" and that "civilian casualties were very light."

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An observer from still another nation reported that according to all available information the accuracy of the POL strikes was "excellent" that he had heard no first-hand or local reports that any bombs had dropped off target and that no population centers were hit.

He said further that from personal observations the attack on installations outside Hanoi was "extremely accurate and effective."

Another source who was in Hanoi during the strike on the Gia Lam petroleum depot said that the foreign community in North Vietnam regarded that strike as a "technical masterpiece." He noted that "no civilian areas were touched."

Civilian Casualties

Notwithstanding the precise and limited nature of US air attacks against military targets, and the special care to which witnesses have testified, it is inevitable that there have been [significant] personnel casualties in North Vietnam.

We have investigated this matter as thoroughly as possible on the basis of all sources of intelligence, for the period beginning with the initial bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965 and continuing through the month of September 1966. Our study was completed late in 1966. It does not cover the last

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quarter of 1966, during which there has been no change in the pace of operations that we believe would substantially change the casualty rate.

US air attacks against North Vietnam have fallen ^{roughly} ~~roughly~~ into two categories. In the period from February 1965 to October 1966, a grand total of approximately 85,000 attack sorties were carried out against military targets in North Vietnam. Somewhat more than 27,000 of these sorties were directed against fixed military targets. These attacks have destroyed or damaged over 20,000 trucks, barges, locomotives and other units of transport equipment. US planes have destroyed and damaged 10,000 other military facilities -- barracks, supply warehouses, anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles and radar installations.

Railroad and highway bridges have been knocked out; thermal power plants have been destroyed; railroad and fuel depot yards have been struck; vehicle storage areas have been attacked.

In seeking to assess civilian casualties, our intelligence sources include pre-strike and post-strike aerial photography,

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The sources also include North Vietnamese prisoner-of-war interrogation, official radio and press reporting within North Vietnam, and reports of western observers. Additionally, the weight of

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US ordnance expended against a given target is checked against photography. Bomb damage assessment, known effects of the weapons used and experience derived from the Strategic Bombing Survey of World War II are related to the "hard" evidence from reconnaissance and intelligence.

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Based on these sources, we have arrived at an order-of-magnitude estimate, which is not precise but which we believe does indicate the general level of casualties caused.

This estimate is that the overwhelming proportion of casualties of all types have occurred in connection ~~with~~ attacks on North Vietnamese communications lines and direct military targets. It is estimated that bombing operations of this character have killed or injured a possible total of 26,000 North Vietnamese personnel. We estimate that roughly 40% of these have been military personnel and that the great bulk of the remainder have been war workers, such as bridge and road repair crews, barge-men, railroad men, truck drivers, and communications workers.

There have undoubtedly also been some deaths and injuries to non-war worker civilians from the armed reconnaissance attacks normally conducted against moving targets. However, most casualties from armed reconnaissance missions have been those persons directly engaged in the maintenance and operation of the logistic system moving supplies and personnel through North Vietnam and into the South.

Casualties among non-war workers from armed reconnaissance flights have been limited almost entirely to ~~those~~ those who did not stay away from scenes of repair activity or who were struck when pilots jettisoned bomb loads to avoid enemy aircraft

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or to avoid disaster after being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire.

Secondly, we have sought to estimate the casualties associated with attacks against fixed targets not occupied by military personnel. In connection with targets in this category, we estimate that approximately 1200 non-war workers' civilians have been killed and approximately 1500 injured. This much lower proportion of casualties, in relation to the more than 27,000 strike sorties directed at such targets, reflects the special care taken in operations against these targets. The fatality rate in relation to this category of target is approximately one civilian non-war worker per 23 attack sorties. We believe that the low 1200 non-war worker civilian fatality rate reaffirms the success of the intensive evaluation which takes place during the selection of fixed military targets and the extraordinary discipline and control under which US pilots are operating.

I repeat, all our estimates of civilian casualties are necessarily matters of judgment. It is noteworthy that the estimates I have just given are ^{substantially} ~~substantially~~ higher than have ever been claimed by North Vietnam. For example, a May 1966 North Vietnamese letter to the International Red Cross claimed only 239 civilian casualties since January 31, 1966, a period of roughly (3 1/2) months.

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The Education Ministry in October, 1966, stated that 300 students and 30 teachers had been killed since the bombing began. Even in the well-publicized propaganda statement on the attacks against Nam Dinh, the North Vietnamese themselves claimed that air attacks against targets in that city of 90,000 had killed only 89 persons from early 1965 to September 20, 1966. Nam Dinh is a heavily defended population center with more than 500 anti-aircraft guns within its air defense area. These are augmented by surface-to-air missiles. Military targets are located in densely populated areas. It is not a typical case and the percent of its casualties should be regarded as an absolute upper limit, an upper extreme.

In view of these North Vietnamese statements in relation to specific situations, our own estimates may conceivably be in error. Nonetheless, they reflect our own best over-all judgment, prepared by wholly objective analysts not associated in any way with combat operations.

(Resume at page 10: "The guided tours . . . " with a heading "Specific Targets".)

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