A P P E N D I X

Army, Navy, USAF and USMC review(s) completed.

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#### APPENDIX I

#### Background

- 1. (C) The combat air program in South Vietnam utilizes an extremely complex mixture of South Vietnamese Air Force units generally flying propeller-driven aircraft in support of SVN land forces; US Air Force units equipped with a variety of aircraft flying in support of all land forces in SVN; US Marine Corps units equipped with a variety of aircraft generally flying in support of Marine land forces but contributing excess capability to meet any overall requirement; and US Navy aircraft flying in support of all land forces in SVN. Incorporated in this overall program are the US Army fixed and rotary wing aircraft engaged in visual and photographic reconnaissance and armed escort missions.
- 2. (C) Generally, the types of sorties flown in South Vietnam are as follows:

Sortie Function	Type Mission
Attack	Interdiction
Attack	Close Air Support
Attack	Armed Reconnaissance
Attack	Defoliation
Attack	Flak Suppression
Escort	Escort, Helicopter
Escort	Escort, Train
Escort	Escort, Convoy
Escort	Escort, Ship
Recon	Infared Reconnaissance
Recon	Side Looking Radar Reconnaissance
Recon	Electronic Reconnaissance
Recon	Defensive Survey
Recon	Weather Reconnaissance

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# Approved For 160 and 2 670 ft GIND 7850 44 R000100050023-0

Sortie Function

Type Mission

Air Alert

Airborne Alert

Combat Support

Forward Air Control

Combat Support

Combat Observation

Combat Support

Combat Support Liaison

Combat Support

Artillery Adjust

Combat Support

Flare Drop

Combat Support

Tactical Air Evacuation

Combat Support

Airborne Command Post

Psych War

Psychological Warfare

Air Refuel

Aerial Refueling

Support

Airborne Assault

Support

Troop Airlift

Support

Airlanded Assault

Combat Support

Search and Rescue

- 3. (C) Generally, all type missions listed in paragraph 2 above are flown in SVN except that to date there has been little or no requirement for flak suppression missions although this type mission could increase if VC/PAVN forces introduce conventional AAA to any degree in SVN.
- 4. (U) Type aircraft available in SVN or off-shore to accomplish these missions are listed at Tab A to this appendix.
- 5. (C) There is evidence that in the early days of the campaign in SVN, there were not sufficient aircraft of the various types to accomplish the variety of missions required. This, coupled with a relatively loose air request and control system, led to a variety of complaints on the land force side that a cohesive air support program did not exist, that the air elements were not responsive and did not react quickly enough, that they did not provide the type support desired, and that the request system was cumbersome. The air elements countered these complaints with charges that land forces did not preplan air requirements or that air elements were

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not privy to the planning conferences, that US advisors with ARVN land forces did not make use of preplanned and airborne alert aircraft, that the request system from advisor to ARVN element and up through the various channels was so slow and cumbersome that the requirement ceased to exist by the time the request reached the air element, that ground/air communications systems did not allow proper and precise control of the mission aircraft, and that language difficulties contributed to lack or loss of control.

- 6. (C) In spite of these complaints, use of close air support continued and gradually evolved into an extremely acceptable program used effectively, as an adjunct to ground fires, to destroy and harass the enemy. With the buildup of US forces in Vietnam beginning in the first part of 1965 and continuing into the current period, the requirement for closer control of air resources of VNAF, USAF, USMC, USN, and US Army became more urgent. Air resources had been under centralized control, but this control was made more effective by a refinement of the allocation and request system. This was prescribed by MACV Directive Number 95-4, dated 13 July 1965 which superceded a similar directive, dated 7 September 1964. The new control provisions, detailed in succeeding paragraphs, appear to have resolved many of the above-noted early difficulties in control of the air effort.
- 7. (C) The current directive retains the air operations center (AOC) in MACV headquarters; additionally, it covers the following areas:
- a. Directs the Commander of 2d Air Division to establish and operate in conjunction with RVNAF a tactical air control system (TACS) for command and control of USAF/VNAF and for the coordination of USMC/USN strike aircraft.
- b. Directs Commander, 2d Air Division to establish in conjunction with other US and RVN agencies, an air traffic control system (ATCS).

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- c. Directs CG, US Army Support Command to establish and operate Army aviation elements (AAE) at Corps and Division Tactical Operation Center (TOC).
- d. Directs CG, III MAF to establish and operate an organic tactical air control system (TACS) to include a tactical air direction center (TADC).
- e. Requests CINCPACFLT to provide strike aircraft as directed by CINPAC to operate in coordination with USAF/VNAF TACS.
- f. Directs Corps Senior Advisors to establish an Army Aviation Element (AAE) co-located with the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) in each corps area and within each ARVN Division TOC.
- 8. (C) Aircraft operating under the TACS will be allocated through the AOC to the ASOC's (MC aircraft excess to MC requirements will be reported to and allocated by the AOC). US Army aviation resources are allocated by the Army Aviation Operations Section (AAOS), Joint Operation Center Branch, J-3, MACV, to Corps or Separate Division US Senior Advisors for employment in support of ARVN/US/third country operations. US/third country units will request US Army aviation support through the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC of the Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) which they are supporting.
  - 9. (C) Requests for tactical air support are made in 3 ways:
    - a. Emergency air request channels.
    - b. VNAF/USAF immediate air request channels.
    - c. VNAF/USAF preplanned air request channels.

Tabs B through D are diagrams of these three systems.